With No Ends in Iraq, a Way Ahead
Abstract
Although there were few national or international misgivings about the U.S. action against Afghanistan, there was widespread opposition and uncertainty with the invasion of Iraq. The connection to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was more tenuous, the rationale justifying the war more contentious, and the strategic and operational requirements more complex. Notwithstanding, the U.S. attacked Iraq without significant international support, insufficient military and interagency resources, an incomplete operational concept, and a misguided military strategy based upon questionable justification. As the justification for invading Iraq unraveled, four distinct objectives surfaced and faded as the Administration struggled to adapt to the dynamic Iraqi environment. The impact on the U.S. military has been profound. If there is any chance of succeeding in Iraq, there must be a clearly defined exit strategy and end-state. That end-state should match what is feasible within the current constraints on the means and our ability to pursue the necessary ways. This paper examines the basic theoretical elements of strategy, compares them with what was developed for Iraq, assesses the established objectives of the strategy and the associated high risk tasks, and proposes a framework for future strategic engagement in Iraq and the broader Middle East.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 09, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA468990
Entities
People
- Catherine Patterson
Organizations
- United States Army War College