

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**PHASE FOUR: APPLYING HISTORY'S SUCCESSFUL NATION BUILDING
LESSONS IN IRAQ**

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ABSTRACT

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Shock and Awe, the term used to describe our invasion of Iraq, was the most successful application of US combat power to date. While it was a great accomplishment it also presented U.S. leadership with a tremendous challenge in its preparations for and execution of a transition plan. The transition from what is typically described as phase three (combat) operations to phase four (post conflict) operations is always difficult. Recent operations in Iraq have highlighted the challenges in planning and executing the previously described transition. When the challenges mentioned above are coupled with an extremely hostile environment it only exacerbates the difficulty of the transition. Historically, Germany, Japan and Post Civil War America are examples of successful nation building efforts. Post conflict operations are typically seen as a Department of State (DoS) function but require Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities; this gap routinely tends to be unbridgeable. In order to bridge this gap DoS and DoD must agree on the importance of the Interagency process to post conflict operations and institutionalize the interwoven tasks into their respective cultures. This paper examines the challenges faced by the DoS and DoD in applying history's lessons to our current efforts in Iraq.

PHASE FOUR: APPLYING HISTORY'S SUCCESSFUL NATION BUILDING LESSONS IN IRAQ

Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations and significant post-conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security . . . The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously.

—Gen Richard B. Myers, 2004¹

This paper examines the challenges faced by the Departments of State and Defense in conducting post conflict operations in Iraq and uses a historical lens to identify strategic insights from three historically similar and successful phase four operations. These historic operations are associated with post-Civil War America and Germany and Japan after WWII. The historical focus will concentrate on strategic leader's decisions using concepts such as visioning and strategy in articulating end state, The ways and means used to reach the desired end state, the pillars of Post Conflict Reconstruction and stability, and how the military capability can be effectively used in concert with other elements of national power to accomplish the desired end state. From this examination this paper will provide recommendations for consideration when planning future phase four operations. With the historical vignettes described above, it is important to understand the concepts and theories used to frame the insights and recommendations in this paper.

Background

While Shock and Awe, the term used to describe our invasion of Iraq, was the most successful application of our US combat power to date, it also presented the U.S. leadership with a tremendous challenge from the standpoint of preparation and execution of post stability operations. The transition from what is typically described as phase three- combat operations, to phase four-post conflict operations, is difficult, but remains the most crucial step in creating a stable environment.

The decision to go to war is a policy decision as is the decision to terminate the conflict. This implies a justification for conflict that entails a vision and strategy that changes current conditions for the better. "Clausewitzian theory holds war to be a servant of the political interests of the state and never a means in and of itself."² Thus war forms only a part of the activity that was of interest to society.³ Clausewitz further postulated that to win in any conflict

you must accomplish three things; destruction of the enemy's fighting capability, occupation of the country and defeat the will of the people.

The United States has proven its ability to accomplish the first two tasks. It is the third area, defeating the will of the people, which presents the most significant challenge to overall success. Defeating the will of the people is a continuous process throughout a conflict and as a result doesn't always end when combat operations end. There is contention among theorists as to when the third task is accomplished and therefore when the transition from phase three-combat operations to phase four-post conflict operations occurs. Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operations, currently under revision describes phasing as "... a basic tenant of campaign plan design. Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose".⁴ Campaign plans are typically organized into four phases: Phase one-**DETER/ENGAGE**, Phase two-**SEIZE INITIATIVE**, Phase three-**DECISIVE OPERATIONS** and Phase four- **POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS**.⁵ It is the transition from phase three, which is traditionally considered a Department of Defense (DoD) responsibility to phase four, which is traditionally considered the purview of the Department of State (DoS), where responsibilities become blurred. It is this "grey area" of confusion where the biggest challenge exists. Post-conflict operations by their very nature, overlap into the realm of civil responsibilities (dealing with civil unrest and providing for the needs of the population) but in many cases require military capabilities for support. Doctrinally post conflict security and stabilization operations in non hostile environments require 'force ratios of one to four per thousand of population.'⁶

Vision and Strategy

During the course of studies at the US Army War College there has been extensive discussion concerning the attributes of Strategic Leadership. One of the most significant attributes is Strategic Vision. Strategic Vision is the leader focused organizational process that gives the organization its sense of purpose, direction, energy, and identity.⁷ Vision, the ability to see a desired end state, and strategy, the plan to reach a desired end state are key elements to successfully planning and executing stability and reconstruction operations. It is also the foundation for developing and implementing a strategy or plan to achieve desired goals and end state.⁸ Strategy is generally defined as a carefully devised plan of action to achieve a goal, or the art of developing or carrying out such a plan.⁹ At the strategic level this can be defined as

the ability to employ all elements of a nation's power to accomplish its objectives in peace or war.

Pillars of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Stability Operations

Liddell Hart asserts that "If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one containing a germ of another war."¹⁰ It is important to have common areas of reference that apply to all the scenarios in order to properly conduct an analysis. In the book 'Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction' the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights four key areas of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Stability operations. These key areas, also described as pillars, are as follows: Security, Governance and Participation, Social and Economic Well-being, and Justice and Reconciliation.¹¹

Each of these pillars are important to Post Conflict Reconstruction and Stability operations because they provide the foundation for building a minimally capable state. The **security** pillar addresses all aspects of Public safety... and encompasses the provision of collective and individual security and is the precondition for achieving success in the other pillars.¹² The **Governance and Participation** pillar addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institution and participatory processes.¹³ The **Social and Economic Well-being** pillar addresses the fundamental social and economic needs of the population,... laying the foundation for a viable democracy.¹⁴ The **Justice and Reconciliation** pillar addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for ways to deal with past abuses as well as mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict.¹⁵ Based on these pillars a minimally capable state is one in which its population is secure both from internal and external threat, participates in its own governance, has all of its primary needs met and has a way of addressing grievances. This paper will use these pillars as a common reference to illustrate the United States historical successes during post conflict or Phase IV Operations.

Traditional Roles and Missions

Current global operations have brought new emphasis and interagency focus to phase four operations. These type operations most often occur following a conflict, major combat operations or in a fragile state recovering from disaster or crisis. Over the years they have been identified in a number of different ways with words, acronyms, and phrases. For the sake of continuity in this paper terms such as Post Conflict operations; Stability and Reconstruction

operations as well as Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction operations are used interchangeably with Phase four operations. The “grey area” mentioned previously is challenging because the functions required when conducting post conflict operations are deeply interwoven and connected between several departments, primarily Defense and State.

In order to reduce confusion among the myriad of organizations there must be centralized or coordinated planning and decentralized execution. While it is convenient to leave the overall job of nation building to the military, the military is most effective when its role is limited to the military core competencies, namely providing a “secure environment for stability, transition and reconstruction operations”.¹⁶ When wielding all elements of national power, it is extremely important to include government and non-government organizations that are better suited for certain aspects of these operations.

James Dobbins, noted author, strategic analyst and former ambassador, defines the term nation-building “...as actions taken in the aftermath of a conflict to rebuild a nation and support an enduring peace”¹⁷ and believes the military should have a primary role in nation-building, even though the term does not appear in military doctrine. This issue is important because while the military plays a significant role in post-conflict operations, and will continue to do so in the future. The roles and missions of the military and government organizations must be identified to minimize cost and maximize efficiency and effectiveness in stability and reconstruction operations. Even if the proper participants are identified, resourced, and trained, the ability to define stability and measure progress toward stability is lacking.

Post-Civil War America

While the Civil War which occurred between 1861 and 1865 was one of the most important events in United States history, I will focus on the reconstruction of the nation in its aftermath, the period of 1865 - 1877. On the surface this internal conflict may seem out of place with the other two successful historic examples of post conflict operations that will be present later in this paper but it was in essence the first American successful nation building effort. Whereas the outcome of the war, won by the north, set the direction of the country forward as a unified entity, it was the efforts of the strategic leaders at the time through their vision (ends), the development of a plan (ways), and the application of resources (means) that set the foundation for the countries reunification.

As important as the war was to unifying a fledgling democracy its aftermath presented a complex problem of how to reintegrate the defeated South and reconstruct the nation as a whole. President Abraham Lincoln set about this enormous task with a vision of preserving the

union and a strategy which he laid out in several speeches. The most notable of these speeches was the Gettysburg Address given on the heels of the battle of Gettysburg in July of 1863. In this speech President Lincoln provided the objective end-state of a reunified nation, “. . . that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom. . . and that government of the people. . .by the people. . .for the people. . . shall not perish from the earth.”¹⁸

In applying the pillars mentioned above to this scenario **security** was provided by the union forces occupying seats of power throughout the south. Most historical accounts put the number of Union troops arguably occupying the south where estimated to be between ‘10,000 to 15,000 strong.’¹⁹ **Governance** was also provided by Union military leadership in control of the selected areas when the war ended. President Lincoln used the Emancipation Proclamation delivered in January of 1863 to address the **social and economic well-being** of freed slaves. **Justice and Reconciliation** posed a challenge to the country’s reconstruction efforts on two fronts; first, blacks resented slavery and “the “experience of bondage remained deeply etched in their collective memory”.²⁰ Second, southern whites blamed northerners for the demise of the southern way of life. “The Civil War destroyed the model slave system ... and exposed undercurrents of discontent which most southerners were unaware”.²¹ Both Presidents that served during Reconstruction brought different experiences to the position; ‘President Abraham Lincoln had served in both the Illinois state and U.S. House of Representatives’²² and ‘President Andrew Johnson was a former Senator from and Governor of Tennessee’²³; they each realized the importance of the time. Initially President Lincoln, whose term in office was from his election in 1861 until his assassination in 1865 and subsequently President Johnson, whose term began in 1865 with Lincoln’s assassination and ended in 1869 needed to reunite a divided nation. While these pillars were not formally in existence both presidents knew the healing and reconciliation processes required to bring the nation back together could not begin without addressing these significant issues and concerns. The existence today of the United States as the only remaining super power is testament to the success of America’s Post Civil War Reconstruction efforts over 130 years ago.

Post-World War II Germany

World War II, the bloodiest conflict in European history had just ended. Germany was decisively defeated and the Allies had decided to occupy Germany militarily. This situation presented some tremendous challenges for the U.S. and its Allies as they began to determine what actions to take in the wars aftermath. Unlike after World War I the victorious powers were

determined to play an active role in transforming Germany into a peaceful democratic state that would never again threaten Europe with military force.

While there were several plans proposed for Post World War II Germany's reconstruction they were considered short sighted and overly harsh. The two strategies proposed were the Morgenthau Plan which called for stripping Germany of the natural resources required for war.²⁴ and Joint Chiefs of staff Directive 1067, a toned down derivative of the Morgenthau Plan, which stated that no help was to be given to the Germans in rebuilding their nation save for the minimum required to mitigate starvation.²⁵ Neither of these plans was acceptable in light of Europe's post war condition and the onset of the Cold War and rising tensions with the Soviets highlighted the extreme importance of bringing a revitalized West Germany into the Allied camp. Hence the Marshall plan proposed by the U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall, which called for the U.S. to allocate billions of dollars for the reconstruction of Europe.²⁶

As the pillars mentioned above are applied to this Germany scenario, it becomes apparent that certain actions set the conditions for successful reconstruction and stability measures to take hold. The Marshall plan not only provided the *strategic vision* necessary to begin the reconstruction effort by identifying the end state, ways and means, it also addressed **economic well-being** concerns by arranging the aid required for Germany to begin its recovery. Additionally, the occupying forces consisting of the U.S., UK and France realized early on that they needed to prevent a security vacuum from occurring due to the disbanding of both the Nazi political and military apparatus. The initial use of Allied military capability, numbering over 1.6 million U.S., to provide both internal and external security for an estimated population of nearly 21 million including resident citizens and displaced persons²⁷ ensured that no **security** gap existed while training and fielding a constabulary. 'The constabulary was created on the basis of one constable for every 450 German civilians.'²⁸ The constabulary force was intended to be a temporary measure until military and police forces could be recruited, trained and fielded from the German population. This action and the granting of limited self governance at the county and internal state level helped to address **governance** challenges. These steps coupled with German participation in the Denazification process as part of the need for **justice and reconciliation** set the conditions necessary for a stable environment and successful reconstruction to occur; as a result Germany is looked upon today, over sixty years later as one of the most successful reconstruction efforts in history.

Post-World War II Japan

After Japan surrendered to end World War II it was placed under the international control of the Allies; whose objectives were to ensure that Japan would become a peaceful nation and to establish democratic self-government supported by the freely expressed will of the people. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to oversee the occupation of Japan. MacArthur's strategic vision provided the foundation for Japan's transition from an imperialist state to a democratic member of the international community. Rather than establish an American military government to rule Japan during the occupation, MacArthur decided to employ the existing Japanese government. By governing in this fashion MacArthur put a Japanese face on the occupation. He realized that imposing a new order on the island nation would be a difficult task even with Japanese cooperation. MacArthur believed it would be impossible for foreigners to dictate radical changes to millions of resentful people.

In order to prevent a **security** vacuum after Japan surrendered, the occupying forces (consisting of nearly 400,000 personnel from the U.S., UK, Australian, Indian and New Zealand) provided that function for a population estimated at nearly 74 million people.²⁹ MacArthur addressed the **governance** and participation situation by resisting calls from the international community to try Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal and use him as a symbol to unify the country's efforts during the occupation. Additionally, the development and implementation of a constitution provided some continuity. To provide for the **social and economic well-being** of the conquered Japanese population MacArthur took steps to minimize the impact of the occupation on the defeated Japanese population. He set several laws: No Allied personnel were to fraternize with Japanese people. No Allied personnel were to assault Japanese people. No Allied personnel were to eat the scarce Japanese food. In the first phase of the US occupation, significant democratic reforms (suffrage for women, legalization of trade unions, and an anti-feudal land reform) were introduced. These measures were accompanied by mostly symbolic blows against the war-time nationalist because MacArthur felt he needed to retain some of the moderate 'old guard' in order to limit or eliminate public discord.

MacArthur himself shared the vision of a demilitarized and democratic Japan and was well suited to the task at hand. An administrator of considerable skill, he possessed elements of leadership and charisma that appealed to the defeated Japanese. Tolerating neither domestic nor foreign interference, he fervently set about creating a new Japan. He encouraged an environment in which new forces could and did rise, and where his reforms corresponded to

trends already established in Japanese society; they played a vital role in Japan's recovery as a free and independent nation.

Post Invasion Iraq

The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq is clearly the United States' most ambitious task to date. Along with the ambitious nature of the plan to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, despite the non-concurrence of the International Community, came the risk associated with stabilizing the country after the regimes predictable fall with a small coalition of the willing. While few doubted the combat abilities of Coalition Forces, their size was a topic of hot debate within the Department of Defense. During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SACS) Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, stated "He thought an occupying force of several hundred thousand men would be needed to stabilize postwar Iraq".³⁰ Shortly thereafter in testimony before a hearing of the House Budget Committee Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, countered General Shinseki's estimate as "wildly off the mark."³¹ As stated earlier in this paper standard post conflict troop to population ratios in secure, stable environments require one to four per thousand of population. In unsecured and volatile environments the ratio requirements are higher. The estimated population of Iraq is approximately 26,700,000.³² U.S. forces in Iraq are estimated at approximately 132,000³³ of which approximately 70,000 are combat troops;³⁴ "In Iraq today, coalition forces number about 160,000, or one for every 160 Iraqis."³⁵ This clearly demonstrates the volatility of the security situation that currently exists in Iraq and further highlights the importance of establishing and solidifying a secure environment concurrent with ongoing combat operations in order to forestall any potential security vacuum. The integration of security operations into ongoing combat operations sets the conditions for maintaining order during a chaotic period and sets the foundation for stability operations to occur. A smaller and lighter force may be the wave of the future for swift phase three operations but does not set the conditions for successful phase four operations of which security is the key pillar. This debate over the risk associated with a smaller, lighter and faster force continues even today four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.

In order to negate the risk associated with the administrations desire to execute its plan of regime change with what some considered a small force; speed was considered to be of the essence. The speed required of coalition forces in their march to Baghdad necessitated the bypassing of large civilian populations, large stocks of munitions and to some degree pockets of light resistance. These actions coupled with the reported lack of phase four planning set the

conditions for the current insurgency to flourish. Disenfranchised civilians and disgruntled military personnel gained access to stock piles of munitions and with the encouragement of foreign fighters, criminals and terrorists, became the foundation for the current insurgency.

Similarities

There are some typical similarities between the early stages of phase four operations in Iraq and comparable stages of the successful historical examples mentioned above. The previously mentioned pillars provide a frame work for comparison of the similarities. To establish a sense of **Justice and Reconciliation** at the end of World War II in Germany allied forces conducted a “Demobilization and Denazification program designed to purge military, political and legal structures instituted by the Nazis”.³⁶ A similar process took place in post World War II Japan but allowed for the “Emperor to remain as a low cost, low risk method of governing”³⁷ This action proved to be just as critical to the ability of that nation to start anew because it allowed for a smooth occupation and reduced resistance due to the Emperor's revered stature in Japanese society. “The occupation of Japan... arguably had more success at demilitarization and democratization than it did at fostering a truly open and vibrant economic system”.³⁸

During the later stages of the Civil War the Emancipation Proclamation which addressed the injustice of slavery by proclaiming all slaves to be freemen and the Gettysburg Address which outlined the great task of reconciling a divided nation played significant roles in providing a solid foundation for the rebuilding process to begin. In the case of Iraq; the capture, arrest and public trial of Saddam Hussein and numerous high ranking members of the Ba'ath party was a critical first step. These actions coupled with the deba'athification of the government and the demobilization of the military was a key in establishing a sense of Justice. The dismantling of symbols representative of past injustices are an important signal to those wronged by these institutions and processes.

In order to prevent a **security** vacuum during the cessation of hostilities the “Allied Forces in Germany possessed 1.6 million U.S. military available to provide both internal security and deterrent to any potential external threats”.³⁹ The availability of this capability was critical until a constabulary force could be recruited, trained and fielded to meet the security requirements. In Post World War II Japan the security requirement was met through the availability of roughly 355,000 U.S. troops.⁴⁰ In the Post Civil War south the north occupied key locations in sufficient numbers to insure compliance with reconstruction requirements.

Governance and participation was provided in Post World War II Germany and Japan initially by military governors. Sovereignty was subsequently returned to Germany and Japan over several years after the establishment of new constitutions and the election of leaders. In the case of Post Civil War America initial governance was accomplished by “dividing the eleven states of the former Confederacy into five military districts, with an army general in command of each”.⁴¹ These Border States were later reintegrated into the union through President Johnson’s plan which “subsequently required the former confederate states to rescind their secession ordinances, abolish slavery, repudiate the Confederate war debt, and ratify the proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution.”⁴²

Economic well-being was accomplished in Post World War II Germany through the well known “Marshall Plan which provided substantial resources directly or indirectly through loans and assistance ... needed to get the German economy on its feet”.⁴³ In Post World War II Japan, economic reform was accomplished by the “dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which exercised control over Japan’s trade and industry”.⁴⁴ This purge which affected nearly 2000 of the business elite and was an important part of cleaning out the old ‘old guard’ had no perceptible effect on industrial production.

Differences

There are a couple of striking differences between the three historical examples cited previously and Iraq. The three case studies; the U.S. Civil War, Post WWII Germany and Japan were homogeneous and economically functional – which was the opposite of Iraq in 2003. Pre-invasion Iraq was an ethnically diverse people with deep sectarian divisions and a dysfunctional economy. As the pillars of post conflict operations are applied to each of these case studies, another marked similarity between them that proved to be a significant difference with the post conflict operations in Iraq, was the number of soldiers available for occupation type duty. The difference in the case of Iraq was the absence of authority between the fall of the Hussein Regime and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Coalition Forces were not given clear guidance on what their responsibilities were in the area of civil control. This absence of guidance led to an absence of authority at a critical juncture between the later stages of phase three (combat) operations and the initial stages of phase four (post conflict) operations which in turn allowed lawlessness and reprisals to become standard practice. Once established this security vacuum became the fertile breeding ground for looting, religious revenge attacks, militia formation and ultimately laid the foundation for the current insurgency. As stated earlier this pillar is the precondition for achieving success in the other pillars and was

not established early enough in Iraq in order to provide a solid foundation for stability and reconstruction efforts to begin.

Justice and Reconciliation in Iraq presented a challenge because while the Deba'athification of the government and the demobilization of the military were important to gaining the confidence of the population in the coalition's stabilization efforts. These actions were unfortunately taken to the extreme and served the dual purpose of undermining the positive effects and potential good will that could have been gained by using elements of Iraq's internal government to provide for the basic needs of the civilian population and the use of the military to assist with civil control and to meet border security requirements.

Governance for Iraq initially provided by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and subsequently by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). At first it seemed that both organizations were ill prepared or equipped to deal with the challenges it faced. "The ORHA headed by retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was given five weeks to coordinate post war efforts for Iraq."⁴⁵ The CPA led by Paul Bremer took over the duties and responsibilities as interim Iraq administrator until elections were conducted. While security is considered a precondition for achieving any level of success in stabilizing Iraq's war torn environment, the country's **Economic well-being** is just as important and will continue to prove challenging until the government can leverage the enormous potential of its oil reserves to improve the lives of its citizens by providing basic services that enhance the every day existence of all Iraqi's. In order to successfully leverage its oil capacity the Iraqi government must first stop the continuous violence that limits oil production.⁴⁶ Additionally, the Iraqi government must get serious about stopping corruption.

Challenges

The challenges faced by the U.S. led coalition in successfully stabilizing Iraq fall into two primary categories; internal and external. First, the internal challenges facing Iraq are the unification of a fractured society and the development of a middle class. The unification of the Iraqi people will continue to prove challenging because of the religious intolerance displayed by the primary Muslim population with a deep intra-religious divide between the Shia and Sunni. The religious intolerance displayed by these two sects of the Muslim religion manifests itself primarily in the form of ongoing sectarian violence. The Iraqi government must put a stop to the violence and provide a stable environment in order to stop the flight of its middle class to safer neighboring environments. The middle class is important because history has shown that most stable democracies are peaceful by nature and the middle class is a critical component of a

democracy. The middle class provides the balance and some degree of stability in terms of a check on the political system between the poor and elites in a society, by giving hope to the poor that they can rise above their circumstance and they are feared by the elites who realize they possess the ability to change the status quo. The second challenge facing Iraq is external and is primarily from its neighbors; Iran, Syria and to some degree Turkey all of which have an interest in influencing Iraqi affairs. Syria and Iran's vested interest in a failed American led coalition effort in Iraq would mean their repressive regimes would not have to deal with a U.S. backed democracy with the potential to spread in their backyard. Turkey's interests which are just as self serving, is to protect their boundary from the challenges associated with a potential Kurdish state that may seek to encroach on Turkish soil and sovereignty.

Lessons Learned

There are many lessons learned from history that can guide our nation building efforts in Iraq as well as any other future post conflict endeavors; however there are truly six significant lessons learned. These lessons are not in any particular order of significance as all are equal in importance. The first is the need for patience in nation building; there must be willingness to invest sufficient resources in the form of personnel and finances as well as time, a minimum of five years, to begin to see the results of nation building efforts. Even with this significant investment there is no guarantee of success. A second important lesson is rapid, efficient and systematic processes are absolutely essential to minimize suffering and provide for basic human needs. Third; U.S. led efforts in Iraq is demonstrate that while it is much easier to conduct nation-building as the preeminent power on its own, negotiating with allies who have different priorities it is much more costly in both resources and time. Also, unity of effort politically and unity of command militarily are extremely important in establishing a common vision and can shape international support accordingly. A fourth important lesson is that accountability for past injustices can be a powerful component of democratization but is also among the most challenging and controversial aspects of any nation-building endeavor. The fifth of these important lessons is the need for a closer relationship between civilian and military leadership in planning, coordinating a detailed post-conflict reconstruction plan prior to executing operations. The sixth and final lesson learned is that historically phase four operations have included a variety of participants from numerous organizations with no overarching guidance or control. Therefore, it is only natural that there are challenges in defining the problem. As discussed earlier in this paper there are no generally accepted agreement on terms and definitions applicable to the tasks required in nation-building. This lack

of common definitions and terms leads to confusion over roles and responsibilities, the “gray area” referred to previously in this paper. This “grey area” presents real challenges and fosters misunderstandings between the multiple agencies attempting to coordinate efforts toward a common goal.

Recommendations

While the challenges facing Iraq’s successful stabilization and reconstruction are similar to those faced by Post World War II Germany and Japan as well as Post Civil War America, there are some distinct differences. In future post conflict operations, if the tasks associated with stability and reconstruction will be conducted as joint civil-military operations, then these tasks must be expressed as doctrinal military tasks that can be trained to standard and executed in support of joint or multinational efforts. The U.S. military must leverage its current transformation efforts to make post combat stabilization and reconstruction capability comparable to current combat efficiency. In essence, DoDs ongoing transformation efforts presents an opportunity to inculcate changes in military Doctrine, Organization and Training that will facilitate the execution of post combat stabilization and reconstruction tasks as part of the military’s core capabilities. “An important initial consideration or essential task during the planning of phase four operations involves establishing clear policies for civil-military interaction regarding relief and development initiatives.”⁴⁷ National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) is the current administrations attempt to accomplish this task with the creation of a new coordinator for reconstruction capable of directing the United States nation-building effort. NSPD-44 institutionalized the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State.

While NSPD-44, the successor to PDD/NSC 56 (The Clinton administrations policy designed to manage the interagency process to meet contingency requirements), empowers the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning and implementation it does not allocate any resources; the S/CRS must be adequately resourced to accomplish its task. The directive requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to integrate contingency plans, by tasking the S/CRS to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts, when operations involve other agencies.⁴⁸

Conclusion

While it is no surprise that Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction will be a costly and time consuming endeavor. The U.S. must continue to invest the time and resources necessary to

achieve victory. Coalition Forces demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of its combined capabilities with its marvelous success in vanquishing the Iraqi military and the Hussein regime. But the current state of affairs in Iraq highlights the need to improve U.S. phase four capabilities to include Interagency and Inter-departmental collaboration. Hans Binnendijk, of the National Defense University, states “it is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.”⁴⁹ While the United States’ post conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts during the three historic operations associated with Post-Civil War America and Germany and Japan after WWII were all highly successful there are some stark differences when compared to Iraq. The differences fuel the challenges associated with attempting to implement those lessons learned in Iraq. The ability to provide a secure environment and stability in governance is critical early on in phase four operations. The governance issue was highlighted as Iraq experienced several changes in U.S. led Coalition leadership within weeks of each other; first The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). “The ORHA had civilian lead during the planning phase, but was quickly relieved of the mission and replaced (within five weeks of assuming control) by the CPA.”⁵⁰ These multiple changes made transition governance frustratingly difficult and providing security both for Coalition forces and the Iraqi population extremely challenging and problematic. Without a secure environment overseen by strong and stable governance, justice, reconciliation and economic well-being are just wishful thoughts and extremely difficult to accomplish.

Endnotes

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