

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**INCREASING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE LONG WAR**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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We are engaged in a Long War against an enemy that does not wear a uniform. Our success is dependant upon the engagement of all elements of national power. The readiness of our intelligence Soldiers is essential to our success. Their readiness, training, and employment at the tactical level directly relates to their ability to interact with the analysts and intelligence organizations found at the Operational and National levels. The conduct of intelligence operations today is exceedingly complex and requires access to national analysts and databases. As with combat arms Soldiers, the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders must provide opportunities for intelligence Soldiers to develop and hone their individual and team technical skills. To this end, it is imperative that certification standards be developed and implemented. Intelligence Soldiers readiness/certification should be treated as a pacing item as defined in AR 220-1. As units move through the three force pools of ARFORGEN, their intelligence Soldiers must be aligned to the real world mission they will execute during their Available phase. This paper will provide a plan by which intelligence Soldiers can be engaged at all times.



## INCREASING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE LONG WAR

The first Long War of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is in its fifth year.<sup>1</sup> One would infer that due to constant engagement, the intelligence Soldier, and units available to the Army would be better trained and engaged in the intelligence process (plan, prepare, collect, process, and produce) at every possible moment.<sup>2</sup> Yet on a daily basis a significant portion of the U.S. Army's available intelligence force remains disengaged from the greater Intelligence Communities (IC) daily information acquisition, analysis, and production process. Maintaining an edge on Global Islamic Fundamentalism requires the continuous efforts of the entire IC, particularly those Soldiers who carry a Military Intelligence (MI) Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).<sup>3</sup> Why then are these Soldiers disengaged from the complex and ever changing intelligence fight? There are some technical, some legal, some force exhaustion reasons, and some flat out excuses.

If we are to be successful in this war, against an asymmetric threat, whose Soldier's wear no uniform, and will not surrender on the deck of a battleship, it is essential that we re-look our current process by which we manage the time and training of the thousands of Military Intelligence Soldiers in the Army. Of particular interest are those located in Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Corps and Below (CAB) billets whose efforts are not aligned, as during the Cold War, with a specific collection and production mission unless they are deployed in support of a real world operation. These available intelligence Soldiers are for the most part, consumers of the production efforts of the IC, transforming finished products into a "new" product that suit the needs of their Commander. The Army and the Nation need them to be active collectors and producers now and not just when their unit enters the final stages of pre-deployment training or only during the deployment window.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, calls for an Enterprise approach to intelligence coordination and production. In response to this directive prudent Army intelligence unit commanders would incorporate changes to their internal processes that align them with the DIA plan. As further defined in the DIA plan, acquisition of information to satisfy the needs of Defense Customers is moving from standard on demand reconnaissance missions to the more extensive persistent acquisition of intelligence to provide a constant flow of information required by decision makers at all echelons.<sup>4</sup> DIA also redefined the methodology by which their analysts will process intelligence. This new method is called 3M or Master, Measure, and Monitor.<sup>5</sup> This program is intended to expand the depth of analyst knowledge while concurrently building expertise and increasing analytic tradecraft among the workforce.<sup>6</sup>

The historic paradigm of intelligence production has long waited for drastic overhaul and if the IC is ever to comprehend fully our enemy at the synthesis and evaluation levels defined by Benjamin Bloom's Taxonomy and get inside his decision making cycle we must incorporate the efforts of the entire IC and not just national agencies.<sup>7</sup> The technology, the flattened architectures, and the IC network accesses are available at all echelons and ready to employ the efforts of every intelligence Soldier who is a collector and producer. Yet the Army continually fails to do so in a systematic, de-conflicted manner that supports ongoing tactical to national intelligence requirements necessary to support combat operations throughout the globe.

The past five years of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has shown the resilience of the CAB intelligence force which has, on its own, forged horizontal techniques requisite to answer the requirements of their tactical commanders and those of the supporting Combatant Commanders (CC). When deployed and engaged in the War On Terror (WOT) each IC echelon ensures the proper application of intelligence assets, a source of national power, against valid collection and production requirements. Yet once redeployed to home station those, same incredibly skilled and knowledgeable intelligence Soldiers assigned to CAB lose their access to the IC databases, are not given a production or support mission, such as Tactical Overwatch, for the deployed force and their talents are disengaged from this monumental intelligence effort.<sup>8</sup>

Upon redeployment from an active theater units focus on their training requirements as defined by the Army's Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN).<sup>9</sup> Intelligence Soldiers efforts are driven by the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or by the BCT Commander whose sole focus at redeployment is entering the Reset/Retrain force pool and the impending training requirements. It is not intelligence production for units in the Available force pool and executing real-world missions. Intelligence skill sets immediately begin to atrophy as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) change, the enemy morphs before our eyes and these intelligence Soldiers are no longer prepared and able to prosecute very demanding and complex mission sets.

How then do we reconfigure our efforts so that this enormous capability does not go unused, or worse, duplicate the efforts of other units? Do we continue to rely upon Mobile Training Teams as implemented by the U.S. Intelligence and Security Command (USINSCOM) in 2001 and continued under the "Project Foundry" training/live environment initiative or the efforts of the individual SIO to ensure individual and unit readiness?<sup>10</sup> All are viable systems and processes yet incredibly inefficient in the use of scarce training assets (people, time, equipment, money) and frankly do nothing to address long term readiness sustainment methodologies.

This paper proposes an alignment of CAB unit intelligence capabilities within the ARFORGEN deployment model that will increase force capabilities through two distinct elements. First, it will provide intelligence Soldiers and leaders mandated training on emergent U.S. Intelligence Community technical capabilities. Secondly, it will provide a means for General Support – Reinforcing (GS-R) intelligence engagement on the exact mission and the threat the unit will face upon deployment. This intelligence engagement prior to deployment will provide a better trained force capable of seamless integration into the fight during every phase of ARFORGEN. It will also provide a means by which we can grow Pentathlete individual and leader competency throughout the Intelligence Community and the Army.<sup>11</sup>

### Background

As the Nation began its immediate mobilization for war on the afternoon of 9/11 it was apparent to the IC that once again the enemy had dealt an incredible blow to our physical security. The IC began an increase in collection and production capabilities unparalleled in our history. It became obvious as the days turned into weeks that the post Cold War reduction of the IC budgets: resulted in only sixteen controlled languages being funded and taught at the Defense Language Institute, and the lack of readiness within the Army's intelligence ranks. We would have to re-look the means by which intelligence Soldiers within the Army would be able to attain and maintain their readiness. We were no longer preparing to fight a conventional threat that equipped, trained, and fought much like we did but one with no country, uniform, doctrine or face and the thought was daunting. The Cold War was long over and we had again found ourselves in a very hot war and very unprepared.

In the fall of 2001, the Gordon Regional Security Operations Center (GRSOC), National Security Agency (NSA) issued an immediate request to the Army via a Request For Forces (RFF) for all available Arabic linguists. The Army provided the qualified 98 Career Management Field (CMF) Soldiers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (3<sup>rd</sup> ACR) on a 180 day basis. Approximately twelve Soldiers, all Arabic Linguists, arrived at Fort Gordon to assist with the collection and production of intelligence in support of ongoing and emergent missions. To our utter dismay the Soldiers were neither ready nor capable of immediate integration. While all possessed a Final Top Secret Special Background Investigation (TS/SBI) clearance, none had ever undergone a Counter Intelligence (CI) scope polygraph, a long standing requirement to access National Security Agency (NSA) databases. The polygraph is essential and required by law for Operational and National level Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) access and production. The shortage of qualified polygraph examiners at the Army and National Security Agency (NSA)

compromised our ability to immediately integrate these Soldiers. If these issues were not sufficient aggravation, the language and technical skills of these intelligence Soldiers were substantially below those of the Joint force they were to partner with.

In an effort to rapidly engage these Soldiers in our new found conflict, the Joint Commanders at the GRSOC, in concert with the NSA civilians, quickly consolidated their efforts and introduced a streamlined security process, dialect specific language training, and hands on technical training. These three elements were incredibly time intensive and took from six to twelve weeks to complete thereby reducing the operational availability of the provided RFF force. This initial attempt to integrate tactical SIGINT Soldiers into an operational field site was deemed an overwhelming success by everyone involved. Each element gained an appreciation and understanding that the National level IC would have to take immediate and aggressive steps assisting the Army in order to fix the personnel security readiness, technical training, language training of the tactical force. The IC would also have to update regulatory requirements in order to provide home station access to these SIGINT professionals so they could be incorporated into the fight for intelligence gathering and processing in a timely manner. Little did we know or believe that five years later the same issues which confronted the initial GRSOC attempt to employ tactical SIGINT Soldiers in at an operational intelligence site would continue to plague the Army.

At the direction of the US Army G-2, INSCOM undertook the massive effort required to correct the security readiness and technical training requirements of the deploying SIGINT force. Using what was initially an outreach program to forces identified for OEF; the 206<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion (MI BN) at GRSOC, supported by the 742<sup>nd</sup> MI BN at NSA, jointly developed a tailorable and expandable MTT that could suit the needs of the unit preparing for deployment. The MTT effort suffered because the INSCOM trainers had to “reach out” to units identified in Army RFFs or on the published deployment schedule. There was little to no interface with US Forces Command (USFORSCOM) or the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC&S). These headquarters were overwhelmed with the massive increase in conventional training. This resulted in the Army Cryptologic Office (ACO) at NSA working SIGINT governance issues for the tactical force; providing funding sources for the MTTs; as well as limited and oft time scarce SIGINT equipment for training.

These SIGINT MTTs were conducted under the auspices of the Army Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) available for intelligence Soldiers and Units. With the pending cancellation of REDTRAIN in Fiscal Year (FY) 05, the MTT administrative requirements (scheduling, clearances, temporary duty orders (TDY), and MTT configuration) shifted to the 742<sup>nd</sup> MI BN at

NSA. A team of technical specialists from throughout INSCOM were established at home stations and worked at the direction of the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (A-TCAE), 742<sup>nd</sup> MI BN to meet the burgeoning needs of the deploying force. Training continued unabated and expanded from its initial SIGINT charter to include Measurements Intelligence (MASINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Counter-Intelligence (CI), All Source, and special collection training as defined and requested by the deploying units.

What had been proposed as a “Temporary MTT” had morphed into a half-decade long requirement for INSCOM. With the continuation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the training requirement exploded from an initial 12 Soldiers to over 1,000 Soldiers per year during 30+ training events averaging 7-11 days in FYs 03-05.<sup>12</sup> The temporary MTT mission became permanent. The trainers began to see repeat units and intelligence Soldiers attending training. It became apparent that the MTT efforts were successful but incredibly inefficient. Only the A-TCAE knew who was trained and certified for national SIGINT database access. Compounding the effort was the requirement to tailor the training packet for each deploying unit, the intelligence Soldiers and their leaders. Commanders and Soldiers wanted more training but the process was not producing increasing levels of expertise. We were keeping up with the enemy and not gaining as we should with our vast technological advantage.

#### **THE INITIAL PROJECT FOUNDRY**

To alleviate this growing burden, INSCOM in concert with the Army G2 developed the Project Foundry initiative in 2004. This plan was modeled loosely on the Navy Ship Rider program whereby Sailors were assigned to an Operational Intelligence Site in order to maintain and hone their technical and language skills. When needed by the Fleet, these very capable and fully trained Sailors were deployed to “ride” the ship and provide focused SIGINT support. Under this new Army plan, tactical SIGINT Soldiers assigned CAB would be aligned with one of the three regional focused NSA Field Sites at Fort Gordon, GA; Lackland Annex, San Antonio, TX; and Kunia, HI. The Soldiers would be attached to INSCOM units and would receive technical training, language training, database access, personnel security readiness, basic Soldier skills training and most importantly conduct live environment missions. They and their families would live permanently at the field site location. The Soldiers would return TDY to their parent unit for collective training exercises and deployments.

Needless to say, the tactical force commanders and Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) CAB were not in the least bit enamored of Project Foundry. This original Project Foundry was dead on arrival. It was not going to suffice with the training and unit cohesion building

methodologies used by Army Commanders and they objected vigorously to this perceived intrusion into their responsibility. The Commanders CAB understood that their intelligence Soldiers would return better trained and more relevant to the impending fight but their concerns were deeply and rightfully placed that the displacement of their intelligence capability from the parent combat unit location would diminish their ability to train as a team and would potentially place a wedge in unit cohesion during times of great stress, i.e. war.

The Army G2 and INSCOM undertook an expansive rework of the program while maintaining the monumental MTT. In order to retain the best of both programs Project Foundry incorporated the live environment opportunities (LET) of the REDTRAIN program with an increased MTT effort centered around all aspects of technical, all-source, and human intelligence collection and production. INSCOM intelligence units would post online available LET opportunities for specific missions, languages, and sub-dialect training. Units preparing to deploy, could at their own discretion, “sign-up” for these Temporary Duty Assignments (TDYs) at any time during their ARFORGEN Force Pool state. This is completely voluntary program where the only penalty for not engaging in the training prior to deployment might be increased risk to the unit during the first “100 Days.”<sup>13</sup> The Soldiers and units could then partner with ASCC INSCOM units to conduct Intelligence Overwatch missions.

Intelligence Overwatch is much akin to the support relationship defined by General Support – Reinforcing, yet the supporting unit must initiate contact with the supported unit and there is no defined command or support relationship defined in current operations orders.<sup>14</sup> This Intelligence Overwatch relationship is established by personal contact, a wholly inefficient process. Supporting units, with no established relationship to the supported unit must remain cognizant of the ongoing mission and may only provide support when called upon. The supporting unit is forever in a “ready and available” state, but the supported unit must initiate the request for support. The author, as Director for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Theater Ground Intelligence Center, conducted Tactical Overwatch for Unified Endeavors, OIF, and CENTCOM MASINT missions but not in a GS-R mission state. The true synergy of the concept is not working as intended, because Commanders are not held responsible for an intelligence mission unless deployed to the current combat Area of Operation (AOR).

While many units have availed themselves of the current Project Foundry LET and MTT training opportunities available from INSCOM, many units either do not know this program exists. While Project Foundry training is relevant and provides a necessary and much needed capability it is just training. It is vital but does nothing to address engagement of intelligence Soldiers who remain disengaged from the daily collection and production of intelligence

products. They are not aligned with a specific mission until the final ARFORGEN stage. Requiring Commanders to develop and carve out TDY training events for intelligence Soldiers is not the way we should be conducting business. It is archaic and obsolete. With our current technological capabilities, flattened intelligence networks and ability to enter into the intelligence collection databases and production cycle from any place on the globe we are irresponsibly wasting the capabilities of this group of highly skilled, low density Soldiers.

#### Resetting Intelligence Readiness Standards

Soldiers in CMG 96, 97, 98 should be carried as pacing items, that item of equipment deemed essential to a unit's ability to accomplish its mission, as defined in AR 220-1.<sup>15</sup> The completion of their language and technical training and subsequent certifications, in concert with receipt of their final, not interim, clearance provides commanders with a fully qualified intelligence Soldier whose "mind" is the weapon. As with any other individual or collective task, the intelligence Soldier and intelligence team can only increase their technical abilities through the application of learned skills and use of their minds which is best accomplished by prosecuting a real-world intelligence mission. Army training requirements focus on Soldier skills at the individual and collective level and not on the art of "thinking and reasoning" as required by intelligence Soldiers.<sup>16</sup> Commanders are not required during Quarterly Training Briefs to define the extent of training which can really only be defined as "cerebral." Intelligence skills measurements are at best nebulous. We can certainly grade language aptitude and readiness or watch a Soldier cut and past IC finished products to suit our needs but these do not measure knowledge levels. Commanders require standardized evaluation and certification methodologies in order to measure the training and readiness level of their intelligence Soldiers.

We are in a fight of survival. In order to grow expertise we must reevaluate the way we certify that aspect of unit readiness which focuses on intelligence Soldiers. Commanders must be held accountable for clearances, technical intelligence training, language aptitude, IC access and the ability to produce finished intelligence products from raw information. The best way to do this is to align the BCT intelligence capability in the ARFORGEN cycle to the specific intelligence mission they will assume in the Available force pool state.

#### The Way Ahead, Beyond Project Foundry

As a nation at war we must do not have the luxury of random employment of the intelligence portion of national power. The Army must be able to generate a steady state of available units in order to defend the nation. We must maintain and grow expertise on this current threat. The steady state of the Army this decade is war and continual engagement

against Islamic Extremism. Leaders at all echelons must fully understand the impact of the Army's Transformation away from the historic Division structure, as the focal point of combat power, to the establishment of the extremely lethal BCT. We cannot stop now and we cannot go back. Historic Combat Support units such as the divisional MI BN were eliminated to provide slots for expansion of the Brigade to the BCT. Where previously the Division G2 coordinated directly with the MI BN CDR of equal grade, he is now required to coordinate for collection and production with very junior MI company Commanders assigned to different BCTs. Junior grade Commanders who may not have the depth of knowledge to ensure the readiness of the intelligence Soldiers. While the G2 could certainly offer advice and establish training events and certification standards for all intelligence Soldiers, the BCT Commander and subordinate MI Company Commanders are under no requirement to implement these recommendations. While no clear empirical data exists to track intelligence unit readiness, the fact that INSCOM has provided 28,000 man-days of intelligence training in 280 individual training events encompassing over 2,500 Soldiers since January 2006 is indicative of a system and training methodology that is constantly playing catch-up to the threat.<sup>17</sup> This training constitutes a monumental effort by INSCOM, but the efforts of the trainers would be better used conducting real world intelligence support rather than training iterations to deploying forces. While some level of training is always necessary, there is sufficient advance in on-line technology with regards to education and interactive models that many of the training courses could be migrated to that venue thereby lessening the burden to both the trainers and units undergoing training. Project Foundry requirements are unduly burdening the BCT commander with acquiring intelligence training not part of the standard ARFORGEN requirements. Project Foundry functions but it does not fully address the needs. It only seeks to correct training deficiencies, not the long term engagement of the intelligence capabilities of the Army. Tasking units in the ARFORGEN cycle with an actual intelligence mission in a General Support – Reinforcing (GS-R) relationship will meet the needs for both training and continual engagement against a very determined asymmetric threat.<sup>18</sup>

#### ARFORGEN and Intelligence Engagement

The Army is in a multi-year process of implementing ARFORGEN which "...is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements."<sup>19</sup>



Figure 1.<sup>20</sup>

The figure above shows the ARFORGEN cycle in graphic form. This process requires one to understand that the Army now focuses Command and Control (C2) at the BCT. According to United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM), all combat forces within the Army are assigned COCOM to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) / COCOM to United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM) who is also the Senior Mission Commander or SMC.<sup>21</sup> As SMC, FORSCOM or designated units are responsible for the Title 10 functions to include training and readiness oversight (TRO) unless otherwise designated.<sup>22</sup> With respect to ARFORGEN, "Our planning objective is to be able to generate a continuous output of trained and ready forces..."<sup>23</sup> Units move through the ARFORGEN force pools in three distinct phases: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available.<sup>24</sup>

#### ARFORGEN Force Pool - Reset/Retrain

During stage one units Reset and Train for a period of one to six months. This window of opportunity is intended for commanders' to prepare their units through individual and team training events up to and including Battalion sized Field Training Exercises. Additionally, FORSCOM provides available training equipment sets and Human Resources Command (HRC) begins the assignment of new personnel.

Training available during this period also includes INSCOM available Project Foundry events. Units are advised of Project Foundry training opportunities available at home station via MTT's, at INSCOM units or at national IC sites through coordination with INSCOM. As previously stated, Commanders must ensure the personal security readiness of intelligence Soldiers prior to beginning certain SIGINT and HUMINT training events. Throughout the ARFORGEN cycle personnel security readiness drives the ability of units to send their Soldiers to these technical and regionally focused training events, you may not attend many of these

events with an Interim TS/SCI, even though intelligence Soldiers can be carried on the Unit Status Report as qualified in their MOS with an interim clearance.

As Soldiers and units progress through the FORSCOM training they are laying the foundation of the Pentathlete leader as proscribed by the Chief of Staff Army (CSA).<sup>25</sup> The level of training undertaken provides to the individual, team, and unit exposure to other elements of the tactical to national IC necessary and required to execute the spectrum of intelligence missions to which the unit will be aligned in the Available ARFORGEN force pool. During Phase I, however, the unit is subjected to great turbulence. Units returned from an OIF or OEF rotation are stabilized for up to ninety days. At that point the amount of personnel turnover plays a major part in the length of the Reset/Retrain period. Ultimately Commander's must decide which of the departing/arriving Soldiers attend the available intelligence training cycles. There is no such thing as wasted training, but units must try and align the available training seats to Soldiers who will be with the formation throughout the entire ARFORGEN cycle and not to those leaving.

It is important to note here that when units begin the Reset/Retraining phase they are in the pre-alignment stage to future deployments, combat rotations and/or unforeseen contingencies mode. It is at this time that the SMC commander should focus the efforts of the intelligence Soldiers and unit to the mission it will train in earnest for during the Ready and assume during the Available force pool state. To facilitate intelligence Tactical Overwatch the unit must send a liaison team to the Available unit. The liaison will jointly conduct mission discussions, collection and production requirements, and be provided with supported units TTP. Once familiar and equipped with the TTP the liaison team returns to its parent organization.

At this point the SMC commander issues an order placing the supporting unit in a GS-R status (Tactical Overwatch) for intelligence support role. During the Reset/Retrain phase the supporting GS-R unit should only be tasked to manage databases and produce long-term studies (those taking more than 72 hours) such as those used by the SIGINT, HUMINT and MASINT communities. These types of missions, while mundane, are essential to developing long term understanding of the enemy. During this phase, intelligence Soldiers are learning the basics of the threat and will become increasingly understanding of the nuances that the threat displays while conducting operations against US forces or our allies. Additionally, the supporting unit begins the incredibly difficult task of learning the geographic region, the cultures and the norms of the inhabitants to which it will be assigned. It also begins to familiarize itself with the vast amounts of information available for that specific geographic area in the available Tactical, Theater and National IC databases.

The involvement of the units' intelligence capability at the earliest moment provides mutual benefit to all echelons. As an example, the deployed force typically does not possess the numbers of intelligence personnel required to manage the immense amounts of raw data available for a given geographic area; or sufficient qualified linguists to translate everything it collects. Having a supporting unit in a GS-R relationship alleviates some of these burdens. This relationship begins the process of building expertise and provides much needed manpower while simultaneously providing the Reset/Retrain Commander the ability to integrate his intelligence Soldiers in individual and collective training requisite to move the unit to the next force pool.

Most importantly however, the supporting Reset/Retrain unit begins to build relationships with intelligence professionals at all echelons, inside and outside the Army, and throughout the IC. This relationship building is essential to requesting and receiving support and to ensuring that products or evaluations from collected data will be received by peer intelligence collectors and analysts in the IC as valid. Engagement of the intelligence Soldiers at the earliest possible moment during ARFORGEN is key component to our ongoing and future successes against this threat.

It is extremely important to keep intelligence Soldiers and capabilities engaged at all times. Units are on the verge of their third or more rotation to OIF or OEF and oft times believe that they will be deployed to the exact geographic area they previously occupied and they are hopeful that the threat will be the same. Hope is not a plan and even if the unit occupies the same geographic battle space it will not be the same. In just four years of OIF we have watched the enemy morph through four distinct phases and groups or types of fighters. Units encounter a completely different set of enemy combatants each deployment. With only two weeks devoted to in theater Transfer of Authority (TOA) there is not sufficient time to "learn" the enemy or understand the vast amount of data, information, and intelligence the departing unit leaves behind. Consequently, the earlier units can engage in the intelligence fight the better they will understand the threats and the area they will occupy for the twelve months.

Additionally, the ongoing stress on the force emphasizes to leadership the necessity to ensure maximum home station dwell time between deployments. Through the use of available network and systems architectures located at every Army installation CONUS and OCONUS, intelligence Soldiers can concurrently continue to train with their unit on core METL tasks, focus on the real threat they will face via a GS-R relationship. Finally and most importantly, they can spend the maximum available time with their families prior to deployment. This provides a win-win situation for all involved.

Based upon the Institutional, FORSCOM and Combatant Commander training requirements commanders will not in and of themselves accept an additional mission such as the GS-R relationship to a deployed unit whether they are replacing it or not. Commanders see this as an untenable burden for the short term. We must institute a long-war view that it is essential that we convince them of the necessity for keeping intelligence Soldiers engaged in the fight. The GS-R mission and relationship must be top driven by the SMC who is ultimately responsible for certifying the readiness of the unit. In the long term both the unit and the Army will gain additional cultural and regional expertise from these relationships thereby reducing the stress of TOA by developing and maintaining regional expertise.

#### ARFORGEN Force Pool - Ready

According to the ARFORGEN Implementation Plan upon completion of the Reset/Retraining force pool units move to the Ready Phase. The transition is based upon the commander's assessment of the units' capabilities following the completion of the mandated training. It is also at this point that units receive their Assigned force pool mission which moves the unit into one of three categories described below. The first category is called the Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF), this is when a unit is positively identified for deployment to OIF, OEF, or another named operations. The second category is called the Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF); this is when a unit is assigned to support a major wartime plan. The final category is called the Ready Expeditionary Force (REF); this force is capable of Full Spectrum Operations but has not been aligned to any named operation or major plan. It is nonetheless fully ready for deployment. Regardless of which force mission a unit is assigned all will continue with METL based training, advanced crew certification and training events that grow in size and complexity and include joint force elements. This ARFORGEN phase is estimated to last one year.

Upon entering the Ready force pool, the SMC and unit commander should review the GS-R relationship established during the Reset/Retrain period. It is possible that the supported unit from the original Tactical Overwatch GS-R relationship has moved from the Available phase to the Reset/Retrain phase. If TOA has occurred between the previous Ready and Available forces then the process of sending out a liaison team, learning the TTP, and establishing the GS-R support relationship and publishing the support order with the current Available force must reoccur. If however, the mission and geographic area were correctly aligned during Reset/Retrain and the Available force remains the same then no modification to the order is necessary. During the Ready phase it is imperative that the supporting unit intelligence Soldiers

be correctly aligned in their GS-R relationship to the unit with which it will TOA. A continual exchange of liaison personnel to the Available force location is essential. During the ready phase both units should establish a regularly scheduled video teleconference (VTC) schedule. The supporting GS-R Ready force must be fully cognizant of ongoing and future operations during both the planning and execution stages. Full engagement of the Ready force intelligence capabilities will provide a greater level of access to national and theater IC databases via the flattened architecture and bandwidth that might not be available to the Available force SIO. As the unit moves to the Ready force pool It is essential that the intelligence Soldiers have completed their Project Foundry training. Personal security requirements such as final Clearances, CI Scope polygraphs and national IC database access should be resolved and the Intelligence Soldiers continue advanced certifications. The impending mission is set, access to IC data and daily use of IC tools and processes will be essential to the unit's successful accomplishment of the upcoming mission. The commander will look to his intelligence Soldiers to provide insight and a higher level of understanding on these subjects than the rest of the formation. Knowledge and understanding of a complex enemy takes years to learn and the most efficient way to achieve this is for Soldiers to continually work the live mission they will assume.

The Ready force intelligence unit, through established support arrangements, with the Theater Ground Intelligence Centers (former theater ACE) located at INSCOM ASCC units can receive support and follow-up training on emergent technical changes or increased access to language specific dialect training not formally charted under Project Foundry. This two way relationship compliments the support provided to the Available force while simultaneously allowing the Ready force commander to increase the knowledge of his intelligence Soldiers.

The Ready force will also establish a relationship with its replacement force moving into the Reset/Retrain phase. Sharing of lesson's learned, with regards to the execution of the Tactical Overwatch GS-R missions, TTP, and most importantly sharing of threat knowledge must begin at the earliest possible moment, normally when the intelligence Soldiers have achieved their individual security updates and accesses to national IC databases.

These Soldiers are increasing their knowledge by hands on execution of the mission. Not one simulator or computer driven training exercise can replicate the finesse required to learn a language like a native speaker. Nor do these training environments provide realistic, daunting, thinking enemy scenarios of sufficient depth to train the intelligence Soldiers. Certainly there is much to be learned and growth opportunities for staffex type exercises for the SIO and the Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) but the rank and file intelligence Soldiers time and efforts are better spent against the actual mission.

Toward the end of the Ready phase, the intelligence Soldiers are entering the journeyman level of knowledge on the threat environment from their ongoing GS-R support relationship. There should not be a drop off in production or level of expert knowledge during TOA as has historically occurred. If the Ready unit was aligned properly at the beginning of the ARFORGEN cycle they have worked their upcoming intelligence mission for approximately two years. These intelligence Soldiers are well into the journeyman level of understanding and can easily synthesize the information gained based on personal insight of the culture, norms, and threat. They should have continued to upgrade their certifications. National IC database access is the norm for all. Linguists are language and dialect proficient. Collection and processing systems are in use and the intelligence Soldiers are thoroughly engaged with the Available force.

These intelligence Soldiers have, through the execution of the GS-R Tactical Overwatch mission, built numerous support relationships within the Army, the joint force and at the national IC levels. Their contacts at each echelon are well aware of the level of proficiency of each team and individual. They have forged a mutual support relationship built upon trust that all parties are working to the same end to know the threat, the intelligence systems, and have developed the requisite skills necessary to defeat a radical asymmetric enemy. The Ready force intelligence Soldiers are indeed ready, through prosecution of the mission they are set to assume in the near term. According to the Army Campaign Plan Ready forces move to the Available stage when they have completed a collective training event and are deemed full spectrum capable.

#### ARFORGEN Force Pool – Available

As described above, the Army Campaign Plan lists three types of forces, DEF, CEF, and REF in the Available force pool. Those forces in the DEF are aligned to execute a named operation or available for immediate deployment. The DEF force was assigned its current mission during the Ready force pool phase. The intelligence Soldiers were aligned and required under force pool states Reset/Retrain and Ready to execute the GS-R Tactical Overwatch missions as assigned by SMC OPORD. They are fully trained and have operationally prosecuted portions of the intelligence mission for their specific area of operations (AOR) for up to two years. They have surpassed the entry and journeyman level of knowledge and analysis. The linguists understand the language and the specific dialects. They are in tune with the environment to which they have deployed and in which they must now conduct full spectrum intelligence operations. These intelligence Soldiers could be described as Experts in their field

and have extensive knowledge sets which are lead enablers for the successful execution of the mission.

Those intelligence Soldiers are now in a position to train their replacements as they were trained by the previous Available unit. This is a dynamic cyclic process. At each level of the force pool, the unit is assigned an intelligence support mission that they are capable of executing. The Available force pool has the ability through current technological capabilities available throughout the force to increase the levels of understanding and knowledge in the Army intelligence force and the IC as a whole. They have forged critical relationships and know have the knowledge to make the IC respond to the intelligence requirements of their unit as they execute assigned missions.

The Available force SIO is in a position to modify the ongoing training and GS-R requirements of the Reset/Retrain and Ready force as the enemy and conditions in the AOR change and as they complete Project Foundry training events, individual and collective training iterations and progress toward the Available force pool. The continuity of this cycle enables the intelligence force to maintain contact with the enemy in a state of constant observation and reporting. The endstate of the GS-R relationships is persistent intelligence engagement and the development of a fully trained, educated, and competent intelligence force within the Army. The following chart is a graphic representation of this engagement process.




Figure 2.

## Conclusion

Army INSCOM in concert with FORSCOM developed Project Foundry training events in order to prepare intelligence Soldiers for future missions. The enemy we are currently fighting is unlike any we have faced in previous conflicts and wars. Our current training model is iterative and does not place emphasis on the intelligence Soldier as a weapons system nor does it require commanders to maintain visibility of their language, technical and intelligence system certifications. Opportunities available for the force pool commander to increase the level of knowledge, technical training and language capabilities of the intelligence Soldiers do not require them to align with any future mission. While the soldiers may increase their individual capabilities they will have gained little collective training on their future mission set. Assigning a specific level of GS-R Tactical Overwatch mission throughout the three force pool stages of ARFORGEN enables the Army to grow expertise and Pentathlete leaders. Execution of an intelligence mission is the best form of training.

Starting with the basics during Reset/Retrain force pool the intelligence Soldiers are slowly trained on the specifics of emergent technology. They are afforded opportunities to hone their individual and collective skills against INSCOM Project Foundry live environment training events if their commander schedules the time and places emphasis on training a low-density high demand skill set. Clearances are updated and training certificates awarded as the intelligence Soldiers master new systems. Assigned a GS-R intelligence mission, Soldiers are able to provide a level of support heretofore unavailable to the Available force pool. Requirements are not “made up work” but real world and necessary to support ongoing operations across the spectrum of war. While there is stress to learn, there is not the stress of life and death decisions based on the low level production requirements assigned to them by the Available force. Commanders assigned and held responsible for a GS-R mission will be required to report their accomplishments and failures and the most efficient standardized method to accomplish this is to carry intelligence Soldiers as reportable pacing items as defined in AR 220-1.

During the Ready force pool phase, the mission is adjusted to the specific mission the unit will assume in the Available phase. Intelligence Soldiers are now required to provide increasing levels of support. They are becoming journeyman with the technology, tools, and level of understanding of the enemy and culture in which they will operate. Their level of stress continues to rise as they close on their deployment date but their level of knowledge of the enemy will assist them in providing the Commander and staff knowledgeable assessments of the AOR. They are fully certified on the systems, databases and TTP and their support to the

Available force pool is used to drive operations. They are also reaching back to the Reset/Retraining force pool and assisting with the learning and knowledge growth required by their future mission. Commanders concurrently report intelligence Soldier readiness through the operational chain of command via the Unit Status Report (USR) and through the intelligence system via established reporting criteria.

At deployment the Available force intelligence Soldiers are fully trained and culturally aware. They are considered experts capable of full spectrum intelligence support in concert with the IC. They restart the training cycle by facilitating the introduction of the Reset/Retraining to the Tactical Overwatch GS-R mission as well as increasing the demands on the Ready force for more in depth analysis and support to operations.

This cyclic engagement plan in coordination with required Institutional, FORSCOM and COCOM training requirements provides the force with knowledgeable intelligence Soldiers who have earned regional and threat expertise through mission accomplishment. Combine this expertise with mandatory operational reporting of intelligence Soldier readiness and commanders will have a realistic view of their ability to execute their intelligence mission. There is no cine wave in Army intelligence support to the war. The continual engagement of these Soldiers against the threat mission enables them to maintain and increase their level of knowledge at the expert level. The level at which the national IC operates and is comfortable including the tactical force and intelligence Soldiers. This cycle is a win-win situation for all involved. It will enable us to functionally develop Pentathlete leaders in the tactical force as well as defeat this current enemy.

### Endnotes

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