

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL JIHAD**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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America entered the Global War on Terrorism with little understanding of the enemy it faced. Al-Qaeda plays a leading role in the larger movement of global jihad, a splinter faction of militant Islamism intent on establishing its vision of strict Islamic rule in the Muslim world through armed action. Global jihadis have spent more than 40 years refining their philosophy, gaining experience, building their organization, and developing plans to re-establish what they see as the only true Islamic state on earth. The 9/11 attacks set this plan in motion.

In the years leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their military strategy for creating an Islamic state. This paper draws on those writings to examine and explain the mechanisms by which they plan to neutralize the superpower guardian of world order, claim land and peoples for Islamic emirates out of the resulting chaos, and bring these emirates together to become a true Islamic state. Their writings also expose weaknesses in their strategy, and this paper explores some of those potential vulnerabilities as well.



## THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF GLOBAL JIHAD

On September 11, 2001, out of a clear blue sky, 19 hijackers piloted four aircraft against political, economic, and military targets in America's heartland, killing nearly 3,000 people.<sup>1</sup> Investigation revealed those hijackers to be young Muslim men, driven by a fanatic hatred of America. America responded with Operation Enduring Freedom, toppling Afghanistan's Taliban government, which had provided sanctuary for the leaders of Al-Qaeda, the organization behind the attacks. The American response was swift and effective: the Taliban were overthrown and a new government inaugurated within 78 days, while countries around the world united to help the new Afghanistan move forward on the long road to democracy.<sup>2</sup> America exited the "post-Cold War" period and entered a new era, that of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). With the subsequent U.S.-led overthrow of Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, U.S. military involvement in Southwest Asia had increased dramatically, with troop levels surpassing 210,000.<sup>3</sup>

To the American public, Al-Qaeda's actions seemed unfathomable. By directly attacking America, they had drawn an overwhelming but predictable response in terms of the political, economic, and military means applied to the eradication of their organization. Was the attack on America just an instance of lashing out, or was it part of a larger plan? In the years leading up to and following the attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their strategies in waging jihad, describing plans molded by a strikingly different worldview, a philosophy of militant Islamism, and experiences spanning over 40 years. This paper examines the goals and military strategy of global jihad, as expressed by the global jihad strategists themselves.

### What Is Global Jihad?

In the U.S., Al-Qaeda has become synonymous with terrorism, but in actuality the Al-Qaeda organization plays a leading role in a larger political and military movement called "global jihad." Global jihad is an extremist splinter group within "Islamism," a broad religious movement that seeks to instill a stricter observance of Islam in politics, economics, and society. In Sunni Islamic tradition, shari'a law has four sources. The primary source is the Qur'an, the word of God revealed by the Prophet to the Muslim community – the umma. The secondary source is the ahadith, a collection of the accounts of the life of the Prophet and his Companions. Shari'a as known today was constructed over a long period of time, and Sunni Islam's last two sources of shari'a law – analogy and consensus – were processes through which different Muslim authorities created new rulings to account for situations not covered in the primary and secondary sources. Naturally, those last two sources of law, as well as differing interpretations

of the first two sources, have brought variation to the body of shari'a as it is practiced by Muslim societies. Global jihadis want to strip away the innovations that they see as having corrupted the practice of Islam, starting with the material that analogy and consensus and some of the ahadith have added to the shari'a, but also including extra-legal practices Muslim societies have adopted through emulating the West.<sup>4</sup> They see the current Western-inspired governments in the Islamic world as willing participants in the corruption of Islam; they reject participation in those governments and identify armed action – jihad – as the only way to achieve political power.

### A Jihadi Worldview

Global jihadis share a worldview in which the Muslim world is suffering a prolonged, aggressive assault from the West, led by the U.S., in what Abu-Mus'ab Al-Suri refers to as the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Crusader Campaigns.<sup>5</sup> Abu-Mus'ab Al-Suri is a global jihad strategist who served as a military instructor and lecturer in the Afghan-Arab training camps, fought in several jihad campaigns, and held other positions in jihad organizations in Europe and the Middle East. According to Al-Suri, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Crusader Campaign began with Napoleon's occupation of Egypt in 1798 and ended on the collapse of Arab nationalism in the 1970s. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, other European powers joined the race to colonize the Middle East, and by the end of the First World War they had dismantled the Ottoman Empire and divided its lands among themselves. Britain established Israel through the Balfour Declaration, and the European powers chose rulers from among local collaborators to oversee their new "colonies." After World War II, the U.S. inherited the interests of the European powers and the Soviet Union continued to add the Islamic communities of Eurasia to its growing empire. Fearing that the Muslim peoples might unite and become strong again, the colonial masters encouraged the formation of nationalist movements in their lands. This illusion of independence ensured that the Muslim people would remain divided and weak because they put loyalty to their country above loyalty to their religion or their community as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

According to Al-Suri, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Crusader Campaign began in 1990 and continues to the present time. In his view, the U.S. leveraged the collapse of the Soviet Union to establish a new world order through which it dominates all aspects of the Muslim peoples' lives. He holds the U.S. responsible for the ascensions of Bashar Al-Asad to the presidency of Syria and King Abdullah to the throne of Jordan and the overthrow of Pakistan's government that put President Pervez Musharraf in power, characterizing these events as American political aggression.<sup>7</sup> On the economic front, he accuses a U.S.-controlled International Monetary Fund of manipulating

local currencies to make sure no Muslim country can attain self-sufficiency. Concurrently, the West extracts oil and metals from the Middle East, overseeing their transportation and limiting their prices in Western banks. He accuses the U.S. of having driven millions of workers from the Middle East to the U.S. and Europe to provide cheap labor.<sup>8</sup> Cultural domination includes “programming the mass media and the childrearing, educational, and cultural instruments so as to westernize our societies and reshape them according to the colonists’ desires.”<sup>9</sup> Most significantly, in 1990, the U.S. lured Saddam Hussein into attacking Kuwait in order to provide an excuse for increasing their troop presence in the region to over 500,000 and followed up with the Madrid Peace Accords, forcing the recognition of Israel on the battered Muslim peoples.<sup>10</sup>

### Democracy vs. God’s Sovereignty

The U.S. policy of promoting democracy in the Muslim world is seen as another form of assault on Islam. Global jihadis oppose secularism in any form: democracy, nationalism, communism, Ba’athism, and any other un-Islamic system or philosophy. The late Al-Qaeda ideologue Yusuf al-Ayiri wrote, “One of the worst products of secularism is democracy, which abolishes the authority of shari’a over society and opposes it in form and content. The Most High said ‘the command is for none but Allah.’ Democracy says that the command is for none but the majority of the people.”<sup>11</sup> In the jihadist ideology, only God is sovereign and His law already exists in the form of the shari’a.<sup>12</sup> Rulers or legislators who presume to make laws are thus assuming divine attributes, and anyone who accepts that law is acknowledging the divinity of the legislators.<sup>13</sup> Al-Suri explains:

There is very clear evidence, in the Qur’an and the Sunna, of the faithlessness of those who have given themselves the right to legislate laws in what is forbidden and permissible, and to change the laws, and to confront the sovereignty of God, thus becoming worshiped gods... The indication from the verse and from the Hadith is absolutely clear. It indicates that whoever creates laws, to permit and to forbid, has made himself a god; and whoever obeys him, is then considered a worshiper.<sup>14</sup>

Democracy therefore equates to polytheism because the power of a popularly-elected leader may be used to infringe on God-given law. In this philosophy, democracy is not just an alternative or competing form of government; on the individual level it is a sin, and on the collective level it is an assault on Islam.<sup>15</sup> In the views of the global jihadis, Western liberal principles also contribute to the corruption of Islam by encouraging practices that exceed or contradict the shari’a, such as freedom of belief (or unbelief), freedom of speech (even to insult what is holy), and “equal rights of men and women, without distinction of any kind, such as race,

color, sex, education, religion” – equating believers with unbelievers, sinners with the innocent, and men with women in all situations regardless of the role God meant them to play.<sup>16</sup>

Thus an all-out political, economic, cultural and military invasion was well underway and increasing in strength when, on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the global jihadis struck a blow in their defense.<sup>17</sup> Al-Suri argues that the 9/11 attacks were a logical and necessary response to America’s aggression, and all that followed – the overthrow of the Taliban, the increased U.S. military presence in the region, etc – had been part of America’s plan anyway:

The circumstances we are living today in the Islamic world after the September 11 incidents are not at all the result of that limited incident, even though it was significant. What we are in is a period whose turn had come according to the plans of Americans and Europeans as well as their masters the Jews. They are chapters from the prerequisites to the new world order, launched in the early 1990s after break up of the Warsaw Pact and the entry of its components into NATO, and the beginning of the single American-Jewish pole that wants to manage the world’s matters... We are now living a condition of programmatic American-Jewish media exploitation... for the sake of rationalizing their attacks and convincing the world the opposite of the truth, which is that 9/11, the Intifadah and similar works of resistance are nothing but responses to attacks and not attacks which were initiated.<sup>18</sup>

## The History of Global Jihad

Global jihad today looks back on 40 years of struggle against the forces that they believe have corrupted their community. The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb is regarded as the founder of the modern movement. In his 1964 book, *Ma’lim fi al-Tariq*, he stated that the secular authorities of modern states – democracies, communist states, dictatorships, etc – were using state structure and power to prevent their people from following God’s governance, instead keeping the people in servitude to their own man-made governments and laws. He emphasized that military force – jihad – was necessary to break down this human-imposed order so that the people held under it would be free to serve God alone.<sup>19</sup> In terms reminiscent of Marxist-Leninist philosophy,<sup>20</sup> he proposed that a vanguard of true believers live largely separate from society and lead a movement to tear down the modern Western world order, freeing all people from servitude to human authorities. Having won their freedom from man’s law, those people would then be allowed to choose any form of governance that solely followed God’s law.<sup>21</sup> Considered a threat to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime, he was tried and executed in 1966. Following his death, he was hailed as a martyr by a core group of followers and his philosophy gained traction. Through the 1970s and 1980s, numerous Muslim radical movements formed to foment the overthrow of their local governments, but each was defeated by the state’s security apparatus.<sup>22</sup> By the mid-1980s, a global jihad school of thought had developed the philosophy

that jihad movements had failed in Muslim countries because the corrupt governments were propped up by the imperial West. One of the influences on this school of thought was the eviction of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan followed closely by the disintegration of the Soviet state. The chaos and subsequent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan gave the global jihad movement their first exemplary modern Islamic emirate, as well as a permissive environment in which to develop their philosophy and train a cadre of militants.

Through this 40 year period, other Islamists have worked within the systems they want to reform, even gaining parliamentary seats and ministerial positions in several countries.<sup>23</sup> To the global jihadis, however, these Islamists have been either marginalized or corrupted by the governments they entered, making no significant political gains and diverting efforts and people from the true struggle.<sup>24</sup> This perceived failure of peaceful attempts at reform, combined with the religious obligation of jihad, leaves armed action as an imperative. Despite the necessity for the use of force, however, the global jihadis emphasize that theirs is not a violent philosophy. Instead, they see themselves as a political movement that exercises the right to self-defense.<sup>25</sup>

#### The Political Goal of Global Jihad

For the global jihadis, the political goal is paramount, and they work toward a positive end: the creation of a new state, a “caliphate.”<sup>26</sup> The political and physical form of the caliphate starts with a collection of like-minded Islamic emirates, or mini-states, which can be as small as a suburb or as large as a country. Initially, this network of emirates does not require centralized authority; i.e., it is not necessarily organized hierarchically under one leader or government. Instead, each emirate communicates with the others to provide some degree of political, logistical, financial, military, and/or intellectual support to them and to the formation of other emirates. This decentralized network of like-minded emirates forms the basis for the establishment of the future true Islamic state: the caliphate, a single political entity governed as the Prophet and his successors guided the early Muslim peoples.

Global jihadis today are bound by 40 years of philosophical development and the narrow body of law that they consider to be ideologically pure. These factors have cemented a philosophical framework within which they must remain in order to be true to their ideology. Demonstrating that internal legitimacy is very important to them, global jihad literature is littered with the shari’a (i.e. legal) justifications for their actions. This philosophical framework also imposes requirements on the formation of emirates and a caliphate. As Qutb notes, religion cannot be imposed on a people; it must be freely adopted by them: “a Muslim community can come into existence only when individuals and groups of people reject servitude to anyone

except God-in addition to Him or exclusively-and come into submission to God, Who has no associates, and decide that they will organize their scheme or life on the basis of this submission. From this a new community is born.”<sup>27</sup> Forming a caliphate requires a caliph who meets particular requirements: he must be a descendant of the Prophet, from the Quraysh tribe, a pious Muslim, and sound of limb with full faculties (e.g., sight in both eyes). Because of this requirement, the establishment of the caliphate itself should be regarded as a more distant goal; however, once the network of like-minded emirates is realized, moving from that entity to a caliphate requires only internal changes.

### The Strategy of Global Jihad

Historically, the global jihadis have had success with Qutb’s formula of using military force to break down existing (secular) governance in a region, and then restoring order by instituting their version of Islamic law.<sup>28</sup> After living through the violent chaos that resulted from the breakdown of authority, the region’s inhabitants welcome the return to order that the global jihadis bring, thus meeting the requirement that the population freely accepts their form of governance. As the 21<sup>st</sup> century begins, however, the U.S. stands as guarantor of world order, an order based on the rule of man instead of God. The essential first step to breaking down this world order is neutralizing the U.S., after which they will be able to break down local authorities and build emirates out of the resulting chaos. To some, “neutralize” means causing the destruction or collapse of the U.S.; others are satisfied with weakening or punishing the U.S. enough that it removes itself from the Muslim world. Destruction of the U.S. – the invader and occupier of the Muslim world – is also seen as a useful rallying cry to draw support from the Muslim community.

### Destroying America

The operational-level strategy for neutralizing the U.S. combines active and passive components. Active attacks use military strikes to directly target U.S. interests at home and abroad in an attempt to influence U.S. policy. In addition to the material damage caused, these attacks tear away the illusion of American invincibility. According to the global jihadis, incursions by the U.S. and allies into the Muslim world should be met with terrorist attacks on Western interests at home and abroad. These operations range in size from small-scale action (e.g., an assassination) to large-scale attacks like those on September 11<sup>th</sup>.<sup>29</sup> Al-Suri notes that following the “deterrence” attack on Madrid on 3/11/2004, Spain announced it would withdraw its forces from Iraq – a clear victory for the global jihadis.<sup>30</sup> Al-Suri recommends making the Muslim world inhospitable to Western business, tourism, and political and military engagement

through “individual jihad.” In the tactical implementation of this strategy, Muslims all over the world undertake local unconnected strikes against Western interests, transforming the phenomenon of random or opportunistic violence into what appears to be a mass movement with coordination and direction.<sup>31</sup>

The passive component of the global jihad campaign against the U.S. is a form of economic warfare that involves getting the U.S. to damage its own interests by overextending its military and economic resources. Jihad strategist Abu-Bakr Naji quotes author Paul Kennedy, “If America expands the use of its military power and strategically extends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.”<sup>32</sup> This statement echoes the wide-spread agreement by jihadi strategists that the U.S. economy is both its source of strength and its most vulnerable asset. Abu-‘Ubayd al-Qurashi, a jihad leader and aide to bin Laden, notes:

It is clearly apparent that the American economy is America's center of gravity. This is what Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin has said quite explicitly. Supporting this penetrating strategic view is the fact that the Disunited States of America are a mixture of nationalities, ethnic groups, and races united only by the "American dream," or, to put it more correctly, worship of the dollar... Aborting the American economy is not an unattainable dream. The New York and Washington attacks, contrary to all theoretical predictions, showed the extent of the fragility of the American economy, which was greatly affected.<sup>33</sup>

Economic warfare can be carried out directly through military action,<sup>34</sup> or indirectly by causing the U.S. to overextend its resources. The Mujahidin Services Center’s “Jihad in Iraq: Hopes and Dangers” provides an interesting analysis of the latter phenomenon. The anonymous authors of this 2003 document tally the cost of U.S. operations in Iraq and propose to sever the U.S. from its coalition partners, thereby forcing it to bear the entire cost alone.<sup>35</sup> Naji also highlights Western alliances as a potential vulnerability: “Diversify and widen the vexation strikes against the Crusader-Zionist enemy in every place in the Islamic world, and even outside of it if possible, so as to disperse the efforts of the alliance of the enemy and thus drain it to the greatest extent possible.” He gives an example, “if a tourist resort that the Crusaders patronize in Indonesia is hit, all of the tourist resorts in all of the states of the world will have to be secured by the work of additional forces, which are ... a huge increase in spending.”<sup>36</sup>

The global jihadis’ operational-level strategy to defeat the U.S. combines the active and passive components: strikes against U.S. interests are planned *with the intention* that they incur a military response. Thus, in addition to the destruction of the direct object of the attack, the jihadis also benefit from drawing U.S. forces into hostile territory, an expensive effort that makes them vulnerable to attrition. At the same time, the bare-faced U.S. invasion – instead of the

usual cloak of benevolence hiding a political, cultural and economic assault – incites Muslim wrath against the invaders. Al-Qaeda security chief Sayf al-Adel writes that the 9/11 attacks were planned with the intention of drawing a military response out of the U.S. as well as inflicting damage on the direct targets of the attack:

Our main objective, therefore, was to deal a strike to the head of the snake at home to smash its arrogance... The second objective of this strike was the emergence of a new virtuous leadership for this world... Third, our ultimate objective of these painful strikes against the head of the serpent was to prompt it to come out of its hole. This would make it easier for us to deal consecutive blows to undermine it and tear it apart. It would foster our credibility in front of our nation and the beleaguered people of the world.<sup>37</sup>

In the published views of the global jihadis, the results of the 9/11 attacks initially worked against their interests due to material and personnel losses suffered in subsequent U.S. operations in Afghanistan, but they are now making up for lost ground. Al-Suri published his 1,600 page encyclopedia of jihad in December 2004 because he felt that his generation of jihadis had been essentially destroyed by the unexpected success of the U.S. GWOT; he left his book to guide a new generation when it appeared.<sup>38</sup> By August 2006, a jihad authority known as Lewis Atiyatallah wrote in an on-line interview that the attack's initial negative impact on jihad had died off and been replaced by continuous growth.<sup>39</sup> The Al-Qaeda-affiliated web site Al-Thabitun Ala al-Ahd takes this view further in a November 2006 article, in which the writer assesses that almost all of Al-Qaeda's stated goals for the attacks have been met, and the last one, the actual destruction of the U.S., could be achieved through the U.S. response to one more 9/11-quality attack:

By drawing the enemy into direct combat engagement without proxies Al-Qa'ida wanted to realize an eighth valuable objective: to subject the enemy to a bloody exhaustion -- first, to bleed him dry economically, and then to bleed him humanly, socially, and psychologically in a way he cannot bear or compensate. This is what will lead him to defeat in the end and to turn in on himself, losing the ability, desire, or determination to continue the conflict. This will surely be accompanied by social and civil collapses within the enemy. At best, his state may disappear; at worst, his power to intervene in Muslim affairs will collapse... I still link this to another blow directed at the enemy like the blessed September blow. The enemy then will summon up his final strength and resources, and afterward there will be nothing for him but complete collapse -- or at least complete withdrawal into himself to lick his wounds in shame and grief.<sup>40</sup>

## Creating Emirates

As described above, the global jihadis predict a time in which the U.S. invasion of the Muslim world has been halted and it is even possible that the U.S. itself has broken apart as the

Soviet Union did upon encountering the Afghanistan jihad.<sup>41</sup> With the U.S. gone, or at least unable to interfere, they plan to claim areas inside the Muslim world and install their own rule. Former Al-Qaeda-in-the-Arabian-Peninsula leader Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin wrote several journal articles describing classic Maoist guerrilla warfare as a prescription for how the global jihadis can defeat local authorities and gain territory,<sup>42</sup> while Naji and Al-Suri offer other strategies for this stage of the campaign.

In his book *Idarat at-Tawahush* [The Management of Savagery], Naji describes a three-stage campaign to build an emirate, comprised of 1) “vexation and exhaustion;” 2) “management of savagery;” and 3) “establishment of the state.”<sup>43</sup> “Vexation and exhaustion” uses guerrilla-style attacks to weaken the enemy. As attacks continue, the ruling regimes overextend themselves economically and militarily in an effort to protect a large number of resources. Eventually, they are forced to prioritize their efforts, drawing their most capable troops into the center of the state to protect the ruling regime itself, while peripheral areas are protected by the weakest troops. Under attack and with their deaths imminent, those troops either break under jihadi attack or join the jihadi side.<sup>44</sup> As government control is broken in a region, it becomes a region of chaos. “Management of savagery” has a double meaning. On one level it refers to the entire project of dealing with the West and apostate Muslim leaders, while as a discrete stage in the campaign it focuses on restoring basic services and instilling governance. The tasks for this stage are: 1) spread and preserve internal security; 2) provide food and medicine; 3) secure the region from external attack; 4) establish shari’a justice; 5) train the youths to create a fighting society; 6) work for the spread of shari’a science and worldly sciences; 7) construct an intelligence agency; 8) unite the people through money and shari’a governance; 9) force domestic hypocrites to hide their unbelief and comply with authority; 10) attack the enemies; 11) establish coalitions; and 12) advance managerial groups to participate as an emirate in the caliphate.<sup>45</sup> As this governance matures, neighboring regions link together in the third stage of the campaign.<sup>46</sup>

Al-Suri’s strategy is inspired by guerrilla war theories of Mao Tse-Tung, Fidel Castro, and “Che” Guevara.<sup>47</sup> His concept of “individual jihad,” described above, takes the place of the early guerrilla stages of the conflict in which the stronger nation is weakened by the guerrillas. Al-Suri’s second phase, “jihad on open fronts,” corresponds to the stage in which guerrilla action augments the efforts of regular armies to win control of territory.<sup>48</sup> Having observed jihad experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, however, he concludes that “jihad on open fronts” is simply not possible as long as the U.S. military remains in the picture.<sup>49</sup> He warns, “open confrontation with America or many of her military allies is impossible as long as America

can maintain complete hegemony with its overwhelming technological capabilities,”<sup>50</sup> and “beware of an overt jihad, centralized in open battlefronts, or clearly delineated domain, unless it is unavoidable, as long as the American military force is not abolished and their surveillance terminated, especially in the air.”<sup>51</sup> He advises the movement to focus now on weakening the enemy throughout Muslim lands rather than fight wasteful battles against the U.S. military.

### Connecting Emirates

As viable emirates appear in the world, they enter an already-existing global jihad network. Fleeing from repression (and justice) in their homelands, many global jihadis found refuge in other countries throughout the world. There, empowered by the information revolution, they have created a networked organization that meets, organizes, raises funds, moves ideas and activates its target audiences through the Internet and mass media. Al-Qurashi notes:

America today is facing a huge problem with Clausewitz's theories. The latter are premised on the existence of a centralized hostile power with a unified command. Assuredly, the mujahidin, with the al-Qa'ida organization in their vanguard, believe in decentralized organizations. Thus the enemy cannot ascertain the center of gravity, let alone aim a mortal blow at it. The relation between cells appears, according to some sources, so delicate that they use only electronic means of communication.<sup>52</sup>

Global jihadi leadership hidden in the mountains of western Pakistan can recruit and focus the efforts of foot soldiers throughout the world, supported by jihad intellectuals in the capitols of Europe and religious authorities in Europe and the Middle East. Even when landless, this networked entity exerts enough power and control and owns sufficient resources that some within the global jihad movement consider it to be the equivalent of a state.<sup>53</sup>

This network greeted the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Somalia in June 2006 in the form of the Islamic Courts Union, and it was not damaged when Ethiopian-led forces overthrew the government in December.<sup>54</sup> The network welcomed the Islamic State of Iraq (or ISI, composed of Al-Anbar and several other Iraqi provinces) in October 2006; somewhat cautiously, because it has yet to exert full control over its territory, but by the end of the year saw in the ISI the nucleus of the caliphate.<sup>55</sup>

### A Historical Perspective

In their design for popular revolution, the global jihadis turn to communist leaders Mao Tse-Tung and Ernesto “Che” Guevara as sources for guerrilla strategy.<sup>56</sup> Though the environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century differs from that of Mao’s and Guevara’s era – most notably in the existence of global mass media and the Internet, and the presumed availability of weapons

of mass destruction – history’s lessons about those communist revolutionaries highlights a potential shortcoming in the global jihadis’ strategy.

Following the successful Cuban revolution, Guevara made an important modification to communist revolutionary theory when he proclaimed “it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.”<sup>57</sup> Guevara used this concept, called focoism, in his subsequent failed revolutions in The Congo and Bolivia. Documented in Regis Debray’s *Revolution in the Revolution?*, focoism resulted from an argument as to whether the political or the military arm of revolution had primacy in the early stages of the conflict. To Guevara and Debray, the course of the revolution starts with a military unit, a “foco,” that undertakes attacks against the government. As military attacks become successful, the population sees the apparent strength of the guerrillas in contrast to the weakness of the government and is inspired to join the guerrilla cause. Later, as the revolution gains ground, the military foco starts to exercise political leadership as well.<sup>58</sup> The foco approach uses military action to *create* the revolutionary climate necessary for the desired political change.<sup>59</sup> The result was what one commentator called an inversion of Clausewitz’s principle that war is a continuation of the political struggle by other means; instead, the political struggle becomes a continuation of war.<sup>60</sup> In Guevara’s case, testing his theory proved deadly when the Bolivian peasants he wanted to lead in revolution betrayed him to government forces, demonstrating that the guerrilla cannot expect to hide among a population “like a fish in the sea” *before* that population has been brought to his cause.<sup>61</sup>

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, global jihad faced a crisis. Through the 3<sup>rd</sup> Crusade, America had accelerated its penetration into the Muslim world and was poised to dominate. Though they had worked for decades to build popular support for their cause, the global jihadis had not realized the revolutionary climate necessary for their people to spontaneously rise up and resist the American invasion. Instead, as they saw it, the Muslim people were still firmly under the control of corrupt apostate rulers, lulled into passivity by the false promise of peaceful political progress through elections and internal reform and unwilling to risk what they had by engaging in open resistance. With their philosophical emphasis on jihad as an armed struggle, it was logical for the global jihadis to turn to focoism to ignite revolution.<sup>62</sup> Sayf al-Adel states the fundamental reason behind the 9/11 attacks was to waken the sleeping umma:

Our objective, therefore, was to prompt the Americans to come out of their hole and deal powerful strikes to the body of the nation that did not exist. Without these strikes there would be no hope for this nation to wake up. The entire masses of the nation with their financial capabilities and high morale would defeat the enemy... The sleeping nation will soon wake up. The Americans, their allies, and their lackeys have been fooled.<sup>63</sup>

This philosophy is echoed by Al-Suri, Naji, and others.<sup>64</sup> In classic foco manner, the global jihadis see military attacks as the best means to show America's true weakness and vulnerability, gain followers, and create momentum for political change.<sup>65</sup>

Historians note, "Mao and Giap might have told Guevara and Debray that foco violence, rather than catalyzing revolution, would instead expose the revolutionary movement at its weakest moment to a crushing counterattack."<sup>66</sup> Al-Suri would agree; in his view, the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks led to a crisis in global jihad that has all but wiped out his generation of jihadis: "The jihadist movement in its entirety, its organizations, leaders, symbols, and ranks, indeed, all of its supporters, are today passing through the most severe trial the modern jihadist movement has faced since its launch 40 years ago. This is because of the unjust campaign America is conducting against it under the banner of 'fighting terror.'"<sup>67</sup> He goes on to list categories of leadership, cadres, financial resources, and sympathizers lost to them in the U.S.-led GWOT; 80 percent of them at his estimate. Most importantly, the loss of Afghanistan as a sanctuary deprived them of the ability to effectively indoctrinate and train new members.<sup>68</sup> What remains to be seen is whether the networked, international nature of the global jihad movement is resilient enough to protect it from the type of counterattack that ended Guevara's Bolivian adventure.

## Conclusion

Though the global jihad strategists write primarily to motivate followers and display their vision, they occasionally refer revealingly to actions their enemy takes that work against their movement. Actions that call into question the internal legitimacy of the movement are deemed particularly effective, and include statements by Islamic religious authorities opposing global jihad, deaths of Muslim civilians caused by jihad, and conflating their movement with those of jihadis that even they consider to be wrong-headed extremists.<sup>69</sup> (An example of the last is Algeria's Armed Islamic Group or GIA, which regarded the Muslim communities that live under the current secular government to be complicit in their rule, and carried out massacres that killed tens of thousands of Muslim civilians.<sup>70</sup>) Mujahidin targeting of Iraqi Shi'a Muslims repeatedly raises the specter of the deaths of Muslim civilians caused by jihad, prompting an uneasy dialogue within the movement. In a captured letter to former Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq leader Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri cautioned against the practice as it did not play well to their Muslim audiences.<sup>71</sup> Others, like Al-Ayiri, consider the Shi'a to be renegades and collaborators with the West, and therefore justifiable targets.<sup>72</sup> To be

effective, any challenge to the movement's legitimacy with respect to its own rules can only come from within the Islamic community.

American planners can benefit greatly from the global jihadis' strategic writings by viewing U.S. actions and strategy in the light of the jihadis' very different perceptions and philosophy. America's challenge is great: though the U.S. cannot simply absorb strikes crafted to create maximum destruction and refuse to respond, the global jihadis will continue to try to turn any American military response to her disadvantage. While the West cannot afford to neglect the ungoverned regions of the world, the global jihadis will continue to paint U.S. and Western military involvement in the Muslim world as an invasion. The global jihadis make clear that creating instability is a key component of their strategy, and the West must play its role in restoring order and mitigating adverse conditions in regions the jihadis would otherwise try to bring under their sole control. Taliban-style rule should not be the only option offered to the victims of anarchy; instead, promoters of democracy should make sure such people have other alternatives, forcing the jihadist vision to compete within an open marketplace of ideas. Finally, America's declared policy of promoting democracy<sup>73</sup> is problematic as it confronts issues of religion and governance that reach beyond the global jihadis into the much broader Islamist movement. The U.S. would do better to seek common ground with Islam by emphasizing the core beliefs behind its democratic philosophy: representative government that responds to the people and protects human rights and dignity. The U.S. must also remember that democracy is no panacea; the phenomenon of increasing radicalization of British Muslim youths shows that even the opportunities offered by life in a modern democratic nation may be insufficient to defeat the idea of jihad.<sup>74</sup>

Global jihadis' strategic writings show how they have translated their philosophies and experiences into plans for action; plans they continue to prosecute to this day. To understand and counter their strategy, the U.S. must take advantage of the insights their writings provide into their ideology, their formative experiences, and their goals.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> One of those aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93, is believed to have been targeted at the White House but was brought down by its passengers short of its goal.

<sup>2</sup> *Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan*, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 March 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant Choy, US Central Command Public Affairs Office, telephone interview by author, 12 March 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Dr Sherifa Zuhur of Strategic Studies Institute, interview by author, 2 February 2007, Carlisle, PA.

<sup>5</sup> Abu-Mus'ab Al-Suri, *The Call to Global Islamic Resistance*, trans. CENTRA Technology, Inc, sponsored by the DCIA Counterterrorism Center, Office of Terrorism Analysis (2004), 513; linked from *Open Source Center, Jihadist Ideology and Strategy Community Page* at "Jihadi and Salafi Library/Abu-Mus'ab Al-Suri/The Call to Global Islamic Resistance," available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_6093\\_989\\_0\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6719634/pdffilenov2006.pdf](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_6093_989_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6719634/pdffilenov2006.pdf); Internet; accessed 9 January 2007. Al-Suri is Syrian militant with Spanish citizenship. (Most of the names by which the global jihadis are known are kunyas, reflecting the practice in Arabic of referring to a man by his son's name or a nickname, and are used as noms-de-guerre or pen-names.) Abu-Musab al-Suri, a.k.a. Umar Abd al-Hakim, is actually Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, and was a key figure in global jihad before his reported capture in Pakistan in November 2005. Al-Suri served in the Afghan-Arab training camps from 1987-92. He spent several years in Spain and the United Kingdom, before he moved back to Afghanistan in 1998 where he ran a military training camp and a media center. Al-Suri considers the West's current involvement in the Muslim world as a follow-on to the Crusades of 1095-1291.

<sup>6</sup> Al-Suri, 542-547.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Suri, 113-114.

<sup>8</sup> Al-Suri, 110-113.

<sup>9</sup> Al-Suri, 116.

<sup>10</sup> Al-Suri, 45-46. See also Open Source Center, "Reasons Behind Fall of Baghdad Analyzed," 17 April 2003 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030422000163?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030422000163?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 28 October 2006. This article is a translation of Abu-'Ubayd al-Qurashi's, "Why Did Baghdad Fall?" originally published in *Majallat Al-Ansar* in April 2003. According to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) *Militant Ideologists' Atlas*, Abu-'Ubayd al-Qurashi is the pseudonym of an Al-Qaeda leader and strategist, a close aide to bin Ladin. He was a frequent contributor to the jihad journal (print and online) *Al-Ansar*. His writings are generally devoted to jihad strategy and insurgency tactics. In this author's view, Al-Qurashi often interprets the West and Western ideas for his jihadi audience.

<sup>11</sup> Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad," 1 August 2003 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030929000003?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030929000003?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 20 October 2006. This article is a translation of Shaykh Yusuf Bin Salih Al-Ayiri's *The Future of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad: The Religious, Military, Political, and Economic Future*, originally published by the Center for Islamic Studies and Research (al-Nida), July/August 2003. According to Thomas Hegghammer, Al-Ayiri was a Saudi ideologist and veteran of the first Afghan War in the 1980s. From about 2000 until his death in late May 2003, he was bin Ladin's main contact in Saudi Arabia. He played an important ideological role as administrator of the website Markaz al-Dirasat wa-l-Buhuth al-

Islamiyya [Center for Islamic Studies and Research] and as author of several innovative strategic studies. (Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War," available from [http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Hegghammer-Global\\_Jihadism\\_Afte\\_76427a2.pdf](http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Hegghammer-Global_Jihadism_Afte_76427a2.pdf); Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.)

<sup>12</sup> This view of God's (vs human) sovereignty is a common belief in Islam, called "hakmiyya." In this philosophy, human governments exist to ensure God's law is followed, not to exercise sovereignty in their own right.

<sup>13</sup> Al-Suri, 957. See also Al-Ayiri (Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad") and Abu-Muhammad 'Aasim Al-Maqdisi, "Democracy: A Religion!" trans. Abu-Muhammad al-Maleki (n.p.: At-Tibyan Publications, n.d.): 5, linked from Al-Ilm at "Democracy-a religion-pdf," available from <http://www.alilm.org.uk/>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Al-Suri, 957.

<sup>15</sup> Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad."

<sup>16</sup> Al-Suri, 1041-1043 and Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad."

<sup>17</sup> Al-Suri, 119-120 and Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad."

<sup>18</sup> Al-Suri, 119. Al-Ayiri and Abu Bakr Naji make the same argument. See Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad" and Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, trans. William McCants (2005), available from [http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Management\\_of\\_Savagery.pdf](http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf); Internet; accessed 29 August 2006, 6. According to Mr. McCants, Abu Bakr Naji is probably a pseudonym. He has been referred to as a Tunisian on a jihadi forum and as a Jordanian in an *al-Watan* article. His book, *Idarat at-Tawahush* [The Management of Savagery], was posted on the jihadi forum *al-Ikhlās* in March 2005 and later uploaded to Al-Qaeda's on-line library, tawhed.ws. (William McCants, e-mail message to author, 20 September 2006.)

<sup>19</sup> Syed Qutb, *Milestone*, 49, linked from *Studies in Islam and the Middle East (SIME) Journal Home Page* at "Most recent books/Qutb's Milestone," available from <http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007. *Milestone* is an English-language translation of Qutb's *Ma'lim fi al-Tariq* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1964).

<sup>20</sup> Frederick W. Kagan, "The New Bolsheviks: Understanding Al Qaeda," *National Security Outlook* (November 2005) [database on-line]; available from Columbia International Affairs Online; accessed 8 March 2007. Kagan offers a comparison of the issues and approaches to global Islamic revolution and the Bolshevik theory. The jihadis themselves firmly reject comparison with an avowedly atheist movement, and Al-Suri goes to some length to explain that the Communist revolution was actually a Jewish plot to separate the rest of the world's peoples from their God. He notes that all the major Bolshevik theorists (Lenin, Trotsky, etc) were Jews. Al-Suri, 514.

<sup>21</sup> Qutb, 10, 58-59, 74.

<sup>22</sup> Montasser Al-Zayyat, *The Road To Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man*, trans. Ahmed Fekry (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 7-8. See also Al-Suri, 1356.

<sup>23</sup> The best known participatory Islamists are the Muslim Brotherhood organizations. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood currently holds almost 20 percent of the seats in Egypt's parliament. Though the party is officially banned in Egypt, its members were allowed to run as independents in the 2005 parliamentary elections winning 88 of 454 seats. See Scott MacLeod, "Look Who's Getting Votes," *Time*, v. 166 no. 25 (2005): 54 [database on-line]; available from Wilson OmniFile; accessed 8 March 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Al-Suri, 660-667. Al-Suri describes four "currents" of what he calls the Islamic Awakening: an apolitical current that eschews politics and focuses on teaching, charitable works and advocacy to re-establish man's relationship with God and reform society at the grass-roots level; a political current that participates in elections and parliaments to achieve political power and establish Islamic rule; a jihad current that rejects political participation in current governments and uses armed action to overthrow those governments and establish an Islamic state (or emirate) in its place; and what he calls an "aberrant and asymmetrical" current, which perceives the Muslim population as corrupt and either rejects Islam entirely or engages in massacres to cleanse the umma of its sins. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria is an example of the aberrant current.

<sup>25</sup> Al-Suri, 1116.

<sup>26</sup> The caliphate is a single Muslim state operated as the Prophet did the first Muslim state. "Caliph" means "successor" in Arabic; the caliph is the successor to the Prophet in that he guides the people of Earth to live in accordance with God's laws in all respects: politically, economically, and socially as well as religiously. The caliphate is the physical and political form of government over the lands and peoples the caliph guides.

<sup>27</sup> Qutb, 74.

<sup>28</sup> See Combating Terrorism Center, "A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi," available from <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-600113-Trans.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006. This document, a trip report signed by Sayf Al-Adel, is one of the documents released by the CTC as part of the Harmony project in which documents captured in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban were released. Al-Adel's trip report shows the process of winning over a local population by going into an area of ineffective governance and establishing order, on a small scale. Another Harmony document, "Five Letters to the Africa Corps," gives a glimpse of the jihadis' operations after the departure of the Soviets but before the Taliban had won control of Afghanistan. See Combating Terrorism Center, "Five Letters to the Africa Corps," available from <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-600053-Trans.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Naji 16-17, and Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, "Toward a New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier," trans. Open Source Center; linked from *Open Source Center, Jihadist Ideology and Strategy Community Page* at "Jihadi and Salafi Library/Muhammad Al-Hakaymah/Toward a New Strategy," available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_6017\\_989\\_0\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6732813/GMP20061023298001001.pdf](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_6017_989_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6732813/GMP20061023298001001.pdf); Internet; accessed 21 November 2006. According to the London Telegraph (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/12/10/>

wafg110.xml), Egyptian-born al-Hakaymah is considered Al-Qaeda's new spymaster. Recently seen alongside Zawahiri in an Al-Qaeda video, he is believed to be hiding in the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, from where he has been studying Western intelligence services.

<sup>30</sup> Al-Suri, 1392.

<sup>31</sup> Al-Suri, 1367-1368.

<sup>32</sup> Naji, 7.

<sup>33</sup> Open Source Center, "Commentator Faults US Identification of al-Qa'ida's 'Center of Gravity'; Sees Economy as US's Vulnerable 'Center of Gravity'," 19 December 2002 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030122000038?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030122000038?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 28 October 2006. This article is a translation of Abu-'Ubayd Al-Qurashi's, "A Lesson in War", originally published in *Majallat Al-Ansar* in December 2002, 10-16. See also Naji, 8.

<sup>34</sup> See Open Source Center, "Writer Analyzes Political Thought in 'Imam' Bin Ladin's Latest Speech," 27 February 2002 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20020307000166?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20020307000166?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 28 October 2006. This article is a translation of an article by Abu-Ayman al-Hilali: "Highlights on the Political Thinking of Imam Bin Ladin in Light of His Latest Speech," originally published in *Majallat Al-Ansar* in February 2002. According to the CTC's Militant Ideologists' Atlas, Abu-Ayman al-Hilali was a one-time "official interpreter" for Usama bin Ladin and Saudi Al-Qaeda member. See also Naji, 19, and Open Source Center, "Al-Qa'ida-Affiliated Book Sets Rules for Attacking Economic, Oil Interests," 28 March 2006 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20060328336001?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20060328336001?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 28 October 2006. This article is the translation of a book by Shaykh Abd-al-Aziz bin Rashid Al-Anzi entitled *The Religious Rule on Targeting Oil Interests*, originally published by the Center for Islamic Studies and Research (al-Nida). Naji and Al-Anzi write that the petroleum industry is a particularly attractive target because it furnishes the means for the US to carry out its domination of the world.

<sup>35</sup> Mujahidin Services Center, "Jihad in Iraq: Hopes and Dangers," trans. FBIS, linked from *Open Source Center, Jihadist Ideology and Strategy Community Page* at "Jihadi and Salafi Library/Other Literature/Jihad in Iraq: Hopes and Dangers," available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_6018\\_989\\_0\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/4727998/GMP20040728000229001.pdf](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_6018_989_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/4727998/GMP20040728000229001.pdf); Internet; accessed 8 January 2007. According to the book's preface, the original draft was completed in September 2003, but it was not disseminated until later that year. The anonymous authors conclude that the US ally most easily driven out of the coalition would be Spain, and that this could be accomplished with a few significant operations against her forces. After the Madrid attacks on 3/11/2004, there was a lot of speculation that the attackers were working according to the plan stated in the document. (See Dr. Reuven Paz, "PRISM Special

Dispatches," vol. 2, no. 1, available from [http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM\\_Special\\_dispatch\\_no\\_1-2.pdf](http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_Special_dispatch_no_1-2.pdf); Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.)

<sup>36</sup> Naji, 19.

<sup>37</sup> Open Source Center, "Detained Al-Qa'ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles Al-Zarqawi's Rise in Organization," 6 June 2005 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20050606371001?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20050606371001?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 19 January 2007. This article is a translation of a chapter in *Al-Zarqawi: The Second al-Qa'ida Generation*, by Fouad Hussein, published in Arabic in 2005 and serialized in *Al-Quds al-Arabi*. The chapter presents a letter written by Sayf Al-Adel to Fouad Hussein. According to [http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/saif\\_al-adel.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/saif_al-adel.htm), Sayf al-Adl is one of al-Qaeda's security chiefs, reporting directly to bin Laden. He signed his letter as "Official in Charge of Security for the Global al-Qa'ida of Islam Army." See also Naji, 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Al-Suri, 27.

<sup>39</sup> Open Source Center, "Jihadist Forum Interviews Atiyatallah," 9 August 2006 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_240\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6290238?action=advancedSearch&highlightQuery=eJzT8MrMSEzJLC5RcPRzUXDLLyrNBbM880pSi8oyU8uLwVzHksZKxJLEnJzEDE0Aui4RYg%3D%3D&fileSize=0](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6290238?action=advancedSearch&highlightQuery=eJzT8MrMSEzJLC5RcPRzUXDLLyrNBbM880pSi8oyU8uLwVzHksZKxJLEnJzEDE0Aui4RYg%3D%3D&fileSize=0); Internet; accessed 24 February 2007. On 7 August, a jihadist website posted a new add-on to an interview entitled "A Dialogue with Atiyatallah on Recent Jihad Movement," in which Shaykh Atiyatallah answered questions posed by various forum members on various issues. Shaykh Atiyatallah is the pen-name for an Al-Qaeda ideologue whose true identity is unknown.

<sup>40</sup> Open Source Center, "Jihadist Website Analyzes Al-Muhajir Statement, Al-Qa'ida Strategy," 15 November 2006 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20061129281001?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20061129281001?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 21 February 2007. This is a translation of an article written by Yaman Mukhaddab entitled "Al-Qa'ida Between a Past Stage and One Announced by Al-Muhajir", posted on a jihadist website on 14 November 2006. Though Yaman Mukhaddab is not well known, the web site that featured his article is run by the Egyptian Muhammad Khalil Al-Hakaymah, a prominent Al-Qaeda member.

<sup>41</sup> Naji, 7-10. Al-Ayiri (Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad") comments that many US states are already trying to secede from the union; severe damage to the US would presumably spur that process along.

<sup>42</sup> Al-Muqrin's description of guerrilla warfare were published in the on-line jihad training magazine *Mu'askar Al-Battar* in its first five issues, published January through March 2004. See *Open Source Center, Jihadist Ideology and Strategy Community Page* at "Jihadi and Salafi Library/Abu-Hajir Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin/Al-Battar Articles," available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20040121000214?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20040121000214?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 5 February 2007. According to the CTC's Militant

Ideologists' Atlas, Al-Muqrin became leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in March 2004 and was the first of a number of leaders of the group targeted by Saudi authorities. He was killed during a June 2004 raid by Saudi forces.

<sup>43</sup> Naji, 15.

<sup>44</sup> Naji, 15-19. A region is considered 'suitable' due to its geographical features, the weakness of its ruling regime, and the presence of jihadi thought and weapons. Naji writes that his leadership has identified the following areas on which to focus mujahidin efforts: Jordan, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Northwest Africa.

<sup>45</sup> Naji, 17-19. It appears that the stage of "management of savagery" is analogous to what the US military community refers to as Phase IV, Stability Operations, where order is externally imposed on a society and basic services restored. Naji's third phase, "Establishment of the State," appears to take the place of Phase V, Enable Civil Authority and beyond, where the emirate becomes a self-sufficient political entity participating in a community of nations.

<sup>46</sup> Naji, 50-51.

<sup>47</sup> Al-Suri, 1368. Al-Suri is also thought to be the author of another document, "Lessons Learned from the Jihad Ordeal in Syria," in which he refers to Mao's theories extensively. See Combating Terrorism Center, "Lessons Learned from the Jihad Ordeal in Syria," available from <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-600080-Trans.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006.

<sup>48</sup> Al-Suri, 1367.

<sup>49</sup> Al-Suri, 1367-1368. Though one would think Iraq constitutes "jihad on open fronts," he writes (in Dec 2004) of Iraq as another example of how US military overmatch of the jihad forces prevents establishment of an open front at this time.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Suri, 66.

<sup>51</sup> Al-Suri, 1501.

<sup>52</sup> Open Source Center, "Commentator Faults US Identification of al-Qa'ida's 'Center of Gravity'; Sees Economy as US's Vulnerable 'Center of Gravity'." See also Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, "A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency," December 2005, 47; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=636>; Internet; accessed 9 September 2006.

<sup>53</sup> See Open Source Center, "Al-Ansar Writer Views, Compares Al-Qa'ida and US Elements of Power," 22 September 2002 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20021001000100?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20021001000100?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 28 October 2006. This article is a translation of Abu-'Ubayd Al-Qurashi's, "Strategic Equations", originally published in *Majallat Al-Ansar* in September 2002, 10-16. Al-Qurashi writes, "In many instances organizations, unlike countries, do not control territories. This argument becomes invalid when these organizations possess strong military and political tools. This was the case for many revolutionary organizations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

It also was the case with some Islamic organizations in Lebanon, Chechnya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. As a result, these Islamic organizations became important players that are impossible to ignore on the political stage of these countries.”

<sup>54</sup> Open Source Center, “Shaykh Atiyatallah Expresses Support for Islamic Courts in Somalia,” 10 January 2007 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20070110342001?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20070110342001?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 5 March 2007. See also *Islamic Courts Union*, available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic\\_Courts\\_Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Courts_Union); Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.

<sup>55</sup> Open Source Center, “Atiyatallah Congratulates Iraqi Mujahidin for 'Victories,' Explains Islamic State,” 17 January 2007 [database on-line]; available from [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_989\\_51\\_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20070117281001?action=advancedSearch](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20070117281001?action=advancedSearch); Internet; accessed 5 March 2007.

<sup>56</sup> Mao led communist forces in China, successfully evicting a Japanese occupying force and defeating Nationalist forces to establish a lasting communist government. Che Guevara was a leader in the successful Cuban revolution but followed with failed revolutions in The Congo and Bolivia. Both theorists strongly influenced the Arab Nationalist movement and Palestinian parties based in Syria, as well as the Communist movements of the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>57</sup> Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. J.P. Morray (Lincoln, N.B.: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 1.

<sup>58</sup> Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?*, trans. Bobbye Ortiz (New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 67-91.

<sup>59</sup> Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, “Introduction: Guerrilla Warfare, Revolutionary Theory, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America,” in Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. J.P. Morray (Lincoln, N.B.: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 14-19.

<sup>60</sup> The Political Commission of the Communist Party of El Salvador, “Epilogue,” in *El Diario del Che in Bolivia* (San Salvador: n.p., 1968), 244-246, quoted in Donald C. Hodges, *The Legacy of Che Guevara: A Documentary Study* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 101.

<sup>61</sup> The Political Commission of the Communist Party of El Salvador, 100-101.

<sup>62</sup> The global jihadis face a particular challenge in persuading their target populations to open warfare in that they are trying to replace a political system with another that differs from it only by a matter of degree: they seek *stricter* observance of Islam. Most Muslim countries already incorporate Islamic practices and laws into their constitutions to some extent (See *Assessing the Constitution of Islamic States*, available from [http://www.islamic-world.net/islamic-state/assessing\\_consti.htm](http://www.islamic-world.net/islamic-state/assessing_consti.htm); Internet; accessed 7 March 2007). And, as even the strict form of Islam that the jihadis promote allows consultation (shura), many jihadi organizations, like many Muslim governments, have a shura council or collective consultative body for decision-making, further blurring the line of what degree of representative government they consider to be true to Islam.

<sup>63</sup> Open Source Center, "Detained Al-Qa'ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles Al-Zarqawi's Rise in Organization."

<sup>64</sup> Al-Suri, 67; Naji, 9-10; Al-Hilali (Open Source Center, "Writer Analyzes Political Thought in 'Imam' Bin Ladin's Latest Speech").

<sup>65</sup> Naji and Hakaymah also echo Debray in insisting that political leadership should come from the military ranks. See Naji, 37-38; Hakaymah; and Debray, 67-91.

<sup>66</sup> John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 850.

<sup>67</sup> Al-Suri, 134

<sup>68</sup> Al-Suri, 119-124, 668, 1361.

<sup>69</sup> Al-Suri, 669-670.

<sup>70</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, "Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists)," available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

<sup>71</sup> See Ayman Al-Zawahiri's letter to Abu-Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, linked from Combating Terrorism Center Harmony Investigation Web Page at "Zawahiri's Letter to Zarqawi," available from <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10-05.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006.

<sup>72</sup> Open Source Center, "Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad."

<sup>73</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2006), 9-11.

<sup>74</sup> See Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja'far, *Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism* (London: Policy Exchange, 2007), 11-14; available from <http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/libimages/246.pdf>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2007.

