

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IS THE U.S. ARMY A LEARNING ORGANIZATION?

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 30 MAR 2007		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Is the U.S. Army a Learning Organization?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) John Williams				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel John D. Williams
TITLE: Is the U.S. Army a Learning Organization?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 6 March 2007 WORD COUNT: 10,406 PAGES: 32
KEY TERMS: Lessons Learned, Strategic Lessons
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In August 1994, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) released a seventy-page document entitled TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations. This document described many enabling capabilities of Force XXI, and also stated that the Army had become a "learning organization" through a process started in 1989.

There are five disciplines associated with learning organizations: shared vision, team learning, personal mastery, mental models, and systems thinking. In reality, the Army has not integrated these disciplines into its training regimens or daily operations.

If it truly wants to be a learning organization, the Army must continue working toward integration of each of these disciplines, establish standards for their integration, and determine metrics to measure learning organization behavior. In addition, the Army should:

- a. Update its vision and purpose statements to be more accessible for all Soldiers and civilians, and continue its focus on the Army values.
- b. Make a commitment to start training the learning organization's disciplines early in the careers of its Soldiers and civilians. It should also develop continuing learning plans and opportunities for senior Soldiers and civilians to help ensure that they implement change successfully, as well as internalize the disciplines of the learning organization.
- c. Work to change its culture and place more value on candor and the search for truth and reality among its Soldiers and civilians.
- d. Encourage commanders to use TRADOC's systems to assist them with lessons, and ensure that our organizations submit timely, accurate, and honest reports to TRADOC.

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Defining the Learning Organization

Peter Senge is a pioneer in the development of doctrine and training materials for learning organizations, and has been working in the field since the mid-1970s.³ Although neither he nor any other author writing on learning organizations are specifically referenced in the bibliography of TRADOC PAM 525-5, Senge's seminal, best-selling 1990 work, "The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization", predates the Army's pronouncement of its learning organization status and contains a number of the concepts repeated in the TRADOC pamphlet. Since creation of – as well as discussion of – learning organizations was a major business leadership movement of the early-1990s, and Senge is widely hailed as an expert in this field, it is reasonable to assume that Senge's book and principles had an impact on TRADOC PAM 525-5.

Senge defines a learning organization as one in which...“people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”⁴ He also states that “...through learning we become able to do something we never were able to do. Through learning we perceive the world and our relationship to it. Through learning we extend our capacity to create, to be part of the generative process of life.” According to Senge, there is within each of us a deep hunger for this type of learning.”⁵

The learning organization has five disciplines which Senge describes as “...vital dimensions in building organizations that can truly learn, that can continually enhance their capacity to realize their highest aspirations”.⁶ They are:

a. Building shared vision. This collective discipline establishes a focus on mutual purpose. There must be a genuine vision, rather than just the ubiquitous “vision statement”, to inspire employees. Examples from the world of business include products for the masses: Ford Motor Company’s vision of transportation, Apple Computer’s vision of computing, and Polaroid’s vision of instant photography. According to Senge these companies were able to inculcate their vision in their employees, and this led to their success because everyone knew what they were ultimately working toward, which led to commitment to the mission rather than simple compliance. A learning organization must have a shared vision.⁷

b. Team learning. This is a discipline of group interaction. Teams, not individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in modern, learning organizations. The key concept required for team learning is that members of the team suspend their assumptions, enter into dialog, and think together. Patterns of defensiveness tend to derail this process, and must be recognized by the teams.

c. Personal mastery. This is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening personal vision, of focusing personal energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively. Senge refers to this as the “cornerstone of the learning organization.”⁸ People with a high level of personal mastery are able to realize the results that matter most deeply to them consistently. They become committed to their own lifelong learning, expand their capacity to make better choices, and achieve more of the results that they have chosen.

d. Mental models . These are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and take action. By continually reflecting upon, talking about, and reconsidering these internal pictures of the world, people can gain more capability in governing their actions and decisions. An example of mental models is

when we see a person in nice clothes in an expensive car we normally assume that they must be wealthy. Conversely, when we see a person in shabby clothes, we may assume that they are homeless and out of work. In a similar fashion, new ideas and insights may be discounted immediately because they conflict with ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures; that is, mental models. Senge states that the discipline of working with mental models starts scrutinizing personal thought processes and avoiding the tendency to leap instantly to conclusions and assumptions. Henry Ford provided an example of jumping to invalid conclusions.

Years ago, an efficiency expert was hired by Henry Ford to examine the performance of the Ford Motor Company. The expert presented a report that was highly favorable, except for one employee whom he regarded with great suspicion. The expert told Henry Ford, "That lazy man over in that office wasting your money. Every time I go by, he's just sitting there with his feet on his desk." Henry Ford replied, "That man once had an idea that saved us millions of dollars." Ford added: "at the time he had the idea, his feet were planted right where they are now -- on that same desk."⁹

e. Systems thinking. Businesses and other organizations are systems in which interrelated actions – some visible and some invisible – influence each other constantly. Consequently, understanding these systems and their interaction, particularly during periods of change, can be extremely difficult. In this discipline, people learn to understand interdependency and change better, and thereby to deal more effectively with the forces that shape the consequences of our actions. Systems thinking is a conceptual framework – a body of knowledge – to make these systems clearer and to help change these patterns. This is the discipline – The Fifth Discipline – that integrates the other four and is concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to seeing wholes. Finally, this is a shift of mind to seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains, and seeing processes of change rather than snapshots.¹⁰

When trying to make sense of the world, an organization, or even a small group of people, it helps to think in terms of systems. Systems thinking is useful because among other things, it can be diagrammed into system archetypes. System archetypes describe common patterns of behavior in organizations. They help leaders recognize patterns of behavior that are already present in their organization, providing a way of predicting the future behavior of the organization.

There are many examples from the business world. For example, real estate developers continue building new houses until the market becomes saturated. As construction slows and

existing houses sell, the glut grows smaller until demand is greater than supply. Demand continues to grow, and construction resumes, restarting the cycle.

Did the Army incorporate learning organization doctrine such as these five disciplines into its operations during the period 1989-1994? Next we will examine each of the disciplines and their integration by the Army.

Shared Vision

A vision consists of the vision statement, a purpose, and values. Vision is the “what”, or the picture of the future we wish to create. Purpose, or mission, is the why in the vision statement. Core values answer the question of “How do want to act, consistent with the mission, along the path toward achieving our vision?”¹¹

The Army has a vision and purpose, and it is contained in Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army. They are:

2-23. The Army vision expresses how the Army intends to meet the challenges of the security environment.

Relevant and Ready Landpower in Service to the Nation

The Nation has entrusted the Army with preserving its peace and freedom, defending its democracy, and providing opportunities for its Soldiers to serve the country and personally develop their skills and citizenship. Consequently, we are and will continuously strive to remain among the most respected institutions in the United States. To fulfill our solemn obligation to the Nation, we must remain the preeminent land power on earth-the ultimate instrument of national resolve; strategically dominant on the ground where our Soldiers' engagements are decisive.¹²

This vision – *Relevant and Ready Landpower in Service to the Nation* – avoids what Senge calls a “ubiquitous vision statement” which is actually an abstract statement of purpose. However, the vision statement may not be strong enough to elicit strong reactions from Soldiers and civilians on a daily basis. As Senge states, vision is “a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s” while purpose is “advancing man’s capability to explore the heavens.”¹³ While the express purpose in Paragraph 2-23 in FM-1 is “...how the Army intends to meet the challenges of the security environment”, it should actually express a focus on mutual purpose. In other words, the vision statement should be a clear statement of what Soldiers and civilians are ultimately working toward, which leads to commitment to the mission rather than simple compliance.

The Army also has published core values as part of the vision. The values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. These values received

their impetus from the Army's Character Development XXI initiative and have been part of the Army's initial-entry training since July 1998, when dog tags and thousands of posters representing the values were distributed down to company level.¹⁴

Analysis. It is difficult to imagine how young Soldiers could read the Army's vision statement, internalize it, and use it to help guide their daily activities. Vision only becomes a force when people believe they can shape their future. The fact is that most people do not experience that they are contributing to creating their current reality, so the problems are created by somebody "out there" or "the system".¹⁵ However, the Army Values are inculcated beginning in Basic Training, and can be seen on posters in nearly every Army office. The Army's vision should be just as accessible, and part of the daily routine of the organization.

Team Learning

As stated earlier, teams, not individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in learning organizations. The key concept required for team learning is that members of the team suspend their assumptions, enter into dialog, and think together. In the U.S. Army, team learning is based on lessons learned.

As an organization, how does the Army gather information and interpret what is happening in its environment on a daily basis? All organizations interpret events and activities. People are continually trying to interpret what they have done, define what they have learned, and solve the problem of what they should do next.¹⁶ Daft and Wieck stated in the Academy of Management Review that organizations are open social systems that process information from the environment. Because the environment always features uncertainty, the organization must seek information and then base organizational action on that information. Second, individual human beings send and receive information and carry out the interpretation process. Third, strategic-level managers formulate the organization's interpretation of the information from the environment. Finally, organizations develop interpretation processes, and these systems tend to be either passive or active.¹⁷

Environmental scanning is the process of monitoring the environment and providing environmental data to managers. Scanning is concerned with data collection. Once the data are collected, they must be interpreted. Finally, learning involves a new response or action based on the interpretation.¹⁸ The Army, like any organization, conducts environmental scanning.

Also like any other organization, the Army's Soldiers and civilians are bombarded with information during the course of their on and off duty time, and the analysis of this information –

either consciously or unconsciously – shapes decisions that will affect the Army. This sensing leads to observations, insights, and lessons (OIL); tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and after action reviews (AAR). Through the lessons learned process, the Army has produced a procedure to capture observations and analysis in a structured way. This process is explained and codified in Army Regulation (AR) 11-33, *The Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP)*. The intent of the ALLP is “...to systematically correct Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) deficiencies through research, development, acquisition, and planning activities.”¹⁹

The responsibility for collecting and making sense of this information belongs to TRADOC. According to AR 11-33, the Commanding General, TRADOC, is the Army’s executive agent for the ALLP. He is responsible for the management and execution of the ALLP, and is also responsible for resourcing the implementation of the program. Under the TRADOC Commander, the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the Army specific proponent for the ALLP with the requisite resources and authority to implement the entire ALLP.

Finally, the CAC has a dedicated facility and staff focused on lessons learned. This organization is known as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), also located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The director of CALL, who works for the Commander of CAC, serves as the office of primary responsibility and action agent for CAC in the implementation of the ALLP. CALL’s mission statement is -

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collects and analyzes data from a variety of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produces lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons and other related research materials through a variety of print and electronic media.²⁰

Users visiting CALL’s website can log on and search vast archives of information for lessons relating to most military subjects and operations including both periodicals and user-submitted information. However, a search through the information on the CALL website can also be overwhelming. For example, a recent search for “improvised explosive device” (IED) on the CALL website returned 4,415 hits in 1,333 documents.²¹

Even though the Army has CALL, it has recently gone on-line with the Battle Command Knowledge System, or BCKS.

BCKS provides the Army a cadre of unit and functional area knowledge managers and the web-based capability necessary to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from those who have it to those who need it. A growing population of the Army Team; Soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians, and Contractors;

relies on BCKS to preserve and share intellectual assets among themselves and throughout an expanding system of Department of Defense information repositories.

BCKS directly supports the operational Army by connecting Subject Matter Experts to those who need timely and relevant information. It also supports the exchange of information amongst Soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians and contractors while providing a repository of information for users.²²

According to TRADOC, BCKS was implemented in response to soldiers' widespread use of email and chat-rooms to share war lessons.²³ However, the observations posted on BCKS may not be necessarily validated or even worthy of further consideration. TRADOC proponents are responsible for validating OIL, TTP, and AAR.²⁴ For example, the US Army Aviation Warfighting Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, is responsible for validating those OIL, TTP, and AAR relating to aviation operations.

While CALL and BCKS receive a great deal of attention, most lessons are presented to Army Soldiers and civilians in the form of training and doctrinal manuals. These manuals codify effective action so that it can be repeated, and their content is supplied in large part by the lessons learned process. They also provide the framework and the information used by the Army's education system, and clearly shape attitudes and actions of the Army more than individual lessons learned. When there is a change in a field manual (FM) governing a type of unit (a tank battalion, for example), there is a corresponding change to the Mission Training Plan (MTP) and Soldier's manuals. This is a directed change to operations and normally occurs on a schedule produced by the various TRADOC proponents. This process shapes the Army, and is part of the cultural bedrock of the organization. Therefore, even though Soldiers and civilians may not read and study doctrinal and TTP manuals, they have been exposed to, and have been shaped by the information in them by the process of attending Army schools or in training by Army units.

In the short term, the Army states that applying validated OIL is the responsibility of every commander.²⁵ Commanders at all levels are responsible for applying approved lessons to sustain, enhance, and maximize their unit's ability to conduct successful operations. However, these OIL must be validated by the proponent, and this brings up a critical question: Are the proponents within TRADOC responsive enough to validate OIL quickly to remain relevant during a warfight?

Based on several examples, there can be a mismatch between what is going on in the tactical Army and what is being worked on by TRADOC. For example, while the Army's Aviation Branch started AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopter fielding in 1998, as of this

writing the current attack helicopter employment manual was published in 1997. While it is a well-written manual, it contains no information on Longbow Apache employment, and fielding of the Longbow Apache to the active Army is complete. In this example, Soldiers have no reference for the employment of Longbow Apache equipped organizations other than unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), which are not standardized throughout the Army. In addition, there are ten years of Longbow Apache lessons learned that may have been captured but are not necessarily integrated into branch TTP manuals.

While tactical lessons learned and after action reviews may be outside the purview of this study, anecdotal evidence has shown that despite the pronouncement of being a learning organization, there are still some structural problems with how the Army processes lessons and learns as an organization.

I deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) for a rotation in 1992 as a company commander. During the final after action review (AAR), the senior controller emphasized that we should incorporate the findings and lessons from the rotation into our annual training program. My battalion commander stated that he would, and that he was excited to have these lessons in order to build a better unit. However, when we returned to home station, the AAR soon found its way onto a shelf in the S3 Section, and, to my knowledge, it was never referred to again during my remaining tenure in the unit.

In 2001 I attended the Aviation branch pre-command course prior to battalion command. During this course we received a briefing on lessons learned from the Senior Controller at NTC. The briefing he gave looked strikingly familiar to the one I had received nearly 10 years earlier as a company commander. During the question and answer session I asked the briefer why we are continually doing the same things, making the same mistakes, and apparently not getting any better. He had no answer other than “units are not training properly at home station” and “they are not following lessons learned.” That begged the question: “Whose lessons learned?”

This phenomenon was echoed in Congressional testimony in 1999 by COL John Rosenberger, commander of the Opposing Forces at the NTC. Rosenberger stated, among other things, that

...we are now seeing an absence of proficiency in the fundamentals of warfighting at the tactical level of war. For example, most crews, platoons, and companies display an inability to envision the terrain and its effects, and use it effectively to dominate and win the direct fire battle. Mounted forces at company team level display poor movement techniques, dispersion, and movement control. Most display an inability to mass and control direct fire systems, perform actions on contact, and employ mortars and artillery. The same goes for integration of direct fires, obstacles, and indirect fires. This declining level of proficiency in basic, foundation-level skills is the most ominous trend we see.²⁶

These comments were made about an organization which had won one of the most decisive land combat victories in history just eight years prior. In those eight years junior leaders who had served in combat during Operation Desert Storm had progressed through the organization and were serving as senior staff officers and commanders in the Army's battalions and brigades when Congress was given this grim assessment. Did the Army as an organization learn from the success in combat?

Recently, the NTC has undergone another transformation. In a recent article in *Military Review*, Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, Commander of NTC, reviewed his efforts on keeping the NTC relevant in the current warfight, highlighting his focus on "change". He stated that NTC has a "...focus on integrating lessons learned and best practices from theater into training scenarios. (Leaders) do not seek our interpretation of doctrinal solutions to their problems. Rather, they ask us to teach them the best practices being used in theater to address particular problem sets." He goes on to describe the NTC model for integrating lessons learned:

...The NTC has established a dynamic process to capture lessons learned and best practices from the theater. The NTC uses three major processes to stay current on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These processes allow us to triangulate observations about emerging trends in theater and thus develop greater confidence in the solutions we advocate to the problem sets we train units on. First, the NTC monitors a number of classified and unclassified websites to identify emerging trends. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Central Command, Multinational Force Iraq, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, as well as unit websites, provide valuable information about emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and evolving enemy trends. We also encourage units that have trained at the NTC to provide continuous feedback via the internet on their experiences. We ask them to offer suggestions to modify training. Second, the NTC sends observer/controllers (O/Cs) into theater to capture emerging trends and to conduct detailed studies of best practices and new problem sets. While passive collection from internet sites provides good background information, it is necessary to actively examine unit performance in a combat environment before advocating use of a particular practice to a training unit. Active observation allows O/Cs to understand the context surrounding the successful application of new TTPs. Trained units sponsor visits by O/Cs, and that established relationship often leads to greater rapport and continuity in the training process. Third, while some of our best teachers and coaches do not have recent combat experience, we actively seek combat veterans with OIF or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) experience to serve as O/Cs. Units appear to prefer O/Cs who can speak firsthand of their experiences in similar situations in combat. Over 80 percent of current field O/Cs have recent OIF/OEF experience, and that number will only increase with future assignment.²⁷

Interestingly, TRADOC is not mentioned once in the entire article on how to incorporate lessons learned. Also, while CALL is still relevant, this article shows that NTC prefers sending

O/Cs to theater for active LL collection. It also shows a potential mismatch between observations made by O/Cs and validated TRADOC lessons learned. Unfortunately, there is no measure of effectiveness that shows that NTC trains units to perform any better now than it has at any other time in the past twenty years.

The NTC isn't the only organization charting its own course concerning lessons learned. Recently the TRADOC commander, US Army General William S. Wallace, has expressed his concern about units internalizing lessons learned without sharing them with the greater Army and TRADOC. In an article entitled "Stryker Brigades 'Self-Reliance' Worries Army Training Command", the story of the Stryker brigade's lessons-learned process is portrayed as worrying to some Army officials. Specifically, the brigades have set up a high-tech communications center at Fort Lewis, Washington, where senior leaders and junior commanders receive day-to-day feedback from deployed troops. These detailed, unfiltered (and unvalidated by TRADOC) reports shape their training and preparation for combat.²⁸ While GEN Wallace commended the Stryker brigades for their efforts, he stated that "I like their connection to the operational force ... but we need to be careful we don't end up with multiple armies without a unified perspective."

GEN Wallace acknowledges that the Stryker brigades are not alone in their distrust of the institutional Army. "The operational Army tends not to reach out to TRADOC for help. They turn onto themselves," he said.²⁹ Finally, he stated that "They (Stryker brigades) can't just be a satellite spinning out of control over there. There's some fundamental things we need them to be consistent with — Army learning models, requirements, [and] the battle command knowledge system."³⁰

Based on these two examples, how does what is going on at NTC and inside the Stryker Brigades relate to what is being taught to Army captains in the Maneuver Captain Career Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky? In this 21-week course, captains start by learning about the company level, which is where they'll be working when they take company command, and progress to battalion and brigade level operations. A recent article in Army Times states that this course is based on "combat experience".³¹ Based on the examples of the Stryker Brigades and the NTC, is there any standardization applied to what is taught?

Much in this process is like the one Bob Lutz describes in his book "Guts". Lutz was the chairman of Chrysler Corporation in the early 1990s. His contention is that those who are supposed to do the heavy lifting in decision making – in our case, TRADOC – has to help the consumer – tactical commanders and units – make decisions because the latter are almost completely focused on short-term solutions. He states that the individual customer is not always

right, and seldom has the vision to offer ground breaking suggestions for the larger organization. Lutz says,

Today's shoppers are at best a rearview mirror, offering perspective on products that already exist. They can't supply you with ideas for tomorrow's breakthrough.³²

In a related statement, the new CEO of Ford Motor Company, Alan Mullaly, stated that Ford's founder, Henry Ford, said that if, when he founded his company, he had asked potential customers what they wanted, they would have said faster horses.³³ We as an Army may be continually asking for faster horses, while Model A's are available. We can probably also assume that all lessons are not worthy of consideration or destined to stand the test of time in Army manuals. People sometimes just get it wrong, and even subject matter experts are spectacularly wrong sometimes. A great example is the dire prediction of global cooling made by U.S. government scientists during the mid-1970s.³⁴ Had governments taken action immediately, the results could have been catastrophic and irreversible, and seem ridiculous in hindsight.

Analysis: Team Learning is based on lessons learned, and the Army clearly has a problem with its process of incorporating lessons learned. Currently the lessons learned process is focused almost entirely on collection, with apparently little effort going into analysis, synthesis, and incorporation of lessons. Particularly during warfighting operations, lessons available to warfighters must be relevant and quickly available from TRADOC, the Army's validation authority. Finally, simply restating OIL does not necessarily provide relevant lessons learned.

Personal Mastery

We've seen several organizations taking lessons learned into their own hands without involving TRADOC. Is this a reaction to a larger challenge? Specifically, what are the measures of effectiveness the Army uses to determine whether or not a unit does well?

The concept of the learning organization was developed for public sector corporations. As such, publicly-held corporations use earning per share (EPS) as a gauge of success and failure, and even privately-held corporations base their performance on earnings. But, since there is no profit motive in the Army, concrete measures are difficult to quantify. This shows part of the danger in adapting business practices in an organization in which business-like measures of performance are not used.

The Army is a meritocracy; that is, an organization in which the talented are chosen and moved ahead on the basis of their achievement³⁵, regardless of family or political affiliations.

However, in a meritocracy it is important to stand above one's peers to be noticed and promoted, preferably early (also known as "below the zone" in the Army.) This standing above is called "differentiation", and Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, is one of its chief proponents and has written about it extensively. Welch said, "In a bureaucracy, people are afraid to speak out. This type of environment slows you down, and it doesn't improve the workplace." Instead, Welch called for developing a corporate culture that encourages and rewards honest feedback. "You reinforce the behaviors that you reward," he explained. "If you reward candor, you'll get it."³⁶

Army officers are trained from an early age to be mission focused and goal oriented. To rate these officers' potential for future assignments, the Army uses the officer efficiency report (OER). The OER is a two-page form, and it forces the officer's supervisor to rate him into a specific band of performance. This rating occurs with the check of a block on the back of the OER form, and is almost always "above center of mass"³⁷ (in the top of the pack), or "center of mass" (in the middle of the pack), with strict limits on how many officers can be assessed in each based on the number of officers rated by the supervisor. Individual success can become an extremely important measure of effectiveness, and the words printed on the OER, as well as the block check, may become the measure of how well the officer and his unit actually did, regardless of other indicators.³⁸

Because it is generally held that one average efficiency report in a critical job is all that is required to keep an officer from being selected for command and promotion, commanders at all levels have a tendency to be reluctant to point out what they or their units did poorly. In other words, there is perception that candor is not rewarded. As British General Sir Ian Hamilton³⁹ observed in the early 1900s concerning the difficulty in finding true lessons from the battlefield:

The tendency of all ranks [is] to combine and recast the story of their achievements into a shape which shall satisfy the susceptibilities of nation and regimental vain-glory....On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms.⁴⁰

Clausewitz even noted this phenomenon in "On War". When describing critical analysis of warfare, he states that determining the facts of what really happened during war "are seldom fully known and the underlying motives even less so. They may be intentionally concealed by those in command, or ...may not have been recorded at all."⁴¹

In 1937, Dr. Alfred Vagts stated in "The History of Militarism" that "much of military history is misleading as a result of the authors' deliberate intentions, [while] most of the rest so stereotyped it is useless in determining what happened in any war. The confusion of battle is

perpetuated because generals edit the official reports, and word their orders in such an oracular fashion that victory, if it comes, can be traced to them, while failure, if it befalls, can be blamed on somebody else."⁴²

A related phenomenon is readily observable today. In a recent Los Angeles Times article, a junior Army officer criticizes another unit, and only does so under the condition of anonymity.

Until October, the main U.S. force in the province was the 4th Infantry Division. It largely followed the strategy laid down by top U.S. commanders in Iraq last year: Pull American forces back as much as possible and allow Iraqi troops to take the lead in fighting insurgents. U.S. officers here say that approach did not work. "4th ID tried to keep a low profile after they handed over security to the Iraqi army, but that approach backfired," said an officer with the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, which now has responsibility for the province. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because he was criticizing another U.S. military unit.⁴³

Could the officer cited above not have criticized the technique without criticizing the unit and that unit's commanders? Can we separate the unit and their actions? Are they so tied together that we can't really determine what happened? Did the 4th ID determine that its approach was flawed, and did we as an Army capture the proper lessons learned from this situation?

It must be noted that this discussion is not intended to cast Army officers as a group in which there is a clear choice between officers who deliberately and constantly cover-up their failures and those who will readily confess them. The assumption has to be that the majority of officers are somewhere in between, being embarrassed by their failures in a typically human way. Their embarrassment is not a path to deception; rather, it is something that they would prefer to avoid having to face.

But does the Army's meritocracy create officers who are incapable of admitting what they did was incorrect, or at least less than optimal? Psychologist Norman Dixon claims that officers get to the top because "they possess certain institutionally desirable characteristics: They are cautious, they adhere to rules and regulations, they respect and accept authority, they obey their superiors, and they regard discipline and submission to authority as the highest virtue."⁴⁴ Dixon claims that spending twenty-five to thirty years being promoted in a system like this produces an officer who lacks the flexibility, imaginativeness, and adventurousness needed in order to exercise command effectively.⁴⁵

In defense of the Army officer, his authority over his subordinates far exceeds that wielded by most business leaders or college professors, and this may temper that adventurousness. The officer can order the subordinate to his death, and control his actions 24 hours per day. He

can also punish the subordinate for misdeeds without the subordinate having the opportunity to quit his job and avoid it.

However, there may be a perception that Dixon's observations were correct. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel's (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to The Army from 2001 found that "micromanagement has become part of the Army Culture" and that there "is a growing perception that lack of trust stems from the leader's desire to be invulnerable to criticism."⁴⁶ This leader behavior is enabled because, as former Army general Walt Ulmer stated, "(the Army's).... monitoring system reacts promptly to selected misbehaviors such as driving under the influence or misusing a government sedan. But our sensors and mechanisms for responding to arrogant, abusive leaders who have not created a public spectacle are less well developed."⁴⁷

There may also be a more human explanation. Daniel Gilbert, a psychiatrist at Harvard University and author of the recent book "Stumbling on Happiness," writes that "If I wanted to know what a certain future would feel like to me I would find someone who is already living that future." However, "What we know from studies is not only will this increase the accuracy of your prediction, but nobody wants to do it," he said. "The reason is we believe we're unique. We don't believe other people's experiences can tell us all that much about our own. I think this is an illusion of uniqueness."⁴⁸

There may also be another explanation. Noted Harvard University management scholar Chris Argyris notes that "even if we feel uncertain or ignorant, we learn to protect ourselves from the pain of appearing uncertain or ignorant. That very process blocks out any new understandings which might threaten us." The consequence is what he calls "skilled incompetence."⁴⁹

This phenomenon – comfort in the familiar and fear of appearing ignorant – might be the genesis of this famous quote: "Sir Basil Liddell Hart's dictum -- that the real challenge is not to put a new idea into the military mind but to put the old one out...".⁵⁰

Analysis: Senge states that a key tenet of building a learning organization is "Building an organization where it is safe for people to create visions, where inquiry and commitment to the truth are the norm, and where challenging the status quo is expected – especially when the status quo includes obscuring aspects of current reality that people seek to avoid."⁵¹

Based on this study, the perception in the Army that candor and admitting mistakes will impact future assignments and promotions undermines the development of personal mastery. Soldiers and civilians will continually seek to avoid embarrassment and threat, and this leads to the avoidance of current reality. I believe it is not that they deliberately confuse or hide facts;

rather, they are aware that the Army rewards those who do well and the career stakes are so high for them that the natural tendency is for them to avoid confessing actions that might embarrass or threaten themselves or their superiors.

Mental Models

As stated earlier, mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and take action. In light of this, I have developed the following method to explain how Soldiers, civilians, and units scan the environment and incorporate lessons when presented with a mission or project, as shown in Figure 1. The model also shows how mental models influence this process.




Figure 1. Environmental scanning and execution

We've already seen that individual human beings send and receive information and carry out the interpretation process for the organization. In a hierarchical organization like the Army, people empowered to train and lead Soldiers tend to be in charge of both interpreting environmental sensing and incorporating lessons learned. The model shown in Figure 1 describes the process leaders use to incorporate lessons learned into operations. It describes a

process in which organizations execute missions in one of three ways. First, they execute the mission based on their frame of reference, which includes both personal experience and culture, Army training and publications, and the environment without reference to applicable lessons learned. Second, they execute the mission based on the same frame of reference in spite of known, applicable lessons learned. Finally, they execute the mission based on their frame of reference and knowledge gained from the lesson learned.

In this model, the leader is faced with a situation or requirement. His initial assessment is based on his frame of reference. In the case of an Army officer, that is the education and training process received in the Army, the officer's background (educational and economic) and values, and the operating environment. He, or his staff, continues to develop the situation based in large part on the time available to find a solution. Generally, a short amount of time available will generally lead to a known solution – one based on experience – because there is little ability to search for a better solution.

If time is available, someone has to seek out a lesson or recognize it. This is an active process probably involving reading a quarterly CALL newsletter, phoning or emailing a designated subject matter expert (SME), or visiting a website hoping to find a situation similar and a lesson applicable to that situation. Someone in the organization must become aware of a lesson and believe that it will apply. If the lesson is found and time is available, the source of the lesson must be credible and reliable. This is actually the first step in most cases, and this thought process may preclude a member of the organization from visiting one of the stock lessons learned sites on the Internet. It may also prevent the organization from investing time and effort into incorporating a lesson because it came from a source with no perceived credibility – either personal or institutional.

Once accepted, a qualitative "feasible, acceptable, suitable" (FAS) analysis is done, including another time analysis to determine if there is time to execute. If not, there will be an analysis of the LL based on whether or not the rejection is self-evident; that is, will the rejection stand up to scrutiny? An explanation for the rejection may have to be given to a superior or the person responsible for finding or championing the LL.

If the FAS analysis is positive, the organization must analyze and understand the lesson, and be able to put it in context. The leader has to understand the context of the lesson, the context of his situation, and understand the lesson from the narrative he receives, be it in an email, publication, or printed page from a website. It is important to note that the worth of a lesson is not always self-evident. If the leader concludes there is both reason and time to incorporate the LL, there will be a personal assessment completed. The personal analysis

looks at the feasible, acceptable, and suitable lesson learned and applies the *FADE analysis*. FADE stands for fear, agenda, denial, and ego, and, based on my research and experience, these are the four main reasons a leader will reject an applicable, validated LL. The elements of FADE are:

a. Fear. This applies to both fear of failure and change. This may be an admission that “what I’m doing now is not working”. When addressing fear, the commander might say, for example, “What if I try this lesson and it fails?” Frequently officers who think outside the box are labeled as reckless or “out of control”, and sometimes a label becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

b. Agenda. This refers to ignoring or confusing some facts in order to advance a specific agenda, pet theory, or project.

c. Denial. This normally involves the commander feeling that his situation is much different than the one stated in the lesson, also known as a feeling of uniqueness.

d. Ego. Ego refers to an exaggerated sense of self-importance or conceit.⁵² This is a variation of “this is the way I’ve always done it and I know this works” methodology. It may also appear as a denial of the lesson because of competition with or knowledge of the lesson’s submitting commander or unit.

When reviewing the flowchart, the real question is: What causes an educated, competent leader to discount a validated lesson learned such as those seen repeatedly at the NTC? For some reason, the commander decides that the lesson is not applicable even though he is in a like unit or situation to the unit stating the lesson. In reality, discarding the lesson probably occurs very early in the process. As stated in the description of mental models, new insights fail to get put into practice because they conflict with deeply held internal images of how the world works, and these images limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting.⁵³ In addition, we saw the reference to individual uniqueness in the last section, but there may also be an organizational answer.

This behavior is also related to organizational defensive routines. Chris Agyris has written extensively about the concept of organizational defensive routines which overprotect individuals or groups and inhibit them from learning new actions. These routines are learned early in life to deal with embarrassment or threat.⁵⁴ Agyris argues that they are reinforced by the organizational cultures created by individuals implementing strategies of bypass and cover-up, and they exist because organizational norms sanction and promote them. In addition, there is evidence that in large organizations, to have incomplete or faulty information can be a sign of weakness or, worse, incompetence.⁵⁵

Creating a new organization, operations center, committee, or strategic initiatives group can also be related to organizational defensiveness. It can be personal in that the new group can be a cover-up of poor job performance or incompetence. Senge states:

There is a tremendous tendency of people high in the organization to become remote from reality and the facts. The greatest manifestation of the fallacy of this dichotomy between the thinkers and the doers was the fad in the 60's to create strategic planning staffs separated from operational staffs. Once accepted, this further separated the world of thought from the world of reality.⁵⁶

Based on this information, the FADE analysis may take place very early in the process, and the lessons or other information is discounted almost immediately if there is any perception of potential embarrassment or threat, either personal or organizational.

If the lesson gets through the FADE analysis, the leader incorporates the lesson. This step is potentially the most difficult because it may involve changing the organizational behavior in order to implement the change. If this is the case, it will involve a great deal of leadership to implement the change. The organization's staff will be very involved in this step because there will generally be changes required to the unit processes and procedures.

And finally, we change our behavior – both personal and organizational. Through the change in daily operations, the personnel in the unit will change their behavior to incorporate the lesson. How does the commander of a unit know when the Soldiers and civilians in the unit have learned something? When they can produce what it is they claim they know.⁵⁷

Analysis: Based on the information presented, there is evidence that mental models affect the way the Army incorporates information and lessons learned into its operations. This can lead the Army to continually repeat lessons already learned based on perceptions of uniqueness and the lack of personal scrutiny. After studying these mental models, I believe that current examples show that they, in conjunction with FADE and organizational defensive routines, can keep otherwise creative people from accepting applicable lessons.

Systems Thinking

Systems thinking theory states that certain patterns of structure recur repeatedly in an organization. These "systems archetypes", or general structures, embody the key to learning to see structures in our organizational lives. They also suggest that not all leadership and management problems are unique even though we sometimes see them as such.⁵⁸ Mastering system archetypes helps leaders go beyond just solving a problem; it will help to understand and change the thinking that led to the problem in the first place.

Senge states that researchers have identified about a dozen unique, recurring systems archetypes made up of the same systems building blocks: reinforcing feedback, balancing feedback, and delays. In systems thinking, feedback refers to the reciprocal flow of influence; that is, both cause and effect because nothing is influenced in just one direction.

Reinforcing processes see small changes building upon themselves. Unchecked, these processes continue growth or decline. In reinforcing systems, a leader may be blind to how small actions can grow into large consequences. Seeing the system often allows managers to influence how it works. Senge states that leaders frequently fail to appreciate the extent to which their own expectations influence subordinate's work performance.

If I see a person as having high potential, I give him special attention to develop that potential. When he flowers, I feel that my original assessment was correct and I help him still further. Conversely, those I regard as having lower potential languish in disregard and inattention, perform in a disinterested manner, and further justify, in my mind, the lack of attention I give them. This is known as a "self-fulfilling prophecy".⁵⁹

This is an example of the old Army adage that "Units are good at things in which the commander is interested."

Balancing processes are those which seek to produce stability. Senge states that if the system's goal is one that employees understand and generally agree with, they will be productive. If it is not, you will find all efforts to change operations frustrated until you can either change the original process or weaken its influence. Resistance to organizational change will lead to balancing feedback based on threats to traditional norms and ways of doing things. The norms are part of the established power relationships and distribution of authority.

Finally, delays are interruptions between your actions and their consequences. Leaders at all levels in the Army are impacted by delays. This can be the time delay between submitting an operational needs statement for a new piece of equipment and actually having it fielded, or the time between a new maintenance procedure and the impact on operational readiness rates.

System archetypes which surface repeatedly in the Army are those involving *change*. Change – like learning a new procedure or reading a new doctrinal manual – particularly in a big organization like the Army, creates uncertainty, and that uncertainty leads to resistance. Prior to starting a discussion of change, it is important to put it into context. Change⁶⁰ has become a ubiquitous term within the Army, and its use as a noun is so common that it can be heard during conversations on nearly any Army-related subject. It can be used to impugn an employee or organization which is seen as not supporting any initiative or plan that appears different. For example, if an employee doesn't readily support an idea that is labeled as

change, no matter how bad it is or how poorly it is presented, that employee or organization may be called an obstructionist or be referred to as parochial.

Learning as an organization requires that people change, and this creates resistance. It is safe to assume that people working for the Army – either Soldiers or civilians – resist change because they fear that their job may be eliminated or downgraded, that they may have to do more work for the same or less pay, or that their status in the organization may be at risk. While this paints a picture of an organization full of self-serving bureaucrats, I believe that resistance to change isn't always for purely selfish reasons (as it is so frequently characterized) because it has also been my experience that people also resist change when they feel that the idea being presented and implemented is not a very good one. It is difficult to tell the motivation of these people because the reactions based on each motivation are often nearly indistinguishable.

Because organizations consist of people, it stands to reason that people will ultimately provide the majority of resistance to change in an organization. International business consultants Price Waterhouse Coopers sums it up below:

...we know from recent research (Source: CSC Index/AMA Survey) that 41% of change projects fail and that of the 59% that 'succeed' only half meet the expectations of senior management. A survey that PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) ran in conjunction with MORI in the late 1990's found that 9 out of the 10 top barriers to change are people related, for example, limited change management skills, poor communications and employee opposition were all cited.⁶¹

But according to management consultant Rick Maurer⁶², who specializes in overcoming organizational resistance to change, it is the "reaction to resistance" which creates problems.⁶³ As an example of this phenomenon, he describes a scenario of escalating tension in which the leadership announces a change effort or initiative, and the employees and middle managers begin to resist. As the project unfolds, executives see the resistance and respond by pushing the change even harder. The leadership threatens employees, and the war begins.

The phenomenon relates to the fact that most managers find collective inquiry inherently threatening. Agyris states that school trains us never to admit that we do not know the answer, and most corporations reinforce that lesson by rewarding the people who excel in advocating the company's views, not inquiring into complex issues.⁶⁴

Maurer states that because resistance is any force that slows or stops movement, people resist in response to something. The people resisting probably don't see it as resistance; they see it as survival. He believes that resistance is a natural human emotion that protects people from harm.⁶⁵ Based on this, he has identified three levels of resistance:

a. Level 1 is based on information, and may come from a lack of information, disagreement with the idea itself, lack of exposure, or confusion. This level reflects the feeling of “I don’t understand”.

b. Level 2 is an emotional and physiological reaction to the change. It is based on fear: people fear they will lose face (embarrassment), friends, or their jobs. This level reflects the feeling of “I understand, but I am afraid.”

c. Level 3 is a “Problem Bigger than the Current Change.” People are not resisting the idea; in fact, they may love the idea. Rather, they are resisting the leadership. Level 3 may come from a personal history of mistrust, cultural, ethnic, racial, or gender differences, or a significant disagreement over values. This level reflects “I understand and may like the idea, but I don’t like the person or persons implementing the idea.”

Even when leaders want to take resistance seriously and deal with it responsibly, most choose a strategy to address Level 1 concerns. I believe that there is a belief, particularly in the Army, that if you give people just a little more information from newsletters, briefings, or websites they will come around and support the initiative. There is probably nothing wrong with presentations if people are confused or need more facts, but Level 1 tactics seldom work at Level 2 and 3. This is particularly important because the Army’s leadership is trained to be tactical leaders who prevail in combat rather than leaders of change and this can be a particularly difficult process for the untrained.

To illustrate this, consider that the majority of the institutional training Army officers receive is at the junior officer level. Once an officer leaves the Captain’s Career Course at about the six year point of his career, he can look forward to only two more courses of instruction in the remainder of his 24 years in the Army: Intermediate Level Education as a major (the 10-12 year point), and the War College as a lieutenant colonel (the 20-22 year point). The Army has not made the commitment to train the skill sets required to incorporate change, and the skill sets we do train may be a poor match to effectively change an organization.

Because the Army has not made the commitment to train these skill sets, system archetypes are repeated from unit to unit, from generation to generation. While it is difficult to zero in on why the Army changes so little, it is clear that most of the archetypes presented by Senge relate to the Army. Several are particularly relevant to show the power of systems thinking to break the cycle of repeating mistakes. These are:

- Shifting the Burden to the Intervenor. In this archetype, a short-term solution is used to correct a problem, with seemingly positive immediate results. As this correction is used more and more, more fundamental long-term corrective measures are used less and less. Over time,

the capabilities for the fundamental solution may atrophy or become disabled, leading to even greater reliance on the symptomatic solution.⁶⁶ This archetype is particularly evident when outside “intervenor” try to help solve the problem. An example of this behavior is using contractors rather than Soldiers to perform maintenance on Army helicopters. The solution that works well in a garrison environment becomes extremely expensive and difficult to manage during a deployment and the Long War. The recurring theme is that Soldiers have not been trained and empowered to perform maintenance on all of the systems, and the Army has not focused on that fundamental problem. Eventually, contractors hired to help Soldiers supplant them, and the Soldiers who volunteered to serve as Army helicopter mechanics see their duties shifted to other areas.

- Fixes that Fail. A fix, effective in the short term, has unforeseen long-term consequences which may require even more use of the same fix. An early warning is “It always seemed to work before; why isn’t it working now?”⁶⁷ For example, an Army battalion spends Saturday mornings in their motor pool to increase equipment readiness rates. The rates increase over the short term. Other battalions notice the increase, particularly after the other commander was praised for the increase by the brigade commander. Soon all battalions in the brigade are conducting maintenance on Saturday morning, and within a few weeks the daily maintenance rates begin to drop. The result is that Soldiers started working less during the week because they knew they would have to work on Saturday anyway. Ultimately, a real long-term solution was not the focus, and another fix was required.

The problem with incorporating systems thinking in the Army is that most Soldiers and civilians tend to be focused on extremely short-term solutions. Using their authority, commanders can drive short term behaviors in units, trading long-term health for short-term results. The delay in systems thinking – or the consequences – appear after their change of command or rotation out of the unit. In addition, the balancing process seen in units may be seen as individual “whining” or “not supporting the program.”

Analysis: The Army does not promote systems thinking as a method to analyze how interrelated actions – some visible and some invisible – affect each other constantly. This is particularly damaging during this period of great change because systems thinking helps people learn to understand interdependency and change better, and see interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains. Because systems thinking is not taught or promoted in the Army, there is no study for predicting the future behavior of the organization. Therefore, the Army continually repeats the same behaviors without getting to the root cause of those behaviors.

This behavior is similar to that described by Albert Einstein as insanity, which is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”⁶⁸

Conclusion: Is the Army a Learning Organization?

Based on this study, the five disciplines of the learning organization are not integrated into the Army. The research clearly shows that there is no training available to Soldiers or civilians to teach how to develop and incorporate each of the five disciplines. In addition, there are no measures of effectiveness to assess learning organization disciplines and their integration. The ATLDP states that, as recently as 2001, “the Army lacks an institutional mechanism that provides an assessment, evaluation, and feedback on the status of its training programs.”⁶⁹ Since there are no objective feedback mechanisms, and the learning disciplines are not integrated, it is clear that the Army is not a learning organization.

Recommendations

Based on the research and the observations made, the following are recommendations to start the Army’s transition to a true learning organization, if it desires:

Recommendation 1. The Army should update its vision and purpose statements to be more accessible for all Soldiers and civilians, and continue its focus on the Army values. Once the new vision is developed, with input from Soldiers and civilians of all grades, it should be distributed to the Army much like the Army Values were in 1998 so that it can be internalized and become part of the organization’s every day operations.

Recommendation 2. The Army should make a commitment to start training the learning organization’s five disciplines early in the careers of its Soldiers and civilians. It should also develop continuing learning plans and opportunities for senior Soldiers and civilians to help ensure that they internalize the disciplines of the learning organization.

Recommendation 3. The Army must work to change its culture and place more value on candor and the search for truth and reality among its Soldiers and civilians. The personal and organizational defensive routines present when discussing organizational success and failure, particularly related to unit lessons learned and after action reviews, must be identified and corrected.

This will require a cultural change within the Army, and will likely require a long-term approach. Possible approaches include incorporating 360 degree performance evaluations⁷⁰, evaluations of units and leaders from outside observers, and updated counseling requirements for the Army’s OER, non-commissioned officer efficiency report (NCOER), and civilian efficiency

report (CER). These changes would provide Army raters a mechanism to counsel and rate specific behaviors related to the learning organization.

Recommendation 4: The Army has an organization specifically responsible for helping with Team Learning, and it is TRADOC. However, there is clearly an admission from the TRADOC commander that our Soldiers and civilians do not turn to TRADOC for help, nor do they follow the regulations and policies in place to ensure that the organization learns.⁷¹

First, the Army must encourage commanders to use the system in place to assist them, and, in turn, commanders must demand relevant and timely products from that system in order for it to meet their needs. Second, senior commanders and civilians must ensure that their organizations turn to TRADOC for lessons learned and related products, as well as submit timely, accurate, and honest reports to TRADOC in accordance with the ALLP regulation. Only through this process can the Army begin to stop focusing on short-term solutions.

In the final analysis, an organization cannot become a learning organization just by stating that it has become one. As stated by former Chrysler Corporation Vice President Bob Lutz, "Employees must be led to empowerment; they must be taught and coached. They cannot be declared empowered by executive fiat."⁷² To illustrate this, Mr. Lutz described what Chrysler looked like when he arrived, and he could have very well been describing many of the current organizations in the U.S. Army:

Years of fearing failure and of seeking safety in collective decision making had taken their toll. Team members sought guidance where they needed none, asked permission when they'd been told they already had it, and dutifully followed old, hoary, wasteful administrative procedures when they'd been told to throw these out the window. The familiar exerted too strong a hold for them to break free overnight.⁷³

For the Army, it is time to break free.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Army TRADOC Home Page, available from <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm>; Internet, accessed 3 Jan 07. TRADOC is the major Army command, commanded by an Army general, which recruits, trains and educates the Army's Soldiers; develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army

² U.S. Department of the Army, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, VA; U.S. Department of the Army, 1 August 1994), 4-11. This is apparently the first use of the phrase "learning organization" in reference to the Army in any Army publication.

³ Peter Senge, Art Kleiner, Charlotte Roberts, Richard Ross, George Roth, and Bryan Smith, *The Dance of Change: The Challenges of Sustaining Momentum in Learning Organizations* (New York: Doubleday, 1999); available from <http://www.fieldbook.com/DoC/DOctimeline>; Internet, accessed 10 January, 2007.

⁴ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 4.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁷ Ibid., 209.

⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁹ Clifton Fadiman and Andre Bernard, eds., *Bartlett's Book of Anecdotes* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), 210.

¹⁰ Senge, 73.

¹¹ Ibid., 223-224.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2005); available at <http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter2.html#section5>; Internet, accessed 25 January 2007.

¹³ Senge, 149.

¹⁴ U.S. Army TRADOC Chief of Public Affairs Home Page, available from <http://www.tsap.army.mil/pao/ArmyValues/ArmyValues.htm>; Internet, accessed 3 Jan 07.

¹⁵ Senge, 231.

¹⁶ Richard L. Daft and Karl E. Weick, "Toward a Model of Organization as Interpretation Systems", *Academy of Management Review* (1984, Volume 9, No. 2): 284

¹⁷ Ibid, 286.

¹⁸ Ibid, 286.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Lessons Learned Program*, Army Regulation 11-33 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 October 2006),1.

²⁰ *The Army Center for Lessons Learned Home Page*, available from <http://call.army.mil/mission.asp>; Internet; accessed 18 August 2006.

²¹ Ibid, accessed 22 February 2007.

²² *Battle Command Knowledge System Home Page*, available from <http://bcks.army.mil>; Internet; accessed 17 August 2006.

²³ Sandra I. Erwin, "Stryker Brigades 'Self-Reliance' Worries Army Training Command", *National Defense*, May 2006, [journal online], available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/StrykerBrigade.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 December 2006.

²⁴ AR 11-33, page 6

²⁵ Ibid, 6.

²⁶ Statement by Colonel John D. Rosenberger, Commander 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Opposing Forces), National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA, before the House Armed Services Committee, February 26, 1999, available at <http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/99-02-26rosenberger.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 December 2006.

²⁷ BG Robert Cone, "The Changing National Training Center", *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 72.

²⁸ Sandra I. Erwin, "Stryker Brigades 'Self-Reliance' Worries Army Training Command", *National Defense*, May 2006, [journal online], available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/StrykerBrigade.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 December 2006.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Gina Cavallaro, "Armor, infantry officers' combat experiences reflected in new career course", *Army Times*, May 23, 2006, 23.

³² Robert A. Lutz, *Guts*, (Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 69

³³ George F. Will, "Ford Tries to Outpace The Repo Man", *New York Times*, Sunday, 24 December 2006; section B, p 7.

³⁴ Peter Gwynne, "The Cooling World", *Newsweek*, 28 April 1975, 65.

³⁵ *Meritocracy*, Merriam Webster dictionary online: <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=meritocracy>; Internet, accessed 15 December 2006.

³⁶ Jack Welch, "Create Candor in the Workplace", *Stanford Graduate School of Business Journal Online*, April 2005 [journal online]; available from http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/vftt_welch.shtml; Internet, accessed 12 January 2007.

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *Evaluation Reporting System*, Army Regulation 623-3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 May 2006); 25.

³⁸ There are numerous examples of officers being promoted to senior positions even though their units were failures in actual combat operations.

³⁹ It should be noted that although Hamilton was known to make a number of astute observations, he is best known as the commander of British Forces during the disastrous Battle

of Gallipoli in 1915. While he may have been seen as a failure, this does not necessarily render his observations invalid.

⁴⁰ Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book During the Russo-Japanese War* (1906; reprint, New York: Longmans, Green, 1912), p.v. quoted in Eliot Chen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes*, (New York, Random House, 1990), 44.

⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds and trans (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976). p 156

⁴² "Mars v. Militarism", *Time Magazine*, 6 December 1937 [journal online]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758582-1,00.html>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2007.

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⁵⁴ Chris Argyris, *Knowledge For Action: A Guide to Overcoming Barriers to Cultural Change*. (San Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1993), 20

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⁵⁷ Argyris, 3.

⁵⁸ Senge, 94.

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