Reconciling Counterinsurgency with Civil War: A Strategy for Stabilizing Iraq
Abstract
The complex nature of war in Iraq is best explained as a civil war overlaid by global insurgency. The U.S. is focused on Sunni extremists fighting a global insurgency amongst various local and national Iraqi factions struggling for power. Thus, current counterinsurgency (COIN) methods are inconsistent. Civil war can be successfully concluded by third parties through the provision of harm and benefit. The strategy set forth considers sectarian enmity as a consequence of civil strife rather than its cause. A theory of civil war violence is applied to establish control and political cohesion at the community level. This strategy focuses military effort to resolve Iraqi civil conflict at the local level. Diplomatic effort focuses on leveraging Sunni-Shi'a fears of widespread civil war to marshal regional support for U.S. efforts. If the Iraqi people choose civil war, the U.S. must rely on the fact that war can ultimately resolve conflict and produce a stable environment despite the implications for the Global War on Terror.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 26, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA469666
Entities
People
- Justin C. Gubler
Organizations
- United States Army War College