Ready, Fire, Aim: The Implications of America's Preventive War Policy
Abstract
In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. developed a National Security Strategy predicated on a policy of preemption, otherwise known as the Bush Doctrine. In 2003, the U.S. tested that doctrine when it invaded Iraq. However, in practice the Iraq invasion represented not preemption but preventive war. This paper analyzes the costs of America's preventive war in Iraq as measured against two entities: the international community and the U.S. populace. This paper concludes that by pursuing preventive war in Iraq, the U.S. has measurably reduced its flexibility in addressing other existing and future security threats. Within the international community the jus ad bellum perceptions of America's actions have resulted in the loss of support and assistance, not only in Iraq, but also the larger global war on terrorism. On the domestic front, and for other than jus ad bellum reasons, the U.S. Administration has lost the support of the populace. As the cry of "no more Iraqs" echoes throughout America, the U.S. Administration now has less flexibility to address other remaining threats. In the end, the costs of preventive war have been too high and the preventive war policy cannot and should not survive.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 23, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA469673
Entities
People
- David E. Funk
Organizations
- United States Army War College