Biological Weapons Attribution: A Primer

Abstract

The possibility of an enemy attack using biological weapons (BW) remains one of the biggest threats to U.S. and global security. U.S. defense and deterrence policies are based on the assumption that the perpetrator can be quickly and reliably identified. If perpetrators can conduct attacks without the fear of attribution or punishment, they can act with impunity. The ability to punish, therefore, rests on the ability to identify the perpetrator. Thus, the goal of attribution is at the root of all national security strategies. Unfortunately, there are three reasons why the attribution of BW attacks are very difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and (3) the bureaucratic constraints and organizational overlap that domestic political environments can impose if a BW attack occurs. This thesis thus provides a basic epistemological framework for analysis for successful BW attribution, detailing the nature, methods, and limits of current BW attribution capabilities.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 2007
Accession Number
ADA469951

Entities

People

  • Elizabeth L. Stone Bahr

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Biological Weapons
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Disease Outbreaks
  • Health Services
  • Infectious Diseases
  • International Law
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • Medical Personnel
  • National Security
  • Public Policy
  • Therapy
  • Treaties
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Readers

  • Critical Infrastructure Protection in CBRN and WMD Threats.
  • Strategic Security Studies