Transitions in Full Spectrum Operations: The Effects of Ethos
Abstract
During OIF in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. By all accounts, the Army's participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to translate into success for the campaign? This monograph contends that the missteps following the initial success can be attributed to the same ethos that provided the tactical victory. In spite of the Army's operational concept of full spectrum operations, the tactical culture blinded the Army leaders to the requirements to transition from offense to stability operations and caused a loss of initiative yet to be regained. To correct the ethos and align it with the full spectrum operations concept, the Army must address the deficiencies in doctrine and develop training scenarios that stress the importance of transitioning between offense, defense, and stability operation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 22, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA470660
Entities
People
- Thomas B. Hairgrove Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College