Operational Assessment in a Counterinsurgency
Abstract
Though difficult, it is possible to wage successful counterinsurgency operations across the range of the elements of national power any campaign must be waged in this full spectrum manner to be victorious. Through the course of waging this effort, the operational commander must have a means of measuring his progress and the effectiveness between strategy and tactics. This cannot be accomplished through the study and recitations of endless statistics on dead insurgents, security forces trained, or schools built. Rather, to measure progress and gauge success in counterinsurgency, the operational commander must begin by collecting this type of data along with many other sets of quantitative and qualitative metrics and measure them against planned intermediate objectives and goals established within Logical Lines of Operation (LLO) for the counterinsurgency operation. During this paper, I will examine recently released US military doctrine for the execution of counterinsurgency, discuss the measurement tools outline in Joint and Service doctrine, and evaluate how well operational and national-strategic leaders are applying statistics, measures, and metrics to measure progress and assess success in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 10, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA470761
Entities
People
- Cornelius W. Kugler
Organizations
- Naval War College