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14. ABSTRACT It seems that the US military has a propensity for blaming mission failures or difficulties on what is perceived to be excessive meddling by civilian leaders in military operations. Strict adherents to Clausewitz may argue that while the decision to go to war is a political one, the act of war should be left to the military. I believe those who subscribe to that notion are mired in an antiquated view of war and fail to see the full integration of military and political factors in war. In a civil/military culture such as ours, how can the political and military elements complement each other to achieve success?					
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WARFIGHTING IS FOR THE WARRIORS?

How the U.S. military can ensure effectiveness despite the
participation of political leadership in operational decision-making

by

Pete McAleer

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

10 MAY 2007

ABSTRACT

Often, military leaders blame mission failure or difficulties on what is perceived to be excessive meddling by national strategic leaders in military operations. The complaint follows the thoughts of Clausewitz's notion that while the decision to go to war is a political one, once that decision is made the act of war should be left to the military. Any further involvement by the national-strategic leadership hampers the conduct of the war, impacts the military leadership, and wrestles decision-making from the trained, professional, experienced military force and places it in the hands of leaders who are likely not as well-versed in the conduct of military operations.

Surely, when the national-strategic leaders begin impacting the conduct of military operations, this is a recipe for failure. Those who subscribe to this notion, however, are mired in an antiquated view of war and fail to see the full integration of military and political factors in war. Since war is a political act, political, national-strategic leaders will continue to stay involved in the conduct of military operations. The US military can ensure effectiveness on the battlefield by learning to integrate political leadership's participation in the operational level of war and by understanding the military's role as a force for diplomacy and political influence.

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INTRODUCTION:

Current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated to many in the military that there needs to be greater interaction between uniformed and civilian agencies to achieve success on the modern battlefield. But, what happens when the civilian, national-strategic leadership of the nation departs from working solely with the civilian agencies and begins to influence how the military operational commander conducts his tasks by curtailing, directing, shaping or otherwise becoming involved in the planning and execution of operations? Many servicemembers think that political, civilian involvement in military operations has become too obtrusive and detrimental to military success. Often, uniformed leaders have blamed mission failure or difficulties on what is perceived to be excessive meddling by national strategic leaders in military operations. The complaint follows the thoughts of Clausewitz' notion that while the decision to go to war is a political one, once that decision is made the act of war should be left to the military. Any further involvement by national-strategic leaders hampers the conduct of the war, impacts military leadership, and wrestles decision-making from the trained, professional, experienced military force and places it in the hands of civilian leaders who are likely not as well-versed in the conduct of military operations.

Surely, when the national-strategic leaders begin impacting the conduct of military operations, this is a recipe for failure. Those who subscribe to this notion, however, are mired in an antiquated view of war and fail to see the full integration of military and political factors in war. Since war is a political act, political, national-strategic leaders will continue to stay involved in the conduct of military operations. How can the US military ensure effectiveness on the battlefield despite political leadership's participation? The answer lies in the operational level of war.

This paper will assert that the operational level of war is one in which involvement by national-strategic leaders is inevitable, should be expected, and is the natural point at which heavy political and military interaction is required to effect strategic success. Further, it will make recommendations for improving the interaction and enabling success on the battlefield.

WAR AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:

It is important to examine the American system of government in order to understand how best to integrate military operations with political goals. The Constitution of the United States clearly states that the President is the Commander in Chief of the Nation's armed forces¹ but Congress has tremendous leverage in determining how the President fights wars.² While the President is granted the right and responsibility for the conduct of all level of military operations,³ Congress, in its role of oversight of the armed forces, may examine the President's strategy and determine if his strategy is the best use of the Nation's resources and in the Nation's best interests.⁴ The checks and balances were created intentionally to ensure that no single branch of government over-powered the others and that the military is used judiciously in the national interests.

The American people also have a strong voice in the decisions to go to war and in the conduct of the war.⁵ The desires of the people have tremendous impact on the Commander-in-Chief when he takes the Nation to war and he must remain cognizant of those desires when he develops plans, strategies, constraints, and restraints for the use of the military. Additionally, each Member of Congress is ultimately responsible to their constituency and must keep those same desires in mind when debating, authorizing, and evaluating the use of the military. As such, the use of the military and the employment of military forces are inherently political decisions.

THE MILITARY IN AMERICA:

Throughout American history the military has changed with America's position and standing in the world. Each step of the way, the executive branch, legislative branch and the people have exerted their influence on the process of change and impacted the way that the military conducts business. In modern history, following the United States' elevation to a recognized global superpower at the conclusion of World War II, the Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 to create and organize the Department of Defense.⁶ This established an organization and structure to provide improved military advice to the President and established one department responsible for the coordination of the military might of the Nation. A subsequent amendment in 1958 created the unified commands with responsibilities for specific regions.⁷ Additionally, a command structure was created that allowed the combatant commander a direct link to the President. This link allowed for the bypass of the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs, effectively bridging the President to the operational level of warfare. The linkages between the President and the operational level of warfare were further strengthened in 1986 with the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Beyond making the military more joint, the Act accomplished a number of far-reaching ideas that integrally linked the civilian, national-strategic leaders with the geographic combatant commanders at the operational level.⁸

The result of these two critical pieces of legislation was the creation of a military command structure clearly subordinate to a strong executive and a reinforcement of ties between the President and his military advisors. Most importantly for the discussion of civilian involvement in military operations, the legislation provided a streamlined channel for

the President to interact with his operational commanders without necessarily requiring those commanders to respond through the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, or any other headquarters or entity. While all of those players can still be involved and have significant impact on military operations, the result of this construct is that the President and the Combatant Commander can have frequent and meaningful interaction during periods of peace and war. Depending on the personalities involved, this could allow the President or his designees (often the Secretary of Defense) an avenue to daily and minutely involve themselves in operations.

POLITICS AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR:

For those who bristle at the thought of national-strategic leaders being involved in the operational level of war and who hold to the notion that warfare should be left to the war-fighters, World War II is the perfect supporting example for their case. This example, however, should be considered an aberration. The scope and scale of the war makes it unique in history and kept the President's span of control limited to the strategic level. The more likely future scenario is something short of war on the scale of World War II and more on a scale which can allow the President to become more involved in the operational level.

In modern war, real-time reporting, the media, public will, and global concerns all play much more critical roles in the execution of war. These factors keep politics involved throughout the war and reduce the likelihood of having the conduct of the war turned over exclusively to the war-fighters. If war is the 'continuation of politics by different means'⁹ then the political leadership must and will remain involved in the conduct of modern war to ensure that the operational goals and means support the national strategic aims. The political leaders will direct the proportional use of force to achieve the desired political aims.

One of the principle impacts and responsibilities the President will have on the operational level is in the issuance of his desired end state including a description of the political, military, economic, and other conditions that should exist or be created at the end of hostilities.¹⁰ From this desired end state, the Combatant Commander can develop his operational objectives and operational scheme.¹¹ Whether or not a clearly defined desired end state is provided, it is important to understand that the operation is not likely to be conducted successfully by the operational commander without a thorough understanding of the political goals. The scale and application of military force can then be applied commensurate with the scale of the political objective.¹² As the President determines the importance of the political objective and the impact military operations will have on the politics of the war, he will adjust the amount of military force used.

The following case studies allow an examination of the impact of politics and Presidential influence on operations and provide lessons for the interaction between national-strategic leaders and the operational commander. The lessons learned will identify recommendations to improve this operational level interaction and ensure it is both efficient and effective in achieving strategic success. In the Kosovo case study, the interactions between General Wesley Clark and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and President Clinton were heavily influenced by political considerations and severely hampered the operational design and conduct of the war. In the invasion of Iraq, President Bush and his team were intimately involved in the operational planning and execution, leading to drastic changes in plans and execution, much to the consternation of many military operational planners.

KOSOVO:

From 24 March to 10 June 1999, NATO forces under the command of General Clark conducted operations to eject Serbian forces from Kosovo and end a developing

humanitarian crisis in that province. Due to a number of factors, the involvement of political leaders in determining the method in which force was used to accomplish the objective was extremely heavy and influential. The most direct outcome of their involvement on the operational level was to change the operational scheme by denying the operational commander's request for ground forces. By examining the restrictions imposed by the national-strategic leadership and the reasons for doing so, valuable insight can be gained into how the political objective drives military operations and how an operational commander can interact with the political leadership to accomplish the objective despite having his military operational plans so severely limited.

While this was a NATO operation, the directive of no ground forces was not a NATO only decision.¹³ Instead, General Clark, as Commander-in-Chief for US European Command, was restricted from using American ground forces by President Clinton.¹⁴ While the strategic debates regarding the use of force by NATO are instructive, they simply provide some background to the discussion of the national-strategic leader's role in the operational level of war. What is most instructive for the interaction between political leaders and the operational commander is an examination of the controls imposed on General Clark by President Clinton during the conduct of operations and his reasons for doing so. For that reason, discussions of negotiations and internal matters within NATO will not be discussed despite their impact on NATO forces in the operational planning and conduct of the war.

On the national-strategic level, the President needed to balance many factors when considering the use of force. Among the most prominent factors were continuing operations in Bosnia, a Congress skeptical of more military 'adventurism',¹⁵ an American population concerned with ethnic cleansing and leery of another Vietnam-style conflict, and the

country's leadership role in the world. Balancing all these factors made the President cautious in his use of force and kept him involved in the planning and execution of military operations so that he could use military force to best achieve his strategic goals while addressing all political factors at play.

Throughout the crisis, diplomacy and diplomatic maneuvering remained essential in the conduct of the operations.¹⁶ Since the goal of the military operation was to bring about a negotiated settlement, Clark acted as both military commander and as an advisor¹⁷ on regional politics to help formulate a successful strategy. The desired political end state limited the level of force the President was willing to apply to something less than required in Clausewitz's total war. In fact, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "the military may not be decisive."¹⁸ The operational level air bombardment was used as only one element of the national strategy and provided diplomatic leverage to secure a military technical agreement for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.¹⁹

In applying military force as a part of the strategy, the operations were proportionally limited to support that strategy. This led to what Clark described as a "dichotomy between political aims and military means"²⁰ in which the national-strategic leaders provided rules of engagement that limited the altitude at which the planes could fly, determined and authorized target sets²¹, and even pressured Clark to bomb certain types of targets over others, thereby changing his operational scheme.²² His flexibility as an operational commander was extremely restricted and tools²³ he thought essential for success were taken away.²⁴ This lack of flexibility led to a longer air campaign and an arguably less successful military endeavor. The limits of the political objective determined the level and employment of force.

Risks associated with those limits are what the operational commander and the national-strategic leaders need to fully understand. As the operational level commander, it was Clark's responsibility to understand the desired end state as well as the political goals while developing his scheme of maneuver.²⁵ When the political leadership above him influenced his campaign plan, it was incumbent on him to educate them of the consequences and risks those influences brought to the success of the mission. Additionally, he was responsible for educating his subordinates on the political nature of the operation and the considerations they needed to be cognizant of in its execution²⁶ so that they would understand the nature of the operation and its goal. What is most striking is that General Clark claims to have never discussed the overall strategy with either the Secretary or the President.²⁷ This lack of communication did not allow for both the politicians and the military to understand the nature of the operation. Fortunately, the operation was successful, but it may not always turn out that way when the political leaders and operational commander are not working toward the same goals.

IRAQ:

On 21 March 2003, following orders from the White House, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks began a second campaign in the Global War on Terror²⁸ by attacking into Iraq to conduct a regime change²⁹ and lay the ground work for a stable and free Iraq. The plan he executed for the attack, codenamed Cobra II, was one heavily influenced by President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others of the Secretary's staff. The influences and direction did not stop once the line of departure was crossed but continued through the execution of the plan causing the operational commander to make changes and adjustments along the way. While the impact of the civilian involvement in the

planning on mission success can still be debated, it is an informative case to study when trying to understand the relationships between the operational commander and the national-strategic leaders in the planning and execution phases of military operations.

CENTCOM had long been developing a plan for an attack into Iraq when President Bush took office. OPLAN 1003-98³⁰ was a detailed plan designed to defeat Iraq's army, overthrow Saddam Hussein and begin an occupation as a prelude to the reconstruction of Iraq. Essentially, the plan developed in 1998 would accomplish the same operational and strategic objectives the Bush team would direct in 2003. General Anthony Zinni and his successor at CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks, devoted many staff-hours to the development of the plan and to wargaming the possible scenarios. The key tenets of the plan involved a build-up of forces in a neighboring country and a force size of three corps, roughly 380,000 servicemen, for the invasion with an additional 20,000 servicemen added for the occupation at the conclusion of the offensive operations.³¹ Subsequent refinements brought the required number to a minimum of 385,000.³² General Franks believed that the size of the force, the method of attack, and the objectives were incorporated into a plan that was updated and wargamed, held sound principles of war, and was built to defeat the Iraqi army and secure the country for follow-on development.³³

When Secretary Rumsfeld was first briefed on the plans for the defeat of Iraq, he directed that the plan be conducted with a force of only 125,000. This guidance was given without any knowledge of the detailed wargames and planning discussions backing the original number.³⁴ Additionally, he was concerned that the long build up time required before an attack would constrain the president's diplomatic flexibility.³⁵ These concerns were furthered echoed by the President when he was briefed on the plan.³⁶

Once President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld passed their guidance and concerns, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to remain involved in the process of planning operations. While General Franks described the planning process as collaborative,³⁷ Secretary Rumsfeld often directed changes to the actual operations plan, forces assigned, and methods with which the operations would be conducted going so far as to propose his own version of an operations plan complete with the use of special forces, surprise, deception, and speed.³⁸ The final invasion plan called for only 145,000 servicemen and a rolling start to the attack.³⁹ This force structure was less than half the originally planned force size and the rolling start was considered militarily risky. While there were enough forces to achieve the operational objective of capturing Baghdad, the plan was not properly designed to support the strategic objective of making Iraq a stable country. This misunderstanding of the strategic goal meant that the operations plan was insufficient.⁴⁰

There were many reasons for the sustained and heavy involvement in the planning by President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld. Beyond the international pressures and approval that could affect operations, George Bush had made clear his desire to avoid peacekeeping and nation building exercises.⁴¹ If he were going to use the military in the nation's interests, it would be swift and decisive. Additionally, there was concern among the administration that Congress would not support a lengthy deployment phase and potentially costly attack into Iraq. Public opinion and media influences also weighed heavily on their thought processes.⁴²

Once the invasion began, Secretary Rumsfeld, acting on behalf of the President continued to make changes to the operational scheme. He changed or denied requests for forces,⁴³ monitored the process for picking targets,⁴⁴ and kept in daily contact with

CENTCOM during the duration of the war⁴⁵ monitoring every request that went to the Joint Chiefs and the services.⁴⁶ His influence and involvement ensured that he remained in the operational level and often had him discussing tactical details, as well. His heavy involvement indicated a need to be knowledgeable in the details, precise in the application of military power in pursuit of national strategic objectives, and potentially a lack of trust in the military leaders chosen to be the operational commanders. While his changes and directions did not cause the invasion to fail, there will continue to be debate as to the effect his involvement had on the efficiency of the conduct of the plan.

LESSONS LEARNED:

In the American system, the interaction between the operational commanders and the national-strategic leaders will continue to be very close. The structure of the system has developed to ensure that political leaders will continue to have the opportunity to play a large part in military planning. Political pressures will continue to make the political leaders acutely aware of the consequences of the use of American military might. The strategic goals and policies will continue to change, even while military operations are on-going, as a result of any changes in the political balances. This means that the operational commander will be forced to operate in a complex political and military environment. It is unrealistic for the military to claim that it can only be successful when its operations are unimpeded by political influences. The reality is that political influences are what cause the operations in the first place and are what set the final results desired. Policy will permeate all military operations and continue to influence them.⁴⁷

The political leadership will be best placed to make the determinations on the political factors and what affect military actions have on those political aims. With the

political aims being paramount, the political leadership will continue to hold the levers of military power applying only what the political aims require. The military must remember that politics and military action are fully intertwined and will continue to be in the future. The operational commander must accept this as fact and learn ways to deal with the influences of the political leaders.

Military operations will always be dominated by strategic concerns and goals. The level of force allowed during military operations will be commensurate with the size of the political objective. The operational commander must possess an operational vision that envisions all the phases of a planned campaign or major operation. Without proper operational vision the commander cannot translate the strategic objective assigned by the top politico-military leadership into an operational objective.⁴⁸ No campaign or major operation can be planned without a clear idea of how it should end. This means that the operational commander will need to be in close communication with those setting the strategic goals.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act streamlined the links between the regional combatant commanders and the President to improve communications and ensure sound military advice is being given to the President. It is incumbent upon the combatant commander to keep clear communications with national-strategic leaders. The operational commander will not be able to plan or execute in a vacuum. Instead, he will have to ensure that his ways and means match the desired ends. This can only be successfully accomplished when there is clarity between the combatant commander and the President or Secretary of Defense.

Both the President and the Secretary of Defense are likely to be very concerned with the strategic impact of military operations. This concern could translate into 'micro-managing' the planning and execution of military operations. A lack of experience or

knowledge of military operations has not dissuaded many in the nation's capital from believing they have a better grasp of military strategy than the generals and from trying to plan for the operational employment of the armed forces.⁴⁹ An operational commander should be prepared for their influence, suggestions, and changes to plans and should view one of his primary tasks as educating the political leadership on the consequences of political decisions on military operations.

In the future, the military will only represent a portion of a measured response and in many scenarios will play a subordinate role.⁵⁰ As such, the political situation will define the realm of the possible for the military.⁵¹ In order to be successful, the operational commander will need full knowledge and understanding of the linkage between strategy and policy on one hand and operational art on the other. If General Krulak's strategic corporal⁵² can influence strategic success through his actions or inactions, then the operational commander has even more impact. The operational commander must continuously analyze the linkages between the political concepts and his military operational design⁵³ to ensure that the operational objectives support the achievement of the strategic objectives. Additionally, he must remain aware of the political landscape to ensure that he develops an operational plan consistent with what the politics of the situation will support and with what other national strengths are being employed. If the operational commander fails to fully understand the linkages between the desires of the political leadership and the military objectives, his actions may prove detrimental to the overall success of the strategic plan and be an open invitation for political leadership to become intimately involved in the planning and execution phases.

Responsibility for success or failure in the military operations will rest with the military commander. With an advanced understanding of the political and military factors

influencing the operational level of war, the operational commander should no longer be able to blame political leaders for adversely impacting military effectiveness. The operational commander must be a master of the military arts and of the political and diplomatic arts, as well. It is up to the operational commander to determine the true objectives of military operations from the political guidance or strategic aims. This is often no small task⁵⁴ and can be further complicated when the political leaders change the nature of the conflict due to political pressures. The successful operational commander will be attuned to these changes and understand how they impact the operational scheme and make adjustments accordingly.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The most important thing for an operational commander to consider when working with his political leadership is the value of unity of effort. The commander must remain in communication with the political leaders to understand their intent, strategic goals, and views on the political situation to ascertain what is driving the military operations and what factors will impact his operational design and the achievement of operational objectives. In modern war, the operational commander will no longer be able to claim he can only get the job done without 'interference' from the political leaders. Instead, the operational commander must accomplish his mission by being intrinsically linked to those same leaders.

Communications goes both ways. Not only should the operational commander expect input from strategic leaders, but he should have the moral courage to give his opinions and recommendations back up the chain. While the political leaders are trying to balance all forces at play in the conflict, they may curtail military force and unnecessarily endanger mission success. It is the operational commander's duty to educate his political leaders on the levels of military force required to achieve imposed or negotiated settlements and the

consequences of political constraints or restraints. From this knowledge, the political leaders will make decisions balancing the military risks with the overall goal.

The operational commander must also learn to expect and accept requests for information from his higher political leaders. These requests are a normal part of the process, despite how obtrusive they may become. The only way to counter an excessive amount of requests and 'micromanaging' is to build trust and confidence between the political leaders and the operational commander. That trust is built through a demonstration of sound judgment and proficiency, an understanding of the strategic factors at play, recognition of the politics of the situation, and a record of success. The operational commander can only give his best military advice for an operational scheme based on the strategic objectives and sound military doctrine and principles, it will then be up to the political leaders to determine the course of military action. It may happen, however, that the national political leaders choose an option contrary to the advice they have received from the operational commander. In this case, the national political leaders will direct what they feel is best, answering only to the voters while the operational commander must soldier on.

A practical method to improve the interaction between the operational commander and the political leadership is to incorporate adaptive planning methods into operational design. Adaptive planning methods were developed as a means to give the national leaders more flexibility in the use of military force. Currently, operational plans are developed and presented to the strategic leaders as a complete package. If the President decides to employ the military in a conflict, he is faced with choosing a 'one-size fits all' plan or discarding the plan altogether only to direct a new one to be developed with his latest guidance.

Adaptive planning brings the political leadership into the planning process from the start. It allows the political leader to provide guidance for planning and provides the political leadership more clarity in the ways and means of the use of force. This allows them to be better able to provide political guidance and more clearly define their political aims to the operational commander. Most importantly, the adaptive planning concept allows for embedded options in the plans. These embedded options help the political leadership to tailor the military force to match the political objectives by providing a menu of options for the use of force.⁵⁵ Since the embedded options will be developed cooperatively between the operational commander and the political leadership, the plan will better balance the military and political risks and reduce the impacts on military effectiveness.

Finally, education is critical to making the relationship between the political leaders and the operational commander work properly. Since educating the political leadership on military principles and operations may be difficult, the operational commander should be trained to recognize and understand the political and strategic factors affecting his operational scheme. The commander and his staff must be able to synthesize the strategic goals and the operational art to achieve the desired objective.

This enhanced, formal education should include courses in diplomacy, foreign relations, and domestic politics. Classes in topics such as regional studies, social sciences, politics and political agendas, and mass media need to be taught to the career officer so that as an operational commander he can fully understand the operational environment. If tactics and maneuver can be trained to a level of proficiency in which decisions are made through recognition and experience, the same innate sense can be developed for diplomatic or political impacts, as well. Knowing what boundaries of military operations are likely to be

acceptable will help to formulate plans that can achieve strategic success. With the military continuing to be a tool of statecraft⁵⁶, the operational commander will have to be better prepared to be both a military leader and a diplomat. No longer can the military operate in an environment devoid of political influences. The successful operational commander should be versed in all aspects and factors influencing operations and the operational environment.

CONCLUSION:

Since the political objective will guide the conduct of military operations, politics will continue to dominate military operations in the future. The political and diplomatic nature of war will also continue to invite politicians and political leaders to invade military planning at the operational level to assess and direct military operations in support of political aims. As the military's role as a diplomatic tool continues to expand, the operational commander will increasingly need to learn to operate as a diplomat in the civilian, political realms as high-level issues will have a tendency to permeate deep within a military organization.

Solving future interaction between the operational commander and the national-strategic, political leaders can happen in two ways. The first option is to have civilians change the way in which they approach and use the military. They should learn to provide a clear mission and desired end state, adequate and consistent funding and support, and then leave the military to accomplish its job. Since recent experience and political necessity make this an unlikely answer to fixing the problem of civilian 'interference,' the other option is to adapt within the military. Through education, understanding, new planning methods, and communication with higher political authority, the operational commander can better influence the President and other national-strategic leaders in their decisions concerning the use of military force.

The U.S. military will continue to be assigned ambiguous missions in the future in which military operations will have tremendous political impact. Since success on the battlefield will not just be military in nature, the operational commander will need to accept political leadership's impacts on the planning and execution of military operations. Being aware of the political goals, working with political leaders, and providing flexible planning and execution options to political leaders will allow them to modulate the use of military force to accomplish political ends. For those that decry the political involvement in military operations as an impediment to military success, the time has come to accept reality. Failure to understand and embrace political leadership's involvement in military operations will make the military less effective.

ENDNOTES:

¹ US Constitution. Article II.

² The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to declare war and to “prescribe rules governing military discipline and regulating the capture of enemy property.” Further, as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has written, “except for the actual command of military forces, all authorization for their maintenance and all explicit authorization for their use is placed in the control of Congress.” Additionally, Congress has a long history of providing funding or cancelling funding of military campaigns and operations with their appropriations bills. This ability does not grant Congress the authority to direct the conduct of campaigns.

³ “direct the movements of naval and military forces and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.” – Fleming v. Page (1851).

⁴ Dan Gilgoff. “When a President Owns a War; A lot of folks don’t like Bush’s plan, but there’s risk in trying to change it.” U.S. News & World Report, 22(January 2007).

⁵ Kathy Roth-Douquet. “Left Out of All This War Planning: The People.” USA Today, 31 January 2007, 11.

⁶ Frank Trager. “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary.” Air University Review (Nov/Dec 1977): N/A.<<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1977/nov-dec/trager.html>.>[27 February 2007].

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ As stated in the accompanying report to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the act was written to reorganize the Department of Defense to strengthen civilian authority in the department; improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands and; to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions.--House, Congress. Committee on Armed Services. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Staff Report. 99th Cong., 2d Session. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986.

⁹ Michael Johnson. “Clausewitz on Kosovo.” Unpublished Research Paper. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2001), 6.

¹⁰ Milan Vego. “Wake up call in Kosovo.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, (Oct 2000): 66.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² As Clausewitz said, “generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion, this will be the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of important, intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation.” -- Michael Johnson. “Clausewitz on Kosovo.” Unpublished Research Paper. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2001), 16.

¹³ There were many factors influencing the decisions regarding the use of force and the method of force employment in the Kosovo crisis, not least of which was the fact that this would be NATO's first offensive military action as an alliance. The decisions and political negotiations within NATO that continued through the crisis were difficult at best and were often more about maintaining the strength of the alliance and not as much on the conduct of the offensive. It is important to note that while these delicate negotiations to keep the alliance together involved discussions of how NATO would employ its military power, the directive of no ground forces was not a NATO decision alone. In fact, some members of the alliance, most notably Great Britain, advocated for the use of ground forces to eject the Serbian forces from Kosovo. - Wesley Clark. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 268.

¹⁴ Ibid 450.

¹⁵ Ibid 138, 168.

¹⁶ As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, "we did diplomacy backed by force and...force backed by diplomacy." - Wesley Clark. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 253.

¹⁷ Ibid 136.

¹⁸ Benjamin, Lambeth. NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 160.

¹⁹ Wesley Clark. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 355.

²⁰ Ibid 244.

²¹ Benjamin, Lambeth. NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 199.

²² Wesley Clark. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 177, 186.

²³ While Clark was developing his operational scheme, he preferred to target the Serb IADS before striking other targets. The strategic leaders, Cohen and Clinton, were more in favor of hitting strategic targets like the forces in the field so that they would be seen to be hitting those targets most directly affecting the Kosovars. The focus on the strategic targets impacted the development of a sound operational scheme. Further, as the bombing was gaining momentum, the strategic leaders pushed for an operational pause to allow for more diplomacy. While the pause better suited the strategic goal, it impacted the operational scheme. The President impacted operational surprise by wanting to give an ultimatum date and therefore telegraph the start of the bombing.

²⁴ Benjamin, Lambeth. NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 181, 201.

²⁵ Wesley Clark. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 175.

²⁶ Ibid 245.

²⁷ Ibid 220.

²⁸ Thomas Ricks. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 66.

²⁹ Ibid 116

³⁰ Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and

Occupation of Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 26.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid 28.

³³ Ibid 4.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid 29.

³⁶ Michael Delong and Noah Lukeman. Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004), 64.

³⁷ Ibid 86.

³⁸ Gordon and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and

Occupation of Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 22.

³⁹ Thomas Ricks. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 117.

⁴⁰ Ibid 128.

⁴¹ Bob Woodward. State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

⁴² In fact, after one discussion of force requirements that led to an increase in the force size, Secretary Rumsfeld asked, somewhat rhetorically, “I wonder how long its going to take this to get in the newspaper.” -- Thomas Ricks. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 121.

⁴³ Ibid 71, 121.

⁴⁴ Michael Delong and Noah Lukeman. Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2004), 22.

⁴⁵ Ibid 45.

⁴⁶ Thomas Ricks. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 122.

⁴⁷ “If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature admits, it will have a continuous influence on them.” Clausewitz quote -- Charles Blair. “I Could Get My Job Done If They Would Just Leave Me Alone.” Unpublished Research Paper., U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2001), 11.

⁴⁸ Milan Vego. “NWC 1037A: *Operational Vision*,” (Newport, RI: Naval War College (JMO 2006), 1.

⁴⁹ Ralph Peters. “Wanted: Occupation Doctrine.” Armed Forces Journal, < <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2591168>> [30 April 2007].

⁵⁰ Shanahan, Brian. “Joint Expeditionary Forces: A Step Beyond.” (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1998), 7.

⁵¹ Clark, Bruce. “The political dimension of political action: What works?” Military Review, (Sep/Oct 1997): 95.

⁵² Krulak, Charles. "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." Marines Magazine, (Jan 1999): < http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm> [30 April 2007].

⁵³ Clark, Bruce. "The political dimension of political action: What works?" Military Review, (Sep/Oct 1997): 95.

⁵⁴ As Clausewitz points out, "the greatest difficulty will be in establishing the cause and effect relationship between political and operational objectives that are different. (the operational commander) must figure out what the military will do to achieve the political goal and the end of hostilities." -- Michael Johnson. "Clausewitz on Kosovo." Unpublished Research Paper. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2001), 41.

⁵⁵ Klein, Robert. "Adaptive Planning: Not Your Great Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan." Joint Force Quarterly, (2d Quarter 2007): 87.

⁵⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: 28 January 2003, 5.

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