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Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction Operations as a force employment
operation in the UJTL

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Army or the Department of the Navy.

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7 May 2007

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Introduction

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should update CJCSM 3500.04D Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) dated 17 August 2006 to reflect Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) as a subset of Force Employment Operations (equates to Major Theater War (MTW)). Furthermore, SSTR operations and its subset operations need to be clearly defined and have UJTL tasks assigned. The updated definitions and tasks will help operational and tactical planners develop a more integrated plan for SSTR operations throughout the phases and not just in phase four.¹ Currently, the UJTL has fifteen force employment operations that focus the joint force at the strategic-national, strategic-theater, operational, and tactical command levels.²

The same focus as other employment operations is needed for SSTR before, during, and after traditional combat operations because SSTR operations are often executed simultaneously with these type operations. Additional UJTL tasks will more likely be added to support SSTR operations. The United States military has conducted SSTR operations since the American Civil War with positive, neutral, and negative successes. The military has had much success with stability operations since that is the part the military is historically best structured to execute.

For many reasons the military has struggled with reconstruction efforts, including but not limited to: No clear intent or commanders guidance, undefined operation, lack of planning until phase three of an operation, and no defined tasks to focus military planners. This can further be explained by a message sent from General Franks to the Department of Defense (DoD) subordinates stating “you pay attention to the day after and I will pay attention to the day of.”ⁱⁱⁱ

The military, despite guidance still does not take this part of the operation very seriously, due to unclear guidance, lack of expertise, failure in operational leadership, conflicting doctrine, or because it feels that, other U.S. government (USG) agencies need to conduct SSTR operations. The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05- dated 28 November 2005 further directs stability and reconstruction operations as a core military mission.^{iv} The bottom line is the U.S. military cannot wish SSTR operations away. The USG has placed and will continue to place responsibilities that are more non-traditional on its military, as seen by National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD-24 dated 20 January 2003, which assigned the responsibility for Iraq to the DoD with the creation of the Pentagon office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian relief.^v

These examples show the importance and relevance for SSTR to be the sixteenth UJTL force employment operation. First, SSTR has been directed to be a core mission and second because it is just as important as offensive or defensive operations in today's military operations. If SSTR operations are going to be placed on the DoD then the military needs to dedicate military resources and integrated planning for SSTR before the conflict starts across the range of military operations (ROMO). In today's fast paced, technology based world waiting until the completion of phase three to plan for phase four operations is entirely too late. Additionally it is relevant to mention that, in today's operating environment, a unit can be conducting traditional phase zero, one, two, three and four operations simultaneously.

The intent of this paper is to show the importance of having SSTR operations as the sixteenth force employment operation in the UJTL. This will be demonstrated by using Operation ECLIPSE during World War II, the evolution of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program into the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) during Vietnam, and a look at the new "Long War" OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) as background of SSTR operations conducted by the U.S. military. The first two historical examples were before the UJTL process was established while OIF started afterward. All three examples will help illustrate/outline the importance of having SSTR as a UJTL force employment operation during the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP). The creation of specified SSTR operational tasks will help eliminate a protracted war and the negative effects it creates. The following assumptions were used to build this argument:

- DoD will continue to push for the use of "Joint" doctrine across the range of military operations.

- The U.S. military will continue to conduct SSTR operations as both a supported and supporting agency.
- The military will be the lead supported planning agency with sufficient guidance from civil leaders.
- As the sixteenth UJTL (force employment operation) both the joint and service staffs will be required to resource, train, and provide task lists for each of the missions under SSTR operations.

This paper will conclude with a counter argument that there is no need to make SSTR a force employment operation because this needs to be an Army mission.

Historical SSTR Operations

There have been many SSTR like operations conducted by the military over the years. Some were well executed, some not so well, and some are still too early to tell. To that end, three historical examples of SSTR operations will be used to illustrate this point. The intent of these three examples is to show how important planning is to the success of these type of operations. During WWII, Allied Forces had Operation ECLIPSE, which was its SSTR operation.

Operation ECLIPSE was the link between war and peace ensuring a smooth transition between military and civil operations. The operation was planned and executed by thousands of U.S. and Allied officers and soldiers. The plan was not flawless because of shifting political objectives, higher priorities in combat operations, and because of the effects of military operations.^{vi} Much of the operation's success can be attributed to the use of surveys (what do the German people want), U.S. ancestral ties to Germany, and the ability of the reconstructions teams to move behind combat forces to start stabilizing as combat operations ended. Planning for the occupation of Germany began in May 1943, nearly two years before its execution.^{vii} Even though this operation was not

perfect, it is a great example of how detailed planning can have positive effects on SSTR. Operation ECLIPSE is viewed as a successful operation because Germany is a successful, self sustaining, democratic government today.

SSTR operations during the Vietnam War did not get the same positive reviews as Operation ECLIPSE. This can be attributed to a lack of strategic and operational SSTR planning. At the start of the conflict, President Johnson focused more on domestic issues than international issues. President Johnson also thought that Vietnam was a small insignificant country that would not pose a threat to our military. Because of this poor assessment, General Westmoreland carried out military operations against the North Vietnamese with limited political oversight. This arrangement worked until the war switched from a conventional to unconventional war. With the unconventional war, SSTR operations became more essential, but the lack of planning for this did not lead to many options.

The Marine Corps came up with CAP, which lived and trained with the local Vietnamese.^{viii} The Marines were able to better understand the local populous and their grievances, and therefore found ways to help reduce their grievances. This helped build trust between the Marines and local populous, which had positive effects on military operations in those areas. Unfortunately, the Marines were unable to convince General Westmoreland that it was a good program and SSTR operations needed to be planned around it.

It was not until the creation of the CORDS that SSTR operations started to take off. This program integrated military and civilian officials in operations that ranged from regional security, propaganda, and agricultural development.^{ix} If both the CAP and

CORDS programs had been planned and executed from the beginning of the war, the results in Vietnam may have turned out more positively.

The war in Iraq is providing the U.S. military with many challenges to a successful integration of SSTR operations. This is not to say that SSTR operations have failed, but are certainly challenged everyday. The U.S. initiated combat operations (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) on 20 March 2003 and it was not until June 2003 that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) stood up to plan and direct SSTR operations.^x

The CPA transferred SSTR operations over to the DOS (Ambassador Negroponte) after ordering de-bathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military. As the DOS and the military strive to better understand the SSTR dilemma, both have realized that de-bathification and disbanding the military may not have been the best thing to do.

Currently the U.S. is trying to build both the Iraqi government and its military. It is hard to believe that the U.S. knowingly went to war to remove Saddam from power without conducting the detailed planning for transition as in WWII.

Importance of having Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction as a Force Employment Operation

Unlike the other operations defined in enclosure E of CJCSM 3500.04D, SSTR (core military mission) has no specific tasks at any level of command. SSTR appears to most as being a new concept in military operations, however as discussed earlier it has been around for a long time. The difference is, now the military and DoD realize the real importance of SSTR to the overall success of a major operation or campaign. Even with this recognition, DoD is still not the lead agent, which causes friction and gaps in detailed planning at the operational and tactical levels.

DOS is the lead agent directed by National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 and is required to coordinate with DoD when applicable.^{xi} The DOS relies heavily on DoD for SSTR because of its structure, size, leadership, and resources. This reliance and directive have created the need for DoD to “think out of the box” when it comes to SSTR. SSTR is only going to work with a solid civil-military relationship. This important relationship is discussed in detail in chapter two of Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps War Plan (MCWP) 3-33.5 “Counterinsurgency”.^{xii} This significance can further be explained by the DoDD 3000.05 definition of military support to SSTR operations, which states “ DoD activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests”.^{xiii}

The military needs to partner with the lead federal agency (DOS) and other interagency organizations with expertise in the stability, transition, and reconstruction part of SSTR to help develop the key tasks required for planning and executing SSTR operations at all levels of war. These key tasks will help support the overall UJTL for

SSTR, which will focus planners on the military's role in the use of national power during SSTR operations. Planners and executors need to know, plan for, and anticipate the effects military operations will have on the other elements of national power (diplomacy, information, and economics). Focused UJTL tasks in conjunction with understanding of the military's role and impact on the other elements of national power will focus planners at any level on supporting strategic goals rather than hindering them because combat operations were not integrated with the overarching strategic goals. This is further explained by a quote from General Anthony Zinni (Commander, U.S. Central Command) on 4 September 2003:

On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody. On the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build the economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political system. And there is some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGO's and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand.^{xiv}


Once these tasks are developed with the help of the military's interagency partners, the military has to incorporate them into the military process.

Planners Resources

Joint operational planners are currently hindered in their ability to properly plan for SSTR operations. First, the CJCSM 3500.04D does not recognize SSTR as a core mission. Currently, CJCSM3500.04D still lists the 1990's Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as the military operation that includes peace operations, humanitarian assistance, civil support, and support insurgencies as sub-missions even though DoD has directed SSTR operations as a core military mission.^{xv} Not being

recognized as a military mission in turn means there are no UJTL tasks created to support military planning.


The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFC) J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0 titled “US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation” is a publication designed for government agencies and strategic planners. The operational planner will find a definition of Stability and Reconstruction on page 8, planning process in section II, and an example of a planning template with civilian tasks on page 43.^{xvi} The planner could also use Military Support to Stabilization,



Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept Version

2.0. Here the planner will find a framework that discusses six simultaneous lines of effort. Below is a graph depicting those lines with their corresponding level of effort.^{xvii}


This flow chart depicts the central idea for conducting SSTR flow chart below.^{xviii}



However, the key point to make is while there is a framework to start SSTR operations, units use UJTL / Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) tasks in order to train and prepare for this kind of operation. The Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 does provide both functional and operation capabilities, which would appear to be the first attempt at identifying important UJTL tasks to assist in SSTR planning.^{xix} Additionally, a planner could go to Appendix A of enclosure E of CJCSM 3500.04D tasks for (peace operations) peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace making, humanitarian assistance, civil support, and support insurgencies are found.^{xx} Although, all of these are considered MOOTW and appear as if they would help, these missions are not the same as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. This is further complicated because JP 1-02 defines all the mentioned terms except transition and reconstruction.^{xxi}

Lastly, a planner will find Joint Stability Operations as a tier 1 Joint Capability Area and supporting tier 2 lexicon, but not find any tasks associated with it.^{xxii} This document identifies the need for a stability capability. This would at least show an acknowledgement of the capability requirement. This does not identify any tasks that need to support the capability.

Why is all of this important? During JOPP, a planner needs to use and apply doctrine, tasks, and terminology that is universal to all branches of the military. The figure on the next page is a good visual representation of how complex and important mutual understanding is in planning for military operations.^{xxiii}




Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations

Planners Process


More than eighteen months of planning went into Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the key question of what to do after Baghdad fell was substantially unaddressed according to LTC James Scudieri.^{xxiv} One can question if this was because the resources were not available to support such planning, there was insufficient commanders' guidance, or no tasks to subordinate units were provided. We will soon see why all of this is important to a planner as we go through the JOPP. JOPP is a six-step process (see below) that results in the handover of a plan or order to the executor.^{xxv}

Planning Process



STEP ONE: Mission Analysis

This step begins when the planner receives a warning order (WARNO) or operations order (OPORD) from his/her higher/strategic headquarters. Mission analysis has seventeen steps that are not conducted in any set order, but for this discussion, only three are discussed. One of the most important steps is to identify the mission that is being assigned from the higher headquarters. Then identify the specific, implied, and essential tasks for that mission. This is key because once the mission is identified, the planner should be able to go to the UJTL and look up the mission/operation in appendix A, enclosure E. There a planner will see the corresponding tasks for that mission/operation. Because SSTR is not a defined mission in the UJTL and it does not have tasks assigned, the planner has nothing to reference when assigned a SSTR operation/mission. See the next page for a visual depiction.^{xxvi}



To explain further, assume that the higher headquarters has assigned your headquarters a movement to contact operation. The planner would go to page E-A-39 in CJCSM 3500.04D where they would find a brief description of the mission/operation, further references, and the operational tasks assigned to movement to contact.^{xxvii}

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

Description:

A form of land offensive operation employed by the land forces to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy.

Search Documents: CJCSM 3500.04B, FM 100-5 (Army)

Tasks:

TASK	DESCRIPTION
ST 1.1.3	Conduct Intratheater Deployment of Forces
ST 1.3.1	Posture Forces for Strategic Maneuver
ST 1.3.6	Conduct Theater of War Operations in Depth
ST 4.3.1	Establish and Coordinate Movement Services Within Theater
OP 1.2.2	Posture Joint Forces for Operational Formations
OP 1.2.4	Conduct Operations in Depth
OP 1.3.1	Overcome Operationally Significant Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines
OP 1.3.2	Enhance Movement of Operational Forces
OP 2.2.1	Collect Information on Operational Situation
OP 2.4.1	Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Operational Information
OP 3.1.3	Develop Operational Targets
OP 3.1.7	Employ Fire Support Coordination Measures
OP 3.2.6	Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver
OP 4.4.1	Coordinate Field Services Requirements
OP 4.5.1	Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area
OP 5.1.1	Communicate Operational Information
OP 5.3.1	Conduct Operational Mission Analysis
OP 5.3.3	Determine Operational End State
OP 5.4.4	Synchronize and Integrate Operations
OP 6.4.2	Conduct Operational Deception

Understanding these tasks along with any other tasks assigned in the higher order will help develop the commander's critical information requirements. Without this understanding, the commander may make decisions that will adversely affect the outcome of the mission/operation

STEP TWO Course of Action Development

This step takes all the known information from step one and starts to build different options or courses of action (COA). The commander can have the staff work one or multiple courses of action during this process. Having a dedicated staff section with ownership of SSTR operations is crucial in this step. Historically, operational intelligence is spearheaded by the J2, combat operations by the J3 and logistical

operations by the J4. This will be explained further in the next step. If there is no lead Joint staff section pushing for SSTR there will not be great emphasis placed on the operation. It is this lead staff section that will understand and be able to articulate what SSTR operations are and the tasks associated with those operations once placed in the UJTL.

For example in the last paragraph, the mission/operation type was movement to contact. The J3 will most likely be the lead staff section for that operation. The J3 staff section will be able to articulate the mission/operation from phase zero through phase four and show how the other staff sections can best support that operation/mission. At the end of this process, there will be five products, three of which are important to this discussion.^{xxviii} The first is approved courses of action based on the commander's guidance. Second, is the evaluation criteria, which will have an impact during the next step. Lastly, are the initial staff estimates of how the COA may play out. More expertise and attention paid to the mission/operation that the COA was created yields a better final product

STEP THREE Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

This step begins at the operational level usually with the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) or the Chief of Staff (CoS) setting the ground rules for the wargame and may include what techniques will be used, the order in which participants will go, and usually the time limit for the wargame itself. Once this is done, the staff will present each of their COAs separately, while the enemy cell (usually a member from the J2) will counter with the enemy course of action (ECOAs). This allows the staff to understand how the enemy might react to their COA. It is during the wargame that the staff can

visualize how important each phase of the mission/operation is against the big picture. More often than not the staff section that has mastered their art the best dominates the wargame and may sway decisions in the next step.^{xxix} This is yet another reason it is important for SSTR operations to be well defined and understood. Operations not well defined and understood often take a backseat in a wargaming, when they may need to be the number one priority. This step concludes with published results of the wargame, a list of critical events and decision points, and branches and sequels identified for further planning.^{xxx} These are not an all-inclusive list, but are the main points.

STEP FOUR COA Comparison and Decision

This step has the potential to be either easy or very difficult depending on staff personalities and or priorities. Going back to the previous step, there can be a staff section that can sway the outcome of this step or cause modifications to a COA. At the end of this step, the staff will suggest a COA based on one of the following: COA without and modifications, COA with modifications, an entirely new COA, combining elements of multiple COAs, or discard all COAs and start the process over.^{xxxi} The staff then presents this to the commander in a COA decision brief.^{xxxii}

Sample COA decision brief from NWP 5-01

<u>BRIEFER</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
J-5/N-5	Higher headquarters intent
	Restated mission
J-3/N-3	Status of own forces
J-2/N-2	Updated intelligence estimate
	Terrain analysis
	Weather analysis
	Enemy situation
J-3/N-3	Own COAs
J-3/N-3, J-2/N-2	Assumptions used in planning
J-1/N-1, J-4/N-4, J-6/N-6	Results of staff estimate
J-5/N-5	Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix or table showing COA comparison)
	Recommended COA (may differ from other staff)
COS	Recommended COA

This brief is use more to illustrate the complexities of planning and the better mission/operations are defined and understood the easier this process can be.

STEP FIVE Plans and Orders Development

Step five is the step that brings all the previous information together to create the commander's "ORDER". During this step, the planners will define the mission/operation and assign tasks to its subordinate units. In the case of SSTR operations, it is hard to assign subordinate units a mission and/or tasks that are not clearly defined by the joint force. This lack of clarity may and can result in adverse execution of the commander's intent. Words and tasks have meaning when assigned and it is in this step of the planning process that those definitions need to be universally understood at all levels. Once the order or plan is written, the planner will crosswalk each part to ensure it reflects exactly what the commander intends each of his subordinates to do. This step is completed when the commander approves and issues the order or plan.

STEP SIX Transition

The final step in the planning process is transition. The most important part of this step is that the subordinate commands understand and acknowledge their responsibility to the order or plan. Once this is complete the order or plan is ready to execute.

COUNTERARGUMENT

One may argue that there is no need to make SSTR a force employment operation because this needs to be an Army mission. The Army does not have SSTR doctrine, but does have doctrine and FMs for stability operations. When you look in FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List (AUTL) you will find stability operations with ten sub-tasks under ART 8.0 Conduct Tactical Mission Tasks and Operations.^{xxxiii} Stability operations are also discussed in FM 5-0 the Army Planning and Orders Production manual.^{xxxiv} FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations is the Army's doctrine when it comes to these two missions.^{xxxv} The Army has also published a Training Circular (TC) 7-98-1 Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package, which lays out in detail both planning and training for Stability operations.^{xxxvi} The Army has spent a lot of time and has had a lot of experience with stability operations, but that is only one piece of SSTR. The Army has recently realized the importance of SSTR and has published an appendix in FM 5-0.1 The Operations Process entitled Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction Operations and Civil Support Operations.^{xxxvii}

This argument is flawed for two main reasons. First, even though the Army is the lead land component it seldom fights alone. The Army has and will continue to fight as a joint and/or multinational headquarters. Because of this, it has to be well versed in Joint doctrine. The Army can not expect its sister services to understand and execute Army specific doctrine. Secondly, the Army's universal task list is not nested with the UJTL.

Two figures will help depict this. The first figure is from CJCSM 3500.04D, which shows the flow of tasks through all levels of war.^{xxxviii}




Figure 1 UJTL Task Chart

Here you can see that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Universal tasks are aligned with the UJTL Tactical Tasks. The Army task of stability operations can be tracked up through the UJTL to tasks assigned by MOOTW. An example from FM 7-1 Battle Focused Training of this crosswalk is below.^{xxxix}




Figure 2 Task Crosswalk

This crosswalk shows how a unit task is linked to a AUTL and then to a UJTL task or set of tasks.

Even if the Army was given the mission of SSTR to conduct as a service, they could not do it because there are no SSTR operations or tasks to link or nest them to. This is yet another reason that SSTR needs to be added, defined, and assigned tasks under force employment operations in the UJTL.

CONCLUSION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff need to update CJCSM 3500.04D UJTL to reflect SSTR operations as a subset of Force Employment Operations. Furthermore, SSTR operations and its subset operations need to be clearly defined and have UJTL tasks assigned.

Without this specificity in joint publications and doctrine, the U.S. military will continue to struggle with SSTR operations because SSTR is not a focus during the JOPP.

History has shown and continues to show that if the proper attention, task oriented, detailed, focused SSTR planning is not conducted prior to and during conflict operations, the success of that operation is jeopardized. History also shows that clearly stated political guidance, goals, and end state assist in the success of SSTR operations.

These tasks can then be incorporated into joint doctrine, joint definitions, and UJTL tasks, which will help focus operational planners and provide a common operating environment for SSTR operations across the joint force. As seen in the JOPP, a universally known operation and the tasks associated with that operation are crucial. Without this standardized knowledge, planners are left to make their own definitions or tasks, which may or may not be explained well enough for all executors to perform as envisioned.

The U.S. military conducted SSTR operations in its past, has joint operations on going, and will continue to have SSTR requirements in the future with the current instability in several regions of the world. It is for this reason that SSTR operations need to be a defined operation in the UJTL with associated tasks. This will provide the tools and resources needed for detailed SSTR operational planning.

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¹ Joint Publication 3-0 on page IV-26 shows the six phases on an operation as: Phase zero “SHAPE”, phase one “DETER”, phase two “SEIZE THE INITIATIVE”, phase three “DOMINATE”, phase four “STABILIZE”, phase five “ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY”.

² The fifteen Force Employment Operations are: theater counterair, rear area security, joint interdiction, land offense, land defense, land retrograde, maritime operations, blockade, nuclear, theater nuclear, space, strategic attack, information operations, C2 attack, and C2 protect

ⁱⁱⁱ Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 79

^{iv} Department of Defense, directive, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” 3000.05 (28 November 2005)

^v President, National Security Presidential Directive, “Post-War Iraq Reconstruction” 24 (20 January 2003)

^{vi} Conrad Crane, “Turning Battlefied Victory into Strategic Success”, PowerPoint Presentation, 14 September 2004.

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^{ix} Ibid.

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^{xviii} Ibid, IV

^{xix} Ibid, 54-62

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- ^{xx} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List, Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500-4D (Washington, DC: August 2005), E2 – E9.
- ^{xxi} See annex 1 definitions.
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- ^{xxxi} Ibid, 5-4
- ^{xxxii} Ibid
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