

Confounding our Enemies and Astounding our Friends, Honesty in Twenty-First Century Warfare

**A Monograph
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Confounding our Enemies and Astounding our Friends, Honesty in
21st Century Warfare

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Abstract

Confounding our Enemies and Astounding our Friends, Honesty in 21st Century Warfare

by MAJ John A. Oliver Jr., US Army, 42 pages.

Propaganda and disinformation characterized indispensable components of nineteenth and twentieth century warfare. Examples such as Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* or Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" series made no attempt to honestly display differences between nations, but instead cast all arguments in black and white. In an age where audiences had no readily available resources to question the accuracy of such works, propaganda and disinformation represented effective methods to target the will of large groups of people. The information revolution and the "flattening" of the world as described by columnist Thomas Friedman and other authors has forever altered the use of information or disinformation in warfare. Simplistic characterizations of the enemy and false statements on operations find immediate counter in an age of 24-hour media coverage and access to an uncontrolled internet.

The evolution of warfare in concert with the information revolution, as well as current political, demographic, and religious trends also contributes to the downfall of propaganda and disinformation. Twenty-first century warfare, characterized by COL Thomas Hammes as "fourth Generation" warfare, emphasizes not destruction of enemy forces but instead targets the minds and will of political decision makers. Modern warriors use all methods, political, social, economic, or military to achieve their ends. Master strategists in modern conflict, such as Mao or Ho Chi Minh understand tactical or operation considerations pale in comparison to strategic considerations. No longer will victory on the battlefield ensure that national ends are met. When we combine the ascendancy of strategic considerations with the information revolution, we find a battleground of thoughts, values, and ideas. This battleground, found on internet websites, news programs, and in the folds of newspapers can enable the strategic victory of tactically inept forces or drag tactically magnificent forces down to strategic defeat. The primary ordinance on this battleground of ideas is not artillery shells, tank rounds, or bullets. It is legitimacy. While culture and nationalism will influence how an audience perceives messages from any actor, legitimacy finds its most firm foundation in credibility and candor. If an audience perceives that a messenger is truthful, they may perceive the content of his message as more legitimate. *This legitimacy, the key to victory in the battle of ideas, can only be won by honesty.*

The interconnected and rapidly evolving nature of the twenty first century, as explored in chapter one, shall enable all individuals, regardless of nation or culture, to seek truth and honest information. The epistemological foundations of ethical theory in regards to honesty, as explored in chapter two, mark the path between the requirement to deceive an enemy in wartime and maintaining the integrity and honesty necessary for national and international support for the conduct of war. This study concludes with a synthesis of this deeper understanding of truth and honesty with a thorough awareness of the nature of twenty-first century conflict to clarify the relationship between the two. In the twenty-first century, Soldiers will fight violent extremists more often than they will face the armies of other nation states. In such confusing warfare, the temptation to use any means will be ever present. As American Soldiers, we must be courageous in the face of such temptation and heed the words of that uniquely American philosopher, Samuel Clemens, who wrote "When in doubt, tell the truth. It will confound your enemies and astound your friends."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Honesty and the Bay of Pigs.....	1
Chapter 1: Scharnhorst's Legacy.....	7
Chapter 2: An Irrational Desire for Honesty?	23
Conclusion: Advice from Samuel Clemens.....	37
Bibliography	45

Introduction: Honesty and the Bay of Pigs

“By a lie a man throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a man.”

-Immanuel Kant, *Doctrine of Virtue*

In the spring of 1961, US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson rose before the United Nations to defend the United States. Cuban Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Roa had accused the United States of planning and financing air raids as a “prologue” to a “large scale invasion of Cuba.” In preparing his defense, Ambassador Stevenson had turned to the Kennedy Administration for accurate information. Only a few days before, on April 12, 1961, President Kennedy announced “there will not be, under any conditions, any intervention in Cuba by United States armed forces and this government will do everything it possibly can...to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba.” The CIA had confirmed the President’s words, informing Stevenson’s office that the pilots of the ancient B-26 bombers which had attacked Cuba were genuine Cuban defectors taking off from Cuban airfields in Cuban airplanes. In fact, the CIA provided Stevenson with photos clearly showing Cuban markings on the aircraft. Ambassador Stevenson took these photos to the United Nations, declaring that the United States had not supported the air attacks and would not be involved in any attack on Cuba. The violence represented an internal Cuban dispute, nothing more.¹

The United States, through Ambassador Stevenson, lied to the United Nations. The CIA photos were doctored fakes, a fact soon uncovered by the press. The B-26s were American provided planes, flown by American trained pilots. The United States was indeed planning and financing an invasion of Cuba which would become known as the “Bay of Pigs.” Ambassador Stevens understood the cost of his deception and described it to his friend, Mrs. Edison Dick. “You heard my speech [at the UN] today? Well, I did not tell the whole truth; I did not know the

¹ Richard J. Walton, *The Remnants of Power; the Tragic Last Years of Adlai Stevenson* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1968), 31.

whole truth. I took this job at the President's request on the understanding that I would be consulted and kept fully informed on everything. I spoke in the United Nations in good faith on that understanding. Now my credibility has been compromised, and therefore my usefulness."² The failure of the invasion humiliated the United States, and the lies told by the Kennedy administration damaged US credibility among the international community. In fact, the damage done was so great that despite a lobby of émigré Cubans in the United States and a generally bellicose attitude toward Cuba, no US administration since Kennedy's has mustered the political will to oust the Castro government. Fidel Castro has outlasted nine US presidents and, if he lives two more years, will add President Bush to that list for an even ten.

The riddle of a tiny island nation's ability to thumb its nose at the United States for over four decades certainly comprises multiple complex factors and can not be explained by a single, or even several, dishonest acts. But there can be little doubt that the loss of credibility incurred by US false statements impacted the ability of American strategic communications to entice indigenous Cubans and other populations to the US side. Failure of the Cuban populace to revolt spontaneously against the Castro government contributes one of the principle reasons the "Bay of Pigs" invasion failed. But one wonders how the Kennedy administration could expect any rational Cuban to revolt in favor of an invasion which the powerful United States specifically stated it would not support. Perhaps President Kennedy intended his words to be heard by the American electorate or the Soviet government. Unfortunately for the 1,500 unlucky souls who landed on the shores of the Playa Giron on April 17, 1961, Kennedy's words were transported by the media not only to American or Russian ears, but to Cuban ears as well.

Aldai Stevenson's unwitting dishonesty to the United Nations would hardly constitute the first or last time leaders or representatives of the United States would lie to the detriment of American national interests. COL H.R. McMaster, in his thought-provoking book, *Dereliction of*

² Arnold Beichman, "The Politics of Personal Self-Destruction," *Policy Review*, Feb and March, 2006. [database online], available at <http://www.policyreview.org/135/beichman.html>

Duty, describes President Lyndon Johnson's predilection for dishonesty and its impact on the United States when he writes "his (Johnson's) misrepresentation of his war experience for political benefit revealed a real propensity for lying. Both Lyndon Johnson's self-doubt and his willingness to forgo the truth would color his relationship with his principle military advisers and shape the way that the United States became more deeply involved in the Vietnam War."³ With these examples in mind, there can be little doubt that honesty and dishonesty profoundly impact a nation's ability to pursue its interests.

Propaganda and disinformation embodied staples of nineteenth and twentieth century conflict. Examples such as Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* or Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" series made no attempt to display honestly differences between nations, but instead cast all arguments in black and white. Propagandists painted their conflicts in terms of good versus evil and freedom versus slavery with no gray area or middle ground. In an age where audiences had no readily available resources to question the accuracy of such works, propaganda and disinformation provided effective methods to target the will of large groups of people. We no longer live in such an age. The information revolution and the "flattening" of the world as described by columnist Thomas Friedman and other authors forever altered how people access and consume information. Simplistic characterizations of foreign governments, people, or societies and false statements on events or operations find immediate counter in an age of 24-hour media coverage and access to an uncontrolled internet. The comical example of Iraqi Minister of Information Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, or "Baghdad Bob," proclaiming the victory of Iraqi forces while embedded journalists reported the advance of US forces into Baghdad clearly demonstrates the humiliating failure of disinformation in the information age.

The evolution of warfare in concert with the information revolution, as well as current political and demographic trends also contributes to the downfall of propaganda and

³ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that led to Vietnam* (New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 51.

disinformation and the rise of the importance of honesty. Twenty-first century warfare presents a complex puzzle for professional soldiers, politicians, and interested thinkers to consider. The current and dawning age of conflict has been characterized by noted author and veteran Marine COL Thomas Hammes as a “fourth generation”⁴ of warfare which emphasizes not destruction of enemy forces but instead targets the minds and will of political decision makers. ADM A.K. Cerbrowski, former Director of the Office of Force Transformation in the Pentagon, provides a different opinion and describes a “netcentric” warfare in which networked force can gain significant advantage through effective use of modern information technologies. Numerous other theories on the nature of twenty-first century conflict abound, but there can be little doubt that modern leaders and warriors will use all available methods, whether they are political, technological, social, economic, or military, to achieve their ends. A deep study of the theory and evolution of war in the new century may enable a clearer view of the role of information operations and the value of honesty in conducting them.

Absolute honesty, however, may be neither possible nor desirable. Lying to enemies, for example, may be justified in particular conditions. Battlefield deceptions or ruses, such as the extensive efforts to convince Germans that the D-Day landing would occur at the Pas de Calais, may be appropriate for their particular circumstances. The foundations of ethical study support the notion of “appropriate” lies and “incomplete” honesty in very specific cases. Aristotle’s “Doctrine of the Mean,” for example, suggests that “every ethical virtue is an intermediate between two other states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency.”⁵ But where does this intermediate lie? In what circumstances does deception prove acceptable? What consequences might such deception bring? Such questions find satisfactory reply if we study honesty and virtue in light of the teaching of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Mill as well as current

⁴ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, Zenith Press, 2004), 2.

⁵ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Aristotle’s Ethics”; available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/>; Internet, accessed 20 October, 2006.

thinkers and ethicists such as Sissela Bok and Harry Frankfurt. In coming to understand truth and honesty, study of the tension between utilitarian arguments and the virtue ethics of our Army Values may provide a framework for understanding.

Master strategists in modern conflict, such as Mao or Ho Chi Minh, understood that tactical or operation considerations pale in comparison to strategic considerations. This seems to illuminate a relative decline in the importance of tactical or operational victory in achieving strategic ends. No longer does victory on the battlefield ensure that national ends are met. When we combine the ascendancy of strategic considerations with the information revolution, we find a new battleground of thoughts, values, and ideas. This battleground, found on internet websites, news programs, and in the folds of newspapers can enable the strategic victory of tactically inept forces or drag tactically magnificent forces down to strategic defeat. The primary ordinance on this battleground of ideas is not artillery shells or bullets. It is legitimacy. While culture, religion, and nationalism will influence how an audience perceives messages from any actor, legitimacy finds its most firm foundation in credibility and candor. If an audience perceives that a messenger is truthful, they may perceive the content of his message as more legitimate. *This legitimacy, the key to victory in the battle of ideas, can only be won by honesty. The interconnected and rapidly evolving nature of the twenty first century, as explored in chapter one, shall enable all individuals, regardless of nation or culture, to seek and know truth. The epistemological foundations of ethical theory in regards to honesty, as explored in chapter two, mark the path between the requirement to deceive an enemy in wartime while maintaining the integrity and honesty necessary for national and international support for the conduct of war. This study concludes with a synthesis of this deeper understanding of truth and honesty with a thorough awareness of the nature of twenty-first century conflict to clarify the relationship between the two.*

This discussion of truth and honesty harbors more than academic interest for military professionals and national leaders. The question of honesty as a characteristic of successful

twenty-first warfare poses serious implications for operations and strategic communications in the coming decades. The authors of “The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2030 and Beyond,” a publication of Joint Forces Command published in September, 2006, speak to these implications when they write:

The importance of a skillfully orchestrated information campaign cannot be underestimated. Some may view this campaign as the driving factor for all other complementary operations—political, military, and economic. This campaign is designed to gain the support of the nation, the world, and the local populace in the operational area while draining the will of the adversary. For the United States, this information campaign must be based on the truth. Aside from the potential backlash of being caught in a lie, it is simply an accepted part of the American value system—honesty is a hallmark.⁶

The value system of American culture, particularly the culture of the American Army, cherishes truth and candor. The Army Values of honor, integrity, and respect demand that Soldiers practice honesty. The values of loyalty and duty give reason for that honesty. Courage and self-less service provide the means to be honest in demanding situations. The jaded may see such discussion as trite or naive, but such opinions wither in the light of current operations and the many unfortunate historic failings of American honesty. American dishonesty about the Bay of Pigs crippled the reputation of Adlai Stevenson and contributed to failure of the invasion. American honesty or dishonesty in the twenty-first century will carry equally significant consequences.

⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2030 and Beyond*, (Sep, 2006) 47.

Chapter 1: Scharnhorst's Legacy

“The only point which is certain is that, from this point on, war will no longer be what it was originally. Which is to say that, if in the days to come mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we are familiar.”

-Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*⁷

“Now everybody do the propaganda, and sing along in the age of paranoia...”

-Green Day, American Idiot

Prussian General Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst suffered the nightmare all soldiers dread. He watched as Napoleon humiliated and defeated his beloved Prussian Army and conquered Prussia in October of 1806. Within three short weeks, the French had destroyed the army of the heirs of Frederick the Great and reduced the Prussians to servitude. This defeat weighed even more heavily on Scharnhorst because he had seen it coming. He and a very few others had understood the nature and danger of the French Revolution and what it would mean for warfare. Scharnhorst understood that the evolution of warfare enabled by the *levee en masse* developed not merely larger armies, but instead “destroyed the shackles that had enslaved the will of the common soldier, and had released a force unprecedented in the history of warfare. In Prussia, the reality of the individual soldier fighting willingly for a cause he believed in was unimaginable to most officers and civilians”⁸ Scharnhorst had passionately argued for “a national militia”⁹ to fight the coming French juggernaut, but his pleas fell on deaf ears.

Scharnhorst could see how the societal changes of the French Revolution impacted upon warfare not due only to some inner genius, but also to an earnest and deep study of history,

⁷ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, (Beijing, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999) 4.

⁸ Charles E. White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the 'Militarische Gesellschaft' in Berlin, 1801-1805*, (Ann Arbor, UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1986) 123.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 180.

science, sociology, and warfare. From his earliest days as a cadet in the military academy of Count Friedrich Wilhelm, Scharnhorst learned to “view warfare as something shaped and conditioned by larger historical forces, many of which could never be clearly defined or understood. Success in war depended not only on the skill and valor of soldiers, but also on the social, political, economic, and military structure of society.”¹⁰ Scharnhorst’s attempts to reform the Prussian army through the education of its officers prior to 1806 failed due to the ignorant and ossified aristocracy of Prussia, but after the crushing defeat by Napoleon his voice finally found the king’s ear. The rebirth of the Prussian army in just six years and its part of defeating the Emperor of France can be credited in large part to Scharnhorst and his students.

Indeed, the work of Scharnhorst’s most famous student, Carl von Clausewitz, continues to guide nations, militaries, and even businesses to the current day. Clausewitz’s famed statement “war is merely a continuation of politics” may be the most quoted and least understood military maxim in history. This misunderstanding may be, for the most part, brought about by a lack of understanding of the term *politics*. Merriam-Webster Online defines politics in a multitude of ways having to do with leadership and government and finally settles on “the total complex of relations between people living in society.” Defined as such, politics encompasses all commerce, diplomacy, education, religion, warfare, science, and every other human interaction on the planet. With an understanding of term politics, Clausewitz’s quote becomes a simple truism. Of course warfare is politics, and so is every other human relationship. Warfare must then be governed by the same interactions which govern commerce, science, or government.

For most of human history, interaction between societies and cultures was limited. Long distance travel until the twentieth century represented a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Information had to be carried from one place to another in the form of tablets, scrolls, and finally books. Most people lived and died within a small radius of their place of birth. As technology and society evolved together, people and ideas began to move more freely. It is in light of

¹⁰ Ibid., 89.

societal and technological evolution the true meaning of Clausewitz's quotation becomes apparent. Warfare, like politics, depends upon the current evolutionary state of the society which practices it. Warfare is *contextual* and must be viewed in light of the "social, political, economic, and military structure of society." Gerhard Scharnhorst would undoubtedly agree.

This understanding of warfare brings us to the most important question in regards to whether honesty is relevant in twenty-first century conflict. What is the context of our society, and therefore the context of warfare in our time? What are the social, economic, military, and technological characteristics of our new century? To appreciate the place of honesty in twenty-first century conflict, this chapter seeks to describe this context and the relevant theories of warfare within it.

Thomas Friedman's description of globalization in his works *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* and *The World is Flat* provides a useful theory of the current state of society and how we got here. Friedman argues that there have been three eras of globalization. The first can be characterized as the "age of discovery" in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when European explorers traveled the world to find new markets and resources. Friedman first describes "globalization 1.0" writing that "in this era, countries and governments (often inspired by religion or imperialism or a combination of both) led the way in breaking down walls and knitting the world together, driving global integration."¹¹ Or, if we see it from a different point of view, driving global exploitation. Regardless, the evolution of the technology of "wind power and horsepower," along with economic and religious motives, drove human interaction in this period. The primary actors were nation-states and these competed among each other.

Friedman next describes "globalization 2.0" which lasted from the turn of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. This period saw the "birth and maturation of the global economy, in the sense that there was enough movement of goods and information from

¹¹ Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat, A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005) 9.

continent to continent for there to be a global market.”¹² Steam power and oil power replaced wind and horses, and the spread of publishing and, eventually, computers allowed ideas to spread as rapidly as manufactured goods. This period saw the American Civil War fought against the backdrop of slavery, the US civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the decline of colonialism in places such as Vietnam and Algeria. This spread of ideas should not be underestimated as a precursor and characteristic of conflict during the period of “globalization 2.0.” The ideas of the philosophers of American and French revolutions that all men were created equal and deserved “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” found warm reception not just in the societies in which they were written, but all over the world. No doubt Ho Chi Minh believed these sentiments just as surely Thomas Jefferson and acted upon them in a similar manner. Also apparent in this period was a change in the nature of actors. Smaller groups began to have a larger impact on the world stage. The FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), a small band of Muslim nationalists in Algeria, managed to defeat France and help end her colonialism in North Africa. The small nation of North Vietnam defeated the vast power of the United States. Technology and connection served to empower smaller groups of people, and, at the close of the twentieth century, human civilization had evolved into complex, interdependent web of nations, corporations, societies, and individual actors. The context of society at the beginning of the twentieth-first century is complex. However, the constant theme of increasing human interaction makes itself apparent. There can be little doubt that as technology advances, the general trend of the increasing rate of the exchange of ideas and goods and the empowerment of smaller groups of people will continue and increase.

Friedman discusses the current evolution of society as he describes his concept of “globalization 3.0.” He writes that the primary characteristic of “globalization 3.0” is its empowerment of “individuals to collaborate and compete globally.”¹³ This empowerment of

¹² Ibid., 10.

¹³ Ibid., 11.

individuals is at the heart of understanding twenty-first century society and warfare. The information revolution enabled this empowerment of individuals and will continue to do so in unforeseeable ways over the next one hundred years. In *The World is Flat* Thomas Friedman describes in detail the forces that are currently evolving how people, corporations, societies, and governments interact. He illustrates the use of the internet and specific software applications to standardize how work in many fields is accomplished. This standardization and long distance communication allow for “outsourcing” of work from one part of the world to another. Friedman’s descriptions of the boom in companies in India taking advantage of the digital connections between India and the West paint a vivid picture. American tax returns completed in Bangalore, India at a fraction of the cost American accountants would charge, Indian “call banks” establishing help lines for hundreds of companies, and workflow software that can chop up parts of a project to be completed by firms in the US, China, and India simultaneously, with each effort complimenting the others, all contribute to an increasingly interconnected world. Information now travels between points on the globe at the speed of light. The trip across the Atlantic that once took months or weeks can be accomplished “virtually” in a video teleconference and take place instantly. The information revolution compliments advances in transportation, materials, and other sciences as well. We can not only communicate over great distances, we can send packages and products quickly and cheaply.

The pace of this change can only increase over the coming century. Technology writer Stephen Johnson highlights the acceleration of technological and social change when he writes:

Something fundamental has changed in the minds of consumers as well. Radical shifts in technology once required a process: evangelism, training, then slow adoption. But for those who grew up with shape shifting software, innovations unfold with the rhythm and passion of fashion – a constant, surging quest for the latest thing. Even the most ardent supporter of blogging could not have predicted 30 million blogs. Having a MySpace.com presence went from hobby to mandatory for every teenager in less than 16 months. The ease of producing software is matched by the hunger for innovations among consumers. They’re blogging, podcasting, gambling, and building virtual worlds. So many of them

have been willing to adopt new tools in such a short time because the tools have been designed to give them a voice, to allow them to shape the media.¹⁴

The social norm of how technology is adopted is changing. Other social norms are changing as well. Teens now compete to be in each others' "top 5" friends as posted on MySpace.com.

Virtual friendships between individuals far apart are now commonplace. Bloggers constantly fact check all media reports and can be read by millions if they find discrepancies. Individuals no longer depend on mainstream, local media outlets for information. If "Fox News" or "CNN" fails to please, an individual can surf the net to Al-Jazeera.com or tune to Al Aqsa Television on their satellite receiver. Individuals are now presented with the widest array of information, entertainment, and products that history has ever known. Friedman calls this world "flattened." This leads the professional soldier to ask, what is the nature of war in a flat world?

In his writings, Samuel Huntington presents the thesis of a "Clash of Civilizations" as a structure for conflict in the twenty-first century. Huntington, in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article, states:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.¹⁵

This view sees cultural differences as the primary cause of conflict. Huntington's paradigm would forecast future conflict between Islam and the West, between China and West, between massive blocks of peoples. Thomas Friedman has a different view when he writes "countries whose workers and industries are woven into a major global supply chain know they cannot take an hour, a week, or a month off for war without disrupting industries and economies around the

¹⁴ Steven Johnson, "Here Comes Everybody," *Discover*, July 2006, 23.

¹⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations?", in "Foreign Affairs", vol. 72, no. 3, Summer (1993), 22.

world and thereby risking the loss of their place in that supply chain for a long time..."¹⁶ Where Huntington sees cultures dividing humanity Friedman sees economics uniting us. Edward Said informs this argument:

These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis. "The Clash of Civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.¹⁷

Though an examination of Said's writing certainly shows little empathy for Friedman's political ideas, Said clearly understands Friedman's contention that walls and divisions are useless in the twenty-first century. Dividing people by civilization or religion or color is an easy way out, a refusal to attempt to understand fundamental human drives or desires and how current social conditions and technology can enable individuals to seek them. Said wisely turns to basics and councils an honest examination of justice and power in civilization. This examination will not be easy. Current operations in Iraq provide a sobering example. Although the US *intent* surely was to eliminate an evil dictator and spread stability and peace in the form of democracy, our *actions* have resulted in a bloody chaos of pain and misery for Iraqis. It is a hallmark of the human condition that while we may judge ourselves by our intentions, others have only our actions to judge us upon. Huntington might believe that the insurgents of Iraq are fighting for their culture and religion, but an honest assessment must include the consideration that they are fighting for their own ideas of power and justice, which for some of them include the removal US forces which they see as the cause of the suffering and death in their society.

If we accept that conflict in the twenty-first century may be driven by globalization empowered individuals seeking their own versions of power and justice rather than monolithic

¹⁶ Friedman, 421.

¹⁷ Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation*, 2001 [database online]. Available at <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said/3>; accessed 10 December, 2006.

blocks of culture grating against one another, a very different world view emerges. The paradigm of large nation-state armies clashing in relatively short and bloody conflicts shifts to smaller bands of non-state actors using methods including, but not limited to, violence to achieve their aims. Eventually, this paradigm envisions individuals leveraging globalization to shape world politics. In the second century before Christ, the great Greek mathematician Archimedes postulated, “Give me a place to stand and a lever long enough and I will move the world.” The technical and social change of the twenty-first century may indeed provide Archimedes’s lever and platform.

Misreading the information revolution presents a dangerous trap for current military thinkers. Without understanding deeper meanings, a casual examination of rapid technological change might suggest that it is the technology and its use which is important. Just as Scharnhorst understood that the real meaning of the French Revolution went far beyond massive armies or new command and control structures and rested in the fundamental motivation of the common soldier, wise military thinkers of the present must look at humans and human interaction to find the nature of current warfare. The tension between two theories of twenty-first century conflict, “network-centric warfare” and “fourth-generation warfare” provides an illuminating example. The theory of network-centric warfare hypothesizes that networking a military force and evolving tactics and strategies to capitalize on that networked force create a decisive advantage in current warfare. The late ADM A.K. Cebrowski, former director of the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, champions network-centric warfare when he writes, “In the information Age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed, all of which are facilitated by networked forces...This linking of people platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids into a single network creates a whole that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts.”¹⁸ While network-centric warfare theory certainly recognizes the information

¹⁸ A.K. Cebrowski, *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*, (Washington, DC, DOD Office of Force Transformation, 2005) i.

revolution and the power of the technology this revolution is creating, ADM Cebrowski's theory seems deficient in recognizing that human decisions and understanding represent the most important factor in warfare. Network-centric warfare does address the cognitive and social domains but only discusses them in relation to how quickly individual and shared situational awareness can join in a collaboration to achieve decisions.¹⁹ Unfortunately, there seems to be little discussion on whether those decisions are *wise* decisions or how to make them wise decisions. Network-centric warfare makes the arrogant assumption that as long as we can make decisions fast and together, they will be good decisions. Network-centric warfare theory then focuses on the speedy implementation of those quickly and jointly realized decisions through linked sensors and weapons. While speedy operational and tactical decision making is certainly important, and the capitalization of enabling technologies can provide advantages on the battlefield, network-centric warfare theory fall short of encompassing the strategic level of war. Network-centric warfare describes ways in which we can fight wars more efficiently, but it fails to show us *why*, *when*, *if*, or *how* we should fight them.

Network-centric warfare theory certainly enables us to kill quickly. Unfortunately, as the circumstances in Iraq today (and those in Vietnam in 1968 or Spain in 1810) show, knowing whom to kill is much more important than killing him quickly. To gain that knowledge of whom to kill in such a complex environment and, perhaps more importantly, whom to cooperate with, the theory of fourth generation warfare provides more utility. COL Thomas Hammes describes fourth-generation war:

Fourth generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks - political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of societies networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the

¹⁹ Ibid., 19.

networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will.²⁰

Fourth generation warfare theory, like network-centric warfare theory, stresses the importance of networks. But instead of physical, technological networks this theory stresses the important of all networks, including social networks such as families, tribes, or religious communities. COL Hammes' use of the term "enemy" when describing the targeted decision makers is unfortunate. Often, neutral, indigenous, or even friendly political decision makers could be the target of a fourth-generation campaign. In his fictitious field manual "FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War," William Lind, one of the primary developers of fourth-generation warfare theory, not only discusses the three current levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical), but also adds three more important levels, taken from the writings of COL John Boyd, the moral, the mental, and the physical.²¹ Boyd, perhaps, envisioned the moral level of war to be psychological rather than ethical; however since fourth generation war seem to be wars of ideas and values, an ethical moral level appears necessary. A combatant's goal in fourth generation warfare is to *convince* enemy, neutral, or friendly decision makers to do his will. Often these political decision makers are the inhabitants of entire nations. If the combatant offends them through odious acts, he loses. The sad example of physical and mental abuse at Abu Ghraib prison demonstrates the disastrous effects of abhorrent acts. The disastrous impact of these acts on how Americans were and are viewed by the Iraqi populace makes the importance of the moral level of war in modern conflict all too clear. We must not think of this loss of the ethical and moral level of war only in the abstract. The consequences of immoral or even simply thoughtless acts are physical and devastating, as shown in the writing of MAJ Bill Edmonds, a Special Forces officer recently returned from Iraq where he served as an interrogator:

²⁰ Hammes, 2.

²¹ William Lind, *FMFM 1-A Fourth Generation War*, available at http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc; accessed 7 March 2007, 7.

It is how you act," he (a recently captured Iraqi insurgent) says, "and how we are treated that makes me fight. For many Iraqis this anger at you is just an excuse to kill for money or greed. But for most others, they truly feel they are doing what is right. But you give them this excuse; the American military gives them the excuse... Two years ago I saw Abu Gharib and what Americans did to women. I became an insurgent," whispers a man I call Kareem, another civilian turned insurgent. "You come into our homes without separating the women and children, or asking the men politely if you may enter. Almost every hour of my life I hear some noise or see some sight of the American military. Soldiers talk with Iraqis only from behind a gun, from a position of power and not respect. Last week American Soldiers got on a school bus and talked with all of the teenage girls. You had them take off their hijab so you could see their faces. You do not respect our women. This is the biggest of all problems of yours. You do not respect our women. How can we believe that Americans want to help when you do not even respect us or our faith?"²²

Lind makes clear a contradiction between the levels of war in fourth generation warfare theory.

"What works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level," he writes, "often works against you on the moral level."²³ The inclusion of this dichotomy between physical acts of violence and the gaining the support of groups of people makes fourth generation warfare theory extremely potent in the interconnected world of the twenty-first century. In network-centric warfare, we may kill faster, but only hasten our defeat if such killings weaken our moral standing in the eyes of political decision makers, especially the indigenous population whose support we are trying to gain or the American public whose support we are trying to maintain. Fourth generation warfare theory recognizes this paradox, and emphasizes the criticality of ethical decisions in the use of violence.

Fourth-generation warfare theory thus improves upon network-centric warfare theory on the strategic and moral levels of war. Fourth-generation warfare theory very clearly tells us *why* to fight: to convince important political decision makers to do our will. It tells us *when* and *if* to fight: when our goals are clearly achievable and if those goals are worth the cost likely to be incurred. It also instructs us *how* to fight: in such a manner as to maintain superiority on the moral level of war. This understanding of the tension between the physical efficiencies gained by

²² MAJ Bill Edmonds, "A Soldier's Story," *The Nation*, November 29, 2006 [database online]; available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061211/soldiers_story; accessed 7 March 2007

²³ Lind, 7.

network-centric warfare and the ethical necessities of fourth-generation warfare theory combined with our understanding that wars in the twenty-first century will likely be driven by globalization empowered individuals seeking their own versions of power and justice represents most of the answer to the question of the *context* of twenty-first century society and warfare. Most, but not all.

Carl von Clausewitz's theories of warfare certainly owe much to the work of physicists and mathematicians. The analogy of the physical concept of friction applied to the difficulties and complexity of waging war, in particular, enables a clear and vivid understanding of Clausewitz's concept. "Everything in war is very simple," Clausewitz penned, "but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction..."²⁴ Friction provides a wonderful image for us to imagine the difficulties and obstructions in war. We can clearly imagine misplaced horseshoe nails, thrown tank treads, or lost supply convoys impeding our progress. The concept of friction, however, naturally draws the Western mind to seek technological solutions to minimize such resistance to our will. Just as engineers have developed better ball bearing or more effective lubricants to minimize friction in mechanical systems, some military professionals look to improved intelligence and surveillance platforms or networked communications to minimize friction. At the tactical and physical levels of war, such advances are indeed highly useful. However, the illusion that such advances can eliminate all chance or unpredictability in war must be shattered.

In physics, when students are taught the equations that govern mechanics, teachers initially ignore friction. Engineers must calculate and include friction when completing real world projects. In the same manner, Clausewitz postulates that "Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."²⁵ Perhaps there is another. In quantum mechanics, the concept of probability strangles conventional notions

²⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976) 119.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 119.

of a deterministic universe. Brian Greene, professor of physics and mathematics at Columbia University, notes that “a core feature of classical physics is that if you know the positions and velocities of all objects at a particular moment, Newton’s equations...can tell you their positions and velocities at any other moment, past or future. Without equivocation, classical physics declares that the past and future are etched in the present.”²⁶ Clausewitz, too, discusses probability in this very classical sense:

Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirements that extremes of force be applied. Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the *laws of probability*. Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws reality supplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead. From the enemy’s character, his institutions, the state of his affairs and his general situation, each side, using the *laws of probability* forms an estimate of its opponent’s likely course and acts accordingly.²⁷

Quantum mechanics, however, destroys predictability. Professor Green continues, “according to quantum laws, even if you make the most perfect measurements possible of how things are today, the best you can hope to do is to predict the *probability* that things will be one way or another at some chosen time in the future, or that things were one way or another at some chosen time in the past. The universe, according to quantum mechanics, is *not* etched into the present; the universe, according to quantum mechanics, participates in a game of chance.”²⁸ Here Clausewitz is simply a victim of his time. His concept of probability, informed by classical physicists such as Newton, simply isn’t advanced enough to encompass the fact that the notion that “we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead” is simply wrong. Two hundred years of effort and experimentation by scientists such as Max Planck and Werner Heisenberg leave us in a world where probability means much more than Clausewitz could have imagined, a world of true uncertainty. In Clausewitz’s trinity of warfare, reason can not dominate; it must be subordinate to probability.

²⁶ Brian Greene, *The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality*, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) 10.

²⁷ Clausewitz, 89-90.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

In the conventional western way of warfare, and especially in current operational practices such as “effects based operations,” determinism and causality are crucial. If we act in the belief that our actions can *cause* a predicted effect, then we act according to classical physics, even if we take into account that some friction which may hinder our actions. The quantum mechanics concept of probability, on the other hand, clearly shows that any action we take can only have some chance of producing a desired effect, with an infinite array of other effects also possible.

More disturbingly, probability can not be reduced in the same manner as friction. With friction in war, one may apply some technical fix such as better intelligence collection or improved logistics. With probability, the only action we can take is to attempt an honest examination of initial conditions and likely probabilities within a system and determine what action may provide the greatest chances for success given those initial conditions and probabilities. Quantum mechanics also has the disturbing characteristic of allowing things to exist in multiple states at the same moment. The “duality” of light, for example, is well documented. For anything to exist in multiple states at once may sound schizophrenic until we consider the human mind. Imagine, for a moment, a Shiite shopkeeper in Bagdad watching tanks of the Third Infantry Division roll past his window. He may, at the same time, feel joy at the impending fall of the vile and hated Saddam Hussein and humiliation at the defeat of his nation by a foreign occupier. This dichotomy of the human mind, the ability to hold multiple emotional states or opinions simultaneously is familiar to us all. A keen observer may note that this same human mind is the primary objective in fourth generation warfare. In the wars of the twenty-first century, our primary target will be the multiple states of thousands or millions of human minds and our aim will be to collapse those states on a probability advantageous to us. The best question we may ask, then, could be “what traits should we possess and actions should we undertake in light of the current initial conditions so that we enjoy the greatest probability of success?”

Theoretical Physics today can be separated into Quantum Mechanics, which is the study of physics at the atomic and subatomic level, and General Relativity, which explains the macro universe. Unfortunately, our understanding of physics breaks down when we attempt to combine the two. The previously quoted Professor Greene continues his instruction:

A very few realms – extreme physical situations that are both massive and tiny – fall squarely in the demilitarized zone, requiring that general relativity and quantum mechanics simultaneously be brought to bear. The center of a black hole, in which an entire star has been crushed by its own weight to a miniscule point, and the big bang, in which the entire observable universe is imagined to have been compressed to a nugget far smaller than a single atom, provide the two most common examples. Without a successful union between general relativity and quantum mechanics, the end of collapsing stars and the origin of the universe would forever remain mysterious.²⁹

In black holes, infinitesimal singularities possess enormous mass and gravity. It is here, where a singular point embodies such massive attributes that our science breaks down and physicists struggle for understanding. If twenty-first century warfare is indeed characterized by massively empowered and yet unpredictable individuals, classical theories of warfare may suffer a similar breakdown. Such discussion is not merely academic. Chinese authors COL Qiao Liang and COL Wang Xiangsui have suggested that the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 actually represented a financial attack by a single individual, the multi-billionaire George Soros.³⁰

While the empowerment of individuals and groups may sound threatening, as professional Soldiers we would be remiss not to see the opportunity of this new societal context. The example of Stetson Kennedy provides a promising illustration of the power of a “fourth generation” war of ideas. In the mid 1940’s, Kennedy infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan. Once inside the secretive organization, Kennedy endeavored to attack the Klan by passing information of its activities and intentions to the police and government, but met with little success. Kennedy then tried a different approach using the most widespread, technologically enabled network of his day,

²⁹ Greene, 17.

³⁰ Liang and Xiangsui, 52.

radio. He contacted the producers of the wildly popular radio show *Adventures of Superman* and passed all the clan secrets to be used as plot devices. As Superman attacked the Ku Klux Klan during the show, the actual Klan was distraught and embarrassed to hear their secret code words and rituals broadcast for the world to hear. They were angered to see their own children playing “Superman against the Klan.” *Freakonomics* authors Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner sum up Kennedy’s success:

Of all the ideas that Kennedy had thought up - and would think up in the future - to fight bigotry, his *Superman* campaign was easily the cleverest and probably the most productive. It had the precise effect he had hoped: turning the clan’s secrecy against itself, converting precious knowledge into ammunition for mockery. Instead of roping in millions of members as it had just a generation earlier, the Klan lost momentum and began to founder. Although the Klan would never quite die, especially down south...it was never quite the same. In *The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America*, the historian Wyn Craig Wade calls Stetson Kennedy ‘the single most important factor in preventing a postwar revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the North.’³¹

Kennedy used the network of radio to broadcast the Klan’s secrets, demonstrating the power of truth and honesty in wars of ideas. In the intervening sixty years, information networks have expanded from radio to television and the internet, magnifying the power of those who can use them. This understanding of the context of twenty-first century warfare clearly demonstrates the power and utility of honesty.

³¹ Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, *Freakonomics*, (New York, HarperCollins Publisher’s Inc., 2005) 65.

Chapter 2: An Irrational Desire for Honesty?

“Is truth something that in fact we do - and should - especially care about? Or is love of truth, as professed by so many distinguished thinkers and writers, itself merely another example of bullshit?”

-Harry Frankfurt, *On Truth*³²

Truthiness (Noun): the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than the concepts of facts known to be true.

-American Dialectic Society Word of the Year for 2005

The Pythagoreans of the sixth century B.C. believed in a rational, orderly universe where mathematics reigned supreme and all geometric and mathematical concepts could be described with simple whole numbers and their ratios. Their theory of a well-ordered universe found challenge, however, by the order's inability to find a ratio of two numbers that could describe the hypotenuse of a right triangle with sides of one. The ancient mathematicians and philosophers knew that the length of the hypotenuse must equal the square root of the sums of the squares of the sides. But if both sides were one, this method led to an answer equal to the $\sqrt{2}$. The Pythagoreans could not find any ratio of two whole numbers to describe this length. Mathematician Julia Diggins describes the Pythagoreans' dismay:

Horried, the Pythagoreans called the square root of 2 an irrational number. After that, they found other irrationals and swore to keep them secret, for the discovery of these "irrationals" wrecked their entire beautifully constructed system of a universe guided by whole numbers. The breakdown in their mystical morale was followed by the breakup of the Secret Brotherhood itself.³³

³² Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Truth*, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) 14.

³³ Julia Diggins, *String, Straightedge, and Shadow*, (New York, Viking Press, 1965) 120.

Despite this attempt to conceal the true, irrational nature of mathematics and reality, one member of the Pythagorean order revealed the truth. Hippiasus of Metapontum, believing that honesty about the nature of the realty trumped the desire of the Pythagoreans, exposed the irrational nature of our world. After revealing this secret, Hippiasus soon died in a suspicious accident at sea, his death rumored to be at the hands of Pythagoreans. Hippiasus quite possibly paid for his honesty with his life, leaving us to ask if honesty, even in such a topic as the true character of reality, is worth such a price.

This chapter attempts to answer the question of the value of honesty by first examining the nature of truth and lies. This examination is informed through study of the utilitarian ethical philosophy and the tension between this utilitarianism and the demands of the ‘virtue ethics’ inherent in the Army Values.

Any discussion of honesty, of course, must begin with a discussion of truth. Many would say that truth is merely in the mind of the speaker and listener, and that it is therefore completely relative or subjective. Philosophy professor Harry Frankfurt of Princeton University describes this argument when he writes

We live at a time when, strange to say, many quite cultivated individuals consider truth to be unworthy of any particular respect...these shameless antagonists of common sense...rebelliously and self righteously deny that truth has any genuine objective reality at all. They therefore go on to deny that truth is worth of any obligatory deference or respect.³⁴

Such attitudes view respect for truth or honesty as quaint or naïve. Honesty is a notion to be debated in ivory towers and holds little practical value. In her seminal work *Lying: Moral Choice in Public Life*, ethicist Sissela Bok of the Harvard Center for Population and Studies development illustrates the views of those who believe that “Since there is an infinite gradation between what is truthful and what is deceitful, no lines can be drawn

³⁴ Frankfurt, 17-19.

and one must do what one considers best on others grounds.”³⁵ For those wishing to be dishonest, such beliefs about the nature of truth demonstrate great convenience. One may prevaricate and, if found out, blame the perception of those to whom one chose to lie.

This attitude seems unfortunately common among professional Soldiers. Dr. Martin Cook, former professor of Ethics at the Army War College, writes that “there is, to some extent, cynicism in the military about this appeal to values and character.”³⁶ For those who feel that honesty plays little part in conflict, lies may represent simply a type of weapon. Depending on the circumstances, this may be entirely appropriate. FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, allows “ruses of war” as long as they “do not involve treachery or perfidy.” The field manual explains:

The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts of perfidy is sometimes indistinct, but the following examples indicate the correct principles. It would be an improper practice to secure an advantage of the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading conduct which involves a breach of faith, or when there is a moral obligation to speak the truth. For example, it is improper to feign surrender so as to secure an advantage over the opposing belligerent thereby. So similarly, to broadcast to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon when such is not the case would be treacherous. On the other hand, it is a perfectly proper ruse to summon a force to surrender on the ground that it is surrounded and thereby induce such surrender with a small force. Treacherous or perfidious conduct in war is forbidden because it destroys the basis for a restoration of peace short of the complete annihilation of one belligerent by the other.³⁷

As we consider the value of honesty in the military profession, the above definition provides the “left and right limits” within which our words and actions must operate.

One would not question the use of most weapons, including lies, against those trying to kill American Soldiers or harm our national interests. However, any commander should carefully consider the effects of his weapons systems when using them near civilians, weighing the risk of the unfortunately termed “collateral” damage of

³⁵ Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*, (Vintage Books, 1978) 12.

³⁶ Martin L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior*, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004) 40.

³⁷ FM27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, US Army, 1956, A-13.

his attack against any possible gain. The danger of paying inadequate attention to this important consideration makes itself apparent in a recent headline from the Christian Science Monitor: “Air War Costs NATO Afghan Supporters: An increase in air strikes has led to more innocent deaths as Taliban fighters use civilians as human shields.”³⁸ In the article, Author Rachel Morarjee describes the deaths of innocents caused by decisions to use air power against legitimate targets surrounded by civilians. Even if the Taliban targeted were indeed killed, one must question the effectiveness of attacks which turn the Afghan populous against NATO.

When we order the use of physical weapons, especially near civilians or friendly forces, we always consider their *surface danger zones* (SDZ), defined in the glossary of DA PAM 385-63, Range Safety, as “The ground and airspace designated...for vertical and lateral containment of projectiles, fragments, debris, and components resulting from the firing, launching, or detonation of weapon systems.” One wonders if government and military leaders and spokespersons should consider the *moral danger zone* (MDZ) of misrepresenting facts before making dishonest statements. Just as SDZs inform us on the possible dangers using a particular weapon system in a certain area, so MDZs should enlighten us as to the costs of using lies to further our ends. So a fundamental question this chapter must answer becomes clear: how do we determine the MDZ, the scope and magnitude of the harm caused by lies?

The costs of such lies may be immense. Bok illustrates the importance of respect for truth:

³⁸ Rachel Morarjee, “Air War Costs NATO Afghan Supporters,” The Christina Science Monitor, DEC 18, 2006 [database online], available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1218/p01s02-wosc.html>; accessed 7 March 2007

...some level of truthfulness has always been seen as essential to human society, no matter how deficient the observance of other moral principles...A society, then, whose members were unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse. But even before such a general collapse, individual choice and survival would be imperiled. The search for food and shelter could depend on no expectations from others. A warning that a well was poisoned or a plea for help in an accident would come to be ignored...³⁹

Imagine not being able to trust that the food in grocery stores was safe to eat, or that the doctors would provide competent care to patients. Society, especially a modern free society, depends upon trust, trust depends upon truth, and truth depends on honesty. Professor Frankfurt agrees, writing “Any society that manages to be even minimally functional must have, it seems to me, a robust appreciation for the protean utility of truth.”⁴⁰ But concern for the general welfare of society seems an amorphous goal, perhaps too flimsy to move serious professional Soldiers. Professor Frankfurt offers a more convincing argument,

Our main concern is clearly not the concern of the *citizen* [emphasis in original]. What is most immediately aroused in our response to a liar is not *public spirit* [emphasis in original]. It’s something more personal. As a rule, except perhaps when people misrepresent matters in which serious public interests are directly involved, we are dismayed far less by the harm liars do to the general welfare than by their conduct toward ourselves. What stirs us against them, whether or not they somehow managed to betray all of humankind, is that they have certainly injured us.⁴¹

Perhaps a liar may consider his untruth simply “business,” but to those lied to the matter is intensely personal. As we consider the harm done by lies and construct our MDZs, the personal, visceral reaction of those lied to must remain paramount in our deliberations.

As discussed in the introduction, Aristotle’s “Doctrine of the Mean” provides an important foundation in the construction of the MDZ of a lie. Complete honesty may be

³⁹ Bok, 18.

⁴⁰ Frankfurt, 15.

⁴¹ Ibid., 74.

as immoral as a lie in a certain context. Imagine the release of accurate friendly patrol schedules to the enemy. Such “honesty” would result in the deaths of friendly soldiers, while the “lie” of releasing deliberately inaccurate patrol schedules may protect friendly lives and provide the opportunity to gain surprise on the enemy. Classic utilitarianism, the moral theory espoused by John Stuart Mill, describes the outlook that an “act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion.”⁴² Of course, the uncertain and probabilistic nature of our world, as described in the previous chapter, makes the calculation of such amounts of “good” and “bad” extremely difficult. Here again the analogy to the SDZ of a physical weapon system may help. When constructing an SDZ, planners do not consider the *minimum* range at which fragments of the munitions may fall; they instead consider the *maximum* fragmentation pattern. The question should not be “what will the damage to civilians or property be if we get lucky and the fragmentation pattern is as small as possible?” Instead, planners must consider the worst case scenario so that the true risk of using a particular weapon can be understood. Professor Bok provides a similar caution when she writes, “Liars usually weigh only the immediate harm to others from a lie against the benefit they want to achieve. The flaw in such an outlook is that it ignores or understates two additional kinds of harm – the harm that lying does to liars themselves and the harm done to the general level of trust and social cooperation. Both are cumulative; both are hard to reverse.”⁴³

⁴² Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Consequentialism,” available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/>; Internet; accessed DEC 18, 2006,

⁴³ Bok, 24.

What kind of harm can a liar do to himself? The first and most obvious harm lies in simply being caught in the lie. One has only to view a few hands of poker to see the painful financial costs of being caught in a bluff. In the setting of strategic communications, lies may cost the very trust of those whom communicators were seeking to influence in the first place. In other words, the lie would then have exactly the opposite effect intended. The recent case of how the U.S. military counted Iraqi casualties in August 2006 provides an illuminating example. Many in the press lambasted the decision not to count those Iraqis killed in car bombings or mortar attacks as a deliberate lie intended to present the security situation in Bagdad in a more positive light. A military spokesman defended the decision, stating “the numbers more accurately reflect the impact of Operation Together Forward’s mission: targeting operations of shadowy sectarian death squads, who often use drive-by shootings, torture and executions as tactics for terror, rather than suicide bombings or rocket or mortar attacks.”⁴⁴ But one must ask if counting one death while not counting another merely because one type of attack was used presents a more or less accurate picture of events on the ground. If the true intent of Operation Together Forward was to improve security in Bagdad, then preventing suicide bombings by Al Qaeda operatives certainly counts as much as preventing drive-by shootings from the various militias. Ironically, even if deaths from all sources were counted, deaths in Bagdad still decreased by 17% in August relative to July 2006. By not counting deaths from certain types of attacks, military spokesmen could claim a 52% reduction. However, any benefit from the claim of a 52% decrease in deaths versus a 17% reduction was certainly lost in the ensuing media uproar about

⁴⁴ Mark Brunswick and Zaineb Obeid, “U.S. Count of Baghdad Deaths Excludes Car Bombs, Mortar Attacks,” *McClatchy Newspapers*, 8 September 2006.

whether the U.S. military was attempting to distort the facts. Indeed, the violence in Iraq in the few months following this report made clear that the situation there was not improving and was, in fact, significantly worsening. Whether or not this decision to count only certain types of casualties was simply misguided judgment or a deliberate prevarication may be debated, but the harmful effects of being caught failing to be as accurate and honest as possible are crystal clear.

A second type of harm a liar may do himself is that in working to convince others of his lie, he may himself lose sight of the truth. A striking example is found in COL McMaster's assertion, in the previously quoted *Dereliction of Duty*, that "(President) Johnson and (Secretary of Defense) McNamara succeeded in creating the illusion that the decisions to attack North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than war itself." President Johnson's and Secretary McNamara's web of deceit fooled themselves more than anyone else. Since their primary desire was success in domestic politics rather than honest examination of the situation in Vietnam, they refused to consider any evidence which disagreed with their preconceived notions. The results of such contempt of honesty are well described by COL McMaster as "arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people." Thus the probability of fooling oneself as much as fooling others must play in the creation of a moral danger zone.

The "harm done to the general level of trust and social cooperation" presents a more difficult enigma. Since some lies are necessary and, in fact, expected in warfare, the question must be what type and how many lies should be told to whom? Historian Martin Van Creveld describes lies in war:

Whereas images in a mirror reflect each other more or less faithfully, the essence of strategy – whether in war or in football or in chess – consists of the ability to feint, deceive, and mislead. Each side advertises his intention to do one thing and secretly prepares to do another. Each concentrates at place A even as he prepares to be at place B, making out as though he were planning to strike in direction C even while his real objective is D. Nor does the process end at this point. The really artistic touch is to make “truth” and “falsehood” change places at a moments notice, tailoring their respective roles to the opponent’s moves so as to counter his designs and exploit his mistakes. At some point during the process, what was originally intended as a feint is turned into the main thrust. What was originally meant as a main thrust becomes a mere feint. Over time, truth and falsehood actually *become* [emphasis in original] each other. Insofar as secrecy often demands that one’s real intentions be concealed even from one’s own men, the point may come where one of the contending sides, or both, no longer knows which is which.⁴⁵

If Van Creveld has accurately described the “essence of strategy” as deception, one must wonder why the US Army maintains integrity as a core value. If lies and deceit are the epitome of leadership in war, shouldn’t we replace integrity with guile or cunning? Our Army wisely has not done this because what Van Creveld describes is not strategy but chaos. At the end of his argument, no one knows the truth, each commander has lied to not only to his enemy, but to his own troops as well, and then changed his mind numerous times to boot. Once this situation has come about, victory becomes almost random, brought to whichever side has, perhaps, become less entangled in the joint web of lies and can understand the truth of the situation enough to triumph. What’s more, as lies to lead to more lies we injure ourselves more than the enemy. The enemy certainly expects to be lied to and adjusts accordingly. But the men and women we lead do not, and certainly should not, expect us to lie to them. But the lies told to an enemy require us to lie to our Soldiers to make them convincing, thus ensuring that our own troops understand little or nothing about the truth of the situation. The lies told serve to increase the fog of war for all, ensuring more death and destruction for less gain. Knowing this as

⁴⁵ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (New York, The Free Press, 1991) 119.

the nature of lies, the use of a *moral danger zone* to limit their usage, especially at the strategic level of war, becomes all too critical.

Professor Bok captures the idea of the breakdown in the “general level of trust” as she portrays the perspective of those deceived by lies: “Those who learn they have been lied to in an important matter...are resentful, disappointed, and suspicious. They feel wronged; they are wary of new overtures. And they look back on their past beliefs and actions in the new light of discovered lies.”⁴⁶ Those deciding to lie often consider only the singular event about which they are lying. Mrs. Bok reminds us that those lied to will not limit themselves to this singular event, and that, indeed, all past actions will be considered differently and all future interactions irrevocably changed for the worse. As we construct our MDZs, we should consider Clausewitz’s admonition that “the result in war is never final”⁴⁷ and the fact that lies do not die easily. Lying, essentially, is done to gain power. The liar steals power from those whom he has deceived. In the case of a battalion commander leaking false patrol information so he can surprise and kill enemy snipers, an MDZ would probably show this as entirely appropriate. The dangers of lying to the populous protected by such patrols must of course be weighed. For example, an innocent shopkeeper who believes a patrol will be on his street may decide to open his shop during that time, and if attacked in the absence of such a patrol may become disillusioned with American forces and intent. But if the risk of attacks on civilians is weighed and found small and the danger of sniper attacks on the patrol is sufficient, then the MDZ would be relatively small enough to convince the commander to lie in this

⁴⁶ Bok, 20.

⁴⁷ Clausewitz, 89.

particular case, while remembering that all future promises of security will be met with doubt by a suspicious indigenous public.

In the example of a battalion commander deciding to leak false patrol schedules, the lie occurs on the tactical level of war. Since we have discerned that lies have vast unintended consequences, the level of war at which we may decide to lie certainly finds importance. Here we see again the utility of the theory of Fourth Generation Warfare's concept of the moral aspect of war operating at all levels. Lies at the tactical level are less likely to cause severely damaging consequences than lies told at the operational or strategic levels. This is not a hard and fast rule; lies thought to be tactical may garner the attention of the media and accidentally become strategic failures. A possible example of this migration can be found in the US decision to pay certain Iraqi newspapers to carry news stories intended to portray the events in Iraq more positively. That this was intended to be deceptive is apparent since, even though the stories were "basically factual," they "presented only one side of events and omitted information that might reflect poorly on the US or Iraqi governments."⁴⁸ Also, the effort to use a contractor, the Lincoln Group, to hide the fact that the US military approved and distributed the stories shows the effort to deceive. This deception seems to have been intended as operational and aimed at the minds of the Iraqi populous. Its discovery and subsequent exposure by the *LA Times* turned it into a strategic failing impacting negatively on American and world public opinion. Once again probability and uncertainty rear their ugly heads and demand that our MDZ take into account the most disastrous effects of any decision to deceive.

⁴⁸ Mark Mazzetti and Borzou Daragahi, "U.S. Military Covertly Pays to Run Stories in Iraqi Press," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 NOV 2005, A1

In our quest for a workable MDZ to help in any decision to use lies in modern conflict, Professor Van Creveld's use of the football analogy in his description of the importance of deception in warfare bears further scrutiny. Although "trick" plays are certainly useful and appropriate in a good game of football, no college or professional coach would describe them as the "essence" of football. Instead, most coaches would say that blocking, tackling, passing, receiving, rushing, and, above all, the spirit of competition represent the essence of good football. In short, fundamentals mean more than deception. In the study of ethics, the concept of virtue may present a similar notion of "fundamental" qualities which people or organizations should exhibit to be successful. Virtue ethics, fathered by Aristotle and Plato but certainly evident in Eastern philosophy as well, "may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism)." ⁴⁹ This idea of moral character forms the foundation of the Army values. The Army's capstone document, Field Manual 1, affirms "The Army Values are the basic building blocks of a Soldier's character. They help Soldiers judge what is right or wrong in any situation. The Army Values form the very identity of the Army, the solid rock on which everything else stands, especially in combat."⁵⁰ The concept of virtue ethics, debated for millennia, encompasses myriad attributes beyond the scope of this monograph. The important point, however, is that virtues are "habits formed by making satisfactory moral decisions and acting on them. For example, you become honest and fair by behaving honestly and

⁴⁹ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Virtue Ethics," available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#3>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

⁵⁰ FM1, The Army, (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 14 June, 2005) 1-15.

fairly.”⁵¹ The US Army recognizes that the ability to make moral decisions must be practiced in times of peace to exist during the stress of war. Much as weapons training enforces fundamental skills required in combat, so twenty-first century Soldiers require education on ethics and morality to provide the foundation for the creation of useful *moral danger zones* when considering the use of lies and deception. However, virtue ethics demands much more than simply deciding when or if certain lies are appropriate, virtue demands that we actually be virtuous.

This understanding reveals the concept of virtue ethics to exist in tension with our utilitarian notion of moral danger zones, and such tension should be the basis of our ethical decision making when conducting information operations in the twenty-first century. Our MDZ, after all, simply informs us as to the possible harm of a lie told. Its use does not make that lie *right* or *virtuous*. In that sense, lies told, even in combat, damage our virtue. Without doubt, deception has a place in warfare. Commanders should indeed be shrewd and fool opponents as to their actual plans. Those who would use deception must take into account the probability of the worst possible effects of lying. The would-be deceiver must consider the danger of discovery. Here the “CNN test” is appropriate: what if this lie is exposed on CNN tomorrow? What will the effect be? Will the gain be worth such a price? The danger to one’s own knowledge of the truth must be considered. Will subordinates, peers, and superiors tell the truth while they are being lied to? How will this lie alter their knowledge of the actual situation? Will it color their reports? Will they give information biased by the lie told to them, thus destroying any ability to see the truth of the situation? If found out, how will this lie affect my

⁵¹ Andolph M. Feezell, and Curtis L. Hancock, *How Should I Live*, (St. Paul, Paragon House, 2005) 164.

Soldiers' loyalty? How will their families feel and act if Soldiers die as a result of this deception? MDZs provide utility in describing the danger inherent in the use of lies, but must be viewed as a "lesser evil." The virtue ethics demanded by the Army values should be the litmus test against which we regard all of our actions, even in combat. Only when a situation clearly demands that a lie be told should we then turn to our analysis of *moral danger zones* to understand the inevitably costs of such lies.

Conclusion: Advice from Samuel Clemens

“You have to look yourself in the mirror the next day, but more importantly, you have to look at the men and women you’re responsible for. They need to know that you stand up for them and that you’re willing to speak what is right and truthful.”

-GEN Tony Zinni

“It is not necessary to make the happiness of the human race dependant on fiction. It is not necessary to erect the social pyramid upon a foundation of sand, or upon clay which slips from beneath it. Let us leave such trifling to children; men ought speak the language of truth and reason.”

-Jeremy Bentham, *Principles of Legislation*

In the winter of 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell rose before the United Nations to defend the United States’ decision to go to war with Iraq. “My colleagues,” spoke Powell, “every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”⁵² Secretary Powell then described in meticulous detail Iraq’s quest for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. “We have first hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between one hundred and five hundred tons of chemical weapons agent...He (Saddam Hussein) remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons...What I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.”⁵³ Secretary Powell’s strong words and harsh accusations left little room for doubt that Saddam Hussein intended to obtain weapons of mass destruction and then either supply them to terrorist organizations for use against the West or use them himself. Saddam represented a menacing threat which the United States and her allies must deal with immediately.

⁵² Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, (New York, The Penguin Press, 2006) 90.

⁵³ Ibid

The United States, through Secretary Powell, failed to be honest with United Nations. Secretary Powell may have been unaware, but “most of what he said wasn’t solid...much of it was deemed doubtful even at the time inside the intelligence community, and...some of it was flatly false.”⁵⁴ The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s assessment of the intelligence foundations of Secretary Powell’s speech reveals that “much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.”⁵⁵ This dishonesty of American intelligence systems both to Secretary Powell and eventually the United Nations resulted, primarily, from the subordination of honesty and accuracy to the perceived desires of superiors. Paul Pillar, the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia at the State Department, described the failure: “It was certainly clear fairly early in 2002 to just about anybody working on intelligence on Iraq issues that we were going to war, that the decision had essentially been made. For the analyst, favorable attention to policy makers is the benchmark of success. There was a natural bias in favor of intelligence that supported, rather than undermined, policies already set.”⁵⁶ The intelligence apparatus of the United States, guided by political and military leaders, prioritized loyalty above honesty and thereby contributed to the loss of United States’ credibility and legitimacy around the globe.

As our study of honesty in the previous chapter taught, the painful consequences of this dishonesty will be long lasting and unavoidable. Our current struggle against violent extremism provides an all too vivid example of such costs. A recent study on the international effects of the Iraq War conducted by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, research fellows at the Center on Law and Security at the NYU School of Law, starkly portrayed the cost of our policies in Iraq:

One measure of the impact of the Iraq War is the precipitous drop in public support for the United States in Muslim countries. Jordan, a key U.S. ally, saw popular approval for the United States drop from 25 percent in 2002 to 1 percent in 2003. In Lebanon during the same period, favorable views of the United States dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent, and in the world’s largest Muslim

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Michael R. Gordon and GEN Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, (New York, Pantheon Books) 134.

country, Indonesia, favorable views plummeted from 61 percent to 15 percent. Disliking the United States does not make you a terrorist, but clearly the pool of Muslims who dislike the United States has grown by hundreds of millions since the Iraq War began.⁵⁷

Of course, gauging how much of this dissatisfaction is due to the invasion of Iraq itself vice perception of US dishonesty is extremely difficult. However, the negative reactions revealed by the Bergen and Cruickshank study are exactly in line with our understanding of the consequences of being caught in a lie as described by ethicist Sissela Bok. Words and actions both matter and both must be considered as we review the costs of our Iraqi policy. The view that something other than simply the invasion of Iraq itself is at the root of America's falling popularity finds additional support in the testimony of Dr. Steven Kull, Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight. Discussing polling data that clearly reflects America's declining image, Dr. Kull states "These numbers are also not simply a reaction to the US decision to go to war in Iraq. Views of the US did go down sharply after the beginning of the Iraq war in 2003. But now, nearly four years later, they continue to move downward."⁵⁸ It may be impossible to quantitatively prove that such negative reactions represent a direct result of US dishonesty, but this must not stop responsible military professionals from considering the possible qualitative impact of false statements and lies.

In our discussion of conflict in the twenty-first century, we concluded that the goal of such information age warfare would be to collapse the myriads states of millions of minds across the globe to probabilities advantageous to the United States. According to Bergen and Cruickshank, our actions appear to have had exactly the opposite effect. Such opinions against the United States are, unfortunately, much more likely to support funding and recruitment for

⁵⁷ Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "The Iraq Effect: War has increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide," *Mother Jones*, 1 MAR 2007, [online database] available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/featurex/2007/03/iraq_effect_1.html; accessed 22 FEB 2007, 3.

⁵⁸ Dr. Steven Kull, "America's Image in the World," *World Public Opinion.org*, 6 MAR 2007, [online database] available at http://65.109.167.118/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/326.php?nid=&id=&pnt=326&lb=brglm; accessed 8 MAY 2007.

violent extremist organizations than to support assistance the United States in the unfortunately named “Global War on Terror.” Bergen and Cruickshank corroborate our loss of the “idea war” when they write

The Iraq War has also encouraged Muslim youth around the world to join jihadist groups, not necessarily directly tied to Al Qaeda but often motivated by a similar ideology. The Iraq War allowed Al Qaeda, which was on the ropes in 2002 after the United States had captured or killed two-thirds of its leadership, to reinvent itself as a broader movement because Al Qaeda’s central message--that the United States is at war with Islam--was judged by significant numbers of Muslims to have been corroborated by the war in Iraq.⁵⁹

The contrast between how many Muslims perceive the ideas of these violent extremist groups and how they perceive American ideas is chilling. American ideas are seen as “overstated, misleading, and incorrect” while Al Qaeda’s “central message” has been “corroborated” by American actions. In the minds of most Americans, it is laughable that a violent, extremist organization like Al Qaeda could be viewed as more honest than the American government. But we must remember that this particular bias does not exist in the minds of the 5.7 billion people who do not live in the United States. We cannot simply dismiss Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. We must compete with them for millions of minds. Some of these minds, of course, will support violent extremism on religious grounds alone. Others will reject violent extremism on either religious or philosophical grounds. In between these groups are the mass of men and women who will judge, through their own lens informed by culture, religion, politics, and a myriad of other factors whether America or the extremist have the more honest argument. They will judge actions and arguments later revealed to be based on lies harshly, and caste their support to the other side.

If we accepts Edward Said’s argument that people’s thoughts and actions will be guided by the “terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice,” then it follows that we must, if we wish to win the war of ideas, base our words and deeds on reason and justice for the powerful and

⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.

powerless alike. Thus our actions and statements must be based on honesty, both with ourselves and the world. Our enemies certainly expect us to lie to them, and on the tactical battlefield there will be times and places where the just decision may be to do so. But for our general communications, actions, and information operations, honesty must be, as the Joint Operational Environment Publication tells us, a “hallmark.” Unfortunately, some believe that information operations are “effects based” operations and, therefore, that statements must be designed to create certain opinions in the minds of those to whom we communicate. As study of twenty-first century warfare and honesty have shown us, this idea is misguided in two ways. First, it is impossible to accurately calculate the “effect” of any statement or action. We can guess what such effects may be, but at the end of the day have only probabilities of what may or may not occur. Secondly, if we fail to be honest and instead opt to “spin” actions, events, or ideas as we communicate them, we take the chance (a chance exponentially increased by the advent of the information age) of being caught in our lie. And while we may see such “spin” as simply an “alternate” way of viewing the facts, our audience will almost certainly perceive that we have lied to them, resulting in the multitude of harms we have previously discussed.

Of course, some fear that while we may be honest, our enemies will not be and the media will report only the worst of news. If our enemies are not honest, however, would they not suffer the same consequences we have described for our own dishonesty? They almost certainly will, if only we ensure that our actions do not prove their statements and dogma correct. As for the tendency of the media to report only the worst of news, the incredible competitiveness of the information age will almost surely require honest and factual reporting from all members of the media. The sad example of Dan Rather’s fallacious story on President Bush’s service in the Texas Air National Guard and Rather’s subsequent removal from CBS news⁶⁰ shows that the media will be held accountable for falsehoods. Even in the case of the Iraq War, where many

⁶⁰ “CBS Ousts 4 For Bush Guard Story,” CBS News, 10 JAN 2005 [online database], available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/10/national/main665727.shtml>; Internet, accessed 7 March 2007.

officials inside and outside of the military have been critical of the media's portrayal of the war, an independent study by Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp for the Brookings Institute found that the media was largely fair in its reporting:

The broad argument voiced by critics of the media in the United States is often badly overstated. Even though the overall image of Iraq portrayed by the mainstream media may be somewhat more negative than reality, it is not incredibly dissimilar from the situation on the ground. Iraq is a war zone in which progress has been largely elusive. Given this reality, accurate reporting naturally places more emphasis on the negative aspects than on the positive ones. Journalists are missing quite a few stories in Iraq, but the ones they miss are often just as bad as they are good.⁶¹

Neither the actions of our enemies or any biased reporting of our media affords us a reason to lie. Instead, just as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham writes, we must "speak the language of truth and reason."

In our desire not to suffer the ill effects of lying, it might be easy to overlook the more important fact that honesty and virtue are powerful in and of themselves. Philosophers have espoused justice and virtue for thousands of years not out of fear, but out of hope of what such justice means for humanity. When we act justly, other men see such justice and respond positively. The value of being viewed as just cannot be overstated in twenty-first century conflict. The previously quoted MAJ Edmonds provides an example of the power of truth when he writes:

Last night the Iraqi Army captured Ibrahim's cell leader and brought the two together in the same small room. For Ibrahim, this was a very traumatic moment, for he saw that the pious Muslim man, whom he followed but had not met, was in fact a 27-year-old tattooed common criminal. Ibrahim began to weep when he realized he had been deceived. A greedy and immoral man who killed for money while pretending to be religious had skillfully manipulated Ibrahim's anger at Americans. Before Ibrahim was turned over to the Iraqi authorities, I saw him teaching soldiers to use their new office computer. He was helping them to type up his own written confession.⁶²

Even former Iraqi insurgents may be converted by the power of honesty. Another bright example exists in Indonesia where public opinion of America, after falling to the dismal lows cited above

⁶¹ Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, "Is the Media being Fair in Iraq?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2006, 17.

⁶² Edmonds, 4.

by the Bergen and Cruickshank study in 2003, climbed to new heights after American assistance to victims of the 2004 Tsunami. Jennifer Harper of the Washington Times cites a Heritage Foundation study:

American response to the tsunami that ravaged the region last December has inspired good feelings. The poll found that 65 percent (of Indonesians) had a more favorable view toward the United States in the aftermath, with 75 percent saying Americans had done enough to help tsunami victims and 64 percent deeming that assistance "important." Among those who said they supported bin Laden, 71 percent said that American tsunami relief had made them more favorable to the United States.⁶³

When we treat other human beings with respect, they return that respect regardless of religious or cultural differences. Perhaps the simplest way to show respect for another human being is simply to be honest with him.

As we conclude our study of honesty, it is important to understand that honesty has fundamentally enabled the US Army's progress and achievements for the last two decades. After every attack down the dusty central corridor of the National Training Center or defense of the wooded 'Baldy' bowl of the Combat Maneuver Training Center, groups of Soldiers would gather for platoon, company, battalion, and brigade after action reviews. Only by honestly reflecting on the successes and failures of each training mission did we build the greatness of our Army. Such reviews were painful. Hearing about the failings of one's self and unit requires humility and courage. Responding to such reviews in a positive way to build great units rather than simply rejecting the criticism as unfair or uniformed requires true leadership. In the years ahead, Soldiers will fight violent extremists much more often than they will face the armies of other nation states. In such confusing warfare, the temptation to use any means will be ever present. As American Soldiers, we must be courageous in the face of such temptation and heed the words

⁶³ Jennifer Harper, "Muslim opinion of U.S. improves," *The Washington Times*, 5 MAR 2005 [online database], available at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050304-102718-5867r.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

of that uniquely American philosopher, Samuel Clemens, who wrote “When in doubt, tell the truth. It will confound your enemies and astound your friends.”⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Bok, 145.

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