

Integrated Planning for Unified Action in Phase Zero

A Monograph

by

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14. ABSTRACT Within the context of current US government efforts to unify actions to secure national interests against current threats, this paper will assess the current capability of the Department of Defense to plan for Phase 0 at the strategic and operational levels. This paper will answer whether DoD has a method for integrating US national elements of power, policy and planning into a combatant commander's Phase 0 activities, as required by joint doctrine. This paper uses the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) process to evaluate the DoD capability in four simplified steps: identify the military problem, determine the current military capability to address it, evaluate the capability, and recommend solutions for capability shortfalls. It then evaluates the capability using criteria: common problem identification; clear national policy and strategic objectives, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational levels; recognized and practiced tools for planning; and common assessment mechanisms, identifies vital shortfalls in the military capability, and makes recommendations for addressing the gaps. This paper finds that despite the unprecedented levels of transformation by each agency, DoD does not yet have methods for integrating all US elements of power, policy and planning into a combatant commander's Phase 0 activities. In order for a military output of unified planning for phase 0 the US government must provide the unified input of national policy, strategic guidance and strategic objectives specifically for this phase. Specific areas of the greatest shortfall were security cooperation or shaping guidance, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational level, and recognized and practiced tools for integrated planning. The most significant recommendations are for the interagency community to provide deliberately integrated guidance for phase 0, with the JCS J5 as the focal point from DoD. However, recommended internal actions for DoD include building the planning systems required to give phase 0 the military planning rigueur of operational planning as well as link into the Department of State systems for Foreign Assistance and Embassy operational planning; providing the specific and detailed guidance for military planners on using the tools and methods to integrate under the State Department lead, identifying the multi-agency organization and offices that are responsible for this planning and providing them unified training and resources. Issues for further study based on this paper are the Congressional resolution to provide the amount and transparency of funding between agencies to conduct this integrated planning and action, clarifying the military terminology for shaping, stability and support to civil administration operations, and the impact of splitting the US Army Civil Affairs strategic capability from SOCOM to report directly to FORSCOM					
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Abstract

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Within the context of current US government efforts to integrate, synchronize and unify actions to secure US national interests against current threats, this paper will assess the current capability of the Department of Defense to plan for Phase 0 at the strategic and operational levels. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to answer whether DoD has a method or methods for integrating, both horizontally and vertically, all US national elements of power, policy and planning into a combatant commander's Phase 0 activities, as required by joint doctrine.

This paper uses the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) process to evaluate the DoD capability for integrated Phase 0 planning in four simplified steps: identify the military problem, determine the current military capability to address it, evaluate the capability, and recommend solutions for capability shortfalls.

Using a previous study as a baseline, this paper provides an update on the existing guidance for the US government, determines the specific requirements and methods available for planning Phase 0, shaping operations, identifies the current DoD capability to plan integrated Phase 0 or shaping activities using recent examples, evaluates the capability using criteria developed in the prior study, updated by current research: common problem identification; clear national policy and strategic objectives, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational levels; recognized and practiced tools for planning; and common assessment mechanisms, identifies vital shortfalls in the military capability, and makes recommendations for addressing the gaps.

By using the process above, this paper finds that despite the unprecedented levels of transformation by each agency, DoD does not yet have methods for integrating all US elements of power, policy and planning into a combatant commander's Phase 0 activities. In order for a military output of unified planning for phase 0 the US government must provide the unified input of national policy, strategic guidance and strategic objectives specifically for this phase. Specific areas of the greatest shortfall were security cooperation or shaping guidance, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational level, and recognized and practiced tools for integrated planning.

The most significant recommendation is for the interagency community to build a working group to provide deliberately integrated guidance for phase 0, with the JCS J5 as the focal point from DoD. However, recommended internal actions for DoD include building the planning systems required to give phase 0 the military planning rigueur of operational planning as well as link into the Department of State systems for Foreign Assistance and Embassy operational planning; providing the specific and detailed guidance for military planners on using the tools and methods to integrate under the State Department lead, identifying the multi-agency organization and offices that are responsible for this planning and providing them unified training and resources.

Issues for further study based on this paper are the Congressional resolution to provide the amount and transparency of funding between agencies to conduct this integrated planning and action, clarifying the military terminology for shaping, stability and support to civil administration operations, the impact of splitting the US Army Civil Affairs strategic capability from SOCOM to report directly to FORSCOM and finally the lessons learned in interagency integration by the creation of the Phase 0 Combatant Command, US AFRICOM.

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CHAPTER ONE

Achieving Unity of Effort

The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad . . . Today's environment demands that all agencies of government become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy. This requires much more than mere coordination: the Department must work hand in glove with other agencies to execute the National Security Strategy.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*¹

INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically changed the US security environment and necessarily redefined and reprioritized the focus of President Bush and his administration from a domestic agenda to a security agenda of homeland defense and counterterrorism. Shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center, President Bush announced a US war on terror.² A few months later the White House published a new *National Security Strategy* that introduced fundamentally different ways: strengthen alliances to prevent attacks, build regional capacity to diffuse conflict, prevent the threat of weapons of mass destruction, promote global economic growth and build the infrastructure of democracy, for responding to increasingly vital national threats.³ Although, some of these ways depend on the conventional hard power means of military forces, most require synchronized US government means across all branches, agencies and departments, just as Secretary Rumsfeld stated above.

After five years of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the trans-Sahara nations, and the Philippines, the current and updated *National Security Strategy* of 2006 reiterates

¹ US Department of Defense, QDR Report (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 83.

² George Bush, Radio Address to the Nation, [document on-line] (Washington DC: White House, September 29, 2001); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007, first major public speech using the words "war on terror."

³ George Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, September 2002), 1.

the US war on terror as a “long struggle similar to the...Cold War” for the government.⁴ This long and unconventional war requires the US to synchronize and apply a deliberate balance of hard and soft power using all elements of national power to ensure the security of US national interests. In the past six years, the Executive Office, with the advice and consent of Congress, has directed significant restructuring of the national security apparatus through Presidential Directives, Department of State initiatives, Department of Defense Directives, new national security organizations: the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counter Terrorism Center and the National Counter Proliferation Center, and appointments to new positions: the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of Foreign Assistance.⁵ However, to this day, there is no law that requires the base solution to current threats: the permanent unification of the elements of the US government beyond the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1984.

In 2002, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) initiated a three-phased study called *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* to address the US security needs in the current environment.⁶ The phase-one report began by describing necessary defense reform. By 2004, CSIS confirmed the expanded scope of future efforts studying the entire U.S. national security structure not simply the Department of Defense. In its second report, the CSIS team conclusions were an overall need for a more integrated and effective security apparatus, unifying efforts in interagency operations, and operational capacity outside the Department of Defense.⁷ In a separate paper, Michele Flournoy, a recognized CSIS core team member and leader, commented that the integrating or unifying

⁴ George Bush, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC: White House, March 2006), 1.

⁵ George Bush, National Security Presidential Directives 1,8,9,17,26,44 and 46, and Homeland Security Presidential Directives HSPD 1, and 4 (Washington DC: White House, various), set up the initial organization of the NSC apparatus for the administration and created additional structure to address the new threat of terrorism.

⁶ CSIS, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols webpage [document on-line] (Washington DC: CSIS, 2007); available from <http://www.csis.org>; Internet; provides the historical overview of the four year long project initially focused at improving DoD.

⁷ CSIS, BGN Phase II Report, (Washington DC: CSIS, 2006), 6.

process recommended in the BGN reports must be accelerated and Congress influenced to make it permanent.⁸

Until permanent unification is achieved, the US national security apparatus continues its evolution into more streamlined, unified and synchronized partners against our enemies. LTC David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert, reminds readers in his recent *Counterinsurgency Redux*, that unity of effort will not be enough to fight the long-war the US faces. In modern counterinsurgency a common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for collaboration, may matter more than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies.⁹ If this is true, how then should the US prepare to sufficiently defeat the future threat to our interests? How does the US establishment achieve common diagnosis of the problem across the branches, agencies and departments as well as gain legal or institutional enablers to consistently collaborate and synchronize actions or activities in order to truly secure the US against conventional threats, and non-state violence or terrorism that has been described as a global insurgency? One solution is unified US Government efforts in a pre-conflict or –crisis phase called Phase 0, led by the State Department.

BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War, the US military has operated in a world without conventional force peer-competitors.¹⁰ However, as recent experiences show in New York, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kenya, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report 2006* reflects, although our threats come from four categories, our vulnerabilities are to the unconventional fight of non-peer competitors or non-state actors.¹¹

⁸ Michele Flournoy, *Historical Lessons Learned and Unlearned* (Washington DC: CSIS, 2004), .

⁹ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, (London: IISS, 2006), 10.

¹⁰ US Department of Defense, *QDR 2006* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 19.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 19.

In the *QDR 2006* figure 1 is used to depict the shift in military capabilities required to address the evolved nontraditional threats to the US in the areas of disruptive, irregular and catastrophic challenges.




Figure 1 – DoD Shifts Portfolio of Capabilities, QDR 2006

Since September 11, 2001 the US Administration, Congress, military and the American public have experienced a relatively common attentiveness to building the national integration mechanisms beyond conventional military capabilities, required to protect us from future attacks by recently emerged threats.¹² A lot of progress to prevent crisis and conflict has been made and must be acknowledged.¹³

¹² S/CRS, Consensus Opinion (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 1.

¹³ Harry Tomlin, White Paper (Stuttgart: EUCOM, February 2007), 2.

The current administration, executive departments and Congress agree that in order to protect US national interests from unconventional or irregular warfare threats, prevention of conflict through capacity building, and democratic and economic growth activities should occur in lieu of, before, during or after the execution of any potential military plan.¹⁴ There is unique agreement in Washington DC that US dollars spent in prevention are fewer and longer lasting than those spent on short-term major military combat operations.¹⁵ S/CRS estimated that a US military division operates at a total cost of \$1.2 billion per month; a UN peacekeeping force operates at approximately \$100 million per month with the US share being \$27 million, while the initial investment for a civilian rapid response that can conduct shaping activities to potentially prevent a conflict, build local capacity for conflict management or enable a later force to conduct a more deliberate operation totals only \$124 million.¹⁶

Still looking beyond conventional requirements within the military community itself, operations in the war on terror began a period of reflection centered on a long standing counterinsurgency principle: military force sets the conditions, but long-term success is achieved by good governance.¹⁷

Based on this reflection, the concept of a more adaptive, inclusive and current planning process was initiated at DoD. On November 8, 2004, in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom where a vacuum of “phase IV or national-building” activities is argued to have cultivated conditions for an insurgency, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld published a memo with the subject of “war phases.”¹⁸ This memo requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a plan for the military to address both “phases 0 and 4” for all existing operational plans, Even though the notion of a

¹⁴ S/CRS, Consensus Opinion, (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 2.

¹⁵ Marcia Wong, S/CRS briefing, (Washington DC: Department of State, March 2006), 11

¹⁶ Ibid, 11

¹⁷ HQDA, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, Dec 2006), 2-1, quote from David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1964 and follow-on discussion in manual of integrated activities.

¹⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, Memo to Chariman, JCS, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 2004).

Phase 0 was recognized in very small circles within DoD.¹⁹ Since then, the Joint Chiefs have formally established the new planning construct called the adaptive planning process and identified the inherent military capabilities required for each phase, as now published in joint capstone documents and joint doctrine, and seen in the figure below as it is graphically depicted.²⁰




Figure 2 - Newly Established Six-Phased Military Adaptive Planning Construct

As described in the joint doctrine, the application of US government efforts towards failing or failed states to ensure stability and safeguard US interests without having to execute a military operational plan is identified in the military adaptive planning process as Phase 0 or

¹⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, Memo to Chairman, JCS, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 2004).

shaping operations. Shaping operations occur simultaneously at the global, theater and country level, and continuously throughout all phases of a subsequent military operation plan.

While the US military, from the Joint Staff to the Combatant Commands, conducts continuous operational planning, having some 50 approved contingency, functional and operational plans reviewed on a cyclical schedule, these plans generally focus on phases 1 through 4.




Figure 3 - Joint Strategic Planning, JP 5-0

Although routine shaping activities such as Security Cooperation Planning are a part of military Joint Strategic Planning as seen in the figure above, specific guidance on how to develop joint and integrated Phase 0 planning has not been given. To date, the military has no formally published Phase 0 plans, a phase that falls under the Executive Agency and Foreign Assistance funding of the Department of State.

²⁰ JCS, JP 3-0, (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), IV-26.

There is a standard security cooperation planning process and associated system called Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS). However it is not linked directly to the operational and strategic planning processes or systems: the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), the Joint Strategic Planning System, and above that the Program Planning Budget and Execution System (PPBES), neither is there the standard military planning rigueur associated with operational planning. According to recently published joint doctrine, the requirement for Combatant Commands is to deliberately plan for this phase, in concert with operational planning, so that Phase 0 activities either stabilize a country and prevent conflict or set the conditions to posture US forces and enable major military operations.²¹

RESEARCH QUESTION

Within the context of current US government efforts to integrate, synchronize and unify actions to secure our national interests against the threat of terrorism and a disruption of US interests, this paper will assess the current capability of the Department of Defense to plan for Phase 0, via its planners at the strategic and operational levels. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to answer whether DoD has a method or methods for integrating, both horizontally and vertically, all US national elements of power, policy and planning into a Combatant Commander's Phase 0 activities, as required by joint doctrine.

RELEVANCE

The prevailing school of thought that is reflected in the Joint Chiefs of Staff *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations*, states that unified effort of the US government must start with a common understanding of the problem, be framed by clear policy and guidance, and then

²¹ JCS, JP 3-0, (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), IV-26

integrated through planning and action that supports the achievement of US policy across the full range of military operations, to include Phase 0.²²

The work of the Joint Staff J-7 is reflected in the discussion below on shaping operations which is also included in the *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations*.

Peacetime shaping operations might be aimed at spreading democracy, creating an environment of peace, stability, and goodwill or even aimed at destabilizing a rogue regime. Shaping operations provide the joint force continuous opportunities to assess the structure and dynamics of potential adversaries and crisis locations to the extent practicable in anticipation of follow-on operations, should they be required. Continuous assessment is important because of the significant limits on precise “understanding” one might have of any adversary or situation. This implies the joint force must actively train and be equipped to be full partners in proactive and robust peacetime interaction activities. The importance of assessment should also be reflected in military education and exchange programs and Combatant Commander theater security cooperation plans. Such activities complement joint force basing and presence strategies, shaping the environment to establish conditions that enable rapid response should a crisis occur. Success in these activities relies heavily on active support and participation by other elements of national power.²³

DoD must apply this new joint doctrine and concept of shaping operations as it executes the sixth year of the long war on terror, with major operations ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and lower profile operations ongoing in the Horn of Africa, the Trans-Sahara region and the Philippines.

Not only is the US involved in major operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, the US government is initiating a potential model for the first unified government Combatant Command for the Continent of Africa: AFRICOM. The US Government and DoD in particular will need policy, doctrine, people and tools to quickly establish and use this new command to exercise its ability to plan for and execute truly unified shaping activities as Phase 0.

Without accelerated implementation of this new doctrine, the US may continue to see this twist of the Pyrrhic victory: the military winning battles with relatively minor cost without hopes

²² JCS, CCJO, (Washington DC: CJCS, 2005), 2.

²³ Ibid, 17, discussion of shaping operations.

of the US winning the war.²⁴ How long can the US hope that SOCOM can synchronize and coordinate the Global War on Terrorism despite the clamor that eighty percent of the war on terror efforts must come from the interagency community? SOCOM acknowledges while it has the capability to find, fix, finish, capture or kill identified enemy forces, it cannot address the activities that will cultivate long term success without more integration or unified non-military action.²⁵

METHODOLOGY

Creating new ways to adapt more quickly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated a streamlined process for evaluating DoD capabilities and needs. This process, called the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) is described in the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, *Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*. A simplified model will be used in this paper.²⁶ The need for integrated Phase 0 planning fits various types of CBA taxonomy that have been directed: “operational shortcomings we have already experienced, perceived future needs, and to provide a unified look at a mission area.”²⁷ The simplified CBA, as illustrated in the following figure, has four steps: identify the military problem, determine the current military capability to address it, evaluate the capability, and recommend solutions for capability shortfalls.

²⁴ A Pyrrhic victory, [definition on-line] (New York: Dictionary.com, 2007); available from <http://dictionary.reference.com/wordoftheday/archive/2003/07/16.html>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007, is generally a victory achieved at great or excessive cost to ones force; a ruinous victory whereas the analogy is used in the reverse from Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, when faced with an irregular threat, “the military can win battles and still lose the war” meaning the conventional fight is deceptively seen as the answer, when the true solution must come from non-military, non-kinetic efforts.

²⁵ SOCOM J5 Staff, Briefing to SAMS students, (Tampa: SOCOM, 3 January 2007).

²⁶ CJCSM 3170.01B (Washington DC: CJCS, 2005), A-2

²⁷ JCS, CBA Whitepaper (Washington DC: CJCS, 2005), 8




Figure 4 - Simplified Diagram of Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA)

This paper is a follow up study to a graduate thesis written at the Command and General Staff College in 2006 titled “Operationalizing the Coordination Mechanisms between State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Department of Defense.” Using the same CBA model, that paper evaluated whether DoD had a new capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations, concluding that despite significant progress and transformation, by June of 2006 there was not enough institutionalized process for the interagency coordination mechanisms to operationalize a consistent Stability and Reconstruction strategy.²⁸

Using the previous study as a baseline assessment of interagency integration, and following the steps of the CBA methodology above, this paper will begin by studying subsequent policy, doctrine, organization and integration of the interagency community to provide an overall

²⁸ Elizabeth Medina, “Operationalizing the Coordination Mechanisms Between the State Department and Department of Defense for Stabilization and Reconstruction.”, (Ft Leavenworth: CGSC, May 2006), iii.

update for the reader on the existing guidance for the US government to fight the long war. Next, this paper will determine the specific requirements and methods available for planning Phase 0, shaping operations, as defined in interagency and joint publications. Then, this paper will identify the current DoD capability to plan for and execute integrated Phase 0 or shaping activities using examples of recent integrated activities.

Understanding the doctrine, tools and current capability DoD has to plan integrated US efforts, this paper will evaluate the DoD capability and links to military operational planning. The criteria used to evaluate the capability are those developed in the prior study, updated by current research, doctrine and requirements: common problem identification; clear national policy and strategic objectives, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational levels; recognized and practiced tools for planning; and common assessment mechanisms.

Lastly, this paper will identify vital shortfalls in providing the military capability, make recommendations for addressing the gaps and provide areas for further assessment as the government continues to transform towards a more unified effort.

DEFINITIONS

Not yet in the Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, there are two definitions of Phase 0 in the Department of Defense. The first comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and regards Phase 0 as activities to enable military operations, part of the contingency planning process. The second comes from the Joint Staff J7 Office which developed the Adaptive Planning model and regards Phase 0 as Combatant Command activities required to transform a conflict into something manageable by the local or regional government. Because of the whole-of-government discussions regarding smaller longer term investments in prevention as the preferred US response, for this paper, the definition of Phase 0 will be the shaping activities of promoting stability and capacity to prevention of conflict and in the event of a crisis, to enable force posturing for potential military operations. During this phase the military

is in a supporting role to other government agencies and focuses primarily on security cooperation planning.²⁹

The definition of shaping operations used in this paper comes from the Joint Publication

3-0. These operations are:

“Joint and multinational operations inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.”³⁰

As mentioned in the definition, “normal and routine military activities” planned and executed during Phase 0 are theater security cooperation activities which can include security assistance, foreign military sales, international military education and training, theater intelligence, counternarcoterrorism, status of forces issues, host nation relations and capacity building, critical infrastructure protection, contracting, training and exercises, targeting, and strategic communications.

In this paper, the term integration will be used as defined in a draft Department of Defense Directive 3000.dd.³¹ This directive describes integrated operations as “unified policy, planning, or execution actions, of the US interagency community, in coordination with other partners, across the spectrum of operations, to achieve unified action to advance US Government goals and objectives.”

The use of the terms horizontal and vertical integration are not by the common microeconomic definitions but by the strategic management definitions. In this paper this phrase will mean the capability and processes of an agency to communicate, plan, produce and execute

²⁹ JCS, JP 3-0 (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), IV-26

³⁰ Ibid, IV-27

activities both up and down its own hierarchy, as well as across all agencies at its level of operation.

According to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, unified action “highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power including nonmilitary and military organizations.”³² The expanded definition from the Capstone Concept of Joint Operations requires that “strategic objectives be determined in the context of the global situation and interaction with a variety of allies and other multinational partners. Achieving these objectives requires integrating joint force actions with those of interagency and perhaps multinational partners.”³³

Finally, the term assessment is defined in JP 3-0 as a process that measures progress of the joint force toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective or mission accomplishment. Measures of effectiveness assess changes in system behavior, capability or the operational environment, and measures of performance measure task performance.³⁴

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

It is important to note, although beyond the scope of this paper, that despite the convergence of US opinions regarding the criticality of integrated US government efforts, the current requirement for unified action is written in presidential directives, think tank literature and military doctrine that can be changed with a new presidential administration in as early as two years. Therefore, if recent achievements are not codified into law or hardened into the institution, the largest pending potential spoiler to recent adaptation of the interagency community is a new administration reorganizing the national security apparatus and issuing presidential directives that override successes.

³¹ Harry Tomlin, JIACG progress (Stuttgart: EUCOM, February 2007), p. 3.

³² JCS, JP 3-0 (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), Executive Summary, xiii

³³ JCS, CCJO (Washington DC: CJCS, 2005), 2.

³⁴ JCS, JP 3-0, (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), IV-30.

As the military community finds itself transforming rapidly, with a newly published Joint Operating Concept, *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction*,³⁵ yet without a corresponding Joint Operating Concept for Shaping Operations, it must be recognized that a cluster of capabilities are described as central for both and found in each. The relationship between Phases 0, IV and V is not yet defined. These phases should not be planned separately; they all likely will address the same causes and symptoms of instability and/or conflict. Further, it is confusing that stability operations are found balanced with offensive and defensive operations in each of the six phases as well as in each type of military operation in the range of military operations. This paper will not compare or contrast shaping operations to stability operations, nor will it discuss the shaping activities found along the range of military operations. Instead the scope of this paper is on effective Phase 0 planning.

This paper will not address the constriction of phasing operations by time that are depicted in any linear expression of the adaptive planning process, particularly with the current understanding that all types of operations could and likely will occur simultaneously in every phase.

Although there are many agencies of the US government, and there is a natural split between the agencies that operate in a classified, threat-based environment, and those that operate in an unclassified population-based environment, this paper will not address information transparency issues based on classification or content beyond what is generally required for integrated planning of Phase 0 purposes.

Finally, although funding is always central to government capabilities, particularly with the prospect of transitioning the lead agency responsibility for unified activities, it is both beyond the scope of this paper and premature as authorization hearings are occurring after the publication of this paper to assess the Congressional budget process in its entirety in relation to shaping

³⁵ JCS, Joint Operating Concept, *Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and*

operations. Previous allocations, authorization, approved transfers, and budget requests will be identified, but pending any results from the 110th Congress Budget Authorizations, assessments of this facet of interagency integration will be left for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed.

President George Bush, National Security Strategy, 2002³⁶

In the last four years, we have made substantial progress in transforming key national security institutions...We must extend and enhance the transformation of key institutions, both domestically and abroad.

President George Bush, National Security Strategy, 2006³⁷

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND INTEGRATION

In direct response to the events of September 11, 2001 and the *US National Security Strategy* of 2002, many departments and agencies of the US Government went to war, with themselves, as they fought their own bureaucracy to reorganize for effectiveness in the current operational environment ripe for empowered non-state actors and irregular warfare. Most executive agencies and departments were asked to change substantially and have made honorable efforts and progress. To date, most agencies have developed their own strategic guidance and policy that supports the current *National Security Strategy* starting the transformation process and the elemental integration. Reflected in President Bush's comments above, both progress and challenges of the key national security institutions were highlighted in the National Security

Reconstruction, (Washington DC: CJCS, December 2006).

³⁶ George Bush, National Security Strategy (Washington DC: White House, 2002), 32.

Strategy of 2006.³⁸ However, much of the significant guidance and transformation of the interagency that specifically supports the Phase 0 or shaping operations has not been highlighted yet in any universal national documents so they will be covered in the following chapter as an update to prior research.

INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE AND INTEGRATION

The State Department

Because the State Department is the lead agency during Phase 0, Shaping Operations planning, it is critical that military planners understand the guidance, organization and integration efforts published and in implementation by State to date.

Through the Transformational Diplomacy Initiative announced on January 18, 2006, the Secretary of State issued guidance for the “updating of a cold war agency to the security needs of today. The objective of transformation diplomacy is to work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”³⁹

Beyond repositioning diplomats from Cold War embassies to emerging conflict areas of Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East, this concept has produced operational efforts of more Political Advisors (POLADs) to the military, a revamped State Political-Military (P/M) division, and consolidated planning, resource management and evaluation staffs with USAID.⁴⁰

³⁷ George Bush, National Security Strategy 2006 (Washington DC: White House, 2006), 43-44.

³⁸ Ibid, various.

³⁹ Condoleeza Rice, Press Release on Transformational Diplomacy, (Washington DC: Department of State, January 2006).

⁴⁰ US Department of State, Transformational Diplomacy webpage [document on-line] (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007); available from <http://www.state.gov>; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.

The organizational chart of the United States Department of State is structured as follows:

- United States Department of State**
 - United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator** (Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA))
 - Secretary of State (S)**
 - United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations (USPN)**
 - Deputy Secretary of State (D)**
 - Chief of Staff (SCOR)**
 - Executive Secretariat (SES) Executive Secretary**
 - Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P)**
 - African Affairs (AF) Assistant Secretary
 - East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) Assistant Secretary
 - European and European Affairs (EUR) Assistant Secretary
 - International Organizations (IO) Assistant Secretary
 - Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Assistant Secretary
 - South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Assistant Secretary
 - Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Assistant Secretary
 - International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Assistant Secretary
 - Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs (E)**
 - Economic & Business Affairs (EB) Assistant Secretary
 - Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (I)**
 - International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Assistant Secretary**
 - Political-Military Affairs (PMA) Assistant Secretary**
 - Arms Control, Compliance and Proliferation (ACCP) Assistant Secretary
 - Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (PA)**
 - Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) Assistant Secretary
 - Public Affairs (PA) Assistant Secretary
 - International Information Programs (IIP) Coordinator
 - Under Secretary for Management (M)**
 - Administration (A) Assistant Secretary
 - Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions (DS) Assistant Secretary
 - Foreign Service Institute (FSI) Director
 - Information Resource Management (IRM) Chief Information Officer
 - Consular Affairs (CA) Assistant Secretary
 - Human Resources (HR) Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources
 - Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Director
 - Medical Services (MMED) Director
 - Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs (D)**
 - Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DHL) Assistant Secretary
 - Global and International Development and Scientific Affairs (GISA) Assistant Secretary
 - Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) Assistant Secretary
 - Counselor (C)**

Key Positions Highlighted with Green Circles:

- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator** (Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA))
- Secretary of State (S)**
- Deputy Secretary of State (D)**
- Chief of Staff (SCOR)**
- Executive Secretariat (SES) Executive Secretary**
- International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Assistant Secretary**
- Political-Military Affairs (PMA) Assistant Secretary**
- Policy Planning Staff (PP) Director**
- Resource Management (RM) Assistant Secretary / Chief Financial Officer**

Other Positions:

- Inspector General (IG)**
- Child Rights (SCOR) Director**
- Legal Advisor (L)**
- Legislative Affairs (LA) Assistant Secretary**
- Intelligence and Research (IRI) Assistant Secretary**
- Chief of Protocol (SCPR) Ambassador**
- Counterterrorism (SCT) Coordinator and Ambassador at Large**
- Coordinator for Reconstruction and Distribution (SCRS)**
- Global AIDS Coordinator (SGAC)**

Approved by S/ES May 2006

Most significant to the Combatant Commands for Phase 0 planning, Department of State committed to the assignment of permanent State representatives to the Combatant Command Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG).⁴¹ As the central coordinating body for interagency issues this group previously had ad hoc, temporary or voluntary assignments of personnel from other agencies. Today the JIACG representatives also have a larger planning, coordination, reach back and translation responsibility.⁴²

⁴² JFCOM, Commanders Handbook for JIACGs (Norfolk: JFCOM, 2006).

State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The publication of the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, which established the role of the State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in November of 2004, has been a central focus on national discussions regarding the interagency and US government capabilities to transform conflict in countries in which we are not at war.⁴³ S/CRS directly supports the State Department transformational diplomacy goal. Secretary Rice recently stated that the role of S/CRS is "to work more effectively at the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security."⁴⁴

Because of the national discourse, a working group was established to develop a work plan to implement the NSPD which was completed in October 2006. Civilian and military agencies agreed to prioritize the implementation of this work plan. The Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization met on January 25, 2006 to address the Interagency Management System and the triggers and processes for interagency conflict planning. The working group will coordinate the next steps to be taken to identify potential countries for S/CRS to begin contingency planning in coordination with the Department of State regional bureaus.⁴⁵

Significant operational efforts have included continued stabilization planning and execution for not just post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries such as the Sudan, Lebanon, and Haiti, but also mid and low level country involvement and advisory efforts that bring together the non-DoD agencies of the government in a strategic planning effort

⁴³ George Bush, NSPD-44 (Washington DC: White House, December 2006), 2.

⁴⁴ Marcia Wong, Update Briefing to ASD SO/LIC (Washington DC: Department of State, 13 March 2006), 3

⁴⁵ S/CRS, NSPD Implementation Planning WG IPR (Washington DC: Department of State, October 2006),

to address shaping needs in failing or failed states pre-crisis such as Nepal, Zimbabwe, Cuba, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁴⁶

The S/CRS planning framework and process made up of four components: interagency assessment tools, a one-page framework, an essential task list, and metrics, has received positive feedback from all facets of crisis planning. This process is able to garner a US policy goal, produce interagency agreement on the problem, identification of the elements necessary and sufficient to transform the conflict into a level manageable by the local government, and achieve a whole of government approach for implementation and evaluation.⁴⁷

The following figure illustrates the S/CRS 3-level planning process and the outputs generated in the one-page planning framework enabling decision-makers to rapidly provide for policy needs.

3 Levels of Planning




Figure 6 - S/CRS Planning Process and Framework

⁴⁶ S/CRS Country Reports webpage, [site on-line] (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007); available from www.crs.state.gov; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

Because of the recognized value of the process, civilian training on the S/CRS planning framework, the centerpiece of this process, has expanded from a series of courses at the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, and the Joint Warfighting Center to civilian universities and their schools of government such as George Mason University and the University of New York at Syracuse.⁴⁸

S/CRS has continued to exercise and coordinate its planning concepts with not only the US military through Joint Forces Command but with the British Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), Australia, France, Germany, Canada, and the European Union. Various organizations within the UN have also identified interest in and means for collaboration with the S/CRS. This year will be the third year that S/CRS will refine concepts and exercise processes during the civilian led exercise Unified Action (UA), and the JFCOM led Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5).⁴⁹

The Director for Foreign Assistance

Recently nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate on March 29, 2006, Ambassador Randall Tobias, as the first Director for Foreign Assistance and dual Administrator for US Agency for International Development, published a new method of budgeting and funding country activities linked to the National Security Strategy, and State's Transformational Diplomacy.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Marcia Wong, Briefing to ASD SO/LIC (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 4

⁴⁸ George Mason School of Government Webpage, [Webpage on-line] (Arlington: GMU, 2007) available from <http://poppp.gmu.edu/research6.htm>; Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship, <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/ir/globalprogramspages/files/CohenSyllabusF06.doc>; [Webpage on-line] New York, SU, 2007; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007; both offer training on the S/CRS planning framework.

⁴⁹ S/CRS, Office webpage [Webpage on-line] (Washington DC: DOS, 2007), available from www.crs.state.gov; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

⁵⁰ DFA, Senate Confirmation Announcement [Press Release on-line] (Washington DC: DOS, 30 March 2006), available from <http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2006/pr060330.html>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

Our nation's security depends on the stability of other nations. Foreign assistance and the development it supports are therefore more important than ever, not just in terms of our moral responsibility to alleviate suffering, but as foundational pillars of our new national security architecture and the Global War on Terror.⁵¹

Under this Foreign Assistance reform of organization, planning and implementation, all foreign assistance dollars will be focused on the achievement of the Transformational Diplomacy goal at the top of figure 7: helping to build and sustain democracies, well governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Using the new strategic framework, all accounts and associated activities such as the Democracy Fund and Foreign Military Financing, will be focused on the five objectives across the top of the figure that achieve the goal: peace and security; governing justly and democratically; investing in people; economic growth; and humanitarian assistance. These five objectives nest with the goal of Transformational Diplomacy and subsequently with the National Security Strategy.⁵²

Also shown in the figure down the left hand side, this framework categorizes each country as either a rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partner, or a restrictive country, to more accurately evaluate the assistance required, and the path to the US transformational diplomacy goal. The State Department will use a system called the Unified Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) to combine the planning and reporting of foreign assistance activities into one data system.⁵³

⁵¹ Randall Tobias, Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, FY2008 Budget Request (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007), 2.

⁵² US Agency for International Development, Foreign Assistance Reform Briefing to ACVFA (Washington DC: Department of State, October 2006), 5-6.

⁵³ DFA, FY07 Operational Plan Guidance (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 9.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK								
Goal	"Helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."							
Objectives	Peace and Security	Governing Justly and Democratically	Investing In People	Economic Growth	Humanitarian Assistance	End Goal of US Foreign Assistance		Graduation Trajectory
Accounts within State/USAID	PMF, IMET, ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, ACI, PSA, SEED	DA, SEED, PSA, OP, ESF, INCLE, IO&P, ACI	DA, TI, CSH, ESF, IDPA, IO&P, PSA, SEED, GHAI, Title II	DA, TI, ESF, SEED, PSA, IO&P, Title II	IDPA, MRA, ERMA, Title II			
Other USG Agency Contributions								
Foreign Assistance Program Areas	- Counter Terrorism - Controlling WMD - Stabilization Operations and Defense Reform - Counter-narcotics - Transnational Crime - Conflict Mitigation and Response	- Rule of Law and Human Rights - Good Governance - Political Competition and Consensus-Building - Civil Society	- Health - Education - Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Populations	- Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth - Trade and Investment - Financial Sector - Infrastructure - Agriculture - Private Sector Competitiveness - Economic Opportunity - Environment	- Protection, Assistance and Solutions - Disaster Readiness - Migration Management			
	Category Definition							
Rebuilding Countries	States in or emerging from and rebuilding after internal or external conflict.	Prevent or mitigate state failure and/or violent conflict.	Assist in creating and/or stabilizing a legitimate and democratic government and a supportive environment for civil society and media.	Start or restart the delivery of critical social services, including health and educational facilities, and begin building or rebuilding institutional capacity.	Assist in the construction or reconstruction of key internal infrastructure and market mechanisms to stabilize the economy.	Address immediate needs of refugees, displaced, and other affected groups.	Stable environment for good governance, increased availability of essential social services, and initial progress to create policies and institutions upon which future progress will rest.	Advance to the Developing or Transforming Category.
Developing Countries	States with low or lower-middle income, not yet meeting MCC performance criteria, and the criterion related to political rights.	Address key remaining challenges to security and law enforcement.	Support policies and programs that accelerate and strengthen public institutions and the creation of a more vibrant local government, civil society and media.	Encourage social policies that deepen the ability of institutions to establish appropriate roles for the public and private sector in service delivery.	Encourage economic policies and strengthen institutional capacity to promote broad-based growth.	Encourage reduced need for future HA by introducing prevention and mitigation strategies, while continuing to address emergency needs.	Continued progress in expanding and deepening democracy, strengthening public and private institutions, and supporting policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction.	Advance to the Transforming Category.
Transforming Countries	States with low or lower-middle income, meeting MCC performance criteria, and the criterion related to political rights.	Nurture progress toward partnerships on security and law enforcement.	Provide limited resources and technical assistance to reinforce democratic institutions.	Provide financial resources and limited technical assistance to sustain improved livelihoods.	Provide financial resources and technical assistance to promote broad-based growth.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Government, civil society and private sector institutions capable of sustaining development progress.	Advance to the Sustaining Partnership Category or graduate from foreign assistance.
Sustaining Partnership Countries	States with upper-middle income or greater for which U.S. support is provided to sustain partnerships, progress, and peace.	Support strategic partnerships addressing security, CT, WMD, and counter-narcotics.	Address issues of mutual interest.	Address issues of mutual interest.	Create and promote sustained partnerships on trade and investment.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Continued partnership as strategically appropriate where U.S. support is necessary to maintain progress and peace.	Continue partnership or graduate from foreign assistance.
Restrictive Countries	States of concern where there are significant governance issues.	Prevent the acquisition/proliferation of WMD, support CT and counter narcotics.	Foster effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Create local capacity for fortification of civil society and path to democratic governance.	Address humanitarian needs.	Promote a market-based economy.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Civil society empowered to demand more effective democracies and states respectful of human dignity, accountable to their citizens, and responsible towards their neighbors.	Advance to other relevant foreign assistance category.
Global or Regional	Activities that advance the five objectives, transcend a single country's borders, and are addressed outside a country strategy.						Achievement of foreign assistance goal and objectives.	Determined based on criteria specific to the global or regional objective.

Figure 7 - US Government Foreign Assistance Framework, January 2007

By using the Director of Foreign Assistance's guidance and framework linking countries to funding and the National Security Strategy, sixty-seven "fast track" or priority countries submitted newly designed country operational plans this January to replace the Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) of the past. All remaining country plans will be submitted in this format by January 2008.⁵⁴ With this new clarity of nesting US goals and strategies, the process of building integrated plans to prevent conflict using the Foreign Assistance funds will be more

⁵⁴ US Agency for International Development, Foreign Assistance Reform Briefing to ACVFA (Washington DC: Department of State, October 2006), 4.

streamlined and potentially provide better results with which to leverage Congress for appropriate budget authorizations.⁵⁵

The FY2008 budget submitted to Congress was for an increase from \$17 billion in FY2006 to \$21 billion in 2008 for assistance to 155 countries, prioritized to meet the US national security objectives. The funding request submitted to Congress is the first budget request that is as clearly prioritized and supporting of national security objectives. The funding chart depicted in the following figure indicates by country category and major objective what percentage of the overall budget requested will be allocated. This enables the State Department and USAID to plan, execute and report back to congress on activities that are clearly linked to national security, clearly measured for effectiveness and consistent funding.

FY 2008 Country Category by Objective, including projected MCC disbursements					
	Peace and Security	Governing Justly and Democratically	Investing in People	Economic Growth	Humanitarian Assistance
Rebuilding	35%	18%	16%	20%	11%
Developing	32%	6%	44%	17%	1%
Transforming	7%	4%	49%	40%	0%
Sustaining	76%	1%	21%	1%	0%
Restricted	2%	63%	16%	8%	11%
Regional	13%	12%	36%	38%	1%
Global	16%	3%	34%	7%	41%

** Outlined cells denote assistance priorities*

Figure 8 - Foreign Assistance Budget Allocations by Country Category and Objective

⁵⁵ DFA, FY2008 Operation Plan Guidance (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 5-6.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID also falls under the guidance of Transformational Diplomacy, and the new Foreign Assistance framework. The recent USAID national security vision called “the 3 D’s: Development, Diplomacy and Defense” conceptualizes a unified US government team working together to secure the long-term interests of the US. The USAID tenets of this plan to work together are for development to be prioritized in order of country progress, sustainable impact, resources focused on US long-term stability and prosperity, and finally the importance of getting the consolidated budget passed in its new format as a significant precedence.⁵⁶

As an agency that grants out its activities to voluntary organizations, USAID convened a seminannual meeting of the Advisory Committee for Voluntary Foreign Assistance members in October 2006. At this meeting, the Acting Deputy Administrator, James Kunder, explained in detail the new planning process and required US and international voluntary organizations to learn and use the DFA’s planning process and metrics to continue as grantees or executors of the strategy.⁵⁷

Under this strategic guidance, USAID has made operational efforts to change from a by sector to a by country development approach as reflected in the FY2008 budget. Within the functional bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), headed by a retired US Army Civil Affairs officer, USAID stood up the Office of Military Assistance (OMA), also directed by two retired Civil Affairs Army officers, published a Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) for their field offices, assigned USAID response task forces made up of disaster assistance (OFDA) and conflict management (CMM) personnel at the State Department

⁵⁶ Randall Tobias, Speech to CSIS, We’re in This Together (Washington DC: USAID, February 5, 2007).

⁵⁷ US Agency for International Development, Foreign Assistance Reform Briefing, Minutes of the ACVFA Meeting (Washington DC: Department of State, October 2006), 6.

Bureaus. DCHA also invigorated the office of Conflict Management and Mitigation office and linked it to the State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization office.⁵⁸

Figure 9 reflects the organization of this USAID bureau.




Figure 9 - USAID Functional Bureau DCHA Organization

By reading the mission of this bureau, it is clear how well integrated DCHA is with both State and the goals of the National Security Strategy.

“to save lives; alleviate suffering; support democracy; and promote opportunities for people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, natural disasters and a breakdown of good governance. Together with the U.S. Department of State, USAID developed the Joint State/USAID Strategic Plan focusing activities around strategic goals relating to the National Security Strategy. These goals most prominently feature: democracy and governance, regional stability and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the Bureau has established the DCHA Management Council as a decision-making group that has the responsibility to develop a strategic approach to DCHA programs.”⁵⁹

For military planners focused on integrating shaping activities for Phase 0, continuing the long standing relationship with USAID through the focused offices under this functional

⁵⁸ USAID, About USAID Webpage [site on-line] (Washington DC: USAID, 2007); available from www.usaid.gov; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

⁵⁹ USAID, DCHA Webpage [site on-line] (Washington DC: USAID, 2007); available from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/cent_progs/central_dcha.html; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

bureau with individuals who understand the military will provide invaluable country information, assessments and operational planning tools.

CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE AND INTEGRATION

As noted earlier, the 109th Session of Congress provided the advice and consent to approve the President's creation and nominations for the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of Foreign Assistance, the National Counter Terrorism Center, the National Counter Proliferation Center, new Deputy Secretaries of State, the establishment of Multi-National Force-Iraq and the assigned Commander, Special Envoys to Sudan, Iraq and the myriad of Ambassadors reporting to new posts. The Congress convened the 9/11 Commission, and supported the convening of the Iraqi Study Group. It has convened its own hearings into the national security environment and requirements, with many sessions involving the interagency community.

In 2004, Senators Joseph Biden, Charles Hagl and Richard Lugar co-authored a bill named the *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004* that introduced the concept of necessary legislation to enable a civilian response corps to conduct preventative or non-war activities to manage an external conflict. Similarly House Representatives sponsored a parallel bill, HR 2601. Both were tabled at the end of the session with the war in Iraq taking the priority.⁶⁰

Despite the change in majority, the 110th Congress understands that the military cannot provide every solution to the threats to the US today. By continued encouragement from the DoD community, emphasis from external experts and personal motivation, Senators Lugar and Biden have introduced an updated Senate bill named, S 613 titled the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007. Representatives Farr and Saxton have introduced a parallel bill in the House, HR 1084. These bills capitalize on the accomplishments of the S/CRS in setting

up the organization and creating processes supported by wide consensus of the US government.⁶¹

If these bills become legislation they could be the first move towards unifying legislation.

Although it specifically addresses a civilian response corps under the direction of S/CRS, the details regarding training and funding will directly apply to Phase 0 Shaping operations as well as Phase IV and V efforts across the globe. Per Senate Report 110-50, dated April 10, 2007, this time the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended SR 613 for approval with no amendments.

According to the Legislative Assistant serving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,, there is much interest on the hill to sponsor this unifying legislation, in the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as evidenced by the number of hearings and testimony their office provides.⁶²

Over the past two years, Congress authorized funding for the administrative start up of S/CRS. They also authorized a critical transfer of funds from DoD under lines 1206 and 1207 of the budget. Both houses of Congress heard recent budget testimony from the Secretary of State, Director of Foreign Affairs on the national security oriented budget reformation reflected in the FY2008 request. Congress has also been hearing the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs reiterate the need to not only develop civilian capabilities, but to provide fungible funding at the same time as Congress encourages DoD to get away from supplemental authorizations. Levels of true motivation in Congress to provide for a whole-of-government capability for Phase 0 or shaping operations have yet to be seen as current requests for funding are considered and the new bills are deliberated for passing into legislation.

⁶⁰ S/CRS, Consensus Opinion (Washington DC: Department of State, 2006), 1.

⁶¹ US Senate, S 613, Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007 (Washington DC: THOMAS, 2007),

⁶² Michael Barron, Briefing to SAMS Students (Ft Leavenworth: CJCS, March 2007).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE AND INTEGRATION

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

In February of 2006, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* reported serious gaps in the interagency process needed to win the war on terror, and position for future security of the US.⁶³ This document offered the unprecedented recommendations that Congress authorize transfers of up to \$100 million of 2006 and 2007 funds between the military and the State Department, and that other transparency and authority issues be resolved to enable smoother transitions between non-military and military agencies leading US efforts in foreign nations.⁶⁴ In conjunction with the QDR, DoD Directive 3000.05, titled *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)*, raised the priority of stability operations to equal those of offensive and defensive operations. It charges the US military to support other agencies in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction, but in the event of a gap be prepared to cover it.⁶⁵

Recent efforts to integrate from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, began with the creation under the Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) of a new deputy for stability operations and assignment of Dr. Jeffrey Nadaner as the chief, as depicted in figure 10.

⁶³ Donald Rumsfeld, QDR 2006 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 90-91.

⁶⁴ US Department of Defense, DODD 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, November 2005), 2.

⁶⁵ George Bush, NSPD 44 (Washington DC: White House, December 2005), 2

this command will be to “oversee security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and if directed, military operations on the African continent.”⁶⁶

National Security Consortium

As recommended in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006*, the executive agencies initiated discussions on the institution of a National Security University⁶⁷ but have recognized the momentum behind a whole consortium of schools that is moving towards national security integration. In addition to the Foreign Service Institute, and a handful of civilian universities that offer training on the integrated tools of the S/CRS, the National Defense University, the service war colleges, and the Joint Warfighting Center offer courses on interagency integration as well as on the S/CRS planning framework and its recent uses. The National Defense University continues its proponentcy of the Interagency Training and Education Analysis center, and the Naval Post Graduate School has established a Reconstruction and Stabilization Center. Ongoing efforts by the Training and Information Management working group evaluate progress towards the QDR goals, and identify collaboration requirements to keep moving towards the goal of a National Security University, Consortium, and integrated National Security Officers capable of unified planning for any and all US agencies towards national security goals.

The Joint Staff

In August 2005, the Joint Chiefs published clear strategic guidance in the form of the Capstone Concept of Joint Operations (CCJO) as an overarching guide to the development of future joint force capabilities.⁶⁸ An overview of the CCJO is at Appendix A. As seen in the

⁶⁶ Robert Gates, DoD Establishing US AFRICOM (Washington DC: American Forces Press Service, February 6, 2007).

⁶⁷ Donald Rumsfeld, QDR 2006 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 79.

⁶⁸ JCS, CCJO (Washington DC: CJCS, 2005), See Appendix A.

following figure, this CCJO supports six individual Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), four of which have been published and two that are in draft version to be published in final form summer of 2007, as well as multiple other supporting concepts.




Figure 11 - Joint Chiefs Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

The Joint Chiefs assigned the affiliated Combatant Commanders responsibility for developing the main operating concepts. NORTHCOM published the first JOC titled Homeland Defense in February 2004. Joint Forces Command was given the task of developing the Major Combat Operations and Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction concepts which were published in December 2006, as well as an operational concept for military support to shaping operations necessary in each region and country to satisfy the national security strategy. For the shaping JOC, an in progress review was held with the Joint Operations Deputies

in October 2006, and the Joint Chiefs in November 2006 with the goal of publishing the Joint Operating Concept in June 2007.⁶⁹

The following figure details the status of the six Joint Operating Concepts.

JOC Title	Author	Version	Status	Approval Date
Homeland Security	NORTHCOM	1.0	Approved	February 2004
Major Combat Operations	JFCOM	2.0	Approved	December 2006
Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction	JFCOM	2.0	Approved	December 2006
Deterrence Operations	STRATCOM	2.0	Approved	December 2006
Irregular Warfare	SOCOM, USMC	1.0	Pending CJCS endorsement of draft for Sec Def Approval	Last IPR 20 October 2006
Military Support to Shaping Operation	JFCOM, EUCOM	1.0	Pending approval of draft	Last IPR 20 October 2006

Figure 12 - Status of Joint Operating Concepts

Recent strategic and operational efforts to integrate by the Joint Staff include the QDR “roadmap” effort to establish the Office of Building Partnership Capacity, within the J5.⁷⁰ Figure 13 depicts the organization of the Joint Staff J5, including this new office.

⁶⁹ JCS, Joint Transformation Concepts Report, [Report on-line] (Washington DC: CJCS, March 2007); available from www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/status.ppt; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.

⁷⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, QDR 2006 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 2.




Figure 13 - Joint Staff J5 Organization Chart

This office is charged with addressing many of the transformation issues mentioned in the CCJO due to different interagency capabilities and rates of transformation which pose challenges to the joint force gaining and maintaining the ability to operate effectively no matter what the circumstances, or who is involved. To this point, integration has been ad hoc and is unsuitable for future operations. Greater integration is to be a focal point of policy development with intended outputs of delineation of roles and responsibilities; overarching national concept for giving direction to all US agencies; robust planning, coordination and execution processes; expanded education and training for common understanding of environment.⁷¹

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Referring back to Figure 3 readers can see the relationship of security cooperation planning to strategic planning. In practice, *Security Cooperation Guidance* (SCG) is also outside

the doctrinal military operational planning process. In addition, referring back to Figure 10, places the DSCA under the OSD Policy office. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) publishes classified guidance that is updated every couple of years to provide direction on how to coordinate historically stove-piped tools such as foreign military financing (FMF), international military exchange training (IMET), security assistance (SA) and humanitarian assistance (HA). The latest version of the SCG is from 2005, with specific country updates added in 2006. The strategic objectives of the current security cooperation guidance are to secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action, strengthen alliances and partnerships, and establish favorable security conditions. These objectives are nested generally in the US National Security Strategy.⁷² However, recent efforts by the DSCA to give bridging guidance to Combatant Commanders have not yet addressed the policy and doctrine requirement for integrated Phase 0 planning that includes security cooperation activities.

Funding for security cooperation is appropriated and allocated to the Department of State to execute as part of normal and routine country programs but has never been linked to the National Security Strategy before FY2007.

With the recent Foreign Assistance framework and operational guidance to the field, and no updated SCG, the gap of guidance, transparency of funding and planning systems between Phase 0 planning and security cooperation planning begs to be addressed, and linked to operational planning. Combatant Commanders currently must hope they have military planners adept enough to prepare both Phase 0 plans under Department of State funds, and contingency plans under future military funds or supplemental war time budgets that are integrally linked through a continuous set of shaping activities.

⁷¹ JCS Webpage [webpage on-line, SIPR] (Washington DC: CJCS, 2007); available from <http://j5.js.smil.mil/sosa.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

⁷² DSCA, Strategic Plan 2006-2011 (Washington DC: DSCA, February 13, 2006), 2.

Joint Forces Command

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has the mission of concept development and experimentation, conducting annual interagency and multinational exercises such as Unified Action (UA), and Multinational Experiment (MNE).⁷³ JFCOM has provided strategic guidance and feedback on the interagency coordination process through the publication of the JFCOM Pamphlet regarding the S/CRS Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation, and Commanders' handbooks for the standardization of JIACG configuration and roles at the Combatant Command level.⁷⁴

JFCOM published the Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept and is currently writing the Shaping JOC in conjunction with EUCOM. JFCOMs current efforts to publish the shaping JOC focus on the actions a joint force commander might take in the context of unified action to: strengthen weak states, build partnerships with reluctant states, and strengthen willing partnerships (with traditional friends and emerging powers); mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism; and set the conditions that enable rapid action when military intervention is required.⁷⁵

JFCOM's proposed definition of shaping operations is "the set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions with a broad spectrum of government, nongovernmental and international partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur."⁷⁶ While acknowledging that shaping actions occur throughout the operational continuum, this concept will focus on those actions taken prior to a crisis-precipitating event, in Phase 0, in order to maintain or advance US interests.⁷⁷

⁷³ JFCOM, Unit Webpage [webpage on-line] (Norfolk: JFCOM, 2007); available from www.jfcom.mil/about/experiment.html; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.

⁷⁴ JFCOM, JFCOM J7 Pamphlet: US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (Norfolk: JFCOM, December 2005).

⁷⁵ JFCOM, OpsDeps IPR Briefing (Norfolk: JFCOM, 20 October 2006), 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 10.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 16.

JFCOM considers its long term efforts through interagency efforts, and assisting EUCOM in the set up of AFRICOM as part of their strategy to develop the shaping JOC. The figure below depicts the interrelationship of their efforts to the development of the concept.




Figure 14 - JFCOM Shaping JOC Development Strategy

Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

Although the Joint Staff is responsible for producing the National Military Support Plan to the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT), in 2004, the Department of Defense assigned SOCOM the responsibility and authority as the supported commander to coordinate the Global War on Terror. Within the year, SOCOM requested they be given not only the authority and responsibility to coordinate but also to synchronize the GWOT by setting priorities and directing action. Although they have published their plan and received approval in 2006 to implement it, difficulties remain in the synchronizing and coordinating with interagency partners, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders. SOCOM remains isolated from DoD and Interagency planners at the strategic level by not yet representing the military at the National Counterterrorism Center. It remains outside

the organization of military authority between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders.⁷⁸

Executing the GWOT, SOCOM finds three of the decisive lines of operations out of the five total lines under other than DoD for the lead; eighty percent of the plan is indirect action to influence, shape, and stabilize the environment, for which the capability resides in the interagency community.⁷⁹ Currently SOCOM is conducting another rewrite of their plan, and much of the feedback has been to hone in on the required interagency planning and coordination.⁸⁰ SOCOM has also been approved to provide priorities and a list of tasks to be included in the next Security Cooperation Guidance.⁸¹

The SOCOM J5 has a handful of military planners working the interagency coordination into the new draft including a Navy Seal Commander, a Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and an Air Force Foreign Area Officer Major.

Recent efforts SOCOM made to build interagency integration include assigning Admiral Olson to work with LTG Brown on an interagency engagement plan from a Washington DC office, located separately from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC).⁸²

As part of their interagency initiative, SOCOM realigned three levels of interagency work groups. The Interagency Task Force at the tactical level is now called the J36. The Interagency Coordination Group is now called the Joint Planning Board, and there are new special operations forces liaison elements (SOFLE) at a handful of agencies such as the National Counter Terrorism Center, and the Central Intelligence Agency with the intent to increase those elements to 100.⁸³

⁷⁸ Michael Vickers, Testimony: Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems (Washington DC: CSBA, March 15, 2006), 2-3.

⁷⁹ SOCOM J5, Personal Interview: Interagency Initiative (Tampa: SOCOM, 6 March 2007).

⁸⁰ SAMS, SOF Elective Review of 7500, (Ft Leavenworth: CAC, March 2007).

⁸¹ SOCOM J5, Brief to SAMS: Status of GWOT, (Ft Leavenworth: SOCOM, 3 January 2007).

⁸² JSOU, Personnel Interview: SOCOM Interagency Initiative, (Ft Leavenworth, SOCOM, 14 November 2006).

⁸³ SOCOM J5, Personal Interview: Interagency Initiative, (Tampa: SOCOM, 6 March 2007).

SOCOM continues to assign support teams to priority US Embassies made up of active component theater special operations forces: special forces, psychological operations and civil affairs soldiers. These soldiers support security cooperation activities but because of the deployment tempo to the larger global operations, these support teams are only for the highest priority countries. Many countries have been neglected despite a long term instability issue that could impact the US national interests.

Geographical Combatant Commands

Each Combatant Command has a unique staff, context and current operations. However there are common guidance points and recent efforts that apply to this paper.

Although Combatant Commands are comfortable with the robust and hardened operational and contingency planning processes and appear to be conducting the prescribed revisions in cycle, they perceive a gap in policy and guidance between planning for Theater Security Cooperation and planning for Phase 0.⁸⁴ Combatant Command planning staffs are left to determine on their own how to manage security cooperation activities rather than developing a deliberate and robust plan to request resources and support USG agencies in Phase 0 shaping activities that includes security cooperation. Similarly, the planning staffs are also becoming aware of the need to synchronize those Phase 0 activities towards a common US Government goal, paid for by Department of State dollars, and reflect the potential transition of activities, funding and authorities that will occur under an operational plan if not successful.⁸⁵ Guidance specifically requested is: planning and resource guidance focused on the strategic vision and shaping future conditions, models to identify fragile state and stability security challenges to

⁸⁴ EUCOM, ECJ5 Briefing: The Gap Between Security Cooperation Policy and Resourcing (Stuttgart: EUCOM, 2006), 2.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 3.

develop Phase 0 operations to shape the environment and prevent conflict, clear links to security cooperation funding source, and the ability to link funding to requirements of shaping activities.⁸⁶

Recent efforts by the Combatant Commands to integrate the interagency have seen the common expansion of the use and rhythm of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group as they've received permanently assigned representatives from the Department of State and other agencies. The relationships and common understanding of the team has evolved greatly over the past year because of it.⁸⁷

The most recent command established, AFRICOM, was announced this past February with a mission to focus mainly on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and crisis response efforts. The purpose of the command is to build upon ongoing security cooperation efforts and create new opportunities to strengthen the capabilities of partners in Africa.⁸⁸ It is not to enable the Department of Defense to set policy for an essential area of the world. Jennifer Cooke of the Center for Strategic and International Studies reminds, "we don't want a lopsided, security-heavy engagement in Africa...our military engagement needs to be integrated into a much broader engagement of diplomacy, development assistance, governance, and human rights."⁸⁹ Of the 600 personnel assigned, half will be civilian and half military, with a robust JIACG of 50 people, a theater security cooperation staff of approximately 5 and a strategy, policy and planning staff of 34.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ EUCOM, ECJ5 Briefing: The Gap Between Security Cooperation Policy and Resourcing (Stuttgart: EUCOM, 2006), 4.

⁸⁷ Steers, Howard, Personal Interview of DOS Rep: EUCOM JIACG Perspectives (Stuttgart: EUCOM, 14 November 2006).

⁸⁸ Robert Gates, Press Release, DoD Establishing AFRICOM (Washington DC: American Forces Press Services, 2 Feb 07).

⁸⁹ Jennifer Cooke, Press Release (Washington DC: CSIS, February 1, 2007).

⁹⁰ CJCS, JVMB Results (Washington DC: CJCS, 15 February 2007).

Other Military Functional Experts

Additional capabilities exist throughout the military to plan, integrate, and conduct shaping operations. However, one historical capability needs to be addressed for this paper. Through traditional relationships with the State Department, USAID, nongovernmental organizations, and civilian employment expertise, the Reserve Component Civil Affairs units at the CA Command level have provided the strategic and operational support to each Geographical Combatant Command for both security cooperation and operational planning. With resident expertise in multiple facets of governance such as agriculture, public health, public administration, public safety and public works, these soldiers have organized to provide strategic and operational advice to military planners since the early 1990's.⁹¹ In accordance with Joint Publications 3-08, Interagency Operations, published in 2006, and US Army CA doctrine, the CA Plans, Policy and Program teams (CAP3) and standing strategic and operational Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) of a CA Command responsible to coordinate interagency, nongovernmental and civilian activities and provide additional CMO and interagency planning support to the Combatant Command staffs.⁹²

A recent effort by the Department of Defense to provide more direct reporting units to the conventional forces split civil affairs forces between SOCOM and Forces Command. By mission and Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), the Civil Affairs strategic and regional shaping capability that equates to approximately 1000 soldiers at the Command level, now resides in US Forces Command to provide direct support to the Combatant Commanders, with all their subordinate units supporting the conventional forces.⁹³ One active component civil affairs brigade and its two battalions remain in SOCOM, however, these units do not carry the same repertoire of important civilian skills but are civil affairs generalists by nature. This split has yet

⁹¹ HQDA, FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations (Washington DC: HQDA, 15 September 2006).

⁹² JCS, JP 3-08 (Washington DC: CJCS, 2006), 42.

to be considered to determine the impact it will have on the military ability to leverage the interagency community, Phase 0 planning and SOCOMs GWOT role.

CHAPTER THREE

Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies.

David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency Redux

CURRENT INTEGRATED PHASE ZERO CAPABILITY

Having reviewed the nature of the military problem, reviewed the current guidance and requirements for planning Phase 0 shaping operations, this paper will now provide an overview of what the US government has been able to integrate and execute. It will also review cases in which military planners provided the Combatant Commanders ways to conduct what from now on will be called his Phase 0 activities.

EXECUTION OF S/CRS PLANNING FRAMEWORKS

Since 2005, S/CRS has conducted a whole-of-government process multiple times to establish planning frameworks in use today, from operations in Haiti, the Sudan and Lebanon, to advisory committees continuing to follow tenuous situations in Zimbabwe, Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Chad.⁹⁴

In each circumstance, the National Security Council alerted the S/CRS planning staff of a need to begin a US contingency response. S/CRS brought stakeholder agencies together to draft a

⁹³ USACAPOC, Memorandum: USACAPOC(A) Transition to the United States Army Reserve Command (Ft Bragg: CAPOC, 2006).

framework organized with a US policy goal on the top, supported by the major mission elements that included everything necessary and sufficient to transform the conflict into something manageable by the host nation government. Each of these major mission elements was supported by specific tasks required to achieve them and deliberated over by the group of agencies involved. Each major mission element was assigned to an agency or team of agencies depending on their capabilities and access. It was then the responsibility of that agency to ensure there was a plan to execute and evaluate the associated tasks.⁹⁵

The following figure is a draft version of the S/CRS template produced for US government activities in the Sudan. Following this process, a special envoy was named and deployed, an Ambassador established an Embassy in Southern Sudan, and teams from the State Department and USAID deployed to work with local, regional and international partners to manage the conflict. No US military force has been required to date although deployment of a UN peace keeping force is pending approval by the Sudanese Government.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ S/CRS, Country Reports Webpage [site on-line] (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007); available from www.crs.state.gov; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.

⁹⁵ S/CRS, Course Material: Foreign Service Course 651, Planning Applications. (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007).

⁹⁶ S/CRS, Sudan Country Report Webpage [site on-line] (Washington DC: Department of State, 2007); available from www.crs.state.gov; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.




Figure 15 - DRAFT Planning Template for USG in Sudan

The greatest value of the S/CRS planning framework has been the process of bringing the interagency together to analyze the problem. This common understanding of the problem, along with the buy-in of the agencies involved makes the implementation of the framework, once approved by the deputies and principals of the NSC, relatively administrative.⁹⁷ This process and framework can be and have been used for countries pending, in, or coming out of conflict.

The questions surrounding the military use of this process for Phase 0 planning have been the selection of countries being centrally made and limited to a handful of countries as designated at the Policy Coordination Committee level or above. For military planners, the Phase 0 planning requirements are for every priority country in their Combatant Command in which there are ongoing security cooperation activities or an associated operational plan. The current size of the

⁹⁷ Marcia Wong, Briefing to ASD SO/LIC (Washington DC: Department of State, March 2006), 3.

S/CRS planning staff precludes their being able to conduct planning to the extent needed by Combatant Commands.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO SHAPING OPERATIONS

From the military point of view, linking military activities under Theater Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Foreign Military Sales to the National Security Strategy is not a new concept. As early as 2002, Combatant Commands were recognizing the value of links between funding, the war on terror, regional capabilities and threats, and partner capacity building.

Long before the joint publications were published on integrated efforts, the US government and SOUTHCOM understood the importance of getting policy makers and budgets to support capacity building of Colombia through the development of an integrated national support plan, Plan Colombia.⁹⁸ With this national plan, the SOUTHCOM Commander developed theater security cooperation strategies to support the US Embassy in Bogota to help President Uribe establish a ministerial Center for Coordination and Integrated Action (CCAI) that became his national CMOC to address the conditions enabling the insurgency, partner with the Colombian military for capacity building in counterinsurgency and conduct military civic action.⁹⁹ The results of this unified US-Colombian plan provide a model of activities defined in the current doctrine as the type of shaping operations the US hopes to plan and achieve deliberately as Phase 0.¹⁰⁰

Another early example of interagency shaping operations is the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative to "assist governments in the region to better control

⁹⁸ George Bush, NSPD 18 Supporting Democracy in Colombia (Washington DC: White House, November 2002)

⁹⁹ SOUTHCOM J334, Accion Integral/CCAI Information Paper (Miami: SOUTHCOM, 2005).

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Johnson, Helping Colombia Sustain Progress Toward Peace (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, October 19, 2005), 1.

their territory and prevent huge tracts of territory from providing a safe haven,”¹⁰¹ supported by the military through Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara. Through the identification of a national security vulnerability, the US government stated the need for an initiative to address a large geographic area bounded by multiple sovereign nations. Military planners were able to build supporting plans and execute low profile operations that enabled partner nation counterterrorism efforts, denied safe haven and maintained access throughout the area of responsibility.¹⁰²

Even in a major operation like Iraq, unified action has been the goal of integrated planners. In early 2004, as the US Embassy in Iraq was being established, the MNFI planners cross-walked their campaign plan with the State’s Goal Oriented Plan to validate resource and task efficiency to achieve common strategic objectives by evaluating activities with common measures. The goal definitions and crosswalk to the campaign plan lines of operation can be found in Appendix B of this paper.

Finally, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa has been conducting shaping operations under the war on terror since 2002 in coordination with US diplomatic and development staff as well as other US agencies. Through security cooperation JTF-HOA has conducted counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and military civic action programs that provide internal security to nations and strengthen regional stability.¹⁰³

Joint Publication 3-0 notes that 1,400 U.S. and 500 coalition forces have helped create a Yemeni Coast Guard; worked with the Kenyan government to improve border control, law enforcement, criminal investigation, and port security; improved counterterrorism capabilities throughout the Horn of Africa; built or repaired schools, clinics, hospitals, and drilled wells; and

¹⁰¹ Global Security, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative webpage (TSCTI) [site on-line] (Washington DC: Global Security, 2007); available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tsci.htm; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

¹⁰² Global Security, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara webpage (OEF-TS) [site on-line] (Washington DC: Global Security, 2007); available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_ts.htm; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

¹⁰³ Donald Rumsfeld, QDR 2006 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2006), 12.

conducted nearly 40 medical and veterinary visits. By also building capacity of the local governance, local conditions have improved, minimized conflict points, and decreased the possibility of failed states or ungoverned spaces.¹⁰⁴

CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATING THE CURRENT CAPABILITY

Knowing the strategic guidance and requirements for Phase 0 shaping operations, and identifying an ad hoc current interagency and military capability to address Phase 0, this paper will now assess that capability. The assessment will be made using the following criteria developed in prior study and as updated with current requirements: whether there is a venue for common problem identification; whether there is a venue to gain clear national policy, guidance and objectives; whether there are clearly identifiable actors responsible for this process at the strategic and operational levels; whether there are recognized and practiced tools for integrated planning; and finally whether there are common assessment mechanisms for determining levels of success.

COMMON PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

For DoD to be able to integrate all elements of power into a Phase 0 plan for Combatant Commanders activities, there must be strategic and operational understanding of the problem. With this, military planners are well practiced at translating strategy into plans for execution as tactical action. Common understanding of the Phase 0 problem must be the start point for flexible and adaptive execution of any complex long term strategy. To date, military security cooperation and operational planning processes do not include a process to determine a common problem

¹⁰⁴ JCS Joint Operating Concept Military Support to SSTR Operations (Washington DC: CJCS December 2006), 33.

statement for Phase 0. There is currently no allowance in management information systems for this type of discussion for Phase 0 since it is not a component of operational planning.

Only through group discourse or dialogue, free to share reflections of the nature of the problem in the context of US national security, can an interagency working group reach common understanding. Multiple interagency bodies exist that can achieve this common problem identification for shaping operations, the National Security Council, the Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization, members of the Joint Staff J5 in conjunction with S/CRS led interagency representatives or the Combatant Command J5 and JIACGs. The S/CRS planning process provides the best methods for interagency identification of and agreement on the problem faced in relation to US national security strategy during shaping operations, or any other operation.

The shortcoming of the S/CRS process to generate a planning framework is the number of countries that can be analyzed versus the number required for Phase 0 planning. The likelihood that any staff at the national level can do this is small. Also, to come to a common understanding across agencies and departments takes dedicated time and staff. Also key to this process, the results must be recognized by the greater community to be valuable. Currently, there is not enough recognition of this process among military staff to accept it for its worth.

CLEAR NATIONAL POLICY, GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES

The National Security Strategy of the past six years has been relatively consistent, and provided similar policies. With the efforts made by each agency in the past couple of years to link their individual strategies to the National Security Strategy, most US government agencies and departments are moving forward in the same direction.

While all agency strategies being nested with the National Strategy allows for easier integration of efforts, the guidance for planning and execution of Phase 0 activities, or any other activities, which cross the lines of agencies, are not yet provided.

As portrayed in the following figure, National Security Strategy is reflected in stove-piped agency strategy across the board. There is no integrated policy, guidance or objectives for Phase 0 below the National Security Strategy.




Figure 16 - Current US Strategic Guidance

allocation process for the Foreign Assistance dollars which fund Phase 0 shaping activities have been linked clearly to the US National Security Strategy. By synchronizing the diplomatic efforts, foreign assistance funding, and US Embassy program planning, military planners at the strategic and operational level can identify consistent national policy to link security cooperation activities into unified efforts.

If necessary, using the S/CRS framework as a common tool that generates clear and specific policy, strategic objectives, and interagency tasks with assignment of lead agency, military planners can draft the inputs to plan integrated Phase 0 activities for the Combatant Commander.

Specific shortfalls of the capability in this area are two absent central guidance documents: the lack of specific and updated Security Cooperation Guidance that reflects the

changes of interagency guidance and implementation, as well as the pending Shaping Joint Operating Concept which should standardize across the Combatant Commands the specific methods and tools available to military planners to plan deliberate and consistent Phase 0 shaping activities.

IDENTIFIABLE ACTORS AT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS

This paper has provided a discussion of the actors in each agency, department and staff that can be expected to contribute to the progress of Phase 0 planning. There are policy and legislation makers at the top in the NSC and Congress, interagency working groups and coordinating bodies in the Joint Staff, S/CRS, State Department staff and USAID departments in the middle, and civilian and military planners at the Combatant Command and Country Team level at the bottom.

Currently these bodies are not linked through their commonalities on Phase 0 or shaping operations. There is not yet a clear and definable hierarchy or vertical analysis of the specific actors that are involved in integrated Phase 0 planning.

For DoD in specific, there are military officers trained and assigned as strategists or planners to strategic and operational staffs that have the integration mission, however, few are trained on the integrated planning tools available for Phase 0. With clear policy guidance on the joining of security cooperation, the war on terror and Phase 0 planning as well as formal or informal training on the template, however, these military planners could learn and apply what they need to synchronize acceptable activities for the Combatant Commander's Phase 0 activities. Combatant Commanders have multiple planning elements within their staffs that can be assigned the Phase 0 planning: the POLAD, J5, the JIACG, the associated Civil Affairs CAP3 team, the associated Theater Special Operations Command, the civilian Theater Security Cooperation staff, the associated Defense Attaché Office personnel, or a combination of these elements.

Shortfalls for this area are the lack of clarity even within DoD as to who is responsible for providing the guidance and conducting the integrated planning for Phase 0 activities. It is not clear whether the ultimate Phase 0 guidance will come from the State Department, the Joint Staff, the DSCA, or SOCOM. Additionally, disagreements between the Joint Staff and SOCOM as to who coordinates the interagency contributions for the GWOT must be settled and may lead to a decision as to who will coordinate the interagency process for Phase 0.

Finally, a shortage remains of civilian agency representatives that are available, authorized and assigned to work along side military planners to develop the amount of truly integrated Phase 0 plans required for the Combatant Command.

RECOGNIZED AND PRACTICED TOOLS FOR INTEGRATED PLANNING

The recognition of the S/CRS planning framework is expanding throughout the military and civilian community. Not only has it been published in the JFCOM Pamphlet but it is now in the Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Joint Operating Concept and is mentioned in the Joint Publication 3-0. If the S/CRS planning frameworks are only developed for high, mid and low level anecdotal scenarios as identified by the National Intelligence Center, then military planners at the strategic and operational level would do well, particularly in the absence of interagency staff, to develop a draft planning framework for each country as a baseline for integrating interagency elements as they become available for Phase 0 activities. The exception on how to use of the S/CRS planning framework comes with regard to the timeframe. Developed for two to three year opportunities, the S/CRS frameworks if they are to be used as the base for planning Phase 0 shaping activities must have an adjusted draft policy goal for longer-term operations linked directly to the Foreign Assistance budget, the regional Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation Strategy and each associated Country Operational Plan.

Other tools that are recognized and available for use are the S/CRS essential task matrix with metrics for each functional area. This tool provides three goal sets of metrics from which military planners can select to develop appropriate activities for a country Phase 0 plan: initial response, transformation, fostering sustainability.

Shortfalls are that despite the modest recognition of the S/CRS planning framework, few planners at the Combatant Command level have been trained or are practiced with its use. There is also a planning system gap for this phase. Although there is an existing Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System that Combatant Commands use as an administrative planning tool for security cooperation activities, this system needs to be expanded and accessible to the interagency community to allow for the appropriate level of discourse and Phase 0 planning. Although the Stabilization and Reconstruction Management Information System is to be built using the S/CRS framework and essential task list, it has not been developed yet and should include more inputs to enable a wider community of interagency actors across Phases 0, IV and V. There is no standardized format for Phase 0 plans nor is there any direction as to how to link them to associated operational plans in JOPES, the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System, or the State Department's Humanitarian Information Unit.

COMMON ASSESSMENT MECHANISMS

For Phase 0, or shaping operations, there are a refreshing number of assessment tools and mechanisms available and applicable. The new Foreign Assistance guide to operational planning has multiple annexes of strategic and operational metrics in each category of funding to use as country teams evaluate progress of plans in the achievement of national security strategy. Not only will the State Department, Country Teams, and USAID be familiar with these assessment terms, the voluntary foreign aid organizations that contract to these agencies are also required to use them as they submit proposals for involvement.

The S/CRS Essential Task Matrix developed initially by the CSIS and AUSA staff that has been adopted by S/CRS and published on the Joint Electronic Library site also provides assessment measures for stabilization and reconstruction operations that are familiar to the State Department, USAID, country teams and those students of the S/CRS planning process.

Between these published, distributed and recognized documents, there is enough material for the military planners at the strategic and operational level to develop and assess integrated measures for military support to shaping operations in a Phase 0 plan.

Shortfalls for this area revolve around the mechanisms and doctrine required to standardize the application and evaluation of these metrics. Metrics used in the TSCMIS, those serving as the base to the SRMIS and those in JOPES must be linked or associated to provide the best situational understanding and planning, as well as enable whole-of-government evaluations to achieve success.

CHAPTER FIVE

“Speaking with one US Government voice to maximize impact: One strategy, one plan, one report”

Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, Foreign Assistance Reform¹⁰⁵

CONCLUSION

FINDINGS

The US government has a unique window of opportunity, created over the past six years, in which branch, agency and department actions are directly linked to the National Security Strategy. To best succeed at integrated or unified Phase 0 planning and activities, it cannot be left

to any one department such as the Department of Defense. To guarantee consistently integrated outputs by each department requires deliberately integrated inputs by the US whole-of-government establishment. At that time, DoD efforts to address the identified shortfalls in its Phase 0 planning capability can go a long way towards taking advantage of this opportunity, and achieving long term unified planning processes.

Only after receiving this deliberate input, and then acknowledging and addressing the shortfalls, DoD can take the next critical steps to build a deliberate, whole of government Phase 0 planning process, supported by the right people, systems and training.

Figure 17 depicts a recommended strategy for building integrated phase 0 input below the NSC principles and deputies level, creating an interagency body built to develop unified policy, guidance, and objectives, signified by the bold oval, to meet shaping needs in countries of pre-conflict or crisis.




Figure 17 - Recommended Phase 0 Planning Strategy

¹⁰⁵ Randall Tobias, Foreign Assistance Reform, closing slogan, slide 6.

Before this paper can lay out specific and detailed recommendations, it must answer the original research question of whether DoD has a method or methods for integrating, both horizontally and vertically, all US national elements of power, policy and planning into a Combatant Commander's Phase 0 activities, as required by joint doctrine. By reviewing the requirements for Phase 0 planning, identifying the current DoD capability, and evaluating that capability according to the given criteria, this paper finds that despite the unprecedented levels of transformation by each agency, DoD does not yet have methods for integrating all US elements of power, policy and planning into a Combatant Commander's Phase 0 activities. Specific areas of the greatest shortfall were security cooperation and shaping guidance, identifiable actors at the strategic and operational level, and recognized and practiced tools for integrated planning.

Noting these shortfalls, this paper will offer specific recommendations to meet the needed capability within DoD, the interagency community and the US government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of this paper will be offered in order of ease with which DoD can make or enable the changes: those internal to the Department of Defense, those internal to the Executive Branch and finally those for the US legislative branch.

Department of Defense

DoD should emphasize and accelerate the development and fielding of the Stability and Reconstruction Management Information System in order to provide Combatant Command planners a more consistent and institutionalized system for Phase 0 planning. This system should be comparable to the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and compatible with JOPES, the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Program, Planning, Budget and Execution System. Because Phase 0 planning supports the Department of Defense and is paid for primarily under foreign assistance funding, this system should incorporate the existing TSCMIS,

and be able to connect to JOPES operational plans, but more importantly get data feeds from the State Department Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System and Humanitarian Information Unit. The British PCRU system, a snapshot captured in the figure below, can serve as a prototype.¹⁰⁶




Figure 18 - British Prototype Management Information System

DoD should also request authorization to build a fifth Civil Affairs Command to be regionally aligned with the new command AFRICOM to provide them with the doctrinal Civil Affairs planning support and advice as well as a deployable Civil Military Operations Center to used as an integrating center for shaping operations.

The Joint Staff J7 should immediately authorize more broadened access for US government officials to the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System and operational

¹⁰⁶ PCRU, PCRU Information Webpage [site on-line] (London: PCRU, 2007); available from planning.postconflict.gov.uk; Internet; accessed on 29 March 2007.

plans to provide the environment needed for transparency of planning and pivotal dialogue on transition planning. In the short term, the DoD should direct that each Combatant Command JIACG function as the planning link for each agency between the operational planning efforts and the Phase 0 planning efforts.

The Joint Staff should be tasked to provide the Strategic interagency coordination for Phase 0 planning based on working groups made up of the J5, strategic SOF and Civil Affairs, State's Foreign Assistance office, S/CRS, and the Regional Bureaus, and the USAID DCHA bureau and its subordinate offices.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency should develop new guidance to give details for consistent Phase 0 planning. Also, DCSA should publish updated Security Cooperation Guidance that provides specific direction on using the new Foreign Assistance framework and the S/CRS planning framework to focus activities, provide resources, and link Phase 0 shaping operations to the national security strategy. The purpose of security cooperation guidance should be stated as providing military planners ways to plan integrated activities under theater security cooperation that make up the Combatant Commander's Phase 0 plan, can be submitted as Annex V of a corresponding operational plan, and can be included in the Country Teams Country Operational Plan for inclusion in the continuous whole-of-government assessment process.

JFCOM should publish the Military Support to Shaping Operations Joint Operating Concept on time (Summer 2007) with State Department and DSCA input. Similar to the *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations* JOC, it should provide instruction on using the S/CRS planning framework, recommend its use in Phase 0 planning, and guide its use as Annex V of affiliated operational plans. It should also identify the key actors responsible for the Phase 0 planning process at the strategic and operational levels.

Each Combatant Command should schedule their assigned planners and JIACG staff to attend the Joint Warfighting Center or Foreign Service Institute courses on the Foreign Assistance Framework, the S/CRS Planning Framework and assessment processes to build interagency Phase

0 plans corresponding to existing Combatant Command operational plans. These trained Combatant Command staff members should then develop and submit a Phase 0 plan by country, to include a draft S/CRS framework, to the Country Team, and State Regional Bureaus for inclusion in the Country Operational Plan. The Combatant Command staff should then submit these Phase 0 plans, draft S/CRS planning frameworks and country operational plans as the institutionally required Annex V of each operational plan.

EUCOM-AFRICOM should be designated the test command for Phase 0 planning and be fielded the SRMIS and its own Civil Affairs Command as soon as available. AFRICOM planners should start working with the State Regional Bureaus and Country Teams within its area to develop draft S/CRS planning frameworks for each of its countries.

Interagency Community

DoD must join with the State Department and USAID to leverage both houses of Congress to immediately deliberate on and pass the legislation regarding the Civilian Response Corps as an initial step in the direction of providing a long term and more efficient solution to international conflict management.

As a consolidated team made up of the “3-D’s”: Diplomacy, Development and Defense, the team above must continue to work together to draft national policy, develop strategic guidance and objectives for unified Phase 0 planning and shaping operations. A standing working group should be formed with State members from the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, S/CRS and its Regional Bureaus, USAID members from DCHA’s OFDA, DART, CMM and OMA, and DoD members from the JCS J5, SOCOM, Combatant Command JIACGs and the US Army Civil Affairs and Psyops Command.

DoD must encourage and support the Department of State Regional Bureaus and Country Teams to solicit Phase 0 plans from the Combatant Command planning and JIACG staffs as well as be prepared to include them in the Country Operational Plans, and regional or bureau plans.

The Department of State must grow the civilian component of the interagency team and forward deploy its regional bureaus.

All agencies must develop interagency planning capabilities that allow them to forward deploy operational planners into the regions.

Congress

The current Congress must authorize and appropriate funds as requested under the new Foreign Assistance framework to enable unification of activities towards national security strategy. In addition to authorizing funding within the new structure, Congress should also authorize more transparent means of transferring money between US government departments and agencies for the purposes of transitioning lead agency status.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT

The 110th Congress is deliberating the 2008 budget requests from all agencies and departments. The resulting budget will indicate their level of support for unified action in Phase 0. With the 2008 budget it will be important that Combatant Commands contribute Phase 0 planning to the first established Country Operational Plans which are to provide Congress with justification for subsequent funding requests. Studying this budget-, evaluation-, and request for subsequent budget-process will provide best practices methods for the interested communities.

With the pending publication of all six of the Joint Operating Concepts, it will be important to study the relationships between the various civilian led phases of adaptive planning, particularly the relationship between security cooperation and operational planning, between shaping and stability operations, and between levels of military efforts and range of military operations.

It may become necessary to assess whether the existing military and civilian planning elements can add the Phase 0 planning requirements to their duties or whether an additional

number of personnel will be required to accomplish these new duties. It may be necessary to develop quality control planning cells that synchronize and coordinate all of the Phase 0 planning in support of global efforts.

Currently residing on the Joint Staff Doctrine webpage, there is an interagency capabilities database that should be evaluated to determine its use for integrated Phase 0 planning.

Finally, by establishing this most basic foundation for integrated Phase 0 planning, the next step will be to assess the US capability to unify shaping activities of multinational governments and militaries, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

SUMMARY

The body of this work remains a snapshot in time. The author notes that as the transformation of the US government and national security apparatus continues, the context of this paper and its recommendations evolve. Any subsequent information, validation, correction or improvement is most welcome.

By using the Capabilities Based Assessment to evaluate DoD's capability to implement Phase 0 planning as required by joint publications, this paper has provided information to DoD and the interagency community. This paper has provided an update on current USG guidance and integration efforts, an update on DoD capability to integrate the elements of US power for a Combatant Commander's Phase 0 activities, evaluated the shortfalls of the current DoD capability, provided recommendations on developing the capability and identified issues for subsequent study and assessment.

APPENDIX A

Capstone Concept of Joint Operations (CCJO)

Purpose: Overarching concept that guides development of future joint force capabilities. Broadly describes how the joint force is expected to operate in the mid to far term, reflects enduring national interests derived from strategic guidance, and identifies the key characteristics of the further Joint Force.

Scope: Describes the environment of the Future Joint Force (DY-20 years), 2012-2025, and the Range of Military Operations

Problem: Complex, adaptive adversaries who will employ traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic methods to keep Joint Force from success across the ROMO

Central Idea: The Joint Force with the other elements of national power will conduct integrated, tempo controlling actions to dominate any adversary and control any situation in support strategic objectives.

Status: Approved by the CJCS 3 Aug 05, formal announcement via msg by EOM August 05

Author: J7 JETCP; 3 year revision cycle

APPENDIX B

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Multi-National Force-Iraq and Department of State DRAFT Planning Crosswalk

Goal Definitions

These definitions should be read accompanied by the Goals Hierarchy of the next page.

Security is determined by developing counter terrorist capabilities within the forces of Iraq; supporting the Iraqi's provision of public safety and internal security; and, ensuring the defense of Iraq from external aggression. Elements of the support rendered by the USG and its international partners include all aspects of institution building; training, equipping, management capability, command and control systems, intelligence and support functions.

Economic development depends on seeing to the immediate relief and humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq; supporting the Iraqi desire to develop their nation into a full and open market economy within their rich culture and heritage; and, supporting the needs of Iraq in providing for a national infrastructure that will allow the Iraqi people and government to fully utilize the resources and riches of their country. Encouragement of private sector development; tax, trade and tariff reform will allow for the acceleration of Iraq's economic fortune. This development must occur with a society that is active with its virtual infrastructure of education, health care and public health services, social services and support.

The **Democratic** maturity of Iraq will be achieved when it is able to form a representative government of freely elected leaders at the national, regional and local levels. The USG and its international partners will assist this democratization process by supporting the definition and development of unique Iraqi institutions for local through national government. Support and advise will also be offered in the structuring of the legal underpinnings of Iraq and Iraqi society. This foundation of law will begin with a new constitution and be completed with civil and criminal codes, a modern and responsive justice system and a humane and efficient penal system. Property claims, land reform and a modern responsive regulatory system will complete the achievement.

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Goals Hierarchy

Key:

Security LOO

Developing Fundamentals LOO

Urgent Essential Services LOO

1. Security
 - 1.1. Develop Counter Terrorism Capabilities
 - 1.1.1. Intelligence
 - 1.1.2. Suppression
 - 1.1.3. Mitigation
 - 1.2. Support Public Safety and Internal Security
 - 1.2.1. Internal Security Institution Building
 - 1.2.2. Support Public Safety
 - 1.2.3. Support Police Training, Education and Equipping
 - 1.2.4. Support Facilities Protection
 - 1.2.5. Support and Equip Fire Protection Services
 - 1.2.6. Support and Equip Emergency Medical Services
 - 1.3. Defense and External Security
 - 1.3.1. Defense and External Security Institution Building
 - 1.3.2. Enhance Border Security
 - 1.3.3. Support, Train, Educate and Equip the Iraqi Armed Forces
 - 1.4. Support, Train and Equip Iraqi Security Forces to Increase their Command, Control and Intelligence Capabilities
2. Economy
 - 2.1. Enable Urgent Essential Services
 - 2.1.1. Food Security
 - 2.1.2. Water Resources
 - 2.1.3. Sewerage and Sanitation
 - 2.1.4. Emergency Shelter
 - 2.1.5. Public Health and Health Care
 - 2.2. Support Community Empowerment and Capacity Building
 - 2.2.1. Support Education
 - 2.2.2. Work with Religious and Tribal leaders
 - 2.2.3. Support the Provision of Public Services
 - 2.2.4. Support the Development of Media
 - 2.2.5. Support the Protection and Development of Cultural and Heritage Systems and Sites.
 - 2.2.6. Support to Refugees and Displaced Persons
 - 2.3. Market Development
 - 2.3.1. Advise and Support Banking and Financial Systems
 - 2.3.2. Encourage Private Sector Development
 - 2.3.3. Support Public Sector Efficiency
 - 2.3.4. Encourage and Support Affordable Housing Policies
 - 2.3.5. Insure Oil Sector Efficiency
 - 2.3.6. Support Agriculture
 - 2.4. Construction and rehabilitation of tangible assets
 - 2.4.1. Support Housing Infrastructure
 - 2.4.2. Support Transportation Systems and Infrastructure
 - 2.4.3. Support Power Systems and Infrastructure
 - 2.4.4. Support Oil Systems and Infrastructure
 - 2.4.5. Support Water Systems and Infrastructure
 - 2.4.6. Support Communications Systems and Infrastructure
 - 2.4.7. Support Public Facilities
3. Democracy
 - 3.1. Democratization

- 3.1.1. Build Effective And Representative Local And Regional Government
- 3.1.2. Establishment Of A Legitimate, Constitutional Government With Effective National Institutions
- 3.1.3. Support and Advise on the Development of the Iraqi Constitution
- 3.1.4. Develop Civil Society at the Local and National Levels
- 3.1.5. Support Elections
- 3.2. The Rule of Law and Human Rights
 - 3.2.1. Supporting and Advising the Justice System
 - 3.2.1.1. Civil Laws – i.e., property claims, land reform and regulatory systems
 - 3.2.1.2. Criminal Laws – Ordinary and Special Courts to include the IST
 - 3.2.2. Supporting and Advising the Penal System

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