Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, Rhodesia, and Iraq
Abstract
One of the tools available to the counterinsurgent when devising a campaign is the interdiction of the insurgent's movement of men, materiel, and money at the border. This thesis examines three case studies of border interdiction in insurgency: the French in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, the Rhodesian experience from 1965 to 1980, and the current Coalition experience in Iraq. In 1956, to counter insurgent infiltration of fighters and weapons, the French built the Morice Line, a barricade system built around an electronically charged fence. The Morice Line was remarkably effective in stopping insurgent infiltration. While the Rhodesians attempted similar border fortifications, they lacked the resources to successfully employ them. Instead, they found that employing highly mobile teams to track and kill insurgents was a more successful tactic, given their resource constraints. The U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq, after a slow start, employed small advisory teams to support Iraqi Security Forces working from border forts to secure Iraq's borders. The three case studies show that border interdiction is a relatively inexpensive component of a counterinsurgency campaign, but that it can be a vital component of that campaign if the counterinsurgent interdicts the right target (e.g., manpower, weapons, or funding).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 15, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA471103
Entities
People
- Timothy M. Bairstow
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College