

BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION INTEGRATION
WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ROBERT MERCERON, MAJ, USA

M.B.A, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, 1997

M.S.A, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan, 2005

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2007

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-06-2007		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug 2006 - Jun 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION INTEGRATION WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Merceron, Robert, MAJ				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Since the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) was a recently created organization, the researcher sought to address the problem that little developmental knowledge existed about BSTB staff planning. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans. Fifty-three BSTB commanders, executive officers, operations officers and observer/controllers were invited to participate in this research. The researcher used a self-administered questionnaire, containing 10 questions, to collect data. Of the 53 invited participants, 27 completed and returned the questionnaire. The findings suggested that BSTB integration begins with the BCT commander. Therefore, the BSTB commander must seek the guidance of the BCT commander to determine which missions he envisions the organization performing in support of the BCT and the corresponding command and support relationships to perform these missions. Based on these designated roles and relationships, the BSTB could develop techniques and procedures that integrate its activities throughout the BCT. The BSTB commander and staff must identify a battle rhythm that is integrated with the BCT battle rhythm. The battle rhythm must include a sufficient number of meetings to present and exchange relevant information and working groups to coordinate and provide recommendations for required functions.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Brigade Special Troops Battalion, Integration, warfighting functions, meetings, working groups, Brigade Combat Team					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU	89	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Robert Merceron

Thesis Title: Brigade Special Troops Battalion Integration within the Brigade Combat Team

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Mr. David Goebel, M.M.A.S., M.A.

_____, Member
Dennis L. Dolan, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Mr. Robert Rielly, M.S., M.A.

Accepted this 15th day of June 2007 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

BRIGADE SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION INTEGRATION WITHIN THE
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, by Robert Merceron, 89 pages.

Since the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) was a recently created organization, the researcher sought to address the problem that little developmental knowledge existed about BSTB staff planning. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans. Fifty-three BSTB commanders, executive officers, operations officers and observer/controllers were invited to participate in this research. The researcher used a self-administered questionnaire, containing 10 questions, to collect data. Of the 53 invited participants, 27 completed and returned the questionnaire. The findings suggested that BSTB integration begins with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander. Therefore, the BSTB commander must seek the guidance of the BCT commander to determine which missions he envisions the organization performing in support of the BCT and the corresponding command and support relationships to perform these missions. Based on these designated roles and relationships, the BSTB could develop techniques and procedures that integrate its activities throughout the BCT. The BSTB commander and staff must identify a battle rhythm that is integrated with the BCT battle rhythm. The battle rhythm must include a sufficient number of meetings to present and exchange relevant information and working groups to coordinate and provide recommendations for required functions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was undertaken to examine techniques that BSTB staffs could use to integrate their specialized units to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent. It has been a pleasure to do so. I was inspired to complete this study due to my growing appreciation of the challenges faced in these new organizations. While serving as part of the first observer/controller task force at the joint readiness training center, organized to support this newly created organization, I observed the capabilities that these organizations possessed and often pondered how these capabilities could be maximized in support of the BCT. This study is intended serve as a foundation for future study and professional discussion on BSTB staff training and employment.

This study has been possible only by the valuable input from the 27 BSTB commanders, executive officers, operations officers and observer/controllers that participated in this research. It was through their feedback that I was able to collect sufficient data for my analysis. I also want to thank my thesis committee members for volunteering to serve on my committee. Their technical assistance, guidance and candid feedback was valuable to the completion this project. Additionally, I want to thank my wife, La-Shawn, for her support and understanding while I worked on this project. She selflessly sacrificed time we would have normally spent together so that I could dedicate numerous hours to completing this project. Therefore, this project is dedicated to the BSTB community, my research participants, my thesis committee and La-Shawn.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ACRONYMS	vii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
Introduction and Background	1
Research Question	2
Assumptions.....	2
Definition of Terms	3
Scope.....	6
Significance of Study.....	7
Summary and Conclusions	7
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW	10
Introduction.....	10
BSTB and Transformation.....	10
Command and Control of Army Forces	16
Battle Command (visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess).....	18
Plan Integration Techniques	19
Summary and Conclusions	21
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	25
Introduction.....	25
Research Methodology	25
Instrumentation	26
Field Procedures	27
Data Processing and Analysis Process.....	28
Participant Background and Experience	29
Tasks	29
Assets	30
Integrating Techniques.....	30
Additional Comments	31
Methodical Assumptions	32

Methodical Limitations.....	32
Summary and Conclusion.....	32
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS.....	34
Introduction.....	34
Participant Background and Experience.....	34
BSTB Tasks	35
Potential BSTB Assigned Tasks	35
BSTB Additional Capabilities	36
BSTB Asset Control	39
BSTB Control of Organic Assets.....	40
BSTB Control of Non-Organic Elements	41
Integrating Techniques	42
BSTB Task Organization along Warfighting Functions.....	42
Use of Warfighting Functions to Integrate BSTB Plans.....	44
Use of Meetings to Integrate BSTB Plans	47
Use of Working Groups to Integrate BSTB Plans	50
Additional Participant Comments.....	54
Summary and Conclusion.....	55
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	57
Introduction.....	57
Summary of the Findings in Chapter 4.....	57
BSTB Tasks and Capabilities	57
BSTB Asset Control	58
Integrating Techniques.....	59
Interpretation of Findings Described in Chapter 4	61
Recommendations.....	63
Further Study	63
For Action	64
Revision to FM 3-90.61, <i>The Brigade Troops Battalion Operations</i>	64
Implementing a Systems Planning Approach to BSTB Training and Integration	65
Summary and Conclusion.....	69
APPENDIX A. BSTB STAFF INTEGRATION SURVEY	72
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	76
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	78
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	79

ACRONYMS

ADA	Air Defense Artillery
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BSTB	Brigade Special Troops Battalion
C2	Command and Control
CA	Civil Affairs
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCIR	Commander Critical Information Requirement
CIED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CMO	Civil Military Operations
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FOB	Forward Operating Base
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HHC	Headquarters and Headquarters Company
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time available, and Civil considerations
MI	Military Intelligence
MP	Military Police
NSC	Network Support Company
NTC	National Training Center

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
US	United States
USACE	US Army Corp of Engineers

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. The Brigade Special Troops Battalion Organization	13
Figure 2. Potential BSTB Assigned Task	36
Figure 3. BSTB Organic Assets Under Brigade Control	41
Figure 4. BSTB Non organic Elements under Brigade Control.....	42
Figure 5. Value of Warfighting Functions to Integrate BSTB Plan.....	44
Figure 6. Meetings That Integrate BSTB Plans	47
Figure 7. Building Integration Into a BSTB Training Plan.....	66

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction and Background

Across the Army, it [the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB)] is considered a collection of “specialists” with no clear task and purpose--a battalion in search of a mission and a meaningful role within the brigade combat team (BCT). Few understand it. Fewer still have seen what happens when you unlock the vast potential that resides within the assemblage of this seemingly unrelated group of maneuver supporters. . . . Tasks that were formerly assigned directly by the BCT to each of its small maneuver support units are now formally assigned to the higher headquarters uniquely responsible for the execution of those tasks--the BSTB. . . . It is the responsibility of the BSTB to determine how best to leverage its specialized units to accomplish the mission and meet the commander’s intent.¹

In 2004, the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) organization was created as part of the Army’s transformation process. Over the next three years, the BSTB had slowly evolved in an effort to integrate its capabilities in support of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans in order to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. The BSTB staff faces several issues determining how to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. First, the BSTB is a recently created organization which is responsible for assets that previously were assigned directly under brigade control. Accordingly, BSTB staff planning must adapt and evolve in order to maximize integration this new organization’s capabilities. Secondly, the interaction between the BSTB commander and staff, its subordinate companies, and BCT staff is a complex and ever changing relationship.² As a result, coordination and control responsibilities among the BSTB staff are difficult to clearly

define or understand. And lastly, the BSTB commander's scope of control tends to differ greatly from one unit to the next.³ Consequently, BSTB staffs must become aware of the various ways that BSTB organizations are being employed in support of the BCT. Therefore, the problem is that little developmental knowledge exists about how BSTB staff planning could help the commander exercise control.

Research Question

The thesis research sought to answer the following primary question: How could BSTB commanders and staffs develop integrated plans that maximize the capabilities of their specialized units to accomplish assigned missions and meet the commander's intent? This question could be subdivided into three secondary research questions. First, what assigned tasks could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to plan? Second, what assets could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to incorporate into their plans? And third, what techniques could BSTB commanders and staffs use to enhance the development of integrated plans?

Assumptions

During this research, the following assumptions are made.

1. BSTB staffs have developed the requisite technical and tactical knowledge and skills to perform in this newly created organization.
2. BSTB staffs are operating within both their BCT and BSTB commander's intent.
3. BSTB staff actions are integrating the capabilities of assets under their control through time, space, purpose and action.

4. Each BCT has sufficiently tasked their subordinate BSTB.
5. Each BSTB staff has the ability to reach back to the BCT for planning assistance and subject matter expertise in areas beyond basic staff functions.

Definition of Terms

Battle Rhythm. The sequencing of standardized command and control activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate effective command and control.⁴

Cell. A grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or purpose to facilitate command and control during operations.⁵

Command. The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.⁶

Commander's Intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the operation's desired end state. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 3-0).⁷

Control. The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 6-0).⁸

Control Measure. A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 5-0).⁹

Command. The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.¹⁰

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.¹¹

Command and Control (C2) System. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to assigned missions.¹²

Command and Control Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction.¹³

Command Post. A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities.¹⁴

Commander's Intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the operation's desired end state. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 3-0.).¹⁵

Commander's Visualization. The mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force's current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commander's intent).¹⁶

Fire Support Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive information operations.¹⁷

Functional Cell. A group [of] personnel and equipment [organized] by warfighting function.¹⁸

Integration. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.¹⁹

Intelligence Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.²⁰

Line of Operations. A line that defines the orientation of the force in time and space, or purpose in relation to an enemy or objective.²¹

Meetings (sometimes called huddles). Informal gatherings used to present and exchange information.²²

Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy.²³

Nesting (application of nested concepts). A planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon's concept of operations is embedded in the other [higher headquarters].²⁴

Protection Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power.²⁵

Sustainment Warfighting Function. The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.²⁶

Synchronization. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place.²⁷

Warfighting function. A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.²⁸

Working Group. A temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function.²⁹

Scope

This study was limited to the following:

1. United States (US) Army Infantry and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams because the BSTB is an organic asset only within these organizations.
2. Feedback from BSTB commanders, operations officers, executive officers, and their observer/controller counterparts in order to gain a broad perspective of the organization.
3. BSTB organization along warfighting functions, BSTB-level meetings and BSTB working groups as techniques examined for enhancing the development of integrated plans.

However, this study did not discuss the following:

1. Roles and responsibilities of the Brigade Staff because the focus of this study is concerned with internal operations among the BSTB commander and staff.
2. BSTB company level organizations because this study is focused on BSTB staff, the command and control asset assigned to the BSTB Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC).

3. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) because a BSTB is not organic to this organization.

Significance of Study

The results of this study would significantly assist in understanding current and future BCT and BSTB leaders understand the capabilities and employment possibilities of the BSTB. As a result, these leaders would be able to use this shared developmental knowledge as a means of expanding their experience regarding BSTB employment planning. Therefore, BCT and BSTB leaders would be better informed to make organizational decisions.

Furthermore, this study would build a foundation for future study and professional discussion on BSTB staff training and employment. The study results suggested techniques that BSTB staffs could use to integrate their specialized units to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent. As a result, this information could be used to establish staff training priorities and develop planning standing operating procedures.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, the BSTB is a recently created and complex organization. It was formed so BCT commanders could concentrate their efforts on the enemy, not on the daily efforts of sustaining brigade support.³⁰ As a result, the success of the BSTB facilitates the success of the BCT, the US Army's standard tactical organization. Therefore, BSTB commanders and staffs should develop procedures to ensure that they are kept current with, and are integrated into, the BCT planning and executions.³¹

In order to achieve this desired integration, BSTB commanders and staffs must vigilantly search for techniques that enhance the development of integrated plans. Consequently, further study and a review of related literature must address the assigned tasks that BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to plan, the assets that BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to incorporate into their plans and techniques that allow BSTB commanders and staffs to enhance the development of integrated plans.

¹Thomas H. Magness, "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part I: All the Way In," *Engineer*, July-September 2006, 44-45.

²Department of the Army, FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2006), 3-10.

³Center for Army Lessons Learned, CTC Trends: Joint Readiness Training Center, No. 6-14 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 83.

⁴Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 2-17.

⁵*Ibid.*, Glossary-3 and 4.

⁶*Ibid.*, 1-16.

⁷*Ibid.*, 1-20.

⁸*Ibid.*, 1-17.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 1-16.

¹¹Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 1-1.

¹²Department of the Army, FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2006), 3-2.

¹³Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-7.

¹⁴Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 5-27.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 1-20.

¹⁶Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 2-16.

¹⁷Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-5.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 2-6.

¹⁹Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2007), 226.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 1-5.

²¹*Ibid.*, A-6.

²²*Ibid.*, 2-7.

²³*Ibid.*, 1-5.

²⁴Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2005), 1-16.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 1-6.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 1-6.

²⁷Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2007), 523.

²⁸Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2005), 1-5.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 2-8.

³⁰Department of the Army, FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1.

³¹*Ibid.*, 3-4.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans in order to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. The review of literature will discuss` the BSTB and transformation, command and control of Army forces, battle command and several plan integration techniques. Since the BSTB is a newly created organization, a need for critical review of this organization exists in order to develop integrated plans that maximize its employment capabilities. Besides military publications, very little has been written on this newly created organization. Therefore, the literature review primarily consisted of Army doctrinal manuals, memorandums and reports.

BSTB and Transformation

In 2004, as part of the Army's organizational transformation, the BCTs were reorganized to become stand-alone combined arms organizations. As a result, cross-attachment of companies between battalions, common in divisional brigades, would no longer be required.¹ Moreover, the major combat and support capabilities a brigade needs for most operations are organic to its structure.² Therefore, BCTs would become more deployable, more versatile, and contribute more to the joint team than the organizations they replace.³ Moreover, the new BCT designs achieved three goals set by the Chief of Staff, Army:

1. Increase the number of available brigade-sized combat assets while keeping their combat effectiveness equal to or better than that of current divisional brigades.
2. Create smaller, standardized modules to meet the varied demands of regional combatant commanders and reduce joint planning and execution complexities.
3. Redesign brigades to perform as an integral part of the joint team. Make them more capable in their basic ground close combat role, able to benefit from support from other services and contribute more to other service partners.⁴

Overall, the new BCT offers several enhancements to increase tactical independence and strategic flexibility over the previous organizational design. These BCTs have improved command and control capabilities and organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistic subunits.⁵ Additionally, the BCT staff was also significantly enhanced to facilitate planning and coordination. Previously, brigades relied heavily on their higher headquarters' planning and coordination capabilities. However, many of these capabilities are now organic to the BCT headquarters.⁶

The Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) are the three standard BCT designs. The HBCT and IBCT have a BSTB within its organizational design. However, a SBCT currently does not have an authorized BSTB. The SBCT has separate companies that are placed under brigade control.⁷ At the time of transformational development, the Chief of Staff of the Army guidance was to look only at the HBCT and IBCT designs. Therefore, a SBCT redesign was not on the table. As a result, the BSTB concept was not explored nor even identified at that time.

The BSTB was developed to support the BCT with its organic assets and to provide command and control, administrative, and attached unit logistical support from within and outside of the BCT.⁸ It is organized to provide the BCT with command and control of the brigade's companies and smaller attachments that formerly operated under the direct supervision of the BCT. The BCT could expect to routinely receive a set of units for most missions. These units may include engineer forces, Air defense artillery (ADA) forces, a military police (MP) company, a civil affairs (CA) company, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) company, a chemical company or a psychological operations (PSYOPS) detachment.⁹ Furthermore, the BSTB provides the BCT with military intelligence (MI) support, communications, engineer (IBCT only), MP, and CBRN [Chemical, Biological, radiological and Nuclear] reconnaissance capabilities.¹⁰

Figure 1 depicts the organization structure of a BSTB organization. For the IBCT and HBCT, the BSTB is organized with a BSTB headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), the BCT HHC, a MI company, and a network support company (NSC). The BSTB of the HBCT has an engineer company while each of the combined arms battalions in the HBCT has an engineer company. The BSTB headquarters company has command and staff sections, an MP platoon, a CBRN reconnaissance platoon, a support platoon (with medical support, maintenance, fuel, and field feeding), and a security section. The sustainment assets in the headquarter company include maintenance, medical support, and petroleum, oil and lubricant sections.¹¹




Figure 1. The Brigade Special Troops Battalion Organization
Source: Department of the Army, FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2006), 2-1.

BSTB organizations are normally employed within its doctrinal responsibilities and assigned tasks as directed by the BCT. In order to support the BCT commander and staff, the BSTB has five primary responsibilities.¹² First, it ensures its organic units are properly trained and equipped to conduct their doctrinal missions. Secondly, it provides command and control, integrates, and supports company and smaller sized units attached to the BCT. Thirdly, it prepares all subordinate units for their missions, ensures their force protection, and provides administrative and sustainment support. Fourthly, it secures one or more of the BCT command posts. And lastly, on order, it conducts the rear area security mission—when adequately augmented.

Moreover, in order to support the BCT commander and staff, the BSTB performs additional tasks as dictated by the BCT commander. These are generally the missions that cross battalion boundaries and extend across the full reach of the brigade's area of operations. They include (but are certainly not limited to) the following:

1. Command and control of detainee operations.
2. Forward operating base (FOB) defense.
3. Route reconnaissance and clearance/assured mobility command and control.
4. Reconstruction headquarters and essential services project management.¹³

Furthermore, the BSTB could be asked to perform several other additional tasks in support of the BCT commander. These missions may include the following:

1. Non lethal effects and targeting.
2. Sensitive site exploitation.
3. Training of host nation units (for example, engineer, explosive ordinance detachment, MP).
4. Military intelligence operations
5. Signal operations.¹⁴

Through recommendations, suggestions, emerging insights, and field observations refinements were made to the initial BSTB design. As a result, the BSTB structure had been refined to now include a battalion staff capable of commanding and controlling its many subordinate units.¹⁵ In 2004, the US Army selected two Army divisions, the 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division, to establish the Army's first heavy and infantry BCTs, respectively. The 3rd Infantry Division was first to transform, establishing the first HBCT design.

During its initial transformational stage, HBCTs of the 3rd Infantry Division conducted their first simulated combat training exercise at the US Army's National Training Center (NTC). The NTC is a world class training center for America's Soldiers, known for its excellent desert training. As a result, their contributions provided the first

major recommendations to refine the HBCT initial BSTB design and influence the IBCT BSTB design. Most BCTs attend the NTC as part of the mission readiness training prior to their deployment in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

During the Army's NTC rotation 04-05, the 2nd HBCT conducted the first test of the BSTB under simulated combat conditions. During this exercise, conducted 29 March 2004 to 7 April 2004, two primary lessons were captured to enhance the BSTB design of the HBCT. These lessons suggested specific increases in personnel and equipment in order to improve protection, intelligence, sustainment, and command and control capability.

First, the current BSTB headquarters and selected subordinate company headquarters' organizational designs must be increased to accomplish their required emerging doctrinal tasks.¹⁶ Originally, the BSTB was an engineer battalion that was tasked to convert into the role of the BSTB. One recommendation was made to increase the size of the MP platoon to facilitate the BSTB's rear area security mission. Also, a recommendation was made to add an intelligence and electronic warfare capability within the MI Company. Additionally, a recommendation was made to provide the BSTB with a logistical, maintenance and life support capability.¹⁷ Moreover, other minor incremental Staff and headquarters refinements in the BSTB will better enable the BCT to accomplish its assigned mission.¹⁸ These recommendations were made to augment the BSTB staff in order to allow it to conduct continuous operations 24 hours a day.¹⁹

During NTC rotation 04-07, the 1st HBCT of the 3rd Infantry Division conducted the second simulated combat training exercise for a HBCT. Observations during NTC 04-07 (21 May – 19 June 2004), concluded that in addition to the recommendations

presented following rotation 04-05, the size of the BSTB staff was insufficient to accomplish basic staff functions.²⁰ Several factors contributed to the conclusion. First, the BSTB was operating with a shortage of 25 personnel and a mismatch of military occupational specialties. Additionally, the assigned 19 mechanics struggled to maintain 231 vehicles and equipment attached to the BSTB.²¹ Moreover, it suggested these command and control refinements [filled personnel shortages and properly matched military occupational specialties] will better enable the HBCT to accomplish its mission.²² Therefore, the BSTB staff would be sufficiently resourced to simultaneously plan and execute operations.

Command and Control of Army Forces

The essential task of commanders is applying the art and science of war to the command and control of Army forces. The commander's command and control system enables him to use his authority to accomplish the mission and see to the health and welfare of subordinates. Using his command and control system, the commander directs the actions of his forces and imposes his will on the enemy. Through command and control, the commander initiates the actions of, influences, and synchronizes the assets of combat power to impose his will on the situation and defeat the enemy.²³

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.²⁴ Through C2, commanders initiate and integrate all systems and warfighting functions toward mission accomplishment.²⁵ The main criterion of success for C2 is how it contributes to achieving that goal. Other criteria may include positioning the force for future operations and using resources effectively.²⁶ C2 is unique among the warfighting functions: while the other warfighting functions focus resources against the enemy or

environment, C2 focuses resources on integrating the activities of the other warfighting functions.²⁷ C2 accomplishes the following:

- Gives purpose and direction to military operations.
- Integrates the efforts of subordinate and supporting forces, causing separate activities to achieve coordinated effects.
- Determines force responsiveness and allocates resources.²⁸

Command and control has two components: the commander and the C2 system.²⁹

Through the exercise of command and control, it is the role of the commander to direct the organization toward the goal of mission accomplishment. The staff's primary function is to help the commander and subordinate commanders exercise control.³⁰ Additionally, commanders exercise command and control through a command and control system.³¹

Staffs are a major component of the C2 system. The C2 system supports the commander's ability to make informed decisions, delegate authority, and synchronize the warfighting functions.³² Moreover, an effective C2 system allows commanders to—

- Operate freely throughout the area of operations to exercise C2 from anywhere on the battlefield.
- Delegate authority to subordinate commanders and staff to allow decentralized execution of operations.
- Synchronize actions throughout the area of operations.
- Focus on critical actions instead of details.³³

The effective exercise of command and control allows the command to effectively exercise battle command in order to accomplish the mission within the higher commander's intent. Therefore, allowing the commander to focus command and control efforts on the “big picture” and synchronize resources through time, space and purpose. In which, the commander and staff operate together as a system.

Battle Command (visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess).

Battle command is the exercise of command in operation against a hostile, thinking opponent.³⁴ The commander's role of visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing is continuous and drives the operations process.³⁵ Commanders visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in terms of the warfighting functions.³⁶ The commander's role in exercising C2 involves accomplishing the following:

- Visualizing the environment.
- Describing their commander's visualization to subordinates.
- Directing actions to achieve results.
- Leading the command to accomplish the mission.³⁷

Commander's visualization is a way of mentally viewing the dynamic relationship among Army forces, enemy forces, and the environment at the present while conducting operations against an opposing force over time. It occurs until the end state of an operation is achieved. Commander's visualization is the key to combining the art of command with the science of control. It focuses on three main factors:

- Foreseeing an end state.
- Understanding the current state of friendly and enemy forces.
- Visualizing the dynamics of operations leading to the end state.³⁸

Commanders describe their commander's visualization through the commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander critical information requirements.³⁹ The commander's intent describes the commander's visualization in terms of the desired endstate; therefore, subordinates could exercise initiative when the commander's concept of operation no longer becomes applicable. Commanders develop planning guidance for the staff from their visualization.⁴⁰ Planning guidance states in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to employ the warfighting functions in the decisive

operation to accomplish the mission within the higher commander's intent. Planning guidance contains priorities for the warfighting functions. Commander's critical information requirements help to prioritize the relevant information that commander's need for decision making. Therefore, the staff could ensure the commander gets the information he needs to make timely and accurate decisions.

Commanders direct during all operations process activities.⁴¹ Commanders direct during planning by guiding staffs during the military decision making process (MDMP), preparing mission orders, and establishing control measures.⁴² During the preparation phase, commanders direct actions to effect any necessary plan revisions based on received information. Furthermore, during the execution phase, commanders direct adjustments to exploit opportunities and counter unforeseen enemy actions.⁴³ Throughout the operations process, commanders assess the situation and lead the organization to mission accomplishment. This allows the commander to continually monitor the situation, evaluate progress and make adjustment decisions as required to achieve the desired endstate.

Plan Integration Techniques

During the review of literature, three techniques were found that BSTB commanders and staffs may be able to use to enhance the development of integrated plans. Organizing along warfighting functions, establishing relevant meetings and establishing relevant working groups are all techniques that provide the focus required to integrate staff action. These techniques are usually used at a higher staff echelons. However, I feel they could be relevantly applied to the BSTB staff. Therefore, one must consider whether task organizing a BSTB staff into warfighting functional cells, the use

of meetings or the use of working groups could serve as an effective means to allow the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans.

The first technique was task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells, along warfighting functions, as a means to enhance the BSTB's capability to develop integrated plans. Command posts are the principal facilities commanders use to control operations.⁴⁴ The commander's staff provides the manning necessary to fill the cells that operate these command posts. These cells contain assets from various staff sections.⁴⁵ In a sense, they are combined arms staff components.⁴⁶ Commanders organize command posts to meet changing situations and the requirements of different operations. Command posts help commanders control operations by coordinating and synchronizing the warfighting functions.⁴⁷ Additionally, commanders use warfighting functions as a construct in their implementation of battle command. Therefore, organizing staff cells along warfighting functions may facilitate the development of integrated plans through unity of effort.

The second technique was the use of meetings as a means to allow the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Meetings (sometimes called huddles) are informal gatherings used to present and exchange information. Each is a control measure for regulating a specific action, process, or function.⁴⁸ Additionally, each forms a major part of a unit's battle rhythm. Moreover, each meeting or working group should be logically sequenced so that one group's outputs are available as another's inputs when needed.⁴⁹ Cell chiefs and staff section representatives hold meetings as needed to synchronize their activities.⁵⁰

And the third technique was the use of working groups as a means to allow the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Periodically or as

required, ad hoc groupings form to solve problems and coordinate actions. Some working groups may be thought of as ad hoc cells. Others are forums used to synchronize contributions of multiple cells to a process.⁵¹ The number of and subjects working groups addressed depend on the situation and echelon. Groups may gather daily, weekly, or monthly, depending on the subject, situation, and echelon.⁵² Typical working groups that meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for the following purposes or functions:

- Operations synchronization
- Plans
- Targeting
- Information operations
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
- Intelligence synchronization
- Protection
- Logistics synchronization
- Movements
- Civil-military operations
- Information management⁵³

Summary and Conclusions

In conclusion, this review of literature examined several key aspects associated with BSTB and transformation, command and control of Army forces, battle command and several plan integration techniques. As a result, valuable knowledge was consolidated on the BSTB and its command and control system. It also documented the evolution of this newly created military organization. Therefore, the related literature builds the foundation needed to identify areas in which BSTB staffs should focus their efforts to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. And lastly, the review of literature in these areas establishes the foundation for determining the research methodology in chapter 3 of this study.

¹US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Government Printing Office, 8 October 2004), 1-15.

²Department of the Army, FM 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2005), 4-7.

³US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Government Printing Office, 8 October 2004), 10-3.

⁴*Ibid.*, 6-1.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-2.

⁷Department of the Army, FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2006), 2-7.

⁸Department of the Army, FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1.

⁹*Ibid.*, 2-2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 2-1.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 2-1 and 2-2.

¹²*Ibid.*, 1-2.

¹³Thomas H. Magness, "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part I: All the Way In," *Engineer*, July-September 2006, 46.

¹⁴Thomas H. Magness, "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part II: Synergy," *Engineer*, October-December 2006, 5-6.

¹⁵Department of the Army, FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-1.

¹⁶US Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: National Training Center Rotation 04-05 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-2.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, A-1.

¹⁸Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁹Ibid., A-2.

²⁰U.S Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: National Training Center Rotation 04-07 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 10.

²¹Ibid., A-1.

²²Ibid., 2.

²³Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 1-1.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-7.

²⁶Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 1-1.

²⁷Ibid., 1-3.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-7.

³⁰Ibid., 2-1.

³¹Ibid., 1-16.

³²Ibid., 1-7.

³³Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 3-3 and 3-4.

³⁴Ibid., 4-24.

³⁵Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-5.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., 1-18.

³⁸Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 2-16.

³⁹Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 1-20.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 1-21.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 1-20.

⁴²Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 4-10.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 4-12.

⁴⁴Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 2-2.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 2-6.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 2-7.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 2-4.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 2-7.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 2-8.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 2-7.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 2-8.

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans in order to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. This Chapter will discuss the research methodology, instrumentation, field procedures, data processing and analysis process, methodical assumptions and methodical limitations of this study. Therefore, the formulation of this chapter provides the means to conduct thorough analysis of the primary and secondary research questions.

Research Methodology

The method of investigation will use a combination of published Army doctrine, published observations, and expert opinion. Secondary research data, primarily gathered from the review of related literature, will be used to answer tertiary questions that lead to answering the following secondary research questions: (1) what assigned tasks could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to plan, (2) what assets could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to incorporate into their plans and (3) how could BSTB commanders and staffs enhance the development of integrated plans? Primary research data will come from a questionnaire administered to a panel of BSTB experts, consisting of BSTB commanders, operations officers, executive officers and their observer/controller counterparts. The collected data, in association with the doctrine and published observations, will be used to answer tertiary and secondary questions. Based on this collected data and my experience as a BSTB observer/controller, analysis will be

conducted to suggest recommendations on how to integrate the specialized units within the BSTB to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent.

Instrumentation

Based on an analysis of each secondary question, a set of tertiary questions will be developed to determine how BSTB commanders and staffs could integrate their specialized units to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent. These questions were consolidated to develop a questionnaire to facilitate data collection. The data were consolidated to identify the assigned tasks BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to plan, which assets BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to incorporate into their plans and how BSTB commanders and staffs could enhance the development of integrated plans. Lastly, once all secondary questions have been answered, I will provide insight on how various BSTB organizations gained developmental knowledge to integrate its specialized unit's capabilities.

A questionnaire was developed to serve as the primary research tool of this study. In order to improve the rate of return on the questionnaires, the length of the questionnaire was limited to ten questions. The questionnaire was created using tertiary questions related to each of the three secondary questions. Additionally, four review methods were used to provide feedback on the content of the questionnaire. First, my thesis committee reviewed the questionnaire for content and clarity. Based on their feedback, questions were deleted or reworded to improve clarity and better support secondary research questions. Secondly, a small pilot study was conducted with the sixteen officers in my Intermediate Level Education staff group. A revised questionnaire was offered to them for review of understanding and clarity. Based on their feedback,

questions were reworded to improve clarity and understanding. And thirdly, a second revised questionnaire was given to the Command and General Staff College's quality assurance office and my thesis committee to check for reliability and validity. Based on their feedback questions were rephrased or restructured to increase reliability and validity, compared to answering tertiary and secondary research questions. Lastly, the Army Research Institute provided feedback to refine the effectiveness on the questionnaire. As a result, several questions were combined or deleted to prevent redundancy, instructions were added to increase clarity, some questions were restructured to avoid ambiguity and a question was provide to solicit any additional comments.

The survey results were used to gather first-hand feedback on what tasks BSTB units are performing, what assets BSTB units are controlling and what procedures BSTB commanders and staff feel will enhance development of integrated plans. Based on that feedback, I will present the collected results.

Field Procedures

The survey focused on BSTB commanders, executive officers, operations officers and their observer-controller counterparts. Based on the review of literature, I located an author that had written two articles on the BSTB. Via email correspondence, this author provided contact information on several BSTB commanders that he had interviewed for his articles. Since the BSTB community is small, these BSTB commanders were able to provide contact information on several other BSTB commanders, executive officers and operations officers. Using written communication through Army Knowledge Online email accounts, I contacted each person, explained the nature of this examination and invited them to participate in the research. Moreover, I informed them I would send them a questionnaire to

complete, once this instrument completed the approval process. Additionally, some BSTB commanders provided contact information on their executive and operations officers. As a result, I was able to build a sample population of 53 prospective participants once the survey was approved for distribution.

I individually distributed an electronic copy of the questionnaire to a target sample of 53 BSTB commanders, senior staff and senior observer controllers via electronic mail. Participants marked the appropriate response and attach the questionnaire in an electronic mail reply. I kept the electronic mail responses until the final project was completed.

Participants were sent a consent letter, attached with the electronic copy of the questionnaire, explaining the purpose of the study and two-week return deadline. Participants were notified that their participation is voluntary and their responses would remain confidential. Participants were advised that completed questionnaires sent via e-mail did not provide for anonymous return since the sender's email address and name were sent with the response. However, every effort would be taken to ensure that all information remained confidential.

Data Processing and Analysis Process

The researcher applied qualitative analysis to process the data. All submitted questionnaires were included in the final analysis of data. If participants skipped a question or marked more than one response, then no response was assigned to that question or included in the analysis. As a result, some questions had fewer total responses than others.

The overall responses to each of those sections were used to answer the question posed in the purpose of this study. Based on analysis of the information gathered in secondary questions one through three (tasks, assets and integration capabilities), I determined whether consistencies existed between the various BSTB organizations. Additionally, I determined the applicability of using warfighting functions, meetings and working groups to integrate BSTB planning activities. And lastly, additional open response questions were used to determine how the BSTB commander and staff could develop integrated plans.

Participant Background and Experience

The questionnaire focused on four main areas. The first main area will focus on each participant's background and experience. It specifically asked participants to provide their BSTB duty, HBCT or IBCT and recent combat experiences. This information was used to provide demographic data on the sample population.

Tasks

The second main area focused on the first secondary research question. It asked which assigned tasks should BSTB commanders and staffs expect to plan. Participants were asked to identify, from a list of potential tasks, the likelihood that each task would be assigned to a BSTB. Additionally, participants were asked to identify any other tasks, not in the prescribed list, that they felt the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT. The response to these questions provided a reference point for determining which capabilities the BSTB could provide for the BCT.

Assets

The third main area focused on the second secondary research question. It asked which assets BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to incorporate into their plans. Participants were asked to identify which nonorganic BSTB assets were typically attached to the BSTB. Additionally, participants were asked to identify which organic and attached BSTB assets are typically assigned under Brigade control. This information will provide feedback on the likely amount of control authorized to the BSTB over these assets.

Integrating Techniques

And the forth main area focused on the third secondary research question. It asked feedback to determine which techniques BSTB commanders and staffs could use to enhance the development of integrated plans. This secondary research question was subdivided into three tertiary questions. These questions focused on three specific areas which including BSTB organization along warfighting functions, BSTB-level meetings and BSTB working groups as techniques examined for enhancing the development of integrated plans.

The first tertiary question asked whether task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells, along warfighting functions, would enhance the BSTB's capability to develop integrated plans. Participants were asked whether they felt task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells (along warfighting functions: Intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protections, sustainment, and command and control) would enhance the BSTB's capability to develop integrated plans. Each participant was asked to respond either "yes" or "no", then explain their answer. Participants were asked to

identify and explain which two warfighting functions they felt provided the BSTB staff with the most valuable means to enhance the development of integrated plans. This information provided feedback on the level at which the BSTB could affect these warfighting functions.

The second tertiary question asked which BSTB-level meetings allowed the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Each participant was asked to identify and explain the two most useful BSTB-level meetings that allowed the BSTB staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. This information provided feedback on the linkage between meetings, warfighting functions and assigned BSTB tasks.

The third tertiary question asked which BSTB-level working groups allowed the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Participants were asked, based on BSTB staff size and workload, whether they felt establishing working groups would enhance the BSTB commander and staff's ability to enhance the development of integrated plans. Furthermore, participants were asked to identify the two most useful BSTB-level working groups that would allow the BSTB commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. The information provided feedback on the linkage between working groups, meetings, warfighting functions and assigned BSTB tasks.

Additional Comments

The fourth main area focused on providing each participant with the opportunity to provide additional comments. This information was used to clarify responses, address concerns and provide additional background and experience data. Although a wide

variety of information was provided in this area, I limited inclusion in the analysis chapter to that information only relevant to answering secondary and tertiary questions. This information could also be used to provide areas that may need further study.

Methodical Assumptions

The researcher made several assumptions concerning the methodology used in the project. First, participants truthfully and completely responded to each question. Secondly, participant responses were not biased from discussions about the questionnaire with other participants. And lastly, the questionnaire was a valid and reliable instrument. The questionnaire was sample tested for clarity and understanding. However, the questionnaire was not statistically tested for validity or reliability.

Methodical Limitations

Several limitations applied to the methodology of this project. First, since the BSTB is a newly created organization some participants had limited experience working with the organization. Secondly, due to the small population size and sample, analysis was limited to open response questions and general raw data for forced response questions. Thirdly, some collected data is subjective in nature because it is based on participant perceptions and not “statistical facts.” Lastly, demographic information was omitted from the survey to protect participant anonymity. As a result, demographic data was not available for analysis and comparison.

Summary and Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter discussed research methodology, instrumentation, field procedures, data collection and recording procedures, data processing and analysis

process, methodical assumptions and methodical limitations of the study. Therefore, it builds the foundation for a thorough analysis in chapter 4 to help determine (1) what tasks are typically assigned to BSTB organizations, (2) what assets does the BSTB typically control and (3) what techniques could BSTB commanders and staffs use to enhance the development of integrated plans? As a result, the collective results of this analysis will help determine how the BSTB could integrate its specialized units to accomplish the mission and meet the commander's intent.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans in order to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. This Chapter will discuss questionnaire participant background and experience, BSTB assigned tasks, BSTB additional capabilities, BSTB control of organic and nonorganic units, BSTB Task organization along warfighting functions, warfighting functions most valuable to the development of integrated BSTB plans, meetings as a means of enhancing the development of integrated BSTB plans, working groups as a means of enhancing the development of integrated BSTB plans and additional participant comments. This analysis was taken from a questionnaire that asked for input concerning BSTB staff integration. Fifty-three BSTB commanders, executive officer, operations officers and their observer/controller counterparts were invited to participate in this research. Of the 53 invited participants, 27 completed and returned the questionnaire.

Participant Background and Experience

The 27 participants in this study had a varying degree of BSTB experience. Seven of them had BSTB Observer/controller experience. Additionally, 12 were commanders, seven were executive officers and five were operations officers within BSTB organizations. Among these 27 participants, 14 reported having HBCT experience and nine reported having IBCT experience. As far as recent combat experience, 23 served in Operation Iraqi Freedom and one served in Operation Enduring Freedom.

BSTB Tasks

Potential BSTB Assigned Tasks

Participants were asked to identify, from a list of potential tasks, the likelihood that each task would be assigned to a BSTB organization. Figure 2 shows the percentage of very likely or likely responses compared to the percentage of unlikely or very unlikely responses to 14 potential BSTB tasks. Among the forced response list of tasks, only two tasks were considered overall unlikely to be assigned to a BSTB organization. Sixty-three percent of participants felt that operating a movement control cell was either an unlikely or very unlikely task to be assigned to a BSTB organization. Moreover, 81 percent of participants felt that operating a joint visitor's bureau was also an unlikely or very unlikely task to be assigned to a BSTB organization. On the other hand, 12 of the 14 potential BSTB tasks were considered to be likely assigned to a BSTB organization. Among these tasks, between 74 and 96 percent of total participants felt these 12 potential tasks were either very likely or likely missions for a BSTB organization. Therefore, BSTB staff could possibly expect to plan on executing any of these 12 tasks.




Figure 2. Potential BSTB Assigned Task

BSTB Additional Capabilities

Furthermore, participants were asked to identify any other tasks, not among tasks on the originally prescribed list, that they felt the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT. Responses to these questions fell into two categories. First, several comments were directed to the BSTB's general contribution to the BCT fight. And secondly, several comments were made on specific tasks that the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT.

Several respondents made comments on the general contributions that the BSTB provided to the BCT. According to one BSTB commander, "The key capability that the BSTB provides for the BCT commander is flexibility. . . . Given the proper resources, the BSTB could do nearly any mission." Another general comment suggested that a BSTB commander's background, experience and personal relationship with the BCT

commander was a decisive factor in the type missions assigned to a BSTB organization. Some of them [tasks] “depend on the background and experience of the commander and staff (for example--essential services).” When asked what other tasks the BSTB is capable of performing in support of the BCT, another BSTB commander responded it was personality dependent; “the relationship between the BCT commander and the BSTB commander will drive that.” A BSTB executive officer reinforced this observation responding, “Personalities, situation and individual capabilities drove the train on assigned roles and responsibilities in the BSTB. I don’t think any two BSTBs do things the same.”

Participants indicated six specific tasks that the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT. First, ten participants felt the BSTB had the capability of providing command and control of an assigned area of operations as a battle space owner. Over one-third (10 of 27) of the participants felt the BSTB was capable of performing as an additional maneuver battalion, responsible for operating in its own designated battle space. One BSTB commander mentioned, “During the first 90 days in Iraq, his battalion owned battle space where they conducted full spectrum operations ranging from raids, cordon and searches, working with the Iraq Army, special operations forces, civil military operations, tactical human intelligence collection and target development, and non standard CAS integration among other actions.” Another BSTB commander remarked, “If properly resourced, the BSTB can be a 4th maneuver asset for the BCT. The combined arms staff, organic logistics and maintenance, and BCT Staff linkages all make this feasible for the BCT Commander under METT-TC [Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time available, and Civil considerations] conditions.” Several participants

indicated that BSTB command and control of designated battle space should be conducted in a limited area of operations, compared to an infantry or armor battalion, or directed in a low threat area as an economy of force mission.

Secondly, eight participants specifically felt the BSTB had the capability to perform command and control of counter improvised explosive device (CIED) operations for the brigade. One BSTB commander had the mission of manning the CIED equipment to conduct route clearance throughout his brigade area. He also formed a CIED fusion cell in his intelligence section that was responsible for updating the brigade in all improvised explosive device (IED) developments and tracking in the brigade area of operations. In addition, his operations section synchronized the route clearance and CIED route sweeps. Furthermore, a BSTB operations officer suggested the formation of a CIED fusion cell, consisting of personnel from the BSTB's MI Company, to conduct deliberate collection and analysis, determine friendly / enemy techniques, tactics and procedures, identify networks and linkages.

Thirdly, three participants specifically felt the BSTB had the capability to perform command and control of EOD assets. A BSTB commander indicated, "Our BSTB had operational control of an EOD Company. The battalion tactical operations center managed all EOD requests and served as the C2 cell for the EOD teams. Additionally, we provided security for the 5 EOD teams within the EOD Company."

Fourthly, four participants felt the BSTB had the capability to perform command and control of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) within the BCT area of responsibility. One BSTB controlled its brigade's CA teams. Additionally, the same BSTB managed 50 million dollars of construction projects for the entire Brigade. Furthermore, this BSTB

provided all mission taskings, intelligence updates, life support, cross boundary coordination, and maintenance support to the teams.

Fifthly, three participants suggested the BSTB had the capability of conducting limited specialized training of coalition forces. In this instance, BSTB soldiers were used as subject matter experts to train their specialized skills to others. One BSTB organization was responsible for regularly training coalition force host MP, engineers and bomb disposal units within the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army.

And lastly, four participants suggested the BSTB had the capability of conducting non lethal targeting for the BCT. As one BSTB executive officer noted, “The BCT commander can look to the BSTB as the unit capable of managing entire lines of operations such as reconstruction, CA or non lethal fires.” During a deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), his battalion became the defacto non lethal battalion in the brigade. As a result, the BSTB leveraged all the combat support assets toward the execution of non lethal fires in support of integrated BCT targeting plan. Moreover, he acknowledged the C2 challenge became coordination across the entire BCT area of responsibility and synchronization with terrain owning maneuver commander.

BSTB Asset Control

As mentioned in the additional comments of two BSTB commanders, the amount of assets placed under the BSTB control varied significantly between BSTB organizations. One commander described the vast amount of assets placed under his control. “During OIF 05-07, I controlled the majority of assets you listed below: engineer company, MI company (organic), NSC (organic), MP and CBRN platoons (organic), CA companies, PSYOPS detachments, Air Force EOD teams, military working dog teams,

etc.” On the other hand, another BSTB commander described the limited amount of assets placed under his predecessor’s control. “I replaced a battalion [BSTB] commander who had the battalion chopped up by his BCT Commander during his last OIF rotation, in effect not allowing the BSTB to function as a battalion. I have convinced the current BCT Commander to keep us intact as a battalion and we will deploy into the next OIF rotation as a battalion--a big victory.”

BSTB Control of Organic Assets

Participants were asked to indicate the perceived likelihood that several specified organic BSTB assets would be placed under brigade control. The data (see figure 3) suggested that 59 percent of respondents perceived it as likely or very likely that the BSTB MP Platoon would be placed under Brigade Control. Conversely, the data suggested that the BSTB Engineer Company, MI Company and NSC and the CBRN Platoon were likely to be placed under Brigade Control. Overall, either 38 or 42 percent of respondents each felt a likely or very likely possibility existed that these assets would be placed under Brigade Control.




Figure 3. BSTB Organic Assets Under Brigade Control

BSTB Control of Nonorganic Elements

Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the perceived likelihood that several specified nonorganic BSTB assets would be placed under brigade control. According to the data shown in figure 4, a majority of respondent felt that all of the specified nonorganic BSTB assets were likely to be placed under brigade control. Moreover, at least a 69 percent of participants felt Civil Affairs assets, psychological operations assets, public affairs assets, explosive ordinance detachments, a military police company and a nonorganic engineer company were either likely or very likely to be place under brigade control. Additionally, a slight majority, between 54 and 58 percent of participants felt ADA assets, infantry companies and armor companies were either likely or very likely to be place under brigade control.




Figure 4. BSTB Nonorganic Elements under Brigade Control

Integrating Techniques

BSTB Task Organization along Warfighting Functions

Participants were asked, “whether task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells, along warfighting functions, enhances the BSTB’s capability to develop integrated plans?” In response to this question, 67 percent answered “no,” suggesting that BSTB staffs not task organize into functional cells. On the other hand, 33 percent answered “yes,” indicating some agreement with task organizing the BSTB staff along warfighting functions. Interestingly 10 participants mentioned personnel shortages in reference to task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells along warfighting functions. Three used personnel shortages as a justification in favor of this task organization. However, on the other hand, seven participants used personnel shortages to justify opposing of task organization along warfighting functions.

Several significant comments were made to support task organizing the BSTB staff along warfighting functions. As one BSTB commander noted, “Given the current structure of the Battalion, the organization is short of both manpower and functional experts in those areas.” As another BSTB commander mentioned, “The value in the BSTB is the ability to adapt the staff into what is needed to accomplish the specific mission. In Iraq, I reorganized my tactical operations center into a reconstruction cell (including my S3 and all the officers in the S3 shop) and an operations/intelligence and personnel/sustainment cell.”

Conversely several significant comments were made that opposed task organizing the BSTB staff along warfighting functions. The most frequent responses that explained this decision were the small size and limited depth of the BSTB staff. One BSTB commander summarized this argument in the following statement. “Given my split based operations and small staff, it’s about all I can do to manage 24 hour operations with my given missions and manning while organized along traditional staff lines.” One participant, who has both BSTB executive and operations officer experience, suggests that the BSTB commander will determine the BSTB staff’s task organization. According to him, “The commander will organize his staff based on the mission set he is assigned.” Another BSTB commander indicated that he trusts the experience of his executive officer and operations officer to focus his staff on the requisite warfighting functions required to accomplish the mission. He said, “I relied heavily on my majors to organize MDMP and Staff actions to facilitate the warfighting functions on an as needed basis.”

Use of Warfighting Functions to Integrate BSTB Plans

Participants were asked to identify which two warfighting functions they felt provided the BSTB staff with the most valuable means to enhance the development of integrated plans. Although all of the warfighting functions have to be taken into account, the intent of this question was to identify whether the BSTB was perceived as better suited to influence any specific warfighting functions. Among the participants that provided feedback in this area, intelligence, command and control and movement and maneuver were the three most selected warfighting functions (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Value of Warfighting Functions to Integrate BSTB Plan

The intelligence warfighting function was most commonly named as the most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans. Fourteen participants felt it was among the two most valuable warfighting functions to the development of integrated BSTB plans. One BSTB executive officer's commented,

“intelligence drives maneuver,” suggesting the significant influence of the intelligence warfighting function. Additionally, the capabilities of the MI Company have a considerable impact on the integration of the intelligence warfighting function. One BSTB commander mentioned that MI assets within the BSTB provide the BCT with invaluable information for planning the fight. Moreover, a former BSTB executive officer and operations officer mentioned “this company provides nearly all of the BCT Commander’s ISR capabilities and plays an integral role in developing and managing the BCT’s collection and targeting effort.”

The command and control warfighting function received the second most mentions as most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans. Thirteen participants felt it was among the two most valuable warfighting functions to the development of integrated BSTB plans. One BSTB operations officer referred to one purpose for developing the BSTB organization into the Army’s new modular BCT, stating command and control is the primary responsibility of the BSTB. According to one BSTB commander, “the [BSTB] command group provides the brigade commander with a command and control capability for whatever critical mission is un-resourced.” Furthermore, according to a BSTB operations officer, “With multiple disparate companies, each with its own mission/task, command and control integrates them into the overall plan.”

The movement and maneuver warfighting function was perceived the third most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans. Seven participants felt it was among the two most valuable warfighting functions to the development of integrated BSTB plans. “A BSTB executive officer indicated that

movement and maneuver was also important because of “the different unit’s battle space you will encounter on a single mission.” Therefore, the BSTB staff must coordinate with other battalions within the BCT to integrate the movement of its subordinate assets. A BSTB commander cited the large number of engineers in his BSTB staff and ownership of the only engineer unit in the BCT as reasons why movement and maneuver contributed to the development of integrated BSTB plans within his BCT. As he explained, “our BSTB staff is still somewhat ‘engineer heavy’. The BSTB Commander and executive officer are both engineer officers and we have the IBCT’s only engineer unit. The brigade looks to us for input and analysis primarily on movement and maneuver functions.”

Fire support, protection and sustainment warfighting functions were not among those most often named as most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans. Only one participant felt fire support was among the two most valuable warfighting functions. This participant felt the lethal and non lethal effect components specifically contributed to the development of BSTB plans within this function. On the other hand, two participants felt the protection warfighting function was among the two most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans. Force Protection for organic patrols, facilities for Coalition and Host Nation Forces as well as key (strategic and operational) infrastructure. Although none of the participants selected the sustainment warfighting function among the most valuable toward contributing to the development of integrated BSTB plans, other comments suggested that sustainment was an implied task that was understood to be an inherent function within the BSTB’s mission.

Use of Meetings to Integrate BSTB Plans

Participants were asked to identify the two most useful BSTB-level meetings which allowed the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Several respondents provided a general response that indicated these meeting would depend on the missions assigned within the BSTB. Figure 6 indicates the type of meetings that participants felt were most useful to enhancing the development of integrated plans and the number of participants that selected each meeting among their two most important meetings.




Figure 6. Meetings That Integrate BSTB Plans

Participants were given the opportunity to comment on their two most useful BSTB-level meetings which allowed the commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Several respondents provided a general response that

indicated the value of these meetings would depend on the missions assigned within the BSTB. Figure 6 indicates the fifteen meetings that participants selected as most useful for enhancing integration. The commander's update briefings, targeting meetings, CIED meetings and planning meetings were the four most important meetings within the BSTB organization. These responses could be grouped according to three target audiences. Among the BSTB organizations, meetings were used to exchange information among the staff, commanders and staff or functional cells. Meetings appear to be an important medium of exchanging information within the BSTB. The According to a BSTB operations officer, "Morning staff huddles and daily commanders update briefs were the only time we had to get everyone together." Therefore, meetings must be carefully planned and managed to maximize productivity and availability of personnel.

In order for the BSTB staff to exchange information, participants felt that shift change briefings and planning meetings were the most important meetings. One BSTB commander stated that his primary meeting was the shift change briefings which they conduct twice a day. Another BSTB commander commented, "Shift change briefs are essential and must include the entire staff (not just the TOC [tactical operations center] crew!) because everyone needs situational awareness before beginning their duty day/cycle." In order to integrate plans, select BSTB staff members formed to create planning meetings. Some BSTB staffs used pre-mission planning huddles so the operations officer and executive officer could receive the commander's guidance and then we could focus the staff without going down the wrong path. Additionally, some BSTB staffs used a hasty form of the MDMP to conduct mission and course of action analysis to develop integrated plans. One BSTB executive officer remarked that the

MDMP process works well, but you have to tailor it to your staff and commander. After training the staff on the proper steps of MDMP and what they mean to each member of the staff, it becomes easy to abbreviate the process based on time available and the understanding of the process. Mission analysis and wargaming [doctrinally referred to as course of action analysis] were always the two most useful steps for the staff in order to develop integrated plans.

Moreover, in order for commander and staff to exchange information, participants felt that the command and staff meeting, commander's update briefings and operations and intelligence briefings were among the most important meetings. Command and staff meetings integrated all the functions into one meeting, thereby enhancing situational awareness across the formation. In reference to the commander's update, one BSTB Commander presented the agenda of his daily commander's update. "We ran one at 1630 daily for about 30 minutes in duration," he explained. This provided a look at enemy activity last 24 hours, expected enemy activity, next 24-48 for BSTB and brigade operations. And lastly, one BSTB commander identified his battalion level operations and intelligence brief as a means of providing the essential commonality, synergy and feedback from subordinate commanders on staff product effectiveness. He said, "The focus of this meeting must constantly answer whether the staff is enabling or hindering the process."

Furthermore, in order for functional cells to exchange information, participants felt that coordination and synchronization meetings were the most important meetings. One BSTB commander felt their effects coordination meeting was the most important meeting because it combined both lethal and non lethal capabilities. He was directly

involved in coordinating CA, reconstruction, PSYOPS, and many other brigade level coordination efforts. Additionally, a former BSTB operations and executive officer regarded their effects working group meeting as the most important since it involved key players on the brigade staff and the battalion operations officers. Furthermore, he suggests this type of meeting could be applied to reconstruction and essential service integration. In this case, it could involve project managers, US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) representatives, provincial reconstruction team representatives, and CA representatives.

Use of Working Groups to Integrate BSTB Plans

Participants were asked, based on BSTB staff size and workload, whether they felt establishing working groups would enhance the BSTB commander and staff's ability to develop integrated plans. The responses to the question were fairly balanced between "yes" and "no." Ten participants answered "yes." On the other hand, 11 answered "no," to this question.

Several significant comments were made to support establishing working groups as a means to enhance the BSTB commander and staff's ability to develop integrated plans. Three comments suggested guidelines for conducting working groups. First, as one BSTB executive officer said, "It's always going to be mission dependent." Secondly, according to a BSTB operations officer, "We [BSTBs] do conduct working groups as needed." And lastly, as one BSTB commander commented, "The BSTB working groups [should] parallel the Brigade working groups."

Several BSTB commanders felt working groups were an important factor for developing integrated plans. According to one BSTB commander, "this is a must do to

have functional level meetings to coordinate on a regular basis the missions of the various BSTB capabilities. Because the BSTB often provides capabilities across the Brigade area of operations, these meetings involved various battle space owners, brigade staff sections etc.” In addition, another BSTB commander responded, “Definitely! Since the staff is small quick working groups can help work out issues that don’t require a full blown out meeting or planning cell to create a plan for re-occurring operations.”

Conversely several significant comments were made in opposition to establishing working groups as a means to enhance the BSTB commander and staff’s ability to enhance the development of integrated plans. First, the BCT level is the right place for these functions. According to one BSTB observer/controller, “These staff functions occur at the BCT level and the BSTB should participate there.” A BSTB commander provides an excellent example as to how the BSTB contributes to the execution of BCT working groups. “I chair the BCT IED Defeat and Projects Working Groups. The art is integrating your staff functions (capabilities) into this process as vital players/enablers as well as leveraging the special staff capabilities found only at BCT Level. Where we have made a lot of money is having additional huddles prior to BCT level working groups to allow smaller groups to focus on specific problem areas to make recommendations for employment of systems, troops, etc to mitigate a potential risk.”

Secondly, the BSTB staff does not have the depth to establish working groups internally. According to a BSTB executive officer, “I work directly with our S2 [intelligence officer] and his limited staff to drive CIED intelligence functions. The S3 [operations officer] utilizes our liaison officer and plans officer to flush information out of BCT headquarters and develop plans at battalion level. As the executive officer, I

move between the S4 [logistics officer] and S1 [personnel officer] shops to work out the personnel and logistical issues for the battalion.”

And thirdly, similar to the comments in justification for BSTB working groups, several participants indicated that they would form ad hoc working groups as necessary. According to one BSTB commander, “I would establish a ‘Tiger team’ when we had a critical function [on call] -- but would not considering an established team in place.”

Furthermore, participants were asked to identify the two most useful BSTB-level working groups that would allow the BSTB commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans. Working groups met to coordinate and provide recommendations for four particular functions. According to their comments, threat, project coordination cell, CIED and non lethal effects working groups had significantly contributed to the development of integrated plans. In several cases, the BSTB was the proponent for several brigade-level working groups and select BCT staff and representatives collaborated in the effort to contribute to the BCT fight.

First, threat analysis was one area in which working groups were used to coordinate and provide recommendations to the BSTB and BCT commanders. One BSTB commander explained his organization’s role in threat analysis for the BCT. “We’ve had good effects with taking the lead on a Brigade “threat working group”. This started off as a CIED working group, but became a great way to integrate threat analysis (IED, indirect fire, direct action cells, etc.) across all the brigade assets and feed into the targeting process for the brigade.”

Secondly, essential services were another area in which working groups were used to coordinate efforts and provide recommendations to the BSTB and BCT

commanders. According to one BSTB executive officer, “One example where we used a working group was with the project coordination cell.” This working group consisted of a robust group of representatives from all task force CA cells, BCT CA cell, BCT information operations cell, USACE, provincial reconstruction teams, Iraqi security forces, the BCT Surgeon and the project coordination cell in order to synchronize reconstruction efforts throughout the BCT area of operations. According to one BSTB operations officer, “We were the lead agent for the BCT essential services coordination effort.” As a result, they formed a project coordination group with selected BSTB staff, CA representatives, USACE Representatives, and other non lethal operators, to include the BCT information operations officer and BCT public affairs officer.

Thirdly, assured mobility was also another area which working groups were used to coordinate efforts and provide recommendations to the BSTB and BCT commanders. According to one BSTB commander’s comments, “We are currently chairing the BCT CIED working group. With Soldiers on the ground executing route clearance and embedded intelligence assets, we can bring to bear the best actionable picture for the BCT.” Moreover, a BSTB executive officer from a different organization provided similar comments that supported the previous BSTB commander’s comments. “Our unit led a BCT CIED Working Group that met once every two weeks to discuss CIED targeting across the spectrum of capabilities and through the assets of Assured Mobility. It included representatives from the BCT communication officer, BCT intelligence officer, BCT electronic warfare officer, and leaders from other engineer units within the BCT. This effort synchronized CIED efforts and disseminated the latest enemy and friendly techniques, tactics and procedures.”

And lastly, non lethal effects were an area in which working groups were used to coordinate effects and provide recommendations to the BSTB and BCT commanders. According a BSTB commander, “outside of the normal battle rhythm, non lethal effects working groups and consequence management working groups are required to do a sanity check or to respond to an incident.” Based on multiple comments that indicated varied integration of additional BCT assets, such CA, PSYOPS and public affairs, the BSTB has the capability to synchronize the efforts of these assets toward achieving the BCT commander’s intent.

Additional Participant Comments

Participants were given the opportunity to provide additional comments that they had concerning the BSTB. Among these offered comments, interesting viewpoints were provided that help understand the BSTB varying tasks and integration with the BCT. Understanding these viewpoints will help BSTBs develop capacity over time through the development of systems and processes that are capably managed at the mid to lower levels of the organization.

First, BSTB tasks varied greatly among participant feedback concerning the actual tasks assigned to their respective organization. One BSTB commander captured the essence of its assigned tasks within the BCT fight with the following comment. “I would offer that no single BSTB in Iraq during my time there was employed in the same way. Every brigade chose to employ them differently. That is the power of the organization, and frankly the challenge of the commander and his staff.” Furthermore, another BSTB commander discussed the importance of the BCT commander in the BSTB’s assigned tasks. “The role of the BSTB and its commander is up to the desires of

the BCT Commander and is very much influenced by the background and experience of the BSTB Commander and his staff.” Another commander indicated an emphasis was placed on individual attributes and competencies to determine the assigned tasks of the BSTB. “So much of this has been based on the personalities and talents of individual staff leads as we have tailored the battalion for counter insurgency operations here in Iraq.”

Furthermore, several suggestions were offered to deal with challenges associated with BSTB integration. According to a BSTB commander, “Defining good mission sets and encouraging the boss to let us [the BSTB] demonstrate our capabilities are a constant challenge in integration and education.” Moreover, according to a BSTB observer/controller, “Integration into the BCT processes is the answer. Additionally, a supportable targeting process and battle rhythm at the BSTB and BCT level will facilitate integrated planning.”

A BSTB observer/controller offered an observation on the issue of BSTB integration and offered a recommended solution. He observed that in some cases, the separate units integrated individually and directly with their staff proponents, resulting in taskings going directly from a BCT staff officer to a BSTB company commander. Therefore, he believed the answer to developing BSTB integration lay in creation of a BSTB planning team, headed by the operation officer that integrates BSTB functions at the BCT level.

Summary and Conclusion

In conclusion, an analysis of typical BSTB assigned tasks, additional capabilities, and control of organic and non organic units identified how BCT commanders visualized the employment of their BSTB organizations. Once required missions were identified to

achieve this visualization, the BSTB used warfighting functions, meetings and working groups as a means of enhancing the development of integrated BSTB plans to meet the BCT commander's intent. As a result, conclusion and recommendations could be drawn to assist the BSTB with the development of integrated plans that are also integrated with the BCT.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify how BSTB commanders and staffs could develop integrated plans in order to help their commander exercise control over its specialized units. This chapter is organized to present a brief summary of the findings in chapter 4, an interpretation of these findings, recommendations and a summary and conclusion. The analysis in chapter 4 sought to answer three secondary questions. First, what assigned tasks could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to plan? Secondly, what assets could BSTB commanders and staffs expect to incorporate into their plans? And lastly, what techniques could BSTB commanders and staffs use to enhance the development of integrated plans?

Summary of the Findings in Chapter 4

BSTB Tasks and Capabilities

BSTB commanders and staffs should expect to plan a variety of tasks in support of the BCT because brigade commanders chose to employ them differently. In addition, BSTB integration must be linked to BCT integration processes. Furthermore, flexibility was a key capability that the BSTB provided the BCT commander. Given the proper resources, the BSTB could perform a myriad of missions. Moreover, a BSTB commander's background, experience and personal relationship with the BCT commander were a decisive factor in the type missions assigned to a BSTB organization.

The BSTB staff could expect to plan the following assigned tasks: FOB mayor, C2 of detention operations, convoy escort, route reconnaissance, non lethal effects, restoration of essential services, FOB defense, security of a BCT C2 node, sensitive site exploitation, training of host nation forces, military intelligence operations and signal operations. This data gave relevance to the additional BSTB tasks identified in Colonel Magness' article, "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part I: All the Way In," *Engineer Magazine*, dated July-September 2006. Moreover, participants indicated six additional tasks that the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT. Therefore, BCT and BSTB commanders should carefully consider the possibility of their BSTB performing any of the following six tasks:

1. C2 an assigned area of operations as a battle space owner
2. C2 CIED operations for the brigade
3. C2 EOD assets
4. C2 CMO within the BCT area of responsibility
5. Conducting limited specialized training of coalition forces
6. Conducting non lethal targeting for the BCT

BSTB Asset Control

BSTB commanders and staffs could expect to maintain control of their organic assets. It was perceived that the BSTB MP Platoon would likely be placed under Brigade Control. However, the BSTB Engineer Company, MI Company and NSC and the CBRN Platoon were unlikely to be placed under Brigade Control.

On the other hand, BSTB commanders and staffs could expect nonorganic assets to be placed under brigade control. According to the data previously shown in figure 4, a

majority of respondent felt that all of the specified nonorganic BSTB assets were likely to be placed under brigade control. At least a 2/3 majority of participants felt Civil Affairs assets, psychological operations assets, public affairs assets, explosive ordinance detachments, a military police company and a nonorganic engineer company were likely to be place under brigade control.

Based on the varied amount of assets placed under BSTB control, along with the various tasks assigned to it, BSTB commanders and staffs must be prepared to incorporate both organic and nonorganic units into their plans. As a result, the BSTB must have a reception and integration plan to integrate non organic assets in the organization.

Integrating Techniques

BSTB commanders and staffs focused on warfighting functions, meetings and working groups to enhance the development of integrated plans. Two-thirds of participants felt that task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells, along warfighting functions, would not enhance the BSTB's capability to develop integrated plans. Although a majority of participants felt formal task organization along warfighting functions did not enhance integration, informal task organization may have provided temporary enhancement of BSTB integration. Three warfighting functions were deemed valuable to the development of integrated BSTB plans, giving credence to their impact on integration. According the participant responses, intelligence, command and control and movement and maneuver were perceived the most valuable toward development of integrated BSTB plans. Based on staff size and workload, BSTB organizations could

develop informal working groups as a mean of integrating one ore more of these warfighting functions.

Furthermore, participant feedback suggested that meetings were an effective means of enhancing the development of integrated BSTB plans. The commander's update briefings, targeting synchronization meetings, CIED meetings and planning meetings were the four most important meetings within the BSTB organization. Among all the identified meetings, they could be grouped according to three target audiences. Within BSTB organizations, meetings were used to exchange information among the staff, commanders and staff or functional cells. Meetings appear to be an important medium of exchanging information within the BSTB. Among the BSTB organizations, meetings were used to exchange information among the staff, commanders and staff or functional cells.

Moreover, participant feedback suggested that working groups were an effective means of enhancing the development of integrated BSTB plans. An analysis of participant feedback suggested that BSTB staff members served on working groups that provided recommendations on threat analysis, essential services, assured mobility and non lethal effects. The BSTB staff's involvement in these working groups played a vital role in the success of BCT efforts in these four areas. Moreover, participants were equally divided as to whether establishing working groups would enhance the BSTB commander and staff's ability to enhance the development of integrated plans. Comments suggested that working groups were mission dependent, conducted as needed, and should parallel the Brigade working groups. As a result, the most effective BSTB working groups were those in which the BSTB had the lead responsibility for execution of the corresponding

BCT working group. These working groups provided true integration between the BSTB and BCT, allowing members of the BSTB staff, BCT enablers and BCT staff to focus their efforts within the BCT commander's intent. Additionally, select working groups could be developed as a means for the staff to temporarily concentrate on all warfighting functions or select critical functions, as determined by the commander, allowing the organization to see itself in these particular areas.

Therefore, all required meetings and working groups should be included in the unit's battle rhythm. Furthermore, unit standing operating procedures should address the purpose, frequency, composition (chair and attendees), inputs and expected outputs and agenda of these meetings and work groups.¹ The commander should approve the scheduling of these activities. Additionally, the executive officer should provide a recommended battle rhythm that incorporates all desired meetings and working groups into the unit's regular activities. This recommendation must be integrated with the BCT battle rhythm to avoid conflicts and synchronize activities.

Interpretation of Findings Described in Chapter 4

Based on an interpretation of the findings, I have concluded several factors impact the assigned functions of the BSTB. First, since these functions varied significantly between respective organizations, they must be carefully defined within each organization and used as a foundation for building integration throughout the organization. Moreover, these functions need to be prioritized in order to help the BSTB commander and staff focus training and allocate resources. Secondly, the BCT commander determines the assigned tasks of the BSTB within that BCT organization and the command and support relationship established to perform these roles. Consequently,

the BCT commander must provide his BSTB commander with guidance that directs the employment and integration of the BSTB within his intent. This guidance will help define which functions the BSTB will be required to perform for the BCT and assist with the prioritization of BSTB staff and subordinate unit training. Moreover, the BSTB commander's intent must be nested into the BCT commander's intent for true integration to occur. Nesting will facilitate the development of BSTB techniques, tactics and procedures that enable it to integrate its operations with those of other BCT battalions and the BCT staff.

During the analysis, I encountered two unexpected findings. First, I expected most BSTB organizations would have performed a group of related tasks that could be generalized under specific warfighting functions. However, in some cases, some of the tasks appeared to be more complexly integrated, related to the achievement of a specific line of operations. For example, the BSTB integrated its CMO activities and non lethal targeting to achieve the line of operations for restoration of essential services. Moreover, the task of training host nation forces is related to the line of operations that transitions control to host nation forces.

Secondly, I thought the BSTB commander played a more significant role in determining its employment in support of the BCT. I expected recommendations on BSTB employment to be generated from the BSTB commander and forwarded to the BCT commander for refinement and approval. However, it appeared that BSTB employment was directed from the BCT commander to the BSTB commander based on how the BCT commander perceived the required functions of the BSTB. Therefore, the BCT commander played a more dominant role in directing the employment of the BSTB

than I expected. As a result, the BCT commander's guidance becomes a critical aspect of how the unit could expect to be employed within a given theater of operations.

Recommendations

Further Study

I recommend further study in two specific areas. First, further study needs to be conducted to develop a basic BSTB staff training plan. This training plan should identify basic functions and system required to perform C2 using the Army's operations process; plan, prepare, execute and assess. This training plan will establish a foundation and point of reference for new BSTB staffs. In addition, once the BSTB commander receives more specific guidance from the BSTB commander, critical tasks, duties and responsibilities, leader tasks, applicable battle drills and functions could be added to the basic training plan.

Secondly, further study needs to be conducted to identify a career path for future BSTB commanders in order to build the necessary skills required to make them subject matter experts on the capabilities and employment of the BSTB organization. This career path should groom future BSTB commanders through continued assignments with the BSTB organization. Future BSTB commander should be assigned to fill a progressive variety of duty positions within BSTB organization. These assignments should include platoon leader, BSTB staff, company command and battalion executive or operations officer.

For Action

In order for the BSTB commander to develop integrated plans, I recommend that action be taken in two areas. The first action is that several revisions need to be made to the current BSTB field manual (FM) 3-90.61, *The Brigade Troops Battalion Operations*, December 2006. These revisions to FM 3-90.61 will provide an expanded knowledge base that future units could reference that contains current lessons learned. The second action is that each commander should implement a top driven, battle focused approach that embraces integration throughout the organizational training cycle. This approach begins with the implementation of the commander's vision for training, and then combines a seven-step model for systems planning. It will allow each organization to build integration early in the training process and assist with the prioritization of resources and training objectives.

Revision to FM 3-90.61, *The Brigade Troops Battalion Operations*

I recommend that FM 3-90.61 be revised to more closely address BSTB employment in stability operations. These changes could be made as revision to the respective chapter or include an Annex that discusses the contemporary operational environment that today's US Army faces. Chapter 4 of the current FM 3-90.61 addresses the BSTB operations within the rear area of a linear battlefield. However, based the current situation in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, US forces are operating within a nonlinear, noncontiguous environment that does not consist of traditional rear area. Moreover, since US Army forces are likely to continue operating in this type of environment, this area needs to be addressed in the future BSTB FM 3-90.61.

Additionally, FM 3-90.61 needs to account for the missions the BSTB organizations are actually performing in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The primary responsibilities of the BSTB, listed on page 1-1 of FM 3-90.61, needs to be adjusted to include an additional responsibility that includes the following statement: “performs additional tasks as directed by the commander.” This annotation will reinforce the role that the commander plays in determining the varying degree of tasks being assigned to this organization. Additionally, the tasks which BSTB staff could expect to plan and the six additional tasks that the BSTB was capable of performing in support of the BCT should be included in a revised FM 3-90.61. Therefore, the next revision of FM 3-90.61 should include these tasks as a point of reference for future BSTB leadership to train and prioritize resources in preparation for future stability operations against a counterinsurgency.

Implementing a Systems Planning Approach to BSTB Training and Integration

In order for the BSTB commander to develop integrated plans, the second action I recommend is that the BSTB commander must seek the BCT commander’s guidance on how the BCT commander envisions utilizing the BSTB. Figure 7 shows how the BSTB training vision is translated into the seven-step model for systems planning (intent, goals, objectives, tasks, priorities, prepare and follow-up) in order to achieve the BSTB training endstate. Additionally, figure 7 depicts that the BSTB training vision is nested within the BCT training vision and BSTB training endstate is nested with the BCT training endstate. Moreover, figure 7 illustrates that prepare and follow up are continuous processes that occur from training vision to training endstate. This process develops a system that trains the BSTB staff to integrate its activities with those activities of the BCT staff.




Figure 7. Building Integration Into a BSTB Training Plan

First, the BCT and BSTB commanders should develop and communicate a clear training vision. The BSTB commander's training vision must be nested with the BCT commander's training vision. Nesting these visions will allow the BSTB and BCT staffs to integrate their combined efforts. The senior leader's training vision provides the direction purpose, and motivation necessary to prepare individuals and organization to win in battle. It is based on a comprehensive understanding of the following:

- Mission, doctrine, and history.
- Enemy/threat capabilities.
- Operational environment.
- Organizational and personnel strengths and weaknesses.
- Training environment.²

Secondly, each commander should implement a seven step model for systems planning and preparing in order to implement their training vision throughout the

organization. This process includes establishing the intent, setting goals, determining objectives, determining tasks, establishing priorities, preparation and follow up.³ The first step, the organizational leader's intent, should be announced at the earliest practicable time after it has been formulated so the staff and subordinate commanders can have maximum time to plan.⁴ Furthermore, the intent will provide a common reference point for everyone within the organization.

The second step involves setting goals for the BSTB. Once intent is established, with the help of his team of subordinate leaders and staffs, the BSTB commander sets specific goals for the organization. Goals frame the organizational leader's intent.⁵ The BSTB commander must ensure that goals are realistic and support the goals of the BCT commander.

In the third step, the BSTB commander must establish objectives that are specific and measurable.⁶ Establishing objectives is difficult because the process requires making precise calls from a wide variety of options. Therefore, potential lines of operations such as restoration of essential services or training of host nations may be used as a guide for selecting BSTB organizational objectives.

The fourth step involves determining the measurable, concrete steps that must be taken on the way to the objective.⁷ I would recommend that commander's consider whether any of the 12 potential BSTB tasks or the six additional BSTB tasks, identified in the BSTB tasks and capabilities subheading of chapter 5, are relevant objectives.

The fifth step is to establish a priority for the tasks. This crucial step lets subordinates know how to spend one of the most critical resources: time.⁸ In order to maximize available time, the BCT and BSTB staffs need to develop and incorporate

techniques that facilitate the employment of multi-echelon training, parallel planning and collaborative planning activities. Moreover, these activities should be exercised at every training opportunity.

The fifth step is to prepare. The eight step training execution model provides a practical template for leaders to plan and prepare collective training. The eight steps are 1) plan the training, 2) train and certify the leader, 3) reconnoiter the site, 4) issue the plan, 5) rehearse, 6) execute, 7) conduct the after action review and 8) retrain.⁹ BSTB organizations should use this model to facilitate training.

The seventh step involves conducting follow up. Follow up validates the priorities and demonstrates that the leader is serious about seeing the mission completed.¹⁰

Assessment is an additional tool for leaders to conduct follow up. Assessing consists of two tasks:

- Monitoring the current situation and operation's progress.
- Evaluating operations against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.¹¹

Throughout the training cycle after action reviews can be used as a means of providing feedback through formal or informal assessments. Additionally, the BCT should use their mission readiness exercise as an important milestone to validate their training and collect lessons learned. The intent of this mission readiness exercise should be to validate developed systems and processes in their respective tactical operations center standing operating procedures and planning standing operating procedures. These procedures must include collaborative and parallel planning techniques, BCT and BSTB integration activities (meeting and workgroups) and an integrated battle rhythm that facilitate operations over an extended period. Then, remaining time should be dedicated

to make appropriate adjustments to these standing operating procedures prior to actual deployment.

And lastly, implementation of the seven-step model for systems planning will allow the BSTB to achieve its training endstate. As a result, the unit will be at a future state in which the commander envisioned it. This endstate should account for the individual, leader and collective state of the organization.

Summary and Conclusion

In summary, the findings suggest that BSTB integration begins with the BCT commander. As a result, the BSTB commander must seek the guidance of the BCT commander to determine potential missions that he envisions the organization performing in support of the BCT. Additionally, the BCT commander's guidance should identify the command and support relationships that will exist to accomplish BSTB assigned missions. Therefore, based on these designated roles and relationships, the BSTB could develop techniques and procedures that enable its ability to integrate activities throughout the BCT. Chapter 4 identifies the value of warfighting functions, meetings and working groups as a means of achieving integration throughout the BCT. However, each specific organization needs to analyze the relevance of these activities to their respective situation. The BSTB commander and staff must identify a battle rhythm that is integrated with the BCT's battle rhythm and includes a sufficient number of meetings that allow members to present and exchange relevant information and working groups to coordinate and provide recommendations for required functions.

In conclusion, training is a key component that sets the conditions for BSTB commanders and staffs to develop integrated plans. Analysis of participant comments

suggested organizational integration was an evolutionary process. Successful processes (meetings and working groups) were achieved when individual BSTB staff members had established working relationships with their peers and BCT counterparts. Consequently, a training plan must be developed to provide the opportunity to establish and develop these working relationships. As a result, these staffs were able to achieve both horizontal and vertical integration that achieve a synergistic effect throughout the organization.

Building an effective training plan must begin with the BCT commander's vision for training. Therefore, the BSTB commander could develop a vision that is nested with that of the BCT commander. The BSTB commander should implement a seven-step model for systems planning in order to implement his vision throughout the organization. As a result, the organization will set goals, determine objectives, determine tasks, establish priorities, prepare and assess training that is consistent with BCT commander's intent. Therefore, the BSTB commander could implement a system that trains and develops the BSTB staff to integrate its activities with BCT staff activities. Additionally, these activities must be captured within organization standing operating procedures and validated throughout the unit's training cycle.

¹Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 2-8.

²Department of the Army, FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003), 2-11.

³Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1999), 6-19 and 6-20.

⁴*Ibid.*, 6-19.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., 6-20.

⁹United States Army Force Command (FORSCOM), FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, *Training: Active Duty Training for FORSCOM Units* (Fort McPherson, GA: Government Printing Office, October 2002), 11.

¹⁰Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1999), 6-20.

¹¹Department of the Army, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), 5-2.

APPENDIX A

BSTB STAFF INTEGRATION SURVEY

Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) Staff Integration

SURVEY APPROVAL AUTHORITY: U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
SURVEY CONTROL NUMBER: DAPE-ARI-AO-07-08
RCS: MILPC-3

Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 10 questions and should take about 30-45 minutes to complete. Please complete the following questions, save the document and return it as an e-mail attachment to robert.merceron@us.army.mil. Every attempt will be made to maintain anonymity.

1. Based on your experience with Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) organizations, answer the following questions, as applicable.

	YES	NO
BSTB observer/controller experience		
BSTB Cdr experience		
BSTB XO experience		
BSTB S3 experience		
HBCT experience		
IBCT experience		
Operations Iraqi Freedom experience		
Operations Enduring Freedom experience		

2. Based on your experience, what is the likelihood that the below tasks would be assigned to a BSTB organization?

Task	Very Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely	No basis to judge
Movement Control Cell (tracking route movement)					
Joint Visitor's Bureau					
FOB mayor					
C2 of Detention Operations					
Convoy Escort					
Route reconnaissance and clearance					
Nonlethal effects and targeting					
Reconstruction and essential services project management					
Forward operating base (FOB) defense					
Support and secure BCT C2 node					
Sensitive site exploitation					
Training of host nation units (i.e. EN, EOD, MP)					
Military intelligence operations					
Signal operations					

3. Are there any other tasks the BSTB is capable of performing in support of the BCT? If yes, please identify the task and explain its contribution to the BCT fight.

4. What is the likelihood that the below BSTB organic and non organic elements will be attached under Brigade Control?

<i>Element</i>	<i>Very Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Very Unlikely</i>
BSTB Engineer Company (HBCT only)				
BSTB Military Intelligence Company				
BSTB Signal Company				
BSTB Military Police Platoon				
BSTB Chemical Platoon				
BSTB Support Platoon				
Air Defense Artillery				
Civil Affairs				
Psychological Operations				
Public Affairs				
Explosive Ordinance Detachment				
Military Police Company				
Infantry Company				
Armor Company				
Engineer Company (non organic)				

5. Do you feel that task organizing a BSTB staff into functional cells (along warfighting functions: Intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control) will enhance the BSTB's capability to enhance the development of integrated plans?

___ Yes

___ No

Please explain.

6. Which two warfighting functions do you feel provides the BSTB staff with the most valuable means to enhance the development of integrated plans? (Please explain)

7. Meetings (sometimes called huddles) are informal gatherings used to present and exchange information. What are the two most useful BSTB-level meetings that allowed the BSTB staff to enhance the development of integrated plans? (Please explain)

8. *A working group is a temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Based on BSTB staff size and workload, do you feel that establishing work groups will enhance the BSTB commander and staff's ability to enhance the development of integrated plans?*

☐ Yes

☐ No

Please explain.

9. *What are the two most useful BSTB-level working groups that will allow the BSTB commander and staff to enhance the development of integrated plans? (Please explain)*

10. *Please list any other comments*

This completes my questions. Save the document and return it as an e-mail attachment to robert.merceron@us.army.mil. Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! Your comments are beneficial to my research and the advancement of BSTB development.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Center for Army Lessons Learned, CTC Trends: Joint Readiness Training Center, No. 6-14. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, May 2006.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: 3ID Modular Force Assessment, No. 6-10. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, March 2006.

Department of the Army. FM 1, *The Army*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2005.

_____. FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, August 2006.

_____. FM 3-90.61, *Brigade Troops Battalion Operations*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2006.

_____. FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003.

_____. FM 7-0, *Training the Force*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2000.

_____. FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2003.

_____. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1999.

_____. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2005.

_____. FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006.

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2007.

Thomas H. Magness, "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part I: All the Way In." *Engineer*, July-September 2006, 44-47.

_____. "Brigade Special Troops Battalions: Part II: Synergy." *Engineer*, October-December 2006, 4-7.

US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, *Training: Active Duty Training for FORSCOM Units*. Fort McPherson, GA: Government Printing Office, October 2002.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity*. Fort Monroe, VA: US Government Printing Office, 8 October 2004.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center. *Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: National Training Center Rotation 04-05*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 29 April 2004.

_____. *Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: National Training Center Rotation 04-07*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 22 July 2004.

_____. *Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: National Training Center Rotation 04-09, 04-10, 05-02*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 29 November 2004.

_____. *Task Force Modularity Insights Memorandum: Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation 05-04*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 16 May 2005.

_____. *Modular Force Insights Memorandum: Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation 05-06*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Government Printing Office, 16 May 2005.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Mr. David Goebel
CTAC
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Dennis L. Dolan
CTAC
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. Robert Rielly
DCL
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 15 June 2007
2. Thesis Author: MAJ Robert Merceron
3. Thesis Title: Brigade Special Troops Battalion Integration within the Brigade Combat Team

4. Thesis Committee Members: _____
Signatures: _____

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
Direct Military Support (10)	/	Chapter 3	/	12
Critical Technology (3)	/	Section 4	/	31
Administrative Operational Use (7)	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: _____

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).