POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE 1989
UNITED STATES INVASION OF PANAMA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2007

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
15-06-2007	Master's Thesis	Aug 2006 - June 2007

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Post-Conflict Stability Operations and the 1989 United States Invasion of Panama	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Major Louis W. Morales, United States Army	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

This study investigates the challenges of planning stability operations after major combat operations. Post-conflict stability operations are difficult to plan and execute if military commanders and campaign planners do not take a comprehensive approach to this critical facet of a campaign. This study uses the 1989 United States invasion of Panama to explore the complexities of planning post-conflict stability operations and identifies three crucial resources planners and commanders should be able to leverage to plan and execute post-conflict stability operations: doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation. Prior to the invasion of Panama, post-conflict stability doctrine was almost nonexistent; manpower problems plagued the planning staffs and hampered the execution of needed stability operations; and the military applied an exclusive military solution to a political-military situation. Although some of these issues have been addressed during the past two decades, there is still room for improvement. A military may defeat an enemy, but a nation can only achieve the desired national end state if it fully leverages all instruments of national power.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Stability operations, Panama, OPERATION JUST CAUSE, OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY, doctrine, manpower, interagency cooperation

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	UU	134	
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)*

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE 1989 UNITED STATES INVASION OF PANAMA, by Louis W. Morales, 134 pages.

This study investigates the challenges of planning stability operations following major combat operations. Post-conflict stability operations are difficult to plan and execute if military commanders and campaign planners do not take a comprehensive approach to this critical facet of a campaign. This study uses the 1989 United States invasion of Panama to explore the complexities of planning post-conflict stability operations and identifies three crucial resources planners and commanders should be able to leverage to plan and execute post-conflict stability operations: doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation. Prior to the invasion of Panama, post-conflict stability doctrine was almost nonexistent and did not help commanders and planners appreciate the importance of these operations; manpower problems plagued the planning staffs and hampered the execution of needed stability operations; and the Department of Defense initially applied an exclusive military solution to a political-military situation. Although some of these issues have been addressed over the past two decades, there is still room for improvement. A military may defeat an enemy, but a nation can only achieve the desired national end state if it fully leverages all instruments of national power. Anything less may lead to tactical success but not a strategic victory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I first would like to thank my wife, Robin, and daughters, Julia and Emily, for supporting me in this endeavor and providing me the time during the past nine months to complete this thesis. Without their patience and understanding this thesis would never have been completed.

Additionally, I like to thank my thesis committee, Dr. Stephen D. Coats, Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, and Mr. W. Kenna McCurry. Their patience, guidance, and mentorship were essential in completing this project. I have learned a great deal from them during this process.

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ACRONYMS

ABN	Airborne
AMSP	Advanced Military Studies Program
ARCV	Augmentation Reserve Component Volunteer
CA	Civil Affairs
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOTF	Civil Military Operations Task Force
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DoD	Department of Defense
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HN	Host Nation
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JLG	Judicial Liaison Group
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFPM	Joint Task Force Panama

JTFSO	Joint Task Force South
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MP	Military Police
MSG	Military Support Group
NCW	Network-Centric Warfare
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other [United States] government agency
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN	Operation plan
OPSEC	Operational Security
PB	Peace Building
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PDF	Panamanian Defense Forces
PLG	Police Liaison Group
PNP	Panamanian National Police
PSYOP	Psychological operations
ROE	Rules of engagement
SAF	Security Assistance Force
SCJ3	SOUTHCOM Directorate of Operations
SCJ5	SOUTHCOM Directorate of Policy, Plans, and Strategy
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command

SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USARSO	United States Army South
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFLG	United States Foreign Liaison Group
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

> The object in war is to attain a better peace. . . .If you
> concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-
> effect . . . it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one,
> containing the germs of another war.[1]

B.H. Liddell Hart

On September 11, 2001, terrorists conducted a spectacular attack on American soil. That evening President George W. Bush addressed a stunned nation. During his seven minute address he clearly articulated to the world America's policy regarding terrorists. President Bush said that the United States would go after all parties responsible for this heinous act. America would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."[2] Nations that supported terrorism now had to choose between severing all ties with terrorists or facing America's wrath.

Some did not heed President Bush's warning. As part of initiating the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the United States attacked Afghanistan and Iraq and replaced two regimes that harbored terrorists and sponsored their activities abroad. As the GWOT unfolds, America will continue to intervene to protect national security. When hostilities end, however, the challenging work of postconflict stabilization must begin. After a major conflict the United States Armed Forces is traditionally the first significant element of the American Government on the ground which has the ability to execute the post-conflict stability plan.

Today as the international community continues to stabilize and reconstruct the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq, members of the United States Armed Forces are forging relationships in these politically evolving nations. These fledgling governments are fragile and once the fighting ends, post-conflict stability operations are crucial components for restoring peace. Peace and stability will only remain if efforts to restore law and order are successful.

Planning for post-conflict stability operations is not easy, but the United States has executed these missions before and in all likelihood will conduct post-conflict stability operations again. These crucial operations require extensive coordination and resources. In order to better prepare for future instances of post-conflict stability operations it is important to examine the successes and failures of past attempts and ensure that lessons harvested from these operations are institutionalized and not lost on the pages of after-action reviews and history books.

This study will examine the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, a combat operation launched to protect the security of the American people. This preemptive attack was similar to the initial attacks during the GWOT because United States Armed Forces conducted a rapid combat operation to remove a corrupt regime and performed extensive post-conflict civil military operations to restore order to the region.

<u>Research Questions</u>

Primary Research Question

The primary question this study will answer is: Did United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and subordinate task force planners have adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989

United States invasion of Panama? For the purpose of this study this thesis will define

resources by three broad categories. The first resource this study will examine is doctrine.

This study will examine the doctrine available to determine what references

SOUTHCOM and subordinate planners had available when planning for conflict

termination and post-conflict stability operations. The next resource this study will

examine is manpower. This study will examine the manpower used to plan this

campaign. It will also examine the number and type of personnel needed to execute the

post-conflict operations as envisioned by the campaign plans. The final resource this

study will examine is the level of interagency cooperation in the planning and execution

of the campaign.

Secondary Questions

To answer this question, several secondary questions need to be addressed. The

first set of secondary questions will examine the doctrine available for the operation. The

first secondary research question, which will be addressed in the literature review, is:

How did doctrine address post-conflict stability operations during the period leading up

to the invasion of Panama in 1989? In order to answer this secondary question, research

will focus on doctrinal manuals available while planning for the 1989 invasion of

Panama. A review of these manuals will provide insight as to what planners should have

seen as their responsibilities during post-conflict stability operations. The next secondary

research question is: How did doctrine influence the planning of the transition and

execution of post-combat stability operations? The thesis will attempt to determine if the

state of doctrine in the mid to late 1980s facilitated the planning process for post-combat

stability operations. The next secondary research question will be: Did the state of

doctrine influence the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations? The final research question regarding doctrine is: Did the doctrine support the stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations?

The second set of secondary questions will examine the manpower available for the operation. The first secondary research question will be: How did manpower affect the ability to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations? This thesis will examine both the number and the expertise of personnel used to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations. The next secondary research question will be: Did manpower affect the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations? This thesis will attempt to determine if the right number and type of personnel were present in Panama to transition and execute post-conflict stability operations. The final research question regarding manpower is: Were there any manpower issues affecting stability operations after the conclusion of combat operations?

The final set of secondary research questions will examine the level of interagency coordination between the military and the rest of the United States Government for the operation. The first secondary research question will be: How did the level of interagency cooperation affect the planning of the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations? This thesis will examine if the United States Government exhibited a unified approach to the anticipated operation. The next secondary research question will be: How did interagency coordination affect the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations? The final research question regarding interagency coordination is: Did interagency coordination support stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations?

<u>Assumptions</u>

The main assumption of this thesis is that planning for post-conflict stability operations is becoming extremely complicated and more difficult. In the past the United States often conducted combat operations over the span of several years. On those occasions, planners had ample time to prepare and develop post-conflict stability plans. Now with the advances of technology, the United States military often conducts combat operations rapidly. Operations now are measured in terms of months, days, and even hours. With rapid decisive operations, planners often no longer have as long of a lead time to plan, develop, and synchronize post-combat stability operations. This compressed timeline makes planning for post-conflict stability operations even more difficult. Military planners now have a much smaller window to prepare post-conflict plans. This compressed timeline complicates the already difficult process. An incomplete or immature post-conflict plan can jeopardize global security, the future of many nations, and the lives of countless service members.

This thesis also assumes that Operation Just Cause is an adequate operation to examine difficult post-conflict stability operations and to identify lessons that are applicable in today's contemporary operational environment. The United States invaded Panama with a preemptive attack to protect the security of the American people. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF) are two recent examples of preemptive attacks by the United States designed to protect the security of the American public. The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that future preemptive attacks may be necessary during the GWOT. "[T]he United States can no

longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay . . . . The fight must be taken

to the enemy, to keep them on the run."[3]

The current NSS also maintains the United States will remain steadfast in its

commitment to new democracies. After a preemptive attack the United States

acknowledges that it will be necessary to "walk alongside governments and their people

as they make the difficult transition to effective democracies. [The United States] will not

abandon them before the transition is secure because immature democracies can be prone

to conflict and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists."[4]

The 1989 United States invasion of Panama was a relatively quick offensive

operation that removed a regime and its military force. America quickly replaced Manuel

Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) with popularly elected officials and a

new national security force, the Panamanian National Police (PNP). After the United

States emplaced the democratically elected officials, American forces remained to

promote the fledgling Panamanian Government and conducted stability operations to

promote regional stability and security.

<u>Definitions</u>

A number of doctrinal terms have been used already and will continue to be used

throughout this research project. In order to clarify their usage, the terms will be defined

as follows:

> civil affairs -- Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units
> organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and
> to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.[5]

> civil-military operations -- The activities of a commander that establish, maintain,
> influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
> nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace

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in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.[6]

conflict termination -- The point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of force to other means of persuasion.[7]

doctrine -- Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.[8]

interagency coordination -- Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. [9]

joint force commander -- A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC.[10]

joint task force -- A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF.[11]

nongovernmental organization -- A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.[12]

stability operations -- An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[13]

Limitations

There is a limitation concerning this study's research method. This thesis will gather all of its information through an examination of data from open sources. Detailed after-action reviews, a review of operational plans and orders, and interviews those involved in the planning and execution of the invasion of Panama and subsequent stability operations should provide the most comprehensive, relevant, and accurate information. Although, not all of the information concerning the 1989 United States invasion of Panama is unclassified, but this limitation should not significantly impact the thesis nor prevent it from exploring the answers to previously mentioned research questions.

Scope and Delimitations

This study set certain delimitations to the scope of the thesis. First, this thesis is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of the combat operations of Operation Just Cause. The study will examine combat operations briefly to provide context for the subsequent examination of stability operations. This thesis will not discuss subsequent tactical actions after the initial invasion except in cases that illustrate when combat operations were simultaneous and sometimes competing with stability operations.

Nor will this thesis review any literature concerning stability operations that do not follow a combat situation. This study will focus only on post-conflict stability operations and the complexities involved with conflict termination and the transition from combat operations to the stability operations.

Current doctrine is changing rapidly to incorporate lessons gleaned from ongoing operations in current operational environment however this thesis will not review any doctrine published after 21 December 2006.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is linked to the increased probability that the United States will deploy its armed forces in pursuit of national security during the GWOT. As the United States deploys its military to intervene in an ongoing conflict or defeat an emerging national threat, American forces will have to complete the challenging work of post-conflict stabilization when the fighting ends. Traditionally, the security situation in a region at the end of a conflict is fragile. Once the peace is restored, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations are critical to the achievement of total victory. In order to better prepare for future instances of post-conflict stability operations it is important to examine the successes and failures of past attempts.

Chapter Conclusion

In the introduction of the 2006 NSS, President George W. Bush states that the United States "must maintain and expand [its] national strength so [the nation] can deal with threats and challenges before they damage our people or our interests."[14] If the United States must conduct another preemptive attack against an emerging threat, America will continue to assist the post-conflict government and their people after hostilities end as they continue to make the difficult transition towards becoming efficient democratic states. The United States cannot desert these democracies too early or they may become susceptible to conflict and exploitation by terrorists.

Stability operations have become a critical component in the NSS. "[P]eace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful."[15] Stability operations require extensive coordination and resources. This thesis will examine the United States invasion of Panama to help identify key issues to consider when preparing for future instances of post-conflict stability operations. This preemptive attack of Panama will provide useful information because it was similar to the initial attacks during the GWOT where United States Armed Forces conducted a rapid combat operation to remove a corrupt regime and performed extensive civil military operations after the fighting to restore order in the region.

Chapter 2 of this thesis will present a review of literature surrounding the transition of combat operations to stability operations. The next chapter will define stability operations. These critical operations assist in the ultimate achievement of the desired national strategic end state following a conflict. Then in will examine the doctrine available to the planners of the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. How were post-conflict stability operations integrated into joint doctrine in the mid to late 1980s? This review of doctrine will provide an excellent frame of reference to analyze the actions of the planners of the invasion. Finally the study will examine literature that discusses the 1989 invasion of Panama and the subsequent post-conflict stability operations. By reviewing the literature that covers Joint Task Force South's (JTFSO) transition from combat operations to stability operations, this study will identify observed trends to further review throughout the rest of this study.

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[1] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2d ed. (London: Farber and Farber, 1985), 353, quoted by David P. Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between*

Combat Operations and Stability Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 1.

[2] George W. Bush, "Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation," [On-line], (National Address, Washington, DC, 11 September 2001, accessed 30 November 2006); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 20010911-16.html; Internet.

[3] U.S. National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2006), 8.

[4] Ibid., 7.

[5] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms As Amended Through 16 October 2006* (Washington, DC, 2006), 86.

[6] Ibid., 88.

[7] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC, 2004), 1-43.

[8] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 168.

[9] Ibid., 272.

[10] Ibid., 288.

[11] Ibid., 298.

[12] Ibid., 376-377.

[13] Ibid., 506.

[14] George W. Bush, introduction to *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, by U.S. National Security Council (Washington, DC, 2006), ii.

[15] U.S. National Security Council, 16.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Strategists and military planners have struggled with conflict termination and how to achieve and maintain post-conflict peace. If the United States has to conduct another preemptive attack on a rogue nation to protect the American public, America must thoroughly plan follow-on stability operations to restore order and maintain peace and ultimately achieve its national strategic objectives. This thesis examines the United States invasion of Panama to help identify key issues to consider when preparing for future instances of post-conflict stability operations.

In this chapter the study will review pertinent literature surrounding post-conflict stability operations and the 1989 American invasion of Panama. First, the study will examine literature to define stability operations. These critical operations assist in the ultimate achievement of the desired national strategic end state following a conflict. The next step will be to examine the doctrine available to the planners of the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. How were post-conflict stability operations integrated into joint doctrine in the mid to late 1980s? This study will review the joint doctrine to identify the planning considerations for resourcing and coordinating post-conflict stability operations. This review of doctrine will provide an excellent frame of reference to analyze the actions of the planners of the invasion. Finally the study will examine literature that discusses the 1989 invasion of Panama and the subsequent post-conflict stability operations. By reviewing the literature that covers Joint Task Force South's

(JTFSO) transition from combat operations to stability operations, this study will identify observed trends to further review throughout the rest of this study.

<div align="center">Stability Operations and Their Importance</div>

The term "stability operations" is a term recently reintroduced to joint doctrine but these critical operations are not new. Joint Publication 1-02, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines stability operations as an all encompassing term that includes "various military missions, tasks, and activities . . . to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[1] These types of operations were previously described by the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), but the term MOOTW implies that these operations are not conducted or critical during an actual war. Current joint doctrine now acknowledges that these operations are essential to achieving the national strategic end state of an operation or campaign.[2] Stability operations enable legitimate civil authority upon the completion of major combat operations and "historically have required an extended presence" by United States Armed Forces.[3]

There are a variety of types of stability operations the United States Armed Forces may execute upon the completion of major combat operations. The military may conduct peace operations to support "diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."[4] The United States Armed Forces may also assist a nation with their internal defense to "protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency"[5] or provide security assistance to a nation training their own military to further "national policies and objectives."[6] Stability operations are not limited to managing conflict. The military may

<div align="center">13</div>

also conduct stability operations to provide humanitarian and civic assistance to quickly restore infrastructure or alleviate human suffering and to dissuade further "adversary actions" to promote stability in a specific region.[7]

<div align="center">Stability Operations Doctrine during the 1980s</div>

Doctrine is a set of fundamental principles that military forces use to guide their actions in support of national objectives.[8] It is an important resource for any military because it provides a common frame of reference. Doctrine facilitates communication, provides a basis for a military's educational system, and serves as a guide for unit training. To be useful, "doctrine must be well known and commonly understood."[9] This study will explore the following secondary question in this chapter: How did doctrine address post-conflict stability operations during the period leading up to the invasion of Panama in 1989? The thesis will review appropriate joint and service doctrine available during the mid to late 1980s to understand its influence on planning and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the United States 1989 invasion of Panama.

<div align="center">The State of Joint Doctrine</div>

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve the ability of United States Armed Forces to conduct joint military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act focused on curtailing the excessive parochialism of the different branches of service. The individual services biases were identified as a significant stumbling block towards integrating their capabilities into an effective joint warfighting machine. One of the stated purposes of the legislation was to "enhance the effectiveness of military operations."[10] In an effort to increase the operational effectiveness of the American military, the

Goldwater-Nichols Act assigned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "the responsibility for developing joint doctrine and joint training policies."[11]

By the end of the 1980s formalized joint doctrine was still in its infancy. The Joint Publication System had identified many references it intended to publish to enhance the combat effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces, but it was a lengthy process to identify the voids in joint doctrine and implement a comprehensive program to complete joint doctrine projects.[12] In 1988, two of the keystone doctrinal manuals needed to plan and execute joint operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publications 3-0, Joint Operations, and 5-0, Planning of Joint Operations, were not yet in existence.[13] It was not until January of 1990 that the Joint Staff finally released JCS Test Publication 3-0 to provide guidance for the employment of the United States Armed Forces during joint operations.[14] This void in doctrine meant that the planners of the 1989 invasion of Panama were unable to use joint doctrine to provide them guidance for the upcoming operation. But because JTFSO was built around an Army headquarters, the XVIII Airborne (ABN) Corps, planners for the invasion could have researched Army service doctrine to plan the 1989 invasion of Panama.

The State of Army Doctrine

Field Manual (FM) 100-5 was the Army's keystone manual that covered military operations. It discussed "how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements in conjunction with other services and allied forces."[15] The manual acknowledged that military operations pursue the achievement of political objectives, but it predominantly discussed the use of force to achieve these goals. [16]

Chapter 3 of FM 100-5 discussed the operational planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It instructed operational level commanders to "set favorable terms for battle by synchroniz[ing] ground, air, and sea maneuver and by striking the enemy throughout the theater of operations."[17] This manual portrayed the military's role in achieving strategic and policy aims through large scale ground maneuver to concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities.[18]

FM 100-5 instructed operational level commanders and planners to closely "integrate civil-military operations (CMO) in support of [a] campaign"[19] but it did not fully explore how these operations supported the achievement of the desired national strategic objectives. Instead, FM 100-5 stated that CMO "seek to influence the relationship between a military command and the civilian population."[20] It continued to state that these operations facilitated a commander's ability to "fight in or near populated areas"[21] and leverage local "supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources . . . to support military operations."[22] FM 100-5's discussion of CMO did not link the execution of these operations to the achievement of the desired national strategic end state. Instead it stated that these operations facilitate the conduct of combat.

The manual also said that the military may have to conduct activities with civil authorities and the host nation population if the United States occupies their land. These activities may occur before, during, or after a campaign or operation. FM 100-5 told commanders and planners that the military may assume "executive, legislative, and judicial authority"[23] in an occupied territory, but it did not address the complexities of assuming these huge responsibilities. In fact, all of the information pertaining to CMO took up less than one page in this 200 page manual that was supposed to prescribe "how

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[the] Army . . . plan[s] and conduct[s] campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements."[24] If the keystone manual on Army operations did not cover stability operations, what manuals did the planners of the Panama invasion have to use?

One manual the planners may have referenced was the 1985 version of FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.[25] FM 41-10 stated that civil affairs (CA) were a commander's responsibility and military operations that considered their impacts on a civilian population were less likely to fail.[26] It said that CA personnel played a key role in conducting military operations because they bear the responsibility of ensuring the military's legal and moral obligations towards the civilian population are fulfilled.[27] Typical operational CA missions included foreign internal defense (FID) and civil administration.[28]

A military force may conduct a wide variety of tasks in support of FID. One of these tasks included supporting a host nation's governmental functions. When the military provided civic assistance to a nation's government, its objective was to develop the host nation's capability to perform various governmental functions. This type of support required specialized CA personnel.[29] The manual stated that during peacetime active duty tactical units have a limited CA capability. Therefore it is imperative to ensure that appropriate CA units or personnel are assigned or attached to these units prior to deployment. [30]

It is also critical to coordinate with other governmental agencies (OGAs) to provide a comprehensive approach to providing civic assistance to a host nation. FID is not solely a military responsibility. FM 41-10 advised that OGAs, like the Department of State, Department of Justice, and the United States Agency for International

Development, all played critical roles during civic assistance operations. Close coordination between these and other entities are necessary to successfully achieve the United States' national end state objectives.[31]

If the host nation's government becomes weak or ineffective, the military can conduct civil administration missions to stabilize political, economic, or social conditions. Civil administration includes providing aid to the host government to improve and maintain a stable and viable civil administration and establishing a temporary civil administration to maintain law and order and provide essential services until a host nation can reestablish itself.[32] Civil administration operations emphasize "[e]stablishing a system of control for the occupied territory, consolidating the military victory, and furthering [national] political objectives." [33]

FM 41-10 provided a comprehensive overview of the military's responsibility to fulfill the military's legal and moral obligations towards a civilian population when planning a military operation. However, FM 41-10 cautioned that the accomplishment of many of these critical tasks require specialized skills and CA personnel. These critical individuals are trained to understand of the importance and complexities of post-conflict stability operations that assist the stabilization of a region and achievement of the national strategic objectives.[34]

<u>Stability Operations and the 1989 U.S.
Invasion of Panama</u>

In an Arroyo Center study, Jennifer Morrison Taw examined Operation Just Cause and stated that the United States invasion of Panama was an operational success, but she also believed that the outcome should not have come as a surprise. United States Armed

Forces conducted this operation in a location that was already familiar to the United

States military. The 13,000 troops already stationed in Panama knew the operating

environment to include the terrain, military, government, and people and had extensive

interaction against their adversary, the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). JTFSO also

faced a permissive populace that did not assist the PDF and welcomed American forces.

However, if the United States did not enjoy all of these unique advantages, the American

invasion of Panama could have been a more difficult operation that may have required a

much longer-term commitment from the United States.[35]

Taw stated that commanders and planners must not overlook or underemphasize

stability operations. Although Operation Just Cause was a success, Taw believed that this

operation followed the trend of combat operations receiving the majority of the emphasis

during the planning of the operation and the post-conflict stability operations received

little if any emphasis. Taw affirmed that if the process of assigning planning

responsibilities for combat and post-conflict stability operations to separate organizations

is continued, sufficient coordination must take place to ensure unity of effort. If this

coordination does not take place, then Taw stated that another possible solution to this

issue would be to plan combat and post-combat operations together.[36] Taw also advised

that civilian agencies, to include the State Department and the U.S. Agency for

International Development, must also be involved with stability planning for these

operations to be successful.[37]

Although the 1989 invasion of Panama is widely considered a successful

operation, Dr. Richard H. Schultz, stated that "the United States was programmatically

and structurally ill-equipped for the situation that followed the fighting."[38] This was

because there was no integrated and comprehensive strategy to support short-term

conflict resolution and long-term reconstruction.[39] According to the then Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, the invasion of Panama should have led to a

follow-on policy that promoted a stable and orderly change in the development and

restoration of a democratic Panama.[40]

Shultz stated that the post-combat planning for reconstruction and democratization

in Panama was lacking. There were unanticipated civil-military problems that unfolded

during the invasion which caused JTFSO to improvise operations to stabilize Panama.

Shultz said that Panama provided an "example of what can occur when [post-conflict

stability] planning requirements are neglected."[41] As unforeseen destabilizing events

occurred, the post-conflict stability plan's restoration efforts were considerably

weakened.[42] Shultz also stated that the United States Government (USG) was ill-prepared

for the situation that followed the fighting. The USG "lacked integrated and interagency

political, economic, social, informational, and military policies and strategies to support

short-term conflict resolution and longer-term stability and development."[43]

Dr. Conrad Crane believed that many of the issues with the post-conflict stability

operations stemmed from a myopic focus on only the decisive combat operation, not the

complete campaign. Planning for the post-conflict phase of the invasion, Operation

Promote Liberty was incomplete when combat operations began. XVIII ABN Corps

planners were tactically oriented and did not focus on post-conflict tasks even though the

SCJ5 planners tried to discuss these critical stability operations numerous times. The

planners did not have an appreciation for the complexities of the upcoming stability

operation and were unable to appreciate the intensive manpower needed to maintain the

peace after the fighting ended. The post-conflict stability plan "assigned a lone military police (MP) battalion to run a detention facility, protect all convoys, provide security for many key facilities, and prepare to restore law and order. . . . [T]he battalion . . . was quickly overwhelmed by its responsibilities."[44]

MPs were not the only type of unit that was shorthanded. Due to a lack of CA personnel, combat units had to conduct non-traditional missions like "foreign internal defense (FID), civil affairs (CA), civic action, and psychological operations (PSYOP)."[45] Also since OGAs were not prepared for the invasion, combat units were forced to operate "in the political, economic, and social . . . arenas."[46]

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates stated that although there were initial issues with post-conflict stability operations following the invasion of Panama, most of the difficulties were rectified. Despite the sluggish flow of aid from America, the population remained largely pro-American, partly because the United States was installing leaders that the Panamanians had elected. Even though Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty ended successfully, Dr. Yates raised a troublesome question about the United States ability to conduct post-conflict stability operations. "Would a disconnect between combat and stability operations in a future conflict lead to greater chaos over a longer period and with less satisfactory outcomes?"[47]

Chapter Conclusion

As strategists and military planners continue to struggle with conflict termination and how to achieve and maintain post-conflict peace, this study turns to the 1989 American invasion of Panama to help identify key issues to consider when preparing for future instances of post-conflict stability operations.

Current literature defines stability operations or MOOTW as various military missions that reestablish security and directly contribute to the stabilization of an area. These operations are essential to achieving the national strategic end state of an operation or campaign. If the joint force commander neglects to plan and resource these operations, the military commitment in these operations may shoulder the majority or entire responsibility to achieve the desired strategic end state.

Joint doctrine during the mid to late 1980s was still being developed and the void within it did not provide any guidance about the importance and execution of post-conflict stability operations. JTFSO planners may have turned to Army doctrine to help plan the invasion, but Army doctrine in the mid to late 1980s also did not address the importance of post-conflict stability operations in detail. FM 100-5, the Army's keystone manual that covered military operations did not discuss post-conflict stability operations and only spoke about CMO as a means available to a military commander to leverage his environment to complete tactical actions. Other manuals like FM 41-10 contained valuable information that was applicable in a post-conflict environment, but mainstream Army units were unfamiliar with these manuals. Because doctrine in the mid to late 1980s did not comprehensively address the importance and complexities of post-conflict stability operations, the planners of the Panama invasion could not depend heavily on doctrine to help plan and integrate post-conflict stability operations into a major operation or plan.

The invasion of Panama was a successful operation, but the transition to post-conflict stability operations was not smooth. Planning for post-combat stability operations at XVIII ABN Corps took a backseat to the combat operations and a lack of

interagency cooperation during the planning process complicated the American efforts to stabilize Panama following the invasion. Most of the issues encountered were mitigated by the fact that Panama was a fairly permissive environment. In 1989, the United States Armed Forces encountered an environment that was compliant and forgiving, but that will not always be the case.

After reviewing the pertinent literature on stability operations and the 1989 invasion of Panama, this study has identified three critical resources for planning post-conflict stability operations: doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation. Doctrine during the mid to late 1980s did not address the importance of post-conflict stability operations to the accomplishment of the desired national end state. What influence did that have on the planning and conduct of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 American invasion of Panama? Manpower is also critical for the planning and execution of post-conflict stability operations. Was there an appropriate level of manpower to plan and execute the post-conflict stability operations needed to stabilize Panama after the invasion? The final critical resource for successful post-conflict stability operations is interagency cooperation. Civilian agencies, to include the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, must also be involved with stability planning to achieve a comprehensive approach to attain the desired national strategic end state. In the remaining chapters, this study will explore a successful campaign, the 1989 invasion of Panama, and examine how it leveraged these critical resources. It will examine the successes and failures of the 1989 invasion of Panama to glean relevant lessons and identify key issues to consider when preparing for future instances of post-conflict stability operations.

 [1] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms As Amended Through 16 October 2006* (Washington, DC, 2006), 506.

 [2] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 2006), V-1.

 [3] Ibid., I-15.

 [4] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, 408.

 [5] Ibid., 214.

 [6] Ibid., 418.

 [7] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC, 2003), 1-4.

 [8] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, 168.

 [9] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC, 2001), 1-14.

 [10] James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 13 (autumn 1996): 10.

 [11] Ibid., 15.

 [12] U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide: 1988* (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University Press, 1988), 86.

 [13] Ibid., 86-93.

 [14] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Test Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint and Unified Operations* (Washington, DC, 1990), i.

 [15] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5*, Operations* (Washington, DC, 1986), i.

 [16] Ibid., 1.

 [17] Ibid., 28.

 [18] Ibid., 1.

[19] Ibid., 31.

[20] Ibid., 58.

[21] Ibid., 57.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 58.

[24] Ibid., i.

[25] John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 1997), 260.

[26] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC, 1985), 6-1 and 1-1.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 1-4.

[29] Ibid., 3-1 - 3-2.

[30] Ibid., 1-5.

[31] Ibid., 3-5 - 3-6

[32] Ibid., 5-1.

[33] Ibid., 5-5.

[34] Ibid., 1-1 and 3-2.

[35] Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other Than War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), vii.

[36] Ibid., ix-x.

[37] Ibid., x.

[38] Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), ix.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., xii.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 3.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Lawrence A. Yates, "Panama, 1988-1989: The Disconnect Between Combat and Stability Operations." *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 52.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The introduction to this study discussed the importance of stability operations as it relates to the current National Security Strategy (NSS). In the 2006 NSS, the president clearly articulated that the United States would conduct a preemptive strike to "deal with threats and challenges before they damage our people or our interests,"[1] but after hostilities end, America would have to conduct stability operations to ensure that the nation achieves its intended strategic goals. If America fails to assist governments and their people after hostilities end, they may become susceptible to future conflict and exploitation by terrorists.

Stability operations have become a critical component in the NSS but they require extensive coordination and resources. This thesis will examine the United States invasion of Panama to help identify key issues to consider when preparing for future instances of post-conflict stability operations.

This study will use the case study research model to examine the following research question: Did the SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners have adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama? After reviewing doctrinal manuals from the mid to late 1980s and contemporary literature surrounding stability operations and the transition from combat operations to stability operations in chapter 2, this thesis has identified three critical resources needed to successfully execute post-conflict stability operations. The first resource this study will examine is doctrine. Doctrine during the mid to late 1980s did not address the importance of post-conflict

stability operations to the accomplishment of the desired national end state. What impact did that shortcoming have on the planning and conduct of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 American invasion of Panama? The next resource this study will examine is manpower. This study will examine the manpower used to plan this campaign. It will also examine the number and type of personnel needed to execute the post-conflict operations as envisioned by the campaign plans. The final resource this study will examine is the level of interagency cooperation in the planning and execution of the campaign.

Before this study can examine these resources, it must present some background information to provide historic context for the ensuing analysis. This thesis will provide a brief background history of the United States relationship with Panama to establish the fact that the United States invasion of Panama in 1989 was vital to American national interests. It will describe the strategic and commercial importance of the nation of Panama and the Panama Canal. The study will then briefly explore the events that necessitated America's intervention on behalf of its national security. It will highlight General Noriega's rise to power and the subsequent deterioration of international relations with the dictator and his regime.

As the relationship between the United States and Panama deteriorated, the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) began contingency planning to replace the Noriega regime if directed. This thesis will examine the planning process leading up to Operation Just Cause as told by historians and campaign planners. These sources will provide first hand information regarding commander's guidance and priorities, staff planning considerations, and interactions between commanders, their planners, the

SOUTHCOM and JTFSO Staffs, and with other governmental agencies. This review will provide valuable insight into the planned conduct of the invasion and the following post-conflict stability operations.

The study will conclude its review of background information by summarizing the invasion and following stability operations. After an overview of the events triggering the execution of the United States invasion of Panama, the thesis will give a synopsis of the tactical actions of the invasion, Operation Just Cause, and the transition to post-conflict stability operations, Operation Promote Liberty. This will conclude the background information. The thesis will then transition to the secondary questions that will allow this study to determine if the SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners had adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama.

The first resource the study will examine is doctrine. Doctrine during the mid to late 1980s did not address the importance of post-conflict stability operations to the accomplishment of the desired national end state. Existing doctrine only superficially addressed civil military operations (CMO) and stated that these operations facilitated the conduct of combat. So what impact did the state of doctrine have on the planning, training, and execution of the 1989 invasion of Panama and the ensuing stability operations?

The first secondary research question will be: How did doctrine impact the planning of the transition and execution of post-combat stability operations? The thesis will attempt to determine if the state of doctrine in the mid to late 1980s could have facilitated the planning process for post-combat stability operations. In order to answer

this secondary question, research will focus on doctrine's impact on the military educational system. Doctrine is the foundation for a military's educational system. How did the state of doctrine in the mid to late 1980s impact the education of the planners and commanders of the invasion? Could commanders and planners rely on doctrine and the military's educational system to prepare them to plan for and execute post-conflict stability operations?

The next secondary question will be: How did the doctrine for conflict termination and the subsequent transition to stability operations impact the actual execution of combat and the transition to stability operations? Military education programs and training allows Soldiers to learn and apply lessons derived from doctrine. Were Soldiers prepared to conduct stability operations when the conflict ended? Were they trained and prepared to execute these critical missions?

The final research question regarding doctrine will be: Did the doctrine support the stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations? The thesis will examine doctrine regarding CMO and determine if doctrine supported the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), Joint Task Force South (JTFSO), and the Military Support Group (MSG). Was there an appropriate level of doctrine to conduct post-conflict stability operations?

The next resource the study will examine is manpower. The thesis will examine the importance of having the right manpower to plan and execute military operations. The study will review the availability of manpower during the planning phase of the operation, during the execution of the invasion and the transition to stability operations, and finally during the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

The first secondary research question regarding manpower will be: How did manpower affect the ability to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations? This thesis will examine both the number and the expertise of personnel used to plan the campaign. In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on primary and secondary sources regarding the SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force-South (JTFSO) Staffs during the planning process leading up to the invasion.

The next secondary question will be: Did manpower affect the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations? Was there sufficient manpower to conduct needed stability operations? This thesis will explore the number and types of personnel present at the time and determine if the manpower in Panama was sufficient for the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations. In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on after action reviews, primary accounts of the operation, and secondary sources regarding the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations.

The final research question regarding manpower will be: Were there any manpower issues affecting necessary stability operations after the conclusion of combat operations? The study will examine the structure of the CMOTF and the MSG and identify any issues caused by the lack of personnel or certain areas of expertise. The study will also explore the relationship between the challenge to initially reestablish law and order and the manpower available to accomplish these critical tasks. In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on after action reviews, primary accounts of the operation, and secondary sources regarding the execution of stability operations after the conclusion of combat operations.

The final resource the study will examine is interagency cooperation. The thesis will define interagency cooperation and examine the importance of having an appropriate level of interagency cooperation when planning and executing military operations. The study will review the level and effectiveness of interagency cooperation during the planning phase of the operation, during the execution of the invasion and the transition to stability operations, and finally during the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

The first secondary research question regarding interagency cooperation will be: How did the level of interagency cooperation affect the planning of the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations? This thesis will examine if the United States Government (USG) exhibited a unified approach to the anticipated invasion. This thesis will examine the interactions of military planners with other agencies within the government. Did military planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies were best postured to achieve the national objectives? In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on primary and secondary sources regarding the SOUTHCOM and JTFSO Staffs during the planning process leading up to the invasion.

The next secondary question will be: How did interagency coordination affect the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations? This thesis will explore the level of coordination between the military and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG. Did the agencies of the United States Government launch a coherent and efficient collective operation designed to achieve national goals, or did a lack of interagency cooperation lead to unanticipated complications during the combat operations and the transition to stability operations? In order to answer this

secondary question, research will focus on after action reviews, primary accounts of the operation, and secondary sources regarding the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations.

The final research question regarding interagency coordination will be: Did interagency coordination support stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations? This thesis will explore if there was an appropriate level of interagency coordination to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. In order to answer this secondary question, research will focus on after action reviews, primary accounts of the operation, and secondary sources regarding the execution of stability operations after the conclusion of combat operations.

<u>Chapter Conclusion</u>

In the next chapter, the thesis will apply the research design previously described. Once this thesis completes the examination of these secondary research questions, it will determine if the three critical resources of doctrine, manpower, and interagency coordination significantly impacted the United States' ability to achieve the strategic end state goals for the 1989 invasion of Panama. Then this study will have enough information to answer the initial research question: Did the SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners have adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama?

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[1] George W. Bush, introduction to *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, by U.S. National Security Council (Washington, DC, 2006), ii.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Background

Importance of Panama

Panama holds significant strategic and commercial importance for the United

States. As a result of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the United States completed a

Canal across Panama. The Panama Canal linked the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans and

the United States exercised sovereign like control in the "Canal Zone" along the 52-mile

long waterway.[1] America wanted to have unrestricted access to the canal which would

prevent U.S. military and commercial maritime traffic from having to circumnavigate

South America to travel from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean.[2]

With the advent of transcontinental airplanes and intercontinental missiles, the

importance of the Panama Canal to the United States diminished to the United States.

Simultaneously, Panamanians support for the American presence in their country steadily

decreased. In 1979, these factors led the United States to agree to cede control of the

Canal to Panama by the year 2000 in the form of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. However

after the treaty ratification, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still continued to recognize the

strategic value of the Panama Canal. Access to the Canal would accelerate the movement

of American naval ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic. If the canal was controlled by a

government that opposed the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also thought that

Panama could be used as a "wartime base by the Soviet Union or one of its client states,

such as Cuba, to attack U.S. maritime operations or, in peacetime, to support left-wing

insurgencies in Central America and drug trafficking with the United States."[3]

Relations with Noriega

Manuel Noriega was an intelligence officer who rose to power after the death of Brigadier General Omar Torrijos in 1983. When he assumed leadership of the National Guard which he renamed the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), Noriega had already cultivated working relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States Drug Enforcement Administration and the United States Defense Intelligence Agency. But even though Noriega provided the United States information on Latin American military establishments, Castro's Cuba, and emerging guerilla movements in the region, he was also dealing with Fidel Castro; trafficking weapons for terrorists and insurgents throughout Latin America; laundering money for drug cartels; and facilitating the transit of drugs through Panamanian Airports.[4]

In the mid 1980s the United States developed deep concerns over Noriega's intimidation tactics, brutality, corruption, and growing involvement in the drug trade. In June of 1987, after allegations of electoral fraud and the1885 murder of his political opponent, Hugo Spadafora, large anti-Noriega demonstrations broke out in Panama. When Noriega brutally crushed the demonstrations, the U.S. Senate immediately passed a resolution calling for General Noriega to step down.[5]

In February 1988, United States federal grand juries indicted Noriega and his key henchmen on multiple counts of drug trafficking and racketeering. Noriega was defiant and initiated a campaign to harass U.S. citizens and service members in Panama and to hinder full implementation of U.S. rights under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties. Noriega also turned to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya for economic and military assistance in 1988 and 1989. Cuba and Nicaragua provided weapons and instructors to Panama. Libya also

contributed $20 million in 1989 in return for Noriega's authorization to use Panama as a

base to coordinate the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups throughout Latin

America.[6] It was now obvious that the United States could not rule out a potential need

for an intervention.

Planning for Intervention

In February 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ordered SOUTHCOM to begin

contingency planning for the commitment of American Forces in Panama to "protect U.S.

lives and property, to keep [the Canal open], to conduct noncombatant evacuation

operations in peaceful or hostile environments, and to develop a plan to assist any

government that might replace the Noriega regime."[7] General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr.,

the Commander of SOUTHCOM, and his director of operations, Brigadier General Marc

A. Cisneros, U.S. Army (SCJ3), initiated work on a contingency plan that was known as

Elaborate Maze. The plan originally consisted of multiple phases of military operations

that ranged from the build up of forces in country to the execution of offensive military

operations and civil military operations. It was designed to "be executed in response to a

variety of possible PDF provocations."[8] The phases could be executed independently or

in sequence and, once executed, different phases could overlap. If the plan executed the

offensive operation "the Noriega dictatorship would [become] a casualty of the

operation."[9]

SOUTHCOM eventually broke Elaborate Maze into separate operation orders at

the request of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

facilitate execution. General Woerner's staff named the operation orders collectively

Prayer Book. One of the operation orders, Klondike Key, covered the evacuation of

noncombatant American citizens to the United States. Post Time, another operation order, planned for the defense of American citizens, installations using forces stationed in Panama and from the continental United States. Blue Spoon was an operation order that called for combat operations against the regime. The goal of Blue Spoon was to defeat the PDF and protect American lives, property and the Panama Canal. The final plan, Blind Logic, was to begin after the initial assaults into Panama were complete. Blind Logic covered the post-combat civil-military operations (CMO) and completed the Prayer Book series. [10]

During the planning process, planners divided the Prayer Book into two separate categories. One group of planners focused on the use of military force to counter the growing Panamanian threat. The focal point for the SOUTHCOM's SCJ3, United States Army South (USARSO), and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was Operation Blue Spoon. Another group of planners concentrated on post-conflict stability operations. SOUTHCOM's Directorate of Policy, Plans, and Strategy (SCJ5) planned Operation Blind Logic with some augmentation from a group of reservists. [11]

Initially, SOUTHCOM planners slated USARSO to become the operational headquarters to command Operation Blue Spoon as Joint Task Force Panama (JTFPM), but they required augmentation to execute their responsibilities. [12] Upon initial review of the Prayer Book, the JCS Staff had reservations about USARSO's ability to manage such a complicated operation. Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, the Joint Staff Director of Operations (J3), believed that USARSO was not structured to execute the mission and that the XVIII Airborne (ABN) Corps should be designated as the operational commander of Blue Spoon. Although some members of the SOUTHCOM staff agreed

with this assessment, GEN Woerner did not immediately agree. [13] In June 1988, BG

Cisneros eventually convinced GEN Woerner that the XVIII ABN Corps should act as

the Joint Task Force Headquarters for Operation Blue Spoon as Joint Task Force-South

(JTFSO). [14] The JCS approved the change in operational headquarters in late 1988 and the

official handoff to XVIII ABN Corps occurred in February 1989.

In 1989, the Panama crisis continued to escalate. The PDF harassed American

service members and their dependants with increased frequency. The most notorious

incident occurred in early March when the PDF seized a number of school busses with

American children still aboard. The PDF detained the busses and the American children

for several hours while brandishing automatic weapons. [15] The security situation in

Panama seemed to be rapidly deteriorating. Panama conducted national elections in May

1989, and presidential candidate Guillermo Endara and his two vice-presidential running

mates seemed to have defeated the Noriega backed candidate, Manuel Solis Palma.

Noriega voided the elections and the PDF brutally suppressed any public support for his

opposition. [16] The United States responded swiftly to the deteriorating situation in

Panama by deploying almost 1,900 additional troops to protect the lives of U.S. citizens

and property. [17]

At the end of the September 1989, General Maxwell R. Thurman, former

commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),

replaced General Woerner as the SOUTHCOM Commander. In his preparations to

assume command of SOUTHCOM, GEN Thurman reviewed the Prayer Book and

expressed reservations about the plans for Post Time and Blue Spoon. He believed that

the gradual increase of forces in Panama under Post Time violated the principle of

operational surprise. Thurman favored a rapid application of overwhelming combat

power to defeat Noriega and the PDF before they realized that they were under attack. He

believed that this bold and audacious change would save many lives in the long run.

During a concept briefing from XVIII ABN Corps, the planners briefed similar concerns

to the incoming commander and advocated a major conceptual overhaul of Blue Spoon.[18]

GEN Thurman also had reservations with SOUTHCOM's capabilities. He did not

think that its staff possessed the ability to manage the type of complex operation called

for in Blue Spoon. SOUTHCOM only had a total staff of 380 service members and they

would be overwhelmed with the detailed synchronization necessary to execute his

version of Blue Spoon. Immediately after Thurman relinquished TRADOC, he told the

commander of the XVIII ABN Corps, Major General Carl Stiner, that he was making him

and his staff the primary planning and operational headquarters of a revised Blue Spoon

that emphasized a rapid deployment instead of the gradual buildup of forces.[19] In August

1989, the XVIII ABN Corps and SOUTHCOM planners would also receive the

additional guidance to include the capture of Noriega in the new version of Blue Spoon.[20]

After Noriega defeated an attempted coup in October 1989, the security situation

in Panama continued to deteriorate. On 15 December, Noriega declared a "state of war"

against the United States and named himself Maximum Leader of Panama. The next

night, at a checkpoint near the Comandancia, the PDF killed a Marine lieutenant and they

detained and assaulted a Navy lieutenant and his wife.[21] After conferring with GEN

Thurman, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State, General Colin Powell, and the

Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, recommended to President George Bush that the

United States attack Panama to eliminate the threat presented by Noriega and the PDF.

President Bush gave permission to execute Blue Spoon and D-Day was set for 20 December. Soon after the president's decision, the name of the operation was changed from Blue Spoon to Just Cause.[22]

Operation Just Cause

On the morning of 20 December 1989, JTFSO conventional and special operations forces conducted a daring strike on twenty-seven separate targets in Panama to protect American citizens, destroy the PDF, and capture Noriega.[23] Units from six different regions of the United States converged on Panama and accomplished most of their military objectives within several hours.[24] Noriega avoided the initial American assault and sought asylum at the Vatican's Nunciature. Eventually he surrendered himself to U.S. officials and by 3 January 1990 all opposition by the PDF ended.[25] That same day President Bush addressed the American public and stated that the United States Armed Forces had achieved all of their objectives for Operation Just Cause. He added that troops not needed for post-conflict stability operations would begin redeploying.[26] Operation Just Cause officially ended on 31 January 1990.

Operation Promote Liberty

Operation Promote Liberty did not begin after the conclusion of Operation Just Cause. Soon after the initial invasion, law and order rapidly eroded, which caused GEN Thurman to begin stability operations immediately to preserve public safety.[27] Thurman created the Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), which was headed by Brigadier General Benard Gann, from the SOUTHCOM J5 Directorate. The initial CMOTF force structure was created by combining some of the JTFSO troops that were in

theater with the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to assist the fledgling Endara government. The CMOTF would also be augmented by three hundred reservists who would arrive in Panama over the next several weeks. [28]

Operation Promote Liberty authorized civil-military operations (CMO) to stabilize Panama and civil affairs (CA) activities to support the new Democratic Panamanian Government that United States authorities had installed at the onset of Operation Just Cause.[29] Operation Promote Liberty concentrated on public safety, health issues, governance assistance, and training the Panamanian National Police (PNP) which was the force that replaced the PDF. On 17 January 1991 the successor of CMOTF, the Military Support Group (MSG), was deactivated and effectively ended Operation Promote Liberty.[30]

Now that the study has reviewed background information on the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, it will begin to examine secondary research questions regarding the three critical resources of doctrine, manpower, and interagency coordination and examine how SOUTHCOM and the subordinate task forces leveraged each of these critical resources to achieve the strategic end state goals for the 1989 invasion of Panama.

<u>Doctrine and Stability Operations</u>

Doctrine is a set of fundamental principles that military forces use to guide their actions in support of national objectives.[31] These principles provide the bedrock for a military's training, force structure and the professional educational system. In essence, doctrine sets the tone on how a nation's military will train, plan, and execute its assigned missions in pursuit of national goals. Because of this fact, doctrine is an important

resource for any military. Doctrine during the mid to late 1980s did not address the importance of post-conflict stability operations to the accomplishment of the desired national end state. How did the state of doctrine impact the planning and conduct of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 American invasion of Panama? Did the void within doctrine in the mid to late 1980s impact the planning and execution of the post-conflict stability operations necessary to achieve the strategic goals for Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty?

Doctrine's Impact on Military Educational System

Doctrine provides the foundation upon which a military builds its educational system. The 1985 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 states that it "provides operational guidance for use by commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army service school curricula."[32] But if FM 100-5 does not comprehensively address the importance of CMO to an operation or campaign's achievement of national end state objectives, then what impact did that omission have on the Officer Educational System in the mid-1980s. Was the importance of post-conflict stabilization operations stressed in the Army's Officer Educational System?

The primary United States Army schools that Blue Spoon and Blind Logic planners attended were the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP). CGSC educates and trains army officers to serve as field grade commanders and staff officers. AMSP is a graduate-level program at the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies that grooms field grade officers to serve in critical battle staff positions with a division or corps headquarters. How well did each course cover the post-conflict operations that a

unit should execute after an operation to ensure that the nation achieves its national strategic objectives?

According to CGSC Circular 351-1, academic year 1985-86 did not devote any mandatory blocks of instruction covering CMO. Students could take an elective entitled Civil Military Operations, A425. This elective class was only thirty hours long and the course description of A425 stated that the instruction covered the tactical commander's civil military responsibilities in his operational area. It discussed how to leverage civil institutions, local governments, and the indigenous population as force multipliers.[33] This block of instruction seems to have viewed CMO as a way to leverage the population and the environment to facilitate the conduct of combat, not to help stabilize a region to achieve national end state strategic objectives. The training was tailored for a tactical commander, not for an operational level commander or his staff.

There was another course that covered operations that today would be considered stability operations. There was a mandatory course called Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), P851, which concentrated on operating in small scale activities in an insurgent environment. This thirty-two hour course covered counterinsurgent operations, foreign internal defense (FID), and peacekeeping operations.[34] This block of instruction only partially covered military operations that are now considered stability operations. The course discussed stability operations designed to defeat an insurgency not as a means to stabilize a country after major combat operations.

AMSP devoted an entire block of instruction to theory and application of the operational level of war, but its curriculum did not cover how an operational level commander builds a complete campaign plan that includes CMO to achieve the desired

national strategic end state. This portion of AMSP intended to illustrate how the operational level of war linked national strategy to tactical actions, but the lessons concentrated on the arraignment of forces on a battlefield and discussed the nature of warfare at the operational level using World War II operations and campaigns.[35] This block of instruction concentrated on fighting and defeating another military at the operational level, not the employment of forces to achieve national strategic goals.

Since the doctrine and officer educational system of the time period concentrated almost exclusively on the application of force to defeat another enemy, how did it impact the planning of the 1989 invasion of Panama?

<div align="center">Doctrine's Impact on the Planning of the
Invasion of Panama</div>

From the beginning, contingency planning for the invasion of Panama never had an integrated post-combat stability plan. A contributing factor may have been the fact that post-conflict stability operations were not integrated into the main doctrinal manual that governs the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations, FM 100-5. Since doctrine did not address these critical operations, planners would only appreciate the importance of post-conflict stability operations based on their own personal and operational experiences. The most glaring example comes shortly after the JCS ordered SOUTHCOM to begin contingency planning for the commitment of American Forces in Panama in February 1988. SOUTHCOM submitted Elaborate Maze to the JCS for this contingency, but Elaborate Maze did not include a post-conflict stability phase.[36]

The initial post-conflict military plan was created in one day. The Deputy SCJ5 called two members of his directorate in on a Sunday morning in March 1988 and

introduced them to Elaborate Maze. After allowing them to review the approved phases

of the contingency plan, he told them to prepare a briefing outlining a post-conflict

stability plan for the invasion of Panama by that evening.[37] This haphazard first attempt

to integrate a post-conflict plan for the invasion of Panama was representative of the

entire planning process for post-conflict stability operations following the invasion of

Panama.

When GEN Woerner later split planning responsibilities for the actual invasion of

Panama and the post-combat phase between two planning groups, the SOUTHCOM

commander inadvertently created the biggest impediment in the integration of the

invasion and the post-conflict stability operations. The SCJ3 planned the use of combat

forces to invade Panama, while the SCJ5 concentrated on post-conflict stability

operations. The only CA expertise on the entire SOUTHCOM J-Staff was in the SCJ5

directorate and the J5 had four active duty CA reserve officers.[38]

CA doctrine and training provided them the expertise to address CMO necessary

to complement anticipated combat operations. Non-CA planners could not rely on

keystone doctrinal manuals or their formal educational experience to help them

understand the importance of CMO. Non-CA planners could only understand the

importance of integrating CMO through their personal operational experiences.

As the two directorates planned their respective parts of the invasion, they were

unable to synchronize their plans. Excessive operational security (OPSEC) concerns

prohibited the two planning cells from discussing their respective plans and

synchronizing them.[39] This challenge increased as the plan continued to develop and

XVIII ABN Corps assumed the responsibility being the primary planning and operational

headquarters of a revised Blue Spoon. If the planning staffs were unable to synchronize

their plans, who was responsible for synchronizing these two critical portions of the

invasion plan?

According to FM 41-10, the commander is ultimately responsible for integrating

civil military operations into an operation, but many commanders did not fully

understand this fact. GEN Stiner, commander of the XVIII ABN Corps, stated that he did

not pay attention to the post-conflict plan. He admitted that the invasion of Panama had a

"great war-fighting plan but insufficient attention to post-conflict strategy."[40] Stiner also

said at a planning meeting in October 1989, "don't worry about the civilians till after

Blue Spoon. We'll be busy neutralizing the PDF."[41] This comment clearly showed that

the commander of JTFSO did not understand the importance of CMO to the combat plan

and he believed that dealing with the civilian population was not his responsibility.

When GEN Woerner was the commander of SOUTHCOM there was some

emphasis on trying to coordinate the two combat and stability plans, but that was no

longer the case when GEN Thurman took over as the SOUTHCOM commander in

September 1989.[42] GEN Thurman admitted that he did not see post-conflict stability

operations as his concern. Thurman stated that he did not provide command emphasis on

this phase of the operation and he should have been more attentive to the transition from

combat to post combat-stability operations. Thurman, the former TRADOC commander,

admitted that "it was the last priority on his agenda at the time." [43]

Why would two well seasoned commanders neglect to emphasize critical post-

conflict plans? GEN Thurman explained that this oversight is not uncommon. He

explained that the military was not good at implementing the post-conflict termination

phase and this flaw was an institutional shortcoming. The former SOUTHCOM and TRADOC commander further explained that "[w]e do not teach [post-conflict operations] in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work."[44]

The omission of post-conflict stability operations from doctrine impacted not only planners, but also the commander. Planners also receive planning guidance from their commanders when planning a campaign or major operation. Since commanders were unable to rely on doctrine or their formal educational experience to help reinforce the importance of post-conflict stability operations, they may not be able to stress the importance of these essential operations to their planners. If commanders do not emphasize these critical operations, planners may not understand the importance of post-conflict stability operation and their impact on the ultimate achievement of the nation's strategic end state.

In May 1989, the United States deployed almost 1900 troops as part of Operation Nimrod Dancer to protect the lives of U.S. citizens and property. During the deployment, a three-man team of XVIII ABN Corps planners were in Panama, and SOUTHCOM planners working on the plan for Blind Logic seized the opportunity to do some impromptu coordination. One of their main concerns of the SCJ5 planners was the integration of CMO into Blue Spoon. The SCJ5 planners discussed the issues and believed that XVII ABN Corps planning staff understood that initial law and order responsibilities and emergency service restoration were JTFSO's responsibility. XVIII ABN Corps planners back at Fort Bragg, however, did not regard this coordination session "as [a] formal [tasking] and [they] continued to focus almost exclusively on . . . Blue Spoon's combat mission."[45]

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The XVIII ABN Corps did not believe that it was their responsibility to incorporate stability operations into the invasion plan. This perception prevented CMO from ever being fully integrated into Blue Spoon. The XVIII ABN Corps OPLAN 90-2 listed all of the rest of the Prayer Book plans in its reference list except for the Blind Logic.[46] The OPLAN also had the phrase "prepare to restore law and order and support the installation of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama," but it did not include the necessary tasks to support this.[47] OPLAN 90-2 later contradicted itself when it included the following phrase, "[e]very effort will be made to minimize commitments of [United States] to support CA operations."[48]

Doctrine during the mid to late 1980s did not address the importance of post-conflict stability operations. It neglected to link these critical operations to the achievement of the desired national strategic end state. The lack of comprehensive operational doctrine resulted in these critical operations receiving little emphasis in the Officer Educational System in the mid-1980s. This omission impacted the ability of commanders and their planners to understand the importance of planning and integrating the transition between combat and stability operations. Commanders and their planners would only appreciate the importance of post-conflict stability operations based on their personal and operational experiences.

<div align="center">

Doctrine and the Transition between Combat and
Post-Conflict Stability Operations
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In order to determine what impact the lack of comprehensive doctrine had on the transition between combat and stability operations, the study will now examine the following secondary research question: "How did the doctrine for conflict termination

and the subsequent transition to stability operations impact the actual execution of combat and the transition to stability operations?"

Doctrine not only provides the basis for the military professional educational system, it also "furnishes the authoritative foundation . . . individual and unit training."[49] Even if the operational-level planners created a comprehensive post-conflict stability plan, non-CA tactical level units were not prepared to execute the necessary stability operations to assist in the accomplishment of the desired national strategic end states. The lack of emphasis of CMO in FM 100-5 caused many leaders to believe that CMO were mainly the responsibility of CA personnel. The combat forces did not integrate these critical operations into their training plans because they viewed that their job was to fight and win the nation's wars. But when widespread looting and the implosion of the Panamanian government caused combat forces to assume non-traditional roles, many units were unprepared.

Not all of the combat forces conducted the initial assault on Panama on the morning of 20 January 1989. As Captain John Sieder, Commander of B Company, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, flew with his company into to Penonome, Panama, he thought that his unit was going to conduct an opposed air assault where they were going to conduct a relief in place with the Rangers. Their landing was unopposed and his unit did not fire a shot that evening.[50] Within a few days, his infantry company moved into the surrounding towns and tried to bring a semblance of stability and law and order. Sieder's company and many others like his began executing a myriad of missions that they did not dream that they would be doing in a combat zone.[51]

Colonel Linwood Burney, Sieder's Brigade Commander, stated that this operation had transitioned into a company commander's war where they would enter each city, town, or village ready for a fight, but they instead executed a variety of missions for which they had not trained. The leaders of these units became de facto mayors and they executed missions ranging from clearing trash to giving out money to locals in exchange for weapons. COL Burney stated that his Soldiers combat skills became less critical and they had to rely on "common sense."[52]

The adjustment of transitioning from warrior to police officer or mayor was not seamless. Many Soldiers entered this conflict expecting to engage in high intensity conflict, but as First Lieutenant Clarence Briggs III, an infantry company executive officer from the 82d Airborne Division, explained the soldiers would have to suppress their aggression and adopt a more civil approach while dealing with their surroundings.[53] As they assumed the role of maintaining the peace, units adopted more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). Combat Soldiers carried out their daily missions, while the ROE adjusted depending on their mission.

During the initial assault the ROE for combat was clearly understood and complied with, however Soldiers had to adapt to adjusting rules of engagement as the initial combat operation ended but the mission continued.[54] When authorities investigated various shooting incidents, a common thread ran through many of the Soldiers' testimonies. They frequently said that they were unsure "when to use force, or when [they] could shoot."[55] 1LT Briggs concluded that current infantry training needed to adjust and include varying the ROE used in training scenarios.[56]

Small units were not the only units to have difficulty transitioning from combat operations to a more non-traditional role of post-conflict stability operations. COL Burney, Second Brigade Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, stated that his organization was responsible for the security for towns spread out over thousands of square miles. Burney's unit did not have a system to analyze all of the towns and villages. He explained that there was "no format for these kinds of things, so [they] did what people normally do: improvise."[57]

The need for improvisation due to the lack of applicable doctrine and proper training did not occur strictly in combat units. As law and order disintegrated, the Military Police (MP) were thrust into the position of reestablishing functioning police departments from scratch. Sergeant Major James Banks from the 7th MP Battalion stated that the scope of the missions were not ones they were prepared for. He said that the organization had no idea where to start.[58]

One innovative officer drew upon a nontraditional resource to accomplish this mission. Captain Barry Keith, the deputy provost marshal for the 7th Infantry Division, used one of his college criminology textbooks to help design the structure of Colon's new police force. He called his wife in Fort Ord, California and had her read the information from his old college textbook. He stated that "it was the only thing I could think of."[59]

In April 1990, a liaison officer from the United States Training and Doctrine Command commented that doctrine was struggling with the concept of post-conflict stability operations.

> "Where do we train an infantry or artillery battalion to run a city, take care of prisoner [and] refugees, feed and police the populace, and operate the public utilities?" . . . [U]nits involved in [Operation] Just Cause . . . . had to chart new

ground as they faced real challenges in conducting foreign internal defense (FID), civil affairs (CA), civic action, and psychological operations (PSYOP). We had combat (direct action) units working in the political, economic, and social (or indirect) arenas. . . . How do we prepare conventional Army forces to do this?"[60]

FID, CA, and civil administration operations were covered by various field manuals, but most combat units did not foresee a need to spend precious training time executing these missions. They believed the Army already had specialized units to accomplish these tasks. However, since the majority of these specialized units were in the reserve component and limited in numbers, any combat mission that the United States would execute would probably necessitate combat units to assume these missions for a period of time before the reserve component Soldiers arrived.

The lack of comprehensive operational doctrine helped prompt a myopic training focus which caused many units to not stray from practicing their core tasks. As units prepared for the invasion of Panama, they did not expand their training focus for the possible stability missions necessary complete the mission. This lack of training caused many units to improvise to accomplish assigned missions. This effect was experienced by large and small units and by combat and non-combat forces. The doctrine for conflict termination and the subsequent transition to stability operations adversely impacted the transition between combat to stability operations.

Doctrine's Impact Post-Conflict
Stability Operations.

In order to determine what impact the lack of comprehensive doctrine had on the execution of stability operations, the study will now examine the following secondary research question: "Did the doctrine support the stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations?"

After the major combat operations of Operation Just Cause ended the military was scrambling to assist the newly established Government of Panama. The CMOTF was fully engaged with the American Embassy in Panama to help launch the Endara government. Tactical units were spread throughout the countryside stabilizing and establishing local governments. Law and order broke down throughout the country as a result of the American dismantling of the PDF and an organization was needed to train the newly formed PNP to reestablish law and order. As a result of the initiative of MG Cisneros, JTFSO created the United States Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) to tackle that crucial mission.[61] All of these organizations were working to stabilize the region during Operation Promote Liberty, but there was no unity of command or effort. Attempted coordination was only partially effective. The SOUTHCOM commander was the lowest ranking common commander for all of the units responsible for post-conflict stability operation and he was not interested in that mission. The CMOTF was not structured properly to oversee all of the necessary post-conflict stability operations. Figure 1 illustrates an organizational chart that shows all units responsible for stability operations as of 25 December 1989.

General James Lindsay, commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), recognized that the post-conflict stability operations to restore Panama were going slowly. As a supporting command to SOUTHCOM, he expressed his concern to GEN Thurman and received permission to help reorganize the post-conflict restoration efforts.[62] Lindsay sent Colonel Youmans from his PSYOP and CA Directorate (J9) to complete an in-country assessment of the operation and make appropriate recommendations. COL Youmans determined that the current plan was "was

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not built around what was needed to be done in order to transition from war to peace. . . .

[T]he transition was not planned as well as it should have been."[63]

Figure 1. Organizational chart of units responsible for Stability
Operations as of 25 December 1989
Source: John T. Fishel, *Civil* Military *Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publisher, 1997), 74.

The J9 recommended a military support group that was modeled after the

doctrinal Security Assistance Force contained in FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*.[64]

This entity would put all of the CA, PSYOP, SOF, and combat service support troops

under one unit that would be subordinate to the joint task force and commander by a

general officer. On 8 January 1990, COL Youmans made his recommedations to

SOUTHCOM and returned to SOCOM. Figure 2 illustrates a typical Security Assistance

Force (SAF) organizational chart.

Figure 2. Security Assistance Force (SAF)
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC, 1981), 128.

SOUTHCOM modified his suggestions by placing the USFLG under the military support group and giving it operational control of the MPs. GEN Thurman recruited Colonel Jim Steele to command the organization that would replace the CMOTF. On 17 January 1990, the MSG was activated. Figure 3 illustrates the command and control structure of the MSG as of 31 March 1990.

Figure 3. MSG Command and Control Structure as of 31 March 1990
Source: John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 1997), 76.

Doctrine assisted in achieving unity of command and effort during Operation Promote Liberty, but conventional units were still having issues completing non-

traditional missions. Major General Carmen Cavezza was the commander of the 7th

Infantry Division and his organization would execute a bulk of Operation Promote

Liberty missions. He stated in an oral interview in 1992 that Army doctrine did not

adequately address post-combat stability operations. He said that doctrinal manuals, like

FM 100-5, must not end its discussion with the completion of combat operations.

"[T]actical units are going to continue to be involved [in military operations] after

[combat ends]."[65] Cavezza stated that Army doctrine "needs to think about [post-conflict

operations] and talk about [them], and [post-conflict stability operations need] to be part

of our doctrine."[66]

Doctrine provided SOUTHCOM the ability to reorganize the units conducting

Operation Promote Liberty to achieve unity of effort and command, but SOUTHCOM

was unable to leverage it to initially synchronize their efforts. It took an outside

organization to recognize the issue and recommend a doctrinally sound solution to their

problem. The lack of comprehensive operational doctrine continued to plague tactical

units supporting Operation Promote Liberty. It was so prevalent that the 7th Infantry

Commander addressed this shortfall in his oral history interview. Even though his

command knew that they would execute much of the post-combat stability tasks, he said

that the doctrine was lacking for him and his subordinate commanders. Units continued to

improvise to accomplish assigned missions. Doctrine supported organizing the forces for

the stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations, but many of

the tactical units felt that they did not have the prerequisite training and doctrine to

support their efforts.

Manpower and Stability Operations

Manpower is an essential requirement for a military operation. Having the appropriate level of manpower to plan a campaign or operation can be the difference between just winning a fight and achieving the national end state objectives. A staff must have both sufficient numbers to plan complex operations, but having the appropriate set of skills is just as important. No matter how good a plan is on paper, an operational commander also needs personnel to accomplish the mission. Manpower is the essential ingredient that translates war plans into vehicles to achieve the desired strategic end state objectives.

This thesis will examine the importance of having the right manpower to plan and execute military operations. The study will review the availability of manpower during the planning phase of the operation, during the execution of the invasion and the transition to stability operations, and finally during the conduct of post-conflict stability operations to determine if the planners of the 1989 Panama invasion had an adequate level of manpower to plan and execute the post-conflict stability operations necessary for achieving the strategic goals for Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty.

Manpower's Impact on the Planning
of the Invasion of Panama

In order to determine whether the planners of the 1989 American invasion of Panama had adequate manpower, the study will examine the following secondary research question: "How did manpower affect the ability to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations?" This thesis will examine both the number

and the expertise of personnel used to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations.

The planners of Blue Spoon did not have any CA officers working with them when they formulated the actual plan for the invasion. Since the SCJ3 did not have any CA officers, they did not understand that it is imperative to integrate CMO into the invasion plan. This omission would complicate the transition from Blue Spoon to Blind Logic. When GEN Thurman decided that his staff did not have adequate manpower to conduct the detailed planning necessary for a rapid invasion of Panama the situation did not improve. CMO was not fully integrated into the JTFSO OPLAN for Blue Spoon. In fact, the only Prayer Book OPLAN not listed as a reference for JTFSO OPLAN 90-2 was Blind Logic.[67] The planners of Blue Spoon did not have the appropriate personnel to appreciate the importance of CMO to the overall operation.

The only CA expertise on the entire SOUTHCOM J-Staff was in the SCJ5 directorate and they were not robustly manned. In 1988, the civil affairs branch of the SCJ5 had only four full-time Army Reserve officers and they were responsible for CMO for the entire SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, not just Panama.[68] As SOUTHCOM started the planning for a potential invasion of Panama, SCJ5 requested a team of CA officers from their Capstone unit, the 361st CA Brigade, to assist drafting the plan for Blind Logic.[69]

Two-man volunteer teams traveled to Panama to work on the post-conflict plan. These volunteers only were in-country for temporary tours of active duty of 31 days but planning for the post-conflict phase was too complicated to complete in one month. Additional teams had to cycle through SCJ5 to complete the plan.[70] When the plan was

revised in 1989 the civil affairs branch of the SCJ5 had only one full-time Army Reserve officer. SCJ5 would need additional augmentation again. GEN Woerner approved the J5's request, but he told them that he did not want a large team from outside organizations. He wanted a few reservists to augment the staff and provide the needed expertise.[71] This resulted in an incremental and disjointed approach to planning that lacked continuity.[72]

Excessive OPSEC concerns would continue to complicate Blind Logic's planning process. As previously mentioned the planners of Blind Logic did not have access to the invasion plan, Blue Spoon, but OPSEC concerns would impact the planners of Blind Logic. The augmentee CA planners could not share ideas with CA officers back at homestation. Even if both parties worked on Blind Logic, they were prohibited from exchanging information. The planning process for Blind Logic could be described as "episodic" at best and the augmentee's inability to share information back at home prevented SCJ5 from leveraging the full expertise of their parent units.[73]

During the planning process, GEN Woerner decided to build the CMOTF around the SCJ5 directorate. The SOUTHCOM commander made this decision due to political considerations. He said that the "sensitivity of the relationships and their political-military nature demanded that the [commander of the CMOTF] be a general officer on [the SOUTHCOM] staff and that the J5 was most appropriate."[74] This decision was unorthodox because a staff directorate is structured to make plans. It does not have the manpower to execute them. GEN Thurman, JTFSO commander, reflected on this decision in a 1992 interview. He said that the J5 did "not have the communication or

transportation services, nor [did] it have the necessary organizational fabric [to command the CMOTF] . . . . [I]t is a bad plan when the J5 ends up commanding anything."[75]

The planning staffs for Blue Spoon and Blind Logic did not have the appropriate manpower to plan their respective operations. The SCJ5 was the only set of planners that had planners with the appropriate skills to understand the importance of CMO. Non-CA officers involved in the planning of Blue Spoon did not have the training or familiarity with CA doctrine to understand the significance of these operations. Even though the SCJ5 had personnel that could appreciate the importance of CMO, they did not have enough of them to plan their operation and also tend to the rest of SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. When SCJ5 asked for assistance, they received temporary help in the form of volunteer CA officers that had a limited amount of time to work on the plan. Multiple sets of augmentees eventually completed the plan, but they were unable to leverage the full expertise of their homestation unit due to excessive OPSEC restriction. The lack of manpower for the planning staffs of the invasion and post-combat stability operations resulted in Blue Spoon ignoring the necessary CMO and prevented the planners of Blind Logic from taking a comprehensive approach to the critical period after combat. Blue Spoon authors did not have the right type of personnel to plan and integrate CMO with the combat plan. The planners for Blind Logic had the right type of officers working on the post-conflict plan, but they did not have enough of them. The planners of the 1989 Panama invasion did not have adequate manpower to plan the post-conflict stability operations necessary for achieving the strategic goals for Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty.

Manpower and the Transition Between Combat and
Post-Conflict Stability Operations

In order to determine what impact manpower had on the transition between combat and stability operations, the study will now examine the following secondary research question: "Did manpower affect the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations?"

The original plan for Operation Promote Liberty called for early activation of five civil affairs reserve units totaling approximately 600 personnel and the 361st CA Brigade would help round out the to CMOTF staff.[76] Planners assumed that the reserve call-up would happen because these units had five years of experience in Panama that would significantly facilitate the necessary post-conflict stability operations.[77] But when GEN Thurman decided to change the Blue Spoon to a rapid assault in Panama instead of a gradual buildup of forces, SCJ5 decided explore alternative command and control and force structures in case the reserve call-up was not quick enough to respond to the threat in Panama or if the call-up was not authorized by the President.[78]

Without a reserve call-up, SOUTHCOM would have to conduct post-conflict stability operations using only the forces on hand and the 96th CA Battalion, which was an active duty CA unit. Missing the functional expertise from the reserve CA units originally planned to support the mission would severely degrade stability operations. SCJ5 decided to use a similar mechanism they used to augment their planning staff. They recommended a system of preplanned orders for a select group of volunteers that would provide critical skills and capabilities to the post-conflict operations. Twenty-five volunteers from the 361st CA Brigade would form the core of this group. The remainder of the volunteers would be selected for their functional, area, or language skills or

expertise. These volunteers would fill out CMOTF staff but it was imperative to get them into country early and front load them on the deployment schedule. They called this concept the augmentation reserve component volunteers (ARCVs)[79]

On the morning of the invasion, the joint staff executed the ARCV option and dismissed the request for a presidential call-up of reserve forces. They authorized 200 CA volunteer reservists for the mission, but stipulated that the twenty-five person core must be active for tours of 139 days.[80] Most of the ARCVs were prepared to serve for thirty-one days not 139. Only three 3 of the twenty-five pre-selected core member could serve for that period of time, the 361st CA deputy commander, his operations officer, and a Spanish linguist.[81]

The reserve personnel were not integrated into the deployment flow plan and there was no command emphasis on getting them into Panama quickly. The ARCVs trickled into Panama one by one on Military Airlift Command (MAC) flights and these personnel were frequently bumped off of flights to make room for additional, but unnecessary combat troops.[82] As these personnel arrived into Panama, CMOTF had to integrate these reservists that come from all different CA units into a cohesive and functional task force that had the daunting task of stabilizing Panama and its fledgling government. Due to lack of unit integrity, CMOTF was unprepared and lacked a coherent organizational structure. It often found itself short of personnel as the crisis unfolded.[83]

Certain forces assigned to JTFSO for the initial invasion were also critical to the accomplishment of necessary post-conflict stability operations. The MPs, the 96th CA Battalion, engineers, and medical personnel all had roles in both missions. SOUTHCOM had to deconflict when these forces would work transfer from JTFSO control to CMOTF

control. The SCJ5 address these issued with the XVIII ABN Corps planners and the J5 thought that they had come to an agreement that these units would transfer to CMOTF control when the threat was reduced to less than platoon sized strength.[84] But when massive looting occurred and GEN Thurman recognized that the Government of Panama was essentially three people, the new President and his two vice Presidents, he ordered BG Gann, the SOUTHCOM J5, to execute Blind Logic on the same day of the invasion, 20 December 1989.[85]

Simultaneously executing two operations that the planners assumed to be sequential caused some significant manpower issues. The 96th CA BN formed a civil Affairs Task force to support JTFSO. The decision to not call-up the reserve units and the slow pace of the ARCV deployments caused the J5 to execute the necessary stability missions with a staff directorate that was designed to create a plan not execute a plan.[86]

The J5 directorate was not the only organization having difficulty in executing their combat and anticipated post-combat roles. The decision to attack 27 targets throughout Panama simultaneously spread American forces throughout the countryside away from the urban areas. Many MP units were executing their assigned missions assisting ongoing combat operations, but as law and order eroded, the MPs had to balance these missions with their other assigned roles. Blue Spoon "assigned the lone MP battalion the responsibilities for running a detention facility, conducting [convoy security,] . . . providing security for many key facilities, as well as for being prepared to restore law and order."[87] Unanticipated widespread looting began and JTFSO did not immediately have the ability to control it. Troops were concentrated away from the capitol and the looting caused almost $2 billion dollars of damage.[88] Locals turned to

vigilantism and the MPs became easily overwhelmed trying to restore law and order.[89]

One MP sergeant major said that "[t]here just weren't enough MPs. . . . They were just

scattered to the winds."[90]

The majority of fighting in Operation Just Cause ended within days, but because

the government was not functional, CA personnel were not in theater, and the MPs were

dispersed throughout the country, combat troops assumed "diverse responsibilities as

traffic control, garbage collection, establishing law and order, and providing food, water,

and health care to the local population."[91] Combat troops served as "police officers,

engineers, social workers, civic affairs, mayors and governors."[92] Eventually CA

personnel, Special Forces, and MPs assumed responsibility for these missions but this did

not happen until well into the execution of Operation Promote Liberty.[93]

The lack of manpower marred the transition between Operations Just Cause and

Promote Liberty. The CMOTF was sentenced to a rocky start when the presidential

reserve call-up never materialized and the ARCV plan was modified to prevent many of

the pre-selected volunteers from deploying into theater. These two events made CMOTF

an ad-hoc entity that could not even get identified volunteers into theater. Planning staff

assumed that the two plans would be executed sequentially, but when SOUTHCOM

identified a need to address CMO immediately after the invasion, the early

implementation of Operation Blind Logic caused the two plans to compete for an already

limited amount of personnel. The lack of MPs and CA personnel forced combat units to

assume non-traditional roles they for which they were unprepared. Manpower adversely

affected the execution of combat operations and the transition to stability operations.

In order to determine what impact manpower had on the execution of post-conflict stability operations, the study will now examine the following secondary research question: "Were there any manpower issues affecting necessary stability operations after the conclusion of combat operations?"

Manpower issues did not end after the formation of the MSG in January 1990. When COL Steele arrived in Panama, he stated that the CMOTF structure "had not been thought through all the way."[94] COL (P) Steele insisted that the MSG be a joint organization, but that insistence contributed to manpower shortages. He reduced the Army manning commitment to approximately 60% of the MSG. Unfortunately none of the other services committed to staffing this joint organization. COL Steele said "that was a mistake . . . . [And] the MSG ended up as an understaffed organization."[95]

The MSG which was supposed to bring organizational coherence to the restoration efforts had also to contend with the constant turnover of augmentees on short tours. With the exception of the core ARCV augmentees that were tasked to serve 139 tours, the reservist volunteers served 31 day tours. Because there had been no reserve call-up, augmentees that were providing critical skills and capabilities rotated too frequently. The frequent rotations brought in "people who knew little or nothing" about Panama.[96] This ad-hoc unit was manned in a piecemeal fashion which did not permit them to build "any kind of integrity."[97]

Manpower issues also impacted combat troops. Soldiers still had to execute unconventional tasks because of a lack of specialized personnel and had to be creative to complete their assigned tasks. American military personnel would hire the local

Panamanians for temporary projects and they would receive their wages in cash from United States military comptrollers. When there were not enough comptrollers around to dispense funds, personnel improvised by paying wages in military rations.[98] Specialized personnel were in short supply in Panama. MG Cavezza said that he "kept looking for help in the civil affairs area, for more people to come in to relieve the combat troops, and they weren't forthcoming."[99] He continued to state that this critical shortage was due to the piecemeal augmentee system that was implemented to support Operation Promote Liberty. He argued that the military "should have the [reserve] units that we would activate ready"[100] instead of asking for volunteers to fill these specialized roles.

Manpower issues plagued the planning, transition phase, and execution of post-conflict stability operations after the 1989 invasion of Panama. The planning staff for the invasion did not have CA personnel integrated with their staff to emphasize the importance of integrating CMO with the actual invasion. The planning staff of the post-conflict phase understood the importance of their mission, but they did not have enough personnel to construct a cohesive plan for their mission. The lack of manpower hampered the transition between Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty. The critical presidential reserve call-up never materialized and the JCS implemented the ARCV plan in a way that prevented many of the pre-selected volunteers from deploying. CMOTF and its replacement, the MSG, were ad-hoc entities that had difficulty organizing themselves even though they assumed the daunting task of restoring stability to a nation. The lack of specialized personnel forced combat units to assume unfamiliar roles where they exercised their ingenuity rather than the skills the learned during training. Additional troops with specialized skills were needed in Panama, but they never came. Lack of

manpower adversely impacted the planning phase of the operation, the transition between combat and stability operations, and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

<div align="center">Interagency Cooperation and Stability Operations</div>

The 2006 version of Joint Publication 1-02 defines a strategy as a "set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."[101] The instruments of national power are the resources a country implements towards the achievement of their national objectives. The national instruments of power fall into four categories: diplomacy, economics, military, and information. Military actions alone do not constitute a comprehensive strategy. Interagency cooperation allows the remainder of United States Government agencies to assist the military and eventually take lead in the ultimate achievement of national objectives. A military may defeat an enemy force, but a nation must appropriately leverage all instruments of national power to achieve the desired strategic end state objectives.

This thesis will examine the importance of interagency cooperation for the planning and execution of military operations. The study will review the level of interagency cooperation with OGAs during the planning phase of the operation, during the execution of the invasion and the transition to stability operations, and finally during the conduct of post-conflict stability operations to determine if the planners of the 1989 Panama invasion had an adequate level of interagency cooperation to plan and execute the post-conflict stability operations necessary for achieving the strategic goals of Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty.

Interagency Cooperation and the Planning
of the Invasion of Panama

In order to determine whether the planners of the 1989 American invasion of
Panama had an adequate level of interagency cooperation, the study will examine the
following secondary research question: "How did the level of interagency cooperation
affect the planning of the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations?"

SOUTHCOM did not coordinate or plan with any OGA. As the planners for
Operation Promote Liberty developed the plan, they realized that they needed to
coordinate with OGAs because they were encroaching on their responsibilities and areas
of expertise. GEN Woerner stated that he was not allowed to "enter into plans with the
Department of State, for security reasons." [102] They were planning an invasion of a
friendly nation and if that information leaked out it could have unforeseen diplomatic
ramifications.[103] Leaders cited OPSEC as the reason why SOUTHCOM did not
coordinate their efforts.

OPSEC caused the planning process to be limited in scope and the military
addressed the mission "unilaterally, without the coordination of the government
departments."[104] When the Blind Logic planners asked GEN Woerner for permission to
coordinate critical planning issues with the political counselor at the American Embassy
in Panama, the SOUTHCOM commander initially balked at the request but finally gave
them permission to speak to the Embassy. The dialogue was for fact finding purposes
only and he instructed the planners to talk around the plan.[105]

Limited information gathering did not substantially assist the planners in fully
understanding the scope of the issues they were about to encounter in Panama. By
attempting to approach the invasion and post-conflict stability operations as an exclusive

Department of Defense operation, the invasion planners were unable to receive valuable insight and contextual knowledge from various functional and country experts. A broader approach would have facilitated a better "understanding of the Panamanian context and of the political, cultural, economic, and social ramifications"[106] of the planned invasion. It would have also outlined and established the post-conflict activities that "SOUTHCOM could conduct as a part of an integrated political-military policy to support democratization and nation-building in Panama."[107]

The lack of interagency coordination may have contributed to several faulty assumptions the planners made during the planning process. The most significant assumption that did not come true was the premise that that the CMOTF would be responsible for CMO to restore some form of government and resume government services in Panama after combat and for a period not to exceed 30 days.[108] When the invasion plan included installing the democratically elected Endara government, the planners no longer planned to execute civil administration missions. They assumed that the Government of Panama could resume self rule immediately after the invasion.[109]

This faulty assumption would have been obvious if the SOUTHCOM planners understood the level of corruption in Panama and the extent of the PDF involvement throughout Panama's government. Since the mission included removing the PDF, most facilities and services would grind to a halt as the PDF was dismantled. The lack of embassy input may have contributed to this flawed assumption. GEN Thurman stated he and his planners did not understand the depth of corruption in the Panamanian Government.[110] Corruption in Panama reached a new height under Noriega. He and the PDF extended their influence "deep into the civilian government agencies, the banks, and

the business community."[111] This corruption was going to complicate necessary stability

operations and should have been foreseen and addressed in Blue Spoon and Blind Logic.

Instead, they assumed that the new government would be functional immediately.[112]

There was no interagency cooperation during the planning of Blue Spoon and

Blind Logic. Excessive OPSEC prevented SOUTHCOM and its subordinates from

coordinating with OGAs from the United States Government. When planners were finally

allowed to speak to the United States Embassy in Panama they had to skirt around the

plan to gather critical facts. This prevented some military planners from gaining valuable

expertise and insight from the OGAs and created an exclusive military solution for the

contingency in Panama. Planners' assumptions of Panamanian Government's abilities

were unchallenged or verified and Blind Logic became the military solution to a political-

military problem. The absence of interagency cooperation adversely impacted the

planning process for the planning of the Panama invasion.

<div align="center">Interagency Cooperation and the Transition Between
Combat and Post-Conflict Stability Operations</div>

In order to determine what impact interagency cooperation had on the transition

between combat and stability operations, the study will now examine the following

secondary research question: "How did interagency coordination affect the transition

between combat and stability operations?"

The lack of interagency coordination prior to the invasion caught the rest of the

United States Government unprepared. In early 1989, the United States recalled their

Ambassador to Panama and the charge d'affaires, John Bushnell, was unaware of the

post-conflict plan prior to the invasion nor was the embassy ready to implement any post-

conflict plan. After the May 1989 elections embassy personnel was lowered from 120 to 45 and the embassy only had 15 people in Panama for the invasion.[113] Very few of them were senior staff members.

These fifteen personnel were expected to spearhead the diplomatic efforts to assist the new Endara government. This was no small task because the Government of Panama imploded after the invasion. The collapse of virtually all of the government's institutions meant that the Endara government basically consisted of the new president and his two vice-presidents. At the time of their inauguration on 18 December, they assumed the responsibility and authority to govern Panama, but they certainly lacked the ability to effectively accomplish anything.

As the situation in Panama degenerated, GEN Thurman recognized that the embassy needed help and placed the CMOTF under the operational control of the embassy. Although the embassy was officially in charge, the CMOTF initially controlled everything that the Embassy and the Panamanian government did.[114] When Ambassador Deane Hinton arrived in Panama, he inherited an embassy that was theoretically in charge of all CMO, but he found "disorganized embassy staff, ... [n]o resources and a mandate to fix things."[115] Ambassador Hinton found that "the Army was . . . implementing a military government,"[116] but due to the lack of interagency cooperation, the embassy was neither staffed nor prepared to execute any other plan.[117] Ambassador Hinton continued to say that it took a long time to complete his staff because he could not just order personnel from the Department of State to deploy to Panama. "The State Department [had] to go through a process of requesting volunteers [to fill the staff], advertising, and

so forth."[118] This inability to respond to the crisis and build manpower left Ambassador Hinton no choice "but to rely on the military to take the lead in restoration."[119]

The lack of interagency planning led to the critical omission of identifying the responsibility to restore law and order. When the PDF imploded, there was a need to establish an entity that could restore order throughout the country. Massive looting during the first few days of the invasion illustrated the need to re-establish security across Panama, but the United States was unprepared to address this unforeseen issue.[120]

JTFSO was completing combat operations across Panama and CMOTF was busy assisting the embassy and the new government of Panama. Who was left to help restore law and order? The government of Panama decided to form the PNP from the remnants of the PDF, and Major General Cisneros, the deputy JTFSO commander, created a unit to help the Endara government establish its police force. The USFLG assumed the mission to train and equip the PNP and assist its deployment to various cities across the country.[121] The USFLG created a twenty hour course transitional course to train the former members of the PDF for their new role. USFLG drew upon the expertise of reservists who were civilian policemen.[122]

The lack of interagency planning also contributed to the inability to anticipate and the lack of resources to deal with the collapse of the Panamanian court system. This vacuum caused JTFSO to create another ad hoc organization, Judicial Liaison Group (JLG). The JLG's mission was to "initiate action to get the court system functioning again."[123] The JLG organized the opening of the night court system and "acted as liaison between the Panamanian government and [United States] forces on legal and judicial matters."[124] The unanticipated need to restore law and order were now addressed.

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Other agencies were unable to react to the invasion. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice were also unable to mobilize quickly into Panama. In between the invasion and the creation of the MSG, there were multiple interagency meetings, but nothing of significance was accomplished at these meetings. One official noted that OGAs "seemed unwilling to participate."[125] He said that the OGAs "were justifiably irritated, and may not have wanted to get involved after the military had already created its own little mess."[126]

The lack of interagency cooperation before the invasion clearly complicated the transition between combat and stability operations. Because many of the OGAs were unprepared to assist in stabilizing the region, the task fell squarely upon the shoulders of the American armed forces in Panama. The already overtasked military had to react to many unanticipated requirements to make up for faulty assumptions and the OGA's lack of resources and manpower to stabilize Panama and preserve the legitimacy of the Endara government.

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Interagency Cooperation and its Impact on
Post-Conflict Stability Operations.

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In order to determine what impact interagency cooperation had on the execution of post-conflict stability operations, the study will now examine the following secondary research question: "Did interagency coordination support stability operations necessary after the conclusion of combat operations?"

When Operation Just Cause officially ended on 31 January 1990, section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the military from continuing to train a foreign police force.[127] The embassy would bring in the International Criminal Investigation

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a Department of Justice program, "to create a "civilian" police force, impart modern methods of policing and replace USFLG as advisers to the PNP."[128]

ICITAP was ill-suited for the job. ICITAP was used to training already established police forces.[129] ICITAP had never attempted a mission of this scope and was not ready to stand up a twelve-thousand man police force.[130] ICITAP normally trained police forces in investigation skills and forensics. It was not designed to teach the needed patrolman skills. ICITAP was unprepared to teach daily police skills and use of force techniques.[131]

ICITAP needed time to develop its course and recruit instructors. ICITAP former FBI and other law enforcement officials formed the core of the ICITAP instructor pool.[132] They taught a 120 hour course in English to the PNP, but the training was too slow to complete. It would take almost two years for ICITAP to complete training the PNP at that rate. [133] It took ICITAP almost 6 months before it had permanent personnel in country which caused the USFLG's successor, the Police Liaison Group (PLG) to continue to work with the PNP until ICITAP was prepared to assume the mission. When ICITAP began training the PNP, the PLG continued joint patrols with the PNP to advise them and provide them feedback on their daily operations.[134]

There was substantial friction between ICITAP and military. ICITAP complained that the MSG was usurping its role and the MSG charged that ICITAP was failing to do its job. Ambassador Hinton finally told the MSG to support ICITAP he was unable to ease the tensions between the two organizations. Because of the underlying tensions between the two organizations, ICITAP failed to did not leverage MSG's expertise. The

reserve component Soldiers that were civilian police could have helped develop some of the training in which ICITAP instructors lacked experience or expertise. ICITAP could have used foreign area officers to teach some of their courses in Spanish. Bruised feelings that may have stemmed from the Department of Defense's failure to integrate the Department of Justice into the planning and execution of the invasion hampered America's efforts to build the PNP.[135]

USAID was also unprepared to respond to post-conflict scenario. It took several months for USAID to set up offices and detail personnel to Panama. USAID was not prepared to assist country-wide nation building. USAID was the lead agency responsible for infrastructure repair, but the military was the de facto entity resourcing and completing the infrastructure repair because USAID was not yet in Panama. When USAID finally arrived in Panama, they resisted to coordinate their activities with the military.[136] USAID's inability to deploy and work with the military detracted from the United States' ability to leverage the nation's capabilities to achieve the national end state objectives.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter explored whether or not SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners had adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. The study examined the three critical resources of doctrine, manpower, and interagency coordination and determined that SOUTHCOM and the subordinate task forces had difficulty leveraging these essential resources during the planning, transition, and execution of post-combat stability operations for the 1989 invasion of Panama.

Doctrine did not address the importance of post-combat operations in the achievement of the nations desired post-conflict strategic end state. The Army educational system and unit training programs were directly impacted by the lack of emphasis on post-conflict stability received in doctrine. The Officer Education System did not train most officers to conduct these critical operations so commanders did not stress these critical operations. This omission impacted the ability of commanders and their planners to understand the importance of planning and integrating the transition between combat and stability operations. The lack of command emphasis on CMO contributed to commanders not devoting training time to hone skills that they did not think they would use. Units were unprepared to deal with post-conflict tasks and had to resort to improvising. Doctrine did provide SOUTHCOM the ability to reorganize the units conducting Operation Promote Liberty to achieve unity of effort and command, but SOUTHCOM initially was unable to leverage it to synchronize their efforts. The lack of comprehensive post-conflict doctrine directly impacted the Army's training and education system. If post-conflict stability operations had been integrated into doctrine, the commanders and planners would have been more aware of the importance of CMO. This would have resulted in the integration of these operations into their planning process and training programs. Instead they were unable to rely on their doctrine and training and they would only appreciate the importance these critical operations based on their personal and operational experiences.

Manpower issues plagued the entire operation. The planning staff for the invasion did not have the appropriate personnel to understand the importance of CMO. The planning staff of the post-conflict did not have enough personnel to construct a cohesive

plan for their mission. The lack of manpower hampered the transition between Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty. The reserve call-up did not happen and the JCS did not implement the ARCV alternative as planned causing many pre-selected augmentees from serving in Panama. CMOTF and the MSG were ad-hoc entities that had difficulties organizing themselves, but they were expected to organize a post-conflict society. The lack of specialized personnel forced Soldiers to assume unfamiliar roles. Lack of manpower adversely impacted the planning phase of the operation, the transition between combat and stability operations, and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

The lack of interagency cooperation was astonishing. The United States Armed Forces attempted to apply a military solution to a political-military situation. Due to excessive OPSEC concerns, the Department of Defense did not consult with other government agencies (OGA) until right before the execution of the invasion. The OPSEC concerns prior to the invasion caught the rest of the United States Government unprepared. The charge d'affaires in Panama, John Bushnell, was unaware of the post-conflict plan prior to the invasion and the embassy was not ready to implement any post-conflict plan. The military was also unable to leverage the expertise of many other subject matter experts throughout the United States Government because they simply did not consult with them. The lack of interagency cooperation before the invasion clearly complicated the transition between combat and stability operations. Because many of the OGAs were unprepared to assist in stabilizing the region, the task fell squarely upon the shoulders of the American armed forces in Panama. When OGAs begin to integrate into the plan, they were begrudgingly compliant or passive aggressive with the military. This

uneasy working relationship resulted in an ineffective approach to post-combat stability operations in Panama. Lack of interagency cooperation adversely impacted the planning phase of the operation, the transition between combat and stability operations, and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

Now that the study completed its examination it has enough information to answer the initial research question. SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners did not have adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama.

The final chapter of this study will examine the current state of doctrine manpower, and interagency cooperation with regards the current conduct of post-conflict stability operations. It will briefly discuss their impact on future instance of post-combat stability operation and conclude with some recommendations for future consideration.

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[124] Ibid.

[125] Shultz, 39.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Donnelly et al., 383.

[128] Fishel and Downie, 69-70.

[129] Taw, 28.

[130] Shultz, 49.

[131] Ibid., 48.

[132] Donnelly et al., 384.

[133] Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, "Panama: Operation Just Cause," [On-line], Available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/Policing%20the%20New%20World%20Disorder%20-%20May%2098/chapter2.html; Internet: Accessed 3 May 2007.

[134] Ibid., 8.

[135] Fishel and Downie, 76.

[136] Shultz, 42 and 64.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Planning post-conflict stability operations is not easy, but the United States is currently executing these critical missions and in all likelihood will continue to do so. These crucial operations require extensive coordination and resources. In order to better prepare for future instances of post-conflict stability operations professionals must examine the successes and failures of past attempts and ensure that lessons harvested from these operations are institutionalized. This study has examined the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, a combat operation launched to protect the security of the American people. This preemptive attack was similar to the initial attacks during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The United States Armed Forces conducted a rapid combat operation to remove a corrupt regime and performed extensive post-conflict stability operations to restore order to the region.

This chapter will briefly summarize the findings of the previous chapter to allow the reader to understand the challenges of planning post-conflict stability operations in the late 1980s. This thesis will then examine how doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation are currently integrated in the planning of contemporary stability operations. Finally, this study will make recommendations for future investigation based on the current state of stability operations.

Summary of Analysis of Research Questions

This thesis explored the United States invasion of Panama to determine if the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and subordinate task force planners had adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations. The study examined the three critical resources of doctrine, manpower, and interagency coordination and determined that each these factors had an impact on the planning and execution of the 1989 invasion of Panama.

The lack of comprehensive post-conflict doctrine impacted the planning phase of the operation, the transition between combat and stability operations, and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations. Joint doctrine was fairly immature and did not cover post-conflict stability operations. It concentrated on standardizing how the different services operated together. Army doctrine also did not cover the importance of post-conflict stability operations. Its keystone manual that addressed military operations, FM 100-5 acknowledged that military operations pursue the achievement of political objectives, but it predominantly discussed the use of force to achieve these goals. [1] It only mentioned civil military operations (CMO) as a means available to a military commander to leverage his environment to complete tactical actions. Other manuals like FM 41-10 contained valuable information that was applicable in a post-conflict environment, but mainstream Army units were unfamiliar with these manuals. The lack of comprehensive post-conflict doctrine impacted the Army's educational system and unit training programs. Commanders and staffs were not trained to appreciate the importance of integrating CMO into a major operation or plan and lack of comprehensive post-conflict

doctrine meant that commanders and their planners would only appreciate the importance these operations based on their own personal and operational experiences.

Manpower issues plagued the entire operation. The planning staffs for the invasion lacked Civil Affairs (CA) personnel to emphasize importance of CMO and the post-conflict planning staff was undermanned and unable to construct a cohesive plan. The lack of manpower hampered the transition between Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty. A planned reserve call-up did not happen and the clumsy execution of augmentation reserve component volunteer (ARCV) alternative caused additional personnel turbulence. Lack of manpower adversely impacted the planning phase of the operation, the transition between combat and stability operations, and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

The lack of interagency cooperation was astonishing. The United States Armed Forces attempted to apply a military solution to a political-military situation. Excessive operational security (OPSEC) concerns prevented the Department of Defense from consulting with other government agencies (OGA) before the invasion. Excluding the rest of the United States Government (USG) from the planning process did not allow the rest of the USG to prepare for their post-conflict responsibilities. The charge d'affaires, John Bushnell, and the embassy in Panama were also unaware of the post-conflict plan prior to the invasion. This unilateral approach to planning prevented the military from leveraging the expertise subject matter experts throughout the USG. Because many of the OGAs were unprepared to assist in stabilizing the region, the task fell squarely upon the shoulders of the United States Armed Forces in Panama. Lack of interagency cooperation

adversely impacted the transition between combat and stability operations and the conduct of post-conflict stability operations.

After completing the examination of doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation, the study had enough information to answer the initial research question. SOUTHCOM and subordinate task force planners did not have adequate resources to plan the transition and execution of post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama. These resources adversely impacted post-conflict stability operations, but the United States Armed Forces were able to complete their mission due to their familiarity with the population. The United States did not face a non-compliant population; in fact the Panamanians welcomed the Americans. The United States Armed Forces also did not encounter a language barrier because many Soldiers spoke Spanish as a first or second language. Without these unique advantages operations in Panama "could have been much more devastating and could have required a much longer-term U.S. commitment."[2] But has the United States incorporated the lessons from the 1989 invasion of Panama or are planners doomed to repeat the same mistakes again in the not so distant future? Now that the study has highlighted the challenges of planning post-conflict stability operations for the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, this thesis will then examine how doctrine, manpower, and interagency cooperation are currently integrated in the planning and execution of contemporary post-conflict stability operations.

A Contemporary Look at Stability Operations

Stability Operations and the Campaign Planning Process

In the contemporary operational environment, the United States can deploy its

military abroad in support of national security goals in a variety of operations. When the

United States Armed Forces embarks on a major campaign or operation involving large-

scale combat, current doctrine recognizes that the military must conduct stability

operations as well as offensive and defensive operations to achieve the desired national

strategic end state and conclude the campaign or operation successfully.[3] Stability

operations are an essential component to achieving long-term regional stabilization and

national strategic objectives.

Current doctrine uses the phasing technique to assist Joint Force Commanders

(JFCs) and their staffs to synchronize and allocate anticipated resources for an upcoming

campaign or operation. The current campaign model consists of six phases (Shaping,

Deterrence, Seizing the Initiative, Domination, Stabilization, and Enabling Civil

Authority) and each of those phases addresses the need to integrate stability operations in

each phase of a campaign or major operation.[4]

Joint doctrine states stability operations must be integrated throughout a major

operation or campaign. It instructs JFCs to "integrate and synchronize stability operations

with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign

phase."[5] Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, stresses the importance of achieving an

appropriate balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations in all campaign

or operation phases. It also states that it is imperative to start stability operations planning

"when joint operation planning is initiated."[6] Joint Publication 3-0 cautions planners that

a disproportionate focus on planning traditional combat operations threatens the full

development of "basic and supporting plans for the "stabilize" and "enable civil

authority" phases and ultimately [jeopardizes] joint operation momentum."[7] Figure 4

illustrates the notional balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations

throughout a major operation or campaign.

Figure 4. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations
Source: DoD, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 2006), V-2.

Stability Operations after Conflict Termination

Combat operations may defeat a foe, but it rarely achieves a sustainable peace or accomplishes desired national strategic objectives by itself. When major combat operations have ended, military operations will normally continue in the form of stability operations. Current doctrine acknowledges that stability operations will be "required to enable legitimate civil authority, and attain the national strategic end state."[8] Stability operations anticipated at the termination of operations are not a solely military effort. The planning for these critical operations requires detailed development and cooperation among diplomatic, military and civilian leadership. These efforts must begin early and leverage all elements of national power to ensure the achievement of national strategic objectives.[9]

Planning Considerations for Stability Operations

Each of the six phases of the campaign phasing model requires some form of stability operations. Joint Publication 3-0 states that successful JFCs must exercise great diligence in including these operations throughout the campaign or operation. Each of these phases has a specific purpose, but current joint doctrine states that stability operations must occur during each of these phases.

In the initial phase (Phase 0 – Shaping) of the campaign or operation, the JFC and his staff prepare for possible conflict and attempt to prevent future aggression. During this phase it is imperative that planning and preparation for projected stability operations begin. These preparation efforts "should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing … an appropriate force mix

and other capabilities."[10] It may be necessary to conduct stability operations during this phase "to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success."[11]

The following phase (Phase 1 – Deterrence), calls for the JFC and his staff to continue to analyze the situation and prepare for potential conflict. The JFC may initiate actions to deter and isolate the potential adversary in an attempt to cause an "early resolution without armed conflict."[12] During this phase planning and preparation for projected stability operations continue. JFCs need to prepare to fill a "power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down."[13] Detailed and comprehensive planning for anticipated stability operations should ease the transition to post-conflict stability operations and "eventually shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority."[14]

As operations commence in the next phase (Phase 2 – Seizing the Initiative), the JFC exploits "friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately."[15] During this phase it is essential to conduct stability operations to achieve military strategic and operational objectives and "establish the conditions for [stability] operations at the conclusion of sustained combat."[16] Operations may include actions "to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase enemies."[17] The JFC must also continue to synchronize stability efforts with OGAs "to facilitate [the] coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives."[18]

The following phase (Phase 3 – Domination), calls for the JFC to employ all of his "forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area"[19] to

rapidly defeat an enemy. During this phase necessary stability operations continue, and the JFC must continue planning and preparing for post-conflict stability operations. The joint force may execute a variety of tasks to include contacting host nation (HN) authorities and offering support, seizing or protecting key infrastructure, or increasing humanitarian operations to assist the local population and "ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is concluded."[20]

At the conclusion of sustained combat operations, the JFC transitions to the next phase of the operation (Phase 4 – Stabilization). Operations conducted during this phase "ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations."[21] Stability operations must initially "secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services."[22] United States Armed Forces must be ready to lead the efforts to accomplish these tasks when local civil authorities or US OGAs are incapable of assuming these responsibilities.

Multiple lines of operations may begin immediately which may cause the JFC "to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations."[23] The JFC must use caution when readjusting force structure because there may still be the need to conduct combat operations in certain areas of the Joint Operations Area (JOA). As law and order are restored and HN authorities, OGAs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) arrive, military involvement shifts from combat operations, and moves "increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished."[24]

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The JFC will conduct stability operations to support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) "in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs."[25] During this phase the United States Armed Forces should eventually transition the lead responsibility of ongoing operations to the United States Department of State in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive – 44. The State Department assumes the responsibility to plan and coordinate the USG "efforts in stabilization and reconstruction."[26] But even though the Department of State assumes the primary lead in SSTR operations, the JFC must provide military support for these operations within the JOA.[27] Figure 5 illustrates the ideal allocation of effort and responsibilities of the military and OGA/NGOs during this phase of the campaign or operation.

Figure 5. Ideal Stability Operations Transition from Military to Civil Control
Source: Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 45.

Once a legitimate civil authority is in place and able to manage the situation without further outside military assistance, the JFC can transition to the final phase of the

campaign or operation (Phase 5 – Enabling Civil Authority). In this phase the military

operations are terminated "when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives

have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished."[28] During this phase

the transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve stability

operations that initially resemble peace enforcement operations (PEO) to "include

counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism; and eventually evolve

to a peace building (PB) mission."[29]

The stability operations campaign planning considerations contained within Joint

Publication 3-0 are relatively new and are a by-product of harvesting numerous lessons

from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Joint Publications 5-0, *Doctrine

for Planning Joint Operations*, 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, and 5-

00.2*, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* were all published prior to

these operations and do not reflect the planning guidance contained within Joint

Publication 3-0.

Operations currently defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as stability

operations were then considered military operations other than war (MOOTW). Except

for the newly published Joint Publication 3-0, all of the current joint doctrine separates

MOOTW, or what today is considered stability operations, from major combat

operations. Joint Publication 5-00.1, the most recent joint publication that specifically

addresses the joint planning process, states that "[c]ampaign planning is used for combat

operations, but also has application in military operations other than war (MOOTW)."[30]

This statement demonstrates that joint planning doctrine prior to the 2006 version of Joint

Publication 3-0 did not consider stability operations an essential component of a major

combat operation. This inability to comprehend the importance of stability operations during a major combat operation may have contributed to difficulties experienced by the United States Armed Forces when they transitioned from combat operations to post-conflict stability operations.

Recommendations for Current Stability Operations

Ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have stimulated a wealth of literature on the planning and execution of these crucial operations. Conventional wisdom agrees that if "war is about the peace that follows"[31] then the proper planning, resourcing, and execution of stability operations are essential in the achievement of national strategic goals. If stability operations are ignored and postponed to a time when the security situation is more stable, the "postponement may well prove to be all but permanent"[32] and the accomplishment of the desired end state goals will be in jeopardy.

Retired Army Colonel William Flavin, Associate Professor, and Director of Multinational Stability Operations, at for the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, recognizes that conflict termination itself does not achieve the desired national strategic end state. The object of military conflict is to set the conditions for an eventual resolution of the original conflict. Conflict resolution is primarily a civil problem that requires military support. In order to successfully resolve the conflict, planners must adhere to "the following fundamentals: conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states; providing adequate intelligence and signaling; ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization."[33]

Flavin advocates a comprehensive effort by the USG to resolve the original conflict. Early interagency planning allows a more holistic approach towards conflict resolution. By adopting an integrated effort, the USG achieves "unity of effort among the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational aspects of national power."[34] This unified effort by the USG should develop a viable end state for conflict resolution due to its collective expertise; ability not to seek a solely military solution to the conflict; understanding of key issues; and increased capacity to assess and predict future critical issues.[35] By having clearly defined objectives and end states, the JFC and his staff can leverage all facets of national power in a comprehensive civil-military plan towards the execution of the stability operations needed to successfully achieve conflict resolution. If the JFC and his staff are unclear on the desired end state and objectives, they will be unable to anticipate and plan stability operations needed to achieve conflict resolution.[36]

A 2005 RAND Corporation report discusses the need to create a safe and secure environment after conflict. The report states that it is critical to establish security during the "golden hour" after the conclusion of major combat operations in order to "prevent criminal and insurgent organizations from securing a foothold on society" as well as to facilitate other required stability operations.[37] There is an immediate need for the establishment of a credible police and internal security force, but the most overlooked element in establishing security is the requirement for a functional justice system. A weak or nonexistent justice system can "undermine the benefits from better policing … and can led to a spiral of political assassinations, extrajudicial killings and petty crime."[38] An effective justice system helps build a long lasting peace.

The report also provides guidance on ways to improve post-conflict security planning. It stresses that post-conflict planning must receive the same amount of attention as the planning of combat operations. By elevating the post-conflict planning process, the USG can promote greater interagency coordination and create lasting institutional mechanisms for these crucial operations that will ultimately resolve the conflict and achieve the desired national strategic end state. Early post-conflict security planning will also facilitate the mobilization and deployment of critical manpower and expertise needed to restore order during the "golden hour." A failure to mobilize and deploy the critical personnel can create a potential security vacuum that may be difficult to overcome.[39]

Another recommendation of the RAND report is to create a force that can quickly fill the security gap. The report states that the United States military attempts to avoid the task of filling the security gap that occurs after an intervention. However, they typically are the only force immediately available to secure the area when local HN forces are unable to secure the environment themselves. It states that this issue cannot be solved by solely creating more military police units. The study recommends that the DoD must reform "joint doctrine, training, and force structures" for these post-conflict security roles.[40]

In order to improve post-conflict stability planning, the RAND Corporation identified the need to develop a comprehensive doctrine for post-conflict stability operations. It advocates creating an overarching interagency doctrine to facilitate operations, streamline the planning process, and ensure unity of effort for these critical operations.[41]

The USG must also create mechanisms to ensure faster mobilization of personnel, funds and equipment so it does not lose the ability to establish law and order during the "golden hour." Initiatives like the newly created Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should improve the USG's capabilities, but the most challenging resource will be "identifying and mobilizing internal security professionals into post-conflict situations."[42] This study recommends that the USG needs to come up with an innovative solution to address this manpower and expertise shortfall.[43]

Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Director of the U. S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, discusses the importance and complexity of stability operations conducted after decisive combat operations. Crane advocates that stability operations must begin shortly after the beginning of combat operations and that the two operations should overlap. Thinking of these two operations occurring sequentially may lead to problems. If the planners and leaders of combat operations do not address the responsibilities and actions needed to stabilize an area of operations, they run the risk of playing catch-up for the rest of the operation. Crane advocates a different term for stability operations. He believes that "transition operations" provides a better term for these operations because these operations assist the military transition the area of operations back to peace and civilian control after the conclusion of a conflict.[44]

Crane also advocates strengthening civilian agencies capabilities. If stability operations are to succeed, the civilian agencies of the USG must develop a quick-response capability and have a system in place to better coordinate their efforts. If this capability is not developed, then the military will "bear the brunt of all essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war-torn state for a long time."[45] Dr. John Fishel,

former Professor of National Security Policy and Research Director at the Center for

Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, concurs with this

assessment and adds that US OGAs need to develop the ability to implement strategy in

terms of ends, ways, and means. Until they develop that capability, the military will have

to continue to lead the organizing of stability operations.[46] Figure 6 depicts the actual

level of effort and responsibilities by the military and OGA/NGOs during the conclusion

Realistic Vision of Transition

of combat and the transition to stability operations.

Figure 6. Realistic Stability Operations Transition from Military to Civil Control
Source: Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 45.

Challenges Identified From Ongoing Stability Operations

Recent examination of ongoing operations has identified many challenges that hinder the execution of stability operations. These impediments range from institutional bureaucracies to cultural biases within the USG. These hurdles complicate the already daunting challenge of achieving the desired strategic end state objectives. The United States has conducted numerous stability operations in recent years, but unfortunately the same issues continue to plague their planning and execution.

The Military's Aversion for Stability Operations

One of the largest hurdles is that the United States military has a long standing aversion towards stability operations. Dr. Lawrence Yates states that the American military has traditionally focused on conventional warfighting as its main mission and believes that follow-on stability operations are "someone else's job."[47] According to the U.S Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, "fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service."[48] Until recently, most of the service's doctrine focused on the major combat portion of the spectrum of conflict. That myopic focus created an aversion to studying and preparing for stability operations and had a ripple effect on subordinate doctrine and military education programs. It created a culture that "real war" primarily equated to major combat operations and that stability operations were a "series of sideshows that [S]oldiers performed either separately from war or in the wake of war."[49] Stability operations must receive a greater priority because a war can be won tactically and operationally, but the nation can still suffer a strategic defeat if the transition to stability operations is poorly planned and executed.[50]

Recent operations have shown that the military must possess the skills to effectively execute stability operations. Most OGAs and NGOs with the desired skills and expertise traditionally do not arrive in "theater to conduct stability operations until friendly combat forces have established some measure of security."[51] This lag time has thrust military officers into fulfilling a variety of diplomatic and traditional roles. Many commanders and staffs find themselves "directing a variety of "nonmilitary" (political, economic, social, humanitarian) projects, or even running or helping to administer villages, towns, and cities"[52] out of necessity. These actions generally require political and diplomatic skills that are not currently taught in formal military education and training. Military leaders have completed these nontraditional missions with varying degrees of success.

The fact that most civil affairs personnel are in the Army Reserves, adds additional challenges. After World War II, all of the Army's civil affairs units, except for one brigade, were in the reserve component. This decision reinforced "the separation from the active Army's focus on combat operations and [set stability] operations apart from the professional heart of the military."[53] Military personnel with skills and expertise needed to conduct stability operations still have difficulty making a timely appearance into theater. After mobilizing these crucial units and personnel, they generally still do not receive a high priority for deployment or are not readily available for rapid deployment.[54] As a result of not having the experts in stability operations present when their skills are first needed, Soldiers find themselves conducting stability operations that they had "not anticipated and for which they lacked the requisite proficiency."[55]

The United States Armed Forces is not the only government agency that has an important role in post-conflict stability operations. Experts agree that OGAs must fully participate in the planning and execution of post-conflict stability operations. This comprehensive approach will facilitate the United States' effort to integrate the military with the other instruments of national power allowing the nation to more effectively pursue its desired national strategic end state. Unfortunately this approach is not easy because US OGAs have just as many challenges as their military counterparts in the planning and execution of post-conflict stability operations.

One of the major impediments for effective interagency coordination with the military is the structure of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Joint Publication 1-02 defines a JIACG as an "interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners."[56] This informal group is comprised of USG civilian and military experts intended to provide the combatant commander the capability to "collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments,"[57] but it does not always provide the joint force commander the level of interagency coordination needed.

Marine Colonel Matthew Bogdanos was a member of a JIACG during Operation Enduring Freedom and identified various challenges for this critical working group. He states that this mechanism is not currently structured or empowered to integrate the elements of national power. Joint doctrine describes a JIACG as a liaison organization "tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander."[58] However,

there is no standard overseeing the composition of these organizations. This creates a challenge for the combatant commander to create an ad hoc organization that has no formal agreement or overarching doctrine. There is no formal direction or requirement to compel other OGAs to participate in a JIACG. How does the combatant commander convince the other agencies to volunteer?[59]

As a by product of recent operations in support of the GWOT, the JIACG has gained "universal acceptance" throughout the USG, but many of the agencies that need to participate in the JIACGs are not allocated the necessary manpower or funds. Only a few selected agencies within the USG were funded to augment the JIACGs for all combatant commands. Subsequently, non-funded agencies "became less inclined to continue providing representatives for JIACGs after they learned they did not make the final cut."[60] This presents a challenge when attempting to plan a comprehensive campaign or operation that wields all elements of national power. The combatant commander must posses the ability to leverage OGA's core competencies effectively. This can only occur when he has the "right number, seniority, and skill sets of representatives from [each] agency."[61]

Another impediment to creating the optimum JIACG is that there is "no single standard directing when individual agencies must begin interagency participation in [the] crisis- or deliberate-planning processes."[62] Delayed interagency participation in the joint planning process can lead to a lopsided solution that neglects to consider the political and economic requirements needed to resolve a conflict. Labeling stability operations a postwar problem "muddles the fact that [post-conflict stability operations are] central to strategic victory."[63]

Even when the JIACG has the right personnel, it lacks the authority to compel any organization outside the Department of Defense to act. The JIACG is intended to "[i]mprove operational interagency campaign planning and execution,"[64] but it cannot task non-DoD personnel.[65] When a consensus is achieved, the JIACG members must take coordination requests from the JIACG back to their parent civilian agencies. Synchronizing the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments with a joint task force (JTF) is an unwieldy process. The USG has acknowledged this shortfall and charged the National Defense University to revise these procedures and create a training plan to enable each combatant commander's "JIACG to accomplish its mission of facilitating interagency coordination at the operational level."[66]

Mobilization Challenges

An appropriately structured and empowered JIACG is not the only impediment to achieving a high level interagency cooperation. Other elements of the USG are not currently structured to mobilize and deploy their agencies to execute the large scale stability operations necessary after major combat operations. There is a significant post-conflict capabilities gap between the military and civilian agencies of the USG. If this gap is not closed, the challenges the United States currently experiencing during ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to plague future post-conflict operations.

In his testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. John Hamre, President and COE of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), stated that the United States "under-invested in the civilian capabilities needed to partner with its military forces to achieve overall success in complex operations."[67] Hamre echoes the prevailing sentiment that the military can defeat an enemy decisively

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during combat operations but their efforts alone are usually insufficient to achieve the nation's overall strategic objectives. He states that the nation has "failed to adequately train, equip, or mandate its military forces for the difficult post-conflict security tasks that those forces are so often asked to carry out."[68]

Hamre testified that to decisively resolve a conflict and achieve a long lasting peace, the United States must develop and institutionalize the civilian capabilities required for post-conflict stability operations.[69] The lack of rapid deployable civilian capabilities leaves the military performing tasks for which they "do not have a comparative advantage."[70] This often leads to suboptimal results and inevitably extends the length of their deployments.

The CSIS Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction identified key gaps of USG's civilian capability in the following areas "security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well-being; and governance and participation."[71] In addition, the study identified shortfalls in four crucial areas that are "enablers" for "creating a coherent and effective response capacity: strategy and planning; implementation infrastructure; training and education; and funding."[72] It made numerous recommendations to increase the USG civilian post-conflict stability capabilities. Some of the recommendations were for the USG replace the ad hoc USG strategy and planning process for addressing post-conflict reconstruction situations and replace it with a standing comprehensive interagency process; create a mechanism for fielding U.S. civil administration experts and assembling interagency, interdisciplinary teams that specialize in building civil administration capacity; and design and develop rapidly deployable training assistance programs to assist post-conflict societies in the training of legal, judicial, penal and

human rights personnel, local entrepreneurs, civil servants and administrators; and anticorruption measures.[73] If the USG does not build these critical capabilities for "post-conflict [stability operations] and posses the political will to stay the course, countries can easily revert to failing or failed state status."[74]

The United States Military also faces challenges that prevent them from mobilizing the appropriate personnel to conduct post-conflict stability operations. The United States enjoys an enormous technological advantage over most of the rest of the world. Technological advances have allowed Americans the luxury of automating many activities that once were labor intensive, but these advances have adversely impacted the nation's ability to conduct post-conflict stability operations.

Technological advances have contributed to impressive victories in combat, but these advances have inadvertently hindered the nation's ability to deploy the appropriate level of manpower to conduct post-conflict stability operations and achieve the nation's desired political objectives. The concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) can be defined as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by leveraging technology "to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization."[75] This increased information superiority allows a force to understand an emerging situation first, act before an adversary, and win conflicts decisively. This interlinked network when coupled with unmanned sensors and precision guided munitions can bring operations to a quick conclusion at a lower cost by allowing commanders to make decisions more rapidly and bring precision fires to bear on the enemy by a relatively smaller force with greater

effect.[76] NCW allows the United States military to stop employing a large force based on the strategy of attrition and use a more streamlined force that leverages technology to shock and awe its rival.[77]

The concept of "shock and awe" leverages an unprecedented information superiority to "defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively, with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons."[78] Shock and awe attempts to end a conflict before the commitment of a large amount of ground forces. Long range precision-guided munitions and surgical attacks target an enemy's critical infrastructure over an extended period of time. These strikes convince the adversary that it cannot outlast the attacks and eventually "affect[s] the enemy's will and his means to continue."[79]

Both of these emerging concepts facilitate the United States already overwhelming ability to decisively defeat an adversary in battle, but these concepts impede America's ability to ultimately resolve a conflict and achieve peace. NCW and the theory of shock and awe allow the United States Armed Forces to fight wars quicker but with a minimum number of troops. Post-conflict stability operations are manpower intensive. If the United States continues to fight future conflicts with an over reliance on technology, there is the possibility that America may not have enough forces to stabilize a region after a conflict and lose the ability to provide basic law and order during the critical "golden hour." A campaign or operation runs the risk of losing momentum if it relies on a subsequent influx of troops to execute post-conflict stability operations. Long range fighters and precision guided munitions cannot execute stability operations.

<center>Conclusion</center>

When planning the 1989 United States invasion of Panama, the inclusion of stability operations was almost an afterthought. In the mid-1980s post-conflict stability doctrine was almost nonexistent. That fact caused the education system and training focus to ignore the importance of these operations and their link to the ultimate achievement of national strategic end state objectives. Manpower problems plagued the planning staffs and hampered the execution of needed stability operations during and after the invasion. The Department of Defense did not coordinate with OGAs during the planning of the invasion and initially attempted to apply a military solution to a political-military situation. The exclusion of the rest of the USG from the planning process did not allow them to prepare for their post-conflict responsibilities. Although some of these issues have been addressed during the past two decades, there is still room for improvement when planning for future instances of post-conflict stability operations.

Emerging joint doctrine is beginning to stress the importance of including stability operations throughout the campaign planning process. And even though the process to revise doctrine is slow and sometimes cumbersome, the military educational system is infusing emerging doctrine as necessary and practical. During academic year 06-07, the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSG) used the draft versions of Joint Publications 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, and included extensive blocks of instruction on the campaign planning process and the importance of integrating stability operations throughout the process. The inclusion of stability operations in emerging doctrine will have a ripple effect on subordinate doctrine, training, and military education programs.

<center>109</center>

Manpower continues to be an impediment for current stability operations. The United States Armed Forces had difficulty achieving the appropriate level of personnel in theater to stabilize a post-conflict region. NCW and the theory of "shock and awe" allow the United States military to defeat an adversary with the minimum amount of troops. However, smaller troop levels have a difficult time completing the most basic stability operation of restoring law and order. Precision guided munitions do not conduct stability operations.

American leadership has recognized the importance of attaining an adequate level of manpower to conduct necessary stability operations to stabilize a region upon the conclusion of combat operations. During his national address on 10 January 2007, President George W. Bush informed America that efforts to secure Iraq were failing and one of the principle reasons for this fact was that "[t]here were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure Iraqi neighborhoods."[80] Moments later the President announced that the United States would commit over 20,000 additional troops into Iraq to provide additional forces to secure and stabilize Iraq.

Interagency cooperation seems to be a tougher problem to address. During the same address, the president announced that the nation needs "to examine ways to mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas, where they can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations recovering from war and tyranny"[81] and pledged to double the number of provincial reconstruction teams to stabilize of Iraq.[82]

This attempt to increase interagency cooperation in Iraq was ambitious and has not been easy to implement because the OGAs do not have the appropriate level of

manpower to execute the necessary post-conflict stability operations. Less than 1 month

after the President's address, senior military officers informed the President and Defense

Secretary Robert M. Gates "that the new Iraq strategy could fail unless more civilian

agencies step forward quickly to carry out plans for reconstruction and political

development."[83] The office of the Secretary of State requested that "military personnel

temporarily fill more than one-third of [the new 350] State Department jobs in Iraq . . .

created under the new strategy."[84] These shortfalls are due to the fact that the United

States Foreign Service only has 6,000 people and Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated that

it would take the Department of State six months to locate and prepare civil servants and

contractors to send overseas. This is just one of many instances that display the inability

of OGAs to provide assistance for post-conflict stability operations. The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace states OGAs must become more expeditionary

in nature to allow the United States to assist a country like Iraq restore justice, law and

order, and basic life services.[85]

     If the rest of the USG does not improve their expeditionary capability, then the

military will continue to be almost exclusively responsible to stabilize a region after the

termination of a conflict. In order to better fulfill these obligations, the former Chief of

Staff of the Army Peter J. Schoomaker stated the Army leaders must become

pentathletes. He stated that the Army must grow and educate adaptive people "that will

be able to operate across the spectrum to include in the non-traditional roles and stability

and support operations . . . and all these other things that we don't consider to be war in

the traditional sense to prosecute our nation's interests."[86] To grow and educate these

pentathletes takes a substantial investment in manpower. Leaders must be afforded the

chance to participate in educational opportunities and internships that prepare them for these growing responsibilities. This investment will not be without cost. The Army currently is unable to spare the manpower to create these unique opportunities for these sorely needed pentathletes. For every pentathlete in training in a civilian educational institution or an internship, the military would need to fill a vacancy in the operational Army. How will the Army create the number of pentathletes needed to continue to the ongoing GWOT? A failure to grow these pentathletes could prevent the United States from prosecuting our nation's interests in the future. This dilemma is beyond the scope of this study but would make an excellent topic for future research.

Impediments to achieving a greater level or interagency cooperation do not end on the strategic level. The USG continues to lack the ability to effectively coordinate stability operations at the operational level. The JIACG is an ineffective structure that is improperly manned and lacks the authority to task any agency outside the DoD. Even if the JIACG could function in a more efficient manner, OGAs do not have the capabilities to field an operational branch to accomplish stability operations necessary in a post-combat scenario.

Interagency cooperation will continue to be sporadic at best if things do not change. The agencies within the USG are separate entities and only coordinate with each other when absolutely essential. Even when it happens, there is no definitive supervising entity to ensure that the USG is fully leveraging the capabilities of the entire government to achieve the desired national strategic goals. One possible solution for this dilemma is called the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Program. This project proposes various models for institutionalizing the interagency process in a similar way the Goldwater-Nichols Act of

1986 created an environment for the United States Armed Forces to operate jointly and more efficiently.[87] This is just one proposed solution to force the USG to approach future campaigns and operations in a more comprehensive manner. Another possible solution targets the operational level of the USG and includes integrating key interagency billets within a combatant command to assist the USG in achieving unity of effort.[88] These and other potential solutions to the interagency dilemma are also beyond the scope of this thesis, but are worthy for future study.

As the GWOT continues, America will continue to intervene to protect national security. But when hostilities end, the challenging work of post-conflict stabilization must begin. The USG must continue to grow its capabilities to conduct post-conflict stability operations to support it allies when the fighting ends. Post-conflict stability operations are crucial components for restoring peace. Peace and stability will only remain if efforts to restore law and order are successful. A military may defeat an enemy force, but a nation must appropriately leverage all instruments of national power to achieve the desired strategic end state objectives. Anything less may lead to a nation achieving tactical success but never attaining a strategic victory.

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