

Building a Planning Transition Capability into the New American Way of War

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

“Building a Planning Transition Capability into the New American Way of War”
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The fast tempo decisive combat operations has been called the “New American Way of War.” This is in contrast to the traditional “American Way of War” which emphasized using massive amounts of firepower in a “grinding strategy of attritions” like the United States did against Germany and Japan in World War II. A major problem for Joint Force commanders and their staffs is that the speed of campaign in this “New American Way of War” challenges their ability to adequately plan for both the decisive war fight and the transition to post conflict operations. Campaigns of attrition in the traditional “American Way of War” tended to be long and therefore there was time during the war fight to plan for the aftermath. Obviously, a solution to this problem is not to revert back to the attrition based strategy, but to figure out how to best organize our commands to deal with this planning complexity. There are many implications with this transition from war fighting to the post conflict across the echelons of command and levels of war from training of combat forces to the integration of the interagency into the operational concept. This monograph focuses on one such implication of this new American way of war, the ability for the command structure to adequately plan through the entire campaign.

The monograph’s thesis is to better facilitate the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase will require separate operational-level headquarters, with sufficient training and expertise, focused on each of these phases working under a geographic combatant commander’s overall operational design.

In operational design, it is important to get the overall command structure right with appropriate levels of responsibility and clear relationships and objectives. An examination of three past operations will reveal insights on the validity of the hypothesis. The first case study is General Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters’ Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II which is an example of the traditional massive firepower, attrition-based “American Way of War.” We will see how the SHAEF command structure organized where the length of the dominate phase was much longer and therefore time to prepare for the stability phase was longer. The two other case studies, US joint operations in Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom are examples of the “New American Way of War.” These operations had dominant phases that were very fast causing a quick transition to the stability phase. The SHAEF case study will reveal insights on what type of organizations, policies, procedures, and training, that evolved over time, that will need to be built into how we operate in the “New American Way of War.”

This monograph uses organizational theory concepts of differentiation and integration to analyze the command structures in each of these case studies. This monograph concludes that it is not only important to properly structure the command through differentiation and integration to meet the complexity of the environment, but it is also necessary to have commanders and staff that are knowledgeable of how to conduct the transition from the dominate and the stability phase. The monograph recommends that this transition be trained in exercises and taught at appropriate Army and Joint schools and courses.

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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are the coach for the Kansas City Chiefs and are preparing to play the New England Patriots. You prepare your team and develop the game plan, after having studied Patriot game film, to best employ your available talent. During the game you must prepare for another game, except this one is cricket against a top UK team from Sussex. It is a game in which you and your staff have little understanding or expertise. There are numerous challenges for the Chiefs in this situation. First, culturally the Chiefs think football is for tough guys and cricket is for white-suited gentlemen. Second, as one staff should not be dealing simultaneously with the execution of one game while attempting to plan for the other, the coach divides his staff with half focusing on playing the Patriots and the other half figuring out cricket. Third, there is the challenge of developing a cricket game plan by a staff with little inherent expertise on the rules or strategy of the game. The half of the staff that is still focused on football intuitively knows how to get the team ready and make adjustments during the game.

After a long, hot summer camp and six games, the staff focused on football has integrated, under the coach's direction, the talent of the team into a well-oiled machine. They are thankful they are not the other half of the staff focused on cricket. Meanwhile, the assistants working the cricket game plan are searching the internet for the rules. At first they are happy that both sports involve eleven players and a leather ball. Then they look perplexed when one of them learns that there is a batsman who defends the wicket from the ball with a cricket bat. The commissioner of the league understands the challenge, but tells you that it is in the best interests of the league that you get over it and learn how to play both games.

Mentally shift the football analogy to military operations. You are a United States Joint Force Commander instead of a coach.¹ Your first game is the decisive war fight and the second is the stability operation.² Conceptually, the problem the Chiefs face is not much different than that of the Joint Force Commander, who believes culturally that the military is all about war fighting and anything else is operations other than war. As a result, you and your staff have not developed the expertise to deal with the complexities of stability operations at the operational level.³

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), GL 10. Joint doctrine defines a Joint Force Commander as a “combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called a Joint Force Commander (JFC).” This monograph has several JFCs in the case studies examined. General Eisenhower, the commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the European Theater in World War II, would, by this definition, be a JFC. In the Operation JUST CAUSE case study on operations in Panama the US SOUTHCOM (Southern Command) combatant commanders, GEN Woerner and GEN Thurman, and the Joint Task Force Commander, LTG Stiner, are JFCs. In the Iraq case study, the US CENTCOM (Central Command) combatant commander, GEN Franks, is a JFC.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), V-1. Decisive war fight is a descriptive, non-doctrinal term to describe major combat operations like DESERT STORM or the attack to Baghdad in the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Doctrinally, major combat operations have combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In the decisive war fight the offensive and defensive operations are dominant, but stability operations still occur to a lesser degree. Joint doctrine defines stability operations as an overarching term that uses the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) “to maintain and reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001, as Amended Through 17 September 2006), 504.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operation*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), V-1. There are doctrinally three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. These levels help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although it is not a joint doctrinal level, the theater strategic level is widely accepted to describe the level between strategic and operational. II-1 In fact, in Joint Pub 3.0, this is a diagram with four levels of war on it, one of which is theater strategic (IV-32).

Strategic level of war. “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.” (GL-29).

Organizationally, your Joint Force is driven by your vision and intent, but you find that it difficult to mentally focus on two very different types of operations at the same time. As the commander, you find it especially difficult to give stability guidance on a topic you have spent little time studying or training. You are puzzled about how to think through the complexity of issues you will face during the transition to stability operations. What is the proper sequence to reestablish a stable society? The answer is not leaping out at you and you have units in decisive enemy contact and have difficulty devoting mental energy to anything but the immense complexity of current joint warfare. Your staff is organized between future operations and future plans, but they are having similar trouble with dealing with the complexity of planning and executing two very different types of operations. Many of the instruments you need to use in the stability operation are from other parts of government. Like the commissioner of the league to the Chief's coach, the Department of Defense orders you to get over it and to put equal emphasis on both war fighting and stability operations.⁴ The fast operational tempo is challenging your ability to do just that.

The fast tempo of current decisive combat operations have been called the "New American Way of War."⁵ Military historian Max Boot, in a 2003 article written in *Foreign Affairs*, describes the initial attack to Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an example of "The

Operational level of war. "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas." (GL-25).

Tactical level of war. "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives." (GL-31).

⁴ Gordon England, *DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 28 Nov 2005), 2. This directive states that stability and combat operations are of comparable priority in the Joint and Service doctrine and training.

New American Way of War.”⁶ According to Boot, with the advent of the information age, there is a new style to the American way of war. This style wants to prevent the large scale losses on both sides. According to Boot, “The hallmarks of this new style are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It relies on precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations. It strives to integrate naval, air, and land power into a seamless whole.”⁷ The United States Joint Forces Command has adopted Boot’s description, “The New American Way of War” as it describes U.S. Joint operation concepts.⁸

Boot’s description of this new style of American warfare is an update of historian Russel Weigley’s view of the traditional American way of war, one of using massive firepower and attrition. Weigley’s observation of the “American Way of War”, in his book of that title, from his analysis of strategy employed by Grant against Lee in 1864, to our strategy against the Germans and the Japanese, is that it has been a “grinding strategy of attrition.” The awesome firepower of industrial age warfare enabled a strategy for the United States to “inflict and endure (massive) casualties more effectively than could our adversaries, ultimately leading to victory.”

A major problem for Joint Force commanders and their staffs is that the speed of the campaign in this “New American Way of War” challenges their ability to adequately plan for both the decisive war fight and the transition to post conflict operations. Campaigns of attrition in the traditional “American Way of War” tended to be long and therefore there was time during the war fight to plan for the aftermath. Obviously, a solution to this problem is not to revert back to the attrition based strategy, but to figure out how to best organize our commands to deal with this planning complexity. There are many implications with this transition from war fighting to the

⁶ Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003) (Journal on-line); available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15404/max-boot/the-new-american-way-of-war.html>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2006.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ US Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment, The World Through 2030 and Beyond* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2006), IV.

post conflict across the echelons of command from the training of the tactical forces across the full spectrum of operations to the integration of the interagency into the operational concept.

This monograph focuses on one such implication of this new American way of war, the ability for the command structure to adequately plan through the entire campaign. This monograph will use the current joint doctrine phasing model as a framework to illustrate this planning challenge of transitioning from conflict to post conflict operations. *Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning*, provides a phasing model for joint campaigns (see figure 1). This phasing model is not prescriptive, meaning a joint force commander must use it for phasing a campaign. Rather, the model is descriptive in that it logically lays out the sequence of a campaign from current peace-time cooperative engagement activities (military exercises, foreign aid etc.) to shape the environment in order to prevent a crisis situation from escalating to combat operations and transitioning to post conflict activities. Although this phasing model has phases zero through five and appears sequential, these phases can occur simultaneously at different locations on the battlefield.

Phases are both sequential and simultaneous. There are parts of each phase that occur from the very first phase of the campaign (see figure 2). The name of the phase simply characterizes what is the preponderance of the military effort at that particular time. For example, there are stabilization operations occurring during the dominate phase and combat operations occurring during the stability phase. This monograph focuses on the transition from major war fighting, the dominant phase, to the post conflict period, the stability phase. A transition is when there is a shift in the preponderance of the military effort by the joint force. Transitions to another phase are usually event driven and not time driven, and occur when the objectives of the phase are achieved. With the speed of the new American way of war, there is little time to develop a plan for the stability phase during the dominant phase. Joint war fighting is so complex that the headquarters commanding the dominate phase will have difficulty concurrently planning the equally complex stability phase.




Figure 1: Phasing Model⁹




Figure 2: Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort¹⁰

In the years since the transition from the dominant to the stability phase during Operation Iraqi Freedom, much has been written about the difficulty in properly planning the stability phase.

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning, Revision Final Coordination* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 11 April 2006), IV-36.

There are many aspects to this issue that have been identified ranging from the quality of strategic-level guidance and direction, to the difficulties in interagency coordination, to not understanding the local culture, to not having sufficient resources and many others. Culturally, our military tended to emphasize training, planning, and executing combat operations and not the post conflict operations that follow. The dominant phase combat operations could be perfectly executed, but this phase does not achieve the national objectives for the campaign. Post conflict operations ultimately achieve our national objectives. Some of these issues have caused action in new Presidential and Department of Defense directives and are reflected in the most current joint doctrine in order to ensure the proper emphasis is taken for all phases of a campaign.¹¹ This monograph will take a broader historical view of this topic, from past operations to our latest joint doctrine and investigate how organizations were structured to make this complex transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase in order to see how their organizational command structure affected their ability to plan for the stability phase.

¹⁰ Ibid., IV-34.

¹¹ England, Gordon, DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 28 Nov 2005), 2. *DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSRT) Operations* states that “stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including, doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. This DOD Directive is now reflected in the most current Joint Doctrine in that in any phase of an operation there are offense, defense, and stability operations. In all phases, stability operations reflect as least half of the operational effort. It is clear in Joint Doctrine that the cultural tendency to emphasize combat over post conflict operations is a hard lessened learned. “Major operation and campaign plans must feature an appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations in all phases. Most importantly, planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated. ...An uneven focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the “dominate” phase may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phase and ultimately joint operation momentum.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), V-2.

ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

In order to understand what the difficulties our joint organizations are having in dealing with this transition from the dominate to the stability phase this monograph uses insights from organizational theory. The essence of the difficulty in the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase is the fast rate of change between two very highly complex operations, combat and stability. The mental capacities of the commander and his staff can only comprehend so much in a fast changing, highly complex environments. Figure 3 illustrates this environment of high rate of change and high complexity in the box in the lower right.¹² The amount of available planning time is key. Obviously, if there was unlimited planning time, then the rate of change would be lower and a staff would be better able to deal with the complexity.

		Rate of Change	
		low	high
Complexity	low	Low uncertainty	Moderate uncertainty
	high	Moderate uncertainty	High uncertainty

Figure 3: Environmental uncertainty is defined by the amount of complexity And the rate of change in the organization environment

If there is too much complexity to process in too short of time the result is great uncertainty. An organizational theory called the law of requisite variety states that “organizations map perceived environmental complexity with their internal structures and management systems.” In other words, to deal with the difficulty in the rapid transition between combat and

stability operations one must adapt the organization to fit the complexity and rate of change. This is called isomorphism, that is, “the belief that organizations match the complexity of the environment with internal structures and systems.”¹³

A simple analogy to illustrate this point of too much complexity in too short of time is imagine trying to drive a car and talk on a cell phone while merging into rush hour traffic. Between the conversation on the cell phone and maneuvering your car into traffic, your brain is experiencing a high rate of change while performing two simultaneous task. Little wonder that your chance of getting into a traffic accident go up five-fold if you drive while talking on a cell phone. Studies have shown that this is even more dangerous than driving drunk. The accident rate goes up for drivers talking on a cell phone because these studies have found that fifty percent of the visual traffic information wasn't processed by the driver.¹⁴

American organization theorists Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, in their book, *Organization and Environment*, discuss how isomorphism causes an organization to change to deal with the degree of complexity and rate of change of the environment.¹⁵ According to these theorists, a way to organizationally match this complexity is through internal differentiation. “Differentiation allows different parts of the organization to specialize” in handling the complex environment. A common mistake in organizational structure is to “combine two distinctly

¹² Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory, Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives* (Bath: The Bath Press, 1997), 89.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ HealthDay News, “Driving While on Cell Phone Worse Than Driving While Drunk,” *Forbes.com*, 29 June 2006. found on <http://www.forbes.com/forbeslife/health/feeds/hscout/2006/06/29/hscout533489.html>; Internet; accessed on 7 April 2007.

¹⁵ Hatch, 90. Although this book is forty years old, the Lawrence and Lorsch's theories are still cited by current organizational theorists. Mary Jo Hatch, cites Lawrence and Lorsch's organizational theories in her 1997 book, *Organization Theory, Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives*. Lawrence, Paul R. and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1967), 213.

different tasks in a single organizational unit.”¹⁶ Lawrence and Lorsch illustrate this point in what they call “differentiation error” in figure 4. The dashed circles represent two different tasks and environments. The solid oval represents an organizational structure that is trying to simultaneously conduct operations in these two distinct environments. It is a differentiation error because the rate of change in relation to the complexity of the tasks is too much for a single organizational structure to handle. For the purpose of this monograph, consider these distinct and separate tasks and environments the dominate and stability phase.

A related differentiation error is where multiple organizations are charged with essentially the same tasks, figure 5. This leads to “competitive clashes, redundancy of effort, and poor coordination.” An example of this is if multiple organizations were involved in planning the stability phase without clear delineations of responsibility. “Appropriate Differentiation” is where an organizational structures match each distinct task and environment, figure 6.




Figure 4: Differentiation Error: One Organization Structure, Two Distinct Environments¹⁷

¹⁶ Paul R Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1967), 213.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 213. In this book, Lawrence and Lorsch derived their theories from studying six organizations in the plastic industry.




Figure 5: Differentiation Error: Two Organizational Structures, One Environment¹⁸

For purposes of the monograph, consider these organizations as two separate operational headquarters for the dominate and stability phases.




Figure 6: Appropriate Differentiation: Two Organizational Structures, two Environments¹⁹

According of Lawrence and Lorsch’s studies, simply dealing with the rate of change and complexity through differentiation is not the full solution to an effective organizational structures. A command structure organized like figure 6 would lack a common vision to link the organizational structures towards a common goal. Differentiation enables an organizational structure to deal with a rapid and complex environment, but integration is what brings these structures together. It is important to link organizations dealing with separate tasks and environments like in figure 6 with a common boss, figure 7.

The leader of differentiated organizations must establish a “framework of purpose to guide the efforts of the parts.”²⁰ The leaders of the separate differentiated organizations will have

¹⁸ Ibid., 215.

¹⁹ Ibid., 213.

a limited span of what they can comprehend due to the complexity of the tasks and the environment they are working in.

There is potential for conflict between these leaders and organizations. Effective organizations, according to Lawrence and Lorsch, have to have ways to deal with organizational




Figure 7: Differentiation with Integration of a Shared Boss²¹

conflict. “An effective conflict resolution system is really the same thing as an effective decision-making system – rather central to organization performance.”²² Conflict between organizations is actually healthy as long as it is managed. One way to manage conflict is through the chain of command, the common boss. It would be an ineffective, time-consuming use of the boss’s time if he had to get involved in every conflict between organizations. Another way is to use integrating committees or teams that help facilitate collaboration between the organizations. Effective interpersonal skills among the leaders of the organization working in a climate of trust help integrate the differentiated organizations.²³

In their study of six organizations in the plastic industry, Lawrence and Lorsch observed the most effective organizations had the highest degree of integration and were the most

²⁰ Ibid., 245.

²¹ Ibid., 219.

²² Ibid., 224.

²³ Ibid., 13.

differentiated.²⁴ This type of organizational structure would have a leader who sets a framework of a common goal for the subordinate organizations to work towards. The leader, to be effective, would have to be knowledgeable in the tasks and environment on the subordinate organizations in order to give useful guidance. Well differentiated organizations would have their separate lanes of their environment clearly understood and personnel trained to perform their tasks. This type of organization would integrate not only through the common leader, but have mechanisms at a lower level as well. The converse of this was also true. The lack of integration and differentiation contributed to low performance.²⁵

In a campaign operational design, a way to organizationally differentiate to deal with the fast transition between the dominate phase and the stability phase is by assigning different operational-level headquarters to focus on these phases under a common commander providing an operational framework to integrate the efforts to achieve the campaign objectives and end state. The monograph's thesis is to better facilitate the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase will require separate operational-level headquarters, with sufficient training and expertise, focused on each of these phases working under a geographic combatant commander's overall operational design.

In operational design, it is important to get the overall command structure right with appropriate levels of responsibility and clear relationships and objectives. An examination of three past operations will reveal insights on the validity of the thesis. The first case study is General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters' Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II which is an example of the traditional massive firepower, attrition-based "American Way of War." We will see how the SHAEF command structure organized when the length of the dominate phase was much longer

²⁴ Ibid., 49.

²⁵ Ibid., 51.

and therefore time to prepare for the stability phase was longer. The two other case studies, US joint operations in Panama and Iraqi are examples of the “New American Way of War.” These operations had dominate phases that were very fast causing a quick transition to the stability phase. The SHAEF case study will reveal insights on what type of organizations, policies, procedures, and training, that evolved over time, that will need to be built into how we operate in the “New American Way of War.”

This monograph uses Lawrence and Lorsch’s organizational analysis approach to analyze the command structures in each of these case studies. This monograph analyzes the organizational structure and environment with two criteria. First, it examines the time span involved the operations. The speed of how the campaign unfolds directly effects how much time commands have to prepare for the transition from war fighting to stability operations. Obviously, a slower tempo of decisive combat operations means more time to think and plan for the transition to stability operations. These criteria reveal how the tempo of the operation affected their ability to plan for the stability phase. Second, it examines the organizational command structure and the degree of differentiation and integration. This monograph will study how the command dealt with the complexity of the two environments, the dominate and stability phase. Did they differentiate organizationally and if they did how effective was it. If the command differentiated organizationally, then how effective was the integration of the commander and subordinate headquarters. This requires looking at how well the senior commanders integrated their commands through providing an operational framework to guide subordinates through the phases of the campaign to achieve the objectives and the end state. It also requires examining how the subordinate headquarters integrated their efforts to deal with conflict and facilitate collaboration. The analysis begins with a case study from the traditional “American Way of War” and SHAEF.

SHAEF TRANSITION PLANNING IN THE ETO

The allied transition from combat operations, the dominate phase, to post conflict operations, the stability phase, in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II was remarkably successful due, in part, to the vision of the Supreme Commander to shape the entire campaign design, not exclusively focusing on combat operations but post conflict as well. Knowledge of past post conflict operations helped shape the future post conflict operation. The organizational command structure from the strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical level were well integrated and differentiated with knowledge of policy and planning boundaries for post conflict responsibilities.

This successful integrated and differentiated organizational structure evolved over the course of the war. The command organizations, doctrine, and training for post conflict operations did not exist when the United States entered the war in December of 1941. The allies developed their structure and procedures that would take shape in the creation of SHAEF for more than two years. SHAEF had almost a year and a half of active operations to work on adjusting and addressing organizational integration and differentiation problems to prepare for the transition to stability phase. The capability to have the knowledge to organize and plan for the post conflict was greatly helped by those who remembered the past.

“The American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its sovereignty.”²⁶ This bleak assessment was not of the aftermath of World War II, but of War

²⁶ COL Irwin L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920, Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany* (Coblenz, Germany, Headquarters, American Forces in Germany, Office of Civil Affairs, 4 March, 1920), 87. The American forces occupation of Germany after World War I began on 1 December 1918 and lasted until 10 January 1920. 2 It is this reports assessment that “The magnitude of the responsibilities assumed, appear to have been underestimated.” 86 The report further states, “The American Army began its duties in occupied territory with only the scantiest information both of the particular situation confronting it and even of a broader nature, such as

World I. This assessment was made by COL Irwin Hunt of Third Army, the officer charged with leading the after action review of American's post conflict operations after the First World War in Germany. This report became known as the "Hunt Report" to the World War II generation of officers who studied and took action on COL Hunt's advice to develop the competency in post conflict military government and civil affairs. By 1940 the Army had published field manuals on military government and in 1942 established a school for military government at the University of Virginia.²⁷ Being seared by the difficulties of the past helped establish the foresight not to wait to the end of the dominate phase to prepare and organize for the stability phase. It is clear that General Eisenhower and SHAEF benefited from this foresight.

SHAEF was established from the acknowledgement of the need to differentiate headquarters to deal with multiple complex problems. At the Casablanca Conference in January of 1943, the Americans and the British agreed to a cross channel attack in 1944.²⁸ While their

would permit it to intelligently frame an organization commensurate with its wide governmental powers. From the beginning there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation." 85

²⁷ Ziemke, Earl F., *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 7. The Judge Advocate General Corps published *FM 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare*, in the 1930s which had a large section of military government. The Army published, in 1940, *FM 27-5, Military Government*, which was based on the observations from the Hunt Report. 4 These were regarded as the "old" and "new" testament by civil affairs officers. The School of Military Government at UVA and similar programs at 10 other universities produced over 6,000 civil affairs officers by the end of the war. 17

²⁸ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff, Historical Sub-Section, *History of Cossac, 1943-1944*, photostatic copy at Eisenhower Library, May 1944, 5. COSSAC was led by British Lieut General F. E. Morgan with American BG R. W. Barker as his deputy. It started on 17 April, 1943 and was in existence until it was absorbed by SHAEF in January 1944. Morgan was made a deputy chief of staff in the new SHAEF headquarters. COSSAC was given three principle planning tasks: deception operations (code named COCKADE) to pin German forces in the West and the possibility of a 1943 cross channel invasion; a plan in case Germany disintegrates (code named RANKIN); and a full scale cross channel invasion in 1944 (code named OVERLORD). RANKIN had several scenarios it planned options for, the most likely being a complete collapse of German forces, know as RANKIN C. Therefore RANKIN C involved initial planning for post conflict operations.. SHAEF was also formed from many officers from General Eisenhower's Mediterranean command, Allied Force

forces were still fighting in North Africa, the allies had the foresight to establish a theater-strategic planning headquarters in London to begin the detail planning for the cross channel operation. This headquarters was designated the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) with the understanding that it would eventually become SHAEF once a supreme commander took the helm. Besides planning for the cross channel attack, COSSAC began planning for post conflict operations in the event of a sudden German collapse. This planning was transitioned to SHAEF when it was established in January, 1944 when General Eisenhower became Supreme Commander. Post conflict planning occurred at all echelons of command, but was centered on SHAEF. At SHAEF the G3 Division was the nerve center with operations and planning sections. The planning section was responsible for outlining future operations and planning for the post hostilities period.²⁹ Working closely the G3 Plans was the G5 Civil Affairs Division which formed the German Country Unit (GCU) as their principle postwar planning organization.

A challenge for the SHAEF staff was working with the many strategic level organizations that had responsibilities with post hostility planning and guidance. The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was created on 1 November 1943 and consisted of representatives from Soviet, British, and American governments. The EAC, based in London, worked on political issues such as the terms of surrender for Germany and zones of occupation.³⁰ The American State Department and the British Foreign Office both had committees working on post conflict issues. The President formed a couple of committees to work post conflict issues. The first was called the

Headquarters (AFHQ), that he brought with him. Pogue, Forrest C. *The European Theater of Operations, The Supreme Command* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief Military Historian, 1954), P.56. The RANKIN C planning was absorbed into SHAEF with their post conflict planning, code named TALISMAN. This was renamed in November, 1944 to ECLIPSE when it was thought the TALISMAN code name was compromised. Pogue, 347.

²⁹ Pogue, 68.

Cabinet Committee on Germany with the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury in the fall of 1944. This committee had limited duration and was succeeded by another committee called the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee made up of assistant secretaries to communicate with the EAC on occupation policy decisions.³¹ The heads of the American and British armed forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, were involved in issuing post conflict guidance. In July, 1943 the Combined Chiefs established a Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) in Washington “to control civil affairs and military government in all theaters.”³² At the American War Department the Civil Affairs Division was tasked to plan for post conflict operations in Germany in both pre-surrender and post surrender conditions. The British had a similar organization called the Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee.³³ The US Joint Chiefs, in August 1944, formed the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) (USGCC) to “formulate policy and create the nucleus of the organization of U.S. military government in Germany.”³⁴ The British had a similar organization called the British Control Commission Military Section.³⁵ The planning responsibilities of these various post conflict planning organizations caused confusion and duplication of effort. There were multiple differentiated organizations working on the same task. Operating at the theater-strategic and operational level, SHAEF worked to obtain the strategic political policy from these various organizations in order advance their post conflict planning.

³⁰ Ziemke, Earl. *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 37. The EAC was created in the Moscow at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 102. The Cabinet Committee on Germany was formed on 1 September, 1944 and its main accomplishment was the development of the “Morgenthau Plan” which called for a very harsh peace for Germany, turning it from an industrial to Agrarian state. This view was accepted at the Second Quebec Conference on 17 September, 1944 and issued out as policy in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. This harsh view was later disavowed by Roosevelt and Churchill.

³² Pogue, 77. Civil Affairs is post conflict operations in liberated (ie France, Norway) territory and military government is post conflict operations in occupied territory (ie Germany). Ziemke, 131.

³³ *Ibid.*, 346.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

General Eisenhower, with the help of his SHAEF staff, was very successful in defining the post conflict planning boundaries of the various echelons both up and down in order to avoid confusion and duplication of effort. His staff found that the USGCC was operating independently and duplicating SHAEF's post conflict planning efforts and took action to resolve this.³⁶ General Eisenhower operated as the integrator to obtain clarity of policy from above in order to translate it into coordinated guidance and orders to subordinates below. In part, he did this by having SHAEF representatives at the various strategic organizations.³⁷ For example, BG Cornelius Wickersham from the SHAEF staff was a member of the USGCC and attended meetings of the EAC. There was no published doctrine of the planning lanes of the myriad of post conflict planning organizations, therefore General Eisenhower established policies to clarify boundaries and responsibilities.³⁸

General Eisenhower looked toward higher headquarters and other strategic organizations to see what policy boundaries existed, needed to exist and he had to prod higher to get, or were not ready to exist. This was a realization that the levels of war operate at different tempos. Policy

³⁵ Ibid., 351. The British commission had a different mandate, however, focusing on training cadres for post hostilities work.

³⁶ Dale Clark, "Conflicts over Planning at Staff Headquarters." In Carl J. Friedrich . *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1948), 234.

³⁷ Pogue, 351.

³⁸ Pogue, 352. For example, in August 1944, General Eisenhower stated that the USGCC would report to him during the pre-surrender period and the British commission would report to the British government. After surrender while the SHAEF combined command was still in existence, the American and British control groups would function "together under the Supreme Commander – but not under SHAEF. The agreed policy of Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR was to be passed on to the Supreme Commander through the Combined Chiefs of Staff." The American and British control commissions would function as the normal communications to the German authorities. He also wanted to ensure his subordinates didn't stray in their post conflict actions. On 15 November, 1944 he declared to his army group commanders that in the period of remaining combined command after the surrender, he would "retain ultimate responsibility for control of the German forces, military government, and disbandment and disarmament. The army groups had to gain concurrence from SHAEF on any post conflict policies developed between the army groups and their country control commissions.

at the strategic level tends to operate at a slower tempo than what action at the theater strategic level and lower require. In the spring of 1944 as SHAEF was heavily involved with developing their post conflict plans, General Eisenhower requested the CCAC to issue definitive guidance on military government. This guidance came back granting the Supreme Commander “supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in all areas occupied by his troops.”³⁹

At times, the SHAEF staff realized that there were some strategic policy guidance that was just not yet available. SHAEF focused their limited staff planning efforts on what they did know or were solid assumptions. They wanted to avoid wasting valuable planning effort on “guesses” and focus on detailed planning that had a reasonable chance to happen. In June of 1944, General Bull, the SHAEF G3 stated, “I strongly feel that the lack of coordination in the Supreme Headquarters staff on post hostilities planning beyond purely military requirements will continue in spite of our desires until political directives are received or improvised. I cannot get enthusiastic over attempts to improvise with all the lost effort of busy staffs based on such guesses.”⁴⁰

SHAEF often found itself operating, at times, in front of official strategic policy that had not yet been crafted. It was able to operate beyond the strategic headlights by making reasonable and acceptable strategic assumptions through constant communications with strategic organizations. On occasion this working in a void of strategic policy guidance got them in hot water. In the late summer of 1944, SHAEF produced a “Handbook for Military Government in Germany” for the army groups in order to clarify post conflict policies and procedures in

³⁹ Ibid., 346.

⁴⁰ U.S. Army Europe Historical Division, *Planning for the Occupation of Germany* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 57.

anticipation of occupying enemy territory. President Roosevelt reviewed a draft copy and was very upset that the handbook was too soft on the Germans.⁴¹

Differentiation in task helped SHAEF to save staff capability to deal with the post conflict planning. Prior to D-Day, General Eisenhower kept himself and his headquarters at the theater-strategic level of command and let subordinate headquarters handle the operational level. An example of this is during the period between the formation of SHAEF in Feb 1944 and D-Day on 6 June, 1944. General Eisenhower left the detailed operational planning and direct operational control for Operation Neptune (the D-Day invasion) to the 21st Army Group, under British General Montgomery.⁴² General Eisenhower still maintained the big decisions like the amount of resources, priorities, and the decision point to invade, but left the detailed tactical planning to Montgomery and his subordinate headquarters.⁴³ This enabled Eisenhower to have time to work with political leaders on shaping strategic issues and to have this staff work issues “in front of” the immediate target, the invasion, of the command. During the winter and spring of 1944, SHAEF was working 72 post conflict studies.⁴⁴ SHAEF was developing the operational scheme looking past the immediate invasion, to the attack onto Germany, and post conflict operations.

⁴¹ Pogue, 354.

⁴² Ibid., 66. The 21st Army Group taking operational responsibility for Operation Neptune (Normandy) planning actually started under COSSAC, SHAEF’s predecessor headquarters it formed out of. When COSSAC transitioned to SHAEF when General Eisenhower took command in January of 1944, Eisenhower kept these planning boundaries.

⁴³ Ibid., 71. General Eisenhower often deferred operational matters pertaining to the D-Day assault to General Montgomery or General Bradley. He retained, however, at SHAEF level matters pertaining to resistance operations, use of airborne forces, and planning for railway bombing.

⁴⁴ Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1953). 2 The most important of these studies was a specific plan, circulated in SHAEF headquarters right after D-Day, on administering the occupation. This study was an early version of what would become known as Operation ECLIPSE, SHAEF’s plan for the occupation of Germany. The other studies “dealt with such matters as the terms of surrender, the application of sanctions; the disarmament and disbandment of the German armed forces; the disarmament and control of paramilitary organizations; the safeguarding and disposal of captured enemy material; the arrest and bringing to justice of war criminals; the control of transportation and communications; the disarming and

This ability of General Eisenhower to stay focused on the theater strategic changed when he became more dual-hatted as an operational level commander. Montgomery maintained direct operation control of allied forces after the invasion until an American Army Group was established on the ground in France. Once Eisenhower took direct operational command, on 1 September 1944, of the two Army Groups, Montgomery's 21st and Bradley's 15th, he was challenged due to the complexity of this task to think ahead to the complex task of post conflict operations.⁴⁵ In modern joint doctrinal terminology he was now acting as both the geographical combatant commander and the joint force land component commander.⁴⁶

He once confided in a memo to General Marshall on September 25, 1944, some weeks after taking operational control of the Army Groups, that, "I must confess that post-armistice

control of the police; the establishment of law and order; the control of governments and military organizations; the institution of military government; the execution of intelligence functions; the control of public mediums; the liberation, care, and reparation of prisoners of war of Allied nationality; and the care and repatriation of displaced persons of United Nations nationality."

⁴⁵ Pogue, 263. Bradley's 12th Army Group (consisting of First, Third, and Ninth Armies) became active on the continent on 1 August, 1944. General Montgomery, the commander of the British 21st Army Group, retained operational control over 12th Army Group through the month of August. Montgomery issued all orders to American forces through Bradley. The reason it took until 1 September for SHAEF to take direct operational control of both 21st and 12 Army Groups was due to signal command and control requirements. It took until 1 September for SHAEF to have the adequate signal infrastructure. Although in August Montgomery had operational control of all forces, General Eisenhower pointed out in a cable to General Marshall that "No major effort takes place in this Theater by ground, sea, or air except with my approval and no one in the Allied Command presumes to question my supreme authority and responsibility for the whole campaign." (264).

⁴⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 10 July 2001), II-12. Geographic combatant commanders are assigned a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) by the President and the Secretary of Defense. It is a four-star level joint command. The Joint Force Land Component Commander commands all land forces for a campaign and serves under a geographic combatant commander. (V-3) When General Montgomery was responsible for both the 21st and 12th Army Groups he was, using this modern doctrinal terminology, a Joint Force Land Component Commander under a geographic combatant commander, General Eisenhower. When General Eisenhower took over direct operational control of these army groups from Montgomery, he was essentially, again using the modern terminology, both the combatant commander and the joint force land component commander. There was no headquarters in theater higher than General Eisenhower's SHAEF.

matters do not occupy any great share of my thoughts. We still have a long ways to go here because of the intention of the enemy, which I think is becoming obvious, to continue the most bitter kind of resistance up to the point of practical extermination of the last of their armed forces. Thereafter, we may be faced with some kind of guerilla problem.”⁴⁷ This is not to say he was wrong to take more direct operational control, there was no combined headquarters to perform this function. Creating another echelon of command did not seem to be practical due to the pressure to limit the size of existing headquarters and the challenge and unfeasibility of creating a new combined headquarters from scratch during active combat.⁴⁸

What is important with this confession of his cognitive limitation of thinking about post conflict issues due to the complexity of the demands of combat operations was that he was implicitly asking for General Marshall for help on preparing for the post conflict. Someone needs to keep their eye on the post conflict ball and General Eisenhower was saying he had trouble keeping his eye on it. Internally to SHAEF, he put another experienced eye to watch the ball. General Eisenhower appointed General Morgan, then SHAEF deputy Chief of Staff, to be in charge of all of SHAEF’s planning for the occupation.⁴⁹ General Morgan, who led COSSAC before it was absorbed into SHAEF, was a very experienced officer and had been involved with post conflict planning from the beginning.

⁴⁷ Alfred Chandler, Stephen E. Ambrose, and Joseph P. Hobbs, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. IV*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2187.

⁴⁸ Pogue, 530-535. There was pressure to limit the size of SHAEF’s staff due to the need to keep the maximum amount of Soldiers for front line combat duty. This pressure was especially heavy for the British Army which, in September 1944, cut their ceiling in SHAEF from 7,000 to 5,245. After months of combat on the continent and the German counterattack in December 1944, the Americans felt the personnel pressure too and reduced their size in SHAEF. At the transition from combat to post hostilities occurred in the spring and early summer of 1945, the size of SHAEF grew to deal with the greater headquarters requirements for the post conflict. This was especially true for the American side as it prepared to transition to a US only headquarters for the US zone in Germany, United Forces European Theater (USFET).

⁴⁹ Headquarters, US Army Europe, Historical Division, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, US Army Europe*, April 1953, 4.

The transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase in the ETO during World War II was very successful. The three and a half years of war enabled the allies to develop organizations, procedures, and post conflict capabilities where little existed at the beginning of the war. General Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander, took ownership of post conflict preparations to ensure his command was ready for this critical transition. Detailed plans were completed well in advance which enabled subordinate commands to have their plans prepared.

He differentiated the post hostility planning effort both vertically across the echelons of command and internally within his headquarters. During combat operations he kept the bulk of the detailed planning at SHAEF in order to have his subordinate commands focus on war fighting. Although at times he personally had a hard time, due to the demands of combat operations, to think far in advance of post conflict operations, his staff was well structured to do both. Although there were frustrations with, at times, slow tempo of strategic guidance pertaining to post conflict operations, General Eisenhower and SHAEF did excellent work integrating the efforts of all involved. The result of this superior organizational differentiation and integration was that, during the period of transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase, the command was well positioned for success.

An illustration of SHAEF's successful organizational structure for planning the transition to the post conflict is in figure 8. General Eisenhower took responsibility and SHAEF, not




Figure 8: SHAEF Differentiation with Integration for the Transition to Post Conflict⁵⁰

encumbered with the daily tactical war fight, had the capability to position the command for a successful transition to the post conflict. SHAEF vertically differentiated the stabilize tasks from their subordinate tactical headquarters. This vertical differentiation was largely due to the enormous size of the command, with multiple American and British Army Groups and millions of troops. This created multiple layers of command between the tactical war fighters and SHEAF. This differentiation between the stabilize and dominate phase tasks was gradual as the allies liberated and occupied territory. In figure 8, the dashed circle of the dominate phase became smaller and the dotted circle of the stability phase became bigger. Eventually, in the weeks after the surrender of Germany, it came to look more like figure 8 where the command's focus was now on the stability phase.

⁵⁰ The author created figures 8 and 9 based on the organizational theories of Lawrence, and Lorsch explained earlier.




Figure 9: SHAEF Differentiation with Integration for the Post Conflict

To further explain figures 8 and 9, the circle with the strategic leaders like the President and organizations like the Joint Chiefs of Staff is offset to the left to represent how strategic policy tends to operate at a different tempo than the theater strategic and lower levels. The solid arrows, (1) and (3), represents the integration of policy and command. The two-way dashed arrow (2) represents the interactive nature between the strategic policy and theater strategic and operational level command. General Eisenhower often had sought and helped shape the strategic guidance he received.

It is not only important to have a command structure that lessens complexity of planning through appropriate differentiation of tasks, but it is critical to accurately anticipate the right tasks to plan for. Otherwise, a lot of time is wasted planning for the wrong tasks. SHAEF was

successful in anticipating what a post conflict Germany would look like.⁵¹ With having members of the staff trained in post conflict activities (School of Military Government at the University of Virginia and other universities) they had the capability to conduct detailed studies of the post war environment in Germany. SHAEF published the post conflict Eclipse plan, 10 November 1944, in enough time for their subordinate commands to develop their supporting plans.⁵² SHAEF mitigated where there was uncertainty in their projections of this post conflict environment. For example, General Eisenhower's thinking about the possibility of a German guerilla campaign (insurgency) after the surrender was mitigated by having over 3 million American troops under his command on V-E Day (German surrender on 8 May, 1945) for a US zone of 19 million Germans.⁵³

In addition to the appropriate task differentiation and accurate planning projections, there was great stability in the American command structure. The commander and staff which wrote the Eclipse plan remained in position at the critical point of transition from conflict to post conflict. SHAEF, under General Eisenhower's command, remained operational for over two

⁵¹ Headquarters, US Army Europe, Historical Division, *The American Military Occupation of Germany* (April 1953), 2. "For the most part, ECLIPSE planning estimated conditions accurately and provided for various contingencies. Plans dealt with such matters as the terms of surrender; the application of sanctions; disarmament and disbandment of the German armed forces; the disarmament and control of Paramilitary organizations; the safeguarding and disposal of captured enemy material; the arrest and bringing to justice of war criminals; the control of transportation and communications; the disarming and control of the police; the establishment of law and order; the control of institution of military government; the execution of intelligence functions; the control of public information mediums; the liberation, care, and repatriation of prisoners of war of Allied nationality; and the care and repatriation of displaced persons (DP's) of United Nations nationality."

⁵² Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 163. The US Twelfth Army Group issued three drafts for its supporting Eclipse plan dated January, February, and April 1945. These drafts were considered approved planning directives and used the same phases as the SHAEF plan. Headquarters, 12th Army Group. *Operation Eclipse, 2nd Draft Operations Plan*. February 1945.

⁵³ Headquarters, US Army Europe, Historical Division, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 47. On V-E Day the Americans had 3,069,310 troops in the ETO. A year later, July 1946, the strength was 342,264. 14.

months after the surrender of Germany. In the final months of SHAEF's existence, General Eisenhower gradually transitioned officers from his headquarters of combined command to one of American-only command, the ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, United States Army).⁵⁴ ETOUSA was redesignated U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET) on 1 July 1945. The combined command of SHAEF was dissolved on 14 July and General Eisenhower assumed command of USFET on 15 July, 1945. He remained in command until 11 November, 1945 when he became Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.⁵⁵

What can be applied from this case study to the New American Way of War? The successful task differentiation of the SHAEF command structure needs to be built into modern organizations from the beginning. There is little time to develop capabilities from scratch. Work to establish clarity of responsibilities and planning boundaries of the different echelons of command. At the time of transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase it is vital to have stability in the command structure. Focus on the unstable environmental transition from conflict to post conflict and not add to the complexity by having to focus on your own command structure. Develop leaders and planners who understand the types of post conflict tasks and apply these with a cultural, economic, and political understanding of the environment. More than any other factor, the role of the theater strategic leader, like General Eisenhower, in ensuring post conflict planning is initiated and integrated from the beginning. What happens if the transition comes at the speed of the "New American Way of War?" Our analysis continues with the American operation in Panama in 1989 to apprehend President Noriega and restore democracy.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 14. This was based on the Yalta conference of February 1945 which divided the occupation of Germany into US, British, and Soviet zones. The agreement allowed the Americans and the British to give part of their zone to the French. Therefore, General Eisenhower had to prepare the United States to transition from combined command to one of American-only for the US zone of occupation.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 14. During the war General Eisenhower was a dual commander of the combined American/British command of SHAEF and of the US only command of ETOUSA. The ETOUSA was responsible for administration and supply of US forces.

TRANSITION PLANNING IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY

The American transition from combat operations to post conflict operations during the invasion of Panama in 1989 was poorly conceived, dysfunctional, and chaotic. The plan had a fractal development under two very different combatant commanders with different conceptual views. The executing combatant commander focused exclusively on combat operations and not on the entire campaign design. The command had an unbalanced, differentiated structure that was well organized for the dominate phase and completely dysfunctional for the stability phase. What was planned for the post conflict phase was based on overly positive assumptions and lack of understanding of the scope of effort it would take. These flaws in integration of the phases of the campaign by the combatant commander and lack of emphasis on post conflict planning were compounded by the high speed of this joint operation made the transition come quicker. If the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase in the “New American Way of War” is to work, then it can not be done the way it was planned and executed in Panama. This is a case study of how a lack of emphasis on post conflict planning can cause a superbly executed combat operation make obtaining our national objections more difficult than it should have.

The United States combat operations in Panama were executed from a contingency plan “off the shelf” that evolved over 22 months, but executed at an extremely fast tempo. The lack of an adequate post conflict plan created the need for creating an adhoc organization to address this major shortfall during the execution of the operation. The beginnings of this flaw in post conflict planning originated in that the operation was not seen as an overall campaign, but a series of related plans that were not well integrated.

What further complicates the evolution of this planning process is that it occurred under direction was two very different combatant commanders. This case study further highlights the importance of the combatant commander as the overall campaign integrator and his role in structuring the organization of the command for success. Each of these commanders influenced

the planning in very different ways. One commander took a more holistic, campaign view encompassing all phases, including the transition to the post conflict. The other commander seemed more focused on the dominate phase. Unfortunately, as the planning evolved, each phase was developed in a vacuum of the other. The end result was brilliant execution of the dominate phase to a fumbled, chaotic transition to the stability phase. Part of the fumble was due to a failure to understand Panama's politically oppressed history.

In the late 1980s the situation in Panama was slowly deteriorating. Panama was suffering from years of corrupt and non-democratic rulers. For the first half of the twenty century Panama was ruled by rich, upper-class families called the rabiblancos.⁵⁶ In this environment the power and influence in the political affairs of the state of the National Police Force, later converted to the National Guard, began to grow. This military influence into the political system of the country was called "praetorian rule", where military leaders explicitly and implicitly pressure political leaders.⁵⁷ Failure for political leaders to disregard pressure from the military praetorian ruler could result in their ouster by a coup.

Two such praetorian rulers were Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega. Omar Torrijos, who came to power in 1969, was a praetorian ruler as leader of the National Guard. Torrijos used oppression and populism during his reign and referred to his role as leader as a "dictatorship with a heart." Torrijos was killed in 1981 in a plane crash and Manuel Noriega, chief of intelligence in the National Guard, emerged as the new praetorian ruler.⁵⁸ Noriega consolidated his power by forming the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) by merging the security forces of the armed forces and the police and placing his cronies in key positions.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Sandra W. Meditz, ed. And Dennis M. Hanratty, ed. *Panama, A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 184.

⁵⁷ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 22.

⁵⁸ Meditz, 59.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

By the late 1980s tensions between Noriega and the United States continued to worsen. As the Bush Administration came into power in 1989, dealing with Noriega's corrupt regime was a priority that became higher as the situation in Panama deteriorated. Tensions escalated as the US and Noriega engaged in an action, reaction, counteraction cycle as their policies clashed. For example, Noriega was engaged in the drug trade with drug cartels. A US reaction was a US grand jury indicted Noriega and some of his cronies for drug trafficking. Noriega's counteraction was to step up his campaign of harassment against US citizens in Panama and challenged some the United States rights under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.⁶⁰ The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) received a planning order on 28 February, 1988 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to revise contingency plans intended to protect U.S. lives and property, to keep open the Canal, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in peaceful or hostile environments, and to develop a plan to assist any government that might replace the Noriega regime."⁶¹

This planning directive led to the development of two very different planning concepts by two successive SOUTHCOM commanders, GEN Fred Woerner and GEN Maxwell Thurman. GEN Woerner initiated the invasion planning upon receipt of the JCS planning directive and his successor, GEN Thurman, dramatically adjusted and eventually executed the plan. Both generals had strengths and weaknesses to their planning approaches that reflected in the development of the plan and the chaotic transition to the post conflict operations.

GEN Woerner had a Soldier-Diplomat type career with a great deal of experience in Latin America. GEN Woerner had a master's degree in Latin American history and had spent

⁶⁰ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause, The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama Feb 1988 – Jan 1990* (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 6. Noriega was linked to the Medellin drug cartel of Columbia.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

years, in multiple assignments, in Latin American.⁶² He was extremely knowledgeable and experienced in the region and sensitive to the negative perception of the United States by countries in Latin American to past interventions.⁶³ With these cultural sensitivities in mind, GEN Woerner had a longer term approach to solving problems in Panama. In an interview conducted by Dr. John Fishel, GEN Woerner states that the “US role was to prompt change in Panama not to create or take charge of change. Panama’s problems had to be solved by Panamanians. With time, patience, and support from the U.S. he believed Panama could, and would, solve their own internal problems.”⁶⁴

GEN Woerner developed contingency plans in a time that spanned across two different presidential administrations, each with a very different approach. The Reagan Administration had a policy of applying the non-military instruments of power to change the outcome in Panama. The Reagan Administration ended with the acknowledgement that Noriega had to go, but had not developed a successful strategy to do so. It was in this non-military intervention Reagan Administration period that GEN Woerner developed a plan that used a slow build up of forces to

⁶² GEN Fred F. Woerner, Biography, “*The Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lecturship*,” available at <http://nimitz.berkeley.edu/pastspeaker-1992.html>; Internet. “His military career was divided between infantry assignments in the U.S. and Vietnam, and duties associated with Latin America. He lived in Columbia in 1965, and spent a year in study and travel throughout the northern countries of South America. He served the following three years in Guatemala as an advisor on the use of military forces in national socioeconomic development. He then attended the Uruguayan Military Institute of Superior Studies in Montevideo. Later, he served as the director of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College. He served as the Commanding General of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, Panama, from 1982 to 1986 and concurrently commanded the U.S. Army Security Assistance Agency – Latin American. ...He returned to Panama in 1987, as the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command.”

⁶³ Rodolfo Vera Calderon, *The United States Invasion of Panama: A Tri-Dimensional Analysis* (Georgetown University: Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Center of Latin American Studies, 2003), available at <http://clas.georgetown.edu/entre2003/Panama.html>; Internet. The opening quote in Mr Calderon’s article attributed to GEN Woerner and Gabriel Marcella: “Latin Americans disapprove at least as much of U.S. military intervention as the do the thuggery of a Noriega. They reason that they all could summon a potential cause for eliciting the forceful wrath of the United States. They would also prefer to solve their own problems. The end of the Cold War has not eliminated the Latin sensitivity toward U.S. intervention.”

⁶⁴ MAJ Annette L. Torrisi, “The Commanders-in-Chief, USSOUTHCOM (1987-1991): Reflections and Insights on Full Spectrum Operations,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2000), 43.

create friction between Noriega and the PDF that would lead Panamanians to make a change for themselves. Additionally, as he and his staff developed the plan it was with the thinking that, according to GEN Woerner, “We never anticipated having to do that plan...since I really did believe what Washington was telling me, that it was contrary to our interests to intervene militarily in Panama, we would not intervene – from the President himself. So I thought at that stage that the greatest value of all this planning was a training vehicle...”⁶⁵ This thinking that the plan was a “training vehicle” would no doubt reflect when another commander and staff, that had the assumption that they would execute the operation, thought the plan was very hollow and lacked the coordination and details required to pull it off.⁶⁶

Two strengths that GEN Woerner brought to the plan, however, were his estimation of the situation of the local effects of an American intervention and his holistic approach to the operation as an entire campaign. GEN Woerner, as an expert in regional and Panamanian affairs, thought that, “We assumed in a post-operational environment there would be a total breakdown in law and order, we even talked about rioting and looting. We placed much emphasis on this portion of the plan but we knew it was a hollow plan (because it could not be coordinated outside of the military). What actually happened (the looting and breakdown in law and order) was

⁶⁵ John Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 15 April 1992), 13.

⁶⁶ MG William A. Roosma, “Joint Task Force South in Operation Just Cause,” interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright jr., Fort Bragg, NC, (15 March 1990), available at <<http://www.army.mil/cmh/documents/panama/JCIT/JCIT25.htm>> as accessed on 8 Feb 07\; Internet. MG Roosma, Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps commenting on the Woerner plan after being briefed by SOUTHCOM planners with GEN Thurman in the weeks prior to Thurman taking command, “...that plan was still on the books, but no one had really done anything to ferret out the pieces and really, you know, make it a workable plan. And it floated it in and out. No one had grabbed hold of it to really put it in concrete and looked at it as to what kind of campaign objectives we want to obtain there. ... No one in that room could answer it; no one ... understandably so, because no one had taken the plan and really worked it down to the point that we should be expect[ed], if we were called to go tomorrow, we would be able to execute it.”

foreseen.”⁶⁷ Therefore, an assumption of Woerner’s planners was that, as a result of American military intervention, the Panamanian security forces would go home and wait to see what happens. The result would be a security vacuum that would cause chaos on the streets.⁶⁸ GEN Woerner understood the importance of a comprehensive campaign plan that included transitioning to the post conflict. When GEN Woerner’s staff initially briefed him on contingency plan they developed, based on the JCS directive, he noted the lack of a post conflict phase and directed it be added.⁶⁹ “I maintained,” according to GEN Woerner, “that the easiest part of the operation was the traditional combat operations. The most difficult part was the post-operational requirements, for the law and order and the civilization of the Republic of Panama.”⁷⁰ Unfortunately, this holistic, campaign approach to planning was lost in how the plan was split up into separate, related plans and how planning responsibilities were organized.

In the summer of 1988, the JCS directed that the plan, known then as ELABORATE MAZE, be deconstructed into a family of plans. This family of plans was called, PRAYER BOOK, with four complementary plans. The first plan was KLONDIKE KEY, addressed noncombatant evacuation of American civilians from Panama in either a permissive or nonpermissive environments.⁷¹ POST TIME was the plan to defend U.S. citizens, U.S. installations, and the canal.⁷² The plan for combat operations was called BLUE SPOON. KRYSTAL BALL, later renamed BLIND LOGIC, was the plan for the post conflict.⁷³ When the order came out to execute the operation, BLUE SPOON was renamed JUST CAUSE and BLIND

⁶⁷ GEN Fred Woerner, U.S. CINC SOUTH, Taped Interview conducted by Dr. John T. Fishel, *Subject: Military Operations in Panama*. 6 May 1991.

⁶⁸ John T Fishel, “Planning for Post Conflict Panama: What it Tells Us About Phase IV Operations,” in LTC Brian M. De Toy, *Turning Victory Into Success, Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 174.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁷⁰ GEN Fred Woerner, U.S. CINC SOUTH, Taped Interview conducted by Dr. John T. Fishel, *Subject: Military Operations in Panama*. 6 May 1991.

⁷¹ Fishel, “Planning for Post Conflict,” 172.

⁷² Cole, 8.

LOGIC renamed PROMOTE LIBERTY.⁷⁴ The de-linking of the plans began when the combat and post conflict planning were assigned to different staff sections within SOUTHCOM.

In May, 1989 GEN Woerner, ordered his J5 section take over the planning of BLIND LOGIC. The J3 section would continue to be responsible for BLUE SPOON. His reasoning was that the J5 contained nearly all his foreign area officers which had the necessary language and cultural competences for post conflict operations. Additionally, he made the J5, a staff officer, the commander for the civil-military operations task Force (COMCMOTF) that would execute BLIND LOGIC. POST TIME contained the majority of the forces necessary to execute BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC.⁷⁵ According to LTC John Fishel, who was GEN Woerner's Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of the J5 and very much involved in post conflict planning, the changing to a family of plans made no difference in the level of emphasis on BLIND LOGIC as long as GEN Woerner was in command.⁷⁶

LTC Fishel's comment implies that the post conflict operations would have been smooth if GEN Woerner stayed in command. Even with the post conflict emphasis in planning by GEN Woerner, the BLIND LOGIC plan did not have realistic planning assumptions or projection of the time duration of the effort. Richard Shultz's study of the Panama operation concluded that the J5 was too short-cited and made overly positive assumptions of the post conflict situation. The planners assumed that after 30 days, responsibility for supporting restoration would be transferred to the embassy and there would be a functioning civilian government in place. Shultz's identified some key questions that BLIND LOGIC did not realistically address. "What kind of democracy was possible in Panama? How long would it take to establish and secure? What were the major obstacles that that had to be overcome? What would replace the PDF? What was the State of the

⁷³ Fishel, "Planning for Post Conflict," 172.

⁷⁴ Cole, 53.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 8.

⁷⁶ Fishel, "Planning for Post Conflict," 176.

economic and social infrastructure?” This lack of addressing key questions such as these is surprising considering BLIND LOGIC was planned by the J5 section which contained foreign area officers who should have been more culturally sensitive to this. Additionally, the planners were physically located in Panama which has had a permanent US military presence for decades.

What contributed to this lack of understanding of the post conflict environment, according to Schultz, was the lack of interagency participation and planning that lacked depth. Due to concerns over operational security prevented interagency partners like the Departments of State and Justice from participating and shaping the planning. The fact that, under GEN Woerner, the plan was not expected to be executed may have contributed to the lack of depth in the post conflict plan. LTC Fishel points out that the planning was “...strictly contingency planning, what the Army and Joint Staff call OPLANS. It was not done at the campaign level, it was not done at the strategy level.”⁷⁷

The challenges with the BLIND LOGIC plan would get much worse with a transition from the Reagan to Bush administrations. GEN Woerner’s relations with the new Bush Administration did not start out well. In 1989, as the Bush Administration came to office, GEN Woerner, in a speech to the American Chambers of Congress, criticized the lack of a cohesive U.S. strategy in Panama. GEN Woerner received an angry phone call from Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor, communicating, “I want you to know the President was furious with your speech.”⁷⁸ As a combatant commander, GEN Woerner could have better used one of General Eisenhower’s techniques to prod higher, within the system, to get guidance or recommend guidance. As General Eisenhower understood, the tempo of strategic policy tends to lag behind the pace of actions on the ground. This is especially true in the first month of a new administration. As the situation on the ground in Panama continued to deteriorate, the Bush

⁷⁷ Shultz, “In the Aftermath of War,” 17.

⁷⁸ Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 83.

Administration gradually took a more aggressive approach, something GEN Woerner never adjusted to.⁷⁹ In July, 1989 GEN Woerner was told by GEN Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, that he was being replaced. GEN Thurman, who was about to retire, took command on 1 October, 1989.⁸⁰

GEN Thurman assumed command with a much different lens than GEN Woerner. GEN Thurman had a reputation as a master organizer, workaholic, and an officer who could make things happen. Commissioned a field artillery officer, he commanded a battalion during the Tet offensive during Vietnam. He made his reputation as the commanding general of Recruiting Command that restored the quality of Soldiers in the U.S. Army.⁸¹ He did not have GEN Woerner's extensive experience in Latin American or a strong tactical operations background. He was selected to command SOUTHCOM with the anticipation that American intervention in Panama would happen, it was only a matter of when.

GEN Thurman dramatically changed the concept of BLUE SPOON as well as narrowed the planning focus to combat operations. Understanding that the combatant commander was not a war fighting position, he wisely chose LTG Stiner, the commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as his Joint Task Force Commander. LTG Stiner would command all the forces participating in the operations.⁸² In October, 1989 GEN Thurman's and Stiner's changed the

⁷⁹ Ibid., 92. 15. On 7 May 1989, Noriega allowed an election to take place, but was not happy with the results. Populist candidates Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderon, and Guillermo Ford were winning when Noriega annulled the election. 79 Television recorded bloody images of these candidates getting badly physically abused by the PDF. (Woodward, 1991, 86) These images shocked the Bush Administration, causing a White House meeting on 10 May, 1989 to review the situation which was viewed as a big setback to U.S. policy. GEN Woerner resisted calls from Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the administration to consider military options.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 96. Secretary of Defense Cheney was not a fan of GEN Woerner. He believed that whenever an escalation in aggression was proposed, GEN Woerner was immediately opposed to it. He concluded that GEN Woerner had gone native. 93.

⁸¹ Ibid., 93.

⁸² Tom Clancy, and GEN Carl Stiner, *Shadow Warriors, Inside the Special Forces* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2002), 313. This is a significant change from GEN Woerner's

concept from a slow build up of forces to influence the Panamanian people to a lightning fast decapitation strike to arrest Noriega and defeat the PDF. LTG Stiner told his staff, “To try to put together a plan were we would strike quickly, it would be a surgical operation; we would do it at night; and we would integrate the capability of all these forces to assure a quick outcome with minimum casualties.”⁸³

During the first planning session between GEN Thurman and LTG Stiner where they discussed this new concept, GEN Thurman focused his commander on war fighting and not to be concerned with the post conflict. This dialogue is remarkable in that it foreshadows the problem that would develop with the transition to the post conflict.

LTG Stiner: “I can handle the combat part of this operation, but who is going to be responsible for planning the national building? The combat part is the easier of the two, because when you are shooting someone, you are in control of the variables. But, when you enter the nation-building phase, you are not. The new government is in control, and you have to respond to their needs and priorities. For that reason, the transition from combat operations to stability to nation-building must be seamless, so there is no loss in momentum. And the planning for it must be integrated from the beginning. It will require a different kind of command and control structure, different kinds of forces – with more technical and specialized capabilities – and a different approach to psychological operations. Their objectives and themes must be focused on support for the new government. Some of the forces needed, particularly Civil Affairs, are in the Reserves and must be identified now for call-up when needed. It is this phase, and the way we leave Panama, that will form the basis for judging the success or failure of this whole operation.”

GEN Thurman: “This is very important, but I want you to focus exclusively on the combat operations; and SOUTHCOM will handle the planning responsibilities for nation-building. Some work has already been done; the BLIND LOGIC plan has gone through considerable development, but it needs to be revised and made to conform with this new combat plan.”⁸⁴

concept. The XVIII Airborne Corps, under Woerner’s plan, would not deploy right away. The intervention would start with forces already in Panama. The XVIII would deploy if required. The special operations forces would not be under the XVIIIth control.

⁸³ LTG Carl W. Stiner, Interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 4. available at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/JCIT/JCIT24.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 February 2004.

⁸⁴ Clancy and Stiner, 385.

LTG Stiner's observations about the importance of transition to nation-building from combat operations are very insightful. Unfortunately, SOUTHCOM did not adequately handle the planning for post conflict operations.

The combat phase was executed brilliantly. The transition to the post conflict was a problem that came to GEN Thurman's attention as the situation turned chaotic. GEN Thurman ensured that BLUE SPOON, using LTG Stiner and his command, was planned and rehearsed superbly. He did not pay attention to the concept for BLIND LOGIC. As predicted by GEN Woerner, the vacuum created by an American intervention caused massive looting which caused severe damage to the economy and the infrastructure and greatly increased the complexity and difficulty of nation-building. The economic damage to Panama was estimated between one and two billion dollars.⁸⁵

GEN Thurman is very critical of his own lack of focus on the transition to post conflict operations. His focus on the war fighting was a case of not being sensitive, due to his experience and training, to the immense challenges of this transition.

GEN Thurman: "BLIND LOGIC was not suitable for the reconstruction of Panama because it did not accurately assess the dimensions of the task...It was a plan based on the hope life would quickly return to normal, people would go back to work, and schools would reopen. Unfortunately, this was a faulty premise, we ended up having to rebuild an entire government."⁸⁶

"The war fighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to post-conflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I had been the XVIII Corps commander, I might have very well said BLIND LOGIC is going to be residual....My task is to conduct the strike force operation and get out. I think the proclivity was to leave the fighting to the war fighter and the restoration to the people who were in country. SOUTHCOM should have been more attentive to the transition from one phase to the other, but I readily admit it was the last priority on my agenda at the time."⁸⁷

"We do not teach (the transition to post conflict) in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work."⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Shultz, "In the Aftermath of War," 28.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 21.

GEN Thurman's analysis on having the J5, which he inherited from GEN Woerner's concept, command the post conflict operations, "It is a bad plan when the J5 ends up commanding anything...If you ask me why I did not catch all of this...I can only say my primary focus was JUST CAUSE."

So how could this chaotic transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase happen with such outstanding combatant commanders? From an organizational perspective the war fighting and post conflict tasks were differentiated but unbalanced in level of understanding and staff manpower (see figure 10). Under GEN Thurman's command, the dominate phase had




Figure 10: Balance of Organizational Effort between the Dominate Phase Tasks and Stability phase Tasks

the huge focus of a corps commander and staff. The stability phase, remanded under the SOUTHCOM J5. The complexity of these two operations were differentiated to different organizations in order focus their effort. By doctrine, training, and organizational structure, the XVIII Airborne Corps was ideally suited to plan and execute the dominate phase. The SOUTHCOM J5, a staff section and not a command organization was possibly suitable for

planning the post conflict since the dominate phase was differentiated with XVIII ABC, but it was entirely unsuitable by lack of training and organizational structure (personnel and equipment) to control the post conflict operations.

As a result, during execution of Operation Just Cause, the anticipated tasks for the dominate phase were accurate and the stability phase tasks were not. Planners correctly identified the critical tasks that they performed during combat operations. The dominate phase was rehearsed many times at many levels. The stability phase was not rehearsed. Conversely, the planners were too optimistic with their assumptions on what the stability phase environment would look like and therefore planned for the wrong tasks (see figure 11). The actual stability phase environmental conditions were much more difficult and challenging. Why did the commanders and staff so accurately anticipate the conditions and tasks of the dominate phase and be so off target for the stability phase? It is not a case of negligence, but lack of competence. This does not mean that the planners were incompetent, but that they have not developed the competence to understand the complexity of post conflict operations. As GEN Thurman observed, this lack of not knowing what to know was partly a cultural and training problem. The Army did not teach it in the institutional school system or express it in doctrine. Additionally, the unbalanced level of organization effort (figure 10) devoted to each phase contributed to this. “While we were engaged in planning for an invasion of Panama, we still had other continuing




Figure 11: Planned conditions and Tasks vs. Actual Conditions and Tasks

responsibilities throughout the hemisphere,” related GEN Woerner, “Thus, we were not only lacking expertise but also manpower.”⁸⁹ The commands that were imbalanced in organizational effort focused on war fighting to the detriment to post conflict planning. Both GEN Woerner’s command (see figure 12) and GEN Thurman’s command (see figure 13) failed to




Figure 12: Level of Differentiation and Integration: GEN Woerner Command

successfully integrate the command’s planning effort.

GEN Woerner understood the importance of the stability phase, but failed to organize his command to successfully plan for the right environmental conditions that they would encounter and therefore the planners did not anticipate the correct tasks. That he did not expect to execute the plan and the fact that the staff also had regional planning responsibilities possibly influenced the failure to develop a useful plan for the stability phase. Knowing the importance of developing a campaign that includes the stability phase will not result in a successful plan if the command is not organized to handle both phases in terms of staff manpower, training, and experience. Due to operational security compartmentalization, there was no integration of the strategic level civilian

⁸⁹ Ibid., 20.

agencies in the planning. Integration with the intelligence agencies, the State Department and Agency for International Development, and the Justice Department possibly could have filled in the holes in knowledge of the planners on the estimation of the post conflict situation. We will never know if GEN Woerner's concept would have succeeded since he left command prior to execution, but it is unlikely. As GEN Thurman and LTG Stiner's analysis discovered, the dominate phase of GEN Woerner's concept was not developed enough for execution.

GEN Thurman dramatically improved the dominate phase planning by devoting a more high power command, the XVIII Airborne Corps, to the planning effort, but inherited the problems of the stability phase from GEN Woerner (see figure 13). GEN Thrumman admits he failed to recognize these problems because of his sole focus on the dominate phase. He did not integrate the planning efforts of the XVIII Airborne Corps with the SOUTHCOM J5.

So how could SOUTHCOM properly integrate and differentiate the command to successfully conduct the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase (see figure 14)? First, and most important, having a combatant commander who is aware of the importance of the transition and takes actions to create a feasible command structure that is able to handle the dual complexities of war fighting and post conflict operations. In addition to awareness to properly structure the organization, the commander must be knowledgeable, through training and experience, to give proper guidance to his command for both war fighting and post conflict operations. GEN Thurman had the right instinct to give the dominate phase planning to the XVIII




Figure 13: Level of Differentiation and Integration: GEN Thurman's Command

Airborne Corps, but think how different the situation would have been if he had given responsibility for planning the stability phase in another Army Corp or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), a Marine three star headquarters. Compartmentalization restrictions would have to be lifted to enable interagency partners to participate and influence the planning. These interagency personnel could integrate at the SOUTHCOM level and at the corps headquarters focused on the stability phase. The complexity of the stability phase demands the command and control capabilities and staff manpower of a corps headquarters. Like the combatant commander, the staff of the stability phase would have to have been properly educated through institutional schooling on the doctrine and trained through exercises to understand the post conflict environment.




Figure 14: A Well Differentiated and Integrated SOUTHCOM Organizational Structure

What can be applied from this case study to the New American Way of War? The high tempo of this type of warfare means that the command needs to have a structure built into the organization that can successfully handle the complexity of modern joint war fighting and post conflict operations. Unlike SHAEF, modern organizations will not have the time to do this on the fly and adhoc organizations are part of the problem and not the solution. Successful task differentiation of the SHAEF command structure needs to be built into modern organizations from the beginning. The Department of Defense must work out procedures to integrate the interagency into planning while protecting operational security. The command concept should lay out what organization is responsible for planning and executing the stability phase from the beginning. The combatant command must provide an overall campaign framework that the commands focused on the dominate and stability phase can nest with. The combatant command must ensure there is proper integration between the subordinate commands through confirmation and back briefs, having regular contact with these organizations and ensuring the organizations

integrate laterally. Like General Eisenhower and SHAEF, this case study confirms, unfortunately in a negative way, the importance of the theater strategic combatant commander in ensuring post conflict planning is initiated and integrated from the beginning. Fast forward to the next case study thirteen years from Operation Just Cause to another example of the “American Way of War”, Operation Iraqi Freedom. CENTRAL Command will face a similar problem as SOUTHCOM in dealing with the complexity of the speed of modern war, but at a much larger scale.

TRANSITION PLANNING IN OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM

The American transition from the dominate phase to the stabilization phase during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was, like the invasion of Panama, poorly conceived, dysfunctional, and chaotic. Unlike OPERATION JUST CAUSE which had a series of related plans in the PRAYER BOOK family of plans, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was one campaign plan. This campaign plan had decisive combat and post conflict phases built into the operational design from the start. It is clear that the combatant commander and his planners recognized the importance of the stabilization as a phase within a campaign construct.⁹⁰ The commander’s emphasis and the command organizational structure, however, was on developing the dominate phase to the detriment of developing a campaign plan where the stability phase was integrated into the overall concept.

Available planning time is always a vicious constraint to planners. As they initiated planning, CENTCOM did not have the advantage of knowing how much time they had prior to execution or if it would happen at all. A high degree of complexity, planning the dominate and

⁹⁰ GEN Tommy Franks,. *American Soldier* (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 351. GEN Franks’ first formal presentation of his commander’s estimate to the President, 28 December, 2002 was a four phase operation: Phase I – Preparation; Phase II – Shape the Battlespace; Phase III – Decisive Operations; and Phase IV – Post Hostilities Operations. GEN Franks said he was

stability phases, competing with available planning time was affected by CENTCOM's degree of differentiation and integration in planning the campaign. CENTCOM was late in differentiating the organizational capability to plan for post conflict operations. The combatant commander did not take ownership of integrating the differentiated organizations planning the dominate and stability phases.

The problem in the OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM campaign plan is not in the lack of understanding of the importance of this transition from the dominate phase to the stabilization phase, but in inadequately structuring the command to properly plan and control this critical transition and not identifying the probable post conflict conditions. This difficulty in properly organizing the command to properly plan and execute the transition from the dominate phase to the stabilization phase led to similar chaotic, lawlessness conditions seen in OPERATION JUST CAUSE. The short term impact was massive looting and property destruction that greatly increased the difficulties of the post conflict reconstruction. The long term impact was creating the conditions for the brutal insurgency to develop.

If the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase in the "New American Way of War" is to work, then it can not be done the way it was planned and executed in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. This is a case study of how inadequately organizing the command to deal with the dual complexities of planning and executing the dominate and stabilization phases can cause a superbly executed combat operation set the conditions for the emergence of a bloody insurgency and place obtaining the campaigns national strategic objectives in jeopardy.

Understanding how much planning time is available is a key piece of information for organizing to plan an operation. At the theater strategic level, however, planners have to deal

aware at this time that phase IV might prove to be the more challenging than major combat operations.

with ambiguity where variables like time are not as clear as they are at the tactical level. When CENTCOM began to develop the concept for OIF, the direction to begin planning to attack Iraq came as a surprise, it did not know that the war was less than 16 months away, and was politically constrained to keep the planning effort compartmentalized to a small group.⁹¹ Rather than the old rule of thumb where a higher headquarters uses 1/3 of available planning time to allow subordinate headquarters 2/3 of the time to prepare their supporting plans, simultaneous collaboration, among the echelon of headquarters, is more of what modern, digitally equipped commands strive to achieve. Compartmentalization is not conducive to collaboration. It can slow down the planning effort and stifle the benefit of lower headquarters analysis and feedback to the higher headquarters plan development. Again, this is a reality of developing strategically and politically sensitive plans at the theater strategic level.

Unlike SOUTHCOM's OPERATION JUST CAUSE which came to a boil after years of continuing deteriorating situation in Panama, the idea for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM for CENTCOM came out of the blue. In the fall of 2001, CENTCOM was in the midst of responding to 9/11 and executing OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Iraq was not of immediate concern to CENTCOM until President Bush made it so. On 21 November, 2001, after a National Security Council meeting in the White House, President Bush told Secretary of Defense (SEC DEF) Rumsfeld, "Let's get started on this (plan to attack Iraq) and get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have

⁹¹ COL Kevin Benson, "Phase IV CFLCC Stability Operations Planning," In LTC Brian De Toy ed. *Turning Victory Into Success, Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 193. Compartmentalization planning, according to COL Benson, the Chief of Plans at CFLCC during OIF planning and current director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, is the most difficult type of planning. Only people with TOP SECRET security clearance and who have permissive and a need to know are allowed to get "read on." Plans developed at this security level are not even known to exist even within the same headquarters by other members of the staff who don't have a need to know. This type of compartmentalization planning puts a strain on planners who are "read in" due to the limitation of not using the full capability of the rest of their planning group that are not.

to.”⁹² Due to strategic and political sensitivity reasons, the President directed Secretary Rumsfeld to keep the planning confined to a small group.⁹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff followed up the President’s directive on 1 December, 2001 by issuing CENTCOM a TOP SECRET planning order directing GEN Franks to present a commander’s estimate of a new Iraq war plan in three days to the SEC DEF⁹⁴ In joint terminology, a commander’s estimate is the combatant commander’s proposed military course of action to the SECDEF to meet a potential contingency. More accurately, what GEN Franks produced was a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation which is a military situation far into the future as to require major assumptions.⁹⁵ Where as CENTCOM’s rapid development, in response to 9/11, of military operations to attack terrorist training camps in Afghanistan was classic crisis action planning, Iraq was at the more deliberate, long range pace of contingency planning. Where as crisis action planning is based on current situation, contingency planning is based on a future situation.

GEN Franks first meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld on Iraq war planning set the tone of the planning effort over the next 16 months. With only a few days to prepare, GEN Franks presented the SECDEF his initial commander’s estimate on 4 December, 2001. He explained to the SECDEF the CENTCOM Iraq plan that was on the shelf, OPLAN 1003, was not up-to-date based on what was recently observed about the latest capabilities of joint operations in Afghanistan. OPLAN 1003 called for a DESERT STORM-like force structure of 500,000. In OEF, 10 years after Desert Storm, what CENTCOM was learning was that advances in precision weapons linked with improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) translated into a higher tempo of operation with less forces. Secretary Rumsfeld commented to GEN Franks,

⁹² Woodward. Bob, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.), 2.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

“I’m not sure that that much force (the OPLAN 1003 level force) is needed given what we’ve learned coming out of Afghanistan.” GEN Franks agreed replying, “You’ll get no argument out of me. I don’t think we have to do it either (that high level of forces due to the advances in precision weapons and ISR), but it is what it is.”⁹⁶

This conversation is very revealing in that it reflects the emphasis of planning that would dominate CENTCOM’s available planning time. Bob Woodward, in his book, *Plan of Attack*, is correct in his analysis that thinking was focused on how to minimize the time between the President’s order to attack and when military operations could begin.⁹⁷ Between GEN Franks first commander’s estimate briefing to Secretary Rumsfeld in early December 2002 to the time when a “level 4 planning detail” plan existed in January, 2003 CENTCOM went through a long iterative planning process with the President and the SECDEF where a series of operational concepts were developed⁹⁸. The operational concepts were focused on phase III and how, as Woodward’s analysis identifies, to conduct the operation quicker with less forces. Each of the concepts had a phase IV, but they are essentially the same. These concepts were done at a level 1 level of detail causing frustration with subordinate commands as they tried to develop their supporting plans.

⁹⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 26 December 2006), GL-7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 26 December 2006), I-18. Contingency planning has four levels of planning detail. The least amount of detail is “planning 1 planning detail, commander’s estimate.” This is a analysis of courses of action to accomplish a military mission. Upon the directive to begin planning for an attack on Iraq in November of 2002, the majority of the planning effort was at this level of detail. The next level is “Level 2 Planning Detail, Base Plan.” This is a specific course of action that includes identifying the major forces, concept of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include planning annexes or deployment information, the time phase force deployment data (TPFDD). The next level is “Level 3 Planning Detail, CONPLAN.” This includes a base plan with annexes and may produce a TPFDD. The highest and most detailed level is “Level 4 Planning Detail, OPLAN.” This is a complete plan with all the annexes and a TPFDD.

Lack of planning detail inhibits collaboration, creates confusion, and negatively impacts planning time available.

LTG McKiernan, the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), reflected this frustration with PowerPoint deep planning when he stated, “It’s quite frustrating the way this works, but the way we do things nowadays is combatant commanders brief their products in PowerPoint up in Washington to OSD and Secretary of Defense....In lieu of an order, or a frag (fragmentary) order, or plan you get PowerPoint slides....That is frustrating, because nobody want to plan against PowerPoint slides.”⁹⁹

What would emerge from these iterative operational concepts was a new Iraqi war plan, OPLAN 1003V. The first operational concept, called “Generated Start”, began development in January, 2002. GEN Franks described it as a “blueprint for generating the necessary ground, air, and naval presence in the region that would enable us, at the orders of the President, to commence decisive military operations to meet the end state objective of regime change.” Variants of this concept were developed based on how much regional support for over flight, basing, and many other variables. These variants were called robust, reduced, or unilateral options.¹⁰⁰ Soon after “Generated Start” was developed CENTCOM realized that Saddam could initiate hostilities on his own initiative, therefore it was necessary to plan for a “Running Start.” CENTCOM would attack with what forces it had in place and continue to flow necessary follow on forces for as long as needed.¹⁰¹

By early August, 2002 GEN Franks considered OPLAN 1003V was no longer a concept, but a full-blown plan. He briefed the President and the National Security Council (NSC) on the Running and Generated Start concepts and a new one called “the Hybrid”, which was a combination of both concepts. With the Hybrid concept the President could wait for a force build

⁹⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 75.

¹⁰⁰ Franks, 361.

up, Generated Start, or attack with what he has, Running Start, and continue to deploy follow-on forces. The Hybrid concept was based on once CENTCOM had the required infrastructure (basing, over flight rights, airfields etc.) in theater in place, then the President had various options to choose from.¹⁰²

GEN Franks may have found this iterative planning process stimulating for both he and Secretary Rumsfeld, but it was at a cost.¹⁰³ Available time for planning and available brain power of a planner are zero sum games. Whether you use it to think through yet another operational concept or develop a detailed plan, a planner is always limited by time and his cognitive power. This is where differentiation comes important so as to match the organization structure to deal with the level of complexity. The life of a planner is hard, but even hard has its limits. The complexity of having to conduct compartmentalization planning for an attack on Iraq while simultaneously continuing combat operations in Afghanistan began to show on the CENTCOM staff almost immediately.

In early January, 2002 GEN Franks sensed this frustration in his headquarters and met with his lead planners. He acknowledged, to his planners, the difficulties in conducting compartmentalized planning and dealing with the demands of Secretary Rumsfeld and his staff . He told them that they are not the enemy. Don't think like that. "Your job is to make me feel warm and fuzzy. Look, we're all professionals. Let's earn our pay."¹⁰⁴

This meeting between the combatant commander and his planners is a possible indicator where things begin to go wrong with the transition to post hostilities planning. Iraq war planning was still at an early stage and the planners were exhibiting the signs of frustration when the organizational structure was not matched to the level of complexity. This frustration would not

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 363.

¹⁰² Ibid., 390.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 333.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 362.

have been as bad if, at this early stage, CENTCOM stuck with and fully developed an operational concept into a plan. The increased time available would have mitigated the complexity. This was not the case. The problem of not correctly differentiating the organization to the degree of complexity only got worse as time continued and new operational concepts were developed. Imagine if the combatant commander, even as late as August, 2002 had identified a headquarters that was responsible to focus on post hostilities planning. This differentiation would not relieved the CENTCOM staff of post hostility planning, but raised it to focus upwards to obtain policy decisions so the Phase IV headquarters could take that policy and develop detailed plans. Like SHAEF's staff developing 72 post conflict Germany studies prior to D-Day, the level of CENTCOM's understanding of what a post conflict Iraq would look like would certainly have been clearer. One of lead CENTCOM planners, LTC Agoglia, stated that, "The ability to focus on it (post hostility planning) was very difficult at the command perspective. You had a lot of energy focused on the tactical piece, again Phase I through III. There wasn't a whole lot of intellectual energy being focused on Phase IV."¹⁰⁵

This lack of energy being devoted to Phase IV planning was not only due to the lack of early planning structure differentiation, but also due to the lack of GEN Franks taking ownership of the complete campaign, not just Phase III. In his autobiography, GEN Franks stated that, "You (the government bureaucracy below the President and the SECDEF) pay attention to the day after and I'll pay attention to the day of."¹⁰⁶ From GEN Franks' perspective, Phase IV was other parts of the governments responsibility. It is not that he didn't acknowledge or understand the importance of Phase IV. He did. In his autobiography he states, "There was no question: Phase IV

¹⁰⁵ Michael R Gordon and General Bernard Trainer, *Cobra II, The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 140.

¹⁰⁶ Franks, 441.

would be a crucial period. Having won the war, we would have to secure the peace.”¹⁰⁷ He understood the importance of it, but didn’t take ownership of it.

This lack of ownership by anyone caused much anxiety through out the planning process right up to the point of transition to Phase IV during the war. A series of ad hoc planning organizations, some military centric and others civilian centric, would be successively formed. Unfortunately, these organizations came together too late in the process and were inadequately resourced to be effective. These organizations probably did more harm than good because it caused CENTCOM to see that other organizations were responsible for post hostilities planning, even though these organizations would prove to be ineffective. An enormous amount of valuable time was squandered as these new, ad hoc organizations took energy to form, gather necessary resources and become operational, yet only to be eventually disbanded for a successor organization which would repeat this dismal cycle. LTC Agoglia stated he was told others in government were responsible for Phase IV and he wanted to integrate planning efforts with them. “We knew there was a void in our ability to deal with Phase IV, the post-hostilities piece, unless we clearly had an interagency link. We kept on getting told ‘oh yeah, it’s coming.’ We’re asking for policy on who is going to be in charge. How do we interact with them?”¹⁰⁸

By the fall of 02 the Joint Staff was seeing the lack of emphasis on Phase IV planning. In October, 2002 the Joint Staff conducted a war game exercise, Prominent Hammer II, where one of their recommendations was to design a new headquarters staff which would be responsible for post hostilities planning and execution. It would be a three star headquarters with members of the interagency plugged into it. This headquarters would eventually be replaced by a US civilian administrator or an interim Iraqi government. LTG John Abizaid, then the director of the Joint Staff, proposed a variant of this idea by having a US Army corps not tied up with the invasion be

¹⁰⁷ Franks, 420.

¹⁰⁸ Gordon and Trainer, 139.

responsible for post hostility planning and execution. He suggested the US Army III Corps, but his idea was not adopted.¹⁰⁹

This new post hostilities headquarters concept was briefed to Secretary Rumsfeld in October, 2002 and he rejected it and he decided that the Department of Defense should be in charge of post hostility phase with a civilian administrator overseeing reconstruction and governance and a US military commander responsible for security and retraining the Iraqi military. Once DOD took responsibility for the post hostility phase, Phase IV planning greatly slowed. This lack of emphasis on Phase IV planning is in part due to their view that this would not be a difficult task. DOD would be “enabling” the Iraqis to do this for themselves in order to facilitate a quick withdrawal of US forces.¹¹⁰

By December, 2002, with little progress by DOD in post hostility planning, the Joint Staff decided to form, with the SECDEF’s approval, JTF-4, to focus on planning for post conflict Iraq and to fall in on a post conflict follow-on headquarters called, CJTF-Iraq. The plan was to get this new organization up and running by 1 Feb, 2003. Unfortunately, JTF-4 was poorly resourced and never jelled into an effective planning group. LTC Agoglia’s observation of JTF-4 was that it was not effective. He stated, “We were told that JTF-4 would be a standing task force. We thought it would be the core planning for a post-conflict headquarters. Instead, it was (its commander) and 55 yahoos with shareware who were clueless.”¹¹¹

It was quickly observed by CENTCOM that this JTF-4 concept was not going to work even before it was fully stood up. In January, 2002 responsibility for post hostility planning was shifted to the Pentagon to yet another new organization. This one was civilian centric rather than military centric like JTF-4. On 20 January, 2003 the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was formed led by retired LTG Jay Garner. Garner spent the next six weeks

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 141.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 142.

building his team of about 300 personnel when he ran into friction with the Secretary Rumsfeld about who was on the team. The day before Garner would deploy to Kuwait, Rumsfeld told him that he would give him new people from DOD.¹¹² Unfortunately for ORHA, these new DOD personnel were very slow to join the team over the next several months.

Meanwhile, LTG McKiernan, not feeling able himself to focus on anything else but Phase III, formed a post hostility planning cell with CFLCC lead by MG Abert Whitley of the British Army.¹¹³ This CFLCC cell, on 17 March, 2003 began writing a sequel plan to their base major combat operation plan, COBRA II, called Eclipse II. Both of these plans names were lifted from similar plans from the ETO during World War II. With JTF-4 pretty much ineffective, it was absorbed into this CFLCC planning cell.¹¹⁴ When ORHA moved to Kuwait, GEN Franks decided to have ORHA report to LTG McKiernan in order to better coordinate their efforts.¹¹⁵ Once OIF commenced and Baghdad was taken by Coalition forces, ORHA began working with CFLCC inside Iraq. According to Garner, this relationship was working exceptionally well. Garner developed nine objective areas that he wanted to focus and a CFLCC one star general was teamed with a senior ORHA civilian with each of these areas.¹¹⁶

While in Iraq, Garner quickly discovered that the post hostility conditions that they anticipated did not happen. During ORHA's time at the Pentagon and in Kuwait, their post hostility planning effort was focused on combating oil fires, handling large number of refugees and displaced people, dealing with a massive food shortage that could lead to famine, and preventing epidemics. What he found were these conditions did not come to true. The effect of planning for the wrong conditions was not being ready to react quickly to the actual conditions of

¹¹¹ Ricks, 79.

¹¹² Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 150.

¹¹³ Benson 2004, "Phase IV CFLCC Stability Operations Planning," 196.

¹¹⁴ Gordon and Trainer, 144.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹¹⁶ Woodward, 180.

looting, lawlessness, the melting away of the army and government workers, and dealing with a terrible municipal infrastructure.¹¹⁷

By May, 2003 things appeared, although very late, to start to come together organizationally. GEN Franks decided to name CFLCC as CJTF-7 that would be initially responsible for post hostilities. CFLCC had developed, since March, 2003, the post hostility ECLIPSE II plan, had absorbed both JTF-4 and ORHA, had world class command and control equipment and facilities, and a superb staff. LTG McKiernan anticipated overseeing forces in Iraq for as long as six months before transitioning to a new command.¹¹⁸ During this turbulent month Garner and ORHA received a lot of criticism that they were in over their heads.¹¹⁹ Despite this, Garner's instincts on major policy decisions were to proven to be dead on. He believed that there should be an immediate Iraqi face civilian administration to avoid the perception as the US was an occupier. He wanted the Iraqi Army immediately brought back. This had been a key element in all the military planning to date and was supported by GEN Franks, LTG Abizaid, and LTG McKiernan.¹²⁰ He wanted a "gentle de-Baathification" policy in order to facilitate the reintegration of these people back into society.¹²¹ Unfortunately, the images of chaos on the ground in Iraq caused the administration to take a drastic course correction for the worse. The administration surprised the American military command with the announcement, on 24 April,

¹¹⁷ Jay M. Garner, "Iraq Revisited," In LTC Brian De Toy ed. *Turning Victory Into Success, Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 259.

¹¹⁸ Gordon and Trainer, 439.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 472. Britain's civilian point man for Iraq was John Sawers. In early May he sent a confidential cable to Prime Minister Blair observing that "Garner's outfit, ORHA, is an unbelievable mess. No leadership, no strategy, no coordination, no structure, and inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis... Garner and his team of 60-year-old retired generals are well-meaning, but out of their depth."

¹²⁰ Ricks, 162.

¹²¹ Garner, "Iraq Revisited," 259.

2003 that Jerry Bremer was selected as the Presidential Envoy to lead a new organization, the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA).¹²²

Bremer took over on 12 May and within a few days, uncoordinated with the American military command, announced some drastic policy shifts that would have huge negative consequences for the future stability of Iraq. On 16 May he announced CPA Order Number 1, De-Baathification of Iraq Society. This went much deeper than the gentle De-Baathification that Garner endorsed. This more drastic policy immediately purged tens of thousands of members of the Baath Party from the Iraqi government. On 23 May he issued CPA Order Number 2, which did away with the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police.¹²³ LTC Agoglia, who was now working as an assistant to Bremer told him, “You guys just blindsided CENTCOM.” That was the day, LTC Agoglia thought that the Coalition “...snatched defeat from the jaws of victory and created an insurgency.”¹²⁴ Similarly, COL Benson, the CFLCC Chief Planner, stated, “We expected to be able to recall the Iraqi Army. Once CPA took the decision to disband the Iraqi army and start again, our assumptions for the plan became invalid.”¹²⁵

Added to these major negative policy shifts by CPA were major changes in the American military high command in Iraq all in the same window. GEN Abizaid took command of CENTCOM as GEN Franks retired. LTG Wallace, the commander of the US V Corps, relinquished command to LTG Sanchez. LTG McKiernan and CFLCC transferred command of CJTF-7 to LTG Sanchez and V Corps.¹²⁶ At a time when the transition window from major combat operations to post conflict operations was occurring, the American civilian and military command was focused on organizing itself. MG Buff Blount, the commander of the 3rd Infantry

¹²² Woodward, *State of Denial*, 181.

¹²³ Ricks, 160.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹²⁶ Gordon and Trainer, 487.

Division which spearheaded the attack to Baghdad questioned these leadership changes at a critical time.

“There were several leadership changes that are questionable. The first is letting McKiernan and his headquarters go back to Kuwait and giving responsibility for CJTF-7 to V Corps. McKiernan and his staff were the Army’s experts on the Middle East. V Corps is European-based and had no experience in the region. You also had a brand new corps commander (LTG Sanchez) who had not participated in the first phases of the war and had all the responsibility Bremer was soon to thrust on him. In the same time frame, Bremer replaced Garner and within a week or two all the people that the U.S. military and the Iraqis had been dealing with were replaced and everything started over.”¹²⁷

At the tactical level the culminative effect of the lack of properly organizing and planning the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase was ugly. Baghdad was falling apart with massive looting and chaos and an insurgency was forming. COL Alan King, the 3rd Infantry Division’s head of civil affairs stated, “I got to Baghdad and was told, ‘You’ve got twenty-four hours to come up with a Phase IV plan...On the night of April 8, COL Sterling, the chief of staff of the 3rd ID, came to me and said, ‘I just got off the phone with the corps chief of staff, and I asked him for the reconstruction plan, and he said there isn’t one. So you’ve got twenty-four hours to come up with one.’”¹²⁸

Although the importance of the stabilization phase was understood from the start, the organizational structure to deal with the complexity of planning the decisive war fight and the post conflict was not developed from the beginning. Until JTF-4 began forming in January, 2003 CENTCOM never really differentiated the planning of the dominate and stability phase within the command (see figure 15). Due to GEN Franks attitude of, “You pay attention to the day after and

¹²⁷ Ibid., 495.

¹²⁸ Ricks, 151.




Figure 15: Differentiation Error: One Organization Structure, Two Distinct Environments

I'll pay attention to the day of," his staff energy was focused on the dominate phase.

This tension of dealing with the differentiation error of one organizational structure handling both the dominate and stability phase was evident at that key scene in January, 2002 where the planners complained to GEN Franks about their severe work load. Instead of taking steps to lesson the complexity through differentiation of the dominate and stability phases with different organizations, he told his planners to "Let's earn our pay." Differentiation at this early stage would most likely had a huge impact on the quality of Phase IV planning. It would have been like SHAEF focusing on post conflict Germany while the 21st Army Group focused on D-Day. One factor that prevented this differentiation was the compartmentalization of planning. The strategic and political requirement for highly controlled operational security of the planning came at a high price.

By the end of 2002, the Joint Staff and OSD differentiated for CENTCOM the stabilization phase so CENTCOM could focus on the dominate phase (see figure 16).




Figure 16: Level of Differentiation and Integration

These organizations focused on planning for post conflict conditions that did not happen. This could be the result of their late in the timeline forming and loss of effort simply organizing themselves versus studying the problem. Although the dominate and stability phases were differentiated between different organizations, the combatant commander did not act as the integrator to ensure their efforts were mutually supportive.

The command was focused on the decisive combat phase and was late in organizing a structure to plan for the post conflict phase. This led to a series of poorly conceived, poorly resourced, adhoc organizations getting formed late in the planning. Once these adhoc organizations were formed, their post conflict planning was based on an overly optimistic view of the probable post conflict conditions. This faulty analysis of the likely post conflict conditions could partly be the result of this adhoc, late forming, organizational structure. Time was wasted forming successive post conflict organizations which could have been used to more thoroughly study the post conflict environment. This resulted in the concept for the stability phase not being

integrated into the concept of the dominate phase and valuable planning time allocated to the wrong post conflict environmental conditions. An obvious example of this is that in the plan concept there was not an organization identified from the beginning of the planning to be in charge of the post conflict. CENTCOM did not adequately adapt their organizational structure to the demands of the complexity of the New American Way of War.

The allies, in the ETO, were more successful with adapting their organizational structure to the complexity of their environment. Unlike Eisenhower's SHAEF which had very stable organizational structures in place at the transition, OIF had a confusing, unstable command structure at the critical transition point. Consequently, the lack of a stable organization structure at the transition caused too much effort being focused on the command structure to the detriment of the mission. The United States combat operation in Iraq was executed as a result of a very deliberate planning effort that evolved over the course of seventeen months. This is not a case of not having enough time to plan for the post conflict phase, there was enough time. It is how the time was utilized in relation to how the command was differentiated to deal with the complexity of planning the dominate and stability phases that is the issue.

As a comparison, to go back in a similar time span in World War II, seventeen months back from the surrender of Germany in May of 1945, would have found Eisenhower arriving to England from North Africa. As the SHAEF headquarters was forming, it was not starting the OVERLORD and ECLIPSE planning from a blank slate. While the Eisenhower and the AEF were occupied fighting the Germans in North Africa, the allies, realizing that they would eventually invade the mainland of Europe and fight to Germany, formed a temporary planning organization, COSSAC, to think and plan about future operations. During this period, as noted earlier, SHAEF was coming into existence, transitioning from COSSAC and AEF, and initiated the many studies to determine the post conflict conditions and likely tasks in Germany, later incorporated into the ECLIPSE planning, while they simultaneously planned for OPERATION OVERLORD, the invasion at Normandy and the subsequent campaign across Europe. Imagine if

Eisenhower had arrived in England in January 1944, without the benefit of COSSAC, and started focusing his staff, instead of General Montgomery's 21st Army Group, on the detailed planning of D-Day. It is unlikely that those 72 post conflict studies of Germany would have happen prior to the invasion of Normandy and consequently the allies knowledge of post war Germany most likely would not been as accurate.

What would have greatly helped CENTCOM is if it stayed at the theater strategic level and focused its efforts on developing an overall campaign design. If it had recognized the difficulties of the planning complexity it could have organized subordinate commands to focus on the dominate phase and the stability phase. Instead, it went down to 21st Army Group operational level and was unable to see the forest through the trees. By the time successive post conflict organizations were developed it was really too late to be effective. The in depth understanding of post conflict Iraq was not there. When you don't know what you don't know then you can only plan for what you do know.

The combatant commander failed to properly differentiate the complexity of the planning for the dominate and the stability phases in time to make a difference. What last minute, poorly resourced, adhoc post conflict organizations that were formed were not well integrated with the command. This caused terrible decisions with huge, detrimental strategic implications to be implemented that fueled the conditions for an insurgency to emerge and dampened the prospect of achieving the national objectives for the campaign. Unfortunately, GEN Franks was more like GEN Thurman than General Eisenhower with his focus on war fighting and not the overall campaign. He, like GEN Thurman, did not organize his command for success. The chaotic transitions from the dominate phase to the stability phase for both SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM are examples of the challenge of dealing with the dual complexity of planning and executing the decisive war fight and post conflict operations at the speed of the New American Way of War. To address this challenge requires a new way on how our theater commands organize to meet these dual complexities at the speed of modern war.

CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, the speed of the New American Way of War makes the challenge of preparing for the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase very difficult. So how can this be done? First, is to recognize the essence of the difficulty in the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase is the fast rate of change between two very highly complex operations, the dominate and the stability phases. The mental capacities of the commander and his staff can only comprehend so much in a fast changing, highly complex environment. Therefore, to meet the complexity of this transition requires differentiating the dominate phase and the stability phase through separate organizations.

COL Benson, the CFLCC Chief of Plans, explains how his commander, LTG McKiernan, experienced this challenge of planning Phase IV while conducting Phase III during the attack to Baghdad, “LTG McKiernan, to his credit, recognized that he only had so much energy because we were all getting really tired. He felt he needed to get through Phase III before we got into Phase IV. He delegated responsibility, or authority, for Phase IV planning to another major general on the staff – Major General Albert Whitley of the UK Army.”¹²⁹

General Eisenhower complained about the same difficulty and came up with a similar solution. After taking operational control of the Army Groups after D-Day in the late summer of 1944, General Eisenhower sent a letter to General Marshall that, “I must confess that post-armistice matters do not occupy any great share of my thoughts. We still have a long ways to go here because of the intention of the enemy.”¹³⁰ Both LTG McKiernan and General Eisenhower dealt with their mental challenge by personally differentiating the Phase IV planning to a trusted officer.

¹²⁹ Benson, “Phase IV CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” 196.

¹³⁰ Alfred Chandler, Stephen E. Ambrose, and Joseph P. Hobbs, eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. IV*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins press, 1970), 2187.

Second, an organization can differentiate vertically, between different echelons of command, or horizontally, between different commands in the same echelon. Somewhat unfairly, this monograph used the SHAEF case study of how to do this transition right. SHAEF, of course, was not operating at the high tempo of the New American Way of War and had time to react to create organizations where none existed. Despite their advantage of having more time, a key lesson to take from SHAEF is that when it was faced with the challenge of multiple complex planning tasks it tended to differentiate organizations to match the complexity and ensured these organizations remained integrated. The sheer scale of SHAEF's forces, numbering in the millions, meant that it could differentiate vertically. That is, SHAEF was separated by multiple echelons of command from the tactical fight. When SHAEF was in England prior to the invasion of Normandy, it had the General Montgomery's 21st Army Group as the echelon between it and the lower echelons of army, corps, and below.

In the New American Way of War it is unlikely the scale of our formations will ever be as large of those of SHAEF. Therefore, vertical differentiation is not feasible. Army Groups no longer exist as an echelon of command. What could work instead of vertical differentiation is if a command differentiated horizontally. A successful example of this is how the Allies had the foresight to see the need to begin planning for the invasion of Normandy while their main effort, the AEF, was still fighting in the Mediterranean. They formed COSSAC to begin the invasion planning while General Eisenhower and the AEF continued to fight the Germans in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Once the main effort shifted to Western Europe, COSSAC and parts of the AEF were absorbed into SHAEF.

So how could a modern command, in an operation at the high tempo of the New American Way of War, differentiate horizontally for the transition from the dominate to stability phase? The latest edition of *Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations* states that planning for

stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.¹³¹ Therefore, the command must organizationally differentiate to adjust to the complexity of simultaneously planning the dominate and stability phase from the start to enable planning for both phases. Therefore, a solution would have to utilize existing operational level headquarters versus creating new a new one, like COSSAC in the SHAEF case study, due to the immediacy of the need. An existing operational headquarters would have to already been trained and equipped to meet this requirement. Horizontally differentiating for this need implies multiple operational level headquarters: one focused on the dominate phase and the other focused on the stabilization phase.

Since integration, ensuring their efforts are working toward the same goal, of these two headquarters is important, then it is necessary to have a command above these two commands to function as the integrator. This leads to the monograph's thesis, that is, to better facilitate the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase will require separate operational-level headquarters, with sufficient training and expertise, focused on each of these phases working under a geographic combatant commander's overall campaign design.

From the SHAEF, SOUTHCOM, and CENTCOM case studies, General Eisenhower was clearly the superior integrator. General Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander, took ownership of the post conflict preparations to ensure his command was ready for this critical transition. GEN Thurman, on the contrary, did not take ownership of post conflict preparations. Instead, he focused on the dominate phase to the eventual detriment of the stability phase. GEN Thurman admits that Phase IV was not on his radar screen and it should have been. Phase IV was on the radar screen for GEN Franks, but he did not take ownership of the transition process. He felt his responsibility was for the major combat operations and others in government were responsible for Phase IV.

¹³¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 17 September 2006), V-2.

An example of differentiation to deal with the complexity of the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase was LTG Abizaid's recommendation, when he was the Joint Staff Director, to have a corps not involved in the major war fight focus on planning the post hostility phase while another, in this case CENTCOM, focused on planning the dominate phase. The thesis would differ from this example, however, by not having CENTCOM as the headquarters that plans the dominate phase. Within this thesis construct, the geographic combatant command must stay at the theater strategic level and focus on the entire campaign as well as the rest of its area of responsibility. Along with that stabilization headquarters it would have been important to identify another headquarters to conduct the detailed dominate phase planning. CFLCC could have been designated a CJTF and filled this role. This would have enabled CENTCOM to stay at the theater strategic level and focus on the overall campaign while it continued see the forest through out its area of responsibility (AOR). This will not work if the geographic combatant commander focused on the dominate phase like SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM did in these case studies.

It is not only important to properly structure the command through differentiation and integration, but it is also necessary to have commanders and staff that are knowledgeable of how to conduct the transition from the dominate to the stability phase. Recall GEN Thurman's admission that thinking through the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase was "...the last priority on my agenda at the time....We do not teach (the transition to post conflict) in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work."¹³²

The Hunt Report seared a generation of officers prior to World War II on the difficulties in conducting post conflict operations in Germany following World War I. Likewise, the harsh lessons of OIF will sear a generation of officers on the importance of this transition. DOD has codified the importance of this transition in policy, *DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for*

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. The major points of this policy direct that “stability operations are a core US military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”¹³³ The latest joint publications, published since the transition to post conflict in OIF, are following this policy. *Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations*, states that planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated. The campaign should strike the appropriate balance between office and defense operations and stability operations in all phases.¹³⁴

With this emphasis from DOD Directive 300.05 and the most current joint operational doctrine, this monograph recommends that operational organizations (US Army Theater Army and Corps and Marine MEFs) be designated as having as one of their joint universal military tasks, conducting stability operations. Combatant commands should focus on being the integrator of multiple differentiated headquarters. This monograph recommends Joint Forces Command’s Joint War fighting Center, the Army Battle Command Training Program and its Marine equivalent conduct training exercises with a transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase be embedded in the exercise scenario. In keeping with DOD Directive 3000.05, the dominate phase and stability phase should be given comparable priority in training. Many of the mistakes in the post conflict transition during OPERATION JUST CAUSE were repeated during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM due to the lack of incorporating these lessons into our doctrine and into how we train and educate our leaders. How a command is structured and concepts for how to conduct stability operations should be studied during the academic weeks preceding the exercises. The importance of properly organizing a command to meet the complexity should be

¹³² Shultz, “In the Aftermath of War,”21.

¹³³ Gordon England,. *DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 28 Nov 2005), 1.

¹³⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office. 17 September 2006), V-2.

discussed at seminars at the appropriate venues such as in our field grade education systems and CAPSTONE for senior officers. Senior leaders require education in how to think through the guidance they would give for stability operations just as they would for major war fighting. In addition to exercising the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase among multiple operational level headquarters, planners must learn how to do this in a compartmentalized environment. It is important that those responsible for the stability phase are “read in” to ensure the campaign is planned through all phases.

The tempo of warfare in the New American Way of War requires our military to be capable of successfully achieving our nation’s strategic objections for the campaign. This monograph proposes that to better facilitate the transition from the dominate phase to the stability phase will require separate operational-level headquarters, with sufficient training and expertise, focused on each of these phases working under a geographic combatant commander’s overall campaign design. The complexity of having to plan and execute the dominate and stability phase requires an adjustment to how we organize our command structure to successfully operate at the speed of the New American Way of War.

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