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Airmen and the Art of Strategy

Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF

Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy

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Busting the Icon: Restoring Balance to the Influence of Clausewitz

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STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY

*An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum for
Military, Government, and Academic Professionals*

VOLUME I

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NUMBER 1

Editorials

- Ideas—The Essential Elements for Strategic Security
in an Uncertain Future* 3
Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF
- Welcome to the First Issue of Strategic Studies Quarterly!* 5
Anthony C. Cain

Feature Articles

- Airmen and the Art of Strategy*. 7
Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF
- Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy* 20
Terry Everett
- From Kosovo to the War on Terror: The Collapsing
Transatlantic Consensus, 1999–2002*. 36
Edwina S. Campbell
- Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?*. 79
Jeffrey Record
- Through the Glass Darkly: The Unlikely Demise of
Great-Power War*. 96
James Wood Forsyth Jr.
Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF
- Busting the Icon: Restoring Balance to the
Influence of Clausewitz* 116
Phillip S. Meilinger

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Book Reviews

Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement;
Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe 146
Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly,
Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien,
and William Rosenau
Reviewed by: Lewis Griffith

The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline 147
Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi
Reviewed by: Douglas Peifer

America's Environmental Report Card: Are We Making
the Grade? 149
Harvey Blatt
Reviewed by: Lt Col Thomas N. Williams, USAF

Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 151
Tony Judt
Reviewed by: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired

Ideas—The Essential Elements for Strategic Security in an Uncertain Future

Welcome to the first issue of *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (SSQ)—the US Air Force's forum for exchanging ideas that matter for our nation's security. Air University was established to develop our Air Force leaders as they prepare for the future. In support of that mission, we at Air University are committed to the exploration of ideas that foster engagement and growth within the defense community. This strategic journal is part of a larger set of initiatives designed to ensure that the ideas that are part and parcel of our national security debate do not become stagnant or conventional.

The most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* described four strategic challenges that our nation faces: traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic. Our national security apparatus must transform to meet all of these challenges, and much of that transformation will require new ideas, organizations, and relationships among members of the military, government, and academia. Our vision is for SSQ to become an effective forum to foster those ideas and relationships.

Our staff—Dr. Anthony C. Cain, editor-in-chief; Ms. Tawanda Eaves, managing editor; Ms. Betty Littlejohn, editorial assistant; and the team at Air University Press—already has SSQ on a solid footing, as you will see in the contents of this inaugural issue. We will begin by publishing the printed journal each quarter while simultaneously offering an online version. Additionally, we will offer an electronic subscription service at <http://www.af.mil/subscribe> that will deliver SSQ to you via e-mail each quarter without delay.

Gen T. Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff, has said, "We must ensure our war-fighting future." SSQ contributes to this imperative by helping to develop relationships and by facilitating the exchange of ideas that will prepare us to confront the challenges facing our nation during these uncertain times.

We look forward to seeing an active, enthusiastic exchange of ideas that contributes directly to making our nation more secure, and we encourage you to bring ideas into this forum—to offer your views and proposals

here, where they will receive the serious consideration they deserve. We expect that some of the answers to the tough problems we will confront in the rapidly changing strategic environment will appear in the pages of this journal.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Lorenz", with a stylized, flowing script.

STEPHEN R. LORENZ
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander, Air University

Welcome to the First Issue of *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (SSQ)!

"To provide a forum for critically examining and debating warfare, strategy, national and international security, and defense policy."

Gen T. Michael Moseley, US Air Force chief of staff, has sponsored this journal to be a forum for Airmen, members of government, and members of academia to exchange ideas, views, and opinions about strategic matters.

The strategic environment has undergone unprecedented change in the past 20 years. The United States is presently a nation at war—a war fought on many fronts characterized by many types of battles, conflicts, and campaigns. Historically when such shifts in the strategic landscape have occurred, professional communities have sought to interpret those changes by providing new forums for understanding how strategic policies must shift in order to meet the challenges of the new environment. For example, in 1922 in the aftermath of World War I, the editors of *Foreign Affairs* wrote that "the dominant purpose is to promote the discussion of current questions of international interest and to serve as the natural medium for the expression of the best thought." Similarly, in 1970, the editors of a new journal, *Foreign Policy*, noted that "in light of Vietnam, the basic purposes of American foreign policy demand re-examination and re-definition."

In other words, the changes in the international context today that stem from globalization and economic competition; the collapse of the bipolar world and the rise of regional powers; trends toward increasing democratization in some areas and the opposing retreat from democratic reforms in others; the unprecedented wealth in some areas of the world compared to the hopeless poverty in others; and the challenges of energy sufficiency, environmental security, and demographic change, along with a host of other strategic concerns, will be the subjects of *Strategic Studies Quarterly's* pages. Furthermore, our book review section will provide opportunities each quarter for our readers and contributors to evaluate the latest scholarship on the widest possible range of issues.

There are several reasons for launching a new journal at this time. *SSQ* will perform a role that existing USAF journals do not fill. It will also provide a way for strategic thinkers, policy makers, and researchers to find ways to forge relationships with each other as they exchange ideas. Finally, *SSQ* will contribute to the strategic policy development process. The perspectives provided by Airmen will characterize some of those contribu-

tions—but often those contributions will add to rather than derive from the unique air, space, and cyberspace perspectives that Airmen hold.

Healthy professions use professional membership organizations and journals to refine their institutions as their members exchange ideas. Those ideas and the relationships from which they spring serve as catalysts for evaluating the best alternatives for future decisions. But when professions intersect as they do at the strategic level of international security and defense policy, the exchange of ideas often becomes difficult to achieve. Certainly, military, government, and academic professionals have vehicles for interacting with one another—but adding another way for that interaction to occur through the open exchange of ideas gives opportunities for forging and strengthening relationships and connections among the three communities.

The unique strategic security concerns that military professionals contribute can inform government and academic professionals about certain tangible aspects of the policy development equation. Government leaders can communicate to the military and to academe how they view the long-term geopolitical, political, social, and domestic aspects of the strategic challenge. Academic professionals can provide multiple perspectives grounded in disciplined research techniques that can enrich the views of their colleagues in the military and in government. As these and other interactions take place, the professional communities that formulate, inform, and execute policy can learn more about each other while they also develop greater confidence in each other.

The prospect of starting a new professional journal is fraught with excitement and risk. The quality of the journal will be a reflection of the interests and the contributions of the members of the professional communities that the publication seeks to serve. As the editor, I am confident that the members of military, government, and academic communities will provide the insights that will inform and enrich perspectives that will ultimately lead to more effective international security and defense policies. I am also confident that *SSQ* will help those professionals find ways to understand the challenges our nation faces today and for the foreseeable future.

I look forward to serving as your editor and colleague as we move toward that future.

Anthony C. Cain

ANTHONY C. CAIN, PhD

Editor-in-Chief, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*

Airmen and the Art of Strategy

T. Michael Moseley, General, USAF

The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.

—King Archidamus of Sparta, as quoted in Thucydides'
History of the Peloponnesian Wars

Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated—mostly in the light of probabilities alone. The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality of intuition that perceives the truth at every point.

—Carl von Clausewitz

THE WORDS of wisdom cited above span the ages and reflect two eternal truths: first, that war is a uniquely challenging human endeavor; and, second, that strategic thinking is as difficult as it is vital. These fundamental ideas frame both the logic of this essay and the rationale underlying the decision to launch *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (SSQ).

Men have fought wars since remotest antiquity on land and at sea. We fight them still today on land and at sea, and, since the twentieth century, we also fight in and through the air, space, and cyberspace. The breathtaking changes these millennia have seen in humanity's way of life and in the environment we have created for ourselves are matched by fundamental transformations in the character and conduct of war in terms of who fights where, when, and how. Yet war persists essentially unchanged in its most fundamental, primordial nature as a clash of opposing wills and intellects.

General T. Michael Moseley is Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training, and equipment of more than 710,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general and other service chiefs function as military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President.

Although war represents human violence in its most extreme form, war is not simply organized violence. War is a political act, employing force to promote or defend a set of interests. It is the violent outcome of a calculated, conscious decision that there is more to be gained by fighting than by remaining at peace. As war became institutionalized over the centuries, a new profession emerged: the guardians of the nation's defense and the masters of the unique skills necessary to fulfill a function so vital that without it civilization would perish within a generation. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* is a forum for this increasingly diverse national security elite of warriors and scholars.

There can be few decisions more crucial—or more momentous—than determining whether, when, how, and to what end the nation should commit blood and treasure. These issues are, in Sun Tzu's words, "of vital importance to the state—the province of life and death, the road to survival or ruin." All deserve to be studied seriously; all touch the very essence of the profession of arms. Yet, none has ready-made, universally acceptable answers. And no one Service or Agency can claim a monopoly on either posing the questions or framing the answers.

Many of this journal's readers have been engaged, at various levels, in implementing decisions with strategic effect, some over 16 years of continuous combat. We realize that using other, nonmilitary instruments of statecraft to promote and defend the national interest might be more desirable, frugal, and humane than armed combat. We also know, however, that if we are required to fight, we fight to win. Therefore, we must have both the material and the intellectual tools to do that at the strategic level. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, if "wars must sometimes be our lot," it behooves us to learn how "to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our own follies," and prepare as best we can to fight and win the other, unavoidable half. The wisdom to know the difference is, ultimately, what strategy is all about.

Accordingly, *Strategic Studies Quarterly* will be an important addition to our leaders' intellectual arsenals. Reading, thinking about, and contributing to the strategic discourse we intend to conduct on these pages should be a critical element in the lifetime pursuit of professional excellence that is the duty of every Airman. I challenge you to engage with fellow Warriors from all Services, professionals across Federal Agencies, and scholars in universities and think tanks in the quest to master the strategic art and understand the many dimensions of war and peace.

The Art of Strategy

As a long-overdue venue to voice Airmen's unique perspectives, subsequent editions of *Strategic Studies Quarterly* will no doubt examine these issues in more detail. For this inaugural issue of the *Quarterly*, it is appropriate we begin with a succinct reminder of foundational concepts such as **strategic theory and practice, innovation, and holistic thinking**. These concepts are inextricably linked to—and reflected in—SSQ's core purpose: Developing Airmen for strategic leadership.

Strategic theory and practice constitute the intellectual foundation of the profession of arms. The function of any theory is to describe, organize, and explain a body of knowledge. Strategic theory has an added function: it guides action. Thus, it is nothing if not pragmatic. To paraphrase Bernard Brodie, strategy is a field where practitioners seek truth in the pursuit of viable solutions. The focus of strategy is on the *ways* in which available *means* could be employed to achieve the desired *ends* with acceptable *risk*. Therefore, the first strategic question is, will this "brilliant" concept actually work under the special—and usually unknowable—circumstances of its next test? Often, that next test of the ends/ways/means/risks solution is the crucible of war, where the opponent gets an equal vote.

Throughout your future careers, you will be developing and implementing national security strategies and war plans. Your actions (no matter how far removed from the actual fight) and your recommendations (no matter how compelling they might seem as a PowerPoint brief or a policy memorandum) will have real and often far-reaching consequences. My advice to you is to always ask, is there a better way? Stay focused on the ends, don't confuse ways with means, and remember to factor in the inevitable differences between planning and execution. If we are at war and we get the military strategy about right, people will be killed; if we get it wrong, *lots* of people will be killed. We must always consider how strategic decisions might impact operations and how, in turn, tactical and operational realities might limit the range of options available to the decision maker.

Innovation is the ability to think anew and develop creative approaches to changed circumstances. Some military innovations involve science and technology; their product has been new weapons systems that changed the face of warfare. Other, equally significant, innovations come in the realm of ideas and organizational designs. In either case, the ability to innovate rests on foresight—that is, the aptitude to read current and emerg-

ing trends, as well as to anticipate their future potential. Innovation also requires moral courage, perseverance and, often, readiness to “break some glass”—especially in large bureaucracies.

Throughout history, some leaders chose to stick with comfortable assumptions and time-tested constructs, failing to realize that the strategic environment had fundamentally changed. Victory tended to shine on those who were able to grasp the potential for innovation and figure out how to fuse concepts, technology, doctrine, and organization into an overwhelming combination of effects. Their gift was integration, or holistic thinking.

Holistic thinking is an approach which captures both the whole and its component parts; grasps multidimensional, dynamic relationships as they are today and as they might evolve tomorrow; yet does not assume—or expect—linearity, perfect coordination, or clear-cut answers. Absent a holistic approach, our universe of possible constructs would be little more than a series of disconnected loose ends. Moreover, successful strategic designs must be integrated both horizontally and vertically. Even the best military operation will be an abject failure if it does not support the overarching political strategy. Likewise, a brilliant strategy unsupported—or unsupportable—by reality at the tactical and operational levels is, at best, an interesting academic exercise or, more often, a prescription for disaster.

Strategy is both an art and a structured intellectual process. It is the constant adaptation of ends, ways, and means to shifting conditions in an environment where chance, uncertainty, friction, and ambiguity dominate. To complicate matters even further, strategy is a multisided affair, wherein the objectives, intentions, actions, and reactions of other participants—both allies and opponents—are often obscure, or at least variable. A wide variety of factors—politics, economics, geography, history, culture, religion, ideology, etc.—influence strategic behavior in subtle but important ways. These realities require a much broader, more integrated, more conceptual approach than most of us have grown comfortable with. For the essence of strategic effectiveness is the ability to connect seemingly disparate activities, issues, and areas of concern into a coherent whole. This is the kind of holistic approach we’ll strive to foster and articulate in the pages of *Strategic Studies Quarterly*.

There is an art to developing and implementing a coherent strategy—an art that requires imagination, creativity, and sound logic. Military strategy is not developed in a vacuum. Any use of force is, ultimately, a political act. Therefore, the nature of the strategist’s mission demands that it be

approached in the context of its environment, factoring in and taking account of a vast array of dynamic variables—which further compounds the inherent complexity of solving the ends/ways/means/risks equation. This task requires rigorous, precise thinking and the ability to reconcile—or choose among—competing courses of action. There are no easy answers to guide the strategist except the knowledge that the only alternative to an integrated approach is inconsistency, wasted effort, and increased risk.

Strategic effectiveness comes from a coherent, synchronized approach sustained over the long term and guided by a clear vision of the desired end state. Foresight and flexibility—informed by the harsh lessons of history—are the keys to success, as is the ability to fuse a wide variety of actions, issues, and equities into a logical whole. Frankly, this kind of holistic thinking is rare precisely because it is so difficult. It is difficult precisely because it requires the widest possible perspectives developed over a lifetime of professional and intellectual development. Consider *Strategic Studies Quarterly* a forum to practice this art, to hone the intellectual skills that are the essence of strategic leadership, and to develop relationships with those who seek to develop their own holistic thinking skills. The stakes are so high that it is not enough merely to make the attempt—it is *vital to our national interests and those of our allies and partners to develop an institutional culture that fosters holistic thinking*. We owe that to our Air Force, our Joint Team, and our nation.

The Crucible of History

If you need an example of a failure to match military design with strategic purpose—with disastrous consequences—the First World War is definitely “Exhibit A.” No other war comes close. It was clear within weeks of the war’s outbreak that the Schlieffen Plan on which the Germans had staked all had utterly failed; so had the French Plan XVII. Within a couple of months it was clear—or at least should have been clear—that the war was going to be exceedingly costly in blood and treasure and that a quick strategic victory was all but impossible. Yet the carnage continued for four miserable years, killing millions and scarring several generations.

The scale, velocity, and intensity of the violence that erupted in August 1914 were beyond the experience and comprehension of those responsible for directing and conducting the war. The result was intellectual paralysis. The sheer might of the opposing armies seemed to overwhelm enlightened

thought about how to harness that power to a viable political cause. No one could discern a winning approach. Unable to gain advantage, the combatants dug themselves in—both literally and figuratively—resigned to slug it out until they exhausted their resources and their will to continue fighting.

Airpower was born in this crucible, which history regards as one of the most ineptly fought wars in history. By opening the vertical dimension, airpower promised to restore maneuver to the positional stalemate and break the intellectual deadlock that condemned Europe to four years of unprecedented death and destruction. It offered a viable alternative that would minimize—if not avoid altogether—the loss of life and treasure inherent in a land war and sidestep the horrific cost of symmetric attrition. Yet, even after aviation's potential was conclusively established in the Battle of Saint Mihiel, it took a decade—and, ultimately, another world war—to fundamentally transform entrenched constructs.

In contrast, by the fall of 1941 the US Army Air Forces had developed and submitted the air component of the overall American military's "Victory Plan" for World War II. Highly complex, detailed, and visionary (recall that it was submitted prior to American involvement in the Second World War), the Air War Plans Division Document 1 (AWPD-1) was, in a nutshell, a fresh strategic approach that gave the nation a new way to wage and win a global war. With war raging in both Europe and the Pacific and with the US on the precipice of conflict, four air planners—former Air Corps Tactical School instructors Colonel Hal George, Lieutenant Colonel Ken Walker, Major Haywood Hansell, and Major Laurence Kuter—developed a roadmap to create an essentially independent air service that could simultaneously wage strategic air warfare, fight a tactical fight, resupply forces on a global scale, and win a world war. Clearly, these were no small feats. But as Hansell would later say, "If the task was staggering, so too was the opportunity."

Today's Strategic Challenges

Today, with the nation at war, we face similarly daunting tasks. But our opportunities are equally great. Today the nation once again demands Airmen who can think strategically. Like the current Global War on Terrorism, US involvement in the Second World War started with a surprise attack on US territory; the times called for a total commitment and quick adjustment to unexpected imperatives. Along with war-fighting and organizational skills, intellectual agility and adaptability—the ability to innovate—proved

to be the keys to victory. These very skills are also second nature to Airmen. If we are to win today's war and prepare for the uncertainties of tomorrow, we must make our talents count once again. Developing a strategy to match our tasks is a difficult one that seeks to reconcile ends, ways, and means; mitigate risks; and balance present imperatives with future considerations—all in an environment where chance, fog, friction, and ambiguity dominate. It is a difficult and imprecise art. But it is also a necessary endeavor if we intend to continue to be prepared to fulfill our enduring tasks no matter what kinds of challenges the future holds.

Today, as in 1941, we face conditions we had not planned on or prepared for, requiring us to adapt in the midst of a fight, learn from experience, and quickly evolve new approaches and procedures—often fielding new, untested technologies—to solve emerging problems. Today, as in 1941, we have the opportunity—and the responsibility—to shape the Air Force for the next century. The Global War on Terror and radical transformation of the strategic environment demand an equally radical transformation of how we approach the problems of national security. Our air-, space-, and cyberspace-minded perspectives and skills must not be absent from this strategic policy development process. If Airmen do not propose options derived from our unique perspectives, no one will. We have already begun important, long-term efforts to *materially recapitalize* our air and space systems. It is now also time to *intellectually recapitalize* as well.

There is an urgent need to do this, given the world's fundamental transformation since 1990 and given the likelihood of further unprecedented change in the years to come. Since 1990, empires have collapsed, the Cold War has ended, Desert Storm and Allied Force have been fought and won, and Americans have been attacked on American soil. The United States is now engaged in a new kind of war with a new, implacable enemy that invokes an extremist brand of Islam against America and our allies; is not tied to geographic boundaries; operates in nontraditional domains; employs nontraditional means; and is unbound by established norms of international behavior. A long, global war against this enemy is simply unavoidable.

But while the war is an important and emotional issue and demands significant resources, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is not our only concern. It cannot be; we do not have that luxury. Even as we wage—and strive to win—the Global War on Terror, our nation and Air Force must also prepare for emerging threats at all levels of warfare. We have to be ready to deliver sovereign options to defend the United States, its inter-

ests, and its ideals, given a host of changes and challenges in the international security environment.

The end of the Cold War and the advent of the Global War on Terror set the stage for tectonic shifts around the globe, with repercussions that are still unfolding. In the coming years, massive political, economic, societal, cultural, and technological upheavals will determine the amplitude and direction of even more global change. Worldwide demographic trends such as changing age structures, urbanization, population growth, and population density movement could have increasingly significant impacts and potentially cause conflict around the world. Sparked or amplified by these conditions, ethnic, cultural, and religious discord may lead to violence that weak or failed governments are incapable of containing. The global economy remains vulnerable to shocks and cycles that could trigger even greater social and political instability. Competition over scarce resources—oil and natural gas, water, and arable land, just to name a few—may also cause conflict.

Fueled by quantum leaps in nanotechnology and computational power, increasingly sophisticated next-generation threats with more killing power than ever are proliferating at relatively low cost around the world. Unlike the procurement hiatus the entire US military was forced to take during the 1990s, our present enemies and future competitors did not take a break from modernizing their systems. Armed with new equipment, they are fielding capabilities spanning all three of our war-fighting domains, challenging our dominance of air, space, and cyberspace and potentially hindering US forces' ability to prevail in a future fight.

For example, our aircraft will face increasingly lethal antiaccess weapons that threaten to make entire blocks of our weapons systems obsolete. At least one nation has successfully tested an antisatellite weapon, eliminating consideration of space as an international sanctuary. We consequently face competition—if not outright confrontation—with other countries in an environment we used to consider a safe haven. Peer competitors have declared the electromagnetic spectrum as the “fifth battlespace,” and we are seeing more sophisticated attacks occurring daily in cyberspace. There is a virtual “terrorism university” on the Internet, helping mobilize, train, and finance terrorist networks, not to mention tarnishing America’s image with propaganda. Both state and non-state actors have improved their cyber capabilities and now maneuver effectively within this domain. Unlike in the air and space domains, in cyberspace there is no clear delineation

between war and peace. The inherent physical characteristics of the cyber domain facilitate seamless and constant maneuver without the constraints of physical or even temporal presence.

But if we focus simply on countering future threats, we will fall short of delivering the cross-domain strategic effects our nation demands. We may not be able to predict the thrust and vector of any one of these changes or the synergies they might create together, yet each of them could ignite a conflict that engulfs us in the future. If the United States of America—as the world’s sole superpower—is to maintain its ability to dominate peer competitors, dissuade dangerous actors, ensure global freedom of commerce, and defend freedom and the inherent rights of man, its military must be prepared for a full range of possibilities. The art is to ensure our future readiness—material and intellectual—while simultaneously waging a global war.

An Airman’s Response

Accordingly, I see a need to increase the quality and quantity of Airmen’s voices in the strategic debate. If we do not become more regularly vocal and more regularly heard and heeded at the strategic level, we risk our thoughts and thinking being channeled into tactical- and operational-level discussions or limited to programming for systems whose designs we did not get to shape. Consequently, we risk being associated with—if not defined by—the material *means* of strategy, rather than its *ends* and *ways*. I challenge each of you, in the pages of *Strategic Studies Quarterly* and in other venues, to change that, beginning right here, right now.

It is our duty to make our voices heard; to ensure we extend our expertise to the public strategic discourse; and to articulate our *raison d’être*, unique character, and many contributions to national security. The United States of America is an air-, space-, and cyber-power nation that derives much of its global influence from the ability to act in and dominate these three war-fighting domains. In that vein alone Airmen are indispensable. But Airmen also bring a unique *perspective* to the public strategic discourse that adds further value.

Think about it: an Airman’s perspective is, by definition, multidimensional, global, and strategic. We instinctively address problems in a comprehensive, three-dimensional, nonlinear manner, and we intuitively factor in the fourth dimension: time. Our way of thinking starts at the top, with the first-order, overarching determination of desired effects. We systemati-

cally work our way through the ensuing tasks and second- and third-order consequences. We size up situations, integrate seemingly disparate data points, seize on opportunities, and act decisively. We plan and flawlessly execute air, space, and cyberspace campaigns—arguably the most complex of all military undertakings—involving the employment, orchestration, and synchronization of literally thousands of moving pieces, operating from just above the planet's surface all the way into deep space, to achieve desired effects within a compressed timeframe.

Ensuring that our perspective remains a part of the public national security discourse requires constant vigor. Our last publicly proclaimed, original conceptual design was “Global Reach–Global Power,” developed by Lieutenant General Dave Deptula and signed by Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice on 13 June 1990. Ten years later, on 19 June 2000, we added “Global Vigilance” to this guiding construct. It still stands as our overarching strategic architecture 17 years after it was originally conceived, which speaks to its enduring value.

At the same time, it is fair to ask, have we become conceptually stale? Have we grown too comfortable with established, time-tested assumptions? “Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power” are elegant and almost timeless concepts. They do, after all, encapsulate in a phrase what the Air Force does for the nation. But we cannot be complacent about them and what they mean. We have to keep abreast of changes in technology, theory, and practice. The burden remains on us as Airmen to revitalize the application of these concepts and ensure they remain fresh, compelling, and relevant.

Redefining Airpower for the Twenty-first Century

The mission of the United States Air Force is “to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States and its global interests—to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace.” The transformational aspects of this mission statement should not be lost on Airmen, the American people, or the world at large. While firmly rooted in our enduring core purpose—flying and fighting—the mission statement redefines airpower for the twenty-first century in two important ways. First, it adds cyberspace—the domain of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum—to our traditional air and space areas of responsibility. Second, it alludes to the cross-domain synergies we see as possible, given our dominance of these three war-fighting domains.

Our mission statement represents a sea change for the nation's Air Force. We still see the first responsibility of any commander as dominating and projecting power in his domain. But with our mission statement we extend the time-tested principle of "command of the air" as the prerequisite for success in all ensuing military actions—on land, at sea, and in the air—into two additional domains: space and cyberspace. At the same time we elevate cyber to a distinct maneuver space on a par with land, sea, air, and space, we also begin to evaluate what can be achieved through dominance across the three war-fighting domains that are the province of Airmen.

Our ability to integrate effects across our domains, then affect other domains, creates powerful synergies for the Joint Force. It gives the US Air Force a unique ability to *surveil* the battlespace—a battlespace that already encompasses virtually the entire planet—keeping a persistent, vigilant eye on targets and activities around the world from the vantage points of air, space, and cyberspace. Cross-domain dominance allows Airmen to also *range* the entire surface of the earth and continue to surveil those activities or targets, hold them at risk, or strike them when ordered. Airmen then have the flexibility to choose effects that will best fit national objectives, and deliver those effects precisely at previously unachievable ranges and speeds. Cross-domain capabilities give us the ability to achieve effects other Service elements cannot or do not, delivering lethal, kinetic effects at the speed of sound; delivering lethal or nonlethal, nonkinetic effects at the speed of light through cyberspace; delivering cargo for humanitarian aid and military personnel in combat; and delivering Joint and Combined forces to their battlefields so they can do their jobs. Cross-domain dominance gives Airmen the capacity to save the lives of our comrades in arms and minimize the human toll of war.

Airmen also have the unique ability to *command and control* (C2) US and coalition air, space, and cyber activities around the world. Airmen seamlessly integrate airborne, ground-, space-, and cyber-based platforms to detect, track, and identify targets on the surface, at sea, in the air, and in space, then battle manage our assets to deliver the appropriate effect. C2 capabilities ensure friendly-force accountability, an increasingly important requirement given the nonlinear, noncontiguous battlespace in which we operate today and expect in the future. They speed progress through the kill chain by delivering precise, timely, and accurate information even on mobile, fleeting targets. And they enable centralized control of air, space, and cyberspace operations with decentralized execution, a doctrinal tenet that will be even

more critical in tomorrow's uncertain environment. Finally, Airmen have the ability to *assess* effects in real time or near-real time, be they kinetic or nonkinetic, physical or psychological, across three war-fighting domains.

To reach new horizons of conceptual and technological innovation, to take full advantage of and to push the boundaries of our cross-domain dominance, we need the full involvement of Airmen's intellect, foresight, and holistic thinking. We need to forge new relationships with intellectuals who dedicate their careers to researching, analyzing, and teaching about war and peace. "Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power" is conceptually timeless; its application must change with the times. To ensure it continues to link our ability to deliver sovereign options for the nation with the means we have available, we must continue to develop it as a strategic framework—and must encompass all three war-fighting domains—in tandem with our new systems, practices, and tactical and operational theories.

Since the days of Kitty Hawk, airpower has been seen too frequently through the lens of its awesome technology: beautiful flying machines streaking effortlessly across the sky; mighty rockets lifting satellites flawlessly into orbit; and persistent electronics sensing, signaling, connecting, transmitting, processing, and controlling integrated, cross-dimensional effects in air, space, and cyberspace. Yet it is our people—Airmen—whose intellect and skills transform mere hunks of metal, buckets of bolts, microprocessors, and circuitry into the nation's war-fighting edge. We must therefore recapitalize not only our inventories of aging aircraft and spacecraft but also our intellectual power. It is, after all, our intellectual capabilities that determine our ability to practice the strategic art and to solve the ends/ways/means/risks challenges we face. And it is our intellectual capabilities that are the foundation of ideas and concepts that American Airmen have used to fashion the Air Force into this nation's asymmetric advantage in war and peace.

Strategic Studies Quarterly will help stimulate these intellectual recapitalization efforts, which will in turn foster Airmen's long-term ability to think strategically. This ability is at least as critical now as it has ever been; war, after all, surrounds us, and it is not getting any easier to wage or understand. I challenge each of you to embark on your own journey of intellectual discovery; to explore what is possible in the application of air, space, and cyber power; and to weigh in with your thoughts in future issues. If what we do today defines the future for our Air Force, our nation, and the

global community, I challenge each of you to have *strategic effect* by educating other Airmen, the American public, and our nation's leaders about the enduring value of air, space, and cyberspace for national security.

We now find ourselves at a historic inflection point—one fraught with strategic challenges. Previous generations of Airmen also faced great challenges, and yet, armed with well-crafted and resourced strategies, they were able to create the strategic effects our nation needed during epic chapters in its history. When he said, "Nations nearly always go into an armed contest with the equipment and methods of a former war. Victory always comes to that country which has made a proper estimate of the equipment and methods that can be used in modern ways," Billy Mitchell established a vision for strategic thinking that Airmen can still follow. Today, it is our responsibility to apply the same level of mental rigor as generations of Airmen have done before so that we meet the challenges that face us with the imagination and creativity our country expects of its Air Force.

As the 18th Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I am honored to lead Warriors—proud members of the profession of arms—those who have answered the nation's call to service and sacrifice. The Air Force is America's cross-domain, global-maneuver force. The power Airmen wield is at once strategic, operational, and tactical. So must be our habit of thought. At this time of war, and at this strategic crossroads, America could ask no more—and expect no less—from its Airmen. 

Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy

Terry Everett

THE CONTRIBUTIONS that space brings to our daily lives extend far beyond the military. In June 2006, while serving as chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I held a hearing to bring focus to the magnitude of our military and economic dependence on space. Lt Gen C. Robert Kehler, vice-commander of US Strategic Command, provided several examples of how space capabilities are integral to the daily execution of virtually every military campaign, operation, and exercise involving US forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) space capabilities enabled blue-force tracking (which lowered combat losses), command and control of dispersed ground forces (which facilitated ground maneuver around enemy strong points), and the geolocation of downed aircrews. The use of global positioning system (GPS)-guided precision munitions also resulted in lower collateral damage, more efficient use of limited munitions inventory, and mission execution during adverse weather conditions.¹ On the commercial side, the executive director of the Satellite Industries Association, Mr. David Cavossa, estimated that space contributes over 90 billion dollars annually to the global economy, supporting daily activities such as truck fleet management, credit card validations, pay-at-the-pump services, ATM withdrawals, high-speed Internet, traffic and weather reports, and almost all television and radio distribution.² Not only has space become essential to modern warfare, it also has established itself as a permanent utility in our global commerce.

However, I believe much of Congress and the American public are largely unaware of how space capabilities contribute to our daily com-

Cong. Terry Everett (R-AL), second district, is an eight-term member of the US House of Representatives. He became the first chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces in 2004. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee oversees nearly \$60 billion annually, covering military intelligence, military space, missile defense, and nuclear weapons programs. As chairman, he called for increased protection of America's commercial and military satellites, which underpin both our economy and our national security. In 2007, with the change in party control of the Congress, Everett was named the subcommittee's ranking Republican member. He is also a senior member of the House Intelligence and Agriculture Committees.

merce and broader economic security. Unless our nation truly understands our dependence on space, we cannot understand the risks of losing this capability. To this end, I personally included language in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act calling on the National Space Studies Center at Maxwell Air Force Base's Air University to examine this issue "to assess the value of space contributions with emphasis on the United States' dependence on space, innovative ideas contributing to ensuring freedom of action in space, and integration of all space forces."³

On 30 January 2007 House Armed Services Committee ranking member Duncan Hunter of California and I signed a letter to the President calling for a change in America's defensive space strategy in the face of a singular but landmark event 19 days earlier. That letter read, in part:

China's recent test of an anti-satellite missile, destroying a satellite in low earth orbit, marks the commencement of a new era of military competition in space. The dependency of American warfighting capability, and the economy, on space assets compels our nation to take the necessary steps to ensure our forces cannot be targeted through an adversarial space strike. Space capabilities are integral to the daily execution of virtually every military campaign, operation, and exercise involving U.S. forces today. Therefore, a review of Department of Defense programs intended to preserve American space assets is warranted. Further, new programs which provide protection, redundancy, and reconstitution of space assets should be essential.

As an advocate of a vigilant defensive space policy, the Chinese antisatellite (ASAT) test is worrisome to me and warrants a clear and considered US response. America must develop a comprehensive space protection strategy, rethink its national security space architecture, and reexamine its policies on space protection and the use of space. While some have said that we should not be overly worried about this event, I believe this is a clear wake-up call for the Administration, Congress, and the American people.

Recognizing Our Vulnerabilities

After I became chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee in 2002, I warned of the potential loss of our commercial and military satellite constellations to foreign attack. The United States has more satellites in orbit than any other nation. As the most technologically advanced nation in the world, we are also the most vulnerable to disruption if our satellites are threatened.

Unfortunately, our adversaries do not need to be educated about our reliance on satellites. On 11 January 2007 the Chinese launched a medium-range ballistic missile into space. It targeted an aging Chinese weather satellite orbiting 500 miles above the planet. The kill vehicle rammed into the target satellite, sending out into orbit thousands of pieces of debris of varying sizes with speeds up to 1,400 miles per hour, according to Air Force Space Command.⁴ Particles a few centimeters in length are large enough to cause major damage, which is what makes this debris so significant and why, given its potential to stay in orbit for years to come, it poses a long-term hazard to our satellites. The United States, with its space surveillance network, will bear the long-term responsibility for warning others of potential collisions, including foreign and commercial operators, and ironically, the Chinese.

The likely result is that the space shuttle, the International Space Station, and many satellites in low Earth orbit will need to expend precious fuel to maneuver around debris. At some point, our satellite operators will determine the loss of "mission life" due to this extra maneuvering. This could be a sizeable impact when we are talking about multibillion-dollar satellites designed for lifetimes of five to 10 years. In recent testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Gen James Cartwright, commander, US Strategic Command, commented that "we are going to have to make significant adjustments as collision, or, as we call it, conjunction opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years. . . . That is going to have an effect on business, on commerce. And it is going to have an effect on our national assets that are in low Earth orbit."⁵

Simply stated, the Chinese ASAT event was a significant and irresponsible act. In a recent trip to China, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter Pace, commented that China's senior military leaders still refuse to disclose any details about their recent test.⁶ Though the Chinese have firmly denied any malicious intent, I remain highly skeptical based on other activities. Apparently, this single test is part of a broader effort to mature their direct-ascent ASAT capability and to develop a spectrum of counterspace capabilities. This is consistent with their larger military modernization and advanced technology efforts, evidenced by the roughly 18 percent increase in military spending this year alone. A similar observation was made in a recent report by the bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

China has been a student of US space operations dating back to Operation Desert Storm. It knows all too well the advantage space offers the United States, as well as our vulnerabilities. China's military planners have advocated the use of technology that would deny us access to our space assets. This tactic is consistent with what many consider China's unofficial doctrine of asymmetric warfare.

The world has not seen an ASAT test like the Chinese conducted in over 20 years; the United States last tested an ASAT system in 1985. It was believed that the Soviets had also developed and tested different ASAT variants, including co-orbital and direct-ascent ASAT systems. However, at the height of the Cold War, a delicate strategic balance was upheld. Both countries understood that a strike against a space asset would be destabilizing, leaving either side vulnerable to a debilitating first strike that could escalate to nuclear war. During this time the use of space was predominantly for strategic purposes, providing global missile warning, intelligence, and secure communications for the command and control of nuclear forces. This was before we had an operational GPS constellation, widespread satellite communications, extensive civil and commercial use, and near-real-time battlefield intelligence supporting tactical and theater-level military operations.

Today, the repercussions of an attack that existed in the Cold War seem to have diminished. In fact, ASAT incidents and tests are occurring, and we have seen few consequences for the culprits. In the past few years, we have seen a handful of GPS and increasing numbers of satellite communications (SATCOM) jamming incidents. In the early stages of OIF, US forces encountered a GPS jamming situation. In this case, precision munitions were used to hit these jamming sources, which allowed our forces to quickly resume operations.⁷ We have seen several SATCOM jamming incidents, including Iranian jamming of a US satellite from Cuba in July 2003; ongoing jamming by Iran against Panamsat, AsiaSat, ArabSat, and EutelSat from June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan jamming of two international SATCOM systems in December 2005.⁸ Last fall it was reported that a Chinese ground-based laser illuminated a National Reconnaissance Office intelligence-gathering satellite.⁹ What is most troubling is that these attacks are coming during a period of widespread use of GPS, satellite communications, and space-based imagery.

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee has received a number of briefings on the threats to US space systems over the past few years. As I mentioned

above, there is a spectrum of potential threat capabilities looming on the horizon to include electronic jamming, low-power laser blinding, high-energy lasers, microsatellites, direct-ascent ASATs, cyber attacks, physical attacks to ground stations, and possibly even a nuclear explosion. These threats can target satellites in orbit; their communications links to and from the ground; or their ground-based command, control, and receive stations. Our satellites are also vulnerable to other threats including space debris, close approaches, solar flares, and severe weather damaging ground stations. All produce the same general result—they render our space capabilities temporarily or permanently useless. Many of these antisatellite technologies exist today, and many are dual-use in nature, including a microsatellite that could be used as an experimental spacecraft or, with a simple command, could shadow or collide with another satellite.

Space is no longer a sanctuary. Those who wish to challenge America's role in the world increasingly recognize the strategic importance of space and are more willing to deny us freedom of action in space by employing a wide range of methods. The Pentagon's annual report to Congress on China's military power finds that "the direct ascent ASAT system is one component of a multi-dimensional program to generate the capability to deny others access to outer space."¹⁰ I do not believe the threat we face is merely a question of technology; the question to ask is one of motive and intent. In the case of the Chinese, what motivated their ASAT test and why are we seeing them develop a comprehensive suite of counterspace capabilities?

To understand this we need to extend our understanding of threat capabilities and our vulnerabilities, as well as foreign actors' policies, doctrine, motives, and concepts of operations for use. Our nation must posture itself to defend its space capabilities, retain its leadership and technical advantage in space, and adapt our systems to meet and overcome the threat. These threat assessments influence our space architecture planning, acquisition programs, and operations concepts. If we presume it takes roughly 10 years to acquire a new satellite system and that satellite will be on-orbit for seven to 10 years, we place an onus on our intelligence community to predict the threat 10 to 20 years from today and our acquisition community to design satellites to perform in this threat environment 20 years from now.

Regrettably, much of our space intelligence analytical and collection capabilities have withered since the end of Cold War. As a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I see a resurgence in space intelligence, including the accession of talented young analysts. However, rebuilding

our nation's space intelligence capabilities takes time, resources, and commitment from leaders within the defense and intelligence communities. New analysts must be trained, decades of knowledge transferred from senior analysts, and new collection capabilities developed so that the nation is postured to understand, deter, mitigate, and respond to current and future threats to space.

Developing a Space Protection Strategy

As a national security space community, and as a nation, we have a vested stake in protecting our interests in space and developing a comprehensive space protection strategy. This includes both the need to protect our space systems and the need to preserve our assured use of space. The Chinese ASAT is but one striking example of why I believe this issue requires urgent attention.

Our satellite programs are often faced with size, weight, or power constraints, forcing designers and engineers to make trades, usually between performance and protection. For satellites with these constraints, adding a transponder or perhaps a secondary payload has been preferred to adding radiation hardening, fuel for maneuvering, or some other form of protection. However, as we see threats to the space domain come to fruition, we can no longer afford to ignore protection capabilities. This is not unprecedented. As anti-aircraft capabilities and air defense systems matured, so too did our nation's aircraft survivability capabilities. These capabilities have matured over time, beginning with advanced research and development, modeling and simulation, and red teams, growing eventually into robust technical and operational capabilities and countermeasures. Today, these are all considered integral components of all aircraft development programs.

Based on my observations and discussions with senior military leaders, our nation currently lacks a comprehensive protection and survivability strategy for space—one that spans the defense and intelligence communities and addresses policy and strategy, architecture planning, system acquisition and requirements definition, science and technology development, and training and operations. Working with the new chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), the House of Representatives has included a provision in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act which accords a priority to space protection and space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities: "It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense accord, after the date of enact-

ment of this Act, a greater priority within the Nation's space programs to the protection of national security space systems."¹¹ This provision further directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive space protection strategy to include

- identification of threats and vulnerabilities to US space systems;
- description of protection capabilities contained in the program of record, including material and nonmaterial, and needed capabilities;
- assessment of gaps and shortfalls, investment plans, and how protection requirements are defined and incorporated into acquisition processes;
- description of how the Department of Defense (DoD) programs and budgets for protection capabilities; and
- description of how the DoD is organized and managed to address policy, planning, acquisition, and operations of protection-related systems and capabilities.¹²

The manner in which we protect and increase the survivability of our space capabilities spans a diverse spectrum of options. These include rapid replenishment, hardening, redundancy, distributed architectures, alternatives such as unmanned aerial vehicles, active prevention and denial, passive measures, reversible and nonreversible means, and nonmaterial solutions. Each of these solutions has its advantages and disadvantages, employment scenarios, and associated costs. In developing the protection strategy, it is my hope that the DoD will consider these factors.

A foundational component of space protection is space situational awareness. The DoD defines SSA as "the requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend—including physical, virtual, and human domains—as well as all factors, activities, and events of friendly and adversary space forces across the spectrum of conflict."¹³ As we learned on 9/11, seemingly benign systems can have latent or concealed offensive capabilities. An object that appears to be orbital debris or a research satellite may, in fact, be an ASAT targeted at US or friendly assets. Likewise, noise in a data link may be accidental interference or intentional jamming. Unless we can detect and distinguish a hostile event from a malfunction or other benign effect and then attribute that hostile event to the right actor, we will be limited in our ability to mitigate and respond to attacks against our assets.

I do not believe we have invested sufficient resources in SSA to address the growing threat to space, and the defense bill attempts to address this by authorizing additional resources for SSA and protection efforts. The Air Force is starting to place greater emphasis on SSA, and the commander of Air Force Space Command has made it a top priority.

The House continues its support of ground-based radars and optical telescopes, which enable frequent detection and tracking of all objects in orbit. The House version of the defense bill includes additional resources for the development of the Space Fence—an upgraded ground-based radar “fence” that will enable us to detect and track very small objects, including space debris such as that ejected from the Chinese ASAT test. We also continue to support system development efforts such as the Rapid Attack Identification and Detection Reporting System to detect electronic jamming of communications and GPS satellites and the Space-Based Surveillance System—the low Earth orbiting system intended to detect small objects out to geosynchronous orbit. A relatively straightforward means of increasing SSA is to make each satellite its own sensor, able to monitor its own health and status and detect any anomalous activity. I am pleased we were able to add resources for an Air Force unfunded priority in this area and some classified programs.

As I look forward, I also see a greater opportunity for sensors from other mission areas to contribute to the SSA mission. Missile defense assets, such as the ground- and sea-based tracking radars and the soon-to-launch Space Tracking and Surveillance System, when not on missile warning/missile defense alert, could be configured to support SSA missions. Furthermore, there is potential to leverage capabilities from our allies/friends as well as civil and commercial entities that could be brought to bear on the SSA mission.

SSA and all options for protecting our space interests must be examined and weighed as part of a comprehensive space protection strategy. This strategy should encompass the desired mix of active, passive, material, and nonmaterial capabilities; how these capabilities fit together; as well as our priorities for protection. I recognize we will not be able to protect, nor can we afford to protect, all systems to the same level. Therefore, risk management, informed by our knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities, should be our guide.

While the emphasis in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee has been on space protection efforts within the DoD, the intelligence community must also emphasize protection and analysis of its foreign counterspace capabilities or risk losing its vital space-based intelligence-collection systems. To be

successful in protecting our space assets and use of space, we need the defense and intelligence communities tightly coupled. The success of the DoD in executing its space defense mission is dependent on an accurate intelligence assessment and timely reporting of the threat. In addition, the protective measures used for a low Earth orbit intelligence-gathering satellite may be the same as those used to protect a weather or communications satellite. There is too much work, too few resources, and too much riding on these communities not to fully integrate efforts and minimize duplication.

Reexamining Our National Security Space Architecture

I believe the Chinese ASAT can also serve as a catalyst for reexamining our national security space architecture and planning our future capabilities in space beyond protection and SSA. We have an opportunity to take a hard look at what implications this incident might have on our nation's future space architecture, specifically the desired attributes of the architecture, composition of needed capabilities, and investment strategy.

One of the most common themes emerging from ongoing discussions on space threats is the desire to create a more distributed and robust space architecture with greater numbers of satellites, more frequent launches, and shorter development timelines. Others have discussed placing satellites in higher orbits, making them more difficult for antisatellite systems to reach. I encourage the exploration of concepts to fly intelligence and other traditionally lower-altitude satellites in higher orbits. There is great performance value, given sufficient science and technology development and systems engineering. These concepts may also buy time against some threats such as direct-ascent ASATs—at least until countries develop space launch systems that can reach higher orbits, which the Chinese already possess—and mitigate the effects of others like laser blinders, which would have insufficient energy to damage systems in higher orbits. Some key benefits of this thinking include a quicker ability to adapt to threats, greater ability to prove out and stay ahead in technology, and strengthening of the industrial base.

To capitalize on this thinking, we must first fix the problems plaguing our space acquisition programs leading to cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical challenges. Delays in critical space programs can have ripple effects on multiple other defensewide systems, such as the Future Combat

System, unmanned aerial vehicles, and missile defense, all of which depend on space. The importance of space requires that we be successful in our acquisitions and deliver on what is promised.

I am concerned that the current acquisition path we are on is unsustainable. Nearly all of our satellite programs are being recapitalized and modernized, placing great strain on the acquisition community and the space budget. We are seeing the symptoms of this strain in Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition breaches (e.g., the Space-Based Infrared System [SBIRS]-High and National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System), schedule delays to the GPS IIF and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite programs, and the program restructuring of the Transformational Communications Satellite System (TSAT) and Space Radar programs.

We in Congress recognize that we have tough defense budget choices ahead of us given costs associated with ongoing operations in Iraq, the global war on terrorism, and force reset and modernization. The President wants to eliminate the federal deficit in the next five years and impose greater spending discipline. The Air Force, the predominant provider of military space capabilities, spends roughly 11 percent of its budget on space even though space is one-third of its core missions—the other two being air and cyberspace. Without a significant increase to the space budget top line or realignment of recapitalization and modernization programs, the space portfolio will become unaffordable and unexecutable.

We must strike a balance between continuing with legacy systems and moving ahead with modernized systems. I support a measured approach that overlaps new acquisition programs with continuing legacy programs and one that avoids any drastic changes that could severely impact the delivery of war-fighter capability or affect the stability of the industrial base. This thinking is reflected in the House-passed defense bill, which curtails some new-start acquisition programs such as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System and the High Integrity GPS concept. We provide resources for an additional legacy AEHF satellite to mitigate any risk of a gap to our protected strategic communications and fully fund continuing technology and system development of TSAT. We are responsive to the war fighter's demand for orders of magnitude increases in communications and Internet-like connectivity across platforms and users.

I am particularly pleased we maintained funding for the Space Radar program. Space Radar, with its sophisticated synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator sensors, will provide all-weather, day-night, 24-7

coverage of static and moving targets, greatly enhancing our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and protection of our armed forces. As William B. Scott and Linda H. Strine point out in a recent *Aviation Week and Space Technology* article, "Visionaries believe Space Radar will not only revolutionize the way military forces locate, track and target an enemy, but have as profound an impact on commerce and citizens' daily lives as GPS does" if applications such as ship tracking for business and homeland security and all-weather, around-the-clock imaging for marketing are realized.¹⁴

In case it is not yet obvious, I believe we need to quickly improve space acquisition. To do this, government and industry must increase confidence in cost estimating, mitigating risk, and quality control and improve systems engineering. Congress must do better to provide constant and reliable funding for these programs. The DoD must follow through on existing acquisition programs such as the SBIRS, Wideband Global SATCOM System, and GPS IIF to show us these can work. In short, we have all been part of the problem, and we all need to work together on the solution; for even the best war-fighter capability must be affordable and executable. The development and operations of national security space systems are too complex and costly for any one organization to go it alone; jointness and integration are critical. We must be mindful that there is one set of national needs.

I have hope for one solution in particular which, over multiple years, has the potential to revolutionize our nation's space architecture. Last year's defense bill established an Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program office. ORS offers promise not only as a way to supplement a battlefield commander's capabilities, but also to quickly replace damaged or destroyed satellites to meet the immediate needs of the war fighter. This office brings together science and technology, acquisition, operations, and combatant-command support elements. With this effort, I see a stronger national security space portfolio in which ORS systems complement, not replace, large, traditional space programs.

For this office to be successful it must retain a strong, joint core, bringing together leaders and participants from across the military services, agencies, research labs, and industry. It must also create an environment that expects and rewards innovation. The strain of rising costs will continue to put pressure on our space and defense programs. At the same time, technologies are evolving at much higher rates than our current 10-year or longer acquisition timelines. ORS must first get simple, low-cost solutions

rapidly on orbit to meet the dynamic needs of our combatant commanders; and second, ORS must provide more frequent opportunities to prove out innovative concepts and technologies at a lower cost. This must be done while strengthening our industrial base and technical workforce.

In addition, ORS might also serve as a deterrent to nations pursuing programs to threaten our satellites. If we have numerous ORS systems in space along with more traditional military and intelligence satellites, then we can rapidly reconstitute our space assets. This makes it a lot harder for an adversary to effectively deny us freedom of action in space.

While ORS has much promise in getting us to a more numerous, distributed architecture in space, it is still a very nascent capability. We must give it time to mature; after all, we only have one ORS launch under our belts—TacSat 2. It will take time, investment in technology and system development, new thinking on employment and operating concepts, and the adaptation of government and industry to this new paradigm to make ORS successful and transition these successes to the rest of our space architecture.

The nucleus of our space acquisition efforts—our nation's space cadre—has weakened over time. We have seen a reduction in the number of trained, experienced government space acquisition, science and engineering, and program management professionals. Those remaining have become increasingly reliant on industry without having the wherewithal to provide experienced leadership or question technical findings. We need to break this pattern and foster a space cadre of smarter, more empowered professionals who know the technical, operational, and programmatic aspects of their acquisition programs.

I introduced an amendment that was accepted in this year's defense bill requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the management of the space cadre within the DoD. I commend efforts by the military departments to expand their space professional development activities, to include increased education and training opportunities, establishment of space-related specialty codes, and development of personnel databases. However, as noted in a September 2006 Government Accountability Office report, management actions are needed to better identify, track, and train Air Force space personnel. This is an issue broader than the Air Force. Without an assessment of space cadre requirements and the development and use of metrics, I believe it will be difficult to track progress in ensuring the DoD has sufficient numbers of personnel

with the expertise, training, experience, and leadership to meet current and future national security space needs.

Framing the Policy Debate

The Chinese ASAT test also rekindles the larger policy discussion of how we use space and how we best protect our interests in space, including our pursuit of potential defensive and offensive capabilities. This spectrum ranges from international organizational regimes, such as arms-control regimes that seek to prohibit or limit myriad systems that could threaten space assets, to “space weapons” such as space-based interceptors or orbiting weapons that reenter the atmosphere to strike land-based targets.

The recently released national space policy acknowledges the importance of space to our economy and national security and elevates space as a vital national interest. It further states that the United States will “take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”¹⁵ The policy does not indicate a preference for how space capabilities should be protected nor, contrary to some interpretations, does it indicate support for space weapons. It does provide for space to be used as a medium for multilayered and integrated missile defense capabilities.

The policy debate centers primarily on how we use space and whether it should be a matter of US policy to develop and deploy “weapons in space” as a means of protection. The difficulty with this proposition starts with our understanding of space weapons. A definition is elusive. If a space weapon is any weapons system capable of rendering a satellite temporarily or permanently useless, then it could target the satellite in orbit, its data link to the ground, or its ground-control station. Moreover, a space weapon could be land-, sea-, air-, or space-based and use kinetic energy (e.g., direct-ascent missile), directed energy (e.g., laser), other electromagnetic energy (e.g., jammer), or even nuclear energy to disable a satellite. If one believes this definition, then space is already “weaponized.” The Cold War-era Soviet co-orbital ASAT and US F-15-launched ASAT would qualify, as would present-day GPS and SATCOM jamming and, surely, the Chinese ASAT test.

Some believe a space weapon is purely a weapons system based in space that collides with another space object or intercepts a missile traveling through

space. However, I would argue, the damage caused by a ground-based high-energy laser is just as severe for a target satellite as the damage caused by a physical on-orbit collision. The key difference is the latter may create an unacceptable debris field, posing further risks to other orbiting satellites.

It is the ambiguity in definition that makes arms-control measures which ban space weapons difficult to implement and nearly impossible to enforce. This is compounded by the fact that satellites have tremendous dual-use value, making it very difficult to distinguish a nonweapon space system from a weapon space system. Any satellite could be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with a target satellite. Any ballistic missile, with sufficient orbital ephemeris data and software changes, could be used to target a satellite.

Would a space weapon used purely for defensive purposes be acceptable? Assuming space-based interceptors were technically and fiscally feasible, would we hesitate deploying and using them to intercept an incoming ballistic missile armed with a nuclear payload? Though the US ballistic missile defense system has several land-, sea-, and air-based efforts under way to intercept incoming missiles, space provides unparalleled global coverage and access. What about the deployment of space-based interceptors to absorb or counter a potential ASAT strike against our multibillion-dollar intelligence or missile warning satellites? Though I acknowledge the complete undesirability of debris resulting from any kinetic collision, is the cost worth the benefit to all the users and missions reliant on the preservation of that space capability? Are there technologies or methods that could mitigate the creation of debris worth exploring?

It is my position to strongly support reversible means, such that any of our protection or denial capabilities do not cause permanent damage or create widespread orbital debris. However, I do believe it is our responsibility to provide for the strongest defense possible, including the defense of our space assets and the use of space to strengthen our national security. It is for this reason I see value in exploring space-based defensive concepts, including space-based interceptors, to inform the policy debate with sound technical and cost data, ample thought given to operating concepts, and thorough analyses of the policy and international ramifications.

Summary

In this article, I have described several elements of a comprehensive solution to one of our nation's most urgent security threats. Given our reliance upon

space assets and the nature of the growing threat against them, it is imperative that our nation develop a strategy to detect, deter, and respond to any space-threat contingency. This strategy must include careful consideration of methods and technologies to improve space survivability, new concepts of operation, improvements to space acquisition, and an investment in the people necessary to make this new strategy effective. Let me be clear, however: it is essential that we begin taking necessary steps now to reduce our strategic vulnerability and that we bring the full power of innovative thinking to bear on this problem.

Our economic and military prowess in, and reliance on, space is not so unique. To borrow two well-known examples, the ancient Romans with their extensive road infrastructure and the nineteenth century British with their command of the high seas both mastered a domain critical to commerce and military power and, as a result, held great sway in their world. However, the Romans proved vulnerable to dedicated competitors who took advantage of their roads to ease invasion, while the British saw their preeminence challenged by nations able to find and exploit vulnerabilities of the Royal Navy. Our nation finds itself in a similar position today with regards to space. We are the unquestioned global leaders in use of and access to space. The question is whether we will be able to adapt to new and emerging challenges and, in so doing, stay ahead of our competitors and overcome our vulnerabilities. ■■■

Notes

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From Kosovo to the War on Terror

The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999–2002

Edwina S. Campbell

Introduction

THE YEARS since al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attack on the United States have not been happy ones for the transatlantic relationship.¹ Despite initial European rhetorical solidarity with the United States, disagreements with Washington about how to deal with al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan emerged almost immediately in the fall of 2001. Six years later, in 2007, there is no transatlantic consensus on a strategy to counter the terrorist threat and create international stability over the long term. Compared to the transatlantic consensus that existed in 1954, six years after the 1948 Berlin blockade and the start of the Cold War, the state of the relationship today is bleak, indeed.

The common wisdom is that the collapse of the transatlantic relationship began with disagreements at the United Nations over how to deal with Iraq in the fall of 2002, and that the American decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 destroyed the alleged post-9/11 solidarity of Europe with the United States. This article contradicts that view. It argues, instead, that the "dialogue" between Europe and the United States in early 2002, a year before the invasion of Iraq and only six months after 9/11, was already characterized by a degree of mutual sniping that frequently seemed to have lost sight of the fact that a terrorist threat existed at all. European complaints about American decisions (and decision makers), and the United States' discontent with the declining military capabilities of its continental allies already dominated what was increasingly a *dialogue des sourds*.

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The result of this transatlantic self-absorption in early 2002 was an overstated dichotomy between American “unilateralism” and European “multilateralism” that did little to define a strategy against a common enemy. But there was, perhaps, method to this madness. By focusing their attention at the time on their mutual disgruntlement and perceived shortcomings, the Allies avoided posing the most basic of questions: did they have a common enemy, requiring them to define a common strategy? If both sides of the Atlantic had faced that question honestly, as they had when threatened by Soviet communism a half century before, they would have had to confront the disquieting reality that yes was not the European answer. Instead, for a brief moment in the year after 9/11, they continued to paper over profound transatlantic differences, a habit which they had developed in the 1990s and that proved catastrophic in early 2003.

There were new threats confronting the United States after 9/11, but the American determination to act alone, if necessary, in 2003 was not only a result of those threats, but of a decade of frustration with European unwillingness since the end of the Cold War to accept the necessity for a new NATO and European role in a changed strategic context. Despite the rhetoric of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary summit in 1999, there was on 9/11 no European-American consensus on what constituted the common political basis of the transatlantic relationship ten years after the implosion of the Soviet Union. The terrorist attacks did not provoke the creation of a new consensus; instead, they revealed that the old Cold War one was gone forever.

There was a last, futile attempt in early 2002 to analogize post-9/11 transatlantic disagreements to the squabbles of 1982 or 1962, in the hope that they could thus be domesticated, managed, and regarded as “business as usual.” Europeans and Americans on both sides of the Atlantic, “old NATO hands,” had managed this sleight of hand throughout the 1990s with the best of intentions but the worst of results. To any outside observer, it was clear that their ability to do so had ended with the Alliance’s profoundly destructive internal crisis over Kosovo in 1999.

Amid disagreements over how to deal with the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Atlanticists in both Europe and the United States in the 1990s had comforted themselves with the conviction that the NATO Alliance had weathered bad storms before. But by 2002, there was little comfort to be found in such convictions. Americans began to talk openly of the end of the post-1945 transatlantic relationship, and Europeans were met with a new phenomenon: American indifference to

their opinions and criticism. Viewed from Washington, new international constellations were forming, for the first time in nearly fifty years, since West Germany joined NATO. The most important of these in 2002 involved Washington with Moscow and New Delhi, but the emerging Russian-American and Indian-American bilateral relationships were one result, not the cause, of the disentangling of the once entangling Atlantic alliance.

Strategic Changes and Missed Opportunities in the 1990s

The changes that began to be evident in American strategy within a few months of September 11, 2001, were, in some ways, ten years overdue. In the two years from November 1989, when the Soviet Union decided not to take military action to maintain its East German satellite, until December 1991, it was possible to believe that German unification would not fundamentally change the *global* strategic equation for the United States. There were still two superpowers, and while the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in early 1991 had been largely a US military show, it was, nevertheless, the result of a genuine coalition effort, militarily, politically, and especially financially. Washington needed its allies in Europe and Japan, and its chief diplomatic concern was still the negotiation of arms control agreements with Moscow. There was little indication that the United States would be regarded as a “hyperpower” by the end of the 1990s.²

But by early 1992, it should have been clear that future American strategy could not be built on the flimsy foundation that the first Bush administration characterized as “status quo plus.”³ By then, three major developments had shown how critical was the need for a bolder American approach to refashioning the post-Cold War world: the mounting evidence that Saddam Hussein was going to survive as leader of Iraq, despite his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War; the agreement of its members at Maastricht in December 1991 to recreate the European Community as the European Union (EU); and the collapse of both Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership and the Soviet Union itself at the end of that year. But that bolder approach was not forthcoming from Washington.

Instead, the last year of the first Bush presidency was a period of economic, political, and diplomatic stagnation. Seen in the overall context of twelve Republican years in the White House, beginning with Ronald Reagan’s 1980 victory over Jimmy Carter, it was perhaps not surprising

that President Bush and his senior staff seemed overwhelmed by the new strategic context with which they were confronted, and more comfortable with the era that was ending. As John Lewis Gaddis observed, "With the four decades of Cold War, which after all encompasses the whole lifetime [of] a whole generation of leaders, the abnormalities of that situation became so normal that now to begin to depart from them, now to begin to go back to what was on our wish list in 1947, is making people intensely uncomfortable."⁴ Like their political contemporaries in Britain (Margaret Thatcher), France (François Mitterrand), and Germany (Helmut Kohl), Bush and his advisers had spent their political capital in the first years of a long tenure in office. They had come to office in 1981 to prosecute the Cold War. But their adversary in that struggle had literally disappeared, and they appeared unable to articulate exactly what their vision was of the "new world order" supposedly born in 1990–91.

In fact, there was not much that was "new" in President Bush's expectations of the post–Cold War "world order," proclaimed in the context of the 1991 Gulf War. The chief innovation was to have been the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as the drafters of the charter (at least the American ones) had hoped in 1944–45. But with the demise of the USSR and the advent of nearly a decade of economic collapse, institutional chaos, spreading criminality, and erratic political leadership in Russia, the idea that Soviet-American cooperation would shape the post–Cold War world was stillborn. The administration left office in 1993, never having found an idea to replace it.

It is important to recall this history, because September 11 and subsequent events revealed the significance of much that was not done, or was not done well, in the early 1990s. Neither the members of the European Union, nor the EU as an institution, nor the United States was prepared to pose the fundamental questions: What has the Cold War left in its wake? What kind of world do we want? What needs to be done? Instead, they began with the assumption that their task was to maintain the two key Western institutions of the Cold War years, NATO and the EU, and initially sought to adapt the tasks to those institutions, rather than the other way around.

This had its most disastrous short-term consequences in the wars of the former Yugoslavia. In search of a political mission and without military competencies, the EU attempted to use diplomatic and economic means in its

dealings with Yugoslavia and its successor states. In search of a classical war-fighting or deterrent role for its armed forces, the United States attempted to ignore a crisis that initially did not require such capabilities. Overestimating its ability to prosecute essentially any kind of war it wished, after five years of American and EU disarray, Belgrade eventually overreached—twice—and brought about a NATO consensus on the use of classical armed force against Serbia itself. By 1999, NATO had a military mission, but going “out of area” was not the key to keep the Alliance from going “out of business,” as Secretary General Manfred Woerner had once suggested. Prosecution of the Kosovo War revealed how widespread was the mutual transatlantic disenchantment that had developed during the 1990s.

Although the Clinton administration had come to office in 1993 more favorably disposed than its predecessor to a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Europeans themselves were largely responsible for the failure of this disposition to be translated into American policy in the 1990s. Both Washington and Paris allowed the proposed reintegration of French forces into NATO to degenerate into a shouting match over command of AFSOUTH, contributing to the growing disenchantment of the Clinton administration with its European allies. However, the main problem was not in Paris but in Bonn. Throughout most of the 1990s, Germany used its bilateral relationship with the United States to pursue a policy of military abdication that met German domestic needs, but was disastrously out of touch with the strategic challenges of the decade.

The chief component of this policy was Bonn’s success in convincing the United States to support NATO enlargement. Initially hostile to the idea, and receptive to French ideas that “adaptation” of the Alliance had to precede its enlargement,⁵ the Clinton administration had abandoned this position and accepted the necessity of formal NATO enlargement by October 1994. Richard Holbrooke, first as US ambassador in Bonn, then as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, drove the change in US policy.⁶ Holbrooke was strongly influenced by the views of German defense minister Volker Rühe, who in turn reflected the assumption of the Kohl government that a military leadership role for Germany was unacceptable both domestically and to Bonn’s European partners.

Given this assumption, it was logical that the Federal Republic sought a new NATO “task”—enlargement—that would keep the United States militarily engaged in Europe.⁷ It was also logical, given the domestic political climate regarding deployment of German forces outside the NATO

area, that Bonn continually declined to develop the military capabilities that might have given the EU's diplomatic efforts in the Balkans the credibility that they sorely lacked.⁸ But in giving priority to its short-term domestic political problems, the German government was in large part responsible for the tendencies in American policy which it (and its European partners) came to lament by 1999. The continuing focus of the United States on NATO as *the* venue for transatlantic political-military decision making and action, Washington's emphasis on the military element of national power, and its disdain for the military capabilities of its continental European allies should have come as no surprise. For much of the decade, Germany had encouraged the United States to define its relationship to Europe in terms of NATO, while simultaneously failing to carry out the Bundeswehr reforms and commit the resources necessary for the EU to develop the military credibility desired by Paris.

Even more disastrously, instead of accepting the fact that they needed to adapt to a vastly changed strategic context, both Americans and Europeans attempted to make the issues fit their capabilities. Europeans, comfortable with economic aid programs and trade packages, tried to define the world's problems as amenable to solution with nonmilitary means. Equally short-sighted, the United States terminated much of its public diplomacy, looked to private sector activity to encourage economic development, and declined to "waste" its military resources on less than a "peer competitor." By the end of the decade, they had both grudgingly come to accept the necessity of their participation in peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN or regional organizations.⁹ But until September 11, from Somalia through Bosnia and Rwanda to Kosovo, the assumption remained that the maintenance and projection of armed forces was optional and, in contrast to the Cold War, had little to do with one's own security.

As the decade came to an end, the United States began to revise that assumption because of a growing concern with the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by "rogue states" and their possible acquisition by criminal and terrorist non-state actors. But the Clinton administration had little success in convincing its allies of the seriousness of this threat. Nor was there a consensus in Washington about the direction of US foreign policy. In January 2001, when George W. Bush became US president, he was committed to defending the interests of the United States. But how those interests were defined, against what types of threats they needed to be defended, and with what means, remained unclear.

What was clear was that the transatlantic disharmony already apparent in the last two years of the Clinton administration was likely to grow worse. This soon proved to be the case.

Dueling Institutions: NATO and the EU from Kosovo to September 11

The two years between the Kosovo War and the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were characterized by an unattractive institutional duel between NATO and the EU that showed how disconnected from strategic reality both sides of the Atlantic had become. Equally unattractive was the frequently shrill rhetoric accompanying the duel in both Europe and the United States. The 2000 American presidential election campaign and the first months of the Bush presidency saw this rhetoric peak in the United States.

In the campaign, neither Vice President Gore nor Governor Bush had conveyed any understanding that the political and military engagement of the United States in the world had ceased to be optional, at the latest, in 1941. Instead, they both promised to defend American interests, Gore by arguing for multilateral cooperation with America's allies (which made him more attractive to Europeans), but to accomplish what goals remained ill-defined. Bush's suggestion that the United States had borne global burdens alone long enough and was being taken advantage of by free-riding Europeans, incapable of mounting even a small-scale peace-keeping mission on their own, better captured the American mood. In the background was the question of National Missile Defense (NMD), to which Bush was more overtly committed than Gore, but which both of them supported in the broader context of defending what was not yet called (outside a small circle of defense experts) the American "homeland." To the general public, the whole issue seemed more theoretical than real, a far cry from public reaction to the ICBM issue of the late 1950s.

After taking office in January 2001, Bush moved quickly to show what he understood to be in the American interest, and by doing so, gave the Europeans further cause to escalate their rhetoric against the American "hyperpower." Disengagement from the Arab-Israeli peace process that had so preoccupied the Clinton administration, open criticism of South Korea's approach to détente with North Korea, and the declaration that the United States would accept neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Inter-

national Criminal Court confirmed Europe's worst suspicions about the "unilateral" governor of Texas.

Less noticed in Europe, but more important as a sign of the thinking of the new president, was a de-escalation of American rhetoric regarding the desirability of greater European military capabilities. Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, had spent much of his last two years in office encouraging the European allies to accept the implications of the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), restructure their armed forces, and devote more resources to defense research and development. There were many complaints in Europe in 1999–2000 about Cohen's "preaching," especially about a December 1999 speech to the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, in which he said, "The disparity of capabilities, if not corrected, could threaten the unity of this alliance."¹⁰ In contrast, at the 2001 Munich Security Conference, his successor, Donald Rumsfeld, reiterated America's determination to develop and deploy missile defenses (MD), both nationally and regionally, to protect US allies and forces outside the United States, as well as the homeland, but he wasted little time on exhortations to his European colleagues.¹¹

This change in tone from the new Secretary of Defense deserved more attention than it got in Europe. It was a sign that, less than two years after NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in April 1999, the United States was moving away from what had remained one of its chief goals in the 1990s, the attempt to maintain NATO as the principal venue of transatlantic political and military cooperation and to develop it as the principal venue of global burden-sharing. It was not, however, a sign that Washington now expected that cooperation to become "Euro-Atlantic," taking place between the EU on one side and the two North American allies on the other. That might have been the result, had the Europeans listened with more attention and less irritation to Secretary Cohen,¹² but they had not.

Rumsfeld's message indicated that the Bush administration, at the outset, had few expectations concerning the future political-military role of NATO. It did not share the Clinton administration's hope that the continental European allies would make a serious commitment to reforming their armed forces and increasing their defense budgets. In the absence of a substantial investment by the Europeans in the operational capabilities needed for "out of area" military burden-sharing, the United States was unwilling to share strategic decision making on issues of global stability with them in the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The origin of this attitude on the part of the new administration was the American experience with NATO during the 1999 Kosovo War. Preoccupied with their own experience with NATO during that war, senior European officials spent the better part of 1999 and 2000 being self-righteously indignant about American unilateralism in planning and conducting air operations over Kosovo and Serbia. This kept most of them from focusing on the fact that senior Americans—both inside the Clinton administration and soon to be inside the Bush administration—also spent the better part of 1999 and 2000 being self-righteously indignant about how NATO had handled Kosovo. For the Americans, the problem was the Europeans' expectation that they would be consulted strategically about an issue, even though they had virtually no operational military contribution to make to its resolution.

Ironically, there was a broad transatlantic consensus about what had happened during the Kosovo War: the Europeans had generally proven to be operationally irrelevant, and the Americans had made and carried out operational decisions unilaterally. To Washington's frustration, their operational irrelevance did not stop the Europeans from expecting to have a major say in the development of NATO strategy. To the Europeans' frustration, in the end, whatever their opinion, the Americans had the capabilities to ignore them and act alone.

In the two years that followed, Europeans frequently acted as if they were the only ones to draw conclusions from the Kosovo experience. They were angry with the Americans, and despite assurances to the contrary, they set about creating a framework in the EU that would allow them, they hoped, next time, to react independently from the United States to a crisis in Europe. At its June 1999 ministerial in Cologne, Helsinki that December, Feira in June 2000, and the December 2000 summit in Nice, the EU began to develop a Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This included agreement on a "Headline Goal" to create a 60,000-man rapid reaction force; the appointment of Javier Solana as Secretary General of the European Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and other "Headline Goals" designed to give the EU military capabilities that it had never had.¹³

Caught up in these activities, which occupied them for the last eighteen months of the Clinton administration, EU leaders failed to notice that what they were doing—and not doing—seemed disconnected from global realities as seen by Washington. The departure of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq; terrorist attacks on US embassies in Africa, on the

USS *Cole*, and at other American installations overseas; and North Korean missile tests had all begun to concentrate the attention of the American government, Congress, military, and ultimately the American public on the threat from “rogue states” and terrorists. Within the American defense community, the threat of the use of WMDs by such enemies against the population and territory of the United States itself was a particular concern, well before the Clinton administration departed. War games played by the senior US military colleges were already exercising such scenarios in 1999–2000.

In this time frame, as US defense secretary Cohen urged European governments to concentrate their efforts on force restructuring and increased defense R&D, what Washington saw instead was an EU focused on creating new positions in Brussels, and seemingly convinced that the “Petersberg Tasks” were the only type of missions with which Europe would have to deal.¹⁴ Most importantly, in the country that Washington considered crucial to the creation of credible European power projection—Germany—there was no effort to increase defense spending or begin professionalization of the armed forces, as France had done in 1996.¹⁵ The American hope, expressed in the Strategic Concept adopted at the April 1999 Washington summit, that NATO would be a mechanism not only for regional peacekeeping activities but also for global power projection did not survive the Kosovo War.¹⁶ The strategic conclusion that the United States drew from the EU’s reaction to Kosovo was that, in the area of global defense burden-sharing, there was likely to be little help forthcoming from the continental European allies.¹⁷

For their part, European elites did not seem to realize in 1999–2000 that their frustration with the United States was reciprocated. Apparently, they only recognized the extent to which Europe no longer figured in American planning for coalition operations—all of Cohen’s warnings notwithstanding—in the wake of Washington’s response to the September 11 attacks. As Nicole Gnesotto wrote in 2002, “[N]othing in the Europeans’ strategic culture, the humdrum institutional language of the Atlantic Alliance or even developments in the ESDP had prepared them for the paradox that transatlantic security relations could be called into question but not so much by a desire for European autonomy as by developments in America itself.”¹⁸

The surprise should not have been as great as it was. In addition to having taken office with virtually no expectation of having a European partner

in global burden-sharing, the Bush administration expected little sympathy in Europe for its domestic agenda, and it was not disappointed. European intellectual elites had made known their dislike of the impeachment of President Clinton, their preference for Vice President Gore's more "multi-lateral" approach to foreign policy, and their disbelief and disdain at the outcome of the 2000 US presidential election. In early 2001, European media contained virtually daily attacks on aspects of the American domestic political and judicial system that had little to do with partisan differences in the United States or with President Bush as an individual. But he became the symbol of an "American way of life" that was reviled and ridiculed in Europe. "More than any other American head of state," commented Pascal Bruckner, "Bush crystallizes all that we hate in America."¹⁹

Virtually no aspect of American society escaped European criticism, from weekly church attendance to the death penalty, from (too many) speed limits to (the lack of) gun control and government-funded health care. But more disquieting than the substance of the criticism—which was, after all, shared by many Americans, on issues like the death penalty—was the almost universal absence of nuance and historical perspective. A minority of well-informed European observers of American life warned their fellow Europeans about the destructive tendencies of such culturally-motivated attacks on the United States, but with little effect.²⁰ By mid-2001, it was not only senior Bush administration officials, but working-level American diplomats, military officers, and academics who came away disheartened by encounters with their European colleagues. As September 11 approached, much of the American foreign policy elite had reluctantly concluded that European criticism of the "American way of life" said little about the United States, but revealed a great deal about the Europeans who engaged in it.

Initial American and European Responses to the Terrorist Attacks

It was in this atmosphere of mutual recriminations that the terrorist attacks took place on September 11, 2001. As the initial shock spread from New York and Washington across the United States and around the world, the spontaneous reaction of the vast majority of Europeans was one of sympathy for those who had died. Their governments, at the same time, committed themselves to support the American government's response, not only in public expressions of solidarity, but also in formal resolutions

of the UN Security Council and the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the North Atlantic Council.²¹

The reaction in the United States to the rapid and formal expressions of European support was twofold. For the American public, such solidarity was expected. After all, “we,” the Americans, had fought two world wars and supported “them,” the European democracies, through forty years of Cold War. The American public would have been surprised and taken aback had European sympathy and support not been immediately forthcoming. For American decision makers, however, the European response, while gratifying, was less expected. Given the state of transatlantic relations in the first half of 2001, they were pleasantly surprised by initial expressions of “unconditional solidarity” from Europe.²²

As the weeks passed, however, it became clear that, even on September 11 and 12, 2001, the basis of the European response had been different in significant respects from that of the US. By the end of 2001, with the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the differing approaches of the two sides of the Atlantic to dealing with terrorism began to be aired in public. By mid-2002, it was possible to see how far apart they were—and always had been—despite immediate post-9/11 European expressions of solidarity with the United States.

There were three significant differences between initial American and European reactions to what had happened in New York and Virginia. Ignoring those differences, while taking Europe’s early declarations of solidarity with the United States at face value, has been largely responsible for the erroneous belief that the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 shattered an existing transatlantic consensus. There was, in fact, never a transatlantic consensus on the nature of the 9/11 attacks, why they took place, or how the terrorists should be dealt with.

The first difference in their reaction to 9/11 was that, at the most basic level, Europeans and Americans described differently what had happened on that day. For Americans, the territory and people of the United States were attacked; for Europeans, thousands of innocent civilians died in the attack on the World Trade Center. The difference may appear minor, but it is not. If only the Pentagon, or even the White House and Capitol, had been attacked, it is highly unlikely that European reaction, both formal and informal, would have been the same as it was. The North Atlantic Council and the UN Security Council would no doubt have met, but whether the former would have invoked Article 5, and whether the sub-

stance of the UNSC resolutions would have been the same, is at least questionable. More importantly, though, public and media reaction in Europe would have been vastly different.

A significant segment of European opinion would have regretted the use of a civilian aircraft as a weapon, but regarded the Pentagon as a legitimate target, both nerve center and symbol of American global reach.²³ Any outpouring of sympathy would most likely have been more than balanced by a feeling that American military power was the magnet that attracted such enemies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp wrote, “[A]nti-American tendencies were not limited to the left wing of the German political spectrum. Already after the catastrophe of September 11, the view that the United States bears a great deal of responsibility for being hated in large parts of the world could also be heard in conservative circles.”²⁴ This view was widespread in other European countries, as well as in Germany.

Moreover, even at the formal governmental level, initial reactions to an attack only on the Pentagon would probably have been quite different. There might not have been a Joint Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, as there was on September 14, 2001, but had there been one, its wording would probably have been different. It is unlikely to have referred to an “assault on humanity” or to “faceless killers who claim the lives of innocent victims,”²⁵ if the dead had all been US military officers and civilian employees of the Department of Defense.²⁶

Needless to say, this would not have made any difference in the American *political* reaction.²⁷ The attack on the World Trade Center and the civilian deaths there certainly, at specific moments, strengthened American resolve,²⁸ but the fundamental event of September 11, for Americans, was not civilian casualties, but the attack on the people and territory of the United States. In this respect, the destruction of part of the Pentagon and the planned attack on the Capitol were more troubling than the collapse of the Twin Towers, since they were assaults on the institutions of American government and the United States Constitution itself.

The fundamentally different interpretations in Europe and the United States of what mattered in the events of September 11 led to the second important transatlantic difference: Europeans objected vehemently in 2001–2 to the American use of the word “war.” The simplicity of the statement, “We were directly attacked; we are at war,”²⁹ was mocked in Europe as simplistic and overwrought; and the absence of that word in the EU’s Joint Declaration of September 14, 2001, revealed the basic transatlantic

difference in approach to the terrorists. For Europeans, they were criminals to be brought to justice; for Americans, an enemy to be defeated. The EU

would make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts of savagery are brought to justice and punished. The US administration and the American people can count on our complete solidarity and full cooperation to ensure that justice is done. . . . Those responsible for hiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.³⁰

The “urgent decisions on how the European Union should respond to these challenges” included developing CFSP “with a view to ensuring that the Union is genuinely capable of speaking out clearly and doing so with one voice”; making “every effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts against terrorism”; and accelerating “implementation of a genuine European judicial area.”³¹ Clearly, the United States government welcomed these decisions. But as important as improved intelligence and judicial cooperation were in the fight against terrorism, more interesting was what was not mentioned in the declaration as part of the effort to make ESDP “operational as soon as possible.”³² The word “war” was never used, nor was there any reference to the armed forces of EU member states, nor to augmentation of their defense budgets. The problem was apparently not seen by European governments as one requiring the EU to think about the classical use of armed force, despite the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The contrasting American approach became clear a few weeks later, when the United States responded on October 7, 2001, to the Taliban government’s refusal to deny al-Qaeda terrorists the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations. As the United States government, “in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,” informed the United Nations:

On 11 September 2001, *the United States was the victim* of massive and brutal attacks in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia.

From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.

In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to *prevent and deter further attacks on the United States*.³³ (emphasis added)

As the letter stated, in the American view, while the September 11 attacks had resulted in thousands of deaths, it was the United States itself, not innocent civilians, that had been the victim of the attack. The United States Congress had authorized and the President had ordered the use of classical military means in response.³⁴ The prevention and deterrence of future attacks on the United States, through the use of US military force, if necessary, were already at the top of the American agenda.

Finally, the third transatlantic difference was the extent to which Europe's initial response to 9/11 was shaped by its preexisting hostility to the American president. Within the first few days after September 11, Americans began receiving messages from European friends and colleagues expressing sympathy and solidarity, but also asking nervously what the United States government—or more precisely, what George Bush—intended to do. There was greater fear in Europe, immediately after 9/11, of the possible American military response to what had happened than of further terrorist attacks. When it became clear in Europe (as it always was in the United States) that there would not be a swift, unthinking American military reaction out of anger or “revenge,” European commentators breathed a sigh of relief—and surprise. The former Texas governor was apparently not as “quick on the draw” as their stereotypes had led them to believe.

But these stereotypes did not go away. They lay dormant throughout the fall of 2001, and by early 2002, they returned with a vengeance, compounding the other transatlantic differences that had manifested themselves in the initial responses to the September 11 attacks. Europeans had reacted to the deaths of thousands of civilians, not to the attack on the Pentagon. Europeans saw themselves in a *fight against terrorism*, while Americans had declared a *war on terrorism*, as described by President Bush. Europeans wanted to protect their societies from terrorist attacks and saw intelligence and law enforcement cooperation as the way to do so. So did Americans—but they also saw military action as playing an important role in defeating the terrorists and their supporters—in certain places and circumstances, the most important role.

Their dislike of President Bush's personality and politics led European commentators to begin again in 2002 to argue that he had never “really” been elected president of the United States and had no legitimacy for his actions. Americans, meanwhile, of both political parties, gave the US president unprecedented approval for his response to September 11.³⁵ As a result, by mid-2002 in Europe, the atmospherics of the transatlantic

relationship bore a great deal of resemblance to the state of affairs in the summer of 2001. Almost as if the attacks of September 11 had never happened, complaints about the United States, and not the terrorist threat, seemed to be Europe's greatest concern.

Contradictions of European Multilateralism

But things were different in the United States, and that alone changed the nature of the transatlantic relationship in the year after 9/11. Whether they liked the situation or not, whether they agreed with the vocabulary used by Washington or not, Europeans found themselves with an American ally at war, with drastically different priorities than it had had in the summer of 2001. One of the main reasons that European influence began to wane in Washington in 2002 was the attempt of European governments, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to maintain virtually unchanged both the topics and the pace of their national, EU, and NATO agendas as they had existed before September 11. Europe's unwillingness to confront the strategic reality represented by the terrorist attacks reinforced the United States' lack of interest, dating to the Kosovo experience, in acting politically and militarily through NATO or with the EU.

As Nicole Gnesotto indicated,³⁶ the lack of American interest in their viewpoints and capabilities took Europeans by surprise after September 11. In determining its strategy in the war on terror in 2001–2, the United States “called into question” the future of “transatlantic security relations” not by a grand proposal to scrap NATO or by a modest one to reform it, but simply by ignoring the Alliance, more or less. And the European allies, like individuals ignored by those whose attention they were trying to attract, reacted predictably: they were insulted by American indifference.

There is a problem in using this word to describe what happened to the transatlantic relationship in 2002; “insults,” as a factor influencing the behavior of modern state actors, are not supposed to exist.³⁷ Nevertheless, it is impossible to comprehend the vitriol accompanying transatlantic disagreements since 2001 without recognizing the way in which the abrupt change in emphasis in American foreign policy after September 11 forced on European leaders awareness of their countries' military and, to a certain extent, political impotence. The United States' reaction to 9/11, notably its “unilateral” approach to waging war in Afghanistan, suggested to European governments that, militarily, they were irrelevant strategically as

well as operationally, a conclusion that Washington had already reached in dealing with Kosovo two years before.

Throughout the 1990s, one goal of the European allies, generally unstated, had been to impress the status and importance of the European Union on the United States. In two instances, at the start of the Yugoslav crises and throughout the process of European Monetary Union (EMU), as the euro was introduced, European decision makers and media commentators revealed, perhaps inadvertently, how important this was to them. *Now*, they said, we will show the Americans. *Now* they will take us seriously. But the Balkans did not provide the diplomatic “hour of Europe” for which they had hoped; eventually, American bombers and American diplomats brought about the 1995 Dayton Accords.³⁸

The case of EMU was even more instructive. European governments moved toward it, not without difficulty, but determinedly throughout the decade, and American skepticism was gradually replaced with confidence that they would succeed. Confronted with American complacency about the introduction and positive effects of the euro, however, Europeans were not always happy.³⁹ Was it not, after all, going to be a rival currency that would put the dollar in its place? The United States government and the American private sector were supposed to be worried by it. Instead, they were usually congratulatory. There was, thus, in 1999–2000, little satisfaction in EMU, in terms of the EU’s desire to impress Washington with its status as a rival financial power.

At the same time, as described above, the declining expectations of the United States, with regard to the military capabilities of the European allies and NATO’s role in promoting global stability, were already apparent in the last months of the Clinton administration. The political blood that was shed inside the Alliance in the run-up to the 1999 Washington summit could have been spared, given how quickly its conclusions were overtaken by the experience of the Kosovo War. The Bush administration’s expectations were even lower, but in early 2001 it had sent signals that were confusing in this regard—at least to Europeans preoccupied with their own agenda and simply unprepared to believe that the Americans, and not “the desire for European autonomy,” would call NATO into question. Continuing American support of NATO enlargement during Bush’s first months in office was misread in Europe as a sign that the United States saw the Alliance as the centerpiece of American foreign and defense policy, when, in fact, it merely meant that the Bush administration had

no reason to oppose enlargement. The Clinton administration had already paid the political price of setting that process in motion.

There was, indeed, despite the United States' frustrations with operational planning during the Kosovo War, and despite the pre-September 11 European criticism of American "unilateralism," a continuing willingness in Washington to work with Europeans within the NATO framework. In fact, the word "willingness" may understate the case. One might more accurately describe NATO as a habit of the American foreign policy elite—and as such, a great success story of the Cold War generations that had wanted the Alliance to be so "entangling" that its desirability would be self-evident to American decision makers.

The problem that 9/11 revealed was twofold: Europeans, not the United States, were supposed to decide when the "transatlantic" relationship would be supplanted by the "Euro-Atlantic" relationship, and the United States was supposed to continue to provide Europe's "security umbrella" until that day came. Had there been no catalytic event like the terrorist attacks to refocus American political and military energies elsewhere, this might have happened. But after 9/11, the Alliance was no longer the center of the American foreign policy universe. The shock, and the implicit insult, is still being absorbed in Europe in 2007. In 2002, it led to an impotent rage that erupted in the anti-American rhetoric that dominated the German federal election, and to the German-led obstruction of Anglo-American diplomacy in the UN Security Council in 2002–3.⁴⁰

A year before that, however, European governments had already renewed their attacks on alleged American "unilateralism" or "multilateralism *a la carte*." The rhetoric of European politicians was often politically motivated, with a domestic audience in mind, but beyond that rhetoric, there existed a genuine problem: a fundamental transatlantic disagreement about the nature and purpose of multilateralism. This difference, in turn, stemmed from a disagreement over ends and means, and from the different European and American roles in the international system.

The United States is, in that system, a global political and military power—currently, the only one. At home, it is a union of fifty states, extremely decentralized in some ways, but not in the area of foreign and defense policy, competence for which clearly belongs to the federal government. International negotiations, whether formal or informal, are, for the United States, a means to an end—an attempt to achieve consensus on a particular issue with other members of the international system, one-on-one, among a few

states, or universally. Negotiations are entered into in good faith, and are not a zero-sum game. Nevertheless, entering into a negotiation does not mean accepting *a priori* that there will be an agreement. If one cannot be achieved, the negotiating parties are free to walk away, figuratively, if not literally. They are also free to return to the table when there is something new to discuss. Agreements are to be taken seriously—*pacta sunt servanda*—but are also subject to reappraisal, if conditions change: *rebus sic stantibus*.

There is nothing uniquely American about this approach to multilateralism and the international system. On the contrary, most states have a central political authority that makes foreign and defense policy, and they approach international negotiations as a means to achieve particular ends. The vast majority negotiate in good faith and accept that an agreement will depend on compromise—on avoiding a zero-sum game—but on some issues, even the smallest state will not be able to compromise and will walk away from a negotiation.

The unique position is not that of the United States but of the European Union. Externally, the EU has made enormous demands on both its American ally and the international system as a whole as it undergoes an unclear and frequently contradictory process of internal reform and enlargement. To the vast majority of states in the world that deal only with the EU on economic and trade issues, these contradictions have, historically at least, been manageable. But as the EU's diplomatic, political, and military roles change, the contradictions become more important to the functioning of the international system. Among other things, the EU is overrepresented in international institutions like the United Nations.

In 2002, 15 EU member countries claimed to have a common foreign and security policy. In 2007, that number is 27. If there is one policy—if they constitute a *union*—there is no logic to each state having a vote in the United Nations General Assembly. Several EU members always sit on the Security Council, two of them as permanent members. But there has been no EU willingness to recognize the contradiction in the world allocating to Europe the right to cast several votes in the Security Council and the General Assembly, even if all of those votes reflect a common policy. With the enlargement of the EU since 2004, the disparity of European representation in universal international organizations has become even greater than it was immediately after 9/11.

The EU pays a price for its diffuse decision-making processes in terms of lost resources, time, energies, and, ultimately, influence. While de-

manding that the world—particularly the United States—take the Union seriously and treat it as a single entity, its members do not even do so themselves. Each of them still has full diplomatic representation in each other's capitals, and accords full state honors to a visiting head of state or government from another member country. If the United States offered to close all American embassies in EU member countries and deal with "Europe" only through the US Mission to the European Union in Brussels, it is unlikely that EU members would be pleased.

Immediately after September 11, the Europeans, not the United States, chose how they would deal with Washington. Had they sent Javier Solana (or Romano Prodi or Chris Patten) to represent the "Euro" side of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, the American government would have dealt with him. Instead, there was almost a race to be first at Ground Zero and the White House by individual EU member countries. In their more candid moments, Europeans acknowledged in 2002 that the European Union as such lacked the competence to decide or implement any policy of political or military importance to the United States, but they simultaneously faulted the American government for continuing to deal with national European governments that did have such authority and capabilities.

In this situation, in which the US had found NATO interoperability to be sorely lacking in Kosovo, and the EU was, at best, a political and strategic embryo, the United States tried in 2001–2 to build and maintain an antiterrorist coalition. In working with national governments to do so, it was accused in Europe of a policy of *divide et impare*. A year later, in early 2003, the American defense secretary famously made a distinction between "new" and "old" Europe, and vented his frustrations at the latter.⁴¹

Two approaches to multilateralism clashed in 2002: the United States', with its own strong union, seeking partners in intergovernmental cooperation among the countries of the world, and the European Union's, based on a selective reading of the history of the origins of the EU itself. For the American government, multilateralism was, and remains, one possible means to specific ends (in this case, defeating terrorism). For Europeans, it had become by 2002 an end in itself, with continual intra-(West) European negotiations credited for peace and prosperity in post-World War II Europe.

On one level, this was true—multilateral cooperation did play a crucial role in the political and economic recovery of western Europe after 1949, but the EU's interpretation of its own history left out one important catalyst to European integration: military power. There were two essential ele-

ments in converting governments, and not just a few farsighted individuals, to the European idea: the decisive military defeat of Germany in 1945 and the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Together, these made Germans willing to do what had to be done to rejoin the family of nations,⁴² and forced countries like France and the Netherlands to risk cooperation with the newly created Federal Republic.

Even so, a third component of military power was necessary to make that cooperation palatable in the 1950s: the presence in Germany of US forces and the British Army of the Rhine. European leaders did not wake up one morning in 1950 converted to the idea of harmonizing their differences through negotiation; they held their noses and sat down together because, as Alfred Grosser wrote, “a French presence in the Rhineland did not mean much in a world transformed” by the Cold War.⁴³ Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, Dirk Stikker, Joseph Luns: they and all of their colleagues understood the lessons of military power that their successors had apparently forgotten by the end of the twentieth century.

By 2001, despite what should have been the lessons of Europe’s own early twentieth century history and, more recently, of the Yugoslavian wars, European multilateralism was based solely on carrots, in a world where, demonstrably, there were both state and non-state actors that used carrots only tactically, basing their strategy entirely on sticks. American multilateralism, on the other hand, continued to differentiate between regions of the world where carrots had become the single currency—chiefly, North America and Europe—and other parts of the world where the threat or use of force necessarily remained a tool of statecraft.

With such a fundamental difference in their approach to military power, it was no wonder that Europeans and Americans had failed to define a “partnership in leadership” in the 1990s, and that after 9/11 they could not agree to wage a war on terrorism or define a common approach to using military force to deal with rogue states. Nor should it be surprising that the United States in 2001–2 began to look elsewhere for allies that shared its approach to the terrorist threat. There was no American rejection of multilateralism as a means to an end, but there was a determination in Washington to create an antiterrorist political and military coalition, as the US secretary of defense said, that would be defined by the mission, and not the other way around.

American “Hub and Spoke Multilateralism”

The American approach to creating this antiterrorist coalition after 9/11 was based on a concept of “hub and spoke multilateralism.” At the “hub” of the coalition, Washington began to develop new “spokes,” relationships with countries around the world, while also working to connect those spokes, so that within a region, and eventually globally, all of the countries in the coalition would participate in a “wheel” of cooperation with each other. The clearest statement of the American government’s understanding of and approach to multilateralism in the wake of 9/11 was made in a speech by the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, at the Foreign Policy Association in New York on April 22, 2002, which never received the attention it deserved in Europe.

Haass described the attacks of September 11 as having “helped end the decade of complacency. They forced Americans to see clearly that foreign policy still matters, and that our oceans and our ICBMs alone do not make us safe. They brought home the stark reality that if we do not engage with the world, the world will engage with us, and in ways we may not like.”⁴⁴ As a result, “our innocence ended, and we entered . . . a period when increasingly potent transnational challenges intersect with still important traditional concerns.”⁴⁵ Having recognized the nature of these threats and challenges, the United States was developing a foreign policy, the principal aim of which was

to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible. *Integration of new partners* into our efforts will help us deal with *traditional challenges* of maintaining peace in divided regions as well as with *transnational threats* such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also help bring into the globalized world those who have previously been left out. In this era, *our fate is intertwined with the fate of others*, so our success must be shared success.⁴⁶ (emphasis added)

As Haass described it, “Integration is about bringing nations together and then building frameworks of cooperation and, where feasible, institutions,” on the basis of a common acceptance of “what President Bush termed ‘the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, equal justice, religious tolerance.’”⁴⁷ The “historic shift” in American-Russian relations, the “unprecedented dialogue” with India, and China’s “cooperation in the

war against terrorism” all showed that the United States was “creating an architecture for this new era that will sustain the cooperative pursuit of shared global interests even when disagreements over more limited or local issues intrude—as they inevitably will.”⁴⁸ In doing so, the American government was using “all the tools of statecraft,” and

*over the long haul the military tool will almost certainly not be the most important contributor to our success. Instead, a combination of diplomatic, economic, intelligence, financial, and law enforcement means—along with military—will make the difference.*⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

All of this, on the face of it, should have been embraced by Europeans, since it reflected their own emphasis on “peace, prosperity, and justice,” humanitarian intervention, and nonmilitary instruments of power. Nevertheless, the rhetorical search for common ground disguised crucial transatlantic differences. That, for the United States, multilateralism remained *a means, not an end*; that the Clinton administration’s concept of the “indispensable nation” had been embraced by the Bush administration; and that it was also developing a Reagan-like willingness to question conventional wisdom about the alleged immutability of a political *status quo* became clear in Haass’s conclusions.

He described the American approach as “hard-headed multilateralism” and summarized its five “basic principles”: first, *American leadership*, without which “multilateral initiatives can be stillborn, go astray, or worse.” Second, “in forming multilateral initiatives . . . , we should not be shackled by the memories of past animosities. . . . This is an era of *new partnerships*.” Third, paraphrasing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Haass noted that, “*revolving coalitions* will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and circumstance of the country.” Fourth, the US did not rule out the *rejection of “empty or ineffective, but high-profile, agreements,”* which “do not make for an effective foreign policy.” The United States’ “desire to work cooperatively with others does not imply a willingness . . . to agree to unsound efforts just because they are popular. . . . We will not go along simply to get along.” Finally, “we can and will *act alone if necessary*.” The United States does “not take lightly the costs to ourselves and to others when we forego participation in some multilateral initiative. . . . But if we conclude that agreement is beyond reach, we will explain why and do our best to put forth alternatives.”⁵⁰ (emphasis added)

The failure of the Europeans to focus, in the first months after 9/11, on these tenets of the American approach to multilateralism, and to accept

that the United States took them seriously, put both sides of the Atlantic on a collision course when the United Nations took up the Iraq issue later that year.

The president took up many of the same themes in his June 1, 2002, speech at West Point. The United States was, he said,

today, from the Middle East to South Asia, . . . gathering broad international coalitions to increase the pressure for peace. We must build strong great power relations when times are good to help manage crises when times are bad.⁵¹

He emphasized that the United States would use “every tool of finance, intelligence, and law enforcement. . . . We will send diplomats where they are needed. And we will send you, our soldiers, where you’re needed” to

defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.⁵²

There was now, the president said, “our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”⁵³

Contrary, then, to European complaints that the United States was disinterested in coalitions and multilateralism, and convinced that only military means were necessary to deal with the world’s problems,⁵⁴ both speeches emphasized a multilateral approach and the importance of using “all the tools of statecraft.” But it is certainly true that in neither speech was there any special significance given to the transatlantic relationship. In fact, the opposite was true. The focus of both speeches was other countries and regions of the world. This rhetorical emphasis accurately reflected the shifting focus in early 2002 of American policy towards multilateral coalition-building in the war on terrorism.

Thus, Ambassador Haass described “our relationship with our European allies” as “evolving in this time when there is no Soviet threat to reinforce our unity of purpose.” He admitted that

while the bonds across the Atlantic remain strong, they are being stretched in new ways—and, yes, even strained at times—as the Europeans search to develop a common approach to international affairs consistent with their power and interests, and as we seek to enlist European cooperation in the world beyond Europe. Our relationship with Europe is not at risk. But the issues we deal with, and the ways we deal with them, are evolving.⁵⁵

From a senior State Department official, this was a remarkably frank admission that the experience of 9/11 had not given the Atlantic Alliance a new “unity of purpose.”

In his speech, Haass mentioned NATO only once, in the context of adapting institutions to meet new challenges “not just in NATO, but in the Organization of American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the United Nations, and numerous other organizations.” He emphasized the American relationship with countries like China and India, not with Europe: “How we manage our relations with these new powers—and whether we can *forge new kinds of partnerships* with them—will be critical to our success.” The ambassador quoted, in conclusion, George Kennan’s comment that “one of the major weapons in our foreign policy arsenal” is “the cultivation of solidarity with other like-minded nations on every given issue of foreign policy” (emphasis added).⁵⁶ But he made no reference, as American officials routinely had for forty years, to the transatlantic relationship as an example of the success of that approach.

The president made only two direct references to Europe, one in the context of quoting George Marshall’s speech to the West Point class of 1942, whose officers had succeeded in

defeating Japan and Germany and then reconstructing those nations as allies. West Point graduates of the 1940s saw the rise of a deadly new challenge, the challenge of imperial communism, and opposed it from Korea to Berlin to Vietnam and in the cold war from beginning to end. And as the sun set on their struggle many of those West Point officers lived to see a world transformed had succeeded in “defeating Japan and Germany and then reconstructing those nations as allies.”⁵⁷

The second reference was to the “deep commitment to human freedom” shared by “the United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all of Europe,” and “embodied in strong alliances such as NATO.”⁵⁸

But indirectly the president clearly referred to the differences dividing the European and American approaches to the terrorist threat—differences he had personally experienced during his May 2002 trip to Europe, only a week before the West Point speech.⁵⁹ He was speaking to American officers on the banks of the Hudson, but his message was a reply to what he had heard—and not heard—from his European hosts:

America confronted imperial communism in many different ways: diplomatic, economic, and military. Yet moral clarity was essential to our victory in the Cold War. When leaders like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan refused to gloss over the brutality of tyrants, they gave hope to prisoners and dissidents and exiles and rallied free nations to a great cause.

Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong. Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong. There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil. And America will call evil by its name.⁶⁰

The president emphasized, as Ambassador Haass had done, that “America needs partners to preserve the peace. And we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal.”⁶¹ He made no special reference to the transatlantic relationship in this regard.

Immediately after 9/11, Europeans had overestimated the extent to which the United States would define the war on terrorism within the institutional framework and habits of the transatlantic relationship. They had expected to have the choice of working within NATO, of responding to American requests, or declining them, to the extent that *they* chose to do so, but American policy in the fall of 2001 had not given them that option. There was one more moment in May 2002 when Europe had the opportunity to take the Bush administration at its word—that it was committed to the kind of “hard-headed multilateralism” that Ambassador Haass had described—and to participate in shaping the content and direction of that multilateralism. But amidst its own political disarray, Europe had let that moment pass, displaying, instead, indifference to America’s new strategic priorities.

Underlying Structural and Decision-Making Trends

As the first anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks approached, on both sides of the Atlantic it had begun to seem anachronistic even to use the phrase “transatlantic partnership.” Europeans and Americans were independently seeking their own answers to the questions raised by the attacks, and they differed fundamentally on how to handle other crises as well. When they came together to discuss transatlantic disagreements that had long existed—over the chronic Arab-Israeli-Palestinian issue, Iran, North Korea, and UN sanctions on Iraq—their private conversations were more shrill and their willingness to air those disagreements in public more evident. German chancellor Schroeder’s reelection campaign in August–September 2002 demonstrated that there was a great deal of

political capital to be made in Europe by stridently distancing oneself from the United States.

On all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—by September 2002 Europeans and Americans disagreed. There were, of course, also differences within Europe and within the United States over how to deal with global instability and the threats associated with it. But these differences only made the transatlantic situation worse, by giving rise to charges of inconsistency and unpredictability on both sides.

Seen over the long course of the changing European-American relationship since the turn of the twentieth century, the strategic estrangement that gathered speed after 9/11 was not surprising. It had several components. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived NATO of its *raison d'être* in 1991, but neither explains the inability of Europeans and Americans to arrive at a common strategy to deal with terrorism and global instability in 2002. In fact, the level of transatlantic acrimony and recriminations that existed by the first anniversary of 9/11 reflected fundamental differences between the two sides of the Atlantic that had been kept in check by the Soviet threat.

One factor that made a common strategy difficult was the complete reversal of the geopolitical positions of the United States and the European powers in the twentieth century. From being a regional power with global commercial interests in 1900, the United States had become *the* projector of global political and economic influence and of military power by 2000. It had not only supplanted the United Kingdom in that role, but all of Britain's once "peer competitors," notably France, Russia, and Germany, in the course of the twentieth century.

Europeans, meanwhile, had collectively in the EU assumed the American role of a century before, that of a power with regional political and military interests, but only commercial ones worldwide. As the United States was a "free rider" on the global stability underwritten by the British taxpayer and the Royal Navy in 1900, so Europeans benefitted from, while criticizing, American power projection a century later.⁶² This situation led to resentments on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans in 2001 chafed at their dependence on American power, while their failure to bear global military burdens to a degree commensurate with European wealth and economic power provoked resentment in Washington.

The chief utility of the United States to the European democracies in the twentieth century was its ability to devote virtually unlimited resources to

developing military capabilities, a role that it played in two world wars and as guarantor of last resort against Soviet aggression in the Cold War. The United States assumed that role, as “redresser” of the Old World balance, because Europeans were incapable of playing it successfully alone. For fifty years, the American political and military role *in Europe* was defined through, originally, Anglo-American and, later, NATO consultation. Their cumulative experience in the half century from 1941 to 1991 led Europeans to a false understanding of American foreign policy⁶³ as a whole. The definition of the American political and military role in NATO was always *sui generis*, not typical of the focus, decision-making, or implementation of US foreign policy in general. But Europeans, especially Germans, failed to understand this.

In part, this was due to the fact that there grew up in Washington during the Cold War two foreign policy establishments at the working level, and Europeans generally had contact with only one of them. This was particularly true of West Germany, which was not a member of the United Nations until 1973 and did not have to deal with the colonial and post-colonial issues that preoccupied Britain, France, and the United States in the UN and elsewhere in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, the Federal Republic was one side of an extensive working-level German-American network that focused on the East-West relationship, the development of the European Community, and NATO. This network was centered in the Foreign and Defense Ministries in Bonn, the State and Defense Departments in Washington, and numerous American think tanks. It originally grew out of the core of Americans who served as civilians or military officers in the occupation of Germany, but it was cultivated and expanded by the conscious efforts of both governments and, especially, of German foundations and cultural exchange programs over the years. The German-American network grew in significance when France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command in 1967. It still existed in 2002, but its influence on and centrality to American foreign policy had declined after the end of the Cold War.

Without intending to do so, this network had isolated the Federal Republic from other issues in the American foreign policy debate and prevented a broader and deeper understanding of the policy process in Washington. With no role, unlike Britain and France, in global power projection and the UN Security Council, West German foreign policy dealt almost exclusively with the Soviet Union, NATO, and the EC. Working in Washington, Bonn, Mons, and Brussels with American counterparts who were also experts on these issues, West Germans were rarely privy to American

policy discussions focusing on the Americas, Africa, or Asia. They had little, if any, contact with American colleagues dealing with those parts of the world, such was the self-sustaining circle of diplomats and military officers who rotated during the Cold War from Washington to Moscow and Bonn, West Berlin to NATO, and back again.

Beyond the range of this circle, American foreign policy toward other parts of the world was conducted by diplomats, military officers, development experts, and others whose paths rarely, if ever, crossed those of the network dealing with NATO and East-West issues. As the United States Navy has an Atlantic and a Pacific fleet, in a certain sense, the United States in the Cold War had an Atlantic and a Pacific (non-Atlantic) foreign policy process at the working level.⁶⁴ Naturally, the efforts of the two came together at the top level of political decision making, but American presidents and secretaries of state and defense made a clear distinction between those issues requiring NATO consultation and those that did not. American foreign policy decisions on questions that did not directly concern NATO and the European allies were always, in the way in which Europeans began to use the word in the 1990s, “unilateral.” The allies were informed, but they were not consulted, at least not formally or collectively.

Two generations of NATO communiqués and the rhetoric of Eurocentric Americans like George Kennan contributed to disguising the extent to which this was true. But even at the height of the Cold War, the United States was first and foremost a hemispheric and a Pacific power—in reality and in its own self-image—as was apparent when threats emerged in those parts of the world during the Cold War years. There was nothing more “unilateral” than the American response in 1962 to the Cuban missile crisis. Ensuring American survival by securing freedom of action to the south and west had been the central theme of American foreign policy from its origins to the defeat of Japan in 1945. It never lost its centrality, not even at the height of the Cold War, but Washington had the resources that permitted it not to have to choose between its Atlantic and its hemispheric and Pacific political-military roles.

American foreign policy as a whole was never Eurocentric, but this was not how it appeared to the European allies—again, especially to West Germans—during the Cold War, and the Eurocentric misinterpretation had several consequences over the years. One of the most important in the wake of 9/11 was Europe’s overestimation of the extent to which the United States had been influenced by European opinion in years past. In

fact, historically, throughout the Cold War years after the end of the Korean War, Washington had expected and demanded little from its European allies in the way of political or military support outside of Europe. It came to expect (and tolerate) a good deal of criticism of American policies from its allies, but their criticism rarely had the impact that Europeans frequently supposed, unless it happened to dovetail (as in the case of Vietnam) with dissent in the United States itself.

What changed after the Cold War in Washington was not the way in which American foreign policy toward the rest of the world was conducted, but the expectation raised by European rhetoric about CFSP and ESDP that the European allies would finally make a major contribution to political-military burden-sharing outside Europe. They failed in the 1990s to live up to those expectations. What changed after Kosovo was the way in which US decisions on such issues as missile defense, which had previously been defined, at least in part, as NATO issues, were no longer seen that way by Washington. What changed after September 11 was the speed with which the American foreign policy agenda shifted away from NATO and Europe, to focus on parts of the world where American policy had *never* been made in consultation with the European allies.

But on both sides of the Atlantic, these were fundamentally procedural issues. In the wake of 9/11, habits of political consultation could have been changed, mutual expectations lowered, military capabilities improved. Why, in the first year after the terrorist attacks, was there so little willingness to change, to make the adjustments that would have made it possible for the two sides of the Atlantic to define a common strategy to deal with terrorism and global instability?

Europe's "Rogue State"

The failure to reestablish transatlantic unity of effort in 2001–2 reflected the differing interpretations in Europe and America of *why* the United States was attacked on September 11. Those interpretations, in turn, said a great deal about the political identity of the United States, as it had evolved over four centuries, and the attempt of the embryonic European Union to develop a political identity of its own. If Washington in the 1990s was already concerned with "rogue states," so were Europeans—and the one that worried them most was, in their eyes, the United States.⁶⁵ By

September 11, 2001, that perception was reinforced by their entrenched stereotypes of a “toxic Texan.”

After 9/11, perhaps the greatest shock to the European system was the discovery of what should have been clear all along, but had been disguised by the nature of the American relationship with Europe during the Cold War: the United States is not a European power. Its approach to international relations and the use of military force differs drastically from Europe's, as has already been discussed. But there are even more fundamental differences. The identity of the United States is, in large measure, still revolutionary and anti-status quo. American pressure on Britain to accept decolonization during World War II, and on France and Britain during the 1956 Suez crisis, was a much better indicator of the American approach to the world than was its role as guardian of the Cold War status quo in Europe. Europeans and Americans have an entirely different definition of what constitutes “global stability” and what is desirable and acceptable as a means to achieve it.

The extent to which Europe and the United States have historically diverged on a definition of global stability was disguised in the crucial decade from 1989 to 1999. A small but influential segment of the American foreign policy elite that tends to share a more European approach to the question held political power in Washington in the first Bush administration, as the Cold War came to an end and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collapsed. It continued to wield significant influence throughout much of the Clinton administration. But in an America at war after 9/11, its influence diminished. As it always had historically, an existential threat to the United States brought out the country's revolutionary origins.

From the founding of the republic, a debate has raged between those, on the one hand, who see the United States' role in the world as being a “model” of republican democracy, and those who believe that a more activist approach is required to propagate the republican ideal. Through much of American history, the former have held the upper hand. Volumes have been written to explain why, but it is no great surprise that the arguments of those advocating that the United States should “stay home” resonate with an American public generally descended from immigrants who had fled economic and political troubles overseas. “Staying home” is also cheaper—or seems to be, in the short term. This was the great mistake of the 1990s, a decade in which the American government neglected the economic development and cultural aspects of its foreign policy, on the

blithe assumption that the private sector, trade, and “globalization” would ensure democratization and stability in the post–Cold War world.⁶⁶

In wartime, the balance shifts to those who advocate activist propagation of the republican ideal—but only in a certain kind of war, when there is a consensus in the United States that the country is facing an existential threat to the future of the republic itself. This has only happened five times in American history: the American Revolution; the Civil War; the two world wars of the twentieth century; and after 9/11, against “enemies [who] are totalitarians, holding a creed of power with no place for human dignity.”⁶⁷ In the context of an existential threat, American leaders have always forcefully articulated the nation’s founding ideals, embraced an activist foreign policy, and expended the resources necessary to create a decisive military instrument of national power.

Moreover, politicians who began their careers skeptical about the need for an activist approach have frequently become its most committed advocates, if the survival of the United States was at stake. Abraham Lincoln’s abolitionism and the ruthlessness with which the armies of the Union defeated Southern secession, like Woodrow Wilson’s willingness to take America to war and offer the world a liberal democratic alternative to both empire and Marxist-Leninism, testify to this. Existential war was the catalyst to the conversion of politicians who began their careers with different ideas about the role of the United States government and the projection of American power. George W. Bush may be the latest president to undergo a conversion to multilateral engagement and an activist American foreign policy as a result of a threat to American existence. He is not the first.

He is also not the first president to articulate the revolutionary, anti-status quo—indeed, subversive—nature of the United States. From the obvious example of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence through Wilson’s Fourteen Points to Franklin Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter, the American concept of individual self-determination has always been a dangerous idea⁶⁸ to absolute monarchs, oligarchs, and totalitarians of the right and left. Its survival was sometimes a close-run thing.⁶⁹ When Lincoln spoke at Gettysburg of his determination “that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth,” it was not a rhetorical flourish. The end of the American republic would have meant the end of republican government.

In the first year after 9/11, the United States government, the Congress, the vast majority of the American people, and the “American intellectuals”

whose defense of the war in Afghanistan as a just war caused such consternation in Germany⁷⁰ all saw the threat from totalitarian terrorists⁷¹ as one which, potentially, threatened not only the political, but also the literal existence of the United States, should such terrorists develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. As Daniel Hamilton wrote:

Their capacity to kill is limited only by the “capabilities” of their weapons. Their goal is not to influence opinion or win supporters. It is to destroy societies. They have propelled us into an era of catastrophic terrorism. . . . The threat from terrorism and the WMD threat are indivisible and collectively constitute our worst nightmare.⁷²

Hamilton expressed the American consensus in his conclusion that “the only possible answer to such ideological fanaticism and suicidal holy warriors is unwavering resistance. . . . Our true crime in their eyes is that we disseminate the dynamism of a free and democratic culture. In their eyes, our crime is less what we do than who we are.”⁷³

This was not, with rare exceptions,⁷⁴ Europe’s interpretation of why the United States was the target of the September 11 attacks. And therein lay the source of the unbridgeable divide across the Atlantic in 2002. In the year after 9/11, the European discussion of why the attacks took place was an unsavory effort to “explain” them as the result of US policies. Europe’s explanations frequently came perilously close to being justifications. The motives of Europeans differed fundamentally from those of the terrorists, but the tone and substance of their analyses were profoundly different from that in the United States.

At the time, this generally went unnoticed by the broader American public, and by early 2003, the focus of the transatlantic discourse had shifted to disagreements over Iraq. Since 2003, the American invasion of and presence in Iraq has generally been accepted as the source of European opposition to the United States and hatred—it is not too strong a word—of George Bush. But this was not the case; hostility toward the United States and European “explanations” of 9/11 had already caused consternation and disbelief among the American intellectual and political elite that had regular contact with Europeans in the fall of 2001.

In an exchange of letters in 2002 with colleagues in Germany who had denounced the American attack on Afghanistan, sixty “American intellectuals” captured the disquiet that the European discussion caused them.⁷⁵ In asking the Europeans to take a position on whether the use of force was ever morally justified, they commented that “simply denouncing the United

States for nearly everything that it has done in the world since 1945, while certainly your prerogative, does not relieve you from the responsibility” of taking such a position. They described as “an act of moral blindness” the Germans’ use of the word “mass murder” to compare unintended civilian casualties in Afghanistan with the “intentional killing” of civilians on September 11, “where the goal [was] to *maximize* the loss of civilian life.” They said, simply, “We are saddened by these comments,” a phrase that captured the reaction of American decision makers, as well, not just to one letter, but to the European discussion as a whole, in 2001–2.

In their second letter, the “American intellectuals” remarked that their German correspondents had criticized the alleged rise of “fundamentalist forces” in the United States, while “nowhere in your letter do you express alarm about ‘fundamentalist forces’ gaining ground in the Muslim world. . . . Why this discrepancy? Is it only ‘fundamentalism’ in the U.S. to which you object? Is it your contention that ‘fundamentalist forces’ in the Muslim world . . . pose a lesser threat to the world today than do the ‘fundamentalist forces’ that you fear are gaining ground in the United States?”⁷⁶ Unfortunately, in discussions with European colleagues in the first few months after September 11, many Americans had found that their answer to the last two questions was yes.

In explaining the terrorist attacks by reference to American policy failures in the 1990s, notably Washington’s disinterest in Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat there, and as a result of US support for Israel, Europeans took little notice of the fact that Americans were engaged in the same debate at home. There was also in the United States after 9/11 a critical discussion, both of what the United States had done wrong in the 1990s and of its conduct of the war on terrorism. But there was a fundamental difference between the American and European searches for “explanations.”

The American critique sought to identify policy mistakes that contributed to a climate conducive to support for totalitarian terrorists, and to avoid them in the future—hence, the long-overdue return to serious planning and funding of the cultural and economic aspects of American foreign policy. The European critique went beyond that, however, hoping to identify a change in US policy that would make the terrorists go away: the abandonment of Israel, perhaps, the withdrawal of US armed forces from Saudi Arabia. This was a human enough urge, but one that American decision makers found hopelessly out of touch with the reality of the threat posed by the combination of the intentions already demonstrated by

totalitarian terrorists and their potential capabilities, if armed with weapons of mass destruction.

To use a historical analogy: there was widespread recognition during World War II of the way in which punitive Allied policies after World War I had contributed to German support for National Socialism. But the Nazi threat had to be defeated first, before a different policy of reconciliation could be pursued with a different German government. The European failure to differentiate between circumstances in which reconciliation is possible and those requiring “unwavering resistance” had a profoundly negative impact on American decision makers in the year after 9/11. They found more wishful thinking than serious analysis in Europe’s approach to the terrorist threat. This, in turn, contributed to the increasing disinterest of Washington in European opinions, as was clear from the American government’s reaction to early criticism of the internment of Taliban and al-Qaeda captives at Guantanamo Bay.

Conclusion

In a way that was depressing, if not surprising, it became obvious in the year after 9/11 that, in many ways, the United States and the terrorists of al-Qaeda understood each other—and the future that was at stake—better than the Europeans understood either of them. It was clear to Americans after 9/11 that the future represented by the American idea could not co-exist with the terrorists’ totalitarian aspirations. While it is politically irresponsible to mistake a situation as a zero-sum game when it is not, it is strategically disastrous not to recognize a zero-sum game, if the enemy sees it as such. The United States accepted this; Europeans would not even consider the question. Unwilling to accept the necessity to use military force *in Afghanistan*—Iraq was not yet even on the agenda—Europe’s only recourse was to believe that a change in American policy and behavior would somehow remove the whole terrorist issue. Clinging to the idea that the international system no longer required the use of force, despite years of experience in the 1990s that demonstrated the opposite, Europeans had to believe that al-Qaeda was not playing a zero-sum game and that American hyperpower was ultimately responsible for terrorist violence.

This corrosive—to the transatlantic relationship—European approach to the terrorist threat was, ultimately, no accident. The final component of the disintegrating transatlantic political and military relationship in 2002

was the European attempt after 1990 to mobilize support for the European Union through the critical contrasting of American society, politics, and culture with the supposedly superior model provided by Europe. As Daniel Hamilton ruefully remarked after 9/11, "If the Europeans define themselves by what they are not—namely, that they are not American—and not by what they are, then that will be a declaration of bankruptcy of the European ideal."⁷⁷

Unfortunately, after the end of the Cold War, that was the path that Europe followed. To a certain extent—perhaps even to a large extent, except on the left- and right-wing political extremes, this process was originally unconscious. But over time, as a strategy of political mobilization to create a sense of "Europeanness," it was successful, especially with younger Europeans who came of age after the Cold War. Painting a picture of the EU as a "counter-America" became a politically attractive path in the 1990s to explain the necessity for the European Union to otherwise skeptical European voters.

After a decade of this, by 2001, when asked to define what made them "European," European students would frequently name the characteristics that (they believed) distinguished Europe from the United States: social consciousness, environmental awareness, rejection of capital punishment. When asked to identify what they had in common as Europeans without reference to the United States—a young German with a young Portuguese, Greek, or French student—the answers became far more problematic. Knowledge of each other's languages, histories, current politics, and cultures was superficial or nonexistent—but young Europeans were conscious of being "non-Americans."

Until the September 11 attacks, this strategy appeared to be cost free, in terms of its impact on the transatlantic relationship. But the year after 9/11 revealed the political price of mobilizing support for the European Union in such a way. The constant drumbeat of criticism of the United States—not only for what it did abroad, but for what it was, allegedly, at home—had taken its toll. Without sharing in any way sympathy for either the terrorists' violent methods or their ultimate goals, many Europeans nevertheless had doubts about American society. Was it worth defending? Did it warrant their "unconditional solidarity" in the fight against terrorism? European politicians, even those who wanted to, had difficulty framing positive answers to those questions after a decade of using the United States as the negative example of what Europe was not, and did not intend to become.

In that climate, there was little reason to have expected on 9/11 that the transatlantic political-military partnership of the Cold War years would be reestablished because of the terrorist threat. On the contrary, in the months that followed, Europeans remained hostile to the extent and nature of American power, apparently more preoccupied with the theoretical danger posed by a "hegemonic" United States than with the real and present threat from terrorists who had made perfectly clear their motives, methods, capabilities, and goals. Meanwhile, the United States concluded in those first critical months after the attacks that building new partnerships elsewhere in the world, while retaining its freedom of action, was "the only way to secure order in a world where its voice [was] now louder than ever and the fight against international terrorism [had] only just begun."⁷⁸ The year after 9/11 confirmed what Kosovo had already shown, that the US and Europe no longer shared a consensus on how to deal with threats to their security. Given the global nature of the war on terror, the future of American foreign and defense policy would certainly be multi-lateral, but after 2002, it would not principally be transatlantic. ~~SSQ~~

Notes

1. The initial research for this article was done while I was a visiting scholar in 2002 at the Centre for Applied Policy Research (CAP), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet, Munich, with the generous financial support of the Bertelsmann Foundation. I thank Prof. Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, Director of CAP, for the invitation to reflect on the transatlantic relationship in the first year after 9/11, and for the support that he and his colleagues gave the project. I am especially grateful to Nicole Schley, Wolfgang Buecherl, Franco Alghieri, and my fellow visiting scholar, Dr. Esther Ezra, for good conversations, constructive criticism, and collegial hospitality during my stay at CAP.

Simultaneously, I was Vielberth Visiting Professor at the University of Regensburg, and I thank Prof. Dr. Stephan Bierling for the opportunity to co-teach a graduate seminar on issues confronting Europe and the United States in what was a pivotal year for the transatlantic relationship. I profited greatly from the thoughtful comments of the students in that seminar. Professor Bierling and his assistant, Dr. Herbert Maier, were the most generous of colleagues during my stay in Regensburg.

Since 2003, I have had the opportunity to discuss the issues raised in this article with colleagues and students at the Air Command and Staff College. It is impossible for me to name them all here, but essential that I thank my department chair, Dr. Charles Costanzo, for his continuing support of my teaching and scholarship. In the last four years, I have especially benefited from conversations with the American and international officers who participated in my research seminars on US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, and the European Union in a globalized world.

Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous referees of this article, and especially Dr. Anthony C. Cain and his colleagues at *SSQ*, Tawanda Eaves and Betty Littlejohn, for their comments,

constructive editing, and encouragement in preparing it for publication. The views expressed here are mine alone, and do not reflect the opinions of any of the individuals or institutions named above; nor do they represent the views of the Air Command and Staff College, the US Air Force, or the US Department of Defense.

2. There is a tendency to forget today that complaints about American “unilateralism” predated the arrival of George W. Bush in the White House by several years. There was a strong, negative reaction in Europe to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s 1998 description of the United States as the “indispensable nation,” which was, in fact, a quote from President Clinton’s second inaugural address in 1997, in which he had said, “America stands alone as the world’s indispensable nation.” Clinton was talking about American economic success and globalization, but Albright explicitly applied the phrase to foreign policy: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.” In May 2000, in a book-length interview with Dominique Moisi, *Les cartes de la France à l’heure de la mondialisation* (Fayard), the French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, used the term “hyperpuissance” to describe the United States. Perhaps most tellingly, the cover of the March 2000 issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* (<http://www.afsa.org/fsj/Journal2000.cfm>) showed the “Lone Ranger” on his white horse, carrying an American flag, over the title “America Rides Alone: American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy.” When that issue was published, Gov. George W. Bush had just lost the New Hampshire presidential primary to Senator John McCain.

3. As John Lewis Gaddis said of the then new Bush administration in a May 1989 “Conversation with History” interview with Harry Kreisler (<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Gaddis/gaddis-con3.html>)—before the opening of the Berlin Wall, but after Hungary had opened its border to Austria: “[T]hey have no idea of what they’re creating at the moment. . . . There’s a general sense out there now that, yes, we’re coming to the end of the Cold War period, that there’s something new out there that’s developing, but I don’t see anybody who has a comparably Kennanesque or Achesonian vision of what this is at the moment.”

4. Ibid.

5. An argument that the French also made—and lost to Germany—with regard to the EU.

6. Contrary to public perceptions, it was not the victory of Republicans in the midterm US Congressional elections a month later that brought about this change. Richard Holbrooke, “America, A European Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38–51.

7. The background and context of German support for NATO enlargement and influence on the Clinton administration’s reversal of policy are discussed more fully in Edwina S. Campbell, “Germany’s Approach to European Security,” *Brassey’s 1996 Defence Yearbook* (King’s College, London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1996).

8. The 1994 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court allowing such deployments with Bundestag approval eventually provided political cover for the German government. Whether there had ever been a constitutional issue remains subject to debate. See Georg Nolte, “Ensuring Political Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by Requiring Constitutional Accountability,” in Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 231–53.

9. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, “Broaching the Issues,” in *ibid.*, 3–35.

10. Quoted in Gerd Foehrenbach’s excellent analysis of the transatlantic relationship in the Clinton years, “Die transatlantische Sicherheitspartnerschaft an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert,” *Politik und Gesellschaft Online* 1/2001, http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg1_2001/artfoehrenbach.htm.

11. The program and speeches of the 2001 Munich Conference on Security Policy are at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2001/index.php?menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=31&.

12. And with less attention to his State Department colleague, Madeleine Albright, who warned the Europeans not to “duplicate” military assets already extant in NATO. This warning was completely counterproductive, a point the Clinton administration never seemed to grasp. It played into the hands of European politicians who did not want to ask their taxpayers for higher defense budgets, but who argued that they were being “pro-American” and “Atlanticist” by avoiding duplication—in other words, by failing to devote greater resources to defense, as Cohen simultaneously urged.

13. Developments since 1999 can be found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?cmsid=246&lang=EN.

14. The *Petersberg Tasks*, a term which is still largely unknown in the United States, were adopted by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 and incorporated into Article 17 of the EU’s 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. They include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management and peacemaking, but not war fighting in the classical sense. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm. Since neither the air strikes on Bosnia in 1995 nor on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 were “Petersberg” missions, this conclusion struck American observers as particularly odd.

15. See Edwina S. Campbell, *France’s Defence Reforms: The ‘Challenge of Empiricism,’* London Defence Study #36 (King’s College, London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, October 1996).

16. The NATO Strategic Concept is at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

17. For a discussion of this, see Edwina S. Campbell, *Die Relevanz amerikanischer Macht: anglo-amerikanische Vergangenheit und euro-atlantische Zukunft* (Munich: Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 2001), 41–55, http://www.hss.de/downloads/aktuelle_analysen_21.pdf.

18. Preface to Julian Lindley-French, *Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September*, Chaillot Paper no. 52, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2002, 5.

19. In Tom Heneghan, “‘Toxic Texan’ amid His Toughest Critics,” Reuters (Paris), 26 May 2002. See Pascal Bruckner’s interesting essay on “The Paradoxes of Anti-Americanism,” *Dissent* 53, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 9–14, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=650>.

20. For (an all too rare) example, see Stephan Bierling, “Die Europaeische Union und die USA,” in Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Europa-Handbuch* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2002), 639–59. Andrei S. Markovits explores the issue of cultural anti-Americanism in Europe in *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). See also Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996).

21. See NATO Press Release (2001) 124 of 12 September 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>; Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, of 2 October 2001, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm>; and UNSC Resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement>, and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement>. UNSC Resolution 1373 noted that the Council was “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” in other words, dealing with a threat to international peace and security, as defined by the Charter.

22. The phrase is infamous in Germany. Despite much criticism from within his own SPD-Greens coalition, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, immediately after 9/11, had declared Germany’s “unconditional solidarity” with the United States (<http://www.germnews.de/archive/dn/2001/09/17.html>), but he won reelection less than a year later by demonstrating the

opposite. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Germany and the United States: Anatomy of a Crisis," in Notes du Cerfa (Paris), (septembre 2003) 4, S. 1-9, http://www.kas.de/publikationen/2003/2174_dokument.html. As Kamp noted, Schroeder's stance in the 2002 election campaign was popular beyond left-wing voters, and "even the conservatives interpreted the German plea [*sic*—pledge?] of 'unconditional solidarity' conditionally."

23. In this regard, the terrorists were more consistent in their understanding of political symbolism than were Europeans horrified by the attacks on the Twin Towers, some of whom had, in the past, applauded "anti-globalization" attacks on McDonald's in Europe. If the Pentagon was a symbol of American military power, then both McDonald's and the World Trade Center were symbols of American economic power; there was only a difference in scale in an attack on an individual McDonald's. See "Jose Bove: The Man Who Dismantled a McDonalds," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A706736>. The third, thwarted attack of 9/11 was aimed, apparently, at a symbol of American political power, the Capitol.

24. Kamp, "Germany and the United States."

25. The Joint Declaration of September 14, 2001, also signed by the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/Declaration.en1.pdf.

26. It is, of course, impossible to know what would have happened in such a hypothetical situation, but I asked numerous European journalists, foreign policy experts, and colleagues, both civilian and military, in May–June 2002 to tell me how they thought they and their governments would have reacted to an attack only on the Pentagon. Only two of them felt strongly that European reactions would have been the same as they were. The vast majority, when they considered the question, responded that the initial European response would have been quite different, had the World Trade Center not been attacked—or even had it been attacked, but on a different day and time, destroying only the building, but without thousands of civilian casualties.

27. There was, clearly, an *emotional* reaction in the United States to the number of casualties and the heroism of the New York City police and fire departments, as well as to that of the Arlington County, Virginia, police and fire departments that responded to the attack on the Pentagon.

28. John Sack tells the story of a young US Army medic, Eddie Rivera, who after a day of treating heavy casualties, pinned down under fire in Afghanistan, thinks, "What am I even doing here? And then Rivera remembers the World Trade Center. Remembers the flaring fires like Zeus' lightning bolts . . . the towers collapsing, the ashes supplanting them, the ash-plastered people running away. . . . It's not two platoons. . . . It's three thousand people! As bad as Anaconda is, Rivera thinks, we're better off. . . . And now Rivera remembers why he's here." "Anaconda," *Esquire* 138, no. 2 (August 2002): 122.

29. Made by numerous American decision makers and commentators, in this case by former Clinton administration deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs Daniel S. Hamilton, *Die Zukunft ist nicht mehr, was sie war: Europa, Amerika, und die neue weltpolitische Lage* (Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2002), 22.

30. EU Joint Declaration of 14 September 2001.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, circulated as S/2001/946, on 7 October 2001, at: <http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/s-2001-946.htm>.

34. U.S. Public Law 107-40 (Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States), 107th Congress, 18 September 2001: "[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons." At: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/sjres23_eb.htm.

35. For the state of US public opinion six months after September 11, see: <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=44>.

36. Lindley-French, *Terms of Engagement*, 5.

37. At least for Europeans, although, as Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, defending one's honor against insults is an enduring part of the American foreign policy tradition. See his "The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy," *The National Interest* 58 (Winter 1999/2000): 5–29, <http://www.nationalinterest.org>. The article is chap. 8 of Mead's *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

38. See Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000).

39. As I personally experienced at numerous conferences and discussions in Washington and Europe throughout the 1990s.

40. As Charles Kupchan wrote in "The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations," *The National Interest* 85 (September/October 2006): 81, Germany and France "did not just opt out of the war . . . but they mounted a determined and successful campaign to deny the United States the backing of the UN Security Council"; and "by denying the war a UN blessing," they "arguably imposed considerable costs on the United States in terms of both resources and lives."

41. The oft-(mis)quoted comment was not part of the secretary's prepared remarks, but was in response to a question near the end of a briefing by Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, at the Washington Foreign Press Center, on 22 January 2003. At http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t0123_2003_t0122sdfpc.html.

42. The World War II allies declared their "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world." Only then would "there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations." "Communiqué Issued at the End of the Yalta Conference," *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 970–71.

43. *Affaires Extérieures* (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), 34.

44. Richard N. Haass, "Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World," The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002, at <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*

51. Pres. George W. Bush (graduation address, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 June 2002), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. See, for example, Michael Cox, "American Power before and after 11 September: Dizzy with Success?" *International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (April 2002): 276: "When the war [against terrorism] began there were those who hoped it would curb the unilateralist inclinations of the Bush administration, and that it would emerge on the other side converted to the cause of coalitions and multilateralism. In reality, the war has had almost the opposite effect." The war to which Cox refers is not Iraq. His article was written and published a year before, in April 2002, at the same time as the Haass speech. He, like most commentary in Europe in early 2002, simply dismissed anything that the United States said or did that indicated a positive approach to multilateral cooperation. Their dismissal is hard to explain: Cox must have been writing at about the time that the Afghan Loya Jirga was meeting in Bonn (December 2001), and while the United States was actively pursuing "coalitions and multilateralism," both regionally, in central and south Asia, and at the UN. Unlike countries elsewhere in the world that began new relationships with the US in 2001–2, the Europeans' own view of multilateralism as an end in itself ("the cause," as Cox calls it), often combined with their stereotypical view of President Bush to blind them to opportunities for transatlantic cooperation.

55. Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy."

56. Ibid.

57. President Bush, graduation address.

58. Ibid.

59. See the transcripts of Nick Bryant, "On Tour with President Bush," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2005216.stm>. As Bryant described Bush's May 23 speech to the Bundestag in Berlin: "Polite applause greeted his remarks. But it was clear that no great enthusiasm lay behind them. Europe just does not seem to 'get it,' in the view of the White House. His short stay in Berlin—less than 20 hours long—will no doubt have reinforced its sense of isolation."

60. President Bush, graduation address.

61. Ibid.

62. This comparison is more fully developed in Edwina S. Campbell, *The Relevance of American Power: The Anglo-American Past and the Euro-Atlantic Future*, London Defence Study no. 49 (King's College, London: Centre for Defence Studies, June 1999). Translated with a new concluding chapter as *Die Relevanz amerikanischer Macht: anglo-amerikanische Vergangenheit und euro-atlantische Zukunft*, Aktuelle Analysen (#21) der Akademie fuer Politik und Zeitgeschehen der Hanns Seidel Stiftung, December 2000.

63. As used in this discussion, "foreign policy" is to be understood as encompassing security and defense policies, not, as the term is frequently used in Europe, as something separate from those two.

64. In the United States armed forces, this split was reflected in the focus of the sea services (US Navy and Marine Corps) on the Pacific and Western Hemisphere, and of the US Army and Air Force on Europe.

65. See, for an excellent, pre-9/11 analysis of "the US as rogue state," Francois Heisbourg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000): 5–19.

66. "For a time it seemed that American primacy was enough. . . . But, in the absence of a defining idea for American policy, this transitional period became a time of one step forward, one step back. . . . Democracy spread as never before, yet in many places its roots remained shallow and vulnerable to disappointment and backlash. . . . Still, despite the lack of clarity,

most Americans perceived a seemingly inexorable positive trend in international developments.” Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign Policy.”

67. President Bush, graduation address.

68. The realization of which, not without mistakes, failures, and detours, is the history of the United States.

69. “Had [the South’s] sacrifice been crowned with victory, the myths created would surely have sustained an independent nation into eternity. They were not given the chance to do so because the North’s population also imagined a nation, and one which encompassed the whole Union. . . . But the outcome was anything but inevitable, the role of battle, chance and leadership vital.” Dominic Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire 1850–1918. Power, Territory, Identity,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 163–200.

70. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 147–49.

71. “[T]hey seek to impose a joyless conformity, to control every life and all of life.” President Bush, graduation address.

72. Hamilton, *Die Zukunft ist nicht mehr*, 21.

73. *Ibid.*, 35–36.

74. Among the most prominent, Oriana Fallaci, *La rage et l’orgueil* (Paris: Plon, 2002), which was widely denounced in Europe.

75. “Is the Use of Force Ever Morally Justified? A Response from Americans to Colleagues in Germany,” 8 August 2002; the complete exchange, background to it, and list of all sixty American participants is at: http://www.americanvalues.org/index.html#september_11_challenge. They included Jean Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, Amitai Etzioni, Charles Wilson, and George Weigel.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Hamilton, *Die Zukunft ist nicht mehr*, 59.

78. Cox, “American Power,” 276.

Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?

Jeffrey Record

THE AMERICAN debacle in Iraq seemingly vindicates the restrictive use-of-force doctrine propounded by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Gen Colin Powell, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, in the 1980s and early 1990s. That doctrine expressed the Pentagon's "take" on the lessons of the Vietnam War. It called for the last-resort application of overwhelming force on behalf of vital interests and clearly defined and achievable political-military objectives, and it insisted on reasonable assurance of enduring public and congressional support.

In the case of Iraq, insufficient force was employed on behalf of exceptionally ambitious objectives with a resultant unexpectedly bloody protraction of hostilities and attendant loss of domestic political support. Indeed, the rationales upon which public support was mobilized for war—White House claims (widely questioned by experts at the time) that Iraq was an ally of al-Qaeda and on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons—were discredited by the US occupation of Iraq. War was, moreover, hardly the option of last resort. Deterrence and containment had worked effectively against Saddam Hussein since the Gulf War of 1991; sanctions and the threat of war kept him from acquiring nuclear weapons or invading his neighbors. The Bush administration's successful coercion of Saddam Hussein into permitting the return of unfettered UN weapons inspections in late 2002, which eventually would have revealed the absence of an Iraqi threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without a war, was testimony to how really weak Baathist Iraq had become.

Does the Iraq War portend abandonment of America's promiscuous post-Cold War overseas interventionism and a return to the cautions of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine? Will the Iraq War, like the Vietnam War before it, exert a chilling effect on American statecraft, especially the use of

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force? Is the war laying the foundations for an “Iraq syndrome” analogous to the “Vietnam syndrome”? Does the Iraq War vindicate the “realist” foreign policy’s rejection of using force to promote the expansion of American values overseas? Should the use of force be confined to the protection of concrete strategic interests? Is strategic retrenchment the best insurance policy against another Iraq?

This essay attempts to shed light on, if not answer, these questions. The Iraq War almost certainly will prompt a major debate over the circumstances justifying future threatened or actual uses of US force, and many will argue strongly in favor of greater caution and restraint. “No more Iraqs” could become as popular a policy prescription inside the Pentagon in the coming decades as was “no more Vietnams” in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s and “never again” in the 1950s and early ’60s. Yet, the unpopular Korean War was followed by the unpopular Vietnam War, which was followed by the unpopular Iraq War. The chilling effects of Korea and Vietnam proved transitory, as well may those of Iraq. Activist presidents are not bound by conservative use-of-force doctrines embraced by the Pentagon. Such doctrines, moreover, may inhibit American statecraft, especially threatened use of force on behalf of diplomacy. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is a case in point. A doctrine designed to prohibit a repetition of the casual and ultimately disastrous intervention in Vietnam swung the pendulum to the opposite extreme of paralysis in the form of military inaction or, in the case of action, the elevation of force protection above the mission it was designed to accomplish. Those who would return the United States to that doctrine should remember its consequences as well its origins, its weaknesses as well as its strengths. The experience of the Iraq War likely will encourage future administrations to pay far more attention to the potential unintended consequences of using major force than the George W. Bush administration paid to those of its decision to invade Iraq, but policy makers must guard against permitting prudent caution morphing into crippling timidity. The United States is, after all, engaged in a rare war of necessity against a lethal, elusive, and clever al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Weinberger proclaimed his doctrine in the wake of the Reagan administration’s disastrous intervention in Lebanon (which Weinberger had opposed) and amidst rising concern over possible escalation of US involvement in insurgency-torn El Salvador. The announcement also targeted Weinberger’s cabinet and private-sector rival, Secretary of State George Shultz, who had strongly supported US intervention in Lebanon and fa-

vored the direct use of US force to stop the Sandinistas in Central America. Shultz was a firm believer in coercive diplomacy. More broadly, "The Uses of Military Power," Weinberger's famous National Press Club speech on 28 November 1984, reflected a growing consensus within the US military leadership and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the strategic and political instruction of the Vietnam War as it was seemingly reaffirmed by failed US intervention in Lebanon in 1982–83. That instruction boiled down to six "tests" (Weinberger's term) to be passed before the United States committed force:

1. The United States should not commit forces to *combat* overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies.
2. If we decide that it *is* necessary to put *combat* troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.
3. If we *do* decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size and composition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance [that] we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.¹ (emphasis in original)

Weinberger identified "gray-area conflicts" as "the most likely challenge to peace," yet warned that they "are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond." He further cautioned that if "we are certain that force is required in a given situation, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed." Weinberger went on to deplore post-Vietnam congressional intrusion in the formulation of foreign policy but reserved his heaviest fire for those "theorists [who] argue that military force can be brought to bear in any crisis," who "are eager to advocate its use even in limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are American forces of *any* size present they will somehow solve the problem."

Weinberger decried the use of force or threatened force as a means of political coercion. As a tool of coercive diplomacy, force had obviously failed against North Vietnam, and its failure was followed by a real war. He viewed the “intermixture of diplomacy and the military” as inherently dangerous because it meant “that we should not hesitate to put a battalion or so of American forces in various places in the world where we desired . . . stability, or changes of governments or whatever else.” If the enemy counterescalated, as the Vietnamese Communists had in 1965, the United States would have to do the same. Weinberger essentially rejected force as an arm of diplomacy; he saw it rather as a *substitute for* diplomacy—to be used only when diplomacy failed. In so doing, he implicitly rejected the Clausewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means and denied the continuum of agreement, negotiation, threat, coercive diplomacy, and war.

The Weinberger Doctrine was carried into the George H. W. Bush administration by General Powell, who had served as Weinberger’s military aide and had reviewed a draft of “The Uses of Military Power.” Appointed chairman of the JCS in 1989, Powell strongly endorsed the Weinberger Doctrine, especially its commitment to winning quickly and decisively. Though he had serious reservations about using force to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait (he preferred to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia while giving sanctions time to compel the Iraqis to quit Kuwait), once that decision was made by President Bush he orchestrated the assemblage in the Persian Gulf of overwhelming US and allied force with spectacular results.² As a Vietnam War veteran he passionately believed, as did many of his fellow officers who planned and executed Operation Desert Storm, that US military forces had been almost criminally misused by both the White House and the senior military leadership. “War should be the politics of last resort,” he wrote in his best-selling memoirs. “And when we go to war we should have a purpose that our people understand and support; we should mobilize the country’s resources to fulfill that mission and then go on to win. In Vietnam, we entered a halfhearted war, with much of the nation opposed or indifferent, while a small fraction carried the burden.”³ In a speech at the Vietnam War Memorial shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War, Powell enunciated the doctrine that subsequently bore his name. “If in the end war becomes necessary, as it clearly did in Operation Desert Storm, you must do it right. You’ve got to be decisive. You’ve got to

go in massively. You've got to be wise and fight in a way that keeps casualties to a minimum. And you've got to go in to win."⁴

Both Weinberger and Powell believed the use of force should be highly restricted. It should be avoided in situations where political restrictions threaten to impede its effective use, where a clear and quick military win is not attainable, and where public and congressional opinion is indifferent or hostile to the purpose for which force is being employed. For Powell, winning meant going in with crushing force, getting the job done quickly, and getting out cleanly—i.e., without post-hostilities political obligations that might compel recommitment of US forces in less than ideal circumstances. Having a clear exit strategy was as important as having a clear entry strategy. The Gulf War was the obvious model. The United States went in big on behalf of limited, achievable objectives; won quickly and cheaply; and departed the scene. It was a short, popular, UN-sanctioned war that claimed the lives of only 148 Americans. It was a war that seemingly cured the United States of the Vietnam syndrome.

Powell made avoidance of another Vietnam his life's mission. "Many of my generation, the captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support. If we could make good on that promise to ourselves, to the civilian leadership, and to the country, then the sacrifices of Vietnam would not have been in vain." Powell believed the greatest fault of the senior military leadership was its failure "to talk straight to its political superiors or to itself. The top leadership never went in to the Secretary of Defense or the President and said, 'This war is unwinnable the way we are fighting it.'"⁵

In 1992, after Bill Clinton was elected president but before his inauguration, Powell wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* in which he elliptically cautioned his audience, presumably including the president-elect, against repeating the mistakes of Vietnam in the former Yugoslavia. He condemned gradualism and warned against "send[ing] military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish." He noted that "military force is not always the right answer," but urged that "when we do use it, we should not be equivocal; we should win and win decisively." He further warned that intervention's objectives must be clear and achievable, and claimed that the George H. W. Bush administration called off the Gulf War when US objectives had been achieved and immediately

vacated Iraqi territory because the only alternative would have been “the inevitable follow-up [of] major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a complex American proconsulship in Baghdad.”⁶ Powell returned to this point in his memoirs. He argued that it was not in America’s interest to destroy Iraq or weaken it to the point where Iran and Syria were not constrained by it. “It would not contribute to the stability we want in the Middle East to have Iraq fragmented into separate Sunni, Shia, and Kurd political entities. The only way to have avoided this outcome was to have undertaken a largely US conquest and occupation of a remote nation of twenty million people. I don’t think this is what the American people signed up for.” He added that “it is naïve . . . to think that if Saddam Hussein had fallen, he would necessarily have been replaced by a Jeffersonian in some sort of desert democracy where people read *The Federalist Papers* along with the Koran.”⁷

The Clinton administration inherited Powell as JCS chairman, but there is no evidence that either the new president or his foreign-policy principals had much use for the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine—or for Powell himself, who not only made his opposition to any US military intervention in the crumbling Yugoslavian state very clear but also was a potential future Republican presidential candidate. On the contrary, the administration displayed a propensity to use force for coercive purposes in circumstances quite the opposite of those prescribed by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. US military action was undertaken in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Serbia in the absence of either manifestly vital interests or assured public and congressional support. In all cases force was applied in an atmosphere of agonizing indecision, and in the case of the Balkans it was minimally employed. In the war over Kosovo the result was a major mismatch between the immediate political objective sought (a cessation of Serbian ethnic cleansing) and the military means employed (airpower unsupported by ground force action).⁸ Indeed, hesitation, indecision, and casualty-phobia were hallmarks of the Clinton administration’s approach to using force, with force protection becoming an obsession to the point of trumping any other mission.⁹ The Vietnam syndrome remained alive and well in the first administration led by a president for whom the Vietnam War was the primary foreign-policy referent experience.

Hesitation, indecision, and casualty-phobia were notably absent in the George W. Bush administration’s approach to its war with Iraq. The president and his foreign-policy principals, with the prominent exception of

Secretary of State Powell, seemed positively eager for a war to bring down Saddam Hussein even though administration spokesmen conceded that Iraq had nothing to do with the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11. The administration believed that the Baathist regime in Baghdad had chemical and biological weapons, was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, and was prepared to transfer WMDs to terrorist organizations or even use them directly against the United States or its Middle Eastern allies. The White House portrayed Saddam Hussein as an undeterrable madman who had to be removed before he acquired nuclear weapons.

But the objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would not be confined to Iraq's disarmament and Saddam Hussein's removal. A stable democracy that would serve as a model for the rest of the Middle East was to be established in Iraq. It remains unclear how the administration believed such a revolutionary political objective could and would be achieved in a Middle Eastern "Yugoslavia" of deep sectarian divisions and a history of nothing but tyrannical rule. The neoconservatives who supplied the intellectual rationale for the Iraq War apparently believed that democracy would naturally arise once the Baathist regime had been destroyed.

What *is* clear is that OIF violated key tenets of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. First, Saddam Hussein in 2003 arguably threatened no vital US interest. The fact that he turned out to have no WMDs misses the point: even had he possessed nuclear weapons, there is no convincing evidence that he would have been undeterrable, i.e., immune to the grim logic of nuclear deterrence. He always loved himself more than he hated the United States, and while he had used chemical weapons against *helpless* enemies (Iranian infantry and Kurdish villagers), he never used them against enemies capable of devastating nuclear retaliation (Israel and the United States during the Gulf War). Interestingly, in January 2000 Condoleezza Rice wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in which she declared, with respect to Iraq and other "rogue" states, that "the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMDs, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration." She also said that rogue states "were living on borrowed time" and that "there should be no sense of panic about them."¹⁰ Moreover, no expert on Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime believed that he would transfer WMDs to any organization he could not control, especially to a terrorist organization that regarded the Iraqi dictator as a secular "apostate," and even were he prepared to do so, he

could never be sure that such a transfer would escape American detection and retaliation.¹¹ A moral and even a legal case could have been made for OIF, but not a strategic one. Indeed, some have argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, by providing a new recruiting and training ground for al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations and by creating breathtaking new opportunities for the advancement of Iranian imperial and ideological ambitions in the Persian Gulf, have established a new threat to vital US security interests where none existed before.¹²

Second, it is clear, at least to almost every observer without a vested interest in defending the administration's implementation of OIF, that the amount of force employed in OIF was insufficient to establish and maintain the stability necessary to create a new political order in Iraq. The Powell injunction to go in overwhelmingly and decisively and the Weinberger warning to continually reassess the relationship between objectives and committed force were simply ignored by an administration which believed that relatively small, "transformed" forces could accomplish American ends in Iraq. Rejected were warnings from military professionals, such as Army chief of staff Eric Shinseki, that phase-four operations in Iraq might require two, even three, times the force actually committed. The Defense Department's civilian leadership apparently could not imagine that it would require more force to stabilize post-Baathist Iraq than it would to defeat the Baathist regime. Even as the unexpected insurgency arose and sectarian violence spread, there was no serious reassessment of force size; only after Donald Rumsfeld was replaced as secretary of defense by Robert Gates in late 2006 did President Bush announce a modest increase in US force deployments to stabilize Baghdad.

Powell himself was in a most unenviable position. He was a "realist" secretary of state serving a neoconservative "idealist" foreign policy that was propelling the United States into precisely the kind of political-military endgame in Iraq that both he as JCS chairman and Pres. George H. W. Bush had emphatically rejected in 1991. The 9/11 attacks did not convince him that Saddam Hussein posed an unacceptable threat to the United States. "Iraq isn't going anywhere," he told an interviewer a week after the attacks. "It's in a fairly weakened state. It's doing some things we don't like. We'll continue to contain it."¹³ He did not believe the attacks had suddenly established the conversion of Iraq into a democracy as a vital US interest. And as planning for OIF proceeded, Powell was increasingly concerned over what he regarded as an undersized invasion force. He later recalled

that he was “always uneasy about the low numbers . . . [the Pentagon’s civilian leaders] were making up for mass with technology and speed and cleverness and special operations,” assuming that what they did in Afghanistan they could repeat in Iraq.¹⁴ He made several telephone calls to the US Central Command’s commander, Gen Tommy Franks, “questioning the force numbers and the length of the supply and communications lines.”¹⁵ And Powell later remembered telling the president before the launch of OIF that “when you hit this thing, it’s like a crystal glass. . . . It’s going to shatter. There will be no government. There will be civil disorder. . . . I said to him, ‘You break it, you own it. You’re going to own it. You’re not going to have a government . . . not a civil society. You’ll have twenty-five million Iraqis standing around looking at each other.’ ”¹⁶

Though it is far from self-evident that an invasion force several hundred thousand strong would have succeeded in establishing the stability prerequisite for Iraq’s political reconstruction, no OIF issue has drawn more fire from war opponents and proponents alike than the issue of *underwhelming* force.¹⁷ In the Gulf War of 1991, an attacking force three times the size of the OIF force was employed to achieve the very limited objective of driving Iraqi forces out of tiny Kuwait; 12 years later, in contrast, a comparatively small force was employed on behalf of the much more ambitious objective of seizing control of all of Iraq and providing the security necessary for that country’s political transformation. The result in 1991 was a quick and cheap victory. The result in 2003 was the beginning of a costly, protracted, open-ended, and unpopular war that could culminate in a humiliating US withdrawal, Iraq’s political disintegration, or both.

Third, whatever reasonable assurance of public and congressional support might have attended the run-up of OIF, it has long since evaporated. Failure to discover either Iraqi WMDs or a collaborative relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, the rise of an unexpected insurgency and ethno-sectarian violence, and the evident inability of the Bush administration to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion more than four years after it launched OIF have combined to steadily sap public and congressional support for what most Americans now believe is a mistaken war. The November 2006 congressional elections, in which the Democrats regained control of both the House and the Senate, were widely regarded as a referendum on the Bush administration’s handling of the war in Iraq.

Comparisons with the unpopular Korean and Vietnam Wars are revealing. According to an assessment published in December 2005 by John Mueller, an expert in wartime American opinion, "The only thing remarkable about the current war in Iraq is how precipitously American public support has dropped off. Casualty for casualty, support has declined far more quickly than it did during either the Korean War or the Vietnam War. And if history is any indication, there is little the Bush administration can do to reverse this decline."¹⁸ Mueller was pessimistic about prospects for US success in Iraq, as was a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in January 2007. "In effect, the United States created an instant failed state [in Iraq], and clambering out of that condition would be difficult in the best of circumstances," contended Mueller.¹⁹ A key judgment of the NIE was that "Iraqi society's growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism." The NIE further judged that "the term 'civil war' accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements."²⁰ Mueller also predicted the emergence of an "Iraq syndrome."

In the wake of the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the American public developed a strong aversion to embarking on such ventures again. A similar sentiment—an "Iraq syndrome"—seems to be developing now, and it will have important consequences for U.S. foreign policy for years after the last American battalion leaves Iraqi soil.

There will likely be growing skepticism about various key notions: that the United States should take unilateral military action to correct situations or overthrow regimes it considers reprehensible but that provide no immediate threat to it, that it can and should forcibly bring democracy to other nations not now so blessed, that it has the duty to rid the world of evil, that having by far the largest defense budget in the world is necessary and broadly beneficial, [and] that international cooperation is only of limited value. . . . The United States may also become more inclined to seek international cooperation, sometimes showing even signs of humility.²¹

But the impact of the Iraq War is likely to extend well beyond a sharp diminution of neoconservative influence on US foreign policy. It is probable that neoconservatism, which never appreciated the limits of American public tolerance for costly foreign-policy activism—especially the kind of activism that serves up bloody, failed military interventions—will be

replaced by a return to the “realist” approach to foreign policy that characterized the Richard M. Nixon and George H. W. Bush administrations. Interests, not values, will become the primary driver for considerations of threatened and actual use of force, and the Iraq War will cast a dark shadow over any presidential contemplation of major war. Presidents will find it much more difficult to sell any military action that conceivably could enmesh the United States in a foreign internal war. Almost certainly there will be, as there was in the decades after Vietnam, an extreme reluctance to commit US ground forces to combat and a corollary emphasis on substituting local surrogates for US soldiers and Marines. There will be renewed focus on training and equipping foreigners (and private military companies) to do our ground fighting for us. As was the case with the Nixon Doctrine, endangered allies and friends will be expected to bear the main burden of ground combat, with the United States playing naval and air roles. Indeed, there may well be a US budgetary reemphasis of air and naval power at the expense of ground power, though present plans call for the expansion of the US Army and Marines Corps by a total of 92,000 personnel, an expansion to be taken in significant measure out of the hides of the US Air Force and Navy.²²

This may be a mistake. But for the Iraq War, there would be no need for larger US ground forces, and the planned increases in the ground forces budgets could be applied to the overdue recapitalization of the Navy and the Air Force. Indeed, post-Iraq War ground force requirements, especially for heavy armored and mechanized infantry forces, may be considerably less than prewar requirements. The primary rationale for those forces disappeared with the Soviet Union and the shift of the Korean military balance against the North in terms of Pyongyang’s capacity to reunify Korea by force (and to even feed its people). Heavy ground forces would be of little or no utility in a war with China, and a war to block Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons almost certainly would be waged by naval, air, and (if on the ground) special operations forces.

The solution to the severely stressed US Army and Marine Corps is termination of American involvement in the Iraq War. Expanding the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 people on the eve of an era in which the White House and Capitol Hill are likely to be exceptionally skittish about authorizing major ground-combat operations makes no long-run strategic sense. Effective counterinsurgency is a voracious consumer of ground troops, and what are the chances of the United States, in the wake

of the Iraq War, jumping into another large counterinsurgent war? The Army has traditionally despised the counterinsurgency mission; it refused to practice it in Vietnam and dropped any interest in it after that war.²³ And what are the odds that it will stay interested in the mission once it leaves Iraq? The embrace of the mission by a small number of gifted Iraq War veterans and the development of an impressive new field manual on counterinsurgency are certainly no guarantees of persistent institutional Army interest beyond the end of the Iraq War. Indeed, a strong case can be made that America's strategic culture is so hostile to the requirements of successful counterinsurgency that the United States should adopt a policy of deliberate avoidance of counterinsurgent interventions.²⁴

Whether the Iraq War will prompt a future secretary of defense—or president—to proclaim a new, more restrictive use-of-force doctrine remains to be seen. Such a doctrine almost certainly would look back to the tenets of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. Its influence, however, would be problematic. Presidents may listen to public opinion, but they are free to disregard professional military judgments on when and how to use force; Bill Clinton led a very reluctant military into politically messy interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. So too are secretaries of defense free to ignore military advice; Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld were notorious for doing so.

More to the point, a close examination of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine reveals key weaknesses. The first is the absence of any operational definition of *vital interest*. *Vital* means life-sustaining, and the farther discussion ranges from the protection of the American homeland the more contentious it becomes. Making matters worse is the presidential addiction to selling all wars as vital. Every major US combat intervention overseas since 1945 has been attended by White House declarations of the presence of threatened vital interests. Presidents are politically compelled to bill wars of choice as wars of necessity—even though every war the United States has waged since V-J Day, with the sole exception of the war against al-Qaeda, has been a war of choice. Additionally, one of the hallmarks of being a great power is a willingness to fight for less-than-vital interests. Most wars that engage great-power participation are wars fought with limited forces for limited objectives on foreign territory against enemies posing no threat to the great power's homeland. Great powers have waged such wars to acquire and defend colonial possessions, punish aggression,

suppress rebellion, halt genocide, overthrow foreign governments, protect economic investments, and maintain their reputations for using force.

Second, while clarity of military and political aims is indispensable to successful military intervention, it is certainly no guarantee of success. War aims, moreover, are hostage to the course of hostilities. More often than not, states end wars with aims different or additional to the ones with which they started. (This is certainly true for the losers.) Only rarely do prewar exit strategies get implemented. The United States fought the last two years of the Korean War to prevent the forcible repatriation of Chinese Communist prisoners of war, a war aim it could not possibly have foreseen when it decided to fight in Korea. In circumstances of multiple war aims, success may attend some while eluding others. What does victory in Iraq mean? Elimination of the Baathist regime? Establishment of a stable democracy? Prevention of Iraq's ethno-sectarian disintegration? Withdrawal of US forces? Simply declaring success? (The Nixon administration cut American losses in Indochina via a "peace with honor" that set up South Vietnam for inevitable conquest by North Vietnam.)

Third, there are extraordinary circumstances in which war should be an early rather than a last resort. Surely, the great strategic lesson of the 1930s is that early military action is far more preferable than a last-resort use of force against that very rare, powerful enemy who is both politically unappeasable and militarily undeterrable. War against Iraq in 2003 would have been strategically justifiable had Iraq been as powerful as Nazi Germany and had Saddam Hussein been undeterred by America's conventional military power and nuclear arsenal. War, moreover, is not the only use of military power. The mere presence of force can effectively deter, and threatened force can forestall its actual use. To view the use of force as a substitute for diplomacy is to see military victory as the object of war rather than as the achievement of the political ends for which war is waged. Frederick the Great got it right: "Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments."²⁵

Fourth, assured public support at the beginning of an overseas military intervention can weaken, even evaporate, in the event of military stalemate or defeat. Public support for war was strong at the beginning of the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq conflicts, but declined dramatically over time as American casualties continued to be incurred without any apparent progress toward a satisfactory conclusion of hostilities. Sustaining American domestic political support for a war is possible as long as public opinion continues to regard the stakes at hand as worth fighting for and

as long as it is persuaded that military action is moving toward the fulfillment of the war's objectives. Support is endangered when public opinion begins to perceive that the war's costs outweigh the value of its intended benefits. The American body politic has limited tolerance for prolonged, costly, indecisive wars—which is precisely why such wars are the preferred choices of America's enemies.

This brings us to the fifth and perhaps most important point: Massive, rapid, and decisive use of force is rare except against the weakest and dumbest of enemies. It was rare even in the age of great-power warfare; not even Germany's spectacular operational campaigns against France and the Low Countries in 1940 and against the Soviet Union in 1941 delivered strategic victory. Massive, rapid, and decisive use of force is virtually impossible in a world of limited and politically messy wars, in a global environment in which nonstate enemies practice protracted irregular warfare as a means of negating the potential effectiveness of America's conventional military supremacy. No US enemy in his right mind is going to set himself up for the kind of defeat the United States inflicted on the Iraqi army in Kuwait in 1991.

The Chinese in Korea, the Vietnamese Communists in Indochina, the Sunni Arab insurgents in Iraq, and al-Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide all have one thing in common: they understood and understand that they cannot defeat the United States militarily, but that it is possible to defeat America's political will via the combination of time and unconventionality of violence. The fate of American interventions in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq validates the continuing utility of protracted irregular warfare against the United States. Historian Geoffrey Perret believes that the "age of armed intervention is over for the United States. Unable to play its ace—the ability to fight and win a major war—it will no longer be feared. No developing country needs nuclear weapons now to defeat the United States. The distribution of assault weapons and explosives and the creation of an embryonic network of insurgents will do the job at much lower cost."²⁶ Retired British general Rupert Smith, a veteran of protracted wars against irregular enemies, goes further:

War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world—most noticeably, but not only, in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Palestinian territories—and states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most noncombatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.²⁷

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is a nostalgic yearning for the days when wars were wars (and men were men); when states fought each other force-on-force in open battle; when progress could be measured by divisions destroyed, factories bombed, and territory taken; and when the enemy's unconditional surrender could be sought and obtained. It has very limited relevance in a world in which intrastate wars and transnational terrorism have replaced interstate warfare as the primary threat to US security. America's very acquisition of conventional military supremacy has become its own worst enemy by compelling America's enemies to embrace strategies and tactics denying that supremacy decisive effectiveness. As Adrian Lewis has observed in his magisterial *The American Culture of War*,

Weinberger's theory . . . postulated a black and white world with nothing in between. There were only two conditions—war and peace, victory or defeat. Hence, given the logic of this position, the Eighth Army in Korea would have had to complete the destruction of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in North Korea, and advanced to the Yalu, and to do this America would have had to use nuclear weapons. . . . The Weinberger doctrine meant no war or more total war.²⁸

(And, in fact, Weinberger believed that President Truman was “seriously wrong . . . to limit General Douglas MacArthur's freedom of movement in Korea” and to reprimand the general for “going too far.”²⁹)

The doctrine is also a recipe and an excuse for inaction. Colin Powell opposed both US wars against Iraq and both interventions in the former Yugoslavia because, in his view, they entailed the risk of ensnaring his cherished US Army in another Vietnam. He had no such reservations about US intervention in Panama to overthrow the regime of Manuel Noriega—Panama was a tiny banana republic with no army, overwhelming force was available, and the intervention passed all of the Weinberger tests (protection of US military personnel and their families from further murder and physical harassment in Panama by Noriega's goons formed an arguably vital interest). The problem of course is that the United States cannot restrict its use of force to bashing only helpless enemies. If it could, war itself would be virtually risk free. The United States cannot pick and choose its enemies, but in wars of choice if not those of necessity, it must pick and choose if, when, where, and how it will use force.

The experience of the Iraq War almost certainly will diminish America's appetite for the kind of interventionist military activism that has characterized post-Cold War US foreign policy, especially during the George W. Bush administration. One hopes that it will also alert future presidents

and other foreign-policy decision makers to the limits of America's military power, especially when it comes to effecting fundamental political change abroad. The United States is hardly the first great power to incur the penalties of military overconfidence, and it must come to recognize how truly unique were the circumstances that delivered America's total victory of 1945 and subsequent political transformation of Germany and Japan. What has happened to the United States in Iraq mandates greater caution and selectivity in using force as well as greater attention paid to the potential unintended repercussions of military action. The Iraq War has revealed the dangers of worst-casing threats while best-casing intervention's costs and consequences.

Future enemies undoubtedly will attempt to lure us into fighting the kind of indecisive, protracted, and politically messy wars into which we stumbled in Vietnam and Iraq. But if such wars are, for the United States, wars of choice rather than wars of necessity, we should think more than twice before entering them. ❧

Notes

1. Excerpts from the Weinberger speech appearing in the above and following paragraphs are drawn from "The Uses of Military Power," speech before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984, reprinted in Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 329–35.

2. Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 194–201.

3. Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 148.

4. Colin Powell, speech at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, 27 May 1991, quoted in DeYoung, *Soldier*, 210.

5. Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*, 149.

6. Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 38–40.

7. Powell with Persico, *My American Journey*, 527.

8. Jeffrey Record, *Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to Use Force*, Occasional Paper no. 8 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, May 1999).

9. Jeffrey Record, "Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions," *Aerospace Power Journal* 14, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 4–11.

10. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 61.

11. Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 45–63.

12. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terrorism* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004); and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terrorism and a Strategy for Getting It Right* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
13. DeYoung, *Soldier*, 376.
14. *Ibid.*, 394.
15. *Ibid.*, 426.
16. *Ibid.*, 401–2.
17. See David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2005).
18. John Mueller, "The Iraq Syndrome," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 44.
19. *Ibid.*, 50.
20. National Intelligence Estimate, *Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, January 2007).
21. Mueller, "Iraq Syndrome," 44, 53–54.
22. The proposed fiscal year 2008 defense budget increases the proportion of overall defense spending that would go to the Army from 25.4 to 27 percent and the Marine Corps from 3.7 to 4.3, while lowering that for the Navy from 25.5 to 24.8 and the Air Force from 29.7 to 28.2. See Ann Scott Tyson, "Bush's Defense Budget Biggest since Reagan Era," *Washington Post*, 6 February 2007.
23. Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
24. Jeffrey Record, *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency*, Cato Institute Policy Analysis Paper no. 577 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1 September 2006).
25. Quoted in Robert Debs Heintz Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 88.
26. Geoffrey Perret, *Commander in Chief: How Truman, Johnson, and Bush Turned a Presidential Power into a Threat to America's Future* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 389.
27. Gen Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 3.
28. Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 309.
29. Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 8.

Through the Glass Darkly

The Unlikely Demise of Great-Power War

James Wood Forsyth Jr.
Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF

As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want.

—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
9 December 2004

THE FORMER secretary of defense's comment about the state of armored vehicles in Iraq captures a critical, if sometimes forgotten, truth about the future force structure of the US military: the choices we make today affect how the nation will fight tomorrow. Additionally, radical changes in the structure of the armed forces could influence the types of adversaries the United States would be willing to confront in the future. In the face of the ongoing struggle in Iraq it is easy to lose sight of these truths and, instead, focus on the immediate situation. Nonetheless, hidden among contemporary arguments about numbers of troops or types of weapons needed to fight and win a counterinsurgency are unexamined ideas about the nature and future of warfare, and while it is impossible to predict with certainty the nature of a specific future conflict, it is possible to understand the assumptions that underlie such visions.¹

In fact, much of what we read and hear about the future of war rests on a belief that tomorrow will be a repeat of today. That is, small numbers of highly deadly, very capable US forces will take on smaller, largely out-

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gunned opponents either in conventional combat or in battles with terrorists or insurgents. There is truth to these observations, but they might be truer if the caveat "for the time being" had been added. The truth is, we cannot bet on fighting only today's enemy in the future, particularly when we extend the future out 25 or 50 years. What we do know about the future is that states have often misgauged it. We are told, for example, that there is no finer example than that of Great Britain in the nineteenth century. A force of just 331,000 and a budget that amounted to only 2.4 percent of the British gross national product (GNP) "safeguarded an empire that covered 25 percent of the globe."² Yet, by focusing on such operations the British neglected the challenges of fighting a great power and helped invite German aggression in 1914 and 1939 at a staggering cost.³ The same might be happening today. As analysts continue to focus on the challenges posed by terrorists and insurgents, they overlook or downplay a real danger that might lie ahead: namely, war among the great powers. The zeitgeist of our day tells us that great-power war is dead, but is it really?

Before answering that question, it is important to stress that the demise of great-power war is morally uplifting, which is why it appeals to the "better angels of our nature." Even within military circles, where hard-headed analysis is the order of the day, a heady consensus has emerged around the notion that war has changed. In *The Pentagon's New Map*, a book widely read both by insiders at the Pentagon and the general public, Thomas Barnett argues that "big wars are out, small wars are in." He even goes so far as to conclude that "state-on-state war has gone the way of the dinosaur."⁴ Similarly, Thomas Hammes in *The Sling and the Stone* makes the case that the "strategic concepts, operational execution, and tactical techniques of fourth-generation warfare require major changes in the way we think" about war and peace.⁵ This view of war, which is closer in comparison to a giant versus a pygmy than a new way of war, incorrectly and dangerously assumes away the potential of great-power wars in the future. Moreover, these authors seem to believe that the United States will remain, for an indefinite period of time, hegemonic. The idea of hegemony is an old one, but the term can be misleading. Generally, it is used to describe the state most capable, in terms of economic and military strength, to organize relations among other states. This does not mean, however, that this state can do all it wants all of the time; no state can do that. That the United States carries wide sway over events throughout the world is not the same as saying that it is a global hegemon. True global hegemony

is hard to come by. The Ancient Greeks were certainly hegemonic in their relatively small region of the world. The Romans were, too, on a much grander scale. Even Britain enjoyed wide latitude in the comings and goings of other nations, yet it could not get its way within the rebellious American colonies. From 1776 to 1783, Britain's primary military problem remained how to conquer a country as vast as North America without engaging in a vaster military and economic campaign that was beyond her logistical and manpower capacities to sustain.⁶ With an ongoing war in the Middle East, one sees similarities with the United States. No doubt, the United States enjoys regional hegemony with a docile Canada to its north and a complacent Mexico to its south. However, even this hegemony is relative as recent events in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America attest. The uncomfortable fact is that American leadership is not as attractive or as powerful as we once thought.

Nonetheless, throughout the world, the idea of a great-power war occurring anytime soon, or even at all, seems anachronistic. After some 60 years of peace, European nations, especially Germany and France, are intent on building a more united, peaceful Europe.⁷ In Asia, though the rifts between China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan exist, the current prospects for large-scale war appear to be remote.⁸ Within the United States, the idea of fighting a large-scale war seems equally farfetched; here, talk of a peer competitor draws mockery from some and scorn from others.⁹ By most accounts, great-power war is unthinkable, but is it really? And, if so, what evidence exists to support such a strong claim? It is important to be clear—many of the arguments presented here are not new. Indeed, most have a long history within the study of history and international politics and are familiar to academic specialists in these fields. In light of claims being discussed today, however, it is important for generalists to be as equally familiar, and it is to that end that we take up our task.

Typically, the arguments used to consign great-power war to the dustbin of history rest on a cosmology of interrelated and highly optimistic assumptions regarding the relationship among technology, economics, democracy, norms, and military affairs. It is important to stress that these ideas are not just academic musings. They have already taken hold and form the backbone of the United States' transformation efforts—a set of reforms that have influenced policy decisions, which will affect the nation for years to come—launching what one analyst calls a “radical restructuring of US defense policy that is neither necessary nor desirable.”¹⁰ The necessity or desire

to transform America's military ultimately rests with policy makers, but it is high time that scholars question what can only be described as a wellspring of belief that the era of great-power war has ended, lest we find ourselves going to war with a military that we do not want.

This examination is divided into five sections. The first considers the events of September 11 and the effects that they did *and* did not have on international politics. The second looks at the relationship between technology and deterrence. The third section focuses on the supposed pacifying effect of economics on state behavior, while the fourth does the same for democracy. The final section considers the trendy notion that great-power war is going the way of slavery—that is, war is becoming normatively prohibited. At the outset we should be clear—the question is not whether technology, economics, democracy, or ethical norms put a brake on war. In some cases they do. Rather the issue is, does any one of these make great-power war unthinkable? In the end, while all of these arguments remain appealing in theory, in practice they are at best optimistic; at their worst they are unrealistic.

September 11 and International Politics

“We’re living in a whole new world,” is the central claim of those who tout the idea that the attacks of September 11 changed international politics.¹¹ Yet, to claim that the world has changed is not particularly illuminating. Instead, one must show *how* the world has changed. There is no doubt that we are living in a different world. With the Cold War over, we have seen an end to superpower rivalry. The conclusion of this 50-year standoff has had a pronounced effect on international politics. By radically altering the balance of power, and hence the balance of both nuclear and conventional forces, the ending of the Cold War produced systemic effects which made the world less vulnerable to catastrophic nuclear war. On the other hand, the attacks that brought down the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon killed thousands, but they did not change the balance of power, nor have they dramatically increased the possibilities of another catastrophic attack. True, these events opened the eyes of the world to the possibility of terror attacks, but they have been with us for a long time and are not likely to disappear anytime soon. Interestingly, however, the ending of the Cold War helped create the conditions necessary to set in motion the kinds of terror attacks we have recently witnessed and

are primarily concerned with. As a vast portion of Central Asia crawled out from under Soviet domination, strategic pockets opened, allowing those like Osama bin Laden to rush in. It is important to note that the same systemic effects that reduced the chance of nuclear war between the superpowers have increased the likelihood of terror attacks elsewhere.

This is not to say that the events of September 11 have had no effect. The acts shocked much of the world, and states have altered many aspects of the way they do business. Neither domestic nor international travel may ever be the same again. Likewise, concerns over homeland security will affect—and even dominate—citizens' behavior over the coming years. But while changes in travel and homeland security may dominate political discourse in the short term, it is war—or more specifically the threat of great-power war—that could prove to be the biggest danger in the years ahead. Why? Because at the end of the day, the world is still made up of states, large and small, that must look out for themselves. In such a world, where there is no world government to protect states from the harmful intentions of others, survival is the name of the game, and nothing has threatened the survival of states more than great-power war.¹²

In the past 200 years great-power war has decimated empires, laid waste to countries, and claimed over 60 million lives with an unmatched ferocity. All told, Napoleon's wars and the Crimean, Franco-Prussian, and Russo-Turkish wars claimed perhaps two to three million combatants. This, while significant, pales in comparison to the nine million soldiers and untold millions of civilians who died as a result of World War I, or the 50 million men, women, and children who perished in World War II. In Korea, the world's first limited great-power war in the nuclear age, nearly three million fell in the shadows of the superpowers. All of these are colossal numbers by today's standards. For example, 625 people died as a result of international terrorism in 2003; 35 were Americans. This figure is less than the 725 killed during 2002.¹³ It should be clear, terrorism is a weapon of the weak, and as these numbers indicate, terrorists have incredible will but not incredible power. Until such time as terrorists can match the power of the state, the biggest dangers in the world will continue to stem from the strongest powers, the smallest from the weaker ones. This is not meant to downplay the importance of deterring acts of terror or stopping terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The thought of Osama bin Laden with WMDs is truly terrifying. It is important to point out, however, that should the day come when terrorists like bin Laden gain access to WMDs,

they will, in all likelihood, acquire them from men or women who live in states. Despite arguments to the contrary, states remain important actors in international life because they monopolize the most destructive power in the world. Although the events of September 11 shocked the world and changed some of the ways in which states do business, they have done little to alter the nature of international politics and virtually nothing to reduce the likelihood of great-power war.

Technology Will Not Deter Great-Power War

Another line of reasoning suggesting that great-power war is a thing of the past often begins with a statement asserting that improved methods of waging war have created unbearable costs, the likes of which we have never seen.¹⁴ Furthermore, these costs are unambiguous and transparent, clear to everyone with any interest in aggression. No doubt, technological shifts have continuously altered the methods of war—the machine gun, the submarine, and the airplane changed the way of war, and nuclear weapons, some argue, raised both the psychological and physical costs of war to a level most states are unwilling to pay. There is truth to these observations. Nuclear weapons contributed to the long peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What is often overlooked, however, is that nuclear weapons also gave the superpowers many opportunities to vent their aggressions, including the practice of coercive diplomacy, military interventions, and proxy wars.¹⁵ Yet, deterrence held. Why?

Although nuclear weapons played a role in keeping the superpowers in check, political arrangements, the by-product of the distribution of nuclear power among the two key protagonists, also loomed large.¹⁶ Deterrence was also simplified because there were essentially only two players in the game.¹⁷ The superpowers could accurately gauge each other's responses and calculate risks more easily because they only had to focus on each other. While there were plenty of other problems to contend with, at the end of the day policy makers only had to truly worry about the actions of one state. There was no third superpower to appeal to, no balancer capable of reconciling differences. In short, bipolarity increased the freedom of action between the superpowers, enabling them to balance against one another and making it clear what the other side was doing.¹⁸ That nuclear weapons sustained the

Cold War peace is not denied here, but, in the end, the political structure that resulted from them mattered more than the weapons themselves.

Although nuclear weapons are no longer the centerpiece of deterrence, there are those who still insist weapons matter more than political arrangements and who put their faith in technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs.¹⁹ Improvements in information, precision, and stealth have increased the ability to use force in an offensive manner and at a reasonable cost. During the Gulf War, the F-117A fighter-bomber flew only 2 percent of US sorties but accounted for 40 percent of the damage done to strategic targets. Furthermore, the F-117's effectiveness vastly exceeded other aircraft. For example, F-111Es using unguided Mk-82 bombs destroyed two targets in 12 sorties with 168 bombs, while F-117s struck 26 targets in their 12 sorties with 28 precision-guided weapons.²⁰ In Afghanistan, the introduction of US airpower, together with special operations forces troops on the ground, tipped the scales in favor of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, breaking up a brutal and wasteful stalemate on the battlefield that had great similarity to the trenches of WWI. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, precision attacks pummeled Iraqi Republican Guard tank divisions as they tried to move under the cover of a blinding sandstorm.²¹

These are remarkable results by any standard, but a more pressing concern ought to be whether advanced conventional technologies produce the kinds of political structures necessary to enhance deterrence.²² That is an open and important question. On the one hand, one might conclude that the United States has already achieved conventional deterrence, evidenced by the fact that no state appears to be seriously thinking of attacking the United States, at least conventionally. Indeed, the entire asymmetric debate runs on this logic. However, there is every reason to believe that advanced conventional technologies, by themselves, are not as stabilizing as nuclear weapons and, therefore, may not enhance deterrence. Indeed, as conventional weapons become stealthier, deterrence may become more difficult. For example, the emphasis on speed and lethality, which are only two characteristics of advanced conventional weapons, may decrease the likelihood of escalation break points which would allow time for an enemy to reconsider its actions and, perhaps, back down. Lightning-fast communications technologies only further complicate matters because they heighten the expectation that something can and, therefore, must be done instantly. In short, because of their offensive nature, advanced technologies

may complicate diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflicts short of war, rendering their deterrent attributes irrelevant. In the end, political arrangements matter, and the deterrent effect of any weapon should be evaluated within the context of the structure of the international system.²³

Today, the international system seems to be transitioning from unipolarity to multipolarity, where three or more great powers will compete and contend. As the end of the Cold War reminds us, historic global change can come quickly but only somewhat predictably. That is, while history indicates that states will balance against one another, it offers little in the way of predicting when power transitions like the one that occurred in 1989 will take place. Who are the contenders that will shape the future of international politics? Germany and China are certainly candidates. With a population of 82 million and a GNP of 2.2 trillion dollars, Germany outstrips all of the other European powers. France is second with a population of 59 million and a GNP of 1.47 trillion dollars. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Russia all fall behind. In Asia, China is the rising power with a GNP of 1.18 trillion dollars and a population of 1.24 billion. If China managed to equal South Korea's per capita GNP, the Chinese GNP would be 10.6 trillion dollars. If it had just half of Japan's the figure would rise to 20.6 trillion, and if China's per capita equaled Japan's it would soar to 40.08 trillion. In short, China has the potential to surpass the United States, which leads the world with a GNP of 7.9 trillion dollars.²⁴ This is certainly not an exhaustive treatment of potential competitors, but it does indicate potential future trends.

As Germany and China continue to grow economically and expand their influence in Europe and Asia, security pressures may mount inside both countries. As they seek to make themselves more secure, they will likely consider expanding their military forces—which could, in turn, contribute to the insecurity of others. Contrary to optimistic assertions, the presence of new offensive, conventional technologies in such a world may not enhance deterrence. Why? As alluded to above, conventional weapons do not seem to produce the same deterrent effects as nuclear ones. Nuclear weapons, by their very nature, are so destructive everyone but the insane grasps their deterrent potential.²⁵ Further, as our experience with nuclear deterrence suggests, it is easier to achieve and enhance when there are fewer players in the game. Small numbers clarify relationships and, as a result, reduce the dangers of miscalculation and overreaction.²⁶

In such a world, states competing for power can do one of three things: build their own military forces to strengthen their relative position; add to their power through alliances; or withhold their power, thus weakening opponents. During the Cold War, the superpowers chose the first option and sought to maintain the balance by building up conventional and nuclear forces that could both fight and deter war. This is an expensive policy affordable to only the greatest of powers, which is why states, in a world of three or more great powers, often choose from options two and three and rely on alliances. In themselves, alliances are not a cause for alarm or a cause of war, but they do increase interdependence, decrease interaction opportunities among states, and increase the likelihood of wider wars should war come. Tight alliance systems, such as the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance mutual defense pacts that existed in Europe before World War I, are especially dangerous because they increase the incentives for preventive war which, while local at the outset, can spread quickly through the alliance structure.

Extending this logic to existing conditions today, we ought to expect an alliance structure to emerge that will balance against the United States. In fact, there are already signs of what some analysts are calling soft balancing.²⁷ Indeed, prior to the outbreak of Operation Iraqi Freedom, France, Germany, and Russia sought to balance against the United States using the most effective means available—the United Nations. In the future, China and Russia might cooperate with each other to check American power in Asia. Should that occur, India would, in all likelihood, grow even closer to the United States to check a Chinese–Russian-dominated South Asia. Should US forces leave Germany, a European security arrangement may emerge, which could potentially include Great Britain and the other European powers. However, should that fail to materialize, an equally likely scenario would be a German-Franco security pact, which could leave Britain vulnerable. Unless we are ready to make a collective leap of faith and assume that this vulnerability will always take the form of something other than coercive diplomacy or preventive attack, something we have seen in the past in this part of the world, the optimism that surrounds the hope that the alliances of today will extend into the future ought to be hedged.

It is also worth remembering that preventive war has long been feared among great powers. Less than 100 years ago, in 1914, with the rise of German power, the relative position of Britain and France declined. Ethnic tensions inside the Austro-Hungarian empire, stemming from Serbian nation-

alism, threatened the stability of that empire as well as of the alliance system itself. Responding to what was thought to be local pressures, Emperor Franz Joseph launched a preventive war against Serbia, which was believed would quell Serb nationalism. As a result, a seemingly local conflict erupted into the unthinkable and ushered in the twentieth century's first global war.

There is no compelling reason to believe that advances in conventional weapons technology can stop such slides to war. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States came perilously close to launching a preemptive strike against Cuba with the hopes of destroying Soviet nuclear missiles as well as halting Soviet aggression in the hemisphere. Had the crisis taken that trajectory, the Soviets might have followed with an attack on American bases in Turkey. Presumably, US forces would have responded, perhaps with a nuclear strike, and an all-out nuclear exchange could have resulted.²⁸ In October 1962, the great powers came close to world war despite the presence of nuclear weapons, which truly revolutionized military affairs. How was war avoided? President Kennedy chose a decidedly political option, electing to blockade Cuba rather than to invade or attack her. In effect, peace became an extension of politics. Certainly the fear of nuclear war tempered Kennedy's decision, but so did the ability to focus on only one adversary. Yet, the world still came close to a nuclear exchange.²⁹

Globalization Will Not Bring Eternal Peace

Some authors focus on technology for another reason—the growing interconnectedness commonly called globalization—and its peaceful attributes. Few issues have captured the attention of policy makers and pundits like globalization. During the Clinton years, the word *globalization* meant more than a mere shift in economic policies; it was transforming state relations and remaking international politics right before our very eyes. One cannot deny that globalization is occurring. Foreign trade, travel, and communication seem to be changing the world into an open, global trading bazaar for goods and services where war among the great powers appears less and less likely. But while international economics might be changing, international politics are not. The world remains an anarchic place where states must look out for themselves.

Economic interdependence does bring nations closer together, but interdependence does not seem to be capable of altering the basic nature of

international relations, which deals in the currency of politics, not economics. Globalists fail to see this because they misconstrue the relationship between peace and economics, or cause and effect. International peace, which is underwritten by the great powers, produces interdependence—and not the other way around.³⁰

Globalists have long argued that trade promotes peace. Norman Angell in *The Great Illusion* contended that economic interests would usurp political interests because the world of 1914 was becoming more prosperous and peaceful.³¹ Thomas Friedman in his national bestseller, *The World is Flat*, makes a similar case, believing that the world in which we are now living is tied together economically and electronically.³² Barnett makes the strongest argument, prophesying that “extending globalization’s rule sets lead ultimately to less violence” and that failing to do so “forfeits globalization’s promise of eternal peace.”³³ As lofty and appealing as these ideas might seem in theory, they have never worked in practice because interdependence has failed to produce peace. Instead, it has produced insecurity.

Consider Europe prior to World War I. Before that war, many believed that increases in trade, travel, and communication were making war improbable. A new cosmopolitanism—characterized by the universal language movement Esperanto—was transforming the old world into something new. This new world would be one characterized by an ever-increasing quality of life. Certainly the increase in trade among Britain, France, and Germany indicated a new interdependence.³⁴ In fact, global trading was the order of the day. According to one expert, “In relation to output, exports of both merchandise and capital reached volumes not seen again until the 1980s.”³⁵ Likewise, the technology of that time played a role as the steam engine, locomotive, and telegraph brought people closer together. But as increases in trade, travel, and communication increasingly intertwined Europeans, suspicions and antagonisms resulting from changes in the balance of power drove them further apart. In the end, the nations of Europe became more insecure as interdependencies tightened.

Germany’s experience illustrates this trend. In 1913, 44 percent of its foreign investment was in Europe. Yet, as Germany’s economy became more integrated with the rest of the continent, it became less secure. As it grew economically, it developed labor and capital shortages—helping to propel Germany to war. As late as 1911, Germany was drafting only 53 percent of its available candidates compared to France’s 84 percent.³⁶ Similarly, the cost of naval armaments strained Berlin’s ability to keep

pace with its ambitious arms buildup. The cost of three armored capital ships rose from 4.5 million marks in 1893 to 9.6 million in 1898, while France and Britain saw similar increases.³⁷ What was the result of all of this? Fear, as Germany could not muster the men it needed to fulfill its security requirements as laid out in the Schlieffen Plan. Interdependence did not make the Germans feel safer. The changes that came about inside Germany to ensure security—reliance on reserves, incentives to mobilize, offensive doctrines, and a deliberate exaggeration of rival states' capabilities—did not result in peace. Instead, they resulted in war. In this case, interdependence created perceived vulnerabilities. That a state gains in an economic transaction is never the issue. The issue is always who gains more.³⁸ In the case of Germany, while foreign investment grew, feelings of insecurity in relation to the other great powers rose as well.

In general, the relationship between interdependence and peace might be more apparent than real. On the eve of the Great War, the European economy was more integrated than ever before. Yet, war came. Why? Some think war was the result of nationalistic pressures mounting in the Balkans. Others argue that the war was a horrible mistake, a failure of leadership. Both are partially correct. However, the underlying cause of WWI was the changing nature of the balance of power, a shift that was exacerbated by the increasing interdependence of the great powers. Second, the idea that cosmopolitanism—a result of trade, travel, and communication—produces peace also seems to be incorrect. The cosmopolitanism that existed within Europe—along with the Esperanto movement—vanished as men raced off to answer their home states' calls for mobilization. Lastly, the idea that war results from ignorance or want is also misguided. While it is true that ignorant people fight wars and poor people fight wars, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is the well-educated, rich countries that have the resources and the power to wage the deadliest wars. What conclusions can be drawn? In 1914, war came to Europe in spite of high levels of economic interdependence. Today, as globalization continues to occur, it is appropriate to wonder if great-power war will find a way. If the past is any guide, interdependence, alone, cannot guarantee peace.

Democracies Will Not Guarantee Tranquility

A third reason cited by many who believe that war among the great powers is unthinkable has to do with democracy. Democracy has had an

impact on international life; it has both caused and effected the promotion of liberal capitalism. No doubt, democracy and free-market capitalism have taken hold of the world, and the apparent peace among the world's democratic states—both large and small—constitutes the “closest thing we might have to an empirical law of international behavior.”³⁹ Put simply, democracies do not fight one another. Why not?

Some believe domestic institutions guard against the bellicose behaviors of kings, emperors, or tyrants.⁴⁰ Democratic leaders, if for no other reason than self-preservation, tend to hedge against risky wars because their own fortunes are tied either to maintaining the status quo or assuring a victory, or both. Others are convinced that democratic states seem to prefer adjudication and bargaining to fighting.⁴¹ In short, it is not that liberal states would rather trade than invade, as interdependence theory suggests, it is that liberal leaders prefer to “jaw, jaw rather than war, war” as Churchill might have put it.

As compelling as both explanations might seem, neither captures the essence of great-power politics, and neither comes close to accurately describing what a democracy is like when it goes to war. Democracy, as George Kennan put it, fights in anger. Democracy “fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it—to teach it a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end.”⁴² Democracy also fights with vengeance, which is why democratic wars resemble crusades, characterized by unlimited means, ultimate ends, and popular calls for unconditional surrender.

Above all else, relations between democratic states are not by default peaceful because democracies are states, and all states, presumably, have interests, not the least of which is survival. It is difficult to imagine a world of states—be they democratic or otherwise—where the possibility of war does not exist and the need for military defenses is moot. When interests compete, as they tend to do, conflict arises—regardless of the form of government. War is the extension of that process. Thus, peace among the world's democracies may not, by default, last forever. Democracies have interests that will inevitably come in conflict with other democracies. In fact, contrary to proponents of the democratic-peace thesis, the list of wars among democracies is long. Depending on how one chooses to define democracy or war, or both, a case can be made that the War of 1812, the American Civil War, the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, and even World War II saw democracies fighting against other democracies.

Encouraging and supporting democracy is a noble goal and one that the United States will no doubt continue to pursue, but we should not hope that doing so will eliminate great-power war.

Norms Are Not Enough

Lastly, there are those who believe that the norms governing the acceptable behavior of states have made war untenable, comparing the change in norms about war to views towards slavery.⁴³ A great debate rages within the halls of academia regarding the role norms play in international politics.⁴⁴ Some think norms tame state behavior. Often attributed to institutions, which do lower transaction costs between states by establishing formal and informal sets of rules, norms are at work in nearly every area of international cooperation. From the environment to arms control, norms—not interests—explain why states strike bargains with one another. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is often cited as an example of an institution that provides both economic and military security for its members. The normative result of this arrangement is believed to be a peace-prone Europe. In sum, those who think war has become obsolete believe that war among the European powers is unthinkable not because of military capabilities, which are an essential element of deterrence, but because war is considered to be a “bad” thing. Others remain doubtful as to the power of institutions and norms, believing the structure of the international system dictates state behavior. For them, NATO, which was originally designed to halt Soviet aggression, remains intact because of US interests. Put simply, if the United States were to pull out, NATO would fold. Of course, the United States will not pull out because it wants to remain influential within Europe, which is why current plans call for reducing the number of US troops in Europe, not eliminating them altogether.

Essentially, the argument about norms is an argument about power and the role it plays in international life. Edward Hallet Carr observed, “While politics cannot be satisfactorily defined in terms of power, it is safe to say that power is always an essential element of politics.”⁴⁵ Thus, when states seek to cooperate with one another on issues like postal or transport services, they are working what can be called “nonpolitical” or “technical” issues. When, however, an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power of one state over another, the matter becomes political. In a very real way, those who advocate the importance of norms downplay the importance

of power. For norms to play the determining role in international politics would require a politics devoid of power. That is never the case. All politics, as Carr argued beautifully in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, are power politics.

Nonetheless, those who argue for the importance of norms to stop war often use the analogy of the disappearance of slavery because it became normatively wrong. This argument, however, ignores the fact that slavery, at least within the United States, did not go away because it became normatively prohibited. Instead, it was smashed by a war that was as brutal as anything we have to compare it to. In effect, slavery went the way of other heinous political movements like Nazism. It was drawn and quartered by a liberating army that was led by an idiosyncratic general who risked the lives of his troops by marching them deep into enemy territory in order to right a wrong. This phenomenon has been described as war and moral statecraft, and it just might be the long-lasting legacy of democratic armies on the march.⁴⁶ Thus, contrary to those who argue that war serves no moral purpose, great-power war can and often does serve moral ends. The world would be a very different place had the Confederates or the Nazis won.⁴⁷

Moreover, norms offer no guarantees. Indeed, the analogy of slavery having become a norm that is observed rests on a selective and narrow view of the issue. Indeed, slavery still exists in the world today, as noted by the United States Department of State in its annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* to Congress: "This Report is intended to raise global awareness and spur foreign governments to take effective actions to counter all forms of trafficking in persons—a form of modern day slavery."⁴⁸ Certainly the idea of owning human chattel has acquired, at least in many countries, an opprobrium that was not the case 200 years ago. Yet, this norm has to be enforced through laws and the actions of people who will enforce those laws.

This last point strikes at the heart of a two-pronged problem with norms. As long as the world is made up primarily, though not exclusively, of states, where there is no world government to protect citizens from the evil intentions of others, states and statesmen must be on their guard. Clearly, the possibility for evil exists, and it is tragic that we needed the events of September 11 to remind us of this fact. Indeed, the number of tyrannical leaders throughout history is striking. Men like Attila, Alexander, Caesar, Napoléon, and Hitler had one thing in common: they were intent on dominating others. This leads to the conclusion that war among the great powers is not unimaginable. Indeed, the most pressing strategic

concern for the United States today is to figure out how it will live in a world where three or more great powers—one of which might be ruled by someone seeking to enslave or destroy us all—compete for influence in the international system.

Conclusions

The United States cannot prepare to put down any and all potential rivals. The costs of such an undertaking would quickly prove to be enormous, especially when domestic spending on programs like social security and Medicare are factored into the security equation. Over the long haul rivals will emerge, and there is little the United States can do except balance against them, as they will prepare to balance against us. In such a world, where states compete for power, one must be concerned with survival. That being the case, it is worth remembering that the most serious threats to the great powers have historically stemmed from other great powers. In the years ahead, as strong challengers emerge, conflicts will arise, making war among the great powers more, not less, likely.⁴⁹

Contrary to popular belief, we are not living in a whole new world. The events of September 11 and the wars that have followed have had a pronounced effect on US foreign and defense policy, but they have not done away with the state system. The world is still made up of states that must look out for themselves. To pretend otherwise is to neglect history or to fall prey to presentism—something common among pundits but dangerous for statesmen and men and women of the armed forces. Historically, the most efficient and effective way to ensure state security is through military means. Thus, the importance of the balance of power, which exists to prevent one great power from dominating the rest, has not diminished. Instead, it has been reinvigorated as states are reminded of the need to defend themselves.

The implications of acknowledging the possibility of a great-power war are easier to grasp than to implement. Despite the urgency of the war in Iraq, we need to think seriously about what a great-power war would look like, how it could occur and be prevented, and how it would be fought so that we can gain some understanding about the equipment and forces needed to fight and win. The groundwork for the technologies needed for such a contest needs to be laid today. The difficulties in putting armor on vehicles for Iraq pale in comparison to creating the lead time and

resources needed to fight a great-power war. Failing to do so risks lives and jeopardizes US security goals.

This does not mean that we should ignore current threats or overlook the need to relieve misery and suffering around the world, what one strategist terms "minding the gap."⁵⁰ As citizens, we should be concerned with the political and human consequences of poverty, ecological degradation, and population growth. We must also fully address the problem of terrorism. But as real as the consequences of poverty, ecological degradation, population growth, and terrorism might be, it is hard to come up with a realistic scenario involving these tragedies that would alter the balance of power.⁵¹ Put simply, in an age of transformation, we cannot neglect the basics. Should the United States find itself in another great-power war, things that are taken for granted today, like air superiority or control of sea lanes, might come up short tomorrow. That technology, economics, democracy, and norms play a role in preventing great-power war is not the issue. The issue is whether they make it unthinkable. Regrettably, they do not, and because they do not, great-power war has a bright future, however tragic that might seem. ■■■

Notes

1. The authors would like to thank Steve Chiabotti, Kevin Holzhammer, Tom Hughes, J. T. LaSaine, Rich Muller, Jeff Record, Gary Schaub, and Hal Winton for their careful thoughts and suggestions.

2. Max Boot, "The Struggle to Transform the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 104.

3. *Ibid.*, 118.

4. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 271, *passim*. Barnett's theory and policy prescriptions are based on the idea that state warfare is extinct.

5. Col Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 5, *passim*.

6. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1976).

7. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), *passim*.

8. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44–79.

9. Within military circles, talk of great-power war has been subsumed by talk about terrorism and the Revolution in Military Affairs. In fact, one scours the professional literature in vain to find anything written on the possibility of great-power war. This is not surprising. As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach made clear, the study of international politics, and particularly security and defense studies, tends to reflect the spirit of their age. See Yale H. Ferguson and

Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988).

10. Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 4.

11. This theme reverberates throughout James Mann's discussion of the history of the Bush war cabinet. See James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004).

12. This is essentially a realist claim, and we are obviously sympathetic to it. There are many realist authors and many forms of realism. The classical argument begins with Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli. The theological argument is found in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield. Nicholas Sykeman and A. T. Mahan represent the geopolitics school. The modern account begins with Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and George Kennan. The English School is best represented in the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. The contemporary argument is found in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, John Herz, Robert Tucker, Robert Osgood, and John Mearsheimer.

13. It is difficult to obtain precise casualty figures for these wars. Counting battlefield deaths often proves problematic, and civilian deaths in great-power wars are even more difficult to compute. As just one example, there is no consensus on whether the deaths from the influenza epidemic in 1918–19 should be counted as part of the toll from World War I. The figures cited above come from a number of sources and represent generally agreed upon numbers: Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *World War I Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 273; I. C. B. Dear, general ed., *The Oxford Companion to World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 289–92; Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1997), 67–68; and Andre Corvisier, ed., *A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 463–71. For figures on terrorism deaths, see US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, annual report (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2004), 1, 180.

14. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995). Waltz argues that more nuclear weapons might be better for world stability. Sagan argues the opposite.

15. This is one of Sagan's most critical points.

16. This theme reverberates throughout Waltz's writings. However, he does distinguish between weapons and political structures. Again, see Sagan and Waltz, *Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 283. For other perspectives, see Stephan Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 54; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 44–45.

17. Although Waltz does contend nuclear weapons deter, his analysis centers on the structure of the international system. For the definitive account, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979). See also John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–56.

18. For the complete discussion, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 161–93.

19. For an optimistic account, see Adm Bill Owens with Edward Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). For a pessimistic account, see Biddle, *Military Power*.

20. John Orme, "The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity," *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 138–67.

21. Howard D. Belote, "Paralyzed or Pulverized? The Fall of the Republican Guard," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37 (April 2005): 40–45.

22. Deterrence, as Waltz has noted, is a policy formulated around the notion of compelling people not to do something. In international politics, deterrence frightens a state away from attacking, not because the attack itself might be difficult to carry out, but because the expected reaction of the opponent would result in one's own severe punishment. Contrary to those who might think of deterrence in terms of its rationality, successful deterrence policies rest on the assumption that an opponent is capable of reasoning.

23. Here it can be argued that the procurement of a weapon like the F-22 in a unipolar world would allow the United States to lock in its strategic advantage for some time to come. Thus, the debate about a weapon like the F-22 should not revolve around whether or not it should be fielded but what number is sufficient to ensure its deterrent effect.

24. John J. Mearshimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 397–98.

25. See Sagan and Waltz, *Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 98.

26. Mearshimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 343–44.

27. Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46–72. For criticism, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72–108.

28. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition (New York: Longman, 1999), 201.

29. For an account of America's early nuclear war fighting thinking, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

30. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 7.

31. Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage* (London: William Heinemann, 1910).

32. Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005).

33. Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map*, 82, 224.

34. David M. Rowe, "World War Economic Expansion and National Security," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 195–233.

35. Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 64.

36. Rowe, "World War Economic Expansion," *passim*.

37. *Ibid.*, 207. Rowe argues that costs rose due to the increased expense of new technological innovations, the higher cost of manufactured inputs and labor, and the desire for greater profits.

38. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 104–6.

39. Jack Levy makes this observation in "The Causes of War: A Review of the Evidence," in *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, eds. Phillip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilley (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

40. The literature on democracy and war is voluminous. For the philosophical argument, see Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts I and II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, nos. 3 and 4 (Summer/Fall 1983): 205–35, 323–53. For a quantitative

account, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 27–71. For an example of the structural account, see Clifton T. Morgan and Sally Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 187–221.

41. Similarly, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), as well as *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* with John Oneal (New York: The Norton Series in World Politics, 2001).

42. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 66.

43. For the strongest account, see John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also James Lee Ray, "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War," *International Organization* 3 (Winter 1989): 405–39.

44. For an optimistic account, see Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39–51. For a pessimistic account, see John J. Mearshimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49.

45. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1939).

46. Victor Davis Hanson, *The Soul of Battle* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

47. We are not suggesting that Southerners were the "same" as Nazis or that Confederate soldiers fought for what we might call "unjust" reasons. We are suggesting that the institution of slavery and National Socialism were evil, in the ordinary sense of the word. Moreover, evils such as these tend to increase the likelihood of war.

48. US Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, Publication 11252 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, June 2005), 5.

49. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1976); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

50. Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map*, passim.

51. The exception, of course, is a ballistic missile attack from a nonstate actor. Should, however, any actor—person, state, or otherwise—launch a nuclear missile at the United States, that actor would be targeted and destroyed. What is more, states know this in advance, which is why we will not see anything close to what asymmetric doomsayers claim.

Busting the Icon

Restoring Balance to the Influence of Clausewitz

Phillip S. Meilinger

If you train a man for war alone you are automatically training him for murder; but if you claim, in all sincerity, that you are training him to preserve peace you must train him to be a human being.

—Col-Gen Klaus Kahlenberge¹

MANY US military thinkers and practitioners have embraced a view of war that is out of touch with current circumstances—and, consequently, dangerous. This has a direct effect on the present global war on terror that is focused largely on Islamic extremists. There are two main problems. First, US military leaders—especially in the ground forces—continue to view war as a climactic, and usually bloody, clash of arms. “Muddy boots and bloody bayonets” and “occupation of territory” are the liturgies of these people, a maxim that current operations in Iraq against Muslim terrorists have shown to be increasingly bankrupt. In addition, the American military is culturally tone deaf. It does not sufficiently take into account the fundamentally distinct traditions, mores, behaviors, and beliefs of the people that we deal with around the world—especially those in Asia and the Middle East. These are not new problems, and the root of the military’s myopia is the continued infatuation with the ground-centric and Euro-centric ideas of Carl von Clausewitz.



Clausewitz has become an icon among military officers of all the services, and his ideas are taught in every war college, staff college, and service academy in the country. It is common for a military writer or briefer to begin or end an argument with a quote from Clausewitz, presumably lending the author/speaker an aura of credibility.

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We need to broaden our thinking. Clausewitz was a Prussian general who fought in the Napoleonic wars two centuries ago. Afterwards, he served as the director of the Prussian War Academy, where he wrote a number of historical and theoretical books. His most notable work was *On War*, universally considered the classic study of war.

There are several concepts that Clausewitz is justifiably famous for articulating. He warned all political and military leaders to understand first and foremost the kind of war upon which they were embarking. He stressed the importance of knowing in advance precisely what they wanted to achieve and how much they were willing to pay in blood and treasure to obtain it. At the same time, however, attempting to plan out exactly how a war or campaign would unfold was ludicrous. Nothing ever worked as intended. *Fog*—the unknowns and unknowables of the future; *friction*—the thousand little breakages, delays, and misunderstandings that impede and bedevil all activities; and *chance*—fate or luck, both good and bad, which crops up unexpectedly: all of these meant that it was impossible to plan a war strategy scientifically. (Paradoxically, military planners must nonetheless attempt to identify these imponderables and take them into account.)

Clausewitz also stressed the importance of psychological factors in war. He had just witnessed nationalistic wars and an outpouring of passion that had not been seen in Europe for generations. War had become a contest between peoples, not just princes. To help explain this phenomenon, he used the metaphor of a “remarkable trinity”—society (passion or “natural force”), the military (chance and probabilities), and a country’s government (reason)—that constantly interacted during the course of a war. It was necessary for a state to keep these three forces in some type of equilibrium.² Finally, Clausewitz emphasized the importance of focused energy. Commanders have many priorities to choose from when beginning a campaign. Therefore, it is essential that they think through the process of cause and effect: political objectives lead to military strategy which, in turn, leads to specific tasks/targets to be affected, struck, or neutralized.

These were not new ideas. But Clausewitz was seminal because he was the first to examine them rigorously and at length. There is a special value in being able to take ideas that have been circulating in the ether, analyze them, and then explain them to others. Clausewitz did that, and he did so quite well.

Still, *On War* is a difficult read, partly because it has come down to us as a work in progress. Only the first chapter of the first book (of a total of 125 chapters comprising eight books) did Clausewitz himself consider complete.

In truth, the unusual style (for us today) in which he wrote helps compound the confusion. In a format used by his countryman, the philosopher Immanuel Kant, Clausewitz began with a paradigm, in this case, of *ideal war*—war on paper. The ideal war tends to move towards the *absolute*, what today we might term *total war*. After describing this paradigm, he moved on, using what has been termed a *dialectic approach*—he contrasted this ideal war to that which actually occurs in practice. *Real war* is moderated by political goals, resources, chance, friction, and all the other impediments that affect war as it unfolds in the actual event. Yet, the wars that shaped Clausewitz's views were those of the Napoleonic era in which he was a participant. Those wars were as close to absolute—in their objectives sought and the means employed—as Europe had seen in nearly two centuries, and Clausewitz admitted that warfare “had assumed the absolute state under Bonaparte.”³ In other words, during his era war was quite close to absolute war—theory and reality converged. Consequently, the historical examples he used throughout *On War* invariably relate to those absolute wars.⁴ This factor colors how readers have interpreted Clausewitz over the decades.

The unusual dialectic approach used in *On War* has prompted commentators ever since to warn uninitiated readers that these opening pages are snares to be approached warily. Clausewitz's first chapter reads almost like a list of “topic sentences” for the 600 or so pages to follow and also contains some of his most pithy and quotable lines: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”; “In war the result is never final”; “Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack”; and “War is a pulsation of violence.” The temptation to seize on these relatively polished and readable pages without absorbing the vast explanatory material behind them has caused no end of confusion.

It gets worse. In notes written a few years before his death, Clausewitz confessed that he had lately come to view his work in a totally new light. He believed that two themes, which he had largely overlooked until then, should now dominate his work. The first concerned what some have labeled the “dual nature” of war—the fact that some wars were fought “to overthrow the enemy” while others sought merely to occupy a border province to use as a bargaining chip at the peace table. That is, he wanted to distinguish

between the absolute wars of his own era and the limited wars that had been the norm for much of the previous 2,000 years. The second theme to be stressed was the inherently political nature of war. Clausewitz wrote that he had introduced these two themes in book 1, chapter 1, and had sketched them out in more detail in the concluding book 8, but—and this is important—he would need to rewrite virtually everything (except presumably that very first chapter) in order to explain fully these two new foci.⁵

He died before completing those revisions. Nonetheless, one year later his widow published the unfinished manuscript. The fact that the bulk of this tome is a rough draft helps explain its numerous contradictions and redundancies—as well as the fact that the two new themes that he wanted to stress are largely missing from the body of the book.⁶ The inevitable result of these omissions has been for commentators ever since to extrapolate—or imagine—what Clausewitz would/should have written had he been given the chance.

In addition, Clausewitz wrote in an academic form of German that has made translation into English difficult. It is illustrative that the several English translations of *On War* appearing over the past 130 or so years read quite differently. Which of them captures the true spirit and intent of the original? Moreover, there is even doubt as to the actual wording of Clausewitz's original manuscript. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, the editors and translators of the latest version of *On War*, state that German editors in the 1850s introduced "several hundred alterations of the text" to the first edition of 1832—which itself was riddled with "obscurities perhaps inevitable in the posthumous publication of so large and complex a work by a devoted but inexperienced widow."⁷ To resolve some of these competing interpretations, Howard and Paret took an approach that, frankly, should give any serious reader pause, stating that "we have based our work on the first edition of 1832, supplemented by the annotated German text published by Prof. Werner Hahlweg in 1952, except where obscurities in the original edition—which Clausewitz himself never reviewed—made it seem advisable to accept later emendations."⁸ Unfortunately, Clausewitz's handwritten manuscript—which Hahlweg had presumably consulted for his own edition—disappeared during World War II, so we cannot now compare it with current variants. The result is a degree of confusion as to what it is, precisely, that Clausewitz was trying to tell us nearly two centuries ago. There is, of course, even more debate and confusion regarding what Clausewitz actually *meant*.

Other concerns should trouble modern readers. Nearly half of *On War* is now of little use. Most of books 5–7 deal with tactical maneuvers and such topics

as organization, marches, camps, and defending mountain passes or swamps. There are also major gaps that observers have noted for decades—his neglect of technology, his failure to discuss sea power, and his disdain for intelligence.

The omission of technology is almost understandable—the Napoleonic wars in which he participated were virtually devoid of technological advances. Armies of his era were little different in their weapons and equipment than those of Frederick the Great 50 years earlier. In fact, the Napoleonic era was unique in that it epitomized a *revolution in military affairs* (to use the modern term) that did *not* include rapid technological change as one of its key components.⁹ Even so, a man supposedly writing for the future (which he claimed he was doing) should have included such a profoundly important topic in his major work. Clausewitz was, after all, a historian, and he well knew of instances where technology had altered the course of war and strategy in centuries past.

Clausewitz's neglect of sea power is even less excusable. The role played by the Royal Navy and its utter dominance of the seas had a major effect on Napoléon's empire. Clausewitz must have known that. More importantly, in his extended study of war strategy, it is remarkable that he would not discuss a form of war that is so different from war on land regarding its nature, objectives, and methods. As Sir Julian Corbett wrote in 1911, "The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental."¹⁰ It is indeed; and so is air warfare different from either. As we shall see, Clausewitz's unfaltering focus on land warfare has led to a distorted view of strategy that impacts our current military operations.

His neglect of intelligence is usually passed off as being a simple anachronism that is inconsequential—which seems like a stretch. Even granting this, however, there are other criticisms more close at hand and even more fundamental.



In the aftermath of World War I, many military theorists, notably Basil H. Liddell Hart, were critical of what they saw as the baleful influence of Clausewitz. Liddell Hart referred to him as the "Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre" whose belief in the necessity of slaughter led to the hecatomb of the Great War.¹¹ Others agreed with Liddell Hart to the extent that it was standard practice among military historians and theorists to interpret Clausewitz as advocating climactic and bloody battles.¹² It is not hard to see why readers took this interpretation—and still do. In book 4 ("The Engagement"), Clausewitz lists what he terms five "unequivocal statements" regarding war:

1. Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our object.
2. Such destruction of forces can *usually* be accomplished only by fighting.
3. Only major engagements involving all forces lead to major success.
4. The greatest successes are obtained where all engagements coalesce into one great battle.
5. Only in a great battle does the commander-in-chief control operations in person; it is only natural that he should prefer to entrust the direction of the battle to himself.¹³ (emphasis in original)

These are dogmatic statements; indeed, they are unequivocal statements. Is it possible there is a contextual confusion here? No. The only hint of moderation is the word “usually” in statement two. Yet, a few paragraphs later when Clausewitz discusses the unusual situation where victory can be achieved without the destruction of the enemy army, he treats it with disdain. In oft-quoted lines, Clausewitz writes that commanders who have tried to achieve victory without battle are pursuing “nonsense.” Rather, “only great victories have paved the way for great results,” and he is “not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed”; instead, he lauds those generals who “seek to crown their achievements by risking everything in decisive battle.” Clausewitz concluded this chapter by stressing again the “absolute necessity” of fighting the great battle. He reminds us that “it is the theorist’s most urgent task to dissipate such preconceived ideas”—namely that great battles are avoidable.¹⁴

Clausewitz does in places refer to other methods besides fighting to achieve one’s objectives. In one intriguing passage he opined that it is possible for some operations to have “direct political repercussions” that may disrupt or paralyze an alliance or favorably affect the political scene.¹⁵ However, he gives no examples of such operations, so one wonders if such hints and caveats were mere lip service: war is so unpredictable that any manner of unusual things may occur—perhaps even victory without bloodshed. But when settling down to the serious business of instructing his readers on how to actually *conduct* war, such aberrations are not even worthy of discussion.¹⁶

Although it is true that Clausewitz wanted to emphasize the “dual nature” of war in a future revision, he seemed to be referring largely to *objectives*. In other words, some wars may be fought for limited objectives—merely to

detach a province from a neighbor, such as Frederick's First Silesian War of 1740. As for the *means* used to achieve those objectives, limited wars might involve a lesser degree of strength and resources, but Clausewitz argued that even those more limited means should be directed toward a single purpose: to use the utmost violence to locate, engage, and destroy the enemy army. Why? The more total, and bloody, the climactic battle would be, the quicker the war would be over, the easier would be the resulting occupation of enemy territory, and the more decisive would be the overall result. Battle must be "a fight to the finish." As Clausewitz phrased it, "Our discussion has shown that while in war many different roads can lead to the goal, to the attainment of the political objective, fighting is the only possible means. Everything is governed by a supreme law, the *decision by force of arms*" (emphasis in original).¹⁷

Perhaps Clausewitz would have introduced a degree of moderation in later revisions—his references to politics impacting *all* aspects of war are interesting—but the version of *On War* we now possess shows very little ambiguity.

Noted below are 20 statements (emphasis in original in all cases) from *On War* regarding the necessity of decisive and violent battle—there are many more.

It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him—call it what you will—must always be the aim of warfare. (p. 77)

The fighting forces must be *destroyed*: that is, they must be *put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight*. (p. 90)

If we wish to gain total victory, then the destruction of his armed forces is the most appropriate action and the occupation of his territory only a consequence. (p. 92)

Since in the engagement everything is concentrated on the destruction of the enemy, or rather of *his armed forces*, which is inherent in its very concept, it follows that the destruction of the enemy's forces is always the means by which the purpose of the engagement is achieved. (p. 95)

It follows that the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. (p. 97)

Thus it is evident that destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot compete. (p. 97)

To sum up: of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces always appears as the highest. (p. 99)

What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means—either completely or enough to make him stop fighting. (p. 227)

We do claim, however, that direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the *dominant consideration*. We simply want to establish this dominance of the destructive principle. (p. 228)

Later, we will show how we shall apply the principle that the destruction of enemy forces must be regarded as the main objective; not just in the war generally, but in each individual engagement and within all the different conditions necessitated by the circumstances out of which the war has arisen. (p. 229)

In the previous chapter we defined the purpose of the engagement as being the destruction of the enemy. We have tried to prove this to be true in the majority of cases and in major actions, since the destruction of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration in war. (p. 230)

The destruction of the enemy's forces is admittedly the purpose of all engagements. (p. 236)

But since the essence of war is fighting, and since the battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must always be considered as the true center of gravity of the war. All in all, therefore, its distinguishing feature is that, more than any other type of action, battle exists for its own sake alone. (p. 248)

The major battle is therefore to be regarded as concentrated war, as the center of gravity of the entire conflict or campaign. (p. 258)

Battle is the bloodiest solution. . . . It is always true that the character of battle, like its name, is slaughter [*schlacht*], and its price is blood. (p. 259)

Even if a battle were not the primary, the most common, the most effective means of reaching a decision (as we think we have already shown more than once) the mere fact that it is one of the means of obtaining a decision should be enough to call for the *utmost possible concentration of strength* permissible under the circumstances. (p. 489)

In war, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means. That applies to attack and defense alike. (p. 526)

We ended up with the conclusion that the grand objective of all military action is to overthrow the enemy—which means destroying his armed forces. (p. 577)

Basing our comments on general experience, the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are the following: 1. Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant. (p. 596)

Whatever the final act may turn on in any given case, the beginning is invariably the same—annihilation of the enemy's armed forces, which implies a major victory and their actual destruction. The earlier this victory can be sought—that is, the nearer to our frontiers—the *easier* it will be. (p. 624)

Given the relentless hammering of this point throughout *On War*, is it any wonder that men like Ferdinand Foch and Erich Ludendorff—who professed to be disciples of Clausewitz—took their intellectual mentor at his word and during the Great War strove to achieve the “slaughter” he thought essential, and that “the name of Clausewitz became associated in the popular mind with battle and blood”?¹⁸ Liddell Hart's virulent rejection of Clausewitz thus becomes understandable. Today, it is common to dismiss the British thinker, and others of his ilk, as having been so overcome by the horrors of World War I that he simply misunderstood (perhaps deliberately) the true meaning of Clausewitz.¹⁹ This is indeed possible. It is also possible that Foch and Ludendorff were dullards and they, too, misunderstood the real meaning of the “master.”

In fact, various commentators on Clausewitz have listed a host of incompetents who repeatedly misread and misunderstood Clausewitz. The great German military historian Hans Delbrück argued that *virtually the entire* German General Staff, from Helmuth von Moltke the Elder through World War I, had tragically and totally misinterpreted Clausewitz regarding the necessity of a bloody and violent battle.²⁰ More recent commentators have echoed Delbrück's verdict regarding the German officer corps as well as a host of other unworthies such as Antoine-Henri Jomini, Douglas Haig, Ludwick Beck,

Hans von Seeckt, Klaus Reinhardt, John McAuley Palmer, Douglas MacArthur, Maxwell Taylor, and William Westmoreland—as well as noted military practitioners, thinkers, and historians like G. F. R. Henderson, V. I. Lenin, T. E. Lawrence, J. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Hoffman Nickerson, Edward Luttwak, Raymond Aron, Peter Paret, Russell Weigley, Martin van Creveld, and John Keegan.²¹ One admirer simply dismisses all those who disagree with Clausewitz—or rather his interpretation of Clausewitz—as “second-rate soldiers and third-rate intellectuals.”²²

The charges of one acolyte border on the bizarre. Army colonel Harry Summers wrote a book on the Vietnam War that purported to view the conflict through a Clausewitzian perspective—he quotes him copiously throughout. Summers argued that Pres. Lyndon Johnson and Congress were at fault for not following the Prussian general’s dictum regarding the need to gain the support of the populace before embarking on war. The US Army high command—especially Generals Taylor, Westmoreland, and Earle Wheeler—were also to blame for not recognizing the true nature of the war and conveying that information to their civilians leaders—who were similarly clueless. To Summers, the Vietnam War was a conventional war; misinformed leaders in and out of uniform were duped into thinking that the conflict was about guerrillas and counterinsurgency. Rubbish. Had we sent in more troops to fight a conventional war against the North Vietnamese regulars—perhaps invade Laos and Cambodia if North Vietnam were off-limits—and fight the decisive Clausewitzian battle prescribed in *On War*, we would have been more successful. Indeed, it appears that everyone in America had failed to get the memo on Clausewitz—except Summers himself.²³

Taken together, these are remarkably pompous and hubristic accusations. We are to believe that *generations* of men—men with lifetimes of military experience; men who commanded great armies in great battles, often successfully; men who fought in large wars and small; men of intelligence, culture, and learning—all misinterpreted Clausewitz and did so in such remarkably diverse ways.²⁴ Is it really credible to assert that they were all so puerile and thick that they did not understand Clausewitz? Is it not even more presumptuous to believe that academics, scholars, and military officers today have succeeded in solving his mysteries when so many others have failed in decades past?²⁵ If so many military commanders and thinkers have misunderstood the “true meaning” of Clausewitz, then perhaps it is because he is incapable of being understood.

There is another interpretation; namely, that Clausewitz meant what he said regarding the primacy of slaughter in war, and therefore von Moltke, Foch, Ludendorff, Liddell Hart, Westmoreland, and others were indeed interpreting Clausewitz correctly, and it is modern theorists who misunderstand. Such a view appears to be embarrassing to many of Clausewitz's admirers, but in truth, to Clausewitz, decisive battles were the part and parcel of war. After all, he had lived through the Napoleonic wars and written at length on the wars of Frederick the Great. Fighting major battles made those eras important and different from what had gone before, and that is why Clausewitz emphasized them. Michael Howard summed up the issue simply, stating that "no one who experienced Napoleonic warfare could have quarreled with his [Clausewitz's] statement 'the character of battle is slaughter.'"²⁶

But now one must seriously question whether it is either necessary or desirable to fight such battles. They are not only dangerous and potentially bloody—reasons enough to deter their occurrence—but modern Western societies now seem to require that war be bloodless, not only to ourselves, but also to our enemies. We must now minimize casualties to both sides in conflict. Limiting NATO casualties was a major concern to Gen Wesley Clark during the war against Serbia in 1999, or so he was told by his political masters.²⁷ Ominously, the mounting US death toll in Iraq corresponds to the fall in popular support among the American people.²⁸ As for collateral damage, the news media and their mobile satellite uplinks are ever present where our forces fight, and that media will highlight every bomb or artillery shell that falls short and every rifle bullet that kills an innocent bystander at a roadblock—to say nothing of egregious blunders like Abu Ghraib and the Haditha massacre. Such events can seriously undermine US foreign policy; hence, the extreme emphasis now placed on limiting collateral damage in all of our military operations.²⁹



Ironically, despite the protestations of modern readers, the average American ground officer nonetheless believes that the key to war is bloody and decisive battle, and that such engagements are not only necessary but also are desirable. This bias may, in turn, cause commanders to reject or overlook strategies that are not dependent on coming to grips with enemy ground forces in a major fight—was the failed and bloody Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, an operation insisted upon and planned by ground officers,

really necessary? As noted previously, Sailors have differing views on how best to defeat an enemy. Similarly, Airmen have traditionally sought victory by alternative methods. These service-specific cultural views on war and strategy necessarily shape how commanders approach the crucial issue of campaign planning.

To illustrate how service culture plays an important role in strategy, let us review Clausewitz's use of the term *center of gravity* (COG). He implies that the COG is a crucial aspect of the enemy—"the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends"—that must be neutralized or destroyed. As we have seen, in most instances, he identified the enemy's army as the COG, although other possibilities could be the enemy's capital or an alliance. However, since a capital could usually be occupied only after the army defending it had been destroyed, the commander's strategy changed little—find and annihilate the enemy army first. Similarly, the most plausible way for a military commander to drive a country out of an alliance was to destroy its army; once again, the strategic focus left the commander little room for maneuver. As Clausewitz phrased it, "Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be—the point on which your efforts must converge—the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign."³⁰

One of the US Army's foremost historians of World War II, Martin Blumenson, stated authoritatively, "According to Clausewitz and common sense, an army in wartime succeeds by defeating the enemy army." Rejecting the "soft underbelly" argument and the need to work effectively within an alliance, he then went on to score Allied leadership for prolonging the war with its inefficient and diversionary attacks in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy; it should have "gone for the throat" and landed in France so as to destroy the *main* German army.³¹ Such ideas have not mellowed with age. After Desert Storm the US Army chief of staff stated peremptorily, "Achieving victory against an information-based state will entail destroying that country's armed forces, as well as its war-making capability."³² The following year he was even more emphatic, stating that "death and destruction remain the coins of war's realm, and no amount of technology or euphemistic labels will alter their weight. As much as one would like to think that simple solutions are possible, the reality is that wars are messy."³³

These types of inflexible pronouncements, inherited from Clausewitz, have become standard army theology, but what if the COG is defined not

as the enemy's strength—his army—but as his weakness or vulnerability? What if, as Sailors and Airmen believe, a country's industrial infrastructure, economy, transportation network, or leadership is the key center of gravity? In other words, it is quite possible that a Soldier, Sailor, or Airman could look at the same country and yet disagree on the identity of the key strategic focus—their conclusions drawn as a result of unique service cultures that viewed war through different prisms. The designation of a different COG thus would shape a campaign's strategy, weapons, force structure, targets, logistics preparations, and even tactics.

The possibility for such service-specific and one-dimensional thinking regarding the most effective and efficient strategy for overcoming an adversary is illustrated by the doctrinal thinking of the US Army. Field Manual 1, *The Army*, for example, states boldly:

*Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. They focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This active imposition of landpower makes the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation state. In addition, the physical presence of land forces and their credible ability to conduct offensive operations enable the unimpeded conduct of stability and reconstruction operations.*³⁴ (emphasis in original)

This appears much like a paraphrase from *On War* without the now politically incorrect references to violence and slaughter. In US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, this belief in the necessity and desirability of close combat is reiterated: "Land combat continues to be the salient feature of conflict. It usually involves destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking land objectives that reduce the enemy's effectiveness or will to fight."³⁵

Marines have a similar view of war—although they seldom find themselves burdened with a need to be politically correct. In Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*, they, too, paraphrase *On War* to educate their troops on the nature of war:

The means of war is force, applied in the form of organized violence. It is through the use of violence—or the credible threat of violence, which requires the apparent willingness to use it—that we compel our enemy to do our will. In either event, violence is an essential element of war, and its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. While the magnitude of violence may vary with the object and means of war, the violent essence of war will never change. Any study of war that neglects this characteristic is misleading and incomplete.³⁶

Such thoughts have obviously been internalized by Soldiers and Marines. Indeed, one of the US Army's intellectual luminaries is Ralph Peters, a retired lieutenant colonel, devoted admirer of Clausewitz, and author of "19 books and hundreds of essays and articles." In an astonishing essay, "In Praise of Attrition," published in the Army's leading professional journal, Peters defends the notion of slaughter and thinks there should have been more of it in Iraq. Echoing the words of Clausewitz, he too wants to hear nothing of generals who would attempt to make war without bloodshed. Instead, Peters tells us that the entire object of war is killing: "There is no substitute for shedding the enemy's blood." He advises commanders that they should "focus on killing the enemy. With fires. With maneuver. With sticks and stones and polyunsaturated fats."³⁷ How many others in uniform are infected with this unbridled lust for slaughter and a desire to throw as many of America's sons and daughters within range of enemy guns as possible? Can we attribute this bloodlust to an infatuation with Clausewitz?

It is illustrative of how deeply such beliefs have penetrated the military education system in the United States that the National War College, the nation's premier joint military school, emphasizes the Battle of Gettysburg—a battlefield tour is included in the curriculum. The focus is on glorifying a battle that included two of the bloodiest and most inane frontal assaults against a fortified position in US military history.³⁸ What are students—our future military leaders—expected to take from such examples?

In Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the theater commanders (in Vietnam the subtheater commander based in Saigon) were all Army officers. Was their strategic vision shaped by a mechanistic belief in the necessity for close combat—a belief inherited from Clausewitz that was expounded in their doctrine manuals, preached in their schools, and echoed in their professional journals?³⁹ Did General Westmoreland, for example, become so intent on finding, fixing, and destroying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army—to the detriment of using political and economic tools to help win the hearts and minds of the populace—that he shaped all of his plans to that end, with disastrous results? Another Army officer, Lt Col Andrew Krepinevich, thought so and criticized his service and its leaders for not being better attuned to the political aspects of the war that emphasized civil-action programs—programs that could achieve objectives without the "body counts" advocated by Westmoreland.⁴⁰

It is significant that in several of the conflicts just noted—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the operations in northern Iraq during 2003—diplomatic

considerations forestalled strategies that called for the introduction of sizable numbers of conventional US ground troops. The Army generals who were in overall command were therefore forced, fortunately, to improvise. The result was a series of operations that proved unusually successful—providing politically desirable results with a remarkably low casualty toll—to both sides.⁴¹ These notable campaigns relied primarily on airpower—both land and sea based—combined with special operations forces and indigenous ground forces, such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, to achieve success.⁴² (Of interest, all of these examples of near-bloodless victories were ignored by Peters in the diatribe cited above.) This would indicate that in the modern era of standoff precision weapons, near-real-time command and control, pervasive sensor systems, and dominance in the mediums of air and space, alternative strategies for victory are indeed possible—and desirable.⁴³ Conversely, the continual turmoil and bloodshed evident in Iraq stability operations since 2003 highlight yet again the dangers inherent in close combat. In such a situation, the words of another noted strategic thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, are eerily apposite: “The enmity of a defeated population in its home is more dangerous than its hostility on the battlefield.”⁴⁴

It is said that Gen Eric Shinseki was fired as Army chief of staff in 2003 because he advocated more troops on the ground in Iraq, and that was contrary to the Bush administration’s views on strategy.⁴⁵ Since then, Shinseki supporters, like Peters presumably, have lamented the fact that not enough of our ground troops are in place, and there is not enough killing going on as a consequence. Similarly, a number of retired Army and Marine Corps generals who were unequal to the task in Iraq have since blamed their civilian superiors for not sending in more ground troops.⁴⁶ But others have wondered if the opposite is not the case.⁴⁷ Echoing the words of Machiavelli, they ask if the US presence in Iraq is too large and provocative—and has been from the very beginning. Was there a better way to remove Saddam Hussein, disarm and pacify his army, and avoid prolonged guerrilla operations—fueled by thousands of foreigners drawn to the area just itching for a bloody battle with the American infidels occupying Iraq—than to send in tens of thousands of US ground troops?⁴⁸ Did the Clausewitzian focus on decisive battle and bloodshed so permeate the thinking of our military leadership that they viewed such strategies as the first and obvious choice rather than as a last resort?⁴⁹ If so, we are now paying a heavy price for such target fixation. If there is anything that four years in Iraq have taught us, it should be that destroying an enemy army and occupying its territory *do not* equal victory and are therefore not

the primary objectives of war. In fact, in some circumstances such activities become counterproductive. This seems especially the case in Islamic countries that resent, more than most, the presence of non-Muslims on their soil.

The conflicts that America now faces, and those she has experienced for much of the post-World War II era, have involved limited wars of counter-insurgency not anticipated by Clausewitz. Although he devotes one brief chapter to “the people in arms,” he surprisingly gives no examples from the most important insurgency of the Napoleonic era—that in Iberia. Such wars are fundamentally different than those seen firsthand by Clausewitz and which form the focus of his work. In fact, it is clear from his scanty coverage that he viewed such operations with skepticism. In his view, such armed resistance movements must be employed in conjunction with the main army in order to achieve useful results: “*Insurgent actions* are similar in character to all others fought by second-rate troops: they start out full of vigor and enthusiasm, but there is little level-headedness and tenacity in the long run” (emphasis in original).⁵⁰ Obviously, this disdainful description hardly reflects the reality of the Viet Cong or al-Qaeda. It appears that Clausewitz partially recognized his deficiencies in this area near the end of his life—at least to the extent that he understood wars could be limited—hence his statement that *On War* needed to be totally revised to accommodate this “dual nature” of war. But even that recognition gives no indication that he would have examined the unique aspects of what today we would term *revolutionary war*.⁵¹

And yet, modern-day students of Clausewitz insist that *On War* still teaches us about such wars. For those who would attempt to extract meat from these slim pickings, they would do well to remember the warning that Clausewitz himself offered: theory is a slender reed upon which to base a strategy. Only experience (history), properly analyzed, was the true barometer for measuring the validity of theory. Precious little “experience” is noted in the general’s writing on this new type of war to serve this critical analytical purpose. Therefore, any lessons derived from *On War* regarding modern revolutionary warfare are largely being imagined by hopeful readers searching for relevance where none exists.⁵²



The headline read “Rage over Cartoons Perplexes Denmark.” It was one in a long series of flare-ups between the Islamic world and the West.⁵³ The flap over cartoons depicting Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper—the outrage of Muslims and the resultant astonishment as to why they were

offended—was especially ironic because few would ever accuse the politically correct Danes of being culturally insensitive.

This incident was symptomatic: the West and Islam are not on the same sheet of music. We do not understand each other's most basic principles and motivations. To appreciate this dichotomy, simply contrast Muslim reactions to the cartoons—which were not offensive in content—to the frontal assault on Catholic theology engendered in such books/movies as *The Da Vinci Code*, which have elicited scarcely an organized protest from Catholics around the world—much less riots.⁵⁴ After all, freedom of speech is a basic human right—for Westerners. To Muslims, there are beliefs of a higher priority.⁵⁵

The second major problem with the writings of Clausewitz parallels this clash of civilizations. The US military is culturally tone-deaf. Despite lip service to the concept of understanding our enemy, we seldom bother to do so except in the narrowest military sense. Our intelligence analysts can tell us, often with good fidelity, the numbers and capabilities of the military equipment and force structure of the adversaries we may have to face. We have generally been far less effective, indeed profoundly so, in understanding the social values, traditions, and beliefs of those peoples. What were the Japanese thinking in December 1941? Didn't they realize what a sneak attack would do to rouse the sleeping giant? How could the North Vietnamese not understand the simple and elegant logic of gradual escalation and respond to it accordingly? And of course, the entire concept of suicide bombers—either kamikazes or Islamic fanatics—is so alien to our cultural mind-set as to be mystifying.⁵⁶

I attribute the myopia of America's military leaders regarding the importance of foreign culture and its influence on war and strategy in no small part to an overreliance on the writings of Clausewitz. The nut of the problem focuses on the issue of Clausewitz's most famous one-liner.

The problems of translation and a translator's bias, noted earlier, are issues that must be addressed here as well. In book 1, chapter 1, Clausewitz pens his most famous sentence: "War is merely the continuation of . . ." Of what? What specifically was it that he stated war was a continuation of? Clausewitz uses the word *politik* in a subtitle in chapter 1. When explaining that line in the paragraph that follows, his full sentences in German read, "Der Krieg ist eine blosser Fortsetzung der Politik mit andern Mitteln. So sehen wir also, dass der Krieg nicht bloss ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit andern Mitteln." That second explanatory sentence has been translated in a number of ways (emphasis added):

War is . . . a continuation of *political commerce* . . . by other means.
—Graham and Rapoport

War is . . . a continuation of *political intercourse* . . . by other means.
—Jolles

War is . . . a continuation of *political activity* . . . by other means.
—Paret

War is . . . a continuation of *politics* by other means.
—Paret

War is . . . a continuation of *policy* by other means.
—Pilcher

War is . . . only a continuation of *political methods with* an intermixture of other means.
—Maguire

War is a continuation of *diplomacy* intermingled *with* other means.
—Craig⁵⁷

Words are important things. They can mean different things to different people in different circumstances. In English, words such as *policy*, *politics*, *political intercourse*, and *diplomacy* all have varying definitions and usages. *Policy*, for example, often has a negative, bureaucratic connotation (“Sorry, it’s company policy.”); while *politics* often carries with it the baggage of unsavory backroom deals (“It’s all just politics.”). *Diplomacy* is the stuff of the State Department and foreign, not domestic, affairs. Which of these connotations—or perhaps none of them or others not mentioned—did Clausewitz have in mind when he wrote nearly two centuries ago that war was an extension of *politik*?

The point is this. It is one thing to quote glibly Clausewitz’s most famous sentence; it is another to use that statement as a basis for national strategy. Yet, some would have us do so, even though we may have only the vaguest idea of what the general meant by it.

Those who criticize Clausewitz’s detractors and skeptics generally argue that they have taken too literally the “master’s” comments regarding the necessity of slaughter—while at the same time not taking literally enough his advice that combat was merely *one* instrument of policy at a commander’s disposal.



Nonetheless, we must still come to grips with Clausewitz's most noted principle. Is war a continuation of policy (the most common translation)? To many cultures it is not. Over two millennia ago Thucydides observed that man went to war for three possible reasons: fear, interest, or honor. The first two of these are reasonably straightforward and would elicit little disagreement. The last, however, is a different story. Men fight for honor. The implications of that assertion are great. Could one shoehorn such rationale for war into Clausewitz's admonition that war is (should be?) an instrument of policy?

The problem deepens because there are many other reasons why nations have chosen war. Although Clausewitz barely spoke of economics in *On War*, surely he must have realized the impact of Napoléon's Continental System on Europe and how that helped drive Russia towards war. The quest for access to trade and resources has often justified a nation's resort to force. Similarly, revenge and irredentism are common motives for war—ask the Palestinians, or for that matter the French after 1870. What of simple territorial aggrandizement? The wars of Frederick the Great and of German unification had at their root simple motives of greed—often dressed up in the more dignified dress of nationalism, or, in the American case, of “Manifest Destiny.” Ideology is also often cited as a legitimate policy rationalization for war. The Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese civil wars—for want of a better term—and the US response to them are recent examples of such ideologically based conflicts. And of course, there is the war on terror, with its roots buried deeply in religious antagonisms stretching back for centuries.

Are all of these to be considered matters of policy? Clausewitz defenders respond by defining the term *policy* so broadly that it includes factors such as economics, irredentism, domestic politics, religion, and revenge. Christopher Bassford, for example, defines policy as “rational action undertaken by an individual or group which already has power in order to use, maintain, and extend that power.”⁵⁸ Well, that certainly covers the waterfront—although it does ignore the terrorist threat facing us today by begging the questions of what is meant by “rational” or whether a terrorist “already has power.” Paret reinforces this conventional interpretation asserting that “in *On War*, Clausewitz proceeds on the assumption that governments would act rationally and represent the true interest of the state as best

they could.”⁵⁹ That is not a trivial assumption. Even so, although such interpretations may remove the contradiction with Thucydides, it is also tantamount to stating that nations go to war because, well, because they have decided to do so—which is hardly a useful insight.

In *A History of Warfare*, John Keegan argues instead—echoing Paret—that given Clausewitz’s experiences in the Napoleonic wars and his Eurocentric worldview of the early nineteenth century, he must have intended a narrower definition; namely, that war was an affair of states and that the decision to wage it was based on rational decisions regarding political issues and major state interests.⁶⁰ Using this interpretation, Keegan states flatly that Clausewitz was wrong: there were other reasons for war causation, specifically the cultural background and tradition of the belligerents. Such an explication certainly fits more neatly with the words of Thucydides, but, in turn, it denies the universality of Clausewitz that his admirers so trumpet.⁶¹

Clausewitz argued that “war is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts.”⁶² Keegan thought otherwise, noting that numerous peoples in modern times—Cossacks, Samurai, Magyars, Vikings, American Plains Indians, Janissaries, and Mamelukes, to name some—have made war for distinctly cultural reasons that to Westerners often sound quaint, primitive, or nonsensical. In such societies war is virtually constant; without beginning or end it simply continues, as do hunting, farming, and procreating. War for them is a way of life. Although Clausewitz correctly recognized that war is the province of passion and emotion, Keegan goes further, arguing that these passions occur before conflict begins and often are the reasons for the war itself and the specific way in which it is conducted.

If we accept Keegan’s argument, then Clausewitz’s formulation of war being an instrument of policy therefore appears peculiarly “post-Westphalian” and Western European in focus, a focus that did not include such motivations as religion, ideology, or culture.⁶³

Unfortunately, over much of the past century America’s adversaries have been motivated by precisely these types of impulses. To give an example of how this can cause us difficulties, in April 2001 a Chinese F-8 fighter ran into a US Navy EP-3 patrol plane flying well off the Chinese coast. The fighter went down, and its pilot was killed. The EP-3 limped into a Chinese airfield on the island of Hainan, and its 24-man crew was immediately imprisoned. The Chinese reacted vociferously, accusing the United States of

spying and provocative acts; it stated that the EP-3 deliberately rammed its fighter.⁶⁴ The US reaction was surprise bordering on shock: the US ambassador labeled the Chinese response “inexplicable and unacceptable.” Why was China making an issue of what obviously was an accident prompted by an overzealous and not very capable Chinese fighter pilot?⁶⁵

It was expected that Chinese politicians would want to avoid confrontation with the United States: they had no desire to disrupt trade relations, their bid to host the 2008 Olympics, or to further inflame the Taiwan situation. The military, apparently, had other ideas. The military has traditionally wielded enormous influence in Chinese affairs, a situation that far predates the present communist regime. Until recently, the military even played a major role in the country’s domestic economy. Lately, however, the military has been losing ground, and it may have seen the collision as an opportunity to reassert its influence. Was all of this merely about “saving face” or trying to realign the political balance of power with the Chinese hierarchy? If so, then who was in charge in Beijing during April 2001? If it were the generals calling the shots because they were in an internal power struggle with Chinese civilian leaders, how could their actions—risking military confrontation with the United States over a trifle—be considered a rational act of policy?⁶⁶ It is not surprising we were confused by the “inexplicable” behavior of those inscrutable Orientals.

There is a cautionary tale here. Not only do other cultures have differing views on what constitutes rational acts of policy, but also the role of the military in their societies and the fundamental balance between civil and military affairs may be far different than our own—their “trinity” (if it exists at all) operates under laws and formulae we do not understand. We *assume* that the military will be subordinated—physically, ideologically, and legally—to civilian officials. That is how we in the West now do things—to ensure the militarists do not drive the ship of state. Much of the world finds such a hierarchy peculiar.

A related and fascinating interpretation of how biological factors affect war comes from Stephen Peter Rosen in his *War and Human Nature*. Rosen dives into psychological and physiological studies that examine human responses to various stimuli. One of his arguments is that *status* is a key element in human relations and that this element is present in groups as well as in individuals. Thus, status plays a key role in foreign policy as some countries, and their leaders, place a major role (even if unacknowledged) on perceived slights, snubs, or inequalities.

Of greater interest and perhaps importance, Rosen discusses the role of testosterone in human events. Testosterone is present in all humans, although its level varies greatly depending on age, sex, situational factors, and, critically, environment and culture. Basically, testosterone equals aggressiveness and “dominant behavior.” Although some would no doubt argue that stating testosterone affects male aggressiveness—witness teenage boys—is akin to noting that the sun tends to come up in the east, it *is* news to conclude that states and their leaders are similarly driven by such biological phenomenon. Rosen does indeed argue that some societies specifically cater to their more aggressive, macho elements, and it is these groups and individuals within their societies who tend to rise to the top. As he phrases it, “In plain language, some people, under specified conditions, are more likely to fight when challenged. Subjectively, they get satisfaction from subduing challengers apart from the rewards that others give to them. . . . Such people will tend to be high-testosterone men who are members of groups of high-testosterone men existing in unstable status hierarchies.”⁶⁷ Such societies tend to rely on tyrants to lead them. Characteristics of such tyrants include their urge to punish perceived challenges, unwillingness to coexist with rivals, rule by fear rather than by consensus, fostering the growth of yes-men in their immediate circle who are unwilling to tell them the truth, and greater interest in short-term gains/losses and prestige than in long-term calculations.⁶⁸ Does this sound familiar?

Another important aspect of this argument that affects our discussion is Rosen’s claim that such testosterone-prone societies and individuals react quickly, forcefully, and automatically to perceived slights and challenges. Consider Rosen’s assertion in light of present combat operations in Iraq. An insightful and devastating indictment of US military operations in Iraq is presented by Thomas Ricks in his book *Fiasco*. Ricks provides numerous examples of US troops going into areas, breaking down doors in the middle of the night, and then arresting and humiliating husbands and fathers in front of their families. In what Rosen would argue were testosterone-induced tactics, US Soldiers and Marines were attempting to overawe the populace and demonstrate American might and, hence, Iraqi impotence—it is an attempt to ensure passivity and compliance within the citizenry. The actual result, however, has been far different. Ricks has one sheikh complaining that although he wanted to support US efforts, “many of the arrests were done with a boot on the head, in front of the women. You’ve created a blood debt when you do that.”⁶⁹ In Ricks’s assessment, this aggressive conduct—that reflected a lack of understanding

of the cultural implications of US actions—actually *created and fueled* the insurgency. In other words, because of cultural and biological conditioning, Iraqi men, *more than most*, are outraged by such treatment, and their natural response is to seek revenge—regardless of logic or consequences—against the increased use of force and intimidation by US ground troops. The result is a vicious and escalating circle of violence by both sides.

The problem indicated by the above examples: American leaders have attempted to impose the limited Clausewitzian framework of a rational, policy-driven strategy on the wars they have fought; but their adversaries have not read the same book. They often have other reasons for waging war—reasons that to us are illogical, unworthy, or inexplicable.⁷⁰ As a result, we continually run the risk of mirror imaging. We hold in our minds a view of war—how and why it occurs and how it should be fought—that often has little to do with what our enemies are thinking. And so, we are repeatedly caught by surprise by the “irrational policy decisions” of others. It is little wonder that we have been so often stunned by the actions of our enemies, whether they were Muslim fanatics, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Arab.



It is probably inevitable that my arguments will be rejected as just the latest in, to use Bassford's wonderful phrase, “Clausewitz trashing.” Obviously, I just don't get it. Besides the fact that if such were the case I would be in good and copious company, that line of reasoning would miss the mark. I am not advocating that we cease the study of *On War*. When one gets past the excess verbiage, Clausewitz is an intelligent, thoughtful, and insightful writer; more importantly, he is provocative—in the sense that he provokes the mind to think and challenge. For any military officer or civilian leader who seeks to understand the nature of military operations, that is a valuable attribute. But he is only one of many military thinkers from all services, mediums, nations, and cultures that is deserving of study. It is fruitless—indeed it is worse—to seek answers in Clausewitz or to compare others, always unfavorably, to him and his ideas. A study of Clausewitz should be seen as an intellectual exercise to train the mind and provide insights into the military profession. As noted at the beginning of this essay, Clausewitz's discussions of fog and friction, the importance of defining objectives, the need to focus efforts, and the realization that “modern war” (to him) was primarily a test of wills, were and are valuable insights. It must always be remembered,

however, that *On War*, more so than most other books because of the redundancies, omissions, and inconsistencies already noted, should never be approached by anyone looking for answers. This is not a book of answers; rather, it is a book of questions.⁷¹

The concern centers on the nearly obsequious devotion to the writings of Clausewitz that expound the view that bloody battle is the essential feature of war and that the use of military force must conform to the rational policy decisions of state leaders. Such interpretations are hopelessly inadequate in the modern world. In fact, it is one of the many contradictions and confusions of Clausewitz that these two essential ideas are in opposition to one another. After all, can a decision for slaughter ever be construed as a rational act of policy? Which of these two principles are we to take most seriously?

Mistakes have been made in Iraq, and over 3,000 Americans have paid with their lives for those mistakes, as well as have tens of thousands of Iraqis. The Clausewitzian paradigm so hastily followed has proven disastrous. But the damage is largely done, and we must muddle through. The future has yet to be written, however. We now have an opportunity to move beyond the narrow, parochial, and crippling vision of war preached by Clausewitz. We must not allow future strategies to be dominated by foolish beliefs regarding the necessity of slaughter. We cannot afford a war of attrition with the terrorists, either physically or morally. We must find another way. Just as importantly, we must open our minds to the world around us. We must cease mirror imaging and expecting all cultures to think, act, and react as we do ourselves—as rational policy makers who see a resort to force as a calculated political decision. The epigraph beginning this essay uttered by the fictitious General Kahlenberge contains wisdom. If we train our military forces merely for war—to seek out and then fight bloody battles filled with slaughter—we are not training them to solve the problems that confront us. The global war on terrorism will not be won by such military leaders using such methods. We must broaden our vision of war. Busting the Clausewitzian icon that dominates our strategic thinking would be a good place to start the reeducation campaign. ■■■

Notes

1. Kahlenberge was the fictional anti-Hitler general in Helmut Kirst's *The Night of the Generals*.
2. The "remarkable trinity" is a difficult concept to understand, leading some admirers to treat it as profound. For example: "But the continual twisting about that fills *On War* is not just a case of Clausewitz's being ponderous and wordy. Instead, the apparently irresolute to

and fro of his prose conforms fully to his metaphor of theory floating among competing points of attraction." Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 85. On the other hand, one observer sees it in theological terms, and, like the mystical "Holy Trinity" of Christian doctrine, Clausewitz did not intend it to be understood. Bruce Fleming, "Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?" *Parameters* 34, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 67. Incidentally, some translations refer to a "wonderful" trinity.

3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 580. Discussions of "total" or "absolute" war are certainly relative. Although the Napoleonic wars were far more total than those that had immediately preceded them, they were less total than either world war of the twentieth century.

4. Although there are scattered references to Charles XII, Hannibal, Turenne, and others in *On War*, the vast majority of Clausewitz's historical examples refers to the operations of Frederick the Great or, especially, Napoléon.

5. Clausewitz wrote in 1827 that bks. 1–6 were "a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more"; bk. 7 was a "rough draft"; and bk. 8 was a "rough working over of the raw material." Clausewitz, *On War*, 68–69.

6. Azar Gat has argued that *On War* may actually be more finished than originally supposed—a not altogether comforting thought given its many inconsistencies and contradictions. See his *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), appendix.

7. Clausewitz, *On War*, 608n. I would also point out that in a disturbing admission, Bernard Brodie stated in his introductory essay to this edition that the term *absolute war* is used far less "than others have in their translations" (47). Does this mean that the translators deliberately toned down Clausewitz's prose to make it more palatable to our modern and sensitive ears? Or is Brodie claiming that earlier translators deliberately accentuated the brutality of Clausewitz's prose? In either case, Brodie is telling us that *On War* is as much an *interpretation* as it is a translation.

8. *Ibid.*, xi.

9. The purist might argue that Napoléon benefited from, and improved upon, advancements made in a more mobile artillery arm. To my mind, however, that was a relatively minor advance.

10. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 94. Actually, Clausewitz does make a single, oblique reference to naval tactics in bk. 3.

11. Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The Ghost of Napoléon* (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), 120. Liddell Hart had been an infantry officer in the Great War who was wounded at the Somme in 1916.

12. See for example, Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde, 1793–1939* (New York: Putnam's, 1942); Lynn Montross, *War Through the Ages* (New York: Harper, 1944); John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952); Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Military Heritage of America* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956); Walter Goerlitz, *The German General Staff, 1657–1945* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Robin Higham, *The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918–1939* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966); Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984); and Brian Bond, *Pursuit of Victory: From Napoléon to Saddam Hussein* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). In a typical assessment,

Nickerson noted that Clausewitz advocated a form of war that entailed “the utmost violence and the most fearful sacrifices” (52).

13. Clausewitz, *On War*, 258.

14. *Ibid.*, 259–60, 262. Also note that in bk. 1, chap. 1—the only chapter Clausewitz considered finished—he repeats with disgust his warning that “kind-hearted people may think there is some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed . . . [but] it is a fallacy that must be exposed.” *Ibid.*, 75.

15. *Ibid.*, 92.

16. On several occasions Clausewitz notes the possibility of capturing territory, a prominent hill, or the enemy capital but then notes that the logical intent of such actions is to put oneself in a better position to destroy the enemy army. See pages 95–97 and 529 for his discussion.

17. *Ibid.*, 99, 254. Paret states in his introductory essay to *On War* that “Clausewitz denied that limited aims justified a limitation of effort” (21). Michael Howard echoes this conclusion in his own introductory essay, stating: “There is no reason to suppose that Clausewitz would in his revision have abandoned any of the beliefs expressed in Book Four” (29). Azar Gat, who does not always agree with Howard and Paret, does so in this instance. See his *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 107.

18. Michael Howard, “The Influence of Clausewitz,” in Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Howard and Paret, 36. See the essay on Foch by Etienne Mantoux in Edward Mead Earle’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944). When testifying after the war before the commission on responsibility for the war, Ludendorff stated flatly: “The German General Staff is based upon the teachings of the great war philosopher Clausewitz.” Maj-Gen Sir Frederic Maurice, *British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the Principles of War* (London: Constable, 1929), 45.

19. Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic,” *War in History* 1, no. 3 (November 1994): 319–36. Jack English, in his excellent work, *Marching through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1996), chap. 2, argues implicitly that Great War generals were following Clausewitz’s advice to exert the utmost effort to destroy the enemy’s military forces, and this was a rational decision—until 1917. At that point, however, the generals should have recognized futility and fallen back on another of Clausewitz’s rules—to realize that policy dictated a change of strategy.

20. See Arden Bucholz, *Hans Delbrück and the German Military Establishment: War Images in Conflict* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985), *passim*. Remember, these officers were reading/misreading the book in their native German, so at least the possibility of mistranslation was not an issue. On the other hand, Raymond Aron in *Clausewitz, Philosopher of War* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985), chap. 10, argues that Delbrück was the one who was mistaken. Michael Howard also condemns von Moltke, von der Goltz, and Foch for their misunderstanding of Clausewitz in his introductory essay (30–32).

21. See, for example, Michael I. Handel, ed., *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), *passim*. For MacArthur’s sins, see John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1959); and Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Security* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Also of interest, one of the major criticisms of Gen Dwight Eisenhower’s strategic conduct during World War II was that he insisted on stopping at the Elbe River rather than moving on and occupying Berlin before the Soviets got there. Eisenhower, the future president, obviously did not understand that war is a political and not merely a military act.

22. Ralph Peters, in his review of Christopher Bassford's *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1875–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). *Parameters* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1994/1995): 148.

23. Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Navato, CA: Presidio, 1982), passim but especially chap. 8. The slam on Maxwell Taylor—who had been the Army chief of staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and then ambassador to South Vietnam—is especially peculiar because it was Taylor who emphasized repeatedly that war was a political instrument and that simple military action would never be enough in Vietnam. Ironically, one critique of Summers accuses *him* of misreading Clausewitz! Fleming, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us,” 65. Westmoreland was ambivalent about all of this in his memoirs, arguing both that more emphasis should have been placed on counterinsurgency operations *and* that the United States should have invaded North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 410–14.

24. It is perhaps not coincidental that British military thinkers have tended to be critical of Clausewitz: the long tradition of reliance on the Royal Navy and its unique way of war, and the “indirect approach” on land, are both largely antithetical to the Clausewitzian emphasis on decisive and bloody battle.

25. The faculty instructor notes for teaching the lessons on Clausewitz at the National War College—prepared by an academic with no military experience—makes the outrageous assertion that if the instructors could get the students to understand the points made in these notes that “maybe they could be the first generation of leaders not to misinterpret the master.” Notes provided to author by a faculty member.

26. Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 46.

27. Gen Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 183.

28. To track this decline, see the Gallup Poll Web site at <http://poll.gallup.com>.

29. Peace groups such as Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, and Greenpeace—as well as news outlets like Al Jazeera—are quick to condemn any US military action they see as inappropriate.

30. Clausewitz, *On War*, 596. Of note, Clausewitz refers to a specific historical center of gravity on only a few occasions: “For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army” (596); and “The center of gravity of France lies in the armed forces and in Paris” (633).

31. Martin Blumenson, “A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II,” *Parameters* 23 (Summer 1993): 16–27.

32. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, “War in the Information Age,” US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute pamphlet, 1994, 12.

33. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, “Envisioning Future War,” US Army Command and General Staff College pamphlet, 1995, 23.

34. US Army Field Manual 1, *The Army*, June 2005, par. 3–27.

35. US Army Field Manual 3–0, *Operations*, June 2001, par. 1–36.

36. US Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*, March 1989, 11.

37. Peters, “In Praise of Attrition,” *Parameters* 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 24–32.

38. When thinking about the carnage suffered at Little Round Top and in Pickett’s Charge, one recalls the French general witnessing the charge of the Light Brigade and commenting that “it is magnificent, but it is not war.” Why should such acts be glorified and commemorated?

39. Christopher Bassford traces the influence of Clausewitz in the US Army’s school system in *Clausewitz in English*.

40. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), *passim*. Contrast this interpretation with that of Harry Summers noted above. Also recall that the Army and Marine Corps fired eight million tons of artillery rounds in South Vietnam—more than *five times* the bomb tonnage dropped on Germany during World War II. And South Vietnam was on our side.

41. For an excellent discussion of how this paradigm succeeded in Afghanistan, see Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 124–60.

42. Of note, although Afghanistan is larger and more populous than Iraq, the United States sent far less troops there. The result: approximately one-tenth as many United States military personnel have been killed in Afghanistan compared to Iraq. See periodically updated statistics at www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf.

43. Gen Wesley Clark was reportedly pushed into early retirement after Kosovo because of his erroneous belief that a massive ground invasion of Serbia was necessary to achieve victory. See Peter J. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles," *The New Yorker* 79, no. 35 (17 November 2003): 70–88.

44. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Ruler* (London: The Bodley Head, 1954), 34. For some reason this translation eschewed the more traditional title of *The Prince*, but it is the same book.

45. See, for example, the 28 January 2004 interview with James Fallows, the defense correspondent at the *Atlantic Monthly*, at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html>. See also the Web site of the Democratic Party that echoes this belief, http://democrats.org/a/2005/08/bush_white_house_1.php.

46. Oops, did the generals forget that military actions are constrained by politics/policy? See Evan Thomas and John Barry, "Anatomy of a Revolt," *Newsweek* 147, no. 18 (24 April 2006): 28–32; and Michael Duffy, "The Revolt of the Generals," *Time* 167, no. 17 (24 April 2006): 41–42.

47. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "Officers Question Visibility of Army in Iraq," *Washington Post*, 26 July 2004, 1; and Greg Jaffe, "As Chaos Mounts in Iraq, U.S. Army Rethinks Its Future," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 2004, 1.

48. For an excellent discussion of how airpower plus special operations forces plus indigenous Kurdish forces overcame 12 Iraqi divisions in northern Iraq, see Richard Andres, "The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 3 (June 2006): 395–422.

49. Of note, in testimony before the Senate, then-CENTCOM commander Gen John P. Abizaid stated: "Our long-term strategy in the region will not likely be furthered by the continuing presence of a large U.S. military footprint in the Middle East." See his testimony from 14 March 2006 online at [http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20 Documents/PostureStatement2006.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/PostureStatement2006.htm). A bit late for such thinking.

50. Clausewitz, *On War*, 487.

51. *Ibid.*, bk. 6. It is surprising that Clausewitz never mentions in his lengthy bk. 6 ("Defense") the serious impact that guerrillas can have on an occupying army's supply lines, especially given such effects were demonstrated so dramatically in Spain and Russia against Napoléon's troops.

52. Regarding the common assertion that Clausewitz would have said this or that had he lived to revise his book, Howard observes that this is "an argument frequently used by admirers of Clausewitz—the present writer not excepted—who find aspects of his work not wholly to their liking." Clausewitz, *On War*, 33.

53. *Los Angeles Times*, 9 February 2006, 1.

54. Although the Vatican called for a boycott of the film, it has had little effect except, interestingly, in Asia. Similarly, Pope Benedict XVI's quoting of a medieval predecessor that intoler-

ant and bloody "jihad" was evil raised a vicious outcry among Muslims, with some even calling for Benedict's assassination.

55. Lest we forget, in February 1989 Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death sentence against novelist Salman Rushdie, a British citizen, for the alleged crime of blasphemy against Islam. (There was no trial, merely a *fatwa* [decree] handed down by the ayatollah.) The death sentence was confirmed—with a \$3 million bounty to whomever would do the deed—in February 2006 by Iran's current chief ayatollah, Ali Khamenei. Although Rushdie remains alive and in hiding, several others associated with the publication of his novel, *Satanic Verses*, have been murdered by Muslim fanatics.

56. It should be small consolation to acknowledge that our adversaries are similarly obtuse regarding Americans and the way they think.

57. The translators for each of these editions of Clausewitz's *On War* are, respectively, J. J. Graham (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1918), 23, and Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1982, ca. 1968), 119; O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, 1943), 16; Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 7, 87; Thomas David Pilcher, *War According to Clausewitz* (London: Cassell, 1918), 13; A. M. E. Maguire, *General Carl von Clausewitz on War* (London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1909), 155; and Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 180.

58. Bassford, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz," 326.

59. Peter Paret, *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 169.

60. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Knopf, 1993).

61. A similar thesis is advanced by Martin van Creveld. In his *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), ix, he writes that "contemporary 'strategic' thought . . . is fundamentally flawed; and, in addition, is rooted in a 'Clausewitzian' world-picture that is either obsolete or wrong." Clausewitzian theologians take their religion seriously. In reviewing van Creveld's book, Harry Summers attacked him as being "known for his ill-manners and overweening arrogance" and who "never heard a shot fired in anger." *Strategic Review* 19 (Spring 1991): 58–60. Such insults are, of course, in sharp contrast to the demonstrably good manners and modesty of Summers himself.

62. Clausewitz, *On War*, 86.

63. On the other hand, Michael Howard opined, "Fascists regarded war not just as an instrument of policy but as a thoroughly desirable activity in itself." That would help explain why Britain, France, and the United States had such a difficult time trying to figure Hitler out. Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (London: Profile, 2001), 68. I would also note that Adolf Hitler was an admirer of Clausewitz. Indeed, was not Hitler the epitome of the leader who wielded military power for political ends?

64. Elisabeth Rosenthal and David Sanger, "U.S. Plane in China after It Collides with Chinese Jet," *New York Times*, 2 April 2001, A1; see also <http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/06/wbr.00.html>.

65. The charge that a slow and cumbersome four-engine cargo plane could ram a small, nimble fighter plane that could fly twice as fast is risible.

66. Michael R. Gordon, "A Dangerous Game," *New York Times*, 3 April 2001, A1. For an excellent and provocative discussion of how China's culture—fundamentally different from that of the West—impacts its military strategy, see William H. Mott and Jae Chang Kim, *The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture: Shih vs. Li* (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2006).

67. Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 74.

68. *Ibid.*, 135–36.

69. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 238.

70. Of course, just because a decision is rational does not mean it is correct. We should not then compound our problems by assuming a rationality in our adversaries that may not exist.

71. My advice is to take the “Jeopardy” approach to Clausewitz: all must be in the form of a question. Thus, ask “under what circumstances and in which cultures is war generally considered a rational act of policy” rather than asserting the condition as being a fact, as is usually the case.

Book Reviews

Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O'Brien, and William Rosenau. RAND Corporation, 2006, 226 pp., \$30.00. *Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*, 2006, 214 pp., \$25.00.

"Know your enemy" is as foundational a military maxim as there is, yet it can be surprisingly difficult to get military and policy communities to focus on the nature of the adversary with meaningful depth or breadth. This is particularly concerning when the conflict at hand is something of the nature of the war on terror (WOT), where there is a fundamental shift not just in the context of the war but also in the nature of the adversary. Part, although certainly not all, of that problem is that military and government professionals face significant time constraints, which make the research and reading that academics take for granted difficult to do, no matter how much awareness there is of the need. With this in mind, one can only praise RAND: Project Air Force for the publication of the two-book set *Beyond al-Qaeda*. For while *Beyond al-Qaeda* provides a limited discussion of future WOT strategy, operations, or implications, what it does very well is provide a comprehensive, virtually encyclopedic assessment of the current and potential adversaries associated with the WOT in the wake of US operations in Afghanistan.

Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement covers al-Qaeda in four chapters, with a particular emphasis on its evolution since the loss of its safe haven in Afghanistan. The strength of this discussion is not in its novelty or insight. There is little here that the well informed will not recognize, and at least one chapter, the discussion of al-Qaeda's operational planning cycle, is likely to disappoint. But in four very accessible chapters a comprehensive, timely, and informative discussion of what al-Qaeda is, how it thinks, and how it seeks to achieve its goals is provided. The primary task of the rest of part one is to provide a region-by-region assessment of what the authors term the "al-Qaeda nebula," those regional and national groups that have specific linkages to al-Qaeda proper. The transition chapter between these two sections lays out the authors' assessments of the linkages between al-Qaeda proper and its "associated movements." While brief, this section does a valuable service of mapping the "Jihadist universe" in an easily digestible presentation. Taken as a whole, even the well-informed reader is likely to find significant parts of the al-Qaeda nebula assessment to be helpful either due to depth of the information or simply its organization in one accessible location. Part one concludes with a discussion of implications for US strategy and the US Air Force in the future. These are sound, and for some the cry for more Air Force support for unmanned aerial vehicles will be provocative—but

these are not the book's primary contribution. In fact, one gets the impression that the authors themselves do not see generating policy arguments as the primary role of *Beyond al-Qaeda*, providing them only to bookend the far stronger group-by-group analysis.

Part 2, *The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe* takes the regional assessment format of part one and extends it to regional and national terrorist groups that are not presently known to be associated with al-Qaeda. Beyond laying out the groups' histories, profiles, goals, and primary methods, the authors also assess the likelihood of the group in question associating with or cooperating operationally with al-Qaeda or simply becoming more actively anti-American in the future. Given the fluid nature of the data in many of these cases, the authors deserve praise for maintaining a very measured and pragmatic approach to these questions, an approach that results in credible, if obviously not definitive, conclusions regarding the future of a diverse array of groups—ranging from the well-established Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) to the most recently identifiable insurgent groups in Iraq. Before an even less significant set of conclusions than in part one, part two also provides a cogent discussion of "The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime" (chap. 7) that may have particular value for those teaching courses on terrorism, insurgency, and/or the WOT.

While *Beyond al-Qaeda* has little to say about the USAF, Project Air Force still gets its money's worth in a two-book set that provides a current, thoroughly researched, and accessible analysis of the adversaries and potential adversaries in the WOT. These books are not necessarily the best resource for new thinking on defeating these adversaries, but together they are a very informative and useful resource. Those looking to get a sense of the landscape, to better understand the full range of the al-Qaeda or terrorist threat, or in need for professional reasons of an accessible, encyclopedic reference on modern terrorist groups are well served by *Beyond al-Qaeda*.

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The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline by Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi. MIT Press, 2006, 186 pp., \$24.95.

Economists Alberto Alesina of Harvard University and Francesco Giavazzi of Italy's Bocconi University warn that continental Western Europeans must reform their over-regulated and protected economies or face a grim future of spiraling decline. Their remedy—"that Europe should adopt very large-scale reforms that would make its markets and its institutions look much more like those of the United States than they are now"—is sure to provoke objections from French, German, and Italian readers proud of the European social market economic model. Yet, free-market advocates, liberal economists, and proponents of the Anglo-Saxon economic model will embrace this publication as another affirmation of the benefits of competition, creative destruction, and a culture that rewards the entrepreneurial spirit.

Alesina and Giavazzi argue that Europe, by which they mean continental Western Europe, is like a "frog in slowly warming waters," oblivious of the impending danger of being boiled alive and unwilling to take the necessary action to save itself. Western Europeans, according to the two economists, face three major problems, which they are loath to address. First, Western European governments created an elaborately generous welfare system during the boom years of the 1960s, which they can no longer afford. Alesina and Giavazzi point out that demographic trends accentuate the problem, as the proportion of the working-age population to retirees grows smaller and smaller. Second, they contend that massive government intervention and regulation have created pockets of privilege that block reforms that threaten their protected status. Lastly, the two liberal economists assert that high tax rates and a plethora of regulations have discouraged individual initiative and entrepreneurship and rendered Western European society relatively immobile and static.

Having laid out their general indictments of the continental European economic model, Alesina and Giavazzi develop these themes in greater depth in 12 issue-specific chapters ranging from "Americans at Work, Europeans on Holiday" to "Job Security, Job Regulations, and 14 Million Unemployed" to "Interest Groups against Liberalization." Each chapter presents statistics, graphs, charts, and tables that lay out their analysis of Western European patterns in that area, coupled with an engaging, provocative analysis of these trends presented in a manner accessible to nonspecialists. In discussing vacation time and the workweek, for example, the authors furnish data ranging from the distribution of holidays and vacation weeks in 19 European nations and the United States to the relationship between marginal tax rates and hours worked weekly to the correlation between unionization and vacation time. They caution that much as Europeans may enjoy working less, retiring earlier, and vacationing more, these choices will make them poorer and poorer relative to harder-worker societies.

One of the book's most interesting chapters tackles the topic of "Competition, Innovation, and the Myth of National Champions." Alesina and Giavazzi argue that continental Europe discourages the process of creative destruction that generates innovation and efficiency by protecting and subsidizing incumbent firms. Rather than letting the free-market process of competition winnow out inefficient firms and open opportunities for new ones, Western Europeans support existing firms and seek to stimulate innovation through subsidies, grants, and dirigisme. This policy is bound to fail, according to the authors, who cite a series of enormously expensive and questionable initiatives ranging from the Concorde to Plan Calcul that illustrate the misplaced nature of directed innovation.

Alesina and Giavazzi claim that *The Future of Europe* "is not an academic book, and we are not shy in taking sides on the issues we analyze." The two economists deliver a liberal, free market broadside on the Western European model, claiming that those who talk about a third way between the "American free-market" and the "European model" are fuzzy thinkers: "A market economy is a market economy: qualifications are misleading." Yet, in their enthusiasm for

an unfettered market economy, Alesina and Giavazzi overlook promising signs of the continued economic vitality in "Old Europe," ranging from its sustained positive trade balance to signs of renewed vigor in the German economy. More distressing is their tendency to conflate Europe with Italy, France, and Germany. The liberal economic spirit they advocate is alive and well in Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom, with recently elected French president Nicolas Sarkozy advocating more economic liberalism and less dirigisme. *The Future of Europe* provides both a thoughtful argument in support of this trend and ample statistics of the dangers of blocking meaningful reforms to the Western European economic model.

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America's Environmental Report Card: Are We Making the Grade? by
Harvey Blatt. MIT Press, 2004, 272 pp., \$27.95.

In light of Al Gore accepting an Oscar for the 2006 documentary, *An Inconvenient Truth*, environmental issues have again garnered media attention. While the media's focus on environmental issues waxes and wanes depending on marketability in today's fast-paced corporate world of competing 24/7 news channels, well-researched scientific monographs like Blatt's *America's Environmental Report Card* have been regularly produced ever since Rachel Carson's 1962 watershed book, *Silent Spring*, which focused on the hazards of DDT and set the stage for the modern environmental movement. Some environmental books, like Paul Roberts' *The End of Oil*, gain attention outside of environmental circles because of their timeliness in respect to current events. Others grab similar attention because they are sensational. An excellent example is Gore's 1992 book, *Earth in the Balance*, which, like his movie, received much of its attention because of name recognition. Blatt, who is a retired University of Oklahoma professor, author of six textbooks, and a current professor of geology at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, wrote a book that is neither of these. This book is written in a style reminiscent of the *State of the World* series by the Worldwatch Institute, where clear and concise language is used to document the status of key environmental issues, regardless of current geopolitical events or media attention.

Where the *State of the World* books are produced annually and usually focus on a different area of concern each year, Blatt's is a one-time publication concentrating on the United States and nine areas: water conservation, flood control, garbage disposal, soil protection, energy, global warming, air pollution, the ozone layer, and nuclear waste disposal. While the book does a good job of summarizing and explaining these relatively well-established environmental issues, it does not cover more problematic but equally critical environmental issues such as the looming biodiversity crisis (which is only briefly mentioned in the introduction). Blatt limits his in-depth discussion to those issues that he considers the most pressing, with the greatest impact on the nation's environmental health. Most of his choices are

logical in this respect, except for his omission of the looming, human-induced, mass-extinction event that is being generated by habitat destruction, pollution, and climate change. In his 1992 book, *The Diversity of Life*, eminent Harvard entomologist E. O. Wilson calls this man-made biodiversity crisis the sixth extinction and predicts that half of all the species on Earth will be gone in less than 100 years. Such an event would be larger than the extinction that killed off the dinosaurs 65 million years ago and will include the loss of all the wild ocean fisheries and most of the wild plants that form the root stock of the world's food crops and the raw products for many of its pharmaceuticals. This will have a very large impact on the nation's environmental health and should have been addressed in this otherwise comprehensive work.

Blatt's book has three chapters of particular note—those dealing with soil conservation, energy, and global warming. For the general public, soil conservation is an often overlooked subject but a very important environmental issue nonetheless. Poor cultivation standards can increase normal soil erosion rates by a staggering ten- to hundredfold, and poor irrigation practices can cause salt to accumulate in the soil at an alarming rate. Both issues, together or separately, can greatly reduce soil fertility. Blatt succinctly explains the critical connection of soil, crops, and food and the importance of conserving soil for food production by using techniques such as contour plowing, drip irrigation, and planting windbreaks. Enough food is now being grown to feed the six-plus billion people currently living on the planet. However, if a better job of protecting agricultural soil is not done, it could make it very difficult to feed the 9.5 billion people who are projected to populate the planet by the middle of this century.

His chapters on energy and global warming are the most important from a strategic aspect, and, since they are inherently linked to each other, he places them together in the book (chaps. 5 and 6). America imports 60 percent of the oil it uses, and half of this oil comes from politically unstable areas of the world, making this issue the delicate underbelly of the American economic juggernaut. This realization has caused many in the public arena, up to and including President Bush (albeit a relative latecomer to this view), to call for energy independence by greatly increasing the domestic production and use of ethanol, a fuel derived from corn and other agricultural products. Blatt does not fall into this seductive panacea that alternative fuels alone can cure US dependency on foreign oil by correctly surmising that the "use of petroleum as a source of energy is so ingrained in America's and the world's industrial economies that doing away with it completely is unthinkable for the foreseeable future, despite looming price increases as world supplies dwindle" (p. 105). However, in an attempt to inform (not alienate) the reader, Blatt only lightly discusses other possible solutions for America's energy gluttony and global warming woes. He specifically and deftly avoids any in-depth discussion of the most realistic but politically unpalatable solution—mandatory energy conservation—probably because such enforced energy savings can only be achieved in the American socioeconomic context by the introduction of some type of carbon tax.

Blatt wrote a very accessible book to help the general reader understand the environmental problems facing America. Overall, he presents a fair, balanced, and well-researched evaluation of America's environmental performance, which will stand the test of time better than more sensationalistic writings. His choice of topics is fairly logical, although based upon his own criteria (the environmental health of the nation), a chapter on the looming biodiversity crisis could have proven more worthwhile than one rehashing US garbage disposal policies. For those concerned about the strategic implications of environmental degradation and looking for an easy-to-read general primer, this book is an excellent choice.

Lt Col Thomas N. Williams, USAF

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Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 by Tony Judt. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 2005, 896 pp., \$37.95.

This first-class history spans over 50 years of European developments. It traces the economic hardships that ultimately formed the two blocs in Europe—Western-based capitalism and Eastern-run communism. But unlike other works, Professor Judt has been able to weave a far more comprehensive and readable text about this critical period in world history. By merging economic, cultural, and social histories into one, the reader can clearly grasp why the Marshall Plan was started, who benefited in an economic and political sense, and how developments and policies on one side of the Iron Curtain led to reactions on the other side. While historians can find this information in other texts, Professor Judt's narrative style makes this account far more valuable as a reference for European history surveys and for understanding how policy decisions can and will be influenced by nonlinear events.

The ability of this text to examine such diverse topics as the introduction of democracy in Spain, the Portuguese struggle to decolonize, and the social upheaval within Italy's economic miracle make this a most valuable contribution to history and policy formulation texts. The book opens with the end of the war in Europe and the struggles faced not only by the Germans but by all European states as they sought to rebuild a devastated continent. Countries like Belgium and Bulgaria are covered so that the reader can compare and contrast these beginnings. France and Great Britain, attempting to keep the United States engaged in the continent, had to try a variety of policies as the United States looked for ways to end the expensive postwar occupation and return to domestic American issues.

Also explored is the influence of American culture on the European film industry, for instance, and other concepts that 20 years later would spark a wave of anti-Americanism on the continent. Soviet influences and goals are explained, and it is amazing to see where the West may have deliberately or accidentally miscalculated policies. Professor Judt then lays out something that is rarely found in American texts of the period—the methods and motivations behind Western European adoption of left-wing socialist welfare state policies. By looking at 34 nations, this book provides more than just a sweeping overview; rather, it gives

the reader details to understand the underlying and less visible issues that influence how and when policies are made and implemented.

American and Soviet policies and actions are addressed only as they influence the continent, making the text easier to understand. The shortcoming of the book may be that there are as yet few histories of post-1989 events. However, Professor Judt, who has studied Europe for over 40 years and authored numerous publications, is no stranger to the history of these events and has laid out the problems, policies, and issues that occurred, starting with Poland. The economic shell that was the communist Eastern European bloc showed signs of melting in the late eighties, and as policies and practices mostly in the economic field could not be maintained, strike and dissatisfaction started. Soviet internal collapse only hastened the process. The author also examines earlier upheavals in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, followed by Solidarity, the Velvet Revolution, and the complete collapse of East Germany. What the book does not answer is why the West understood the East's economy so poorly and therefore could not anticipate the dramatic events that led to the end of the Cold War in Europe.

The breakup of states is another segment. Belgium had to adopt a federal system when the country became almost ungovernable due to its two antagonistic linguistic groups, the Flemings and Walloons. The author recounts in depth the numerous European political missteps and the frustrations of an American president during the implosion of Yugoslavia that brought back World War II images of camps, starving people, and wanton killings. Nationalism, a concept post-World War II Europe tried to discard, was back in 1989, and Western European (French and German) hopes for a superstate (European Union) have yet to occur. The myth of European unification—as well as the realities of new state accession and absorption in an economic and cultural sense—forms cornerstones of the book's final chapters.

British decolonization and the Dutch loss of Indonesia, in a sociocultural as well as an economic sense, allow the reader to see why states' policies after decolonization moved in the directions they did. The influx of foreign labor into France, Germany, and Britain are clearly spelled out, and these short-term, limited-stay policies now influence an entire continent that is rapidly succumbing to non-Christian, non-European influences. This, in turn, is leading to problems that Europe is in the midst of grappling with, so there can be no closure here. However, to policy students this example allows the author to show how time, needs, and speed can ultimately undermine a policy that is well laid out and designed, a lesson not lost in the first half of the 21st century.

I recommend this book to students of postwar Europe as an overview text for graduate or service schools. It is compact and easy enough to read, and it can serve as the basis of many interesting courses. Professor Judt is to be congratulated for producing a readable text covering more than just general history and examining the underlying cultural, social, and economic events that Europeans have shared for the past 60 years.

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