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# **Political, Military, and Economic Dynamics in Iraq: A Graphic Overview**

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# Report Documentation Page

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# The Iraq Challenge

- **May have to leave Iraq suddenly for political reasons, but best strategy is caution.**
- **Need to seek to contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.**
- **If surge succeeds, and conciliation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.**
- **If fails, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath.**
- **Need to reassure key allies that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq.**
- **Need clear basing plans.**

# Iraqi Governorates



UNCLASSIFIED


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


# Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends

1 October 2004 – 7 September 2007




# High Profile Attacks



As of 31 AUG 07; High Profile = Car bombs + suicide car bombs + suicide vests



# Improvised Explosive Devices



Total IEDs = IED explosions + IEDs found + IED hoaxes

# State of Al Qaeda Iraq

JAN 07



**Strategic Detention/EKIA**  
15 June to 5 September 07

Emirs of: Media Cells:


Yusafiyah	Ramadi
N. Iraq	Ghazaliyah
Samarra	Baghdad
Mosul	Baqubah
Diyala	Samarra
North Karkh	Tarmiyah
Arab Jabour	
Hay alAndullah	
Sinjar	

July to September 2007

Killed

Captured


AUG 07









# Major Threats to Iraq



# Baghdad Neighborhoods



# Ethno-Sectarian Violence



Density plots are of incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs


# Southern Baghdad




# Diyala




# Al Anbar & Iraq




# Insurgents in Anbar




# Sunni Response in Anbar




# Al Anbar: Iraqi 7th Division




# Al Anbar: Iraqi 1st Division



# Al Anbar: Police Services



# Al Anbar: Iraqi DBE



# *Tribal Engagement*



**Local Security Forces**  
29.8K Vetted  
28.4K In hiring process for  
Iraqi Security Forces

**Security Volunteers**

- Sunni
- Mixed
- Shi'a

# Overall Attack Patterns in MNF-I West


## Weekly Incident Totals 1 yr

Unclassified

98 Incidents this week


157 is the 8 week average

257 is the 26 week average




# Civilian Tips in MNF-I West: July 2007


## Civilian Tips\*






# Incident Cycles in MNF-I West



# Incidents by Initiator in MNF-I West




# Anbar Attacks




# Decline in Attacks by City

Jul 05 - Jun 07


### Fallujah




### Rutbah




### Hit




### Hadithah Triad



# Threat Reduction in Ramadi




# Iraqi Security Force Capabilities




Iraqi Army Battalions, National Police Battalions, and Special Operating Force Battalions

# Recommended Force Reductions/Mission Shift




Leading to Partnering to Overwatch (Tactical to Operational to Strategic)

# Iraq: US Aid Status




# The Electricity Problem




Daily electricity demand August 1-7 was 20 percent above the same period in 2006. Daily supply from the electricity grid was 12 percent below 2006; it met 43 percent of total electricity demand, compared with 58 percent for the year-earlier period.

Average hours of power via electricity grid after meeting demand from essential services: Baghdad 4.9 and nationwide 9.3. Year-ago levels were Baghdad 6.3 hours and nationwide 10.7 hours.

# Crude Oil Production




# Crude Oil Revenues



- 2006 Revenue Estimate: \$31.3 Billion
- 2007 Revenue Estimate: \$19.3 Billion (Year to Date)

# Product Import Dependence



Note: This is a daily average for July 30 – August 5


- Diesel: 10.8 ML supply of 24.5 ML target
- Kerosene: 3.3 ML supply of 11.1 ML target
- Gasoline: 9.1 ML supply of 23.1 ML target
- LPG: 1,630 tons supply of 5,100 tons target

# Iraqi Oil Infrastructure



# Iraqi Oil Production

## June 2006 – August 2007



Source: DoD. "Measuring Security and Stability on Iraq" September 14, 2007. Pg. 12

Note: +/- 5%

# Iraqi Oil Fields

## The thirst for Iraqi oil


While U.S. oil firms have stood on the sidelines, Iraq has negotiated contracts or had serious talks with oil companies from many other nations to develop its vast oil reserves. The map shows some of the major fields and the countries involved.



Source: U.S. Department of Energy, American Petroleum Institute

Times art

# Oil and Gas Resources in Anbar



# Iran's Oil Fields


## Major Iranian Oilfields



# Iran & Iraq as Case Studies

## Demand for Total Liquids vs. Price

(Millions of Barrels Per Day - Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2007,



**Average world oil prices in 2030 are \$36, \$59, and \$100 per barrel in 2030**