

**TURNING ON THE DIME:
DIPLOMACY'S ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY**

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PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect on and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research conducted by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy” Series.



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ABSTRACT

The differences in approach and culture between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense are stark despite the fact that these organizations are members of the same team and share related national objectives. Understanding the nature of these differences is key to improving interagency cooperation between the two key agents of our national foreign policy.

State's historical role as the nation's lead instrument of foreign policy has eroded since World War II, while Defense has seen its power and influence grow. Spending on diplomacy has remained constant and comparatively small compared to both the ebbs and flows in Defense spending. Despite significant differences in purpose regarding planning—in which State primarily engages in planning routine activity aimed at daily efforts to prevent conflict and advance national interests, and in which Defense plans contingency operations involving use of military force—State has developed a results-based planning procedure derived from that of the Department of Defense as a result of pressure from Congress.

In recent history, our nation's diplomatic efforts, and the individual Foreign Service Officers who operate in this arena, aim at exhausting opportunities to secure peace and stability before turning to the option of last resort. Defense is no less pleased than State when diplomatic efforts fail and military force is applied. Moreover, the existence of a critical gap in our national capacity to effect transitions from situations of conflict back to peace exacerbates tension between the two executive branch departments. Neither is prepared to conduct nation-building efforts they are sometimes called upon to carry out. Defense, with an annual budget almost 50 times that of State, has more flexibility to support such transitions but is uncomfortable with this secondary task. Meanwhile, Congress wields the ultimate vote over resources that might bridge the gap, and it shows no current appetite to provide more funding to do so.

Until such time as nation-building becomes a national priority for both the executive and legislative branches, State will continue to struggle to meet the demands of worldwide, universal diplomatic representation with the small staff and resource base it is afforded. Under such constraints, its most important function will be to help avoid situations of conflict that might lead to the prevailing shortfall in post-reconstruction capabilities.

TURNING ON THE DIME: DIPLOMACY'S ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

There be three things which are too wonderful for me, yea, four which I know not:
the way of an eagle in the air; the way of a serpent upon a rock; the way of a ship
in the midst of the sea; and the way of a man with a maid.

The Bible, Proverbs, No. 30, Verses 18-19

The differences in approach and culture between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense are stark, despite the fact that these organizations are members of the same team and share related national objectives. In this paper, the nature and implications of these differences are examined, with a goal of improving military leaders' understanding of the role of the Department of State (DoS) in national security.

While representatives of the two agencies begin their careers with virtually the same oath of office, committing to "protect and defend the constitution of the United States," their missions—in terms of carrying out those commitments—diverge immediately upon employment. The Department of Defense (DoD) approaches national defense prepared to use violent military force to achieve desired ends. In contrast, DoS seeks to achieve national security and advance our interests via the application of diplomacy. These descriptions are simple and shield a host of complexities. Understanding these complexities is key to improving interagency cooperation between the two primary agents of our national foreign policy.

A Bit of History.

With the advent of the new Constitution of 1789, the DoS officially came into being in September of that year when an act of Congress expanded the role of the previous Department of Foreign Affairs to include certain domestic functions. Departing from an unsatisfactory precedent under the Articles of Confederation, the act also shifted responsibility for foreign affairs from Congress to the Executive Branch. The new department constituted the first-ever cabinet position under President George Washington. Over time, most of its domestic duties—which included tasks as diverse as issuance of patents, publication of census returns, and the management of the U.S. Mint—were transferred to other agencies. Two such responsibilities that remain with State are maintenance of the Great Seal of the United States and certain protocol functions for the White House. Thomas Jefferson was the first Secretary of State. Since then, 64 others have held the position. In 1906 Elihu Root became the first Secretary of State to travel abroad in an official capacity.¹

Beginning as early as America's first "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" with France signed in 1778, trade has remained a key focus for the DoS. In the early days, diplomatic and consular functions were separate elements of foreign policy.² Up to the Civil War, State's diplomatic functions remained very limited. Heeding President Washington's warning against "entangling alliances"³ with other countries, U.S. diplomats were

cautiously engaged in negotiating a few necessary treaties while focussing on acquisition of territory for the growing United States. The diplomatic deals for the Louisiana Purchase from France and the northwestern territories from Great Britain helped open the country's expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The Monroe Doctrine defined the Western Hemisphere as America's area of influence and helped ward off European meddling. Following the Civil War period, the thrust of diplomacy aimed at expanding trade opportunities and opening markets for the growing array of American goods.

The "Great War" proved to be a turning point for U.S. foreign policy in that its focus expanded beyond realist interests to include idealistic objectives. Under President Woodrow Wilson, idealism and the principle of self-determination for the world's oppressed became declared national goals. Nonetheless, a sceptical Congress refused to ratify Wilson's vision of the League of Nations, and America remained aloof as Europe slipped into World War II. After 1945 the role and effectiveness of the DoS increased significantly under Secretary George Marshall. Embassies mushroomed in number and size. U.S. diplomacy was instrumental in rebuilding western Europe and in establishing the United Nations (UN) in belated support of Wilson's idealistic political goals, along with the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to stabilize and promote economic development and ensure orderly currency exchange. This period reflects the apex of State's influence as the nation's premier instrument of foreign policy.⁴

The Cold War, McCarthyism, the "loss of China," and a recalcitrant Non-Aligned Movement all took a toll on State's reputation and prestige. The newly united DoD began to assert itself once the country decided to establish a permanent defense apparatus. New foreign policy organizations were mandated by Congress to assist State in the implementation of foreign policy, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency.

During the Cold War, diplomacy played a significant role in the policies of containment and détente, which helped check the Soviet Union and then led to its slow demise. Television and the Vietnam conflict conveyed foreign affairs past the policymaking elite that had long monopolized the debate directly into the living rooms of the American public.

The end of the Cold War brought great flux to the foreign policy community, and fluidity continues to characterize the environment. Some predicted the end of history while others warned of calamity.⁵ Though the debate remains open and a descriptive paradigm unformed, globalization and the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), are providing better definition regarding the nature of future challenges. The war in Iraq is also providing a wealth of lessons learned and experience that will unquestionably inform the ongoing transformation of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus and assist in development of a guiding strategic vision.

Purpose and Legal Status.

Both the original 1789 act establishing the State Department and Title 22, Section 2656 of Public Law, which provides the current legal basis for the conduct of the nation's foreign

affairs, give broad powers for the President to direct the Secretary of State's actions. These executive powers derive from the Constitution's stipulation that the President will "... make Treaties [and] shall nominate [with the Senate's advice and consent] Ambassadors ... Ministers and Consuls."⁶ These elements and their placement within the Constitution have been used by the executive branch to lay claim to the power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Nonetheless, over time Title 22 has been augmented by additional law that adds various congressionally-mandated structures within, and reporting functions to, the responsibilities of the DoS, which range from areas of focus on international economic and commercial activities to human rights and weapons proliferation issues.

The Structure of State.

DoS is organized along functional and regional lines similar to the those played by the various commands within the DoD, some of which have regional focus (or areas of responsibility [AORs]) and some of which are globally "functional" in nature. Typically for State, functional bureaus (such as Consular Affairs or Population, Refugees, and Migration) have global perspectives over a particular set of issues. As the name implies, regional bureaus focus on defined regions that share a degree of cultural, linguistic, and/or historical similarity, and which correlate loosely with the system of regional Combatant Commands (COCOMS) organized under DoD. However, it is important to note that leaders of State's regional bureaus (assistant secretaries) are often primarily focused on the Washington policymaking process or key crises within their AORs and less on lower-priority specifics in the regions and countries contained in their portfolios. For many countries, particularly the smaller and/or poorly-integrated ones not considered priorities by Washington, the ambassador-led "country teams" do the heavy lifting and remain in the lead abroad. Even in more critical missions abroad, the Ambassador, supported by the country team, remains State's primary agent for implementing policy.

Compared to DoD, State has little in the way of reserve resources, either in terms of personnel or materiel. State's assets are virtually always fully employed. There are around 6500 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) at DoS, 80 percent of whom are forward deployed at any given time at one of our 267 missions in 189 countries around the world. The remainder of diplomatic officers staff State's Washington headquarters or are in training. Beyond the core diplomatic staff, State also employs a number of specialists (i.e., approximately 4,900 employees with skills in office management, information technology [IT], medicine, or security) who serve both at home and abroad in supporting roles. In addition, there are around 8,300 civil service employees who primarily staff State's headquarters and domestic operations, especially the "functional" bureaus, as well as 37,100 "Foreign Service Nationals" (FSNs, State's acronym for locally-hired non-American staff) who work at our missions around the world. Currently, the total of all State personnel approaches 57,000 employees worldwide.⁷

In general, neither civil servants nor FSNs may be deployed away from their routine work environment, leaving Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and specialists as the only groups that are "worldwide available." Due to resource constraints and the absence of reserve "float," State often experiences difficulty in staffing for emergent issues. Even though many emergencies are foreseeable, congressional constraints on State's budget

and the thin workforce limit DoS ability to respond.

While FSOs are hired as “generalists” expected to be able to accomplish a wide variety of tasks, from the beginning of their careers they become increasingly specialized. State maintains a system of “cones,” or areas of specialization, to which each officer is assigned upon employment. The five cones are consular, economic, management, political, and public diplomacy. Jobs at various embassies and within the Department are typically divided along these same lines, and officers advance their careers by taking on assignments with increasing responsibilities within their cone. This structure acts as a constraint on the availability of appropriately-skilled officers to meet emergent challenges, particularly those on the scale of Iraq. Furthermore, FSOs also develop regional specialization over time, typically concentrating their assignments in regions or countries where language and culture are the same or similar. For example, a Spanish speaker might spend a great deal of time in Latin America but have little or no experience in the Middle East. The skills and specialization developed by FSOs are similar in nature to those among Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) within the Defense Intelligence Agency. The requirements for worldwide presence and the specialization of officers thus combine to further constrain availability of diplomats for any major staffing changes.

Brief Budget Overview.

The bulk of State’s budget is consumed by the cost of personnel and maintenance of overseas facilities. The current budget request for State (FY 2008) stands at just over \$10 billion, a sum intended to “fund the programs, operations, and infrastructure essential to conduct U.S. diplomatic and consular relations in more than 180 countries [as well as] vigorous U.S. engagement abroad through public diplomacy and international organizations.”⁸ This figure does not include the nearly one billion dollars in supplemental funding requested to cover costs associated with the Global War on Terror, which are to be expended primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹

The DoS budget is included within the broader International Affairs budget (the so-called “Function 150”), which also includes funding for USAID, support for various international organizations, Voice of America broadcasts, and ear-marked direct assistance such as “Camp David” support for Israel and Egypt. For comparison, \$4.5 billion of Function 150 money will go to Foreign Military Financing—a significant sum when considered against State’s \$10 billion budget proposal. The overall FY 2008 Function 150 funding request, which is sometimes confused with State’s budget, equals \$36.2 billion.¹⁰

In contrast to the DoD budget, State’s relatively meager resources are seen by many as inadequate to meet the needs of the current security environment. Another perspective reveals State’s efficiency and impressive “bang for buck.” Viewed against the history of U.S. spending, funding for foreign affairs has remained relatively consistent in real terms, while defense spending has changed dramatically as the balance between war and peace has shifted.¹¹ Since World War II, defense spending has remained at historically high levels¹² that reflect America’s emergence from isolation and its growth as a superpower during the Cold War era. Meanwhile, DoS funding has remained in a relatively narrow range.

Planning at State.

The broad perspective required of State (and its sister agency, USAID) demands systematic definition and prioritization. This focus is accomplished through an annually updated *Strategic Plan*. For example, the 2004-09 *Strategic Plan* defines the State/USAID mission as creation of “a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American People and the international community.”¹³ The plan enumerates 13 separate key priorities, ranging from Arab-Israeli peace, to stable and democratic Iraq and Afghanistan, to HIV/AIDS prevention, and alignment of diplomacy and development assistance. In essence, DoS has numerous ongoing priorities at all levels, to which are added any necessary responses to crises and emergent issues.

Unlike military planning, which focuses on meeting requirements for possible emergent contingencies (coupled with ample training to meet them), DoS planning revolves around constant, routine, and ongoing activities that are organized to address and advance national interests. In other words, while DoD primarily plans and occasionally executes activity in response to extraordinary circumstances, State plans daily activities aimed at shaping outcomes over time; DoD prepares for crises, DoS aims to avoid them. It is difficult to overstate the fundamental difference in these two approaches. While the differences in planning (and execution) are extreme, it is important to remember the goals are the same, namely achievement of national security and defense of national interests.

In order to convey national prerogatives issuing from the White House and Congress, State’s headquarters issues annual planning guidance to the various bureaus within the building, to its ancillary offices and to all missions abroad. This guidance is based on updated priorities and changes in policy emanating from the national policy coordination process. In response, each mission submits its wide-ranging “Mission Performance Plan” (MPP), which looks forward (5 years) and back (1 year), to its geographic bureau. Offices do the same within functional bureaus. MPPs are folded into respective Bureau Performance Plans which form the basis, along with functional bureau plans, for the department’s overall strategic plan.

MPPs, arguably the sharpest, most precise elements of DoS planning, are generated by the various country teams that exist at some scale in virtually every country in which the United States has formal representation. The teams range in size from a small handful of U.S. diplomats and locally hired staff to large embassies such as the ones in Cairo or Baghdad, which have multiagency bureaucracies rivalling those of many Washington-based departments. These MPPs constitute State’s operational plans and, in contrast to DoD’s Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) which are generated at the regional Combatant Command level, they have a country-specific focus. Each plan translates national prerogatives into goals and metrics relevant to the country in question.

Each MPP/BPP contains specific strategic goals, tactics to achieve them, delegated responsibilities, performance indicators, and an assessment of ongoing progress. The department’s overall Strategic Plan is compiled from aggregated MPPs and BPPs.

As noted, DoS plans are essentially guidelines for the conduct of day-to-day diplomatic activities in the field within offices and bureaus and within DoS headquarters. Planning is an annual exercise that serves to remind employees of the focus and priorities of the

department and the president, though the documents are not typically referenced daily by department staff. There is a loose but growing linkage between individual performance evaluation and a plan's targets. DoS planning is primarily aimed at fulfillment of the department's lead role in the interagency process to develop and implement foreign policy. Under pressure from Congress and informed by DoD planning prowess, State has improved its use of metrics and performance assessments over the last several years.¹⁴

Nonetheless, it is important to remember that State does not do war or campaign planning. Instead, DoS goals are general, requiring long-term, continuous commitment, and few operational objectives are identified. For State's planning, there is generally no identified "victory"¹⁵ but rather an attempt to shape and maintain ongoing relationships with foreign partners that are favorable to a broad variety of U.S. interests. Forward movement is usually incremental.

For many FSOs, armed conflict represents a catastrophic failure of diplomacy, whether such conflicts are internal to a country or more regional in nature, and whether or not they involve U.S. forces. This is a somewhat contentious assertion, even among State officers. While Sun Tzu argued that conflict is best won without military engagement, Clausewitz¹⁶ more famously concluded that war is simply politics "by other means." Nonetheless, U.S. diplomacy, since at least the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, has focused on avoidance of war as underscored by treaty language such as that contained in the UN Charter. From Sun Tzu's "sheathed sword" to Teddy Roosevelt's "soft walk with a big stick," the U.S. nature—except in extremis—is one of a peaceful nation for which war is seen as the last resort. In a recent conversation with an FSO concerned that the role of State was poorly understood by the general U.S. population, he said, "I tell people back home that our job is to protect American interests abroad, using everything in the toolkit that's legal and moral—and that we do it for pennies on the dollar of what DoD does. When we screw up, the wet works start and it's time to get out the check book." More elegantly, Secretary of State George Shultz said, "Today foreign policy is a unified diplomatic, military, and intelligence effort that must be tightly integrated—a team approach. It is wrong to say we have gone as far as we can with diplomacy and that it's now time for the military option. To do so is to fail."¹⁷

In any case, DoS plans and activities are relatively flexible, and significant changes from Washington or in the host country can be easily accommodated, initially on an ad hoc basis, and then more systematically via the annual planning exercise.

Transitions From and To Peace—The Crucial DoS/DoD Interface.

Traditionally, State's role has been to lead what the DoD describes as "Phase 0" or shaping activities which are intended to head off developments that might endanger U.S. interests or lead to costly conflicts into which we could be drawn militarily. As indicated, for many diplomats war is tantamount to failure of diplomacy, and so they pursue negotiations long after many would judge such pursuit to be fruitless or overly accommodating. Having emerged as a global superpower, U.S. interests have expanded over the last several decades, placing us in the midst of a variety of complex security situations around the world. This suggests conflicts will not always be avoided.

The transitions from peace to war and back again constitute perhaps the greatest challenge of cooperation and coordination between DoD and DoS. For the warfighter who is planning a campaign in the face of a conflict, it is useful to understand DoS capabilities and limitations.

When conflict occurs (or appears imminent) and a COCOM is engaged in campaign planning, DoS can generally provide significant information on a country-by-country basis (e.g., an understanding of local politics, economy, languages, and customs), contacts, and diplomatic services (overflight/access arrangements, consular services, and introductions to foreign decisionmakers). DoS can also provide linkage to international organizations, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and third-party countries of interest or concern. DoS works closely with USAID to carry out development and meet post-conflict reconstruction goals. While embassies are staffed by Americans on a rolling, tour-by-tour basis, the core of FSNs/locally hired employees within our missions abroad help ensure an in-depth understanding of local issues and a significant degree of continuity. It is useful to remember that DoS also provides a separate channel to Washington policymakers, which can augment or bedevil a commander's own lines of communication.

Most State officials, particularly those at lower to mid-rank levels, have little exposure to the military planning process and may have difficulty understanding DoD's more robust but relatively inflexible, top-down, step-by-step approach. While a small (but growing) number of State officers have served in the military, DoS colleagues are likely to be bewildered when confronted with a process that is focused more on "how" and less on "what if." However, country team representatives have the potential to make particularly valuable contributions in planning phases 0 and I, as well as in IV and V.¹⁸

Currently, the United States has official representation in 180 countries around the world. We are openly engaged in military conflict in only two – Iraq and Afghanistan. In the run up to these conflicts and long before the events of 9/11, policymakers had decided to withdraw official representation to both of these countries in response to their actions. While the wisdom of empty embassies is open to debate, this absence of representation reflects a progression of diplomatic measures intended to induce other countries to act responsibly within the global community. As circumstances within countries or regions deteriorate, the United States typically responds with stern warnings to governments, accompanied by coordination with allies and the larger international community to condemn aberrant actions (potentially accompanied by economic or political sanctions), followed by (as warranted) withdrawal of official representation, perhaps culminating in military action to force compliance. Indeed, this sequence is to a large degree mirrored in the UN Charter as the process by which "the common interest" is protected and "international peace and security" is maintained.¹⁹ Domestically, the U.S. Constitution also provides a division of responsibilities regarding use of force and engagement in conflict, identifying roles for both the President and Congress. Despite the traditions that have been generated by these founding documents, neither prescribes how to engage in military conflicts, nor how to reestablish peace once that is undertaken.

While the process leading up to conflict may be relatively linear (with a number of "exit ramps" along the way) and DoD's planning and execution for engaging in conflict

is unexcelled, the process for transitioning back to peace remains a challenge. Whether in the Balkans, the Korean peninsula, post-World War II Europe and Japan, Cyprus, or the Sinai, history shows that the imposition of post-conflict stability and the return to durable peace requires a long-term peacekeeping or peace-enforcing commitment. Both Iraq and Afghanistan present current examples of this axiom, and both continue to provide frustrating opportunities to test approaches. Ideally, a rapid handoff of the lead from DoD to civilian agencies would be accomplished in post-conflict situations. Yet as the examples provided above show, conflicts often end in a stalemate that requires some form of U.S. or international military presence for long periods of time. Due to limited resources and effectiveness in such situations, the promise of civilian solutions to these conflicts often goes unfulfilled. Such limitations have been recognized and moves are underway to correct them.

Historically, a key mission of DoS was to act as the “eyes and ears” of the U.S. Government abroad. The focus was on maintenance of stability and the status quo, with little pressure on sovereign governments to alter internal policies that were often antithetical to American ideals, and even less pressure on rogue elements within countries and regions. Under the effects of a changing world and a more active Congress, as well as the threat of international terrorism, that mission has been revised. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice currently uses the term “transformational diplomacy” to describe State’s metamorphosis in response to these pressures.

Transformational Diplomacy – State’s Corollary with DoD Transformation.

Secretary Rice is advancing the efforts of former Secretary of State Colin Powell to transform the DoS into a more expeditionary instrument of national power. She states that “America needs . . . a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself.” The objective of this transformation is to work with “partners around the world to build and sustain democratic states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” To do so, DoS is repositioning its diplomats from less problematic areas such as Europe and Washington to countries such as China, India, Nigeria, and Lebanon. State also wants to enhance its ability to respond to regional issues such as trans-national disease and terrorism, and is distributing diplomats beyond capitals into key population centers where we have had no formal representation in the past.

Another effort empowers “diplomats to work more jointly with our men and women in uniform.” This goal is being met by expansion of exchange postings to DoD and its commands and the establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS, from “Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization”), which foresees close coordination with the military in post-conflict environments and which will be able to call upon a wide range of civilian expertise extending from “police officers and judges and electricians and engineers, bankers and economists and legal experts and election monitors.”²⁰ This capability will be provided via an Active Response Corps or the “Civilian Reserve Corps” called for by President George W. Bush.²¹ Thus far, the administration has experienced difficulty in convincing Congress to directly fund CRS. As a result, its development remains very much a work in progress. DoD has been a supporter of

CRS and has assisted successful administration efforts to gain congressional approval for transfer of up to \$200 million from DoD's budget to DoS/CRS in certain cases. The other element of the CRS role, that of heading off conflicts altogether by helping to strengthen weak or failing states, will remain an aspiration until such time as resources become available.

Conclusion.

Our military is constructed to deter and, as necessary, wage war; our diplomacy is designed to employ peaceful means to advance our national interests. A key problem for the United States, and for the international community, is the relationship between these two activities. At issue is restoration of peace in post-conflict situations. In the final analysis, DoS and DoD remain focused on complementary but different approaches to achieve national goals. Against the broader debate over just how "intrusive" our foreign policy should be, officials at both departments are confronted with the challenge of implementing policy once it is promulgated, and doing so with structures and resources that reflect more of the bygone Cold War era than the present reality. Though changing, DoD's capability remains weighted toward conventional state-originated threats. DoS, also attempting to transform, is nevertheless ill-equipped to meet the increasing demand for stabilization and reconstruction services. DoS continues to exhaust its capacity in promoting our political and economic interests and encouraging reform in the dozens of countries in which we are not engaged militarily. It can marshal only ad hoc, poorly-resourced efforts to reestablish peace in the aftermath of war. Despite administration attempts to span the post-conflict divide to address recognized deficiencies in national capabilities, Congress has thus far refused to provide resources to do so. DoD, with relatively greater personnel resources and funding reserves, may therefore continue to be called upon to bear a disproportionate share of the stabilization burden.

The cultural differences between the two organizations also remain a challenge. Both have a professional corps that serve the national interests (i.e., soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the military, and diplomats at State). When not at war, the military uses its "down time" to develop sophisticated mechanistic approaches to ensure that the right force with the right equipment is in the right place to make war at the right time. Congress has largely supported those efforts. Meanwhile, the diplomatic corps, with no dwell time between deployments and in a constant state of engagement, has developed a system that responds to change as it occurs, seeking—by necessity—to elicit favourable outcomes instead of coercing them. The respective approaches of the two departments are perhaps similar to the difference between architecture and fluid dynamics or between science and art. The warrior approaches a problem by asking, "How can we get this done?" The diplomat does so by asking "How can we shape the situation to arrive together at a mutually desirable goal, while maintaining a relationship capable of addressing other important goals in a continuing process?" The diplomat knows he/she or a successor will be present when the dust settles, continuing to work with foreign counterparts to advance our national interests. Everything destroyed—both the concrete of infrastructure and the abstract of institutions—must be rebuilt. The warrior wants to finish his/her work, pack up, and return to base to prepare for the next challenge.

The differences here also provide insight into the diverse leadership challenges facing the Secretaries of State and Defense. The U.S. military, acting under plans in which everything has been delineated in black and white fashion, generally follows orders. Diplomats, functioning in a zone where almost everything is gray, see themselves as interpreters of national policy. Secretary Dean Rusk noted that Secretaries of State “must delegate the overwhelming bulk of decisions to hundreds of Foreign Service Officers, authorized to act on his behalf. The world has become so complex . . . that junior officers in the State Department now make decisions which before World War II would have been made by the Secretary.”²² While frustrating to the military officer expecting a clear chain of command and defined right and left limits, the conduct of U.S. diplomacy has been an effective instrument of national policy precisely because of its inherent flexibility.

There are, of course, other ways to avoid the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. We could simply ignore them. Or we could redouble efforts to avoid conflict in the first instance. The international system developed in the aftermath of the two world wars was intended to do just that. At the very least, our experience in Iraq is showing how important it is to gain the support of that system when we engage our military might. Doing so in the case of Iraq would have helped to increase the prospect that an international team – with players ranging from IOs/NGOs, to aid organizations, to national components from countries that have sharpened niche skills in a variety of post-conflict situations – would have been present to help carry out the work of reconstruction.

In view of its resource limitations, the present most valuable DoS role may be in helping ward off military conflicts. Whether that role is played by individuals such as Ambassador Tommy Thompson, who helped President John F. Kennedy avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union, or diplomat George Kennan, who thoughtfully laid out a strategy of containment against Soviet expansionism that avoided direct conflict, the skill and expertise of diplomats will remain crucial for our national security. Even within the context of the war on terror, the costs of unilateral action must be weighed against the buttressing effects of improved relationships with other countries – our natural allies in the fight against stateless extremism.

If we cannot avoid conflicts, we may need to develop additional capabilities to rebuild failed states. Otherwise, the present argument goes, we simply create breeding grounds for the extremism we fight against. History shows that nation building is an expensive, lengthy proposition, one that requires broad national commitment and interagency cooperation. DoD and DoS will lead in such efforts as a matter of precedent and necessity – Defense must secure and stabilize environments, and State must coordinate and shape outcomes. Ultimately, resources will determine the relative balance of these efforts, and decisions regarding those resources remain in the hands of our elected representatives in Congress. As Executive branch agencies, we must accept this constitutional process, even while we promote changes to address recognized shortcomings. For now, as defined by the resources made available, State’s primary job is to try to avoid situations of conflict that are the *raison d’être* of Defense.

ENDNOTES

1. See www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/faq, accessed April 24, 2007.
2. The Rogers Act of 1924 amalgamated these two functions and created the modern Foreign Service.
3. This phrase is actually Thomas Jefferson's, who, as president, paraphrased elements of President Washington's Farewell Address of September 1796. See Elmer Plischke, *U.S. Department of State: a Reference History*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999, p. 55. Plischke provides a much more thorough history of U.S. diplomacy than the limits this paper can accommodate. For a more colorful perspective of the pre-World War II period, see also Graham Stuart, *The Department of State: a History of its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel*, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949.
4. See for example, Gordon Adams, "The Politics of National Security Budgets," *Policy Analysis Brief*, Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, February 2007, p. 1. Adams offers views on a number of "advantages" enjoyed by DoD over DoS, as well as insightful policy recommendations to correct the imbalance.
5. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989; versus Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 237, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 44-76.
6. Article II, Section 2 of Constitution of the United States. It is worth noting that, under Article 1, Section 8, Congress also retains a number of relevant authorities, such as the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . ." and to "regulate the Value . . . of foreign Coin . . ."
7. Information in this paragraph was provided by the Department's Bureau of Human Resources.
8. FY 2008 Budget Request, *Budget Summary*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 961.
10. For a more complete breakdown, see the FY 2008 International Affairs Request, p. 12, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/80701/pdf, accessed April 24, 2007.
11. The fragmentation of foreign affairs agencies has left State at a disadvantage with regard to gaining a coherent foreign policy budget. See Adams, pp. 12-14. He writes,

The impact of differences between defense and foreign affairs . . . are cumulative by the time the budget requests arrive in Congress. Large, well-planned, integrated budgets that have ample supporting justifications from a single institution, show major domestic economic and political impacts, and are presented by an experienced team, do well in Congress. Budgets that emerge from multiple stovepipes, do not include future planning or a clear link to strategy, have limited domestic impact and are presented by a team that is not trained or focused on domestic politics or national security, do not do so well in Congress. The asymmetries of Congress itself only compound the problem.
12. In comparative terms and constant dollars, though not, as the military enjoys noting, as a percentage of the national economy.
13. This is from the most recently published *Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, p. 1. This was the first combined DoS/USAID strategic plan to be published.

14. See Adams, pp. 7-10, for discussion of DoD's PPBS process, and the resulting 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) that requires all federal agencies to engage in performance-based planning.

15. Henry M. Wriston, *Diplomacy in Democracy*, New York, Harper, 1956, p. 27. He writes, "It is not only bad form, it is bad diplomacy, for [diplomats] to win 'victories.' Such 'triumphs' are hollow, for they are bound to injure domestically the government with which the diplomat has to deal, and make future relationships and negotiations more difficult, needlessly."

16. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 87.

17. Quote from Rickey Rife and Rosemary Hansen, *Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 2.

18. Phase 0 - Shaping; Phase I - Deterrence; Phase II - Deployment; Phase III - Major Combat; Phase IV - Transition/Stability; Phase V - Redeployment.

19. The Charter of the United Nations, Introduction; Articles 24-51.

20. The vision for Transformational Diplomacy was laid out by Secretary Rice in a speech at Georgetown University on January 18, 2006. Text available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm, accessed April 29, 2007. For more on CRS, see Colonel John C. Buss, *The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its Interaction with the Department of Defense*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 09-05, July 2005.

21. See President Bush's January 23, 2007, State of the Union address, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/79286.htm, accessed April 29, 2007.

22. Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, New York: Norton, 1990, p. 525.