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CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS

The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism

A Joint Conference by
the RAND Corporation and
the Center for Security Studies,
ETH Zurich

Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau,
Andrew J. Curiel, Doron Zimmermann

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NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION



The research in this conference proceeding was conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center (IPC) of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. The conference was cosponsored by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international relations and security policy.

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PREFACE

The conference proceedings reported here are the result of a two-day conference on "Radicalization, Terrorism and Diasporas" cosponsored by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich—Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland; and by the RAND Corporation. The conference was held on 30-31 March 2006 in RAND's Washington, D.C. office and brought together a dozen analysts and academicians from some seven countries with expertise in Diaspora and migrant communities; processes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment; and terrorist organization, tactics, and targeting; together with an audience consisting of U.S. government officials and state and local law enforcement personnel.

The conference was undertaken as a part of a project titled, "The Early History of al-Qa'ida." Its purpose is to better understand the evolution and development of Al Qa'ida during its early years in order to anticipate how current and future like-minded Salafi-jihadist movements might emerge, mature, and develop. Through the presentation of academic papers along with discussion in plenary session and accompanying question and answer opportunities, we attempted to compare and contrast the experiences of select global Diaspora case studies with trends in recruitment and radicalization undertaken by Al Qa'ida among Muslim Diasporas in Europe and other parts of the world.

The overall project, within which this conference was funded, is being conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center (IPC) of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. The conference proceeding was cosponsored by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international relations and security policy.

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Comments specifically on this project memorandum are welcome and should be addressed to Drew Curiel at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; or by phone at 310-393-0411, extension 6075; or via e-mail at curiel@rand.org.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Diaspora¹ involvement in terrorist activity is not a new phenomenon; however, new trends have begun to emerge in the modus operandi of the global jihadist movement. Specifically, and perhaps most alarmingly, members of Diaspora communities are now participating in terrorist attacks against their adopted governments. Historically, Diaspora communities provided support to terrorist organizations involved in homeland conflicts. Violence may have occurred in their adopted countries, yet the government and its citizens were not the principal target of such attacks. Western governments often tolerated this support for violence because it was not considered an internal threat, but a foreign problem. Since September 11, 2001, this perception has drastically changed. Diaspora communities are not only supporting terrorist attacks targeting western countries; they are directly participating in them through recruitment, fundraising, training, operations, and procurement.

Terrorists who come from Muslim Diasporas can be placed into three categories: converts to Islam, second-generation failed assimilations, and first-generation migrants who do not fit into their new society. Each group presents its own challenges and affects different countries in a variety of ways.

The European Union frequently considers terrorism to be an internal threat, an issue that affects individual member states rather than the community as a whole. In fact, counterterrorism in Europe is traditionally approached from a legal and a policing perspective. As such, there is no democratically endorsed, obligatory, and comprehensive inter-pillar European Union (EU) counterterrorism policy.

¹ This conference did not seek to define the term Diaspora, nor did it limit the presenters' interpretations of the word. In his presentation, Francois Haut defined Diaspora as referring to "the dispersion of any group and its people, that is, any group or community that can be defined and delineated." While this may have been the general understanding of the word, it was not established as such. If presenters used the term in a different context, it was often explained in their remarks.

For political reasons, counterterrorism and immigration links are being avoided. Many European governments fail to accept that immigration has become permanent.

The fact that the July 7, 2005 (7/7) London bombers were British-born Muslims focused greater attention on the Islamic community. Interviews with non-British Muslims revealed the perception that Muslims are not prepared to integrate into British society; however, these interviews also highlighted the fact that Britons are not necessarily ready to integrate with the Muslim population either. The effects of 7/7 resulted in heightened tensions and negatively impacted social cohesion, and has resulted in an even greater degradation of race and religious relations in Britain than did the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The media is frequently blamed for legitimizing stereotypes and spreading false information.

Islam, which is primarily South Asian in character in the UK, has become a powerful identifying force among Muslims. Interviews suggest that British Muslims are very integrated into a global Muslim *umma*, or community. Events in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the Balkans have provided the driving force for activism and recruitment. Religion, not ethnicity, defines many second- and third-generation British Muslims.

After France, the Netherlands is home to the second largest concentration of Muslims in Europe, with individuals who practice Islam making up 5.6 percent of the population. These communities are concentrated in the country's four largest cities, and segregation remains a significant problem. Immigration in the Netherlands is decreasing, however. Reforms to laws governing immigration have made permanent settlement difficult, and many migrants have chosen to seek opportunities in other European countries.

Yet unlike communities in other European states, Diaspora communities have not carried out large-scale or multiple attacks inside the Netherlands; it is much more likely that Dutch citizens will be affected by terrorism while abroad. The assassinations of Theo Van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn are notable exceptions in that they were murdered on

home soil. This could also represent a new trend of assassinating highly public figures.

The Dutch government's approach to counterterrorism is broad and encompasses much more than law enforcement issues. Policies are aimed at preventing radicalization and other social problems. Combating segregation and youth disenfranchisement are priorities. Counterterrorism is being approached at the local level so that multiple administrative agencies, including Islamic organizations, are involved in decision-making.

Canada has a history of being a base or locale for many major organizations involved in homeland conflicts. In most cases, these groups have drawn all types of support from Canada's Diaspora communities, including attack planning and operational support. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is the most active of these terrorist groups. Canada has also been a financial and propaganda base for Palestinian organizations, and Sunni Islam remains the biggest focus of Canadian intelligence. Jihadist returnees, converts, and 'home-grown' jihadist youth pose potential threats and are a focal point of counterterrorism policy.

Despite this reality, there is little debate in Canada on terrorism, and many deny that it is a threat to the state. As such, security forces have not had the power or tools needed to confront the terrorist threat, and the government has not been successful at communicating a message to counter extremist ideologies. Many new immigrants are not integrating and tensions are growing.

The situation in France is quite distinct. The segmentation of society is strongly criticized and even denied. Nevertheless, the exclusion of groups—whether by choice or circumstance—has become a point of concern, culminating in the riots of November 2005. However, unlike in other European countries, violence among these Diaspora communities is not necessarily ideological in nature. Gangs control territories and participate in drug trafficking and black market operations. While some members are Islamists, for the most part, the population involved in such activity is not attracted to Islam; their main goals are economic, not religious.

The Muslim Diaspora in the United States is much more diverse than that in Europe. Questions of race, ethnicity, and religion are more disconnected in the United States than in other countries. The largest groups are Arabs and South Asians, and in general, Muslim immigrants tend to be well educated and economically successful. This reality has led many to argue that the threat of American Muslims participating in terrorist activities is not as immediate as that in other areas. While socioeconomic factors are certainly important in predicting the potential for violence, it is not the only condition; the risks of sleeper cells and 'hit squads' (groups that enter the country to carry out a specific attack) cannot be dismissed. The influx of conservative ideologies, the marginalization of Muslims (in the United States and abroad), and the growing level of anti-Muslim discourse could also influence certain individuals to become involved in extremist activities. In general, however, the American Muslim community has been active in combating terrorism.

While the environment in Africa appears ideal for terrorist organizations and the spread of extremist ideologies, the African Diaspora's involvement in jihadist activity has been very limited. The African Diaspora has, however, been involved in domestic armed struggles and ethnic conflicts and plays an important role in internal politics. Specific groups with ties to Diaspora communities, such as the Oromo Liberation Front, are popular and receive support from abroad. Yet few Africans, with the exception of North Africans, are affiliated with Al Qa'ida, and Africans have only modest feelings of solidarity with Arabs and 'Arab causes' such as Palestine and Iraq. Overt racism and cultural differences affect this relationship.

Humanitarian crises in Africa have led to an increased presence of Islamic relief groups in Africa. Wahabi institutions have also grown in influence on the continent. Nonetheless, Islam in Africa is noticeably distinct from Middle Eastern Islam. Yet the potential for extremism inspired by these sources remains a concern.

We are faced with the need and challenge of identifying emerging threats embedded in Diaspora communities, but it is imperative to avoid alienating these groups. Profiling must not risk alienation; there must

be a balance between prudence and paranoia. Governments must also consider how they approach this threat. Ideological counterweights must be established, and conflict resolution strategies need to be implemented so that individuals are not inclined to support or participate in terrorist activity. Western nations must also work with Muslim states and moderate Muslim leaders. Terrorism will be defeated by the Muslim community; therefore the active involvement of the Muslim Diaspora is imperative to combating the threat of violence and extremism at home and abroad.

CONFERENCE SUMMARY

BRUCE HOFFMAN, THE RAND CORPORATION

RADICALIZATION, TERRORISM, AND DIASPORAS

We are witnessing a new phenomenon of Diaspora communities turning against their adopted homelands, targeting the government and its people. This reality is important because of globalization: the volume of traffic and open borders makes the problem more acute. Six critical issues are particularly worrisome: (1) the demonstrated fear that communities will indeed attack adopted homelands; (2) the lack of integration has created recruits, affecting both the assimilated and the alienated. Some are attracted through recruitment and auto-radicalization—they are independent actors with no prior ties to terror groups, but become inspired and motivated to carry out acts done in support of or in sympathy with movements; (3) financial lifelines—flow of contributions; (4) Diasporas facilitate procurement of weapons; (5) Diasporas are useful propaganda platforms—new countries allow outlets that are proscribed in native countries; and (6) Diaspora communities can become enlisted and mobilized to lobby and influence adopted governments to bring pressure against governments in their countries of origin.

Diasporas as powerful agents is not a recent phenomenon. The Jewish Diaspora in the United States was extremely successful in lobbying Congress to pass resolutions denouncing the British in Palestine; Irish-American support of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was so great that upwards of 70 percent of the weapons found by British forces in Ireland were American; and the LTTE established a global network of arms procurement, support, and finance operations abroad for its cause. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used cultural events and political events to instill a common cause among the Tamil Diaspora and to ensure their radicalization and support.

Diasporas can provide four categories of support to terrorist causes: fundraising (through open techniques and organized crime); recruitment; procurement of weapons; and lobbying of adopted governments. These communities are effective in soliciting voluntary and involuntary donations and revenues. For example, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) engaged in political and fundraising activities that blurred the lines between politics and ordinary civic activity. In fact, one-half of the group's budget during the 1990s came from the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe.

Lobbying also plays a critical role: IRA-affiliated groups in the United States blocked arms sales to the British; and the LTTE has lobbied South Africa to stop selling arms to Sri Lanka. The old model of mostly passive and sometimes active Diasporas has changed to Diasporas being more active. In the past, Diasporas used adopted countries to attack diplomatic facilities—the adopted country was only the battlefield. There was a distinct shift in the 1990s, however, with the first World Trade Center bombing. Nidal Ayad, a Jordanian citizen who came to the United States, was fulfilling the American dream: he had a master's degree from Rutgers and a good job; he was married and had a child. Despite all of this, he became the brains behind the "witch's brew" used in detonating the bomb at the World Trade Center in 1993.

In another example of Diaspora communities becoming involved in attacks against their adopted country, expatriate Algerians in Paris began carrying out attacks on the metro system and local cafes in 1995. The adopted country is now not just the battlefield, but may also be the target.

This problem has become full-blown in the past two years. The July attacks in London demonstrate an unsurprising reality: radicalization of Diaspora communities in the UK had been occurring well before the July 7, 2005 attacks, and there were clear indications of such activity. According to British authorities, six major plots were foiled before July 7, 2005, and some 3,000 British Muslims trained in Al Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan and Yemen, among other places, before 9/11. Between September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 at least fifty British

Muslims left the United Kingdom to engage in terrorist attacks elsewhere. While some of these British terrorists were well educated, others had extensive criminal pasts.

Terrorists who come from Muslim Diasporas can be placed in three categories: (1) Converts to Islam, such as Richard Reid and Andrew Rowe. Within this grouping there are two sub-categories: 'hardcore,' long-term jihadis trained in camps; and 'walk-ins,' self-radicalized individuals who join the jihadist movement; (2) Second-generation failed assimilations, such as Omar Han Sharif, who led an attack against a bar in Tel Aviv. Sharif was educated at the London School of Economics, married with children, and prosperous. His political radicalization preceded religious affinity; (3) first-generation migrants who cannot fit into their new society and live life on the margins. The problem is that it is almost impossible to profile this adversary. They share a growing sense of aggrievement and frustration with a perceived war against the Muslim world by the west. This feeling is fueled by events in Iraq, Palestine, and the Balkans. This is not just a British issue, however; the genesis of the Madrid cell shows the complexity of the problem. Some of the Madrid bombers had lived in Spain for years, while some were recent immigrants. The cell also was comprised of political radicals and common criminals.

We are faced with the need and the challenge of identifying emerging threats embedded in Diaspora communities, but it is imperative to avoid alienating these groups. Profiling must not risk alienation; there must be a balance between prudence and paranoia. There is a great danger of playing into terrorist hands and following solely reactive policies, an example being the shooting of Mr. Menendez, the Brazilian citizen killed by British police on the London underground days after the 7/7 bombings. Such acts allow terrorist groups to speculate, "If this is what the West does to suspected Muslims, what will it do to an actual Muslim?"

DORON ZIMMERMANN, CSS

TERRORISM, DIASPORAS AND THE EU RESPONSE²

There is a very mixed image being presented to the European Union (EU). Imports, principally Al Qa'ida and its franchises and blowbacks, and jihadis returning from battle with significant operational experience from Iraq, are the two main concerns in Europe. Western converts also present challenges, as they blend in and are harder to track.

The EU is dealing with a set of problems, specifically, limits of the institution and a gap between the expectations of the EU and its form of constitution. Frequently the threat is perceived as an internal one, not necessarily to the European Union, but to its individual member states. The tradition of looking at this issue in this way goes back to the 1985 Dublin agreement, during which any type of crime except political crime was subject to extradition treaties. It is therefore no coincidence that the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not convict terrorists. For this reason, the tradition in Europe is that counterterrorism is approached from a legal and police perspective, although this has diversified somewhat since 9/11.

Many of the new counterterrorism measures in place today were developed before 9/11, only to be left on the back burner. September 11 accelerated the implementation of these ideas, some of which, however, were not linked to counterterrorism issues at all. The Anti-Terrorism Road Map, for example, is a strategy paper that establishes what needs to be done in certain areas and tries to track development and set deadlines.

The flagship of EU counterterrorism policy is the European Arrest Warrant, a multilateral, mutual extradition treaty. This, however, cannot necessarily be considered a European achievement. First, it is not the direct result of counterterrorism efforts; combating organized crime played a much more important role in its development. And second, considerable pressure from Washington accelerated its implementation.

² The Threat Assessments presented here are based on Europol reports.

Other counterterrorism tools employed by the EU include:

- The Joint Investigative Teams allow European member states to cooperate institutionally within the EU if the investigation requires work across borders. The controversial issue is a clause that involves third parties, potentially allowing CIA or FBI participation.
- Eurojust is an attempt to bring together magistrates, yet has a more advisory character than an operational one.
- Europol is often referred to as the most operational outfit of European institutions; however, in principle, it is a coordinating agency; it does not have an operational mandate. While it deals with intelligence exchange, for the most part this intelligence is criminal, not security related.
- The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism is a real achievement, as it sets a standard for terrorist crime, implicitly defining terrorism through the act—something the United Nations has been unable to do.
- The Action Plan on Terrorism tries to keep all these measures on track.

These initiatives are just several examples of how the European Union is going about developing its counterterrorism policy; there are currently upwards of 150 measures at different stages of implementation.

Where is the gap? There is no democratically endorsed, obligatory, and comprehensive inter-pillar EU counterterrorism policy. The pillars of the EU—economic, foreign policy and security policy, and justice and home affairs—do not have robust linkages. This has implications for the question of terrorism and Diasporas, as the Diaspora issue is seen primarily as one of immigration. For political reasons, counterterrorism and immigration links are being avoided. There is also no capability. The EU moves back and forth between expectations on the supranational level and practices on the intergovernmental level.

Effective instruments to combat terror at one time did exist. While they may not have been very democratically transparent or subject

to oversight, they operated successfully. The best example is TREVI (*Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale*), the inter-ministerial, cabinet level consulting group comprised of three chambers, the second of which dealt with counterterrorism. The Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT), TREVI's counterpart on the operational level, operates outside of the EU framework and is still functional. TREVI, however, was subsumed under the third pillar of the European Union. The EU is currently debating resurrecting TREVI as the Counterterrorism Group (CTG), a meeting of twenty-five ministers. Once again, the supranational expectation has devolved down to the intergovernmental practice because of the Union's political limits.

The EU finds itself in a predicament that is almost analogous to that of the Canadians after 9/11. That is, the European Union is waging a two-front war, facing both problems at home and increased U.S. pressure.

The problem we face is one of the *fait accompli*—the situation cannot be changed, but must be addressed as it is. We must therefore focus on countering radicalization. Integration in many ways has failed in Europe, in part because European governments have not engaged the reality that immigration has become permanent—migrants are not returning to their native countries as people once thought they would. Another problem that causes tensions in the Trans-Atlantic discussion on the subject is that Muslims, for a variety of reasons, are much more integrated in the United States than they are in Europe.

The EU considers immigration policies to be linked to issues of organized crime; but this does not traditionally apply to terrorism. This stems from the understanding that political crimes are member states' individual problems and should not be dealt with on a supranational level. Fortunately, this has dramatically changed since 9/11.

The Hague program demonstrates the acknowledgement of the linkage between terror, Diasporas, radicalization, etc. However, the Hague is now encountering the traditional blockage of the EU system.

We are now presented with several critical questions for debate and discussion. How are these issues addressed? Should the EU continue

with the known and unproven path of an integration policy that is predicated on a two-way process of mutual adaptation? Conversely, should the EU embark on a new experiment, which has been referred to by Sarah Spencer as 'inclusion,' the idea of greater participation by the majority citizenry? Should governments focus their attention primarily on these larger populations as opposed to immigrant communities? Of course these issues are hotly contested and viewed from very different perspectives.

The tools necessary for counterterrorism initiatives are not available because of the EU structure and the tension between what the body aspires to be and what it actually is capable of doing. There is also a tension between multilateral and narrow, nationalistic agendas. What is more, the political will to enact effective legislation does not exist. The Belgian Prime Minister's idea of a European 'CIA' was vetoed by the G-5 (UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), and demonstrates the tension between the 'haves' and 'have-nots.' Switzerland sponsored the Geneva initiative, but that effort also went nowhere.

The EU had a functioning system under TREVI and PWGOT; perhaps it should go back to it, as it is uncertain if effective counterterrorism programs can be effectively realized within the EU structure. It may be better to consider platforms outside of the EU, such as PWGOT, and focus on bilateral relations instead.

PAUL BAGGULEY AND YASMIN HUSSAIN, LEEDS UNIVERSITY

NON-MUSLIM RESPONSES TO THE 7TH JULY BOMBING IN LONDON AND THE MUSLIM DIASPORA IN BRITAIN AND ITS RESPONSES TO THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7TH JULY 2005

Bagguley and Hussain investigated how Muslim populations in the United Kingdom are viewed and how the July bombings affected Muslims' perceptions of themselves. Their findings show that September 11 added a complex layer to already strained relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of Britain. The attacks of July 7, 2005 only confirmed suspicions held of Muslims by non-Muslim Britons. While

terrorism is not new to the UK, confronting the threat of Islamic extremism is a relatively recent phenomenon.

The attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 impacted local relations between ethnic groups and enhanced tensions among different segments of society. Opinion polls show that most Britons consider British participation in the Iraq war to be the main reason behind the bombings on July 7 in London. A total of 56 percent of white Britons viewed Muslims as responsible in some way for the attack; 68 percent saw Imams or community leaders as responsible. Anti-Muslim sentiment is prevalent among non-Muslims in the UK, and what could be local or parochial conflicts are now often seen within the 7/7 lens.

The British migrant population is not viewed by Britons as being more integrated than other European immigrant populations. There is also a popular perception that Muslims are not prepared to integrate. It is an interesting two-way phenomenon: interviews made clear that Britons are not necessarily ready to integrate with the Muslim population either.

The United Kingdom, despite popular opinion, is unique when compared to Europe in that racial equality measures have been enacted, and it is generally understood that migration results in permanent settlement. In addition, Muslims have claimed more rights in efforts modeled on U.S. civil rights legislation. Protections, however, were initially indirect. It was still legal to discriminate against Muslims in employment matters until 2003, for example. Only recently has the debate over how to develop new legal mechanisms to prevent discrimination against Muslims intensified.

In August 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair unveiled a 12-point plan that included changes to border security, proscriptions to certain political activities, and a 50 percent increase in MI-5³ staff, with greater influence on recruiting people from diverse backgrounds, among other programs. Only five of the plan's points have been implemented with any degree of success, since managing multiple Diasporas has proven to be a problem.

³ The British security service responsible for protecting the country against national security threats.

The second part of the Leeds University study looks at ethnicity; the geographical placing of Muslim communities in the UK; the relationship between Muslims in Britain and the "global Muslim umma" (community); the relationship between Muslims and the media; and the July 7 bombings. Many of the conclusions came from interviews with Muslim respondents in Britain.

In the past four years, there has been a general questioning of whether or not Muslims can integrate into European society. Muslims have been accused of self-segregation and separatism. Even before 7/7, research was conducted on hostility toward Muslims in the UK. Claire Alexander, who writes on Asian men, masculinities, and religious identities, argues that even before July 7, many politicians and social scientists were discussing political identities and emerging religious problems. These academics only focused on Muslim religious identification and looked at the issue as problematic. A prime example is the British National Party, an extreme neo-fascist group that has gained in popularity since 9/11 and 7/7.⁴ It has changed its focus to South Asians in an attempt to separate the 'good' South Asians (non-Muslim) from the 'bad' (Muslims). The party has capitalized upon the popular stereotype of Muslims building mosques and overwhelming spaces, and has even published cartoons fueling anti-Muslim sentiment.

The fact that the 7/7 bombers were British-born refocused attention on British Muslims and has had a negative impact on social cohesion and order, creating greater tension. The interviews conducted for the study represented a range of opinions, from sensitive feelings affirming the positive aspects of multiculturalism to very anti-Muslim rhetoric.

The debate in Britain is now characterized by terms such as 'secularization,' 'integration,' 'assimilation,' and 'segregation.' No longer are topics such as pluralism, diversity, and multiculturalism discussed. The terminology has changed and the debate has become much harsher.

⁴ While certainly a white-supremacist group, the British National Party is not viewed by all academics as neo-facist.

The presentation of Muslims has also changed. Muslims are seen by non-Muslims Britons as irrational: The response to the publication of Salmon Rushdie's controversial text *The Satanic Verses* is a prime example. They also viewed prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and "bad" British citizens as terrorists. Ultimately, Muslims in Britain are defined in a bipolar perspective: they are either terrorists at war against the west or apologists who defend Islam as a peaceful religion.

The general reaction among the Muslim community in the UK following September 11 was disgust and outrage. Yet despite their solidarity with the American people, many Muslims were harassed after 9/11: people were spat on in the street, non-Muslims forcefully removed women's hijabs, and individuals were humiliated in public. Most of these incidents went unreported. Such attacks increased after the London bombings. Many Muslims came out as apologists, yet the harassment continued. Five hundred hate crimes were reported in the week after July 7.

Muslims represent the largest religious minority in the United Kingdom, numbering 1.6 million people, according to the 2001 census. Islam in Britain is primarily South Asian in character, with Indians, Pakistanis, and Bengalis representing the majority of Muslims. The Indian population is religiously diverse—only 13 percent of Indians in the UK are Muslims—while the Pakistani and Bengali populations are religiously homogeneous (92 percent Muslim). There are sizable groups of Muslims from other areas as well. In fact, "white" Muslims represent 11.6 percent of the Muslim population. It is estimated that 10,000 converts live in Britain, and conversions to Islam have increased despite the negative attention Muslims have received.

Segregation remains an issue in the UK. After the 1991 census, the idea became established that there were ghettos in Britain. The 2001 census revealed the segmentalization of British society more prominently. The existence of defined pockets of people contests the argument that Britain is multicultural and pluralistic. Some of these pockets were created naturally, yet others are the result of segregation. Local residency laws from the 1950s and 1960s made it so that immigrants had to rely on friends and family networks for housing.

Thus, while some immigrants chose to live in these communities, others had no alternative.

Interviews suggest that British Muslims are very integrated into a global Muslim umma. People are more confident in their Islamic identity, partly as a result of the racial hostility that they have experienced. Some Muslims are more wary about openly identifying themselves with Islam, through particular dress or behavior, however. There is also a deeper understanding of Islam, and the way this understanding is achieved has drastically changed.

The second-generation's language is English, thus separating them from the first generation. The mother tongue is spoken at home by force, not necessarily by choice. This language difference is essential in understanding religion. The first-generation's understanding of Islam is based on oral tradition; the second and third generations can learn about Islam through academic texts, many of which are in English.

The first generation understood religion and culture as conflated; the later generations divide the two and find religion, not ethnicity, as the more powerful identifier. There is now a transnational, global identification. The first Gulf War, Bosnia, events in Israel and Palestine, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq have all fueled this feeling of Muslim solidarity. Among the South Asian community, the debate has shifted to racial discrimination and "Islamophobia."

South Asian Muslims in the United Kingdom are seen as an Asian underclass. After 2001, there was a change in South Asian masculinities: men were seen as unable to integrate into society and as only relying on their strength to get by. A similar debate on Afro-Caribbean masculinities took place in the 1960s.

The older generation of immigrants in the UK is not aware of what is happening with the younger generations. 7/7 has highlighted this generation gap. Many blame institutions and believe that gaps in the system lead to violence among their children.

Relations between Islam and the media remain poor. The war on terrorism is seen as a crusade, and many Muslims feel that the war on terror represents attacks on Islam and promotes anti-Islamic sentiment.

Former Home Secretary David Blunkett's insensitive remarks about Islam intensified these suspicions. Baroness Thatcher said that Muslims should share in the responsibility for the attacks. The media has played a role as well, portraying Muslims as culprits after the attacks of September 11 and July 7. It is this rhetoric that makes all Muslims appear to be terrorists; those who are peaceful are viewed as just waiting for the right moment to attack. The media also misuses important terminology such as jihad, extremism, and fundamentalism. Many respondents blamed the media for spreading anti-Muslim bias and promoting the incorrect use of these terms.

In conclusion, we are faced with a problem of leadership, a crisis of representation, and uncertainty as to how the government should interact with Muslim organizations.

DISCUSSION

THE FOLLOWING WAS DISCUSSED AFTER THE MORNING PRESENTATIONS

"Diaspora" is a very difficult term to define, and it has many meanings. In Canada, the term is used quite narrowly, while in the United States it is used to describe an immigrant community. Are we conceding the point of discussing all immigrant groups as Diasporas? Perhaps we should instead think more about degrees of "Diasporaness." The term ranges in meaning from cultural preservation to remittances to much deeper issues. Once a group has lost the language and national identity, can you call it a Diaspora? If you just happen to be a French Muslim, do you belong to the Diaspora?

The problem exists of defining what it means to be British. Many of the activities that define Britons are not things that would characterize or even apply to British Muslims (drinking in a pub or watching a football match, for example). The emphasis of "Britishness" on culture is much more important to white Britons. The reality is that the UK is a multi-Diaspora state. At an individual level, this is not a concern; however, it becomes an issue at the political level.

The condemnation of extremist mosques must be kept in context: mosques condemn the perpetuation of violent behavior. When jihadists came back from the Afghan war, many tried to take over mosques and were

repelled. Richard Reid, for example, was kicked out of his place of worship. Mosques are not the problem because mosques are not recruiting individuals. Basements, backrooms, bookshops, youth clubs, the Internet, and other informal institutions are what we must focus on.

European Union (EU) member states are most concerned about their own countries. Governments are not worried about people going abroad for violent jihad, as long as they don't come back.

There is almost a systematic denial of the relation between marginalization and radicalization/violence. European governments are willing to say that this is an endemic issue.

BERTO JONGMAN, DUTCH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

TERRORISM AND DIASPORAS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Two assassinations of public figures in the Netherlands led to the situation that has been described as a "pressure cooker." The pressure has subsided, but it is still significant. The more recent—and much less publicized—assassination of a Dutchman who conducted research on police investigations could have greater consequences for Dutch society.

To combat rising tensions, the government has implemented a public awareness campaign consisting of radio and television advertisements and pamphlets to inform the public of the terrorist threat in the best way possible. The campaign is multiphased and three years in duration. The initial response has been positive.

Counterterrorism is being approached at a local level since local authorities will have to deal with the immediate impact of a terrorist attack. The government is meeting with local authorities to instruct them how to best deal with attacks in their communities.

Traditionally, disaster management is handled in a bottom-up manner; the scale of the disaster determines if it should be handled at the national level. For terrorism, this approach does not work very well. Depending on the type of attack, there should be immediate coordination on the national level and an effective public relations strategy to disseminate information.

The current government's policies are aimed at preventing radicalization. New methods of communication between Muslims and non-Muslims have to be developed. Only with the involvement of people on different administrative levels will results be possible. Cities with large Muslim populations are working toward this goal, focusing on segregation as well as economic and social problems specific to Diaspora communities.

Recent municipal elections revealed several interesting points. The nonindigenous Dutch population voted in a high turnout, mostly (about 80 percent) for the left-wing labor party. This group will probably form a coalition with the Christian Democrats. Voting trends also reveal that ethnic divisions are forming on party lines. New parties from non-indigenous populations will participate in the next round of elections. The Party of the Non-Indigenous Dutch (PAN) seeks to abolish the mandatory integration course, create a new ministry devoted to cultural development, and grant a general pardon to asylum seekers who have been in the Netherlands for five years.

All Dutch intelligence organizations are contributing to national quarterly threat assessments. The most recent report made several interesting findings. First, the Hofstad group is not the only organization that represents a threat to the Netherlands; there are 15 to 20 other groups similar in size.⁵ Second, the threat assessment also established that segregation in society is increasing. Third, ideological developments among radical groups have led to the neo-takfiri movement. Finally, the Danish cartoon scandal had implications in the Netherlands. The role of the Dutch military in putting down riots in Afghanistan only complicated the issue. What is more, the release of a second film surrounding Theo Van Gogh has raised concerns related to the Danish cartoon scandal. Some are worried that the

⁵ The Hofstad Network is a group of primarily Dutch Muslims of North African descent with connections to other terrorist organizations in Europe. The group's members have planned and in some cases carried out attacks on Dutch targets. The group was labeled the Hofstad Network by Dutch intelligence (AIVD) during its investigation of the organization.

release of such a movie will have violent consequences abroad or in the Netherlands.

The sentencing of the Hofstad group has raised important questions. A recent trial resulted in the first conviction for terrorist suspects and was the first trial in which evidence collected from an intelligence agency could be used in court. However, individuals are being sentenced not for terrorism charges, but for lesser crimes, such as possessing illegal arms. Jason Walters, a convert to Islam and the son of an American soldier and Dutch woman, is considered a senior member of the Hofstad group. However, despite planning to kill Dutch political figures that he considered anti-Muslim, he was sentenced for attempted murder, not attempted murder with a terrorist purpose. The judge in the case decided that the Hofstad group was a criminal organization with a terrorist purpose. The new terrorism legislation allowed for this finding.

The Dutch government has enacted new immigration reforms, including an obligatory integration course, a language exam that must be taken in immigrants' home countries (before arriving in the Netherlands), an increase in the minimum marriage age to 21, a required film on Dutch culture and way of life, and a stipulation that an immigrant's Dutch partner must make at least 120 percent of the minimum wage.

The introduction of a more restrictive immigration policy has resulted in a significant decrease in the number of requests for asylum. In fact, more people are leaving the Netherlands than entering. Immigration as a whole is down—immigration from Africa has halved— and emigration is on the rise. Nevertheless, the nonindigenous Dutch population is expected to rise from 19 percent to 30 percent in the coming years. The overall population will only slightly increase in the short term, and will eventually decrease. What is more, the proportion of the elderly will increase to 25 percent of the population by 2040, potentially causing shortages in the labor market. The government is considering abolishing the option to hold dual nationality as the number of dual citizens has more than doubled.

The Netherlands has a non-western, nonindigenous population of 1.6 million people, approximately 10 percent of the total population. Muslims make up 5.8 percent of the total population, giving the Netherlands the second largest concentration of Muslims in Europe (after France). These communities are concentrated in the four largest cities—Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague—and the level of segregation is increasing. The country is experiencing a “white flight” phenomenon—the indigenous population is moving away from urban areas and being replaced by immigrants. City administrations have been working to counteract segregation. Rotterdam has witnessed a decrease in segregation; however, segregation is rising in other cities. Officials and policymakers are paying more attention to nonindigenous youth, since a high percentage lives at or below the poverty line: 46 percent of Moroccans, 43 percent of Antilleans, and 30 percent of Turks. Social programs are being put in place to combat this problem.

The largest immigrant groups come from Turkey and Morocco. Groups from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and Suriname represent other large immigrant communities. Interestingly, people from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles show greater levels of segregation than do immigrants from Turkey and Morocco.

Most Africans came to the Netherlands as migrants. Many work below their educational skills, make little money, or are unemployed. African communities are spread differently over Dutch territory: the Angolese, Congolese, and Sudanese are more spread out than the Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Nigerians, who tend to be concentrated in large cities. Some are finding better opportunities outside of the Netherlands and are leaving. Dutch bureaucratic regulations are also motivating many to immigrate elsewhere in Europe.

When it comes to the link between Diaspora communities and terrorism, the Dutch had their first experience with the Moluccan community. Moluccans immigrated to the Netherlands in the 1950s instead of joining independent Indonesia. Most lived in appalling conditions; the second generation took steps to change this, and terrorism became a problem in the 1970s. In fact, a train hijacking forced government

troops to use military force in response to a terrorist act for the first time.

The lessons learned from these experiences are still being applied today. Counterterrorism is seen as much more than a law enforcement issue. The Dutch government tries to focus on radicalization within different communities.

The potential for violence among the Moroccan community is of great concern at the moment. Many Moroccans came to the Netherlands during the 1960s and 1970s as migrant workers with the intent of returning to Morocco. Many stayed and were later joined by their extended families, making the Moroccan community one of the largest Diasporas in the Netherlands. Many Moroccan youth have developed a counter-culture and a new identity as they feel that Dutch society does not offer them a promising future. In attempts to establish their identity, some have come into contact with radical ideologies that provide "ready-made" answers to their problems. This exchange is facilitated by the Internet and other informal methods of interaction. The process of radicalization can be an individual one; research suggests, however, that group dynamics and 'spiritual guides' play decisive roles. In this respect, there are constant battles between different intelligence agencies: the domestic intelligence agency is focusing on the individual approach, while others insist on international links. The reality is a combination of the two.

Moroccan networks are also considered the most dangerous. They use modern technology, particularly the Internet, and engage in "cut-and-paste" Islam: that is, they find and cite texts without understanding their broader context. Some groups are very autonomous and lack any hierarchical organization, although some authority figures may play a role. Most are inspired by extremist takfiri ideology (declaring an individual an apostate and thus allowing for his or her murder).

There have been few incidents of terrorism in the Netherlands; Dutch citizens are much more likely to be affected by acts of terror while abroad. The assassination of a parliamentary candidate and filmmaker Theo Van Gogh are notable exceptions. Does this represent a new trend of assassinating highly visible figures? Perhaps. There has

been a link established between such acts and the availability of Al Qa'ida publications and manuals.

The French historian Gilles Kepel distinguishes among three stages of jihad. In the third stage, he identifies Europe as a theater of jihad. This has become clear after bombings in Madrid and London and the assassination of Van Gogh.

Some numbers give insight into the terror/extremist threat in the Netherlands: there is a hard core of approximately 1,000 members; 35 to 40 radical organizations; 20 to 30 radical websites; a number of graduates of training camps and veterans of jihad; 150 to 200 potential fighters; and 20 to 30 ideologues. Though these numbers are constantly changing, they do give an idea of the situation.

The Dutch approach to terrorism is much broader than that of traditional law enforcement. The Ministry of Justice, for example, has three counterterrorism goals: prevent terrorist attacks; manage the consequences of attacks; and focus on the causes of terrorism. For each goal, the Minister of Justice has defined a number of specific projects to be implemented. One was the establishment of the position of a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The position became active two years ago and is the main new feature of Dutch counterterrorism policy. However, there is a debate over whether this department should be folded in with another ministry. When the new coalition forms after elections, it may be.

To reduce the threat of terrorism, policymakers must focus on developments in the big cities. Combating segregation and issues such as the disenfranchisement of youth must be priorities. Muslim organizations must also be involved in tackling these problems. The battle for hearts and minds is a long-term struggle, but a very important one nonetheless.

With respect to the next attack, Dr. Bruce Hoffman made clear that it would make much more sense for a terrorist organization to attack European targets: terrorist groups have the infrastructure and opportunity, and understand the political advantage of splitting the European-American alliance and/or of dividing and isolating the United States.

In conclusion, it must be understood that the threat is worsening and possibly shifting to new areas— the Scandinavian countries and Italy are now at greater risk. There is much left to be done. Muslim populations are growing and segregation is on the rise. If governments want to reduce radicalization, its root causes need to be addressed. The challenge lies in reconciling more restrictive immigration policies with more effective integration measures.

STEWART BELL, NATIONAL POST

TERRORISM AND DIASPORAS IN CANADA

Human Rights Watch recently released a report of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fundraising activities in Toronto and London (United Kingdom) and came to some startling conclusions about the level of extortion being used, particularly in Toronto. Fundraisers for the Tamil Tigers are aggressively going door-to-door in Tamil-Canadian communities soliciting money. Their efforts are quite professional: forms are required and personal information is input into databases to record a person's donation history. This information is even referenced when members of the Diaspora community return home to Sri Lanka and enter into LTTE-controlled areas. This is just one example of the group's fundraising tactics, but it also demonstrates the link between Canada's Diasporas and terrorist organizations.

Canada is often likened to a mosaic of cultures—as opposed to the melting pot image of the United States—and is home to large Diaspora populations. Just as Canada has a mosaic of cultures, it also has a mosaic of terrorist organizations.

Canada has a history of being a base or locale for many major organizations involved in homeland conflicts. In most cases, these groups have drawn all types of support from Canada's Diaspora communities, including attack planning and operational support. Canadian intelligence is monitoring fifty organizations and 350 individual targets, all from various backgrounds and countries. In fact, the former head of the Canadian intelligence service used to say that Canada was home to more international terrorist organizations than

anywhere else in the world, with the possible exception of the United States.

Canada's security troubles are similar to those faced by Europe. Additional problems arise from the country's relatively open refugee and immigration system. Canada's 4,000-mile border with the United States is also seen by some as a convenient launching pad for attacks on the United States.

Since Armenian extremists (ASALA) began using Canada as a place to attack Turkish targets in the 1980s, Canada has become home to many international terrorist organizations, including Hizbollah, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Egyptian Jihad, and Al Qa'ida. In virtually all cases, these groups have drawn some form of support from Diaspora communities located in Canada: Babbar Khalsa emerged and registered as a charity, allowing donors to deduct donations from their income taxes; Sikh extremists gained control of almost everything in the Sikh community and oppressed opposition; and Hizbollah was active in the 1990s and ran lucrative car theft and cigarette smuggling syndicates.

The LTTE is probably the most active terrorist group in Canada. Canada has the largest Tamil community outside of South Asia. In fact, Scarborough, a district of Toronto, is the largest Tamil city in the world with a concentration of Tamils even larger than cities in Sri Lanka. LTTE-affiliated groups have been very successful in lobbying the Canadian government and courting politicians. As such, the LTTE is still not listed as a terrorist organization under the Canadian Anti-Terror Act.⁶ The LTTE has seized control of most Tamil community institutions, including temples, media outlets, non-profit groups, front organizations, etc. The LTTE in Canada has also been involved in collection and tax schemes; however, the group has become much less visible after September 11. With a breakdown of the cease-fire in Sri Lanka, we have seen a resumption of their activities.

⁶ Canada's Conservative government added the LTTE to the Anti-terror act in April 2006 (after the proceedings of this conference were recorded).

Canada has primarily been a financial and propaganda base for Palestinian groups, although there have been ominous signs of this changing. After the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the co-founder and leader of Hamas, a Jewish school was firebombed and a letter signed by the Ahmed Sheikh Yassin Brigades was found stating that the school would be bombed when it was occupied if Israel did not change its policies. In 2003, an individual returning to Canada from Gaza was arrested for being trained by Hamas and sent back as a "sleeper" to later carry out a terrorist attack.

Canada has a vast MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) support network within the Iranian-Canadian community. A number of teenage Iranian-Canadians were recruited to go to a camp in Iraq. Many are still there, yet some have returned. MeK has been shaken by its designation as a terrorist organization, but the group has revitalized its mission somewhat with the current political climate turning against Iran.

Many of the terrorist organizations in Canada are emigrating there for "push factors"—the desire to pre-position people for financial, logistical, or operational purposes—as opposed to the common "pull factors" that attract immigrants.

Two major Al Qa'ida groups have emerged in Canada over the years. Kamal gained notoriety when one of its members attempted to cross into the United States with explosives for an attack on Los Angeles International Airport. The other is the Kadar network, based mainly in Toronto. Ahmed Kadar was the central figure of the organization before being killed in a skirmish with Pakistani troops in 2003. Ostensibly collecting money in mosques for widows and orphans, he actually sent the funds to Al Qa'ida training camps.

Sunni Islamic extremism is the biggest focus of Canadian intelligence. An impressive 70 percent of investigative targets are located in Toronto. Three trends have emerged: First is the importance of jihadist returnees: they serve as role models and recruitment officers. What is more, they have both extreme beliefs and the training needed to act upon them. Deportation proceedings against some of these individuals have been complicated by the Supreme Court's reluctance to deport suspected terrorists if they are from countries that use torture

or do not respect human rights. Since surveillance activities are labor intensive, several Canadians under surveillance for suspected terrorist activity have been able to slip away undetected. The major fear is that someone who "disappears" will return and carry out an attack.

The second trend involves converts. Approximately 3,000 Canadians convert to Islam every year, some to radical denominations. As newcomers, some feel the need to prove themselves to other Muslims. Others come from anti-social backgrounds and may be prone to violence. These individuals are harder to track, since many are already part of Canadian society.

The third trend is one of 'home-grown' jihadist youth: people who were born in Canada, are fluent in English, and have no trouble blending in. These individuals present a clear and present danger to Canada and its allies; however, they are almost impossible to identify and monitor.

What is radicalizing Muslims? Several factors: Family ties, specifically fathers with extremist views; spiritual leaders who preach extremist ideologies; religious conversion; and interpretations of events viewed through an "extremist prism."

Canada, as an open, human-rights oriented society that shares a border with the United States, is naturally vulnerable to terrorism. There is little debate on the issue, however, and many deny that terrorism is a threat to Canada. In fact, only four percent of Canadians ranked terrorism as Canada's foreign policy priority. This could be because of the reality that, while Canada has been a base for terrorist activity, most attacks have occurred abroad. Even the June 22, 1985 bombing of Air India flight 182 is seen as an incident that did not affect most Canadians, despite the fact that it is considered Canada's worst case of mass-murder, with 329 fatalities.

Canadian security forces have not had the power or tools needed to confront the terrorist threat. Canadian border police, for example, have only recently been permitted to carry firearms: There has been a lot of talk, but very little follow-up. In fact, the anti-terror legislation passed after 9/11 has only been used against one person, and it is not retroactive. This reality is compounded by the extreme

difficulty of recruiting informants. There have been blatant attempts to interfere in terrorist investigations, and some community leaders have encouraged others to avoid intelligence officials and not cooperate with investigations.

Canada has not targeted the terrorist inciters. These individuals are very good at getting their message out. Canada, on the other hand, is not communicating its own message. While Canada has very few immigrant ghettos, some newcomers are not integrating. Extremist leaders are urging newly arrived immigrants to resist adapting and instead to force Canadians to adapt to them. It is possible that Canadian security policy will change with the recent victory of the Conservative party. Canada's change in policy toward the Palestinian Authority shows a marked shift; however, much remains to be done.

FRANÇOIS HAUT, UNIVERSITÉ PANTHÉON-ASSAS (PARIS II)

TERRORISM AND DIASPORAS IN FRANCE

In this presentation, the term Diaspora will be used to refer to the dispersion of any group and its people; that is, any group or community that can be defined and delineated. Legally, there are no such groups or communities in France. The segmentation of the population into groups is strongly criticized and even denied, if not forbidden by law. France is, in theory, one and indivisible. Nevertheless, for quite some time we have noticed defined groups excluding themselves from the national entity. Some of their elements have used violence and intimidation to control the territories and populations they claim. These groups are mostly criminal entities and are literally street gangs. Almost all of their members come from the second or later generations of Diaspora communities that have settled in French suburbs, most originating from North Africa or Francophone Sub-Saharan countries. These groups practice technical terror (as opposed to ideological terror on a regular basis.

Unrest among Diaspora communities began during the 1980s in Lyon. Since then, the phenomenon has been analyzed from sociological and economic perspectives with much political correctness applied. The term "exclusion" is used to explain that some people do not live as the

mainstream does, but outside of society. Most of these people, however, do not want to live the way the mainstream does: they do not abide by the laws; practice polygamy; take advantage of social security and welfare programs; and do not pay rent, taxes, or mortgages. In most cases, exclusion is the deliberate choice of these people, despite the fact that society does as much as possible to discourage it. It appears that most of these neighborhoods live under the pressure of powerful street gangs.

In November 2005, France was overcome by riots. Many commentators speculated that it was either a form of Islamic revolution or the response to economic and social policies. In reality, the violence was sparked by neither. Several youths used an electrical plant as a hideout for stolen goods. While being pursued by the police, the young men sought refuge in the plant and tried to jump the surrounding fence. Two were electrocuted and killed. Immediately, violence broke out as many blamed the police and the French state for their deaths. Young people took to the streets in an instinctive reaction, not in support of a broad Islamic movement. Adults then took to the streets, demanding that their children be protected. The youth rejected peaceful protest, burning cars and fighting against security forces. Muslim associations tried to serve as mediators, but two days after the incident, the "elder brothers" went into the streets to try and stop the riots. A few days later, a brother of one of the young men killed in the police pursuit was arrested. This sparked even greater outrage.

While there were riots around the country, the violence did not last for three whole weeks, as many believe. Rather, violent protests took place intermittently over a three-week period. Each city was affected for only a few days. The media fueled the perception that the riots were much larger and more powerful than they actually were.

Gangs in France are not a recent problem. In 1993, criminal gangs and violent protests were also a critical issue; however few people are paying attention to this reality. Gangs control territory and maintain distinct subcultures. They are made up of a small, hardcore under-groups and cliques. Many gangs use rap music as a means of inciting violence, but they claim impunity. Drug trafficking, black markets, and

violence characterize neighborhoods where gangs control daily life. Intimidation is the favorite weapon of such gangs. Abductions are also common. In fact, individuals were taken hostage in more than 1,000 reported incidents in 2005.

There is very little information on Diasporas and gang involvement in France. French politicians have been afraid to break the French Republican model, yet police have noticed the reality on the ground for years.

Not all of these individuals are criminals, but they have a greater propensity for violence. Some gang members in France are Islamists; others have been attracted by another conception of terrorism. Some practice terrorism in France on behalf of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). Others have traveled to Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, the population involved in violence is not attracted to Islam. If such individuals identify with Islam, it is only on a superficial level. These gangs could become centers for recruitment, but their main goal is economic in nature, not religious.

MIKE WHINE, COMMUNITY SECURITY TRUST

TERRORISM AND DIASPORAS IN THE UK

Following the July 7 attacks in London and the planned attacks in Los Angeles, Australia, and elsewhere, new trends have begun to emerge in the modus operandi of the global jihad movement. These include, but are not limited to, the recruitment of nationals who train and operate within their country of origin; the recruitment of converts to Islam; the recruitment of women as terrorists; training in explosives and technical areas through the Internet; the development of low-cost terrorism; and the self-financing of terrorist acts. The Islamic ideologies that promote extremism are now becoming more influential. In recent years the presence of Salafi activists in Europe promoting jihad has also become more apparent. All these trends have emerged, particularly in the United Kingdom, and they are influencing British Muslims of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and African descent.

Immigration to Britain has occurred in distinct periods. Pakistani immigrants arrived in the late 1950s and 1960s, followed by emigrants from Bangladesh, and later from Africa. Political tensions during the 1990s in North Africa led to increased immigration during the last decade. What is more, immigration has come from very specific areas. For example, many Indian emigrants come from Gujarat, while Pakistanis tend to be from the Punjab.

The 2001 Census reveals that there are 1.6 million Muslims living in England and Wales; of those, an additional 42,000 live in Scotland. It is important to note that this Census question was voluntary, and it is likely that these figures are low. The government now privately accepts that there are around two million Muslims in the UK. Over two-thirds are from the Indian subcontinent, but only from a limited number of areas. Indian Muslims are primarily from Gujarat; Pakistani Muslims tend to be from the poorer districts of Kashmir and the Punjab. The 2001 Census also showed that almost 55 percent of Pakistanis and 46 percent of Bangladeshis were born in the UK. The Muslim population is one of the youngest in the United Kingdom.

Settlement in Britain has been geographically uneven. Almost half live in the London area and the West Midlands. Yorkshire and the Greater Manchester areas account for almost two-thirds of the rest. Turkish Cypriot Muslims live almost exclusively in Northeast and East London. More than half of the Bangladeshis are also concentrated in this area. It is important to recognize that prior to the migration of North African Arabs in the 1990s, the British Arab population was almost totally transient, composed of businessmen and students. This group was augmented by Arabs traveling to Britain to establish media outlets. Now the UK is home to more Arab-language media outlets than that of any Arab capital.

The number of mosques registered in the United Kingdom has risen significantly as well. In 1963, thirteen mosques were registered. From 1966, they began to register at any annual rate of nearly seven. Official lists from 1999 show more than five hundred mosques; other sources cite upwards of nine hundred. Virtually all mosques are registered as charities. Umbrella groups of mosques were established in

the 1960s to represent the varied religious positions of these communities.

Political and foreign events, not domestic issues, have provided the driving force for Islamist activism and recruitment, including Kashmir, the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, the first Gulf War, and Saudi Arabia's cooperation with American forces. In addition, Bosnia, the war in Iraq, and the situation in Palestine have all fueled outrage among Muslims. The publication of *The Satanic Verses* in 1988 was seized by extremists when the religious outcry had little effect on the government. Sunni groups took the initiative and leadership of the Muslim community's affairs, eclipsing the traditional and quietist leadership, and at the same time reducing Saudi influence, which had previously been dominant.

The failure of the UK, Europe, and the United States to assist Muslims in Bosnia gave legitimacy to the extremist argument that the West was complicit in the death of Muslims around the world. Despite eventual government intervention, it was too little, too late. Extremists were able to use this perception to incite anti-Western sentiment, as well as to recruit and fundraise. These Islamists emphasize transnational infrastructures and solidarity, while at the same time promoting Muslim insecurity in a society where racism has been shown to be institutionalized. This message of allegiance to the worldwide umma, or Muslim community, is therefore much more attractive than is allegiance to a society that failed to protect Muslim interests.

The UK is gaining a reputation as a refuge for foreign Islamist and Salafi groups, most notably from North Africa and the Middle East. Such groups use the freedoms afforded them by Britain to garner support, raise funds, mobilize political activity, and even affect command and control of terrorist activity in their countries of origin. Jihadist training abroad and the UK's attitude that this was acceptable as long as it did not affect the British state have complicated the current situation. The legal system has also exasperated the problem, as it allows appeals in extradition hearings and takes up to three years to bring certain cases to court. There have been delays in

extradition and sentencing as well. In the meanwhile, the global jihadist movement has gathered strength.

Returned war veterans have also played an important role among Diaspora communities. In fact, by 2001, their influence had penetrated even the South Asian communities in what has been referred to as the 'Arabization' of the South Asian communities. Among the first visible signs of the movement's greater influence was the takeover of moderate mosques in North London and Brighton. One of these became the base for organizing aid convoys to Bosnia and the other became a recruitment center. After 9/11, Islamist activity made further inroads. This process enabled the global jihadist movement to establish itself more deeply.

Three plots (possibly four) have been foiled since 7/7. A multi-pronged approach has been implemented involving legislation, law enforcement, and financial countermeasures. Counterterrorism has adapted from temporary measures to permanent laws. The UK has slowly changed its legislation to fit today's reality. The terrorism of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was very different than that of the current threat: terrorism was domestic, operatives used bombs and bullets and aimed to avoid capture, and there was an end goal that could potentially be reached through negotiation. Islamic terrorism is global, fluid, employs suicide attacks, is designed to cause mass casualties, and offers no negotiable solution.

It has been recommended that permanent terror legislation be based on the new definition and concept of terrorism. The government has dealt with the issue in two parts. The most urgent was put into an act in 1998, which made it illegal to conspire to acts abroad, for example. The terrorism acts of 2000 and 2001 were more far reaching.

The current anti-terror legislation before Parliament is bringing the situation up to date, as it bans the incitement or encouragement of terror, including that propagated through the Internet; criminalizes certain terror-related acts; and extends the detention period for those accused of such crimes. The plan is contentious, since many of its provisions are considered broad and problematic.

Appropriations to security services have increased, including funds for a doubling in the size of forces. The priority is to examine future security needs and to implement the findings. For example, Al Qa'ida assets have been frozen, financial networks to prevent terror financing are being put into place, airline passengers are being screened upon entry and exit, phone and Internet data are being stored for six months, and measures to prevent identity theft and fraud are being considered. A national identity card is also a potential measure to prevent terrorist activity, as is extending the requirement for citizenship to four years.

Seven working groups of leading Muslims were asked to look into tackling extremism. Their recommendations are currently being considered by the government. The effort is to marginalize extremist clerics and prevent extremism through collaborative relationships with places of worship.

It cannot be said that the British government failed to learn the lessons of 9/11 and 7/7. Policymakers took action and recognized new trends. British authorities knew that a terrorist attack was only a matter of time. If criticism is deserved, it should be directed toward the pre-9/11 stage, when jihadists were allowed to penetrate British society and spread extremist ideologies.

Challenges still exist: it is argued by some that the government's decision to deal with some extremist factions has alienated moderates. The focus on race and not religion has also caused problems.

DISCUSSION

THE FOLLOWING WAS DISCUSSED AFTER THE AFTERNOON PRESENTATIONS

The recruitment of terrorists in prisons by imams (Muslim religious leaders) has been a critical issue as well. Ten years ago, authorities began to realize that prisons were a potential recruitment threat and that there was no surveillance of imams. Restrictions and measures on recruiting imams who work in prisons have tightened recently in several western nations; however, the problem is not universally recognized.

In 1998, Abu Qatada, a radical Palestinian cleric released a fatwa (religious pronouncement) that gave permission to Muslims to steal from non-Muslims and apostates. Even though another covenant specifically forbade this activity, certain individuals accepted it, and some members of Diaspora communities became more involved in funding jihadist activities.

There is currently a struggle to control the ideologies that imams preach. The majority of British Muslims have traditions that are very different from traditions in the Middle East. There are growing elements in the Pakistani community that seek to promote Sufi ideologies, for example.

Women seem to keep out of this debate more so than do men. However, there is pressure from women to change Islam so that it has a more occidental way of life. This of course is very anecdotal, but it could help in understanding the current thinking of particular groups.

Despite the prevalence of mosques in certain communities, it is inappropriate to focus on mosques as breeding grounds for terrorist activity. Many moderate leaders have sought to sideline extremists, and since 9/11, pragmatic security concerns have pushed extremists out of mosques and into backrooms and basements. These individuals fear infiltration by security forces and for this reason limit their activities to closed environments.

Even if Salafis were to be replaced with Sufis, there would still be terrorism. Jihadis are radicalized by leaders from the fringe.

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TERRORISM AND DIASPORAS IN THE UNITED STATES

Despite the negative stereotypes and growing suspicions following September 11, Islam remains the fastest-growing religion in the United States. This demographic reality is due to immigration, high birthrates, and conversions, especially among African Americans. This phenomenon is distinct from that which exists in Europe. Christians are converting to Islam in greater numbers. However, the numbers debate in the United States is highly ideological: lobbyist groups publish

statistics and at times compete against each other to prove their varying positions.

Currently the largest Muslim immigrant groups entering the United States are Arab Muslims and South Asian Muslims. Historically, Arabs in the United States tended to be more diverse in national histories and colonial legacies.

Arabs have been immigrating to the United States since the late 19th century. Up until the 1960s, most were Christian. From 1875 to 1892, Muslim immigrants came from the rural Levant and all were seen as "Syrian" or "Turks." Most simply disappeared or otherwise dissolved into American society. The second wave of immigration occurred between 1910 and 1922. The 1930s also saw an influx of Muslim immigrants as people began to flee the economic and political crises after World War I. The fourth wave came after the end of World War II. These new arrivals were better educated and came primarily from urban centers. After 1965, we saw a major wave of immigration. Although it is impossible to tell how the attacks of September 11 affected immigration, it is clear that there has been a decline. Refugees, specifically from Bosnia and Kosovo, continue to arrive. While these populations are legally different from immigrants, it is important to remember that when it comes to integration, they are the same. Overall, the boundaries that separate these immigrants tend to be drawn by culture and tradition, not necessarily by religion.

South Asians have a stronger socioeconomic profile than do Arabs, and are arguably more privileged than Arabs living in the United States. Muslim immigrants in the United States, as a whole, are well educated and economically well off. Muslims in Europe, however, tend to be the opposite.

There is a vibrant Sufi voice in the United States, much more so than in Europe. In fact, American converts tend to be attracted to these Sufi groups.

Muslims are not as homogenous in the United States as they are in Europe. One can see the entire Muslim world in the United States. This reality makes a large difference in how Muslims perceive themselves.

Questions of ethnicity, race, and Islam are more disconnected in the United States than they are in Europe.

The establishment of Islamic institutions in the United States has followed the same agenda as in Europe. From the 1970s to the 1990s there was a booming of Islamic organizations, even more so than in Europe. There are now upwards of 2,000 Islamic institutions, two thirds of them founded after 1975. The visibility of Islam is thus a recent phenomenon in the United States.

Most analysts agree that most Muslims are not drawn to terrorist groups. Fewer Muslims in the United States are attracted to extremist groups than their counterparts in Europe. According to a study by the *Washington Post*, of some four hundred individuals arrested, only thirty-nine had a connection to terrorism, and only nineteen were affiliated with Al Qa'ida. Individuals such as Jose Padilla and those involved in the California prison plot of 2005 have violent pasts independent of their affiliation with Islam.

There are two ways of looking at the Diaspora-terrorism threat in the United States. First, the risk of sleeper cells, groups that have formed but wait to carry out a specific attack, cannot be dismissed. Jihadis could potentially integrate into society and plan an attack. The Lackawana group, for example, was composed of eight men, all of whom were second-generation immigrants and U.S. citizens. This group, however, cannot be considered a cell, since it lacked a specific mission and target. It is interesting to note that all eight men were rejected by the Muslim community. In Europe there is much more protection extended to similar groups.

The second threat is that of a "hit squad," or a group entering the country with a specific terrorist purpose. This has occurred twice successfully that we know of in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and on September 11, 2001.

The Diaspora community in the United States has been active in combating potential threats. For example, Muslims assisted in the case of "Azzam the American"—a convert who threatened America on broadcast videotape—and helped identify Adam Gadahn as the perpetrator. This rejection of extremism is not seen in Europe.

Many analysts put forth a socioeconomic argument, citing that Muslims in the United States are not drawn to global jihad because they tend to be much better educated and economically better off than their European counterparts. Over half of American Muslims have a college degree, and 50 percent make over \$50,000 annually. Socioeconomic factors are certainly part of the reason; however, they cannot be considered the only condition. Since many terrorists come from the middle class, it is not enough to say that the United States is safe because Muslims are well off.

There are three potential factors that could trigger greater interest in terrorism by American Muslims. First, conservative religious interpretations could become more popular. Statistics are not necessarily accurate indicators of religious practice, especially since many religious surveys in the United States are conducted by Muslim groups themselves. In a 2003 survey in Detroit, for example, participants were asked what type of interpretation they follow in their mosque. Eight percent of respondents stated that they followed a Salafist or Wahabi model. After 9/11, it has become almost impossible to find a "Salafist/Wahab" mosque in the United States. After 9/11, it is also extremely difficult to monitor mosques and learn what they propagate. Personal interviews are much more effective. Questions such as "What makes a good Muslim?" give much more insight. Observing Muslims' interaction with outsiders also sheds light on the issue.

Second, the marginalization of certain Muslim populations could result in greater isolation. Individuals that fail to bond with a broader community may be forced to seek out relationships with more radical groups, thus becoming radicalized themselves, not by choice, but because of the group dynamic. For this reason, it is important to focus on fringe communities and individuals alienated from society. Individuals will find networks that accept them; the threat exists that marginalized communities will turn to radical groups.

Third, the level of anti-Muslim discourse could trigger feelings of vulnerability and a defensive approach. In interviews, Muslims are very critical of the media and politics, but when it comes to interacting with Americans they are very positive. Muslims convey the

American dream and still think that it is possible after 9/11. This sentiment demonstrates a feeling of belonging and identification. European Muslims, even those of younger generations, are not making this distinction between the media and European citizens.

As a result of greater Islamic discourse, the term "Muslim" is more legitimate. More people are identifying themselves as Muslim because it is their main way of interacting with others.

It is important to remember that in the United States people are not hearing extremist ideologies in mosques, but from other sources. Academics are not necessarily potential conduits for radicalization, since they tend not to be operative people. Unbound wanderers are those who spread this extremist message.

Support for Islamic groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah or Islamic Jihad tends to be passive, and identifiable mainly through zakat, or religious tax. There is, however, clear and full support for the Palestinian struggle. Could this be a path to radicalization? There is mixed opinion on this— people disassociate what they consider legitimate political support from violence. For example, individuals who see the Palestinian struggle as legitimate may fund Hamas, but completely reject violence. They see their support as strictly political; it is a very thin line.

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AFRICAN DIASPORAS, DIASPORAS IN AFRICA, AND THE TERRORIST THREAT

The African Diaspora is defined as immigrant and second-generation populations abroad. For the most part, Africa is used in this context to mean Sub-Saharan Africa.

Several countries must be seen as Diaspora countries/nations because of civil war and refugee flows. This African Diaspora can be very high: for example, one-third of Eritreans live outside of Eritrea. These groups play important roles in their home countries through remittances, business investment, and politics. The Diaspora mobilizes in the time of elections, and expatriates may even hold political office. When an armed struggle erupts in a country, the Diaspora often raises money and supplies support. The Oromo in Germany are an

important factor in supporting the Oromo Liberation Front, for example. In fact, many leaders of these resistance groups are based abroad.

Approximately 260 million Muslims live in Africa, one-third of the total population. The vast majority has a strong Islamic heritage; there are few recent converts. They practice a Sufi Islam that is very integrated with pre-Islamic beliefs. This Islam would not be up to the standards of Wahabis or Salafists.

The African Diaspora's involvement in jihadist activity in Europe and the United States has been very limited.⁷ Few Africans are affiliated with Al Qa'ida (this of course is not the case if you consider North Africa), and susceptibility of jihadist cells has been moderate. What is it about this group that inoculates them from terror cells? They are poor, marginalized, and disenfranchised; populations are divided on religious lines; and domination of Muslim minorities by other religious groups is common. The environment in Africa appears ripe to recruit youth to participate in terrorist organizations, yet Muslims, for the most part, are not attracted to the jihadist movement.⁸

The hurdles faced by Africans to immigrate to the United States or Europe are prohibitively high. This could limit their attractiveness to terrorist organizations trying to send operatives to the West.

Africans generally only have modest feelings of solidarity with Arabs. Africans often experience levels of overt racism, and events such as the genocide in Darfur work to drive a wedge between African and Arab Muslim populations.

Transnational crime is a long-term concern. The informal remittance networks have been misused at times by terrorist groups, and this could become a larger problem in the future.

Economic desperation of many illegal African immigrants could make them more vulnerable to participating in terrorist activity, not necessarily for religious reasons, but for economic ones.

⁷ A notable exception is the failed London bombings of July 21, 2005, in which all of the participants were East African.

⁸ There has been, however, detected Al Qa'ida activity in Somalia and southern Africa; the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an Al Qa'ida affiliated group, is also active in the Sahel.

Dubai is the business hub for East Africa, and for Al Qa'ida as well. This is of great concern, especially when it comes to making sure that the African Diaspora in Dubai does not become involved in extremist activity. The African Diaspora in the Persian Gulf has been susceptible to Salafist ideologies and has played a part in bringing those ideas back to the continent. In addition, some East Africans have become attracted to conservative Islamic organizations offering scholarships. Poor treatment of Africans in the Gulf has continued to drive a wedge between the two groups, however. The increased exposure to Gulf media outlets needs monitoring. More satellite dishes mean more access to potentially dangerous opinions and perspectives.

There also exists an intra-African Diaspora comprised of Africans traveling within the continent for more opportunities. These individuals tend to be illegal immigrants and have few legal rights. These conditions make them more susceptible to both recruitment and violence.

The non-African Diaspora in Africa is of great concern. A small percentage of these immigrants are attracted by the illicit economy, corruption, low level of government control, and soft Western targets. Al Qa'ida and other groups, for example, are involved in diamond smuggling as a means of supporting their operations. Some use legitimate commercial activities to disguise their illegal dealings.

Humanitarian crises have led to an increased presence of Islamic relief groups. Most are legitimate organizations, yet some are used as cover for sleeper cells and human trafficking rings. What is more, the expansion of Salafi mosques funded by Gulf countries has been tremendous in recent years. These institutions are "package deals," as communities are provided with a mosque, funds, and an imam. Some of these spread anti-Western and extremist ideologies and strive to "purify" African Islam. These mosques also target Muslim populations in which the state is dominated by non-Muslims in order to take advantage of disenfranchised communities.

In general, Africa is of secondary concern to Al Qa'ida and other terrorist networks. The continent does, however, provide a very permissive environment for terrorists. Yet, while some Al Qa'ida

members have fled to Africa seeking safe haven, it has not become the refuge many feared it would.

It is important to focus our efforts not on the vast unconquered zones of Africa, but the on semi-governed urban centers. The deserted areas are not permissive for anyone—lawlessness, corruption, and poor transportation and communication networks make it difficult for terrorists to operate. Large cities such as Nairobi, however, present ideal conditions. They are ethnically diverse and full of soft-targets.

All terror in Africa is local: global grievances do not have the same traction they do in other regions. As such, African involvement in attacks against the West has been limited. Africans do, however, play a role in assisting groups fighting against African governments. These activities are based on ethnic grievances.

There are several reasons why Africans have remained relatively immune to recruitment despite their profiles. Still, questions remain. Is it because poor Africans are so busy working to survive that they do not have time to become involved in such activities? Is the answer cultural in nature? Is there just no appeal to terrorism? The answer could also have to do with discrimination: a feeling that it is not an African agenda, but an Arab one. There is also the fact that suicide among Africans is very uncommon. This might not be the sole reason behind lack of terrorist involvement among Africans, but it certainly could play a role.

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AL QA'IDA AND DIASPORAS

The quality and quantity of support for terrorism by Diasporas has changed significantly. Globalization, particularly that provided by the Internet and affordable travel, has changed the type of support that Diasporas are giving to terrorist cells. All attacks in the West, with the exception of the Oklahoma City bombing, have had some form of Diaspora involvement. All four 9/11 pilots were members of Diasporas, either in the United States or Europe. From this history, we must conclude that Diasporas are vulnerable to indoctrination and participation in terrorist activity.

The greatest change we have seen is that members of Diaspora communities are now *participating* in terrorist attacks, not just supporting them. Cells are mutating into operational networks. Radicalized, politicized, and mobilized segments of society feel angry and have access to propaganda.

Before 9/11, attacks originated in the "global south" because 95 percent of terrorist organizations came from this area. Attacks on the global north were carried out by people who came from the south. Now these groups have developed networks in the global north that have transformed into operational cells. Attacks on the north are being carried out by people in the north.

There are various means of support that Diasporas can give to terrorist groups, including propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, procurement, safe housing, training, and multiple identities, among others.

There are two types of networks: primary, or those that generate support; and secondary, those that carry out attacks. Currently, these differences do not matter as much. In the past, host countries often tolerated support for terrorist activity in their own country because it did not affect them. Because the West wanted to be politically correct, it enacted no legislation and made little attempt to understand the repercussions. Groups might have been monitored by intelligence services, but they were rarely disrupted. This all changed after 9/11.

There are three primary means of penetrating communities: front, cover, and sympathetic organizations (such as human rights groups or charities). Terrorist networks cannot mobilize the Diaspora community without first creating these institutions. It is a fact that most financial support for Diasporas comes from the Persian Gulf and from the West, primarily because the quality of life in these areas is very high and allows citizens to generate and send money abroad.

The threat of Diaspora groups can be classified into three categories: home-grown groups; resident groups; and external threats. These three group categories are being fueled in their mission by Iraq.

It should be no surprise that Diaspora communities have produced terrorist operatives. There has been a history of such individuals traveling abroad to carry out attacks, the "Mike's Place" (a local bar) bombing in Tel Aviv being a prime example. At that time, British citizens had also traveled to Kashmir and to Afghanistan for jihad. Since the UK was already producing suicide bombers, the events of 7/7 should not have been such a surprise.

Individuals are ideologically driven, not operationally driven; however, we see governments investing in the reverse. We must develop ideological counterweights and invest in conflict resolution strategies so that Diasporas of the global south are not inclined to participate in or support terrorist activity. The threat can be managed if we work with Muslim countries strategically.

The operational link is important because many members of the Crevice cell⁹ in the UK had trained in Pakistan, as did three of the four 7/7 bombers. Training therefore is very important, and authorities must monitor individuals who have been trained abroad. Such individuals could be more dangerous than auto-radicalized individuals.

Three trends can be identified relating to terrorism and Diasporas. Terror networks among Diaspora communities are becoming multinational and there has been an increase in participation among converts. Networks are also very young; many members are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. This represents a new development. Finally, people are becoming more educated. Almost all of these individuals are university graduates, and some have advanced degrees.

Members of the Diaspora community no longer need to go abroad for training. The bombs being used in attacks are manufactured from easily accessible products. The information on how to assemble these weapons is also readily available on the Internet and in published manuals. It is impossible to prohibit the purchase of these materials; however,

⁹ In the Crevice Operation, British police raided a home in suburban London and found half a ton of ammonium nitrate. The cell's plot revealed to British authorities the home-grown nature of the jihadi threat.

governments must pay attention to those individuals who buy certain products, especially in large quantities.

The disruption of terrorist cells in Australia makes it clear that this is not just a European or American problem. In fact, the Australian cell was very similar to the group that carried out the London bombings. Most were converts who were either born in Australia or immigrated at a very young age.

We must maintain the edge of monitoring and identifying threats while engaging communities. Terrorism is a byproduct of extremism, and therefore we must target extremism. We must work with Muslims, and perhaps more importantly, stop demonizing Muslims and perhaps even stop demonizing jihadis. The key is the Muslim community, as it is this group that will defeat terrorism.

DISCUSSION

THE FOLLOWING WAS DISCUSSED AFTER THE MORNING PRESENTATIONS

How successful are Gulf attempts to purify Islam in Africa? In the long-term, we do not know. It is certain that Salafi/Wahabi mosques are filling a void and will not be challenged anytime soon. In fact, they are frequently the only provider of services. However, Africans have been very pragmatic about playing various organizations against each other, and not necessarily proscribing to the beliefs of the agency that is providing aid. We will be able to tell how great an impact these mosques and charities are having when we can look at the second generation of students at these schools, especially in terms of scrutinizing the education they receive.

We must be careful when criticizing governments for being politically correct. It is not necessarily true that they are just being politically correct; they may be protecting civil liberties.

It is important to note that there is a cultural opposition to certain practices in Africa. Salifism/Wahabism in Somalia, for example, is seen as anti-Somali, an argument that goes over very well with indigenous communities.

Discrimination in Europe might make European Diaspora communities more susceptible to extremism. This trend could be changing in the

post-Iraq world, as Islamism and Jihadism are moving toward the center; that is, more and more Muslims, including educated Muslims, are now participating in jihadist activities. Perhaps Americans could become susceptible to extremism as well. More and more individuals believe that Islam is under attack; governments have done a poor job of countering this argument.

The radicalized immigrant community has a greater attraction to Zarqawi than to bin Laden because Zarqawi is seen as being at the forefront of the global jihad. His strength is the Levant, however, and it could spread to the West, the United States included. After moving to Iraq, recruitment in the Arab peninsula has been the most significant. Instead of expanding his network in Asia, Europe, and North Africa, we see that Zarqawi is building a network similar to Osama bin Laden's in Afghanistan. He is linking up with supporters and sympathizers and may soon have a network parallel to Al Qa'ida's. His ambition goes far beyond Iraq.¹⁰

There is an absence of moderate Web sites on the Internet. It is important to provide a counterbalance to radical ideologies, and we must invest more in such programs.

¹⁰ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2006 outside of Baqubah, Iraq.