

## **Evaluating Mission Training Fidelity Requirements: Examining Key Issues in Deployability and Trainability**

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### ***EVALUATING MISSION TRAINING FIDELITY REQUIREMENTS***

*Due to infrequent training while deployed, warfighters' skills can decay, thus creating a training gap. Deployed training has historically been hindered by restrictions to live-fly training opportunities due to factors such as ops-tempo, airspace/range restrictions, security issues, alert requirements, and wartime rules of engagement. In order to maintain high proficiency and readiness levels, changes are needed in standard training programs while warfighters are deployed. The United States Air Force's Distributed Mission Operations (DMO) concept has become critical to warfighter training across all mission areas. Despite an increased reliance on DMO training, a deployable DMO training capability does not exist to provide the critical training opportunities previously unavailable during extended deployments. Moreover, while researchers have discussed and described the tradespace associated with varying levels of physical and functional fidelity, opportunities to conduct controlled studies to examine and quantify "how much of what kind of fidelity" for skills improvement and maintenance are few and far between. This presentation will describe a series of research studies underway at the Warfighter Readiness Research Division in Mesa*

Schreiber, B.T.; Bennett, Jr., W.; Rickard, R.; Bell, J.; France, M.; Greschke, D. (2006) Evaluating Mission Training Fidelity Requirements: Examining Key Issues in Deployability and Trainability. In *Virtual Media for Military Applications* (pp. 15-1 – 15-8). Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-HFM-136, Paper 15. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: RTO. Available from: <http://www.rto.nato.int/abstracts.asp>.

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE <b>01 JUN 2006</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Evaluating Mission Training Fidelity Requirements: Examining Key Issues in Deployability and Trainability</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Lumir Research Institute 195 Bluff Avenue Grayslake, IL 60030 USA</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>See also ADM002024., The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

*Arizona designed to assess within-training and training transfer to live operations for both individual and tactical teams, with varying levels of fidelity in the training environment. These studies are examining a variety of specific parameters associated with achieving and maintaining combat readiness and proficiency. We conclude with discussion of our longer-term plan to demonstrate and quantify the impact of deployed training and rehearsal environment on transfer to the operational environment and to subsequent retraining intervals.*

## **1.0 CHANGING TRAINING NEED**

A shift in available resources and changes in the strategic environment demand a transformation in how we prepare the warfighter. The financial cost of actual training events has increased, while the opportunities to conduct actual training events have decreased. Operational tempo, security issues, alert requirements, environmental restrictions, encroachment on training areas, and the reduced tolerance of the general population for close proximity of military training have all combined to make it more difficult to carry out the type of live training activities common 20 or even 10 years ago [1]. Additionally, the emphasis has shifted towards smaller deployed forces capable of operating anywhere, anytime, day or night, and in all weather. Training must, therefore, transform to support the needs of the force. Often, our warfighters are deployed for extended periods of time, but without sufficient opportunity to train/maintain their skills. This insufficient deployed training results in skill proficiency loss, reduced readiness, and additional training time later to reconstitute those skills. Unfortunately, deployable systems for use in-theatre do not currently exist to fill this training gap. In order to maintain high proficiency and readiness levels, changes are needed in standard training programs while warfighters are deployed.

Meeting the training need of the deployed warfighter encompasses a range of requirements. Ideally, a deployable system would allow the warfighter to train critical aspects of the “job”, i.e., the transfer environment. The “job” is, of course, more than what is learned in the classroom and more than just checklists and emergency procedures. A warfighter must be prepared for Mission Essential Competencies (MECs), which are the higher-order individual, team, and inter-team competencies that a fully prepared pilot, crew, flight, operator, or team requires for successful mission completion under adverse conditions and in a non-permissive environment [2]. The conditions of performance in this MEC definition are most important. The focus here is on *combat conditions* to define standards of warfighter performance [3].

### **1.1 Distributed Mission Operations Training as a Solution**

Distributed Mission Operations (DMO) training capabilities can be generally defined as affording the ability to bring a number of warfighters together to train complex individual and/or team tasks during the course of larger-scale, realistic combat missions [4]. The very definition of DMO appears to align closely with the combat-relevant conditions of performance necessary as part of maintaining MEC proficiency. Interestingly, in 1991, a time period just preceding DMO, researchers [5] surveyed 94 F-15 air combat pilots and discovered higher order experiential areas as receiving less than adequate training in their current unit. The experiences identified were: bogey, reaction to SAMs, dissimilar air combat tactics, all-weather employment, electronic countermeasure employment, communications jamming, low altitude tactics, chaff/flare employment, escort tactics, track-while-scan assessment, and work with the Air Weapons Controller. The F-15 pilots also felt all of these experiences were better suited to the simulator, this opinion provided even during an era in which much of the benefits of networking and the emerging DMO environment were still absent! The early evidence for simulator advocacy was not isolated. Other practitioners in 1993 [6] interviewed 99 F-16 pilots, who reported that the highest “difficult aspects” of attaining/maintaining mission-ready status were weapons

delivery, radar interpretation, electronic combat, cockpit switchology, and air-to-air combat. When the F-16 pilots were asked which ground-based medium they would like to see used more, the most preferred option was the simulator.

Another large sample pilot opinion study was conducted recently, specifically on contemporary DMO training. In that study [7] the authors surveyed 327 F-16 pilots and 49 Airborne Warning and Control Station controllers, who based their opinions on experiences obtained during a five-day DMO training research program containing over 40 total air combat scenarios. “I would recommend this training experience to other pilots/controllers” was rated with the highest rating possible of “Strongly Agree” by all but one of 49 controllers and all but 16 of 327 pilots. When asked to rate to what extent the DMO environment provided the 45 different F-16 critical air-to-air experiences (defined by the MEC process), the pilots rated that 38 experiences (84%) could be obtained “to a moderate extent” or higher, more than all seven other training environments surveyed.

These large sample, opinion-based studies reveal warfighter advocacy for DMO, but how effective is it as a training device? Recently, a large-scale study was done specifically to examine DMOs training effectiveness [8]. 76 F-16 teams (384 pilots) flew for one week in DMO and were “tested” at the beginning of the week and again at the end of the week on mirror-image point defence scenarios. On the post-test, the teams, on average per scenario, allowed 58.33% fewer enemy strikers to target, killed 9.20% more enemy aircraft, reduced F-16 mortalities by 54.77%, and registered 55.20% less time allowing hostiles into vulnerable ranges. Also part of this study, expert observer ratings—both those taken in real-time and those done according to a scientifically blind protocol—revealed statistically significant improvements as a function of the DMO training. The improvements in expert ratings were found both for briefs/debriefs and also for mission execution, corroborating the objective results. DMO training is obviously an effective training paradigm, but no DMO solution currently exists to fulfill the deployed warfighter’s training need. So, what are the issues involved in researching and building a deployable DMO solution?

### **1.2 Issues in Researching and Building a Deployable Distributed Mission Operations Tactical Trainer**

Designers and users of training devices often attempt to replicate as many physical and functional stimuli as possible in a training device [9]. The goal here is often to increase physical fidelity (i.e., look & feel) and functional fidelity (i.e., the dynamics, or “actions”), two arguably interdependent system aspects [10]. Prior research addresses familiar themes in building the “right” simulation training environment, with many of the issues revolving around the level of fidelity needed. In general, the literature tends to support the notion that higher fidelity will translate into a better training device (e.g., [11]), but this does not mean that effective training devices must all be high fidelity. Indeed, even low fidelity pilot trainers absent of stick and throttle have shown to positively transfer compared to a control group [12]. Further, some studies have shown that added fidelity does not significantly contribute to performance [13]. As a rule-of-thumb, however, increasing fidelity tends to increase the training utility and value, perceived and/or real. But, increases in fidelity are coincident with costs [14]. Increasing costs almost inevitably leads to fidelity compromises. One solution is to build a reconfigurable system capable of training different platforms (e.g., [15]). However, adopting a reconfigurable system does not ameliorate, and may exacerbate, the difficulty of choices needed to be made when it comes to cost versus fidelity.

To build a capable deployable DMO tactical trainer (in our case an F-16 tactical trainer), a number of objectives are desirable, including the ability: (a) to train forces with a realistic mix of experiences from strategic to tactical levels; (b) to integrate live, virtual, and constructive elements within a common synthetic

environment; (c) to integrate low density/high demand assets through distributed simulation; (d) to practice missions requiring a “total team” environment to meet national objectives; (e) to meet institutional training goals and needs for individual, collective, and joint/coalition training; (f) to tailor training for individuals and teams; (g) to support Air Expeditionary Force training and preparatory spin-up and sustain wartime readiness; and, (h) to provide joint training with command linkages. To work towards these objectives, scores of decisions must be made regarding physical fidelity (e.g., display field of view, stick and throttle, switches, etc.), and functional fidelity (e.g., flight model, weapons models, threat generation system, etc.). Of course, the same central question presents itself: In building a DMO environment, how do we know which fidelity components, when interconnected, provide the best training value for the money spent? And, once the system is built, additional questions must be addressed, including those that relate to assessing, tracking, and comparing warfighter performance both within a deployable DMO system and at other locations. That is, what approach needs to be taken to assess combat readiness and proficiency across sites? Such questions, properly addressed, would provide answers for the degree of training transfer between environments, skill acquisition rates, and recommended DMO retraining intervals.

**2.0 APPROACH**

To build and complete sound empirical evaluations of all possible, practical, variations of deployable DMO tactical trainers is cost-prohibitive, especially given the rapid change in technology progress and alternatives. Therefore, the approach of choice should be appropriately aggregated so as to avoid assessing all possible technology interaction effects, yet still provide meaningful information. A simple approach yielding data-based recommendations is needed. Likewise, an approach to assessment, tracking, and comparing performance needed to be simple if it is to be implemented successfully across sites. These common assessments would provide the proficiency-based data needed to help answer questions regarding skill acquisition, decay, training transfer, etc.

**2.1 Building and Evaluating the System**

Our goal for the deployable system is to meet the needs of the warfighter with a level of fidelity that best prepare him/her for *combat experience*. To this end, we are able to leverage outputs from the MEC process, in which operational warfighters are brought together and define a critical list of experiences they believe would fully prepare a warfighter for combat. In the case of the F-16, the MEC process identified 171 total experiences across a variety of mission types (e.g., air-to-air, air-to-ground, suppression of enemy air defense). Selected examples of the F-16 experiences are provided in Table 1. Note that many of the experiences require the simulation to be a *system of technologies* to include sophisticated capabilities (e.g., night vision, various threat capacities) and multi-player connectivity (e.g., buddy lasing, large force employment).

**Table 1: Selected Mission Essential Competency Experiences for the F-16**

Performing buddy lasing	Unlocated or pop-up threats
Employing weapons with degraded systems	Using chaff/flare for threat reaction
Operating in mountainous versus flat terrain	Seeing surface-to-air threat launches under NVG
Large force employment	Degraded aircraft avionics

These 171 experiences provided us with a comprehensive set of mission/tactical level ideals. To augment this exhaustive tactical level list, we chose to add the emergency procedures (EP) list from the United States Air

Force Dash One document for the F-16. The MEC experiences and the EPs, if fully and faithfully realized in any DMO environment, would represent the highest trainability/usability standards we could hope to achieve. Hence, the warfighter-centered list therefore became our system evaluation criteria.

Since scientifically evaluating all technological permutations was cost-prohibitive and impractical, our initial deployable DMO build/configuration was decided upon by examining the spectrum of MEC experiences for *common* underlying functionalities/requirements. Examples of these included F-16 flight dynamic model, threat generation system, avionic displays, visual display system, simulator connectivity, weapons models, terrain database, etc. For each common area, an initial low-cost solution was identified, procured, and integrated, thus creating an initial, baseline deployable DMO configuration. This configuration was documented in a survey and is in the process of being evaluated by F-16 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), who separately rate the ability of the system to provide each of the MEC/EP experiences. Analyses will reveal the system's trainability/usability by each experience and EP, by aggregated mission area (e.g., air-to-ground), and overall. Examining commonalities amongst the lowest rated MEC/EP experiences will reveal the technological deficiencies that need to be addressed (e.g., insufficient field of view). The deficient functionalities will form a follow-up survey. In this survey SMEs will rate each deficiency against each of the MEC experiences/EPs for the degree to which each detracts from the ability to gain/train that experience/EP. The results will provide a priority order of fidelity/technology areas to be upgraded, constrained by cost considerations.

Once this evaluation/development cycle is complete, a number of scientific opportunities become available. First, we can re-evaluate the (upgraded) system to determine the training value added for the cost incurred. Second, we can implement the same survey evaluation process on other, higher fidelity environments for additional comparison of trainability/cost. And third, in conjunction with data from the first two efforts, we can re-use the same two-cycle evaluation/deficiency survey process iteratively in building the deployable DMO system to determine the point of diminishing returns, in terms of added trainability/usability for additional costs. Though this approach cannot delineate all possible interaction effects between technology subsystem components, it does provide us cost-effective data-driven assessments of the overall system and the fidelity/cost trade-offs involved.

### **2.2 Need for Standardized Assessment Suite (SAS) and protocol.**

Once a configuration of the deployable DMO trainer is settled and deployed for training use, a number of research questions arise. Research will need to be undertaken in the deployable trainer to examine skill acquisition rates needed to meet proficiency, skill decay rates (for new and experienced pilots), training effectiveness, and degree of transfer between the deployable trainer and live-fly and other DMO training environments. To examine these issues, a central, critical need is to quantitatively assess *proficiency* using a standard, controlled protocol. Doing so permits comparisons of warfighter skill levels both longitudinally and across sites. To meet this assessment criterion for addressing the research objectives, a standardized assessment suite (SAS) will need to be developed to evaluate warfighter performance within not only the deployable trainer, but also any other DMO location used as part of the investigation.

Conceptually, the SAS approach provides a common method to compare warfighter proficiency across all DMO environments (e.g., simulator, live-fly training, exercises, and potentially combat locations)—similar to the method of using Graduate Record Exams (GRE) across universities to assess student proficiency. At periodic intervals within the deployable trainers (and other DMO locations), a set of missions would be performed under strict, standardized data collection protocols. The set of missions to be performed would be a sample of the suite, representing a spectrum of difficulty. The scenarios comprising the mission “set” to be

periodically flown would be a sample of the overall library of available “test” missions. The assessments for all scenarios would be standardized, leveraging final product versions from three projects currently under development: (1) MEC vignette knowledge test [16], (2) subjective assessment of skill proficiency [17], and (3) objective data collected directly from the simulation systems [18].

At each DMO location, experiment control of the standardized assessment suite and a protocol for managing the training conditions and for data collection will be required. However, no restriction is needed regarding who participates and when, only that demographic data is captured on each participant when he/she performs a SAS set of scenarios (e.g., dates of participation at each location and relevant moderator training events such as weapons school). By utilizing this approach, data can be collected on all participants through each DMO environment, thereby maximizing sample size. By controlling the SAS tests and tracking other moderating demographic variables of interest, sufficient data can be collected at each site to allow for the application of multiple regression and/or mixed models of analysis to subsets of the database that address specific research questions of interest.

These mixed models of analysis will use the standardized assessment suite as a multivariate outcome space and use other variables (site/fidelity, pilot, important potential moderators) as predictors to address the research questions of skill acquisition rates to meet proficiency, skill decay rates, training effectiveness, fidelity to meet proficiency criterion, and degree of transfer between DMO environments. In addition to the benefits of collecting data observationally at each DMO location (i.e., not having predefined experimental conditions) and therefore maximizing sample size, the SAS approach was also chosen because it: (a) minimizes necessary DMO environment controls, this method is likely to introduce the lowest amount of risk; (b) requires fewer controls to implement, track and enforce, leading to the lowest research labor cost possible; and (c) ensures data in the alternative environments will be tracked according to their operational uses, resulting in an ability to compare DMO training strategy implementations and relative effectiveness of each environment. This SAS approach, if successful within the deployable trainers and a few other DMO locations, would then become a key component in the USAFs training transformation plan to augment the Ready Aircrew Program with competency-based assessment.

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# Background




- To keep pilots' proficiency at a high level, training must transform due to:
  - Increased costs: Live-fly expenses costly, absolute number of large scale exercises relatively infrequent
  - Real world restrictions: Operations tempo, airspace restrictions, security concerns, and ROE limit live-fly training capabilities in deployed settings.
  - Strategic and deployment shifts: Emphasis on smaller forces deployed anywhere, anytime, in all weather and non-permissive environments.



# Background



- Distributed Mission Operations (DMO), a system of networked entities fulfills many of the training needs:
  - Provides multi-player teams opportunities to train on complex individual and/or team skills in large scale, realistic combat missions.
  - Can be linked to a Performance Evaluation Tracking System that transparently measures behaviors.





# DMO Justification



- The evidence that DMO can meet AF training needs is strong:
  - 1991 Survey (Just preceding DMO): 94 F-15 pilots reported inadequate training in their current unit for (among others):
    - Multi-bogey engagements
    - Low-altitude and dissimilar air combat tactics
    - All weather conditions
    - Jamming
    - Work with air weapons controllers
  - 1993 Interviews: 99 F-16 pilots reported training inadequacies with many “difficult aspects”
  - The 1991 and 1993 pilots specifically identified simulation systems as the training system most likely to correct training shortfalls.
  - 2002-2005 DMO Study: 76 F-16 teams (N = 327 pilots), participants in week-long DMO training, strongly endorsed DMO for providing Mission Essential Competency experiences.




# DMO Justification



- Warfighter endorsement is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to establish DMO efficacy. The '02-'05 DMO Study provides objective evidence.

— 76 teams (327 pilots) flew pre/post scenarios:

- Were all point defense
- Were mirror images
- Equally complex



— The performance changes from the beginning to end of week provide unequivocal evidence of DMO training efficacy, e.g.:

- 58.33% fewer enemy strikers reaching target,
- 9.20% more enemy aircraft killed,
- 64.77% reduction in F-16 mortality, and
- 55.20% reduction of time spent in vulnerable ranges.
- Above performance metrics corroborate real-time and blind ratings by expert observers.



# Deployed Training



- “Bathtub effect”—frequently just burning dinosaurs
- A deployable form of DMO is a significant step toward meeting deployed training needs of the Air Force
- Conclusion: Need affordable, deployable, systems so that significant, Mission Essential Competency (MEC) training occurs in those operational settings.
- A DMO system that meets the needs of a deployed pilot will fulfill a number of important criteria simultaneously. It will:
  - Train specific, critical, individual job skills,
  - Provide practice on individual, intra-team and inter-team skills, and
  - Provide realistic missions in adverse, non-permissive environments.



# High Fidelity DMO Environment





# Deployable DMO





# Deployable DMO





# Deployable F-16 Cockpits





# Deployable F-16 Cockpit





# Mission Training Fidelity Requirements



What are the issues in building a deployable DMO system?

- Fidelity: Designers try to create physical (look and feel) and functional (dynamics) fidelity in training devices.
  - Higher fidelity generally leads to better training devices, but
  - Increases in fidelity increase cost, so
  - Tradeoffs among training objectives, costs and physical and functional fidelity are inevitable.
- Component/option variations: A deployable DMO system involves almost limitless potential combinations of options that it is not possible to empirically evaluate all possible systems.
  - FOV, IGs, software, threat models, databases, etc.
  - Configurations change rapidly! Where to spend \$\$\$?
- Empirically Assessing Deployable Systems: Focus on systems that prepare warfighter for combat experience.



# How to Evaluate Fidelity and its Effects on Utility?



- **Need applied method/process**
  - **Based in warfighter needs**
  - **Efficient**
  - **Cost effective**
  - **Iterative**
  - **Produces data-driven recommendations for procurement and engineering upgrades**
- **Goal is to understand (through data) the training utility by mission essential area and to provide priorities/recommendations on how to upgrade.**
- **Higher level findings and recommendations—i.e., not research into detailed fidelity levels (e.g., JNDs)**



# Fidelity Evaluation (Documentation?)



<b>Resolution</b>	1280x1024	1280x1024	1280x1024
<b>Scan scheme</b>	Non-interlaced	Non-interlaced	Non-interlaced
<b>Type of display</b>	7ch VIDS	Torroid	4ch VIDS
<b>Horizontal FOV</b>	360	270	216
<b>Vertical FOV</b>	135	70	135
<b>Contrast</b>	30:1	10:1	10:1
<b>Sim code</b>	Fortran/C++	Unk	Ada/C/C++
<b>G-suit capable</b>	No	Fittings only	No
<b># geogr. areas</b>	1	5	1
<b>Blurring?</b>	Yes	No	Yes



# Mission Training Fidelity Requirements



## Start with the MECs

- An Empirical Method of Assessing Deployable Systems: Focusing on preparing the warfighter for combat experience led us to use of the MEC outputs. The MEC process identified (across A/A, A/G, & SEAD missions) 171 F-16 experiences crucial to combat mission success, including, for example:
  - Performing buddy lasing
  - Employing weapons with degraded systems
  - Large force employment
  - Seeing surface-to-air threat launches under NVG
  - Degraded aircraft avionics

The 171 experiences (plus 27 emergency procedures) are the core of a set of system evaluation criteria to be used by SMEs. The 198 evaluation points organized into four mission areas (A/A, A/G, SEAD, EPs).



# MEC-Based System Evaluation Survey




We are trying to identify the extent to which you can gain various experiences with the simulator (or system) you have just become familiar with. Please check the box that corresponds to the extent to which you can or cannot obtain each experience in this simulator/system. The system to be rated here is: DTT ver1 (see specification sheet for all technologies/systems included)

To what extent are you able to gain each experience below?		Rating Scale to be used:					
		0 N/A. (Can't experience at all—capability does not exist)	1 Capability to experience exists to a <u>very poor extent</u>	2 Capability to experience exists to a <u>poor extent</u>	3 Capability to experience exists to a <u>moderate extent</u>	4 Capability to experience exists to a <u>good extent</u>	5 Capability to experience exists to a <u>very good extent</u>
1	Employing a Maverick						
2	Strafing						
3	IR fog						
4	Participating in coalition/joint strike package						
5	Unlocated or pop-up threats						
6	...(survey continues with all experiences listed as rows)...						

**Note: All experiences (rows) taken directly from (a) the results of the MEC process for that domain & mission, and (b) dash one bold face emergencies (e.g., flameout landing).**



# Research, Evaluation, & Improvement Flow Chart



<sup>1</sup>Weightings on the experiences/EPs may be needed to more closely align with intended training priorities/needs

<sup>2</sup> Major decision point, as this will determine if sim/system is up to standards. Comparisons between systems (i.e., fidelity) could be made here & associated with actual performance benchmark data to ascertain extent of fidelity trade-offs.

**DONE**

<sup>3</sup> Deficiencies should be listed and prioritized at the most elemental functional level.

† Example surveys for A and B shown next



# Preliminary\* Baseline Results



- Survey administered for both deployable system and high fidelity system
- Deployable system rated highest for A/A and A/G mission areas
  - System rated very low for SEAD and EPs
  - System designed with A/A and A/G in mind
- High fidelity system showed similar trends, but over 50\* experiences rated significantly higher.
- Next step is to analyze lowest rated items for common underlying technological deficiencies (e.g., visual field, IOS).
- Then...



# Deficiency Evaluation Survey



We are trying to identify the extent to which different categories of DMO deficiencies detract from the ability to gain the MEC experiences & practice dash one bold face emergencies (e.g., in-flight flame-out). Please rate to what extent each category (in column headings) degrades your ability to gain each experience (rows) for the identified DMO system. The system to be rated here is: DTT ver1.

0 = Not at all; 1 = To a Slight Extent; 2 = To a Moderate Extent 3 = To a Substantial Extent; 4 = To a Great Extent

How much is your ability to gain experiences...  <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>... under these conditions... degraded by these current configurations?</p> </div>		DMO subsystem deficient areas to be rated					
		Current visual field (i.e., degrees of visual)	Current level of visual acuity	Current level of jamming (all forms)	Current brief/debrief system	Current threat generation system	Current lack IOS fault insert.
1	Employing a Maverick						
2	Strafing						
3	IR fog						
4	Participating in coalition/joint strike package						
5	Unlocated or pop-up threats						
6	...(survey continues with all experiences listed as rows)... 72 A/G, 55 SEAD, & 45 A/A experiences (172 total)						

**Note: All experiences (rows) taken directly from (a) the results of the MEC process for that domain & mission, and (b) dash one bold face emergencies (e.g., flameout landing).**



# How process and data could be used



- Well suited for evaluating tactical-level tasks (i.e., the experiences).
- Could easily be used immediately on any existing sim/system that has the MECs defined for that domain/mission.
- Could be used to certify sims/systems on tactical-level training tasks.
- Could easily compare impact of a single, controlled technology change on training the experiences (e.g., fly sims with and w/o 20/20 visuals to determine added value on entire cross-section of “real-world” tasks).
- Could compare across sites and fidelity levels (especially when augmented with standard assessments such as benchmarks)
- Identifies and prioritizes deficiencies and potential upgrades—use raw data or augment with MEC gap analysis work.



**Questions?**



# Mission Training Fidelity Requirements



- Once a deployable DMO system is available for training applications, a number of research issues arise. Research will need to address:
  - Skill acquisition rates: Which MEC-based experiences can be trained in the deployable DMO? How quickly?
  - Skill decay rates: Once acquired, how rapidly do these skills decay in the absence of CT? What is the optimal schedule of CT?
  - Skill transfer attributes: How extensive is the transfer of MEC-based skills from deployable DMO training to live-fly training and to combat? What elements of proficiency must be trained in live-fly?
- To address these questions a performance measurement approach must be developed that quantitatively assesses proficiency in a standard, controlled way: the Standard Assessment Set (SAS).



# Summary



- **DMO proven effective training solution, but they have not migrated to the field**
- **How to determine technologies/fidelity to integrate into these environments?**
- **Propose new method**
  - **Mission Essential Competency based**
  - **Understand system strengths & weaknesses in terms of warfighter needs**
  - **Understand technology/fidelity limitations and their pervasiveness across the warfighter needs.**
  - **Prioritize upgrades**



# Research, Evaluation, & Improvement Flow Chart (shortened version)

