Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective
Abstract
This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations. The focus is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author, Professor Roger Myerson, uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. We should look to such theoretical analysis for basic insights that may have practical importance in policymaking. The main conclusion is that a great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength. So this monograph may be read as a contribution to our understanding of the vital relationship between diplomacy and military preparedness in defense of national security.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA474684
Entities
People
- Roger B. Myerson
Organizations
- United States Army War College