

The Value of a European Security and Defense Policy

A Monograph

by

LTC (GS) Nikolaus Carstens

German Army



School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 06-07

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 08-05-2007		2. REPORT TYPE AMSP Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2006 - Mar 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Value of a European Security and Defense Policy				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC (GS) Nikolaus Carstens (German Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The end of the cold war called not only for re-evaluating the role and purpose of existing organizations for collective security, but also developing other organizations which can contribute to more stability in a globalized world. Therefore this study describes the dynamics and the rationale leading to the establishment of a European Security and Defense Policy. It points out its strength and limitations in the area of crisis response. The challenges of the 21 st Century call for a change in US foreign policy. A future US foreign policy that favors liberal internationalism should encourage European nations to proceed on the way to enhance their capabilities for autonomous crisis response and perceive these developments as a chance to ease the current US burden and not as a threat to US interests. In order to cope with the challenges of the 21 st century there is a need for both: a capable and effective EU in the area of crisis management and a functioning NATO capable of conducting full spectrum operations. These are the two sides of a coin to ensure security for Europe and the United States.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS European Security, NATO, European Union, Theory in International Affairs, US Foreign and Security Policy, Crisis Management, Crisis Response,					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 58	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army
a. REPORT UNCLASS	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASS	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASS			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

LTC (GS) Nikolaus Carstens

Title of Monograph: The Value of a European Security and Defense Policy

Approved by:

Timothy Challans Ph.D

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

The Value of a European Security and Defense Policy by LTC (GS) Nikolaus Carstens, German Army, 47 pages.

Until the end of the Cold War, NATO was the dominant organization for collective security in Europe. Throughout that time it had always been a particular American interest to increase the European contribution to security on the European continent in order to share burdens equally. After the end of the Cold War the strategic situation in Europe changed dramatically. The dominant threat of the Soviet Union was replaced by a much more diffuse and less obvious situation of potential instabilities on the periphery of Europe, including rising terrorist activities and the proliferation of nuclear technology. This called for not only re-evaluating the role and purpose of existing organizations for collective security, but also developing other organizations which could contribute to more stability in a globalized world. Triggered by the developments in the Balkans in the early 1990s an intense discussion in Europe took place about required adaptations. The crisis made it perfectly clear for European nations that while economically important, Europe possessed neither the required institutions nor the military capabilities to conduct effective crisis management on the peripheries of Europe. European countries were conscious that their individual national capabilities were very limited and that the development of a security component within the European integration had been neglected for a long time. The trigger of the crisis in Yugoslavia led to the Petersberg declaration (1992), the Amsterdam treaty (1997) and the landmark decisions of the European Council of Cologne and Helsinki (1999), which in turn led to the formulation of the European Headline Goal and subsequently a series of initiatives and programs that aimed to improve European Union (EU) military capabilities in the field of crisis response. Many critics see these activities as a duplication of efforts. In their view NATO should serve as the platform to focus European efforts and to enhance military capabilities. This monograph will point out that these activities should be seen as complementary.

The challenges of the 21st Century call for a change in US foreign policy. A future US foreign policy that favors liberal internationalism should encourage European nations to proceed on the way to enhance their capabilities for autonomous crisis response and perceive these developments as a chance to ease the current US burden and not as a threat to US interests. In order to cope with the challenges of the 21st century there is a need for both: a capable and effective EU in the area of crisis management and a functioning NATO capable of conducting full spectrum operations. These are the two sides of a coin to ensure security for Europe and the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	1
2. The importance of theory in international relations in assessing ESDP.....	3
2.1. The European integration from a realist and liberal perspective	4
2.2. Current US foreign policy	8
2.3. The requirement for liberal internationalism in the 21 st century	11
3. European Security and Defense Policy in a changing world.....	15
3.1. From Maastricht to the Headline Goal 2010	16
3.2. The ESDP in the European security architecture	24
3.3. Differing interests in Europe	28
4. Enhanced military capabilities in the EU	35
4.1. EU Battle Groups and NATO Response Force: two complementary concepts.....	35
4.2. Bosnia and Democratic Republic of Congo proof for effectiveness?	38
5. Conclusion.....	44
APPENDIX	48
I. The European Security Architecture	48
II. Milestones for ESDP	49
III. Abbreviations	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52

1. Introduction

“Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”¹

Until the end of the Cold War, NATO was the dominant organization for collective security in Europe. Throughout that time it had always been a particular American interest to increase the European contribution to security on the European continent in order to share burdens equally. After the end of the Cold War the strategic situation in Europe changed dramatically. The dominant threat of the Soviet Union was replaced by a much more diffuse and less obvious situation of potential instabilities on the periphery of Europe, including rising terrorist activities and the proliferation of nuclear technology. This called for not only re-evaluating the role and purpose of existing organizations for collective security, but also developing other organizations which could contribute to more stability in a globalized world. Triggered by the developments in the Balkans in the early 1990s an intense discussion in Europe took place about required adaptations. The crisis made it perfectly clear for European nations that while economically important, Europe possessed neither the required institutions nor the military capabilities to conduct effective crisis management on the peripheries of Europe. European countries were conscious that, their individual national capabilities were very limited and that the development of a security component within the European integration had been neglected for a long time. The trigger of the crisis in Yugoslavia led to the Petersberg declaration (1992), the Amsterdam treaty (1997) and the landmark decisions of the European Council of Cologne and Helsinki (1999), which in turn led to the formulation of the European Headline Goal and subsequently a series of initiatives and programs that aimed to improve European Union (EU) military capabilities in the field of crisis response. Many critics see these activities as a

duplication of efforts. In their view NATO should serve as the platform to focus European efforts and to enhance military capabilities. On the following pages I will point out that these activities should be seen as complementary.

A future US foreign policy that favors liberal internationalism should encourage European nations to proceed on the way to enhance their capabilities for autonomous crisis response and perceive these developments as a chance to ease the current US burden and not as a threat to US interests. In order to cope with the challenges of the 21st century there is a need for both: a capable and effective EU in the area of crisis management and a functioning NATO capable of conducting full spectrum operations. These are the two sides of a coin to ensure security for Europe and the United States.

In the first Chapter I will examine which paradigm of international relations is most suited to explain current developments in the EU and which theory in international relations has lately dominated US foreign policy. Subsequently some normative and meta-ethical conceptual conclusions will be drawn upon to show how US policy should be designed in the future in order to meet the requirements of the 21st century. These deliberations will provide the necessary reference point in order to assess the value of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for the United States.

The second chapter will take a look at recent developments with regard to ESDP and portray the goals which are related to this policy field. The fundamental question to answer is: What does the ESDP try to achieve? Consequently, it is important to understand what the underlying understanding of crisis management within the European Union is and how this understanding has been institutionalized. This chapter will take a look at advantages of the EU compared to other organizations of the European security architecture and discuss the differing

1 Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York 2003), p. 1

interests of the three most influential members (Germany, France, and Great Britain) in shaping the ESDP for the future.

The third chapter will portray why current efforts in the EU for effective crisis management should be seen as complementary to NATO's current reforms. The recent operations of the EU in Bosnia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo will serve as a basis for an assessment of the effectiveness of the EU in crisis management. This will provide a reference point to make predictions for the future development of the ESDP and its possible implications for US foreign policy.

This monograph excludes the part of EU arms policy. Although this area is without a doubt one of the future key pillars of the ESDP, its dynamics and variables exceed the scope of this monograph and therefore will not be depicted in detail.

2. The importance of theory in international relations in assessing ESDP

In order to assess the value of the ongoing developments towards a Common Security and Defense Policy within the European Union from an US perspective it is necessary to briefly touch on the different theories of international relations that dominate US academic discussion and how these theories portray and explain the ongoing European integration. A clear definition of these theories and their implications for the formulation of foreign policy will help to deepen the understanding of ESDP in the larger context of European integration. The academic discussions and their influence on policy makers should not be underestimated, and therefore a deeper knowledge of these theoretical aspects may help to improve the understanding of current and future policy decisions. These theories significantly determine the paradigm in which US administrations formulate their policy goals. Subsequently this chapter will determine which theory in international relations has lately dominated US foreign policy by analyzing recent

policy decisions. After this analysis, some normative meta ethical conclusions are to be drawn that will answer the question of how US foreign policy should be designed in the future in order to successfully cope with the challenges of the 21st century. These conclusions will build the reference point for an assessment of the ESDP from an US perspective.

2.1. The European integration from a realist and liberal perspective

The world after 9/11 changed not only the map of security policy but also challenged the dominant approaches of theory in international relations: realism, liberalism, and idealism or as some call it “constructivism”² It became obvious that parts of the theories had to be adapted to the new realities in international affairs in order to serve as valid paradigms in a changing world. Although all three theories maintain some intellectual blind spots they continue to be the prevailing concepts in international relations.³

To be frank up front: the theory of realism is not very well suited to explain the current phenomenon of European integration. One of the major assumptions of realism is that calculations about power dominate state thinking.⁴ While this paradigm can explain the beginning of European integration in the early 1950s when the prevailing idea was the control of Germany, it does not give a convincing explanation of current events. One can argue that the more the potential “German threat” in Europe faded, the more the realist paradigm became irrelevant. The prevailing idea to establish an organizational framework to control Germany was born out the previous experience of the two world wars in which the continental powers had not been able to balance German power. Thus, from a realist perspective, the development of integrating concepts was a potential solution to restrain Germany and to impede its re-emergence as a threat for

² Compare Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, Volume 6 (2004), p. 53 f.

³ For example realism does not account for progress and change in international relations, whereas liberalism fails to understand that democratic regimes survive only if they safeguard military power and security. Idealism does not explain which power structures and social conditions allow for changes in values. Compare Ibid, p. 59.

Europe as a whole. Thus it is not surprising that at the beginning of European integration, projects like the European Defense Force⁵ and the European Community for Steel and Coal (ECSC) were predominant. They were directly aimed at controlling the German military and those industries that were perceived as the base of military power. But as soon as it became clear that Germany had chosen to leave its former power politics behind, a shift in the European integration can be noted that was focused on breaking the power of nation states to regulate markets and capital, and to enforce competitive market allocation of resources.⁶ Following the Treaty of Rome this policy became the driving factor for European integration. Economic developments, which climaxed in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the creation of the Common European Market and the establishment of the Common European Currency (CEC), can only insufficiently be explained by the realist paradigm as these measures definitely imply a decrease in power of the nation states. From a realist perspective one might argue that the European countries went down the integration path, because they realized that they were not able to balance against the US and other emerging powers on their own.⁷ The only way to ensure their future security was to align with the other European countries and thus the European Union is a result of the European countries' weaknesses and their lack of power. But if that is the case, how can it be explained that up to now the development of military capabilities plays only a marginal role in the European Union and that it is the economy that defines the speed and depth of European integration? For the realist community, military power is a prerequisite in order to prevail in the struggle for power.

4 For the assumptions of the realist theory compare John J. Maersheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, 2003), p. 17-22.

5 For an overview about the treaty and the reason for its failure see Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Ed), *Anfaenge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, (Band II: Die EVG-Phase, Muenchen 1990).

6 For an overview of these developments compare: Bernhard H. Moss, *Monetary Union in Crisis: the European Union as a Neo-liberal Construction* (London, 2005), p. 29-50.

7 "Neorealists might argue that... the European nations, concerned not about their immediate security but as a matter of prudent attention to their relative position in the world economy, elected in the mid – to late 1980s to revive the EC in order to counter the continuing economic challenge of the United States, and especially the new and even more acute challenge of Japan." Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests

Following this logic, should not have been the ESDP one of the first projects of European integration? But this was not the case. The ESDP only came into being very late in the process of integration and still plays a marginal role compared to the economic pillar of the Union. Thus, there is evidence that it is not realism that is the driving factor for current European integration.

One of the major questions is: How can European integration be interpreted from a realist perspective from the US side of the Atlantic? During the Cold War the realist perspective, which implies the struggle for power of self-interested states, saw cooperation with Europe and transatlantic partnership as an indispensable requirement for maintaining the power balance with the Soviet Union. After the breakdown of the Soviet superpower, leaving the United States as the only remaining hegemon, European integration has to be seen more and more in a different light. An intensified European integration encompasses the potential that Europe more and more acts as a powerful player in the international system.⁸ This may lead to increased conflicts in the transatlantic relationships as interests on both sides of the Atlantic will most likely not be identical. The recent failing of the Doha round of talks on free trade may serve as a first example of these future conflicts.⁹ Although realism does not favor instability in Europe, as this would jeopardize a liberal world economy and free trade that are still vital US interests, a united, strong and militarily capable Europe implies decreasing power of the US. Such a strong Europe could endanger the US position in the world. Thus, realism does not favor a European integration that encompasses a strong military component. Nevertheless, despite the predictions of Huntington and other realist theorists, the European Union has not yet commenced to check the rising power of the United States by amassing power of its own. There is no tendency in the EU member states

and institutional Rule Trajectories: a Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union", in: Franklin (ed.) p. 258.

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the deepening of the European Union would be "the single most important move" against a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would lead to a "truly multipolar 21st century". Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78 (March/April 1999), p. 35-49.

to increase their defense budgets significantly, which would serve as an indicator that such a counterbalance really takes place.

If European integration is not primarily driven by power considerations, what might be the driving factor that led to increased European integration and subsequently to the ESDP? In contrast to realist theories, liberalism makes the basic assumption that the political order within a country effects the way the country will conduct its foreign affairs. This leads to the conclusion that the security dilemma among nations with democratic political systems is marginalized or to put it bluntly: democracies do not wage wars against each other.¹⁰ Therefore the promotion of democracy is a key pillar in liberal theory. In addition liberalism stresses the importance of deepening trade and financial ties, thus creating mutual dependence, making future conflicts less likely. Proponents of liberalism favor cooperation through multinational institutions, which might entail putting national interests last. Compared to realism the theory of liberalism seems much better suited to explain current development on the European continent. Through the lenses of liberalism the calculations about power matter less than other kinds of political and economic calculations. The rejection of power politics in Europe has to be seen in the light of recent European history. It was power politics that brought much of the misery to Europe, culminating in two devastating world wars. This historical experience has led to the development of a different perspective on the role of power in international relations, or as Robert Kagan puts it: Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and certainly not for military power.”¹¹ Even if nowadays the goal to control and to limit the hegemonic ambitions of Germany has faded over time in the process of European integration, it is important to understand that the core concept of European integration is aimed at rejecting the European balance-of-power principle and denying

⁹ For the reasons of the failure of the talks see:
<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=July&x=20060701162122mbzemog0.4214594> - accessed 18th of September 2006.

¹⁰ For an empiric study compare, Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 29 (1992), p. 369-376.

any hegemonic ambitions of individual states.¹² A more moral consciousness has replaced the old patterns or as Kagan writes: “Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace.”¹³ The fact that the deepest integration in the European Union has been achieved in the area of trade and finance, symbolized by the Common European Market (CEM) and the Common European Currency (CEC) is clear evidence that the ideas of liberalism have been the dominating factor in European integration so far. The build up of an institutional framework within the Union, aimed at guaranteeing the rule of law and facilitating the spread of democratic norms is a convincing indication that liberalism and idealistic ideas are the dominating principles in the ongoing integration process and thus do also apply for the development of ESDP.

2.2. Current US foreign policy

As indicated in the previous chapter the lens of traditional thinking about international relations matters when it comes to assessing new developments in international politics. Recent history shows that policy makers never have based their decisions on only using one of the existing lenses. The modern globalized world with growing interdependencies and increasing complexity does not allow relying just on one paradigm. Nevertheless it seems not far from the truth to assume that one of the lenses will always dominate the approach a policy maker will employ to tackle a specific problem. The Clinton administration attempted to describe the post Cold War order in terms of the expansion of democracy and open markets. What was dominating most of that administration’s actions was a liberal vision of order. Trade and capital were seen as

¹¹ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, p. 55.

¹² “The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648”. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, in a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, May 12, 2000. English version of this speech is available under: <https://www.iue.it/RSC/symposium/> - accessed 01.12.2006.

¹³ Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power*, p. 57.

the decisive factors and forces for political reform and successful integration.¹⁴ In this sense the Clinton Administration was very much supporting European integration. But when it came to the development of an ESDP, US policy was much more tempted to formulate certain reservations. In this regard former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signaled very early in the process to the European allies that ESDP would only be accepted if that would not imply a duplication of NATO structures, decoupling Europe from the US and discrimination of NATO states that were not part of the EU. Thus, there was still a sense of realism in US foreign policy.

However, through which lens does the current US administration see the world? Much of the confusion and pushback about current US policy in the world might stem from the fact that it is hard to tell from the outside which lens the current US government is using to analyze the world. This ignorance opens the door for misinterpretation and misunderstanding of US foreign policy. The statements of crucial members in the administration ranging from former Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the first year of the administration created the impression that realism was the guiding philosophy.¹⁵ In this regard the unilateral withdrawal from international treaties, like the Kyoto protocol or the ABM treaty, the concentration on military power, increased unilateralism and the continued support of semi-authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt made perfect sense. What did not fit into this realist picture were the moral categories which found their way into President Bush's speeches especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. More and more he divided the world in his speeches into black and white, good and evil, and therefore tended to measure his counterparts in politics and world affairs in moral standards. These moral standards are without doubt also based on

¹⁴ Compare: John G. Ikenberry, "Power and liberal order: America's postwar world order in transition", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5 No. 2 (2005), p. 5.

¹⁵ For examples of these statements compare Michael J. Mazaar, "George W. Bush, Idealist", *International Affairs*, Volume 79 (2003), p. 503.

religious convictions.¹⁶ This does not keep up to the pillars of realism where ideals and ethical standards are irrelevant or as Morgenthau tried to put it: ‘Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.’¹⁷ So from the practical side US foreign policy after 9/11 was much more driven by idealist ideas than realism.¹⁸ Although the real intentions are still nebulous for most of the public, most US government statements tend to indicate that the Iraq War was conducted in the belief that by spreading the norms of democracy, a stabilizing effect could be achieved in the region.¹⁹ Unfortunately, underestimated were the dangers of conflict that nations face when transitioning to democracy, due to weak political institutions as described by Jack Snyder.²⁰ The crucial role of spreading democracy in US foreign policy can be derived by taking a closer look at current US national security strategy.²¹ In this relatively short paper the reference to democracy can be found over 200 times. The quantitative dominance of the term in the current strategy leads to the impression that it serves as the decisive cornerstone for achieving national security. However, does the current US foreign policy stressing the important role of democracy follow the logic of liberalism or idealism? This question is hard to answer as often the two theories overlap to a great extent. Nevertheless recent policy decisions create the impression that idealistic ideas are prevailing over liberalism. This conclusion can primarily be derived from the fact that the idea of

¹⁶ Bob Woodward sites these convictions in both of his books “Bush at War” and “State of Denial” several times.

¹⁷ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York, 1993), p.13.

¹⁸ Avoiding misunderstandings it should be clarified at this stage that the usage of idealism does not refer to the liberal conception of morality expressed by 18th century Kantian cosmopolitanism. In this regard the neoconservative morality is not liberal at all.

¹⁹ “We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yes this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. I merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.” George W. Bush remarks on the 19th of November 2003 in Whitehall London, <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html>. - accessed 21. September 2006.

²⁰ For a description of this phenomenon see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, (Cambridge, 2005).

spreading democracy to Iraq was executed with a high degree of unilateralism.²² This form of unilateralism has led to a perceived weakening of international institutions like the United Nations, and the execution of a preemptive strategy has at least shaken the rule of international law. It is only a matter of time for this to subsequently lead to an increased fading of rules of cooperation in the international system. The failing adherence to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of Iran and refusal to obey the additional protocol²³ about the increased surveillance of the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) may serve as a first example of this process. But both, functioning international institutions as well as the rule of law in the international system are decisive cornerstones in the paradigm of liberalism to sustain peace and security. Whereas the driving factor of idealist actions is the belief in its absolute righteousness. Therefore compromise and a middle way is not a real option. In this context the public remarks of administration officials creating a picture of black and white, with us or against us, good and evil are in the first place expressions of this idealistic world view.

2.3. The requirement for liberal internationalism in the 21st century

Throughout the academic world and among the policymakers in the US great discussions are taking place about how the US should perform its role in the 21st century. The post 1990 uni-polar world, leaving the US as the only remaining superpower, offers the US a virtually free choice. It can choose to act as a *liberal hegemon* or a *nationalist great power* - as the *liberal hegemon* it will seek to lead or manage the global system through strengthening rules and international institutions, as the *nationalist great power* it will pursue national interests

²¹ Compare US National Security strategy: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html - accessed 10. September 2006

²² When Secretary of State Colin Powell warned President Bush that his coalition might fall apart, if Iraq was targeted in the GWOT the answer was straight: "At some point we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America". Cited by James Woodward, *Bush at War*, (Simon and Schuster, November 2002) p. 81.

unilaterally by relying primarily on its military might.²⁴ The military reaction to the 9/11 attacks leading to the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq follows the Machiavellian principle that it is better to be feared than loved. The US was convinced that acting as a *nationalist great power* was the right way to ensure security in the future. The formal expression of this conviction was the implementation of preemptive actions as laid down in the national security strategy. Nevertheless, the greatest weakness of the concept of preemption lies in the fact that it fails to pass the basic test of international legality. It denies being a universal right in the Kantian sense of morality, comparable with the right of freedom and democracy. Benjamin Barber makes the point when he claims: "Imagine an international law that reads, Nations may only resort to war in case of self-defense, except of the United States, which because it is special can resort to war whenever it wants. ... For no nation, not even one as powerful as America, can root its foreign policy in special reasoning forbidden to others."²⁵ In exercising this kind of utilitarianism it is not surprising that the US is experiencing resistance not only from its adversaries but also from its allies. The support for US foreign policy in Western Europe dropped dramatically following the invasion of Iraq.²⁶ For Michael Mann this policy undermined US hegemony and its claim to be a benevolent empire.²⁷ The great weakness of realism and this kind of unilateral idealism is that it shifts towards a world that remains in a status, which Hobbes described in his *Leviathan* as the "state of nature" where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." It is described by the absence of all political institutions and social conventions. In this world of anarchy America

²³ Iran signed the additional protocol in December 2003 and has refused to obey since 2006.

²⁴ John Ikenberry describes these two roles, which he sees increasingly in conflict. See John G. Ikenberry, "Power and liberal order: America's postwar world order in transition", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5 Nr. 2 (2005), p. 133-152.

²⁵ Barber, R. Benjamin, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*, (New York, 2003), p. 100f.

²⁶ The support for US policy in Germany dropped from 61% in summer 2002 to 25% in March 2003 then increased to 38% in 2004. In France the disapproval rate for US policy in 2004 was at 62% and in at Britain at 34%. These numbers do not represent how Americans in general are perceived. The numbers are much more positive. It is the current policy about which most Europeans are skeptical. For these statistics see <http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/USA/image.html> - accessed 05.10.2006.

²⁷ Compare Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, (New York, 2004), p. 252 ff.

relies on military power as the ultimate determinant of national security and success. But what it fails to grasp is that this state of anarchy is a state of fear where security is at stake every day as war and violence are a daily affair. What is critical is that nobody, even a hegemon like the United States, can be sure that it will prevail in this daily struggle. This is why Hobbes and later Kant claimed we left this state of permanent struggle by making a social contract, adjuring individual force and entering a state of collective security. Kant's conviction is that only the rule of law can guarantee perpetuated peace. In today's modern western democracies the rule of law has to be seen as the key cornerstone for stability. Thus, only strengthening a similar system of law in the international system makes peace likely and security achievable. Only in creating a world with universal rights for every member of the international system will we be able to decrease the existing tensions.²⁸

The worldwide resistance and the undesired effects of a policy favoring unilateral action and the extensive use of military force might be acceptable for the US public and the political establishment, if the underlying goal of enhancing security is achieved in the long term. But will that really be the case? Taking the analysis of future threats in various official documents into account, US security will most likely be jeopardized by global terrorist activities combined with proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the short and medium term and from a peer competitor in the long term. Although it might be too early to judge about the implications of current US policy, there are at least some worrying indicators that the goal of increased security is not achieved. According to the latest report of US intelligence agencies the number of terrorists increased due to the invasion in Iraq.²⁹ Homegrown Muslim terrorists in Europe prepared to

²⁸ "There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends." President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a presidential radio address 31st of October 1956, cited in Benjamin Barber, *Fear's Empire*, p. 219.

²⁹ One of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate dated April 2006 states: "Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion."

conduct suicide attacks aimed also at US citizens are a phenomenon that could not be cited before 2003. It seems that the actions taken have led to a radicalization of the conflict entailing an increased threat for the West. And what about the proliferation issue? Isn't it a valid assumption that at least parts of the Iranian ambitions to enhance their nuclear technology program can be traced back to the fact that Iran was nominated as a member of the "axis of evil", potentially threatened by a strategy of preemption? If security is the fundamental aim of nation state, isn't the Iranian nuclear program a practical expression of the desire to achieve this overarching aim? It seems to be more than a coincidence that after a period of voluntary renouncement to pursue nuclear ambitions by states such as South Africa, Brazil, and Ukraine we see the revitalization of these ambitions in times of aggravated rhetoric. There at least remain doubts about whether current US foreign policy is suited to decrease the danger of proliferation in the long term. It can not be ruled out that it just triggered a domino effect of increased nuclear ambitions throughout the world.

Therefore liberal internationalism or what Barber calls "preventive democracy" is what the US should strive for. Mann makes a strong point when he claims that: "Anti-proliferation policy and parts of the war against terrorism were most effective when combining American leadership with multilateral agencies"³⁰ and that interventions go much better for the US if formally multinational and mandated by the UN. The First Gulf War in 1991 showed that impressively. The nature of international terrorism and the issues related to proliferation, because of its complexities in a globalized world, call for a multinational approach.³¹ But also with the perspective of a future

https://webmail.us.army.mil/attach/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf?sid=aFwEjDaXgNM&mbox=INBOX&charset=escaped_unicode&uid=161&number=1&filename=Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf – accessed 05. October 2006.

³⁰ Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, p. 265.

³¹ Underlined by the following passage of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate dated April 2006: "Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders." https://webmail.us.army.mil/attach/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf?sid=aFwEjDaXgNM&mbox=INBOX&charset=escaped_unicode&uid=161&number=1&filename=Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf – accessed 05. October 2006.

peer competitor the US is well advised to strengthen the international system based on the rule of law. As John Ikenberry points out, we should not forget that American success after World War II as well as after the Cold War is closely linked to the creation and extension of international institutions, which both limited and legitimized American power. These institutions most might also help to avoid a confrontation with a peer competitor in the future. And another point should not be neglected. Liberal internationalism will help to share burdens. The current policy has been costly for the United States.³² By linking today's struggles to longstanding European ideas of collective security the US could take advantage of Europe's commitment to crisis management and decrease US direct engagement. This is what Suzanne Nossel calls "Smart Power": knowing that using US's own hands is not always the best tool. Therefore the US should strive to find others to act on behalf of US goals, through alliances, international institutions and careful diplomacy.³³ Thus, the European Union could serve as one of the others. In the following chapters it will be described how the ESDP could fit into such a policy and where their limitations lie.

3. European Security and Defense Policy in a changing world

The aim of this chapter is to explain the legacy which influenced the establishment of ESDP and thus create a better understanding of the term. It is important to understand that part of this legacy still has a great impact on today's actions to refine ESDP. This knowledge will facilitate better comprehension of the strength and limitations which are likely to accompany the future development of ESDP. In addition this perspective will on the one hand help to avoid

³² In 2001 President Bush inherited a budget surplus of \$200 billion which turned into a deficit in early 2006 of \$400 billion. A good portion of that deficit can be attributed to the increase of the defense budget due to the ongoing military engagements.

³³ Compare Suzanne Nossel, "Smart Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 Nr. 2 (2004), p. 131-142.

exaggerated expectations on ESDP and, on the other hand, help to identify the opportunities which are inherent in a functioning ESDP as a key promoter for stability in the world.

3.1. From Maastricht to the Headline Goal 2010

The European Security and Defense Policy as it came into effect in 1998/99 is a result of a transformative discourse of foreign and security relations within Europe, the existence of which is less straight forward and logical as it appears at first glance. This should not be surprising as ESDP is mainly a result of the discourse of many nations whose interests and aims are considerably different.³⁴ Nevertheless, two major events primarily triggered the developments that finally led to today's ESDP. Firstly, the Balkan crisis and the subsequent discussions on Capital Hill created the impression that "Uncle Sam's cavalry was no longer available on request to manage minor European Security crises"³⁵ and secondly, the depth of the European economic integration process was reaching a point where the question of intensifying the political integration in other areas was unavoidable in order to keep a balanced organization. At first it was the West European Union (WEU) that was chosen to serve as the primary organization to enhance European security capabilities. Importantly, the enhancement of these capabilities was driven by the prevailing paradigm to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which served to strengthen NATO in the first place. Nevertheless, the WEU was especially appealing to most European governments as it was intergovernmental - it comprised the military dimension and it was entirely European.³⁶ In this context the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 not only led to the formal construction of the second pillar of the EU in creating a Common Foreign Security Policy, without a doubt an indispensable prerequisite for today's ESDP, but also formalized the relationship between EU and WEU in the field of security. Thus, from the

³⁴ These differences will be explained in more detail in chapter 3.3.

³⁵ Jolyon Howorth, "Discourse, Ideas, and Epemistic Communities in ESDP", *West European Politics*, Vol 27, No. 2 (March 2004), p. 217.

³⁶ Compare, *Ibid*, p. 218.

beginning strengthening the operational role of the WEU was closely connected to the European integration process. In the following years it became more and more clear, that the WEU was more of an impediment than a solution for deepened integration primarily for two reasons. First due to the EU's economic strength and role in security issues, which were not directly related to the military domain, the first pillar of the EU and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) itself became more and more important for an effective crisis management. Thus, abandoning WEU in order to allow a direct EU and NATO relationship seemed to be reasonable in this regard. Second the different memberships in the EU and WEU were increasingly seen as an impediment for a coherent integration process, and all attempts to harmonize the memberships failed due to the character of the WEU Treaty.³⁷

The events of St. Malo in December 1998 finally opened the possibility for starting the ambitious project of ESDP as it removed the British objections to a deeper integration in the military domain leading to autonomous military capabilities within the EU.³⁸ Whereas the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and later the Nice Treaty (2001) continued to enhance the CFSP and thus described the future framework in which ESDP had to operate, the European Council in Cologne (1999) and Helsinki (2000) led to the decisions that not only created the necessary institutional framework of ESDP as well as its current instruments and procedures, but also defined the level of ambition with regard to military capabilities.³⁹ The Nice Treaty formally

³⁷ The WEU Treaty is even more binding for member states than the NATO Treaty as it requires the military support once a member state is attacked. The nature of collective defense was not acceptable for formally neutral EU-member states like Sweden and Austria. Thus, they constantly rejected to become members of the WEU. The current status of memberships in the European Security and Defense Architecture is depicted in Appendix 1.

³⁸ The meeting of French President and the British Prime Minister came as a surprise for most of the analysts as Britain until this point was not very receptive for deepening the integration in the area of defense. In their declaration both Heads of States affirmed that the EU required 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a credible military force, the means to decide and to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. The text of the declaration is available under: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1013618395073> – accessed 27. October 2006

³⁹ With regard to institutions the creation of the Political Security Committee as the strategic control body for military operations, the EU Military Committee as the strategic military advice element

implemented the ESDP into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) framework. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP have to be seen as closely connected. The ESDP provides the military capabilities and thus enhances the credibility of the CFSP in times of crisis management. With the ESDP the CFSP finally received some teeth. Without a functioning CFSP, the ESDP has no direction and objectives to strive for and without a functioning ESDP the CFSP will be perceived as a paper tiger.

Two aspects of CFSP and ESDP are important to stress in order to understand its limitations. Firstly, despite all efforts the second pillar of the EU remains in the sphere of its intergovernmental character. Other than the first pillar, which entered the supranational area in perusing a Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the ESDP stays tied to its intergovernmental working methods. Even the recent European Constitutional Treaty, rejected in France and the Netherlands in a popular vote, no plans were introduced to allow qualified majority voting in the second pillar, thus, decisions will continue to be taken unanimously in the future.⁴⁰ The persisting unanimous decision making process indicates that the nation states will remain the decisive factor in formulating strategies. The possibilities for countries to opt out will remain and thus the formulation of policies among the 27 member states will continue to be challenging and most of the time represent the lowest common denominator. This existing inconsistency in decision making methods between the pillars is increasingly seen as an obstacle to effective action in crisis management, as the borderline between economic and political-security matters grows more and more blurred.⁴¹ Second, although a common defense has been anticipated for the future, the ESDP currently is solely focused on crisis management, as common defense and high intensity operations are still highly contentious among its members. Countries like Sweden, Finland,

and the EU Military Staff as the working body to make this advice possible have to be seen as the decisive institutional changes in order to implement the ESDP. The level of ambition was expressed in the Helsinki Headline goal which aimed at the creation of a deployable force of 60.000 troops within 60 days which could be sustained over one year.

⁴⁰ Compare Art. I-41[4] ECT.

Ireland and Austria allowed the integration of the Petersberg Tasks⁴² but successfully rejected the incorporation of WEU article 5 tasks into the EU. The level of ambition with the Petersberg Tasks was to be able to cope with a scenario comparable to the Kosovo crisis. But, a scenario on the scale of the Iraq war can not be drawn from these tasks. In essence the neutral countries are opposed to collective and territorial defense and instead prefer the notion of “soft” security encompassing crisis management. Article 17 of the TEU ensures in the future that these countries are able to stick to their principles. It specifically states that “the policy of the Union ... shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states.”⁴³ Even the introduction of a solidarity clause which was formulated in the ECT that foresees the Union’s mobilization of all instruments at its disposal in case one of its members is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man made disaster does not change the fact that common defense for the EU is for the time being unrealistic. Thus, the EU will not appear as a competitor for NATO when it comes to Article 5 tasks in the foreseeable future.

Shortly after the formulation of the European Headline Goal, which aimed to strengthen The EU’s operational role, it became clear to all member states that the formulated goal was too ambitious. The EU was hardly able to close the existing military capability gaps in the desired time. Although the EU declared in May 2003 that it now possessed the required operational capabilities to conduct the whole array of Petersberg Tasks, the declaration pointed out existing

⁴¹ For a detailed description of this problem see Borel Lizek, “Do European Security Capacities have Feet of Clay?”, *Perspectives*, Volume 19 (2003), p. 40 ff.

⁴² The term developed following the formal decision of the WEU members in 1992 to provide military forces to conduct humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions when required. These tasks have been recently updated in the constitution. On the one hand, these tasks have been specified: joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization; and on the other hand, it is made clear that all Petersberg Tasks can also contribute to the fight against terrorism. Compare Constitution Article III-309[1].

⁴³ This content was also stressed in the passage of the rejected constitution, which stated: “The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States, it shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.” Constitution Art. I-41 (3).

limitations, especially highlighting the high risk at the upper end of the task list due to significant military shortfalls.⁴⁴ These shortfalls were the same nature as already identified in NATO with significant gaps in the area of C4I, strategic mobility, strategic reconnaissance and surveillance, survivability and sustainment.⁴⁵ Due to the existing reluctance of most European member states to significantly raise the defense expenditure, there was little chance to reduce the existing shortfalls in the desired time period. Additionally, the contemporary operational environment, namely international terrorism and the issues related to failed states, stressed the urgency for rapid deployment capabilities. These developments forced the EU to shift from a very ambitious quantitative approach to a less ambitious qualitative approach. The European Security Strategy (ESS), defining the threats as well as the strategic ends and ways of achieving security for Europe, was setting the stage for this paradigm shift. The European Headline Goal 2010 finalized on the 4th of May 2004 was the formal expression of this paradigm shift. The Headline Goal formulated the following milestones⁴⁶:

- establishment of a civil-military cell and the capacity to set up a Operation Centre by 2004
- establishment of a European Defense Agency by end 2004
- implementation of EU strategic joint lift coordination by 2005
- development of a European Airlift Command fully efficient by 2010
- Full implementation of Battle Group Concept by 2007
- Availability of aircraft carrier with its associated wing and escort by 2008

⁴⁴ “... limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls ... on deployment time and high risk may arise at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, ... Compare Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, Brussels, 19. Mai 2003 under: <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20Capabilities%20%20May%202003.pdf>>- accessed 24. October 2006.

⁴⁵ The 2005 Capabilities Improvement Chart still listed 57 deficits of which 24 are rated significant. Compare Volker Heise, “ESDP in Transatlantic Perspective“, *Discussion Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, (1. March 2006), p. 5.

- Interoperability of major C2 equipment by 2010

Instead on primarily focusing on large unit formations the new goal is more focused on achieving rapid deployable capabilities on a much smaller scale. Under the existing budgetary constraints in most of the EU member states this was a much more realistic approach. The centerpiece of an enhanced military rapid reaction capability was the EU Battle Groups Concept, agreed upon in June 2004.⁴⁷

In comparing the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the ESS, it becomes obvious that despite the commonalities in defining the existing threats and the overarching goals some significant differences can be identified concerning the ways and the instruments employed to achieve these ends. Contrary to the US, the Europeans do not perceive themselves to be caught in a war. As such, achieving the end state is not about winning or losing but rather maintaining a continuous process that achieves the desired conditions. The EU perceives multilateral cooperation, diplomacy and preventive measures as the decisive elements to solve existing crises. In contrast to the NSS the ESS does not mention preemption. The solution to existing crises is seen in an effective prevention policy that targets the root causes more than the symptoms. In this regard effective multilateralism building on international organizations is seen as the key to success. The EU High Representative Javier Solana expresses this understanding when stating that “if you do not like preemptive wars you have to create preventive policies.”⁴⁸ Therefore military measures are only seen in a supportive role. The following passage out of the ESS gives a sense of the above described notion:

⁴⁶ Approved by GAERC on 17. May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council of 17/18. June 2004. The entire document is available under: <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> – accessed 9.November 2006.

⁴⁷ The concept will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3.1.

⁴⁸ Javier Solana in a speech in front of the Oslo Forum on the 27. of June 2006. Speech is available under: www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90605.pdf – accessed 25. October 2006

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.⁴⁹

The conviction that a set of instruments is needed in order to cope with the challenges of the 21st century has led to increased efforts to develop civil tools, mechanisms and capabilities, which are able to support an effective crisis management. Effective crisis management in the conviction of the EU must encompass effective crisis prevention, crisis reaction and crisis aftercare elements. In this concept non-military assets play a decisive role. The European Council in Feira in June 2000 started the process of generating capabilities in the area of police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.⁵⁰ With the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 aiming to establish respective capabilities goals based on reasonable analysis in order to create the right mix and size of civilian experts for crisis response the process has entered a new stage of quality. The Civilian Headline Goal mentions the following areas:⁵¹

- Deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages

⁴⁹ ESS adopted by the European Council on 12. December 2003, p.9.

⁵⁰ The initial goal aimed at in Feira was to create a pool of 5000 police officers, 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts, and up to 2000 civil protection experts. These numbers have been exceeded by now. On the status of the police, which is proceeded most in the area of non-military assets and its challenges see: Michael Merlingen, "ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10 (2005), p. 215-235.

⁵¹ Compare Annex III to the Presidency Report on ESDP. December 2004. Doc 15547/04.

The size, composition of tasks of these ‘packages’ must respond to the specific needs on the ground and draw on the full range of EU crisis management capabilities.

- Conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement

The EU should be equipped to conduct several missions concurrently, including at least one large civilian substitution mission at short notice in a non-benign environment. These should be sustainable over a longer period of time.

- Deploy at short notice

The EU should be able to take a decision to launch a mission within 5 days of the approval of the mission concept and certain capabilities should be deployable within 30 days of the decision to launch.

- Work with the military

Missions can be deployed autonomously or in close co-operation with the military.

- Promote coherence of EU action and a smooth transition from ESDP operations to follow-on long-term EC programmes

This calls for a clear functional division of labor and close co-operation in planning of EC and ESDP efforts and ESDP exit strategies.

- Respond to requests from other international organizations, notably the UN

It is important to understand that ESDP in its entirety not only addresses enhancing military hardware also known as ‘hardpower’ but simultaneously increases civilian capabilities known as ‘soft power’. The EU seeks to tailor these instruments according to the specific crises in order to achieve the desired results. This makes the organization quite unique in the European security architecture.

3.2. The ESDP in the European security architecture

With the formal implementation of the ESDP in the Treaty of Nice (2001), the EU entered formally the arena of organizations in Europe that see crisis management as one of their vital roles. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO have been much longer involved in this kind of business. This chapter will try to answer the following questions: What are the implications of ESDP for organizations already involved in crisis management activities, and is there a need for multiple organizations in the European security architecture that is dealing with these tasks?

The OSCE, which emerged in the early 90's out of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the only European organization that encompasses all NATO members as well as all states emerging out of the former Soviet Union including Russia. This comprehensive structure of member states is the strength as well as the weakness of the organization. Its strength is that Russia is participating as a partner with equal rights, which, once agreements are achieved, will likely provide consistent solutions. The great disadvantage, though, is that with 55 member-states, to achieve unanimous decisions is nearly impossible.⁵² It has been the underlying principle that security in Europe is primarily achieved through cooperative measures that served as the leading attitude in the institutional development of the organization, which found its recent peak with the adoption of the "Charta for European Security" at the summit in Istanbul in 1999. The analysis of the instruments, described in the Charta, reveals that they primarily support early warning, preventive diplomacy, civilian crisis management, confidence building measures, as well reconstructing efforts after the termination of conflicts. This limitation to the civilian aspects of crises management is based on the reluctance of the EU states and the US to broaden its role to encompass military capabilities. This is in contrast to

⁵² This is not changed by the fact that the consent principle has been replaced by the principle (consent – 1) in 1992. This was necessary in order to make the OSCE more effective in inner state conflicts.

Russian efforts in the past to strengthen the OSCE role in the area of crises management. Nevertheless, the Charta adopted in Istanbul does not in principal rule out an OSCE role in peacekeeping missions in the future.⁵³ When it comes to civilian crisis management the organization without a doubt had some convincing successes in the past. With its missions in Croatia, Albania, and especially in Estonia and Latvia existing tensions were discovered early, and, with the preventive implementation of short and long term missions of the OSCE, a necessary balancing of interests could be achieved before an escalation took place.⁵⁴ The major problem with these long term missions of the OSCE is the measure of success. Successes in long term missions most of the time are not adequately perceived by the public. Preventive and early action is not seen as evidence that without the intervention a war would have been unavoidable. An unrealized war in the Baltic States does not nearly get as much attention as the containment of a hot war in Kosovo. What the OSCE lacks is a convincing profile in the public perception. Without such a perception the OSCE will not be able to expand its role. With the ESDP exactly the contrary is likely to happen. The more the EU develops its civilian crises management instruments and extends its membership to the East the more the role of the OSCE is likely to be reduced. Nevertheless, as long as Russia does not find itself as a partner with equal rights in NATO or the EU, the OSCE will keep its rationale for existence. Once vital Russian interests are touched in a crisis as for example on the Caucasus region, turning to the OSCE might be the best choice and the only way to achieve Russian approval for a crises management mission.

The end of the Cold War demanded a significant adaptation process for NATO. This adaptation was not only mirrored in the enlargement process and the changes in the command

⁵³ “We have decided to explore options for a potential greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. Reaffirming our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and on the basis of our existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case by case basis and by consensus decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge to be the most effective and appropriate organization” Charter for European security accessible under: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/osce/text/charter_for_european_security.htm accessed 29.October 2006.

⁵⁴ For a more comprehensive description see Andreas Berns and Harald Rondholz, „Die OSZE“, *Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik (Edit.)*, p. 613-635.

structure but also in the new tasks NATO was prepared to take on. With the adoption of a new strategic concept at the summit in Washington in 1999, crisis management became formally one of the key functions of the Alliance. In the Balkan conflicts NATO proved that it was in principle capable of taking on the new challenges. Caused by significant US pressure, NATO transformed from a purely defense organization within its members' borders to an organization whose main activities relate to security concerns that occur from beyond these borders. With its engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance underlines its principal acceptance of global security responsibilities.⁵⁵ The organizational structure of NATO traditionally offers two key strengths. The North Atlantic Council offers the possibility to permanently address security issues that affect Europe as well as North America, thus maintaining an essential transatlantic link. This political link has not only served as a key element to win the Cold War but will serve as vital to cope with the challenges of the 21st century. What has weakened NATO recently is the fact that the existing institutions in the Alliance are not sufficiently used to discuss security issues in advance in order to overcome political differences and formulate common strategies and policies. The political differences on the Iraq war are a perfect example of this lacking attitude on both sides of the Atlantic.

The second strength of NATO is its degree of military integration, which not only offers the necessary C2 structure for complex military operations, but which over many years has also led to the development of common procedures, common standards, and a high degree of interoperability, which significantly facilitate multinational military operations among the member states. Exactly these strengths were appealing to European countries that wanted them to be utilized in the context of the EU. The "Berlin Plus Agreement"⁵⁶ finally ensured the reliable

⁵⁵ Already in the Prague Summit Declaration in 2002 the Alliance stated that it would employ forces "wherever needed". www.nato.int/docu - accessed 9. November 2006.

⁵⁶ The Berlin Plus Agreement, ensured EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities that are able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO-capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; identification of a range

access to a number of these resources for EU-led operations. In reaction to that the European nations conceded that NATO would keep the “right for first refusal”⁵⁷. This agreement has to be seen as a compromise between the US position, whose aim is to preserve the right of NATO to act first and avoid unnecessary duplication and the EU countries who significantly wanted to increase their military capability outside of NATO. Since ESDP is obviously developing outside of NATO there is the never fading fear among the US and other Non EU-countries that it might weaken NATO. A high degree of mistrust and skepticism is therefore characterizing the EU-NATO relationship and has subsequently led to difficult working relationships.

The fear is unsubstantiated if policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic work to create a policy that combines the strength of NATO and the EU without resorting to a division of labor that will progressively undermine the transatlantic security policy. This policy will demand from the US intensified use of existing NATO institutions to enter an honest dialogue with Europe in order overcome existing strategic divergences. The more the US is willing to use the NATO platform and resists the temptation to use coalitions of the willing, the less likely are European tendencies to develop autonomous military structures that could be seen as duplication of efforts and subsequently weaken NATO. One should not forget that it was the fear of reduced US engagement in European security issues that served as a trigger for most of the European governments to begin to consider autonomous European capabilities. In short: the less US unilateralism and the more NATO involvement, the more the EU will be inclined to avoid duplication. Thus, a US foreign policy based on the principles of liberal internationalism utilizing existing organizations and alliances will most likely avoid the emergence of ESDP as a dangerous

of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of the DSACEUR, a European, as operational commander of EU-led operations; and the further adoption of NATO defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU led operations. Compare <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm> - accessed 9. November 2006.

⁵⁷ Compare Daniel Keohane, “Unblocking EU – NATO Cooperation”, *Center for European Reform Bulletin*, Issue 48 (June/July 2006), p.1.

competitor for NATO. Strengthening NATO's role in the fight against terrorism would be a first step into this direction.

European countries need to understand that only NATO, with its military integration and with the ability to fall back onto military capabilities of the United States, is prepared in the foreseeable future to cope with scenarios that encompass high intensity combat on a larger scale. The strengthening of military capabilities in the upper end of the conflict spectrum should therefore be emphasized by NATO. On the other hand it would be irresponsible to employ the EU in a conflict that clearly exceeds its capabilities. Such an attitude does not necessarily mean that the EU is acting merely as a sub-contractor of NATO, as many commentators like to put it.⁵⁸ What is asked is a realistic assessment of what the EU is able and capable of accomplishing given the resources provided. Nevertheless, an increased European spending on defense will be unavoidable for the EU-member states in order to prevent the turning of the current capabilities gap between the US and Europe into an unbridgeable capability rift that would serve as a decisive impediment in reclaiming strategic partnership with the US. The focus should be on a policy that continues to build on the strength of the EU, which is the combination of civilian and military capabilities. In this regard the military capabilities should serve more as an enabler to bring the civilian capabilities to bear, than as an effort to duplicate capabilities that are more efficiently represented in NATO.

3.3. Differing interests in Europe

Due to the intergovernmental character of the second pillar, it is the interests of the nation states that define the direction and speed the ESDP is heading. These interests are far from being monolithic. The following part will describe and assess the motives and interests of Great Britain,

⁵⁸ See: Krause, Joachim, Wenger, Andreas and Watanabe, Lisa (Edited), "Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum", *Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy*, Volume 11, (Bern 2003), p. 103 f.

Germany, and France as the most important countries in shaping the ESDP. This is not to downplay the influence of the other countries in the process. Recent history has several examples where the “bandwagoning” of smaller countries had great influence on the decision making process in the European Council. Nevertheless, the pure size and the amount of capabilities these three countries bring to the table in the area of security and defense policy will always provide a special weight in the discussions on ESDP.⁵⁹ Or to put it simply - without these countries on board, ESDP will hardly function effectively. The question to answer is what made these countries as Holwarth put it: “to shift from long-held shibboleths (British Atlanticism, French exceptionalism, German pacifism and civilianism) towards a common acceptance of integrated European interventionism”.⁶⁰ But more importantly how will these national interests shape the future design of ESDP?

France is the one country among the three which is driven by long standing ideas and a clear end-state. By 1990, when President Mitterrand met President Bush in Key Largo, the key ideas of how European security should be designed were on the launch pad. France’s conviction was that first NATO should focus on collective defense responsibilities and not transform itself into a instrument for extended US political hegemony, second the EU should gradually take over responsibility for collective security in Europe and its near neighbors, and third there was a need of a new EU-US dialogue inside the Alliance about ultimate strategic and political objectives leading to a subsequent debate about military and institutional restructuring.⁶¹ What was not achievable in the Gaullist years became suddenly achievable in the early 1990s. The French leadership role in creating solely European security arrangements became unexpectedly a feasible course of action. France obviously sees ESDP as an intermediate step towards a common

⁵⁹ In 2004 the defense budget of these three countries together accounted for over 60% of all defense expenditures within the EU. For the numbers of 2004 see <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf> - accessed 24. October 2006.

⁶⁰ Jolyon Howorth, “Discourse, Ideas, and Epemistic Communities in ESDP”, *West European Politics*, Vol 27, No. 2 (March 2004), p. 213.

European defense. What Paris is really aiming at is a Common Security and Defense Union comparable to the developments in the first pillar of the EU. By 1999 President Chirac claimed that “The European Union must be able to act on its own, either utilizing its own means, or making use of those made available by NATO. It must therefore have its own arrangements for the provision of advice, analysis and military leadership, which it currently lacks”.⁶² This quotation reflects a notion in French policy that can be described as EU first and NATO second. But it is important to understand that French influence to push its agenda is quite limited. This became clear in the developments after the meeting in Tervuren in April 2003 where the heads of states of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg made an effort to push ESDP even further in calling for the creation of a nucleus for EU military planning and execution of operations. This attempt to create a strategic European Headquarters was squashed by the rest of the member states and forced the four to seek a compromise.⁶³

Knowing about its limited influence, France in the past tried to coordinate its approaches primarily with Germany. For strategic considerations this has some great advantages as with the integration of Germany and the building of the axis Paris-Berlin, France is able to control and avoid possible German hegemonic attitudes, something it fears most due to the recent European history. The axis has proven to be a motor for European integration in the past and will most likely serve this purpose in the future, although in a greater EU of 27 member states it will become more difficult for those two countries to solely initiate progress.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, France is aware of the disadvantages this connection has. Especially, when it comes to the actual

⁶¹ Compare Ibid, 215 f.

⁶² Peter Rodman citing a speech by Jaque Chirac at the Hearing before the Committee of International Relations. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1 Session, 10. November 1999, p. 90.

⁶³ In the Tervuren declaration less controversial issues were also raised. The timing was probably not well chosen as the controversy about the Iraq war was still fresh. It was the same countries who made this proposal which so vehemently opposed British policy over Iraq. The question is what would have happened if another format and a other time had been chosen for this proposal? For the entire text of the declaration see:<http://www.grip.org/bdg/g2058.html>.- accessed 25. October 2006.

deployment of military capabilities in operations France is aware of Germany's hesitation to play the military card. In this regard British policy is much closer to the French attitude. This might explain the come about of St. Malo, and the French reach out for British support to enhance EU military capabilities. Overall French policy towards ESDP creates the impression that it is at times dominated by idealism. In this regard it is similar to current US Foreign policy. This explains why it has become difficult recently to achieve agreement between the two countries on security and defense policy issues as both continue tend to perceive their ideas as superior.

Nevertheless, since the rejection of the Constitution in France French foreign policy has to deal with a problem they have not faced until that point. Although attitudes of ESDP were not among the root causes for the failed referendum its implications will most likely also affect the way the Republic will push future security and defense initiatives. The policymakers in France should have realized that despite all their European ambitions it is essential to convince the population about the advantages and necessity of future steps in the integration process.

Other than France, Great Britain's traditional concept of Europe is based on the idea of an intergovernmental cooperation within Europe, where the character of the nation state is maintained. This idea is closely connected to its former role as a major power in the world. Traditionally, not solely European interests drive British foreign policy, but interests regarding the Commonwealth and its special relationship to the United States determine much of British foreign policy. Nevertheless, with the intensified integration process Britain had to realize that a lot of its economic and, respectively, foreign policy interests could only be achieved in becoming an active actor in the process. From a British perspective the European integration process gains its legitimacy from the fact that it provides certain advantages for the nation states, especially in the economic field. These advantages might allow giving up certain sovereignty rights, but

⁶⁴ The institutional basis for the close coordination between the countries is laid down in the Elysee treaty of 1963 and subsequently in the establishment of the Franco German Security Council in 1988, which facilitates the development of common positions.

certainly not in every policy field.⁶⁵ Therefore it was somehow surprising that it was Britain, namely Tony Blair, in the meeting with the French president in St. Malo who opened the path to decisively enhance European military capabilities. This step mirrored the British approach towards European integration, which is far more pragmatic than idealistic. In this regard the theory of realism is best suited to describe and explain British behavior patterns towards ESDP. What really caused the paradigm shift in British policy is open to speculation, but it is likely to have been a combination of different factors. By late 1997 Britain was receiving more and more signals from Washington that as long Europe was not dramatically increasing its defense efforts, NATO was perceived as dead in the water. In addition the newly rising clouds in the Balkans showed Blair once again the truly defective capacity to react to a crisis, which led to the conclusion that Europe had to turn to defense.⁶⁶ In addition the British Prime Minister might have had the feeling that France was going to push the issue anyway in due course. Thus, it was much better to take a place in the drivers' seat and control the speed and direction of the course from the inside of the vehicle instead of trying to interfere from the outside, trying to avoid undesired turns. The British policy makers perceive the ESDP primarily as a tool to strengthen NATO. Thus, they support all initiatives that serve this end. All efforts that might lead to the marginalization of NATO are seen much more skeptically and are likely to provoke active resistance as the fight over the Tervuren initiative displayed. The British attitude towards ESDP can be described as NATO first and EU second. It is important to note that the fear that British-French arguments about the Iraq policy might have long term negative implications on ESDP issues seems to be unsubstantiated. At least public statements of Tony Blair shortly after the war create this impression.⁶⁷ British policy towards ESDP in the future will most likely maintain its

⁶⁵ Geoffrey Smith, Britain in the New Europe, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4 (1992), p. 161.

⁶⁶ Compare Jolyon Howorth, "Discourse, Ideas, and Epemistic Communities in ESDP", *West European Politics*, Vol 27, No. 2 (March 2004, p. 221.

⁶⁷ Britain and Poland, along with many others in Europe supported action in Iraq. We are happy to shoulder the burden. But to be fair, so did France and Germany support the actions in Afghanistan; and in

practical approach and try to marry up continental European and US interests in the best achievable way.

The German approach towards ESDP is significantly influenced by the demise of the East-West confrontation, the re-unification (regaining of full sovereignty) and the new understanding of the use of military force in a globalizing world. The significant changes in the early 90s required from Germany to reshape the contours of its security policy and re-define its role and position in Europe. Especially the potential use of force outside its territory called for a paradigm shift within the political establishment. Only with the rule of the Constitutional Court in 1994 which allowed military participation in operations within the framework of a collective security system, could the discussions about the use of military force outside Germany be ended.⁶⁸ Since then Germany has increased its role to push security and defense issues in the EU. It acts as an active promoter in deepening European integration in the second pillar. This integration is desirable as it ensures the creation of a balanced EU among the existing pillars. Traditionally, due to its history, the abandonment of the principal of sovereignty rights in case of a deeper integration is not seen as problematic as it might be perceived in other European countries. Other than in Britain and France, in the mind of German policy makers a pure national deployment of military forces, despite smaller NEO operations, is currently not thinkable. Thus, a common European defense with increased dependability on European partners is not perceived as a limitation in its security policy. Although, traditionally favoring civilian instruments for crisis management, there is a growing understanding among German policy makers for the need of

Kosovo. France may have disagreed with what we did in Iraq; but it is on the forefront of those that build up European defense capability. It is not against using force, but was against this particular use of force...we should manage the disagreement carefully as between allies and not let it explode into a diplomatic dogfight. The United States, in turn, can recognize that the European dilemma is that of wanting to be America's partner not its servant." Tony Blair in Warsaw on the 30th of May 2003 cited in Trevor Salmon, "The ESDP: Built on Rocks or Sand", p. 367.

⁶⁸ For a detailed description of the inner German debate see: Marianne Tackle, "Towards Normalization of German Security and Defense Policy: German Participation in International Military Organizations", *ARENA Working Paper*, WP 2/10 (2002) available under

enhanced military capabilities. Therefore there was only little resistance in the German parliament participating in the implementation of enhanced military capabilities within the EU . Despite its strong support for ESDP which might end in a common defense, Germany still perceives NATO as the strongest pillar for German security and defense policy. This has been underlined by the newly published German White Paper, which describes the essential German security interests. “The transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of common security for Germany and Europe. It is the backbone of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in turn is the cornerstone of German security and defense policy..... Maintaining a close and trusting relationship with the USA is paramount for Germany’s security in the 21st century.”⁶⁹

With the statement that the “EU and NATO are not in competition with one another, but make complementary contributions to our security”⁷⁰ Germany makes it clear that it will pursue a policy in the future that will include NATO and as well as the EU. With such a policy Germany aims to strengthen the international institutions as they are perceived as a key element to an effective and flexible crisis management. Therefore a key pillar of liberalism is mirrored in Germany’s current policy towards ESDP.

It is important from an US perspective to understand these differing national interests and their influence in shaping the ESDP. It explains why ESDP will not lose its ambivalence and ambiguity in the near future. Nevertheless, knowing about the principles of the UK and German current security policy, there is no reason to see the ESDP as a vital threat for NATO and subsequently for US security interests.

http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2002/papers/wp02_10.htm - accessed 29. October 2006.

⁶⁹ White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr available under http://www.bmvg.de/portal/PA_1_0_LT/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFODE/WB+2006+englisch+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb – accessed 29 October 2006.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.40.

4. Enhanced military capabilities in the EU

EU efforts to enhance its military capabilities have made significant progress since 1999. Today the EU is able to conduct either missions falling back on NATO resources, as currently practiced in operation Althea in Bosnia, or to command autonomous missions either using the Operation Centre in Brussels or utilizing existing C2 capabilities in the member states. The latter was practiced in the latest operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While efforts to create expeditionary forces in both organizations only raised rather minor concerns, it has been the questions related to autonomous C2 structures that seem to have created greater turmoil. Especially the birth of the Operation Centre in Brussels has been an especially painful and rather slow process, but was an expression of the different views on what is perceived as necessary duplication, and what is perceived as duplication that carries the seeds to undermine NATO's future role. This chapter will try to take a closer look at the advantages and disadvantages of the command options by examining the two latest EU-led operations in Bosnia and DRC. Additionally, the question will be answered whether the emerging concepts of NATO's Response Force and the EU Battle Groups are really complementary as they claim to be.

4.1. EU Battle Groups and NATO Response Force: two complementary concepts

The most significant symbol of NATO's more expeditionary role to meet the requirements to successfully fight international terrorism, mitigate the implications of failing states, and counter proliferation of weapons of mass effect was the implementation of the NATO Response Force.⁷¹ This multinational and joint force comprising around 25.000 soldiers is to deploy within a few days all over the world with an operational reach of 30 days. The full

operational capability was achieved in 2006. In parallel the EU, following a British-French initiative, decided to implement the Battle Groups concept. This concept is the cornerstone of EU efforts to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities and thus, comparable to the NRF concept, aims to create a more expeditionary toolset. The EU strives to be able to deploy two of these battle groups simultaneously until 2007. The Battle Groups are built around an infantry battalion reinforced by the necessary combat enablers. The approximately 1500 soldiers ought to commence operations 10 days after the council decision has been made to launch the operation. The concept foresees an operational reach of 30 days that can be extended to a maximum of 120 days. Although the concept states that the forces are in principle available world wide, a radius of 6000 kilometers has been chosen for planning purposes. Other than the NRF the EU Battle Groups is not necessarily multinational in nature. Whereas some countries, like Germany, are trying to build Battle Groups integrating smaller nation forces, countries like Britain have decided not to multinationalize their Battle Groups. At first glance both concepts seem to head in the same direction. This could raise the fear, especially in the US, that the EU Battle Groups concept is an unnecessary duplication of efforts, weakening NATO's role. A closer look will reveal that the concepts have to be seen as complementary and a successful implementation of the Battle Groups concept will indirectly help to strengthen NATO .

In order to highlight the complementary nature of the concepts it is important to reveal their differences. The significant difference in troop strength as well as the exclusion of substantial air and naval capabilities in the case of the Battle Groups concept provides a clear indication of the different visions that guide the two concepts. While NRF was aiming to enable NATO to fight high intensity campaigns without geographical limitations that require the full array of joint military capabilities, the EU Battle Groups are designed to intervene in conflicts where the risk of escalation into high intensity battle is rather low. Limiting the planning efforts of the Battle

⁷¹ See Prague Summit Declaration 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> -

Groups to 6000 kilometers gives a clear indication that the EU is primarily perusing a regional approach. Although not officially stated but interpreting the given planning assumptions first and foremost the EU Battle Groups Concept is aiming at potential conflicts in Africa. This should not be surprising as the instabilities in that region are currently perceived as one of the biggest threats to European security. To fight instabilities in Africa will be the best way to reduce the pressure of potential migration into the EU. Taking the size and scope of most of these conflicts the composition of the Battle Groups will be sufficient to create the conditions which allow the employment of EU's civil crisis management instruments.

During the implementation of the two concepts concerns have often been raised about their practical application. As member states of NATO and EU often assign their contributions to the NRF and the Battle Groups out of a single set of forces some problems may arise, when it comes to a situation when both forces are required to deploy simultaneously. These concerns seem to be more theoretical than likely to become a practical problem. All EU member states, including France, have agreed upon the principles laid out in the "Berlin Arrangements" which state that the EU perspective crisis management campaigns are subject to a NATO "right of first refusal". Although there might be a different interpretation on both sides of the Atlantic how far this right might reach, it is not imaginable that the EU will take action without consultations in NATO. Within the consultations in the NAC Washington will keep a strong influence regarding the decision which military toolset is going to be used. The concerns regarding EU actions without US consent are unsubstantiated for a second reason. Even if the EU would decide to act without consulting NATO in advance for whatever reason there still would remain the US influence in the United Nations Security Council. As the EU made clear in the ESS and subsequent concepts, an employment of EU military forces will require a respective Security Council Resolution. For these reasons an employment of EU military assets without

Washington's consent or against US interests is theoretically possible but will most likely not occur in reality.

As the single set of forces is the prevailing approach in the EU member states, the enhancement of professionalism, expeditionary capabilities, sustainment and survivability in the pursuit of the Battle Group concept will indirectly help to strengthen the NRF, as it makes European forces more effective over time. In addition in some European nations it will most likely be easier to receive popular blessing for increased defense budgets if the assets are billed primarily for EU concepts as opposed to a NATO program.

4.2. Bosnia and Democratic Republic of Congo proof for effectiveness?

The EU approach towards military missions has been very careful in the past. In the early stage of ESDP it seems to be essential to policy makers in Europe, not to pursue too ambitious goals when deploying an EU-led military force. A failed mission in these early days will most likely cause a severe pushback for EU aspirations in the field of security and defense and would strengthen those skeptics who do not see a military role for the EU at all. So it should not be a surprise that the EU's recent track record of missions is situated at the lower and middle end of the expanded Petersberg Tasks. The EU received its military baptism of fire with the operations Concordia⁷² in Macedonia and Artemis⁷³ in DRC. Both missions were successful and strengthened the self-confidence of the EU and promoted the conviction among its member states that it was prepared to cope with missions of larger scale. On the 2nd of December 2004 the EU

⁷² The Operation Concordia also took place under the Berlin Plus Agreement from 31. March 2003 until 15. December 2003 and encompassed 400 soldiers. For more detailed Information see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594&lang=EN&mode=g – accessed 10. November 2006.

⁷³ The Operation Artemis was the first autonomous EU operation. France as a lead nation provided the C2 arrangements for the deployment of a multinational Force into DRC to end the humanitarian crisis in the Ituri Region from 12. June 2003 until 1. September 2003. For detailed Information see:

took over the Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina. Until that point with its 7000 soldiers EUFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina was the most challenging and most comprehensive mission of the EU. Mainly three reasons led to the decision to allow the EU to take over NATO's role in the country. Firstly, the finalization of the standing agreements between NATO and the EU had enabled the EU to cope with a mission of that magnitude. Secondly, the EU had an inherent interest in taking over the responsibility for the mission in Bosnia Herzegovina as a country with a clear EU perspective. Thirdly, there was a growing interest in the US administration to allow a European follow on mission to SFOR in order to be able to pull out US military assets, which would be needed in other places. Operation Althea is not only interesting in order to judge EU effectiveness in crisis management operations under the "Berlin Plus Agreement" but also because of the use of NATO assets also well suited to give an impression on the state of EU and NATO relationship, which claims to be a strategic partnership. In the operation the EU for the first time applied its integrated political concepts encompassing civil and military components for crisis management. Activities of EUFOR, the EU Police Mission, the HR/EUSR and the EU Commission are now being coordinated under one roof. Overall it is fair to assess that EUFOR has accomplished its mission so far and has ensured a secure environment, which enables the peaceful transformation of Bosnia Herzegovina. This transformation led to subsequent reforms in the police and military which opened negotiations about a stabilization and association agreement with the EU in December 2005. Nevertheless some problematic issues can not be neglected. Firstly, it took nearly two years in planning until the EU finally took over the mission. This long time can partly be explained by the fact that an agreement between three international organizations and the affected country had to be achieved. Whereas in the United Nations a qualified majority (including all permanent members) was sufficient, decisions in the EU and NATO had to be taken unanimously. It showed that consent about the estimate of the situation,

http://www.consilium.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang=de&mode=g – accessed 10. November

termination of SFOR and the provision of NATO resources were hard to achieve. The US was especially reluctant in 2002 to approve an EU engagement in the Balkans. Even after the principal mission had been agreed upon in 2003, Washington insisted on keeping a NATO HQ in Sarajevo. Obviously this was to safeguard US interests in the region and to be kept informed over the developments in Bosnia Herzegovina. No matter how understandable that was from an US perspective, it also was once again a sign of US ambiguity towards ESDP. The US policy was on the one hand demanding increased European engagement, and on the other hand reluctant to grant unrestricted confidence in EU activities. Subsequently the decision was taken to establish an EU and a NATO Headquarters. The delineation of tasks between the two HQ's was a difficult mission and ended in a compromise leaving NATO responsibilities in the fight against terrorism and in the pursuit of war criminals as well as the advisory role for transforming the military.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, these arrangements made the C2 structure more complex and created the demand for increased coordination between the respective HQ. Once again political considerations were traded against military effectiveness and violated principles of war, such as unity of command. Obviously, a planning time of two years has to be considered as too long. Both organizations should have a vital interest to shorten these timelines significantly. If this is not achieved the "Berlin Plus Arrangements" will not be perceived as a practical solution for more demanding missions in the future. It will serve as a decisive argument for those who call for autonomous EU capabilities.

Secondly, while the cooperation between EU and NATO on the ground works quite well, there is clearly a lack of coordination at the strategic level. NATO's Secretary General expressed this view when stating "NATO and EU work together in crisis areas in a pragmatic fashion. We

2006.

⁷⁴ Compare, Judy Dempsey, "US and EU in Dispute on Control of Bosnia Force", *Financial Times*, (9.3.2004), p.2.

also need a similar approach on the political level.”⁷⁵ The political control of Operation Althea is lying in the hands of the Political and Security Council of the EU whereas the Military Committee supervises the duly execution of the mission. The provisions of the “Berlin Plus Agreement” foresee that NATO receives regular updates on the progression of the EU mission. As the EUFOR commander is only reporting back to the PSC and the EUMS it is the obligation of these bodies to inform their respective counterparts in NATO, the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee. Therefore common sessions of the respective bodies have to be seen as the best tool to meet the information requirement but also to come to informal decisions on contentious issues. In the past certain nations, especially Turkey, have used their power to avoid these consultations on a regular basis.⁷⁶ Still short term political considerations tend to trump operational requirements. The established EU cell at SHAPE and the NATO liaison team at the EUMS can not be seen as a substitute for these meetings as they are not contributing to an open exchange of information at the political and military strategic level. Although in the case of operation Althea having no direct impact on the operational level so far, these behaviors have to be seen as a real danger to the so often claimed strategic partnership between EU and NATO as it will strengthen those Europeans, who favor entire autonomy of the EU and who perceive the “Berlin Plus Agreement” only as a temporary solution.⁷⁷

Other than Operation ALTHEA the Operation EUFOR RD Congo does not recourse to NATO assets but is an operation using autonomous C2 capabilities. In the wake of the Helsinki Headline goals five member states, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece declared

⁷⁵ NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on the 12. Mai 2005 translated from German. Speech is available under: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050512a.htm> - accessed 11. November 2006.

⁷⁶ Turkey’s track record in delaying the progress of NATO and EU relations is quite long. Turkey tried to block the Berlin Plus Agreement for a long period of time and only massive pressure from the United States finally helped to overcome the blockade in the NAC in the end of 2002. In blocking common meetings of the respective Military Committee’s Turkey avoids to sit at the same table with military representatives from Cyprus. For the details see Frank Kupferschmidt, “Putting Strategic Partnership to the Test”, *SWP Research Paper*, (April 2006), p. 15 f. www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3172- accessed 30. November 2006.

their willingness to create the prerequisites within their national HQ capacity to make a strategic level Headquarters available, once required by the EU. This step was mainly undertaken to avoid the creation of a strategic level HQ in Brussels that could be seen as duplication to existing NATO HQ. Therefore these five nations created the infrastructural preconditions as well as the required procedures to establish such a Headquarters on short notice.⁷⁸ On 25th April 2006 the United Nations welcomed with UNSCR 1671 the intention of the EU to deploy a military force in order to support the existing MONUC force during the time of elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN-Charter was limited to the support of the MONUC force in their stabilization efforts, to securing the Kinshasa airport, to conducting operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger, to protecting civilians from imminent threat of physical violence, and ensuring security and freedom of movement of the force. The mission was part of the EU's overall support to the DRC transition process towards stability in the country. Germany declared its willingness to act as the lead nation and thus provided the strategic level Headquarters in Potsdam. France volunteered to provide the deployable Headquarters for DRC. Although the mission came too early to use the entire force out of the existing Battle Group cycle the composition of the force involved was quite comparable with the capabilities and troop strength foreseen in the Battle Groups concept.⁷⁹ Thus, the operation can be seen as a test bed for the level of ambition for future EU missions in Africa. With its limitation of the mandate to four months, the EU clearly emphasized that it saw the military engagement only as a supporting effort in the election process and not as a long term commitment. Although being criticized for its functional limited mandate and the short duration

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 25.

⁷⁸ The HQ issue is a perfect example that perception matters. The efforts undertaken by the 5 member states to create the infrastructure within their national HQ capability, was significant and probably much more cost intensive than the creation of a single EU HQ in Brussels. Nevertheless, these efforts were not perceived as threatening NATO's role and thus much more political acceptable.

⁷⁹ EU-Operation EUFOR RD CONGO comprised military personnel of 19 nations. (17 EU member states plus Turkey and temporarily Switzerland). This multinational makeup of the force is distinct from the EU Battle Groups concept which does not foresee this degree of multinationality.

of its military engagement, the concept applied by the EU has achieved the desired results. Despite a few violent confrontations of the militias of the two leading figures, Joseph Kabila and Pierre Bemba, after the first election round, the situation has not evolved into the feared confrontation and Kinshasa and the remote areas stayed rather calm. Joseph Kabila won the runoff on the 29th of October 2006 and the inauguration into office took place on the 6th of December without violent resistance of the losing faction. In this light the elections must be assessed as a success in DRC's violent history and could mark the beginning of a stable future in the country. Importantly, Operation EUFOR RD CONGO is only one of a series of activities of the EU in DRC. The EU commission with its indicative program 2003-2007 has already contributed 750 million Euro in order to fight poverty, provide institution building and macro economic support; the EU provided 149 million Euro solely for the election process, covering approximately 80% of the entire costs; the police mission EUPOL operational since 2005 aims to enhance DRC police capabilities. With these activities the EU underlines its conviction that effective crisis management can only occur if civilian and military instruments are applied in a sensible combination. In order to sustain the success in DRC it will be decisive to stay politically and economically engaged and to increase the humanitarian aid in order to help to rebuild effective institutions. Only if the people in DRC witness a sensible improvement in their living conditions will the democratic experiment in the country likely endure. Therefore with the redeployment of the EU military force only the first phase of preventive crisis management is terminated. It will be important that the EU stays actively engaged over time. If in DRC lasting stability is achieved this could send a positive political signal to the region due to DRC's important role in Central Africa and could serve as a roadmap to defuse other pending crises in the region.

The limited military operation in DRC was a sensible complementary effort to support the already existing efforts to stabilize DRC. The precise and limited mission and the predefined duration allowed the EU to terminate the military presence and avoid a prolonged military

engagement, thus, maintaining EU's strategic freedom of action for future crises in the region. The mission without a doubt has strengthened the credibility of ESDP. The positive assessment will likely increase the willingness of politicians all over Europe to consider military options in the region.

Despite the overall positive experience a major weaknesses has been revealed by the operation, which will likely fuel the discussions in the upcoming months within the military community of the EU. Although the C2 arrangement overall worked out, especially the force generation process was not satisfying. Firstly, as long there was no headquarters designated no vital planning took place, which defined the critical requirements and capabilities for the operation early in the planning phase. This delayed the force generation process significantly. Secondly, a lot of member states proved to be reluctant to indicate possible contributions before it was decided which headquarters was taking the lead. Thus, the task to close critical capability gaps was staying with the lead nation, putting a disproportionate strain on that member state. For future operations it will be essential to find a way to project required military capabilities early in the planning process and to establish a reliable force generation process. This will require an early standup of OHQ planning capacity. This requirement is likely to support those voices who favor standing capabilities in Brussels instead of relying on national headquarters. This could consequentially lead to a strengthening of the role of the OpsCentre in Brussels.

5.Conclusion

The United States is faced with enormous challenges in the international environment in order to maintain security for the American people. The short and midterm challenges of international terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass effect might be followed by the rise of a peer competitor in the long term. All these challenges ask not only for

military answers but require the appliance of the whole array of national power. Trying to tackle these challenges in a unilateral fashion may exceed the power of the United States over time and may aggravate some of the conflicts instead of solving them. The lurking danger will be that the United States will be in a weakened position, due to its continuous military engagement in military interventions, to tackle short and midterm challenges that will leave the nation ill prepared to cope with an arising peer competitor in the long term. Acting as a *liberal hegemon* the United States will have the chance to shape and manage the global system in a much more sophisticated way, by strengthening rules and international institutions. It will be the rule of international law that will offer the best system for managing a world with a peer competitor and it will be the international institutions and their authority that will best enable the United States to cope with international terrorism and the proliferation issues related to that without overtaxing its own national resources. In this context the United States should have a vital interest in strengthening the ESDP. By linking today's struggles to longstanding European ideas of collective security the US is well advised to take advantage of Europe's commitment to crisis management as demonstrated in Bosnia und recently in DRC. The following advantages could arise out of such a policy:

First the US would build up a partner that has a potential for strong capabilities of all elements of national power. The EU potential especially for diplomatic, civilian and economic power will be very helpful in achieving decisive effects in the current struggle and in expanding possible options. Although not yet successful the diplomatic role of the EU to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear program is pointing into that direction.

Second the US could use this partner to defuse certain crises where a direct US involvement is politically not wise or such an involvement would aggravate the situation instead of improving it. Recent developments in the Middle East should have taught us that sometimes a solely US face on an operation is not always well perceived. The current situation in Lebanon may serve as an example for a situation where US absence may be prudent.

Third the United States could outsource military interventions to this partner in regions and conflicts that do not directly threaten US security, but contribute indirectly to the fight against international terrorism and proliferation issues by helping to stabilize fragile countries. This would allow the US to save its military resources to maintain strategic flexibility and to avoid an overtaxed military. Africa could serve as such a region. Due to its geographical proximity and its influence on European security it is likely that Europe will continue to take over responsibility in that region.

Fourth more capabilities will be mobilized to cope with the challenges of today's international system as some countries in the EU in principle share the assessment of today's threats with the US but are very reluctant to subordinate their capabilities directly under US authority. An indirect US approach supporting the ESDP is likely to influence their willingness to increase their efforts especially in the military domain and thus enhance military capabilities to cope with existing challenges.

It is obvious that unconstrained support of ESDP involves some risks for the US as there is no guarantee that it will not be the EU that arises as the peer competitor one day. But wasn't it Athens' risk evasiveness and striving for total security that was the underlying reason for the confrontation with the Spartans? Real partnership demands trust which is best demonstrated by maintaining a degree of perceived vulnerability and accepting a certain level of risk. In supporting the ESDP the US demonstrates its willingness to take that risk. Such a move will weaken those in the EU who would like to see the EU as a balance to the US in the international system and do not prefer a strategic partnership.

A functioning ESDP with appropriate military and civilian capabilities together with NATO's military might will increase the flexibility to react to developing crises. Depending on the geographical location, the nature of the conflict, its political dependencies, its military and civilian requirements and perceived urgency different courses of action can be created that best meet the requirements of the particular situation. Strengthening the diversity and the capabilities

of international institutions as a key pillar of liberal internationalism will enable flexible answers to complex challenges. What is true in the counterinsurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan that call for adaptive, flexible, interagency and multinational answers is true for the challenges for transatlantic security. ESDP could serve as an important cornerstone to achieve just that.

APPENDIX

I. The European Security Architecture

Organisation	Members	Remarks
EU	<i>Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, France, Germany, Slovenia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,</i>	<i>Participating in CEC</i>
NATO	Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, France, Germany, Slovenia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, United States, Canada, Turkey, Iceland	
WEU	Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, United Kingdom,	Other EU members either associated members, partners or observers
OSCE	All European Countries, all former countries of the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, overall 56 countries	

II. Milestones for ESDP

- 1991 Treaty of Maastricht establishes second pillar within the TEU framework
- 1992 Petersberg Declaration during the WEU summit describes the European level of ambition in future crisis management operation
- 1997 Amsterdam Treaty strengthens the CFSP
- 1998 French – British summit in St. Malo
- 1999 European Council of Cologne (Birth of EU military institutions)
- 1999 European Council of Helsinki (Definition of level of ambition – European Headline Goal)
- 2000 European Council in Feira decides to establish civilian crises management capabilities
- 2001 Treaty of Nice formally integrated ESDP into the TEU framework
- 2003 “Berlin plus arrangements” based on the results of the NATO summit in Washington
- 2003 European Security Strategy
- 2004 European Council Brussels endorses Civilian Headline Goal 2008
- 2004 Formulation of European Headline Goal 2010 and EU Battle Groups Concept
- 2007 EU Battle Groups Operational

III. Abbreviations

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missile
CCP	Common Commercial Policy
CEC	Common European Currency
CEM	Common European Market
C4 I	Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe
C2	Command and Control
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECSC	European Community for Steel and Coal
ECT	European Constitutional Treaty
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
HR/EUSR	High Representative/ European Union Special Representative
IAEO	International Atomic Energy Organization
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NSS	National Security Strategy
OHQ	Operations Headquarters

OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Council
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Allied Command Europe
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WEU	West European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Constitution of the European Union
(http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm)
- European Security Strategy
(www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=391&lang=EN - 41k – accessed 10. September 2006)
- European Headline Goal 2010
(www.ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf – accessed 10. September 2006)
- European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy
(www.statewatch.org/news/2005/nov/eu-counter-terr-strategy-nov-05.pdf - accessed 10. September 2006)
- EU Battle Groups Concept (primary document EU confidential)
- Treaty of Amsterdam
(<http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtext.html>)
- Treaty of Nice
(www.ec.europa.eu/nice_treaty/index_en.htm - accessed 10. September 2006 Internet source TBD)
- Treaty of Maastricht
(www.europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html - accessed 10. September 2006)
- US National Security Strategy
(www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html - accessed 10. September 2006)
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
(www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf - accessed 10. September 2006)
- German White Paper 2006
(http://www.bmvg.de/portal/PA_1_0_LT/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFODE/WB+2006+englisch+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb – accessed 29 October 2006)

Secondary sources:

Books:

- Barber, R. Benjamin, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*, New York, 2003.
- Ferguson, Niall, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*, New York 2004.

- Grant, C, *Intimate Relations: Can Britain Play a Leading Role in European Defense – and Keep Its Special Links to US Intelligence*, London: Centre for European Reform 2000.
- Gregory, S., *French Defense Policy into the Twenty First Century*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd 2000.
- Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York 2003.
- Krause, Joachim, Wenger, Andreas and Watanabe, Lisa (Edited), *Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum*, in *Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy*, Volume 11, Bern 2003.
- Kupferschmidt, Frank, *Strategische Partnerschaft in der Bewaehrung-Die Zusammenarbeit von NATO und EU in der Operation Althea*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin 2006.
- Maersheimer, John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2003.
- Mann, Michael, *Incoherent Empire*, New York 2004.
- Hans Morgentau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York, 1993)
- Moss, Bernhard H., *Monetary Union in Crises: The European Union as a Neo-liberal Construction*, London 2005.
- Neunreuther, Karlheinz and Wiener, Antje, *European Integration after Amsterdam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Petersohn, Ulrich and Lang, Sybille, *The Future of ESDP in the wake of the negative Referenda*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2006.
- Peters, Ingo, The OSCE and German Foreign Policy: A study in How Institutions Matter. In: *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Space and Time*, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallender, (Oxford University Press 1999)
- Williams. Michael C., *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge: University Press, 2005.

Articles:

- Bergsten, Fred C., “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78 (1999), p. 20-34.
- Everts, Steven and Keohane, Daniel, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure”, in: *Survival*, Volume 3 (2003), p. 167-186.
- Chivvis, Christopher, “ESDP and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Political and Geopolitical Considerations”, in: *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Volume 3 (2005), p. 23-38.
- De Camp, William S., “ESDP: NATO’s Demise or Opportunities for NATO”. *USAWC Research Paper Project* (March 2005).
- Dempsey, Judy, “US and EU in Dispute on Control of Bosnia Force”, *Financial Times*, (9.3.2004), p.2.

- Gleditsch, Nils Peter, "Democracy and Peace", *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 29 (1992), p. 369-376
- Heise, Volker, "ESVP in a Transatlantic Perspective – More Differences than Commonalities" (Discussionpaper), *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, March 2006.
- Howorth, Jolyon, "Discourse, Ideas and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defense Policy", in: *West European Politics*, Volume 27 (2004), p. 211-234.
- Ikenberry, G. John, "Power and liberal order: America's postwar world order in transition", in: *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5 Nr. 2 (2005), p. 133-152.
- Licek, Borek, "Do European Security Capacities have Feet of Clay? – Comments on the Institutional Setup of the European security and Defense Policy", in: *Perspectives*, Volume 19 (2003), p. 32-51,
- Mazaar, Michael J., "George W Bush, Idealist", *International Affairs*, Volume 79 (2003), p. 503-522.
- Merlingen, Michael and Ostrauskaite, Rasa, "ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges", in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10 (2005), p. 215-235.
- Nossel, Suzanne, "Smart Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 Nr. 2 (2004), p. 131-142
- Peters, Ingo, "ESDP as a Transatlantic Issue: Problems of Mutual Ambiguity", in: *International Studies Review*, Volume 6 (2004), p. 381-401.
- Salmon, Trevor, "The European Security and Defense Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?", in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10 (2005), p. 359-379.
- Tackle, Marianne "Towards Normalization of German Security and Defense Policy: German Participation in International Military Organizations", *ARENA Working Paper*, (WP 2/10 2002).
- Watanabe, Lisa, "The ESDP: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership in Transatlantic Security Relations", in: *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 13 (2005), p. 5-20.