Is Federalism Based on Ethnic Partition a Viable Solution in Iraq?
Abstract
The U.S. strategy in Iraq from 2003 to 2007 focused on transitioning Iraq into a unified democratic nation state with majority and minority leaders working toward common goals. One seemingly unforeseen issue was that primordial nationalism overshadowed modern nationalism. Primordial nationalism provided an exploitable seam for outside actors and internal ethnically driven leaders to create instability despite the efforts of the United States. Under the confines of the initial U.S. strategy, the rift between the ethnic groups resulted in increased insecurity within the country and sectarian violence similar to Bosnia. This thesis analyzes these sectarian rifts, the potential for establishing ethnic provinces with their own security and governance, and the establishment of a multi-ethnic national government. The thesis concludes that federalism based on an ethnic partition of Iraq is viable. The solution to primordial nationalism is to provide each group with an equal level of authority in the nation. A change in strategy permitting the groups to use their current militias as provincial police forces will provide the security needed for each province. The unit structure in the Iraqi Army requires equality of leadership and membership at every conceivable level. The Iraqi government requires restructuring to provide equal sharing of power between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA475503
Entities
People
- Douglas W. Merritt
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College