

IS FEDERALISM BASED ON ETHNIC PARTITION
A VIABLE SOLUTION IN IRAQ?

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

IS FEDERALISM BASED ON ETHNIC PARTITION A VIABLE SOLUTION IN IRAQ? by MAJ DOUGLAS W. MERRITT, USA, 105 pages.

The U.S. strategy in Iraq from 2003 to 2007 focused on transitioning Iraq into a unified democratic nation state with majority and minority leaders working toward common goals. One seemingly unforeseen issue was that primordial nationalism overshadowed modern nationalism. Primordial nationalism provided an exploitable seam for outside actors and internal ethnically driven leaders to create instability despite the efforts of the United States. Under the confines of the initial U.S. strategy, the rift between the ethnic groups resulted in increased insecurity within the country and sectarian violence similar to Bosnia. This thesis analyzed the sectarian rifts, the potential establishment of ethnic provinces with security and governance, and a multi-ethnic national government.

This thesis concluded that federalism based on an ethnic partition of Iraq is viable. The solution to primordial nationalism is to provide each group an equal level of authority in the nation. A change in strategy permitting the groups to use their current militias as the provincial police force will provide the security for each province. The unit structure in the Iraqi Army requires equality of leadership and membership at every conceivable level. The Iraqi government requires restructuring to provide equal sharing of power between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.

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ACRONYMS

COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics (Elements of National Power)
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IA	Iraqi Army
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Iraqi Police
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistani Regional Government
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces-Iraq
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PKK	Parti Karkaren Kurdistan
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RS	Republika Srpska
SCIRI	Supreme Islamic Council of Revolution in Iraq
SGA	Small Group Advisor
UIA	United Iraqi Alliance

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CHAPTER 1

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The war in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein resembles a civil war more than the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The situation in Iraq in 2007 has high levels of sectarian violence, a continued demand for a significant deployment of U.S. forces, and decreased public support from the national and international public in the view of some. Is the current surge working? Is there a military solution in Iraq? What is the new strategy in Iraq? Politicians, news broadcasters, and world leaders are asking the U.S. Government for answers. Delaware Senator Joseph R. Biden proposed, in a news release on 6 October 2006, a plan to partition Iraq as the new strategy to conclude Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) successfully (Biden Press Release 2006, 1).

The ethnic tension between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds as well as intra-ethnic tensions continue to intensify as U.S. Forces conduct counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. “When an ethnic war is far advanced, partition is probably the most humane form of intervention because it attempts to achieve through negotiation what would otherwise be achieved through fighting; *it circumvents the conflict and saves lives* (italics for emphasis)” (Kumar 1997, 23). The initial U. S. Strategy in Iraq was to establish a unified democratic nation. The policy to promote the development of Iraq into a Western style democracy is failing due to strong ethnic conflicts between the Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds (Eland 2005, 7). The transition to a workable, viable Iraqi federation capitalizes on the cultural strengths of tribal, religious, and secular affiliations within the different ethnic groups. The objective stated in the *2006 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* is

to, “ help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has the security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists” (National Security Council 2005, 1). It does not specify the type of democratic government required to win the war on terror in Iraq and achieve the national objectives.

According to Sam C. Holliday, editor for the *Bath Chronicle*, in his article “A Federation for Iraq?” he states,

It is time to abandon the neo-colonial approach and to establish a federation of eighteen provinces. While Iraq has been divided into eighteen provinces since 1925, they have been only subordinate administrative units of the central government. Now it is time to give them the authority to govern and to represent their people. The goal should be to replace the setting that breeds radicalism and hatred for America with one that values freedom, cooperation, self-determination, stability, and self-sufficiency (Holliday 2004, 1).

Holliday advocated empowering the local governments of the 18 provinces and decentralizing the national government. Although the number of individual provinces or the implementation of ethnic territories is negotiable, the expansion of federalism may be a potential solution for resolving the conflict in Iraq. The fourth pillar of the political track in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* states, “Federalism is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq, but instead is a pre-requisite for the united country and better governance. Federalism allows a strong central government to exercise the powers of a sovereign state, while enabling regional bodies to make decisions that protect the interests of local populations” (National Security Council 2005, 14).

There are many proposals to partition Iraq. The least radical maintains Iraq in 18 provinces with provincial governments and a strong central government. The extreme version of partition breaks Iraq into ethnically centric states that coordinate directly to the

United Nations, but economic cooperation would interconnect them (Wright 2007, A11). Figure 1 was found inside a Mosque during OIF3 in 2005. It illustrates that the concept of partition is not just a United States idea, and potentially some Iraqis support it. Every level of partition addresses similar points of conflict. For successful partition of Iraq, each ethnic group must agree on the governance, level of autonomy and sovereignty, distribution of oil revenues, not feel subordinate to the other groups, and maintain its own security. The security problem in Iraq has three sub-sets. The first problem is the development of the Iraqi police (IP). Over 12,000 IP were killed between September 2004 and September 2006 (Tawfeeq 2006, 1). In many towns and cities insurgents destroyed entire police stations and executed any police caught in the attack or that refused to quit. As the United States attempts to rebuild the local security, the insurgents infiltrated the police forces and some actually conducted sectarian violence. Local militias have replaced IPs as the primary security for the civilians within many ethnic communities.




Figure 1. Map Found in a Sunni Mosque in Mosul Displaying Potential Ethnic Boundaries. (Iraqi Border added for geographic orientation).

Source: New Middle East Map, (Ralph Peters/Chris Broz, publisher unknown, date unknown) 1.

Paul Bremer, the former U.S. administrator in Iraq, disbanded the Iraqi Army (IA) in May 2003 (Slevin 2003, A1). The U.S. Army and coalition military forces are required to recruit, equip, and train the Iraqi Army, while providing security. The overall goal is to turn the security of the country over to the army to allow the coalition military forces to leave Iraq. In order to determine the feasibility of partition, the role of the National Iraqi Army and local provincial armies requires delineation. The different

ethnic groups in Iraq already maintain militias, which currently secure their ethnic communities and conduct attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces. Can the ethnic militias serve as recognized provincial armies and local police forces while maintaining a multi-ethnic national army for border security and interdiction of conflicts between ethnic militias?

Can an Iraqi Federation composed of three ethnic provinces and a central governing city state provide a viable solution to the conflict in Iraq? Can the three provinces secure both their borders from neighboring countries and its civilians from within the country? What is required to prevent one province from attempting to overthrow the national government or another province? Is a central government with national security forces viable for national security? Iraq is the historic battleground of several generations of nations and continues to be the ethnic fault line of the Middle East. To stabilize Iraq and successfully achieve the U.S. objectives, federalism with ethnically partitioned provinces is a viable solution.

A Brief History of Iraq

On April 1920, the San Remo Peace Conference of Allied Powers endorsed the French and British mandate over the Levant (Mideastweb.org 2002-3, 1). Britain retained responsibility for the mandate in Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Mideastweb.org 2002-3, 1). The British created Iraq from the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad & Mosul (Mideastweb.org 2002-3, 1). The first British High Commissioner of Iraq, prevented any degree of self-government from the tribal leaders, which resulted in a tribal revolt (Mideastweb.org 2002-3, 1). Percy Cox replaced Wilson in June of 1920 and permitted Iraq to establish limited self-governance. As Britain

released it holding in South West Asia, King Feisal II, son of Saud, became the first constitutional king of Iraq as a reward for his participation in the British led Arab Revolt (Mideastweb.org 2002-3, 1). Additionally, one of King Feisal's sons became the king of Jordan.

In the 1920s, King Feisal II, a Sunni from Saudi Arabia, recognized the complex problems that came with governing Iraq. "Half a century ago King Feisal II got it right, it certainly appears, when he opined that the country (Iraq) was ungovernable. He noted deep-seated religious, sectional, and political differences in what had become a separate country only after the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire" (Mattox 2004, 1). The current ethnic conflicts between the Shia and Sunni began in approximately 632 CE in a disagreement over who the prophet Muhammed's legitimate successors were (Nasr 2006, 2). The Kurdish people of Iraq are divided from both Shias and Sunnis due to years of conflict and most notably, by Saddam Hussein and his attempted genocide during his reign in 1988 (O'Leary 2002, 17). There is a long bloody history of hate and distrust between the three primary ethnic groups in Iraq.




Figure 2. Map Illustrating the Ethnic Rifts, Which Date Back to Early CE. Four Different Ethnic/Religious Groups Fought to Control the Iraq Area.
Source: Norman B Leventhal Map Center, Ottoman Empire (Iraq, Unknown, 2005), 2.

Sectarian strife is not a new concern for the region of Iraq. The religious rift between Shia and Sunni and the cultural rift between Arab, Persian, Turk, and Kurd in Iraq began in antiquity. Figure 2 illustrates the multiple rifts between the ethnic groups. The Iraqi borders provides historic prospective to the cultural rifts that existed when Iraq became a country. Multiple cultures collided in Iraq, previously called the fertile-crescent, the cradle of civilization, and Mesopotamia, which resulted in the current sectarian and cultural instability. The level of violence between the groups increased and decreased with the changing of leadership, but always remained. Saddam's violent rule during his reign minimized the level of sectarian violence according to a middle age

Iraqi, “Everybody knew what everybody else was...Sunnis and Shias readily married each other, usually maintaining their own religious identity... Sectarianism, in other words, was largely social, and cultural, endemic but relatively benign” (International Crisis Group 2006, 6). During operations in the Khark district in central Baghdad, Imams and Clerics nullified the premonition that sectarian violence was focused on strictly Sunni and Shia neighborhoods. In fact, most of the areas targeted by sectarian violence consisted of families that were intermarried Sunnis/Shias and inter-tribal.

The reinforced sectarian rift is largely a result of the British use of sectarian categories to enforce their rule. The British utilized a “divide and rule” strategy to place the Sunni minority as the ruling party of Iraq (International Crisis Group 2006, 6). King Feisal was the first ruler of Iraq, under the British, and initiated the favored position of Sunnis over Shias and Kurds. With the exception of The Great Iraqi Revolution in 1920, tension, distrust, and hate continued to widen the gap between the ethnic groups in Iraq. In 1932, Iraq earned its independence from Britain; however, the ruling Sunni dictatorship firmly controlled Iraq.

The final Sunni dictator and leader of the Ba’ath Party, Saddam Hussein, concreted the ethnic relationships in Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s strategy of Arabization and the oppression of every non-Sunni ethnic group resulted in deep ethno-centric hatred. In Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam executed Al Anfal from 1986 to 1988, an operation aimed at ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Kurds. The Ba’ath Party destroyed nearly 4000 Kurdish Villages and eliminated approximately 300,000 Kurds (O’Leary 2002, 2). The Shias became the lower working class and lacked governmental representation. Saddam empowered Sunni Leaders in the key positions within the Iraqi Government. Sunni

domination ended when the United States removed the Saddam Regime from power in 2003.

The United States may have made substantial miscalculations when it removed the Sunnis from power in Iraq.

The Bush administration thought of politics as the relationship between individuals and the state, and so it failed to recognize that people in the Middle East see politics also as the balance of power among communities. Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major communities (Nasr 2006, 1).

When the United States supported the long time suppressed Shia to lead the Iraqi Government, they rekindled the rift between the Sunnis and Shias. The Kurds supported the United States and established a relatively secure Kurdish Iraq north of Mosul.

To complicate the situation, neighboring countries affect each ethnic group. The Shia in Iran openly acknowledged the current government of Iraq, however, they supply Shia militias and activists with weapons, training, and funds to conduct sectarian violence and disrupt coalition forces. Syria and Saudi Arabia support the Sunni militias and terrorist networks. Kurdish independence, at any level, may result in violence from Turkey. Turkey suppresses an enormous Kurdish population within its borders and fears Kurdish independence would result in attempted expansionism.

Problem Statement

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) posed the following question to Congress in September 2006; "If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence (Walker 2006, 18)? Is it time for a

change in policy? Should the United States quit forcing the ethnic groups of Iraq to work homogenously throughout the country and research a strategy that permits ethnic groups to promote ethnic identity first then Iraqi Nationalism second? The long standing sectarian situation in Iraq will require several generations to rectify. It is extremely unlikely the U.S. public support will endure the task. Partitioning the country based on ethnicity reduces the sectarian strife that continues to destroy the successful accomplishment of U.S. Objectives. Therefore, the primary research question is; is federalism based on ethnic partition a viable solution in Iraq?

Research Questions

In order to determine the feasibility of an Iraqi Federation, composed of three ethnic states and a central governing city-state, answers to several questions remain to address the areas of concern. This paper will address three primary areas of concern. Security is the first criterion for stabilizing Iraq. The current strategy in Iraq is failing to provide Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capable of securing the people of Iraq. The rising violence will destroy the U.S. public support for the war and may ultimately result in a costly Iraqi civil war. Can security forces be established to maintain security at the state and national level?

Federalism across the world has assumed several different sub-strategies with differing levels of success or failure. How does the situation in Iraq compare to other nations with similar ethnic disputes? Historically, Bosnia underwent partition with differing levels of success. What can the United States learn from how the partitions occurred? What was successful and what was not successful? How did the situations differ or emulate the current situation in Iraq?

A recommended segregation of country and state that successfully addresses the cultural tensions in the area is paramount to determine the feasibility of partition. The current Shia led government of Iraq provides tension to the conflict with the Sunnis. Attempting to return the Sunni Minority to power will result in violence from Shia and Kurds. If a Kurdish leader was put in charge of the country, tension with Turkey would erupt and conflict with the Sunnis would increase. What governmental guidelines if agreed upon would provide equal representation within the government to prevent an ethnic uprising in the early years of the new administration?

Assumptions

The primary assumption is the people of Iraq want protection from the Shia and Sunni sectarian violence. It is required that the Iraqi Government and its people agree to the partition and successfully transition to ethnic centric rule within their geographic areas. It is safe to assume that sectarian violence will continue to rise until the ethnic groups are segregated. The 18 provinces already geographically dividing Iraq are not sufficient to support a federal form of government.

The successful partition of Iraq is incumbent on Sunni, Shia, and Kurds agreeing to provincial boundaries and the scope and authority of the central government and the Iraqi Military. It is required to assume that the provincial governments in Iraq will allow minority groups to reside within their borders. This limits the required mass displacement of each group to its ethnic province. If the partition results in mass movement of civilian personnel, support from the people is unlikely.

The economic issue based on the location of oil fields and ethnic boundaries will not prevent the partition of Iraq. Although not sufficiently researched in this paper, the

assumption that an acceptable compromise on equal distribution of oil revenue could occur. The oil reserves are in Kurdish and Shia controlled area. A solution must occur before the Sunni agree to the development of provincial boundaries and ethnic centric provinces.

Another assumption requires the United States to not conduct a premature withdrawal from Iraq before security is established. In both the current strategy and a federal strategy based on partition, the United States must continue to support the newly formed government and provide an acceptable level of security to protect the people of Iraq.

Limitations

Some data on the ISF and current affairs in Iraq is classified information that will not be included in this text to maintain an unclassified classification. This paper must be complete by 26 November 2007, which prevents elaboration on several topics that will require further study. To ensure successful research of this topic, the last reference used in this paper was the General Patreaus, Commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) report on the situation in Iraq on September 15, 2007.

Delimitation

Security will focus on the restructuring of the ISF and disposition of the Peshmerga, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Parti Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), Badr Organization, Mahdi Army, and Sunni security elements. The paper will not outline specific IA unit movements within Iraq, it will not discuss what capability is required in

each province. The focus will be internal and external security requirements and reduction of sectarian violence.

Significance of this Study

The current war in Iraq is quickly losing popular support in the United States. As sectarian violence continues to plague the current strategy, American service members are paying the price for ethnic disputes from the seventh century. The research presented in this paper attacks the problem in Iraq from an angle that relieves suffering, minimizes armed conflict, and facilitates the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces, while using ethnic diversity to Iraq's advantage. Allowing ethnic centric governments to secure their own people reduces the conflicts throughout the entire country of Iraq. Senators, Congressmen, reporters, and other public persons want a solution to the war in Iraq. The scope of the complex problem in Iraq includes; minimizing sectarian violence, securing the Iraqi people, rebuilding the Iraqi Military, re-establishing the IP, building a central government agreed upon by all Iraqis, revising the Iraqi Constitution to better define authority and responsibilities, and distribution of oil revenues within Iraq. Although this paper will not address all issues aforementioned, the paper addresses security, government, and establishment of provinces. Modifying the current government and security forces to facilitate the governing of the states provides for increased security and development for the entire country. In addition, an acceptable withdrawal plan for the United States will placate the American public and facilitate the continued support for the war.

To answer the question, "is federalism with ethnically partitioned provinces a viable solution for Iraq?" research required the analysis of current and historic data. In

current events, the topic of a solution for Iraq and how to bring home U.S. troops provided a plethora of information from newspapers, periodicals, and other daily, weekly and monthly references. Chapter 2 describes the references used to attain the information required to analyze the problems in Iraq. The next chapter outlined the type of research conducted and demonstrates the in depth study conducted to answer the thesis statement.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature available to provide information required to answer the research question. The concept of partition of Iraq recently resurfaced as a potential solution to the war in Iraq resulting in a plethora of new information. It is important to research each of the ethnic groups of Iraq to understand the cultural issues resulting in the conflict between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Each of the ethnic groups maintains varying ways and means to attain their internal objectives based on whether they are Arab, Persian, or Kurd and Shia or Sunni. Chapter 4 will reference and analyze the ways and means of the different ethnic groups in Iraq with relevance to diplomacy and security.

This is certainly not the first time partition of a nation surfaced as a potential solution. To draw correlations related to the situation in Iraq, research included a literature review of the ethnic partition of Bosnia. The case study dealt with similar issues of ethnicity, intermixed populations, conflicting goals between factions, and western influence working toward democracy and the minimization of human suffering. This chapter reviews current and historic references to determine if lessons learned from those partitions contain relevance to the situation in Iraq and what similarities and differences exist between the situations.

The concept of partition in Iraq is highly controversial resulting in support for and against it. To determine if the partition of Iraq is feasible, it is imperative to understand the current U.S. strategy and situation in Iraq. Information from current news reporters,

key U.S. politicians, and subject matter experts in international relations provided critical information on the current U.S. policy and the likelihood of success of a soft or hard partition of Iraq.

Sunni

The literature review for the Sunni ethnic group begins with a brief history highlighting key events, which resulted in the ethnic conflict with Kurds, Shia Arabs, and Shia Persians. Understanding the chain of events, which led to the Sunni control over the ethnically diverse Iraq until the overthrow of the Saddam Regime, explains the heart of the enduring hate between the groups within Iraq. Following the historical perspective of the Sunnis, literature detailing the current leadership and security forces present in Iraq provided current data required to analyze the impact on conflicts with other groups and the feasibility of a Sunni lead Province.

The Library of Congress Country Studies article, “Iraq, The Ottoman Period, 1534-1918,” outlines the conflicts between the Sunnis from the Ottoman Empire and the Shia from the Safavid Empire in Iran. The conflict between the two groups resulted in several successive changes in which group controlled the country. The article provided an indepth overview explaining how the use of ethnic identities facilitated leaders from each group to bolster the support from it population. The Sunni suffered immeasurably from the Shia leadership from the Safavid Empire from 1623-1638 likewise the Shia suffered equally from the Sunni lead Ottoman Empire from 1638 to 1918. By 1918, the conflicts between the groups resulted in tribal associations throughout Iraq. Tribal conflicts over the Euphrates and Tigris River Valley deepened the rift between the nomadic Arabs and Sunni Ottomans.

“Minorities and the State in the Arab World” by Ofra Bengio provides insight to the Sunni rise to power in the 1920s. He explained how the Sunni worked with the British and became the first Iraqi patriots. The book detailed the relationship that resulted in the Sunni minority achieving diplomatic superiority with the Western forces, which resulted in their monarchy with King Faisal II. The book includes substantial information on the maltreatment of the Kurds and the oppression of the Shia majority. The conclusion does a phenomenal job connecting the pre-British rule, Sunni role, and the conflicts that resulted. This book is important because the conclusion gives views from 1999 on the viability of federalism in Iraq.

On 9 May 2007, Damien Cave, from the *New York Times*, wrote, “Meeting May Lessen Threat of a Sunni Boycott in Iraq.” The article outlined the Sunni resistance to partition due to the lack of oil in the potential Sunni State. The Kurds and Shia control the oil rich territories of Iraq. The Sunnis fear the Kurds and Shia will prosper economically and grow militarily to overthrow the Sunni government. The article describes the concerns and how the current Iraqi Constitution supports the Sunni thesis. According to O’Leary, the Sunni want a law passed forbidding the partition of Iraq.

The United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, “Weak Viability, the Iraqi Federal State and the Constitutional Amendment Process,” compares and contrast the current position each ethnic group has with respect to partition and weighs it against the Iraqi Constitution. It does an excellent job discussing the concerns the Sunnis have with regard to the partition of Iraq. The Sunni State would lack any economic support from Iraq’s vast oil supplies. The amendment process in Iraq prevents change, especially for the Sunni minority that minimized their participation in the elections.

In David E. Sanger's, reporter for the *New York Times* article, "Bush Is Said To Approve More Aid To Iraqi Sunnis Battling Extremist Groups," he discussed President Bush's optimism for the future of Iraq to secure itself from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The article highlights the success in Al Anbar Province where Sunni Militias are attacking insurgents groups without U.S. assistance. Sanger did not identify the specific Sunni militia group, but the militia's actions resulted in the reduction in attacks in the Province. If the militia can successfully disrupt Al Qaeda, it is likely to have the ability to secure a Sunni Province with assistance from the United States.

Shia

The Blanche's article, "Current Affairs in the Middle East," he focused on the state of the Shia in Iraq. Blanche discussed the probability of civil war in Iraq and concluded that it was currently eminent. On September 3, 2006, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani resigned from his participation in politics. Sistani told his aides, "there was nothing he could do to head off all-out civil war, I will not be a political leader any more, but I am happy only to receive questions on religious matters" (Blanche 2006, 1). Sistani lost the influence to rein in the Shia militias from conducting violence. Moqtada Al Sadar, who overshadowed Sistani, commands his own militia, the Army of the Mehdi, and controls 30 seats in parliament and four seats in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki's coalition cabinet. With the resignation of Sistani, Sadr and other power brokers will attempt to increase their control on politics and the population. The vacuum created by Sistani resulted in Shia leaders in parliament attempting to scrap the approved Iraqi Constitution and make a move toward the partitioning into ethnic groups.

One of the primary advocates for a Shia province was Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Council of Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Hakim commands the Badr Brigades. Sadr and other Shia leaders worry that the 15,000 strong organization would dominate the Shia province. Another concern addressed by Blanche is the possibility of a mini-civil war in the newly formed Shia province. Iran's Revolutionary Guards back and fund Hakim and his Badr Brigades. The Shia supports ethnic partition because they own the Southern portion of Iraq to include 60% of the countries oil. The Sunni region lacks oil and therefore under the current constitution do not favor partition. U.S. Analyst Ehsan Ahrari, who runs a Virginia based defense consult, notes, "The Sunni group-especially those who are now participating in the national unity government-might decide their best strategy is to support the insurgency" (Blanche 2006, 4). The Kurds support ethnic partition and are the farthest advanced in achieving that goal. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) established themselves as the regional government, they secure Kurdistan and promote the sale of oil nationally without the support of Baghdad.

Blanche agrees with U.S. President George Bush on his position that partition is a recipe for disaster, and will further deteriorate the situation in Iraq. Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a Middle East specialist stated, "the dividing up of Iraq would not serve either Iraqi or the U.S. interests, and would make life for the average Iraqi even worse." Although Blanche does not support partition, he states that many Iraqi and Coalition leaders believe that it is inevitable. *The United States Institute of Peace*, Special report, "Weak Viability, the Iraqi Federal State and the Constitutional Amendment Process," states that Shia

comprises the majority in Iraq. The United States replaced the ruling Sunni Ba'ath Party, lead by Saddam Hussein, with U.S. backed Shia leadership.

The article, "When Shiites Rise," provides the following reality; "Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore, many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major communities." The article provides extremely detailed insight on the goals and potential plan of the Shia majority. It highlights the history of suppression by Saddam, and the fundamental views of the Shia with regard to the Iraqi Constitution. The author Vali Nasr discusses the impact of a potential civil war and the likelihood that Iran will support the Shia.

Examination of the Iraqi Constitution will determine if Iraq requires amendments to permit partition. The Shia and Kurds reportedly wrote the constitution to maintain a weak central government based on the Shia pursuing a partitioned Shiastan. Research to determine the authority allotted to different level of government and how it affects federalism and partition is essential to this thesis.

Kurds

MAJ Steven Miller's MMAS thesis, "The Kurds: Their Effect on the Attempt to Democratize Iraq A strategic Estimate," supported several parts of this thesis. In regards to history, it provided concise information on Iraq before and after 1918. The paper focused on the Kurds and their impact within the area. He explained the relationship of the Kurds within the Middle East and internally with Sunni and Shias from Iraq. The paper provided logical analysis on the partition of Kurdistan as a state in Iraq. His

analysis provided insight to what is required to partition the Kurds within Iraq. He highlighted potential impacts to the relationships between the regional nations and Iraq.

The senior honors thesis, “Patron-Client Solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma: The Case of the PKK and Syria,” provided a comprehensive review of the history of the Kurds within the Middle East. This paper elaborates on the Kurdish relationship within Iraq and the Middle East. The information provides a basis for the feasibility of the Kurds to self-rule and what conditions must occur to facilitate the partition from the Iraqi Arab population and leadership.

The article, “Iraqi Kurdistan,” written by Dr. Nazhas Khasraw Hawramamy, provides a very detailed history of the Kurds in Iraq. It details the past and present conflict between the Kurds and Turkey. Kirkuk, the oil rich center in the Northeast corner of Iraq presents a serious conflict between Sunni Iraqis and the Kurds. This article outlines the historic diplomatic and military conflict resulting from the conflict for the oil rights.

The Kurds are the most supportive of partition. Carole A. O’Leary wrote, “The Kurds of Iraq: recent History, Future Prospects.” The article published in *Meria*, outlines the Kurdish perspective to partition. She describes the Kurdish plight in history to achieve any level of autonomy. The article provides facts and insight to the Turkish resistance to a Kurdish state and how the Kurds can secure their borders and excel economically. The article highlights how the Kurds will create the model for the other Iraqi states in economic development, self-rule, and security.

Bosnian Case Study

In the report, “ACSC Quick Look: Are the Dayton Accords a Model for Reconstructing Iraq?” Robert C. DiPrizio, a PhD from Catalyst for Air and Space Power research Dialogue, compared the federal government established by the Dayton Accords in Bosnia to the situation in Iraq. This research compared the ethnic boundaries and the motives and objectives driving each group and made a correlation between Bosnia and Iraq. Several similarities exist; however, the model doesn’t match as a definite solution in Iraq. This information was critical to the case study analysis in chapter 4.

America in Europe Pamphlet 525-100, “Military Operations, The U.S. Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” provided a detailed historical chronology of the events that resulted in the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. It established a baseline of the religious and ethnic disputes in the former Yugoslavia similar to the disputes in Iraq. Although the ethnic groups are different between the two countries the historical depth of the prejudice are similar. Both Bosnia and Iraq experienced ethnic cleaning, fights for independence, and continual struggles for power.

In the article, “Divided They Stand, but on Graves,” written by Thom Shanker, a reporter for *The New York Times*, a comparison between the partition of Bosnia and the situation in Iraq attempts to illustrate the probability of success in Iraq. Shanker identified the purpose of the article, “Perhaps predictably, it could be said that a kind of Bosnia nostalgia is taking hold in Washington these days over the quandary of Iraq, at least among those who look to its lessons for a way to end the violence” (Shanker 2007, 1). Similar to other writers and analysts, this article asked the question, should the United

States push Iraq toward a “soft partition?” as a solution. Bosnia’s partition resulted in no American soldier fatalities.

Shanker highlighted the following differences in the Bosnian and Iraqi situations. The fighting between the Catholics, Eastern Orthodox Christians, and Muslims forced the groups into coherent enclaves, which facilitated the geographical partition of Bosnia into ethnic regions. The boundaries in Iraq, between ethnic groups, lack clear borders. In Bosnia, the factions fought to exhaustion, whereas in Iraq the ethnic militants and foreign fighters continue to recruit, arm, and fight. The third highlighted situational difference references the fact that the outside powers in Bosnia Slobosan Milosevic, the Serbian Dictator, and Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian strongman, participated in the Dayton Accords. In Iraq, Shanker explained that the Bush administration’s attempted to bring Iran and Syria to the peace talks have failed.

U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Douglas E. Earle stated, in his USWAC strategy research project “Beyond Dayton: Finding a Solution for Bosnia,”

A negotiated, but imposed partition, combined with international assistance in the voluntary and compensated exchange of minorities can create the stable political framework required for peace in reconstruction. It is the best interest of not only the Bosnian people, but also other people around the world beset with similar strife and yearning for cultural autonomy. While multiethnic democracy is certainly preferable, it may not yet be within the grasp of the Bosnian People (Earle 1997, 26).

It is negotiable that the change to Iraq from Bosnia in this quote, made an equal argument to the Dayton Accords and the eventual partition of Bosnia. Earle’s argument parallels Iraq in discussions of irreconcilable multiethnic differences attempting to survive as a single democracy. In his research, the Serbian objective was autonomy and self-determination, while the Muslims attempted to maintain the majority rule over them. The

research dates to 1997 and provides a comparable historic timeline to the potential partition in Iraq as a solution.

LTC Patrick D. Mace, a student at the United States War College, wrote, “The Dayton Accord: Defining Success,” which provided a view on different theories of nationalism that help explain why conflicts occur. He outlined primordialism and modernism in reference to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and the impact that understanding the difference can help find a solution. He provided several examples to suggest that both theories are valid and merit consideration when attempting to determine the correct way to end violence and resolve conflicts. LTC Mace’s strategic research project provided an eye-opening view at the conflicts in Bosnia, and they are relevant to the situation in Iraq. In the analysis of the potential ethnic partition in Iraq and success of the federal government, the theories add clarity and provided a basis to help determine if the concept is feasible.

The monograph written by Commander Peter Lydon, Commander U.S. Navy, “The Fall and Rise of Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans,” provided additional parallels with the situation in Iraq. It added validity to the theory of primordial nationalism as a legitimate basis for studying conflicts in the Middle East. Lyddon’s monograph provided key information required to build the historic parallel chart in chapter four. The misunderstood root of the civil war in Yugoslavia and Bosnia by Western and European nations resulted in mistakes similar to the United States in Iraq in 2003 after the imposed regime change.

Current Situation in Iraq

Alan Schwartz, principal and cofounder of PolicyFutures, LLC, wrote, “Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq.” The article outlined three potential scenarios for the conflict in Iraq. The scenarios that advocate partition all end in disaster. The results cited in the article range from an ethnic conflict between two ethnic groups, to an invasion into Kurdistan from Turkey, to an all-inclusive civil war. The article provided facts and opinions aimed at dissuading the partition of Iraq.

The *U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, *National Security Strategy*, and *The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* provided the guidelines for operations in Iraq. Do these resources permit or prevent the partition of Iraq as a solution? President George W. Bush, refused to accept partition of Iraq as a solution to the conflict, however, Congressional Delegates are considering it as a possible solution.

In an attempt to bring Sunni political leaders back into the Iraqi Government, Prime Minister Al Maliki, agreed to a de-ba’athification law and the release of approximately 6000 Sunnis currently in jails. Colin Freeman’s, from the *London Sunday Telegraph*, “Iraq to Free Thousands of Jailed Sunnis” discusses two key issues to the current relationship between the Sunni and the Shia lead Iraqi government. The first topic discusses a pledge from Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki to scrap the de-ba’athification law imposed November 2003 by L. Paul Bremer, the former U.S. administrator of Iraq, he additionally dismissed all senior members from their government posts. The de-ba’athification law removed the key officials that governed Iraq and ran most of the key infrastructure under Saddam Hussein. Removing the law resulted in several Sunni’s, who are experienced in leading and operating Iraq, returning

to serve on the unified federal government and assist in increasing the infrastructure efficiency within Iraq.

The second topic released approximately 6000 Sunnis from jail. Approximately 85% of the Iraqis in Jail are Sunni, mostly captured during large insurgent round ups in predominately Sunni areas early in the war. The 6000 were released because they were suspected of being innocent or held for extremely small infractions. These acts of faith by Maliki, are focused on re-integrating the Sunnis into the national government and reducing the friction responsible for the sectarian killing in Iraq.

Potential Solutions for Partition

Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr's, "A Way Forward," is a five-point plan to win the war in Iraq. The plan addressed a new strategy to stabilize Iraq and the fastest way to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq. In the plan, Biden explained the new solution to consist of "giving Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis breathing room in their own regions. The central government would be responsible for common interests, like border security and distribution of oil revenues" (Biden 2006, 1). The five points of the plan are: 1. Establish one Iraq, with three regions, 2. Share oil revenues. 3. Convene international conference, enforce regional non-aggression pact. 4. Responsibly drawdown U.S. troops, 5. Increase reconstruction assistance and create a jobs program. The plan addresses the overarching issues currently plaguing Iraq. However, he made assumptions on what he thinks different ethnic groups want.

Naom L. Levey's, *Los Angeles Times* staff writer, "2 GOP Senators Back Troop Reduction in Iraq," focuses on Senator Sam Brownback statement, "the so-called federalism plan, the only political solution that works." Senator Brownback was a strong

supporter of Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr's five point plan for Iraq which decentralizes the central Iraqi Government and partitions Sunni, Shia, and Kurds into ethnic provinces. Levey discussed the gained support in Congress for the new plan. In the article, "Brownback and Biden, Unlikely Allies on Iraq," Rob Hotakainen, *Kansas City Star* correspondent, explains that Republican Senator Sam Brownback supports Senator Biden's proposal for partition of Iraq.

Sam C. Holliday, author and veteran observer of the international political scene, wrote, "A Federation for Iraq." The article published in *American Diplomacy* in 2004 supported the federation as a viable form of government. The article provided insight to changes required in the authority granted to the central government in Iraq, the changes required in the constitution, and provided background data to prove federalism is viable. He quickly addressed how the economic revenues from the oil industry can benefit the entire country, not the geographic ethnic state.

Donald L. Horowitz's article, "Unifying Iraq," attempted to answer the following questions, "What are the consequences of continuing it (the war in Iraq)?" and "What are the likely consequences of withdrawal?" Horowitz, a professor of law and political science at Duke University and author of "Ethnic Groups in Conflict" (California 2000), briefly described issues for the different ethnic regions if partition occurs. He initially focused internally then concluded by focusing on external factors and potential areas where the U.S would be required for stability. Horowitz is against partition, which he proudly demonstrated when he wrote, "Some in Congress and elsewhere believe the solution in Iraq is a three-way partition. They have not done their homework. Partition is

the way to more war—multiple wars, in fact—not the way to peace, and it is a way to increased Iranian influence.”

If the Shia province became a reality, Horowitz believes, Abdul-Aziz-Al Hakim’s SCIRI would result in increased influence from Iran. Iranian Shia and Iraqi Shia are not the same group. Iranians are Persians and Iraqi Shi’ites are Arabian. Persian and Arab hostilities from history still exist today. The Iraqi Shia fought loyally under Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war. This is another reference to the possibility of a mini-civil war in the Shia province. Ed Blanche, author of, “Breaking Up is Hard to do,” made the same determination in reference to Hakim and Sadr. If America didn’t intervene, Hakim is likely to win, opening up a large portion of Iraq to increased Iranian influence.

The Kurds in the North are closer to independence than ever before. The underlying issue is with Turkey. Turkey contains an extremely large population of Kurds, who like the Kurds in Iraq want independence. If Kurdistan becomes independent, Turkey expects their Kurds within their borders to attempt to gain its independence, expanding the borders of Kurdistan North into Turkey. In the advent of the war in Iraq, Turkey already positioned soldiers on the Iraqi border. It is safe to assume if Kurdistan becomes independent and the United States leaves, war between two of our allies, Kurdistan and Turkey, will ensue.

The concern highlighted by Horowitz in the South focused on the Sunnis attempting to regain their powerbase of the country. The Ba’athist Party would take power of the area and eventually start a civil war with the Shia and Kurds in an attempt to regain control of Iraq. Furthermore, the current trend that Sunnis are decreasing their support for terrorist and insurgents would reverse. The terrorist and insurgent groups

would fight Sadr's Army and hakim's Badr Brigades. The war would elevate the hatred for the U.S. and the overall result would entail an increase in hostilities in the U.S. and against U.S. civilians and military abroad.

In the article, "Historically Speaking, A 'plan B' for Iraq," Brig Gen John S. Brown compared potential solutions in Iraq to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Bosnia. He suggests that establishing zones of separation between ethnic groups in Iraq similar to the result from the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. BG Brown questions the decisions to disband the Taliban and Iraqi Army and states that the government turned over democratization to the soldiers. Refugees from Bosnia were assisted and resettled and were given the appropriate aid to re-establish their lives. In Iraq, the movement of refugees did not become a priority. General Brown's comparison to Bosnia enabled the further exploration to what was successful in Bosnia that may assist in the current dilemma faced in Iraq today.

The Way Ahead

This chapter introduced the references used to analyze the situation in Iraq and compare the situation to the partition of Bosnia. Several additional references provided additional information to elaborate or better define the problems in Iraq. Chapter 3 will define key terms and explain the research methodology utilized to analyze the Iraqi situation. The analysis to determine if federalism is a viable solution to an ethnically partitioned Iraq will occur in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

The political nature of this thesis requires the definition of key terms, concepts and methods. This chapter will define the terms primordial nationalism, modern nationalism, federalism, partition, consociational state, and province. The research will include a case study of Bosnia to determine lessons learned that apply in Iraq. The focus areas of the case study were the ethnic conflicts within the countries, the security situations of the countries, and governance. The analysis of the case study and the study of Iraqi ethnic challenges, security concerns, and governmental conflicts will help determine if federalism based on ethnic partition is a viable solution in Iraq.

Primordial Nationalism Defined

Primordial and Modern nationalism refer to different forms of an established group identity. Primordial nationalism is normally the older of the two forms. For the Muslims, primordial nationalism began in 632 CE with the split of Sunni and Shia. For this thesis, primordial nationalism established the original identities of Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. Primordial nationalism is a form of nationalism based on a extensive shared culture, language, and history. It established the identities of Shia, Sunni, and Kurd within Iraq.

The identity resulting from primordial nationalism is the means used to unite ethnic groups to support conflict with another group. It is responsible for the, “us against them,” mentality historically used by leaders around the world to gain popular support for

a cause. For the Shia in Iraq, it provided the stimulus to bolster support for the militia to attack Sunni in retribution for past wrongs. For the Sunni, this same mentality united them to fight the Shia and Kurds to regain their “rightful” place as the leaders of Iraq. The Kurd’s primordial nationalism historically drove them to attain autonomy and independence in order to achieve recognition as a nation and a people.

Modern Nationalism Defined

As the name implies, modern nationalism is based less on cultural history and more on geography and the current state of affairs. It focuses on nation state and unification of people with different primordial nationalism within borders. In the case of Bosnia and Iraq, modern nationalism is synonymous with Bosnian and Iraqi nationalism. In Iraq, the unification of the Sunni, Shia, Kurds, and other minority groups within the newly formed borders in 1918 started Iraqi nationalism. Modern nationalism required different ethnic groups to unite under a single government and identify themselves with that nation. A Shia in Iraq who derives his sense of identity as Iraqi is demonstrating modern nationalism.

Federalism Defined

The Oxford English Dictionary defines federal as, “Of pertaining to, or of the nature of that form of government in which two or more states constitute a political unity while remaining more or less independent with regard to their internal affairs” (Oxford English Dictionary v5, 795). Federalism is the application of a federal government. The application of federalism in different countries results in varying outcomes. For instance, the United States adopted a federal government with the 50 states subordinate to the

national government. The situation in Iraq will not support the United States' version of federalism due to the strong ethnic conflicts, differences in Muslim culture, and multiple terrorists and state actors interjecting their philosophies and agendas. Federalism similar to the system in Bosnia may potentially provide a solution for Iraq.

Nationalizing or mono-national federalism and multi-ethnic or multi-national federalism require analysis. Mono-national federalism occurs in the United States., Netherlands, and Germany. It establishes a centralized government leading a nation with a single national culture (Bose 2002, 92). Multi-ethnic or multi-national federalism establishes a less unified central government, which attempts to protect two or more ethnic cultures (Bose 2002, 92). The Bosnian government established by the Dayton Accords represents a multi-ethnic federalist government.

In an attempt to stabilize Iraq, the United States established the current federal Iraqi Government consisting of 18 provinces governed by a strong central government. For this thesis, federalism refers to a central government headquartered in Baghdad governing three ethnic provinces. The central government's responsibilities are as follows: regulation of ethnic conflicts between provinces both diplomatically and militarily; controlling the National Iraqi Military while securing the borders of Iraq from neighboring countries; and, economic development within Iraq as well as participation in foreign trade.

Partition Defined

The ethnic partition of Iraq does not require ethnically pure provinces. The partition of Iraq refers to the creation of internal borders to establish three ethnic provinces, with a central government headquartered in the city-state of Baghdad. For this

thesis, the provinces are Kurdistan, Shiastan, and Sunni-Iraq. The borders shown in figure 3 established a common concept of the partition of Iraq and do not represent draft borders from any official source. The borders represent the well-known rifts between Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis.




Figure 3. Map Illustrating an Example of Partitioned Borders in Iraq.
Source: CIA, Iraq: Distribution of Ethno-religious Groups and Major Tribes From Iraq: Country Profile, (CIA, January 2003), 1.

Province Defined

Is “province” or “state” the proper term for the partitioned areas in Iraq? Based on the definitions found in the Oxford English Dictionary, a comparison of the terms resulted in “province” as the term used in this thesis. Province refers to any principal division of a kingdom or empire that has been historically, linguistically, or dialectally distinct (Oxford English Dictionary, v12, 715). Partition based on historical divisions best suits the subordinate areas of Iraq. Division into states maintains a strong reference to the United States form of federalism. It will not appear in this paper except to reference a nation-state.

Consociational State Defined

A consociational state as defined by Rudy Andeweg from the Department of Political Science at Leyden University has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group (Andeweg 2000, 512). The state as a whole nonetheless manages to remain stable, due to consultation among the elites of each of its major social groups. A consociational state does not permit a group to exercise majority rule, the government is comprised of multiple groups each maintaining equal authority shared by elected leaders (Andeweg 2000, 523).

Methodology

A study of the current concerns preventing the successful completion of OIF (OIF) established the base line for this thesis. Understanding the cultural mistakes that affected the current Coalition strategy and how partition would change the potential

outcomes of OIF were critical for study. The cultural study will focus on the sectarian violence that plagues Iraq and prevents the establishment of a sovereign government. Each ethnic group's ways and means in reference to the diplomacy and military sections of the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics) model determined the feasibility of each group accepting the partition and maintaining a province. Further analysis comparing the different groups' interests, objectives, and abilities to govern and secure their provinces provided the framework to determine the viability of achieving the level of cooperation required to maintain Iraq as a nation.

If the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds can secure their provincial borders, govern their populations, and support a limited national government with its military, then federalism with ethnically portioned provinces is viable. Analysis of the ability of ethnic militias to transition to provincial armies and an initial assessment of their responsibilities determined if the provinces could secure their boundaries. Support of an ethnically diverse national army to quell conflict between provinces and to secure Iraq from its neighboring countries completes the border security piece of the military section of DIME. Internal to the military section is the establishment of an IP force to protect the population from crime and to maintain order within the provinces.

The establishment of a limited central government is a key piece to the diplomacy section of DIME. Research comparing the authority given to the central government in the 2005 constitutional referendum, and what is required for partitioned provinces provided the assessment of supportability by each ethnic group. In the analysis of the government, how it accomplished equality amongst the ethnic groups and its ability to provide for the interest and objectives determined its viability. The partition of Bosnia

provided information relevant to determining the feasibility of successfully partitioning Iraq into ethnic provinces.

Case Studies

A case study provided historical data relevant to stopping sectarian violence with minimal armed conflict, an illustration for how the government can join the provinces to maintain global recognition as a nation, security requirements to enforce the newly formed boundaries, and additional information on successfully partitioning a nation. The example of partition analyzed for this thesis was Bosnia. Bosnia's partition into the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ended the conflict between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and therefore was a success. The situation in Bosnia has certain parallels to the situation in Iraq, however, several differences do exist. The overall analysis of this case study in conjunction with the study of Iraq resulted in the conclusion that the partition into three ethnic provinces is viable.

The Way Ahead

Chapter 3 outlined the methodology and comparison criteria used in the remainder of this thesis. In chapter 4, an in-depth analysis of the criteria required to partition Iraq and the partition of Bosnia will provide informative data capable of determining if federalism is a viable solution for Iraq. The areas of analysis include the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish situations, a case study of Bosnia, current construct of Iraqi government, and the potential solutions for partitioning Iraq. Chapter 5 correlates the analysis of areas of study and outlines solutions for the partition of Iraq and federalism as the preferred form of government.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The popular support for the war in Iraq is waning and the current strategy is under constant scrutiny by the media (Wright 2007, A11). General Petraeus' testimony to the Senate Arms Service Committee on September 10, 2007 presented a more positive perception of the war than what the public receives from politicians and the media. During his testimony, General Petraeus did not address the option of partition; however, the topic is receiving increased attention as the war continues without a withdrawal date. This chapter analyzes six different research areas with respect to determining if federalism in an ethnic partitioned Iraq is feasible.

Historic analysis of culture, religion, security, governance, and conflicts provides a base to determine if Sunni, Shia, and Kurd can reconcile their differences or is separation the best option. The U.S. strategy in Iraq stresses the establishment of Iraqi nationalism under a central government. The historic review revealed evidence of primordial nationalism as a potential seam to prevent a possible civil war and establish a U.S. withdrawal strategy. The determination of primordial nationalism is important because the war in Iraq, as in Bosnia, is arguably an insurgency or a civil war. Finally, analysis of the current situation in Iraq focused on the rifts between the ethnic groups, and addressed the feasibility of a stable Iraq without partition.

Several countries resemble Iraq with regard to conflicts, ethnic tensions, security, and governance. The case study on Bosnia researched the same topics used to analyze the Sunni, Shia, and Kurd situations in Iraq. The case studies attempted to draw a

correlation between historic partitions and to determine if any part of the solutions in those areas merits implementation to improve Iraq. Upon completion of the case study, the analysis of the ethnic groups and the comparisons of Bosnian partition built a base to study the current situation in Iraq. The current situation in Iraq, based on historic data, provided insight to analyze the feasibility of the plethora of current articles defining different views on the situation Iraq and providing insight to potential strategy changes to end the Iraq war. The last topic of analysis fuses the historic analysis of the Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, the comparison of the case studies, and the insights from current scholars, media, and leaders to examine the feasibility of both partition and federalism as potential solutions in Iraq. The next chapter compiles the data into conclusions that advocate that soft partition and federalism of an ethnic partitioned Iraq is feasible.

Sunni

To determine the feasibility of a successful Sunni Province as a piece of a larger Iraq, an understanding is needed of the Sunni perception of their situation and what they require to accept the partition. Iraqi and coalition actors in the war in Iraq must set the right conditions to minimize the feeling of insecurity to a level that the Sunni leadership and people can accept. The two key areas of analysis to determine Sunni nationalism focused on primordial and modern nationalism, capabilities, and requirements of the leaders and security forces to establish a Sunni province that accepts the Iraqi central government. Nationalism as a form of mass identity is required for the Sunnis to unite into a Sunni Province, then feelings of Iraqi nationalism, under the right system, can grow over time. Primordial and modern nationalism established a base to determine how

the coalition and Iraqi government can use the pre-existing Sunni identity to stabilize Iraq.

The study of the Sunni concerns and objectives compared to their capabilities in Iraq established criteria for determining the feasibility of a Sunni Province. The criteria required to establish a Sunni Province and understanding the objectives of the group laid the foundation to partition Iraq, meet the Sunni objectives, and reduce their insecurity to a comfortable level. Accomplishing this would therefore reduce the probability of conflict in the area and facilitate the United Nations assuming the mission in Iraq and utilizing diplomacy to stabilize the area. To determine what defines the Sunni primordial nationalism, a brief review of history highlights points of conflict between the Sunnis and the other ethnic groups in the region.

The split of the Muslim religion occurred in 632 CE (Elias 2003, 38). Upon the death of Mohommad, the disciple of Allah (God), his followers split based on a disagreement of who was the rightful successor to Mohammed. The first conflict between the Sunni and Shia occurred in 680 CE (Elias 2003, 43). A rift between the two Muslim sects still exists and is evident in the sectarian violence occurring in Iraq. The Sunni maintained the Muslim majority worldwide over the Shia by including Muslims based on the premise that a Sunni Muslim does not have to agree with how the Sunni Islam world is governed but only that it is more important to keep the Muslim community safe (Elias 2003, 44). Although they expanded their beliefs to maximize the number of Sunni Muslims, the history of conflict and hatred toward Shia for disrespecting key figures maintains a split in the religion that may never get resolved due to how they view conflict resolution. Raphael Patai, an expert in Arab culture and society, states, “In every

conflict those involved tend to feel that their honor is at stake, and that to give in, even as little as an inch, would diminish their self-respect and dignity. Even to take the first step toward ending a conflict would be regarded as a sign of weakness” (Patai 2002, 241).

The primordial nationalism of the Sunni Muslim predisposes the group to armed conflict with Shia Muslims.




Figure 4. Shows the Continuous Conflict Between the Sunni and Shia Elements of Islam.

Source: Data compiled from, Miller, 1996; Arthur, 2004; Bengio, 1999; Eppel, Vandantam, 2007; MidEastWeb.org. 2007

According to Professor Nazeer Ahmed, “the world’s longest running feud is not over Kashmir or Palestine or Chechnya, nor is it the Catholic- Protestant schism. It is the Shia-Sunni conflict. Measured in terms of historical longevity, it beats the Catholic-Protestant schism by a factor of three and the Palestinian conflict by a factor of more than twenty” (Ahmed 2007, 1). The long-standing hatred and distrust of Shia is a component in the very identity of the Sunni Arab. The continual conflict since the original split of Islam in 632 CE likely plays an important role in understanding the situation in Iraq. Figure 4 illustrates the repeated importance of ethnic identity in Iraq’s historical conflicts. It clearly shows that from the split of Sunni and Shia in 632 CE until the Treaty of Versailles in 1920 the rift between the sectarian groups created a vivid history of dispute that, given the current sectarian violence in Iraq, seems still to exist.

The transition from primordial nationalism to modern nationalism occurred when the Treaty of Versailles established Iraq as a nation. Although Iraq combined three different cultures, each with ethnically based primordial nationalisms, achieving Iraqi nationalism became the goal in Iraq. A goal of OIF in Iraq, similar to the British in 1920, is an attempt to establish an Iraqi nationalism comprised of all ethnic groups to promote peace and stability in the region. The U.S. strategy encountered resistance similar to what the British faced from Iraqis reluctant to embrace nationalism due to prejudice against the Shia Muslims. When the British established Iraq, they placed King Feisal, a Sunni and son of Saud, as the first king of Iraq as a reward for Saud’s participation in the British-led Arab Revolt. The leadership role of Sunni Muslims in the newly formed Iraq established them as the ruling minority over the Shia and Kurds.

The term Iraqi nationalism developed from western educated Iraqis, or effendiyya, most of whom came from the Sunni elite. The effendiyya served as a venue to pull Iraqis together with the goal of achieving Iraqi sovereignty from Britain (Eppel 1998, 10). Iraqi nationalism was a misnomer; the association would more correctly be considered as Arab nationalism. Michael Eppel, lecturer in the Department of Middle East History at the University of Haifa in Israel, discussed the nationalism attained in the 1920s when Iraq became a nation as follows:

The contradictions among the population of Iraq and the strength of its various local tribal-ethnic identities kept any feelings of Iraqi distinctiveness that might have existed from developing into a dominant nationalist trend in Iraq. Arab nationalism was a means of bridging the ethnic gaps in an attempt to build a common denominator with all those elements interested in reinforcing the Iraqi state, but fearful of the ethnocentric, centrifugal trends of the Shiites and the Kurds, as well as of the anarchistic, decentralistic tendencies of the tribes. After all, 75 to 80 percent of the population of Iraq consisted of native speakers of Arabic. For the conservative elite, Arab nationalism was a modern socio-political tool adopted for the mobilization of the effendiyya and the preservation of the Iraqi state (Eppel 1998, 10).

Although a level of nationalism did exist to unite against the British, it did not supersede the prejudice of the ethnic groups in the newly formed Iraq. King Feisal II, the last of the three kings in the dynasty, concluded, “the country was ungovernable. He noted deep-seated religious, sectional, and political differences in what had become a separate country only after the First World War” (Mattox 2004, 1).

In 1968, the Sunni-led Ba’ath party came to power in Iraq and was dedicated to the ideal of establishing an Iraqi nation (Bengio 1999, 1). The party’s first Communiqué was its rejection of tribalism. In no certain terms their message was, “We are against religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism,” which they characterized as, “the remnants of colonialism” (Baram 1997, 1). The Ba’ath party never fully accomplished the goal of

abolishing tribal relations to prevent any tribe from getting too strong and challenging the government. The Sunni-led organization attempted to join the country on Sunni-based values and beliefs, and oppressed the Shiites and Kurds (Benjio 1999, 2). The oppression of Shiites and Kurds gave the perception of an Iraqi nationalism that joined the three groups as a nation. A middle aged Iraqi told a researcher for the International Crisis Group, “Everybody knew what everybody else was. After leaving a Sunni home, the Shiite visitor would wash his mouth. If you, as a Shiite, had a had a bad dream you would say this was because you had eaten at a Jew’s or Sunni’s house.” This same Iraqi continued by explaining:

Sunnis and Shiites readily married each other, usually maintaining their own religious identity (unless one partner was forced by the spouse’s more influential family to change it as part of the marriage agreement) but bequeathing the father’s *religion* to the children. Sectarianism, in other words, was largely social and cultural but relatively benign (International Crisis Group 2006, 6).

In the 1970s, Saddam Hussein rose to power in the Ba’ath party and initiated a pattern of development that served to put the Sunni leaders in positions of increased authority and further minimized the Shiites and Kurds. Saddam utilized etatist tribalism, a process in which tribal lineages and symbolic culture were integrated into the state to enhance the power of the fragile elite. This process was exclusive, promoting certain Sunni Arab clans and relatives of the elite (Jabar 2000, 28). Saddam utilized the fragmented tribal affiliations that remained from the previous Ba’ath policy to re-instate the tribe as a tool to subordinate ethnic groups and to recruit soldiers to fight Iran. Saddam also rewarded the villages of loyal tribesmen by providing roads, electricity, and water systems (Hassan 2007, 4).

From its establishment, the Sunni-led government maintained control in Iraq, and the educating of its elite, coupled with minimization of the Shia and Kurds served to maintain that status quo until the fall of Saddam. Saddam took control of the Ba'ath Party and became President of Iraq in 1979 (Jabar 2000, 30). The attempt to build Iraq into a nation-state failed due to the ethnic diversity in Iraq and their secular ideologies. The Sunni Ba'athist Party kept Iraq together by force of arms and external power, excluding the Shia and Kurds from positions of authority. Saddam, as the Iraqi President, used his prejudice against Shia and Kurds to widen the already enormous rift between the ethnic groups. The Sunni primordial nationalistic identity based on 1400 years of conflict and authority in Iraq for 85 years predisposed the Sunnis to distrust any Shiite or Kurd government officials. The potential for sectarian violence based on the Ba'ath Regime and the totalitarian rule of Saddam Hussein existed, but "nothing suggested it would be the inevitable result of the regime's removal" (International Crisis Group 2006, 8). In 2003, the United States removed Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party from power without understanding the full ramifications of their actions (Cordesman 2008, 9). Paul Bremer, the newly appointed chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), banned the Ba'ath Party and disbanded the Iraqi Army (International Crisis Group 2006, 8). To fill the void of Iraqi governance, the formerly exiled opposition groups formed the core of a United States appointed 25-seat "governing council" as well as a 25-person cabinet (Katzman 2003, 1). The ideology behind the establishment of a new government afforded the Iraqis the opportunity to foster nationalism under the auspices of democracy. However, the Shia and Kurds, backed by the United States, used the removal of the Sunni rule as an opportunity to get retribution for their poor treatment under Saddam. The

Sunni comprise approximately 20% of the population, which is one-third the size of the Shia population (Figure 5). Based on the concept of majority rule, the decision was made to make the president of the Post-Saddam Iraq a Shia and the leading Kurd and Sunni deputy presidents, then the presidency council would vote on the Prime Minister (Katzman 2004, 2).




Figure 5. Map Illustrating the Population of Iraq by Ethnic Group.
Source: CIA, Ethnoreligious Groups From Iraq, (Iraq: a Map Folio, CIA, 1992), 1.

The Sunni perception of the newly formed government and the result of the constitutional referendum caused an increase in the ethnic tension in Iraq. The Sunni regarded the electoral process as a step toward Shiite domination with Kurdish collaboration, with an outcome of Sunni exclusion from power (Baker 2005, 6). For the

Sunnis to accept the new government, the United States must dispel the perception of unfair government and diminish the Sunni insecurity that the Shia and Kurds will capitalize on their new leadership roles. With the ethnic tension in Iraq, decentralizing the Iraqi government and establishing a strong Sunni provincial government may provide the feeling of security required to stop the potential civil war. Although the Sunni only comprise 20% of the population, they require no less than an equal voice in the government. The Sunni government required to rule the Sunni province in Iraq must have the ability to provide security and economic support to its population.

According to David M. Walker, Comptroller General for the U.S. GAO Sunni militias lack a distinct leader but share goals of destabilizing the central Iraqi government and consider themselves protectors of the Sunni communities (Walker 2006, 14). David Brooks, reporter for *The New York Times*, explained the likely outcome of a “machine gun partition in Iraq,” as the United States eventually withdraws when he wrote, “...the Iraqi people will increasingly be on their own, to find security where they can” (Brooks 2007, 1). The Sunni militias protect the Sunni communities from Shia sectarian violence. The Mujahadeen Shura Council and Ansar Al Sunna arguably fight to prevent the Shia and Kurds from gaining an overwhelming level of authority and to protect the Sunni communities from outside influence. Under a soft partitioned Sunni province, the Sunni provincial government would assume responsibility to recruit new Sunni IP to maintain law and order and secure its communities. Edward Joseph and Michael O’Hanlan, from the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, argued that the goal to disband the militias would entail a large coalition security force until the Sunni security forces were established. If the militias already protect the Sunni communities, instead of disbanding

the militias, it would be wise to incorporate them as the Sunni Provincial Police.

Utilizing the already strong ethnic loyalties of the Sunnis, coalition transition teams could monitor their actions, train them, and aid the provincial government in establishing secure provincial borders and maintaining rule of law in its communities.

To summarize the Sunni position in Iraq, their primordial nationalism against the Shia will prevent them from embracing modern Iraqi nationalism in the near future. The Sunni's primary goals are to maintain a level of authority not subordinate to the other ethnic groups, to secure their communities from sectarian violence, to destabilize the strong central government, and to remove the coalition presence in Iraq. The insecurity in their current position in Iraq fuels the fighting and the continued escalation of sectarian violence and violence against coalition forces. In order to stabilize Iraq, their objectives must be met, and separation between them and their historic enemy established.

Shia

The historic chain of events that defined the Sunni primordial nationalism also defined the Shia primordial nationalism because they were opposed to each other. The most notable rift that opposes Iraqi nationalism results from the distrust between the Sunni and Shia. A rift between Iranian Shiites and Iraqi Shiites could potentially divide the Shia population and could result in a split in the Shia community that may threaten the existence of a Shia province (Blanche 2006, 11). Two key areas were analyzed to determine the success of partition with respect to the Shia. The first studied the Shia relationship with the Sunnis and Arab nationalism versus the modern relationship with Iranian Shiites. The second reviewed the capabilities and requirements of the leaders and security forces to establish a Shia province that accepts the Iraqi central government.

The Saddam regime suppressed the Shia, to include attempting to divide them through religious interdiction. The Sunni appointed Muhammad al-Sadr as the supreme religious authority instead of Abu Qasim al-Kho'I (Bengio 1999, 10). This raises the question of whether Shia nationalism favors the Persian Shia from Iran or an Iraqi identity based on Saddam's attempts to invoke a sense of Arab nationalism to recruit for the Iran-Iraq war. An internal Shia rift exists between Sadr, Iraqi leader of the Mahdi Army, and Hakim, leader of the SCIRI, an Iranian-supported Shia faction (Horowitz 2007, 1). Don Horowitz, of the Wall Street Journal argued that Iraqi Shia are Arabs, not Persians. He highlighted the intense fighting of Iraqi Shia against the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq War (Horowitz 2007, 1). If this rift exists, instability between Iranian and Iraqi based Shia could erupt if a Shia province became reality. However, their primordial nationalism as well as their mistreatment from the Ba'ath Party could overshadow such instability and draw the Shia together to continue the fight against the Sunni militia. Nasr's view on the rift between Shia Arabs and Shia Persians reinforces the information reported by Katzman in the CRS Report for Congress, in which he delineates that every major Shia group in Iraq has ties to Iran. Although, Muqtada al-Sadr has fewer affiliations than SCIRI, the support still exists from Iran. Nasr concluded that the rift between Sunni and Shia created stronger nationalism than the Arab nationalism originally attempted by the Sunnis, writing:

Much has been made of the fact, for example, that throughout that savage conflict -- which claimed a million lives -- Iraq's largely Shiite army resisted Iranian incursions into Iraqi territory, most notably during the siege of the Shiite city of Basra in 1982. But the war's legacy did not divide Iranian and Iraqi Shiites as U.S. planners thought; it pales before the memory of the anti-Shiite program in Iraq that followed the failed uprising in 1991. Today, Iraqi Shiites worry far more

about the Sunnis' domination than about Tehran's influence in Baghdad. (Nasr 2006, 3).

The Shia comprise 60% of the Iraqi population (Figure 5) and received support from the United States during the removal of the Saddam regime. The United States viewed the overthrow of Saddam as an opportunity to develop a democratic nation based on Iraqi nationalism. However, according to Nasr, the Shia had a different reality:

They (Shia) are the majority of Iraq, backed by the U.S. and rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore, many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major communities. By liberating and empowering Iraq's Shiite majority, the Bush administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come (Nasr 2006, 1).

The Shia exploited the de-ba'athification process and placed Shia into the ministries and key positions of power and authority. The removal of Saddam simply caused a shift in power from Sunni to Shia rather than the promotion of liberation of the Iraqi people as a nation.

Iran supported the Iraqi Shia-led government that the United States established because its development met some Iranian objectives (Katzman 2007, 4). Two primary political groups that represent the Shia in the Iraqi government, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the most pro-Iranian of the groups, and the Da'wa (Islamic Call) party belong to the Shiite Islamist bloc (United Iraqi Alliance or UIA). A third Shia group that belongs to the UIA is the faction of Moqtada Al Sadr, whose ties to Iran are less well developed. This faction originally did not get involved in politics but now Iran identifies Sadr as a growing authority in Iraq. The UIA had great success in the two parliamentary elections held on December 15, 2005. They won 128 of the 275 Assembly seats (Katzman 2007, 1). The major concern with the Shia affiliation with Iran

is the ability of Iran to get access to the rich oil fields in southern Iraq. The United States already has concerns that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon capability and the oil would aid in funding that endeavor. The Shia have the capability to govern a Shia province, however the United States would need to address the Iranian support issue. The strategy to prevent Iran from further disrupting governance and stability in Iraq is a topic for further study.

The Shia political groups maintain militias, which are responsible for the sectarian violence against anti-Shias and Sunnis. Two primary militias are responsible for the acts of sectarian violence in Iraq and especially in Baghdad, the Badr Organization and the Mahdi Army. The Badr Organization is the paramilitary wing of SCIRI. According to the DOD, the Badr Organization received support from Iran (Walker 2006, 11). The Organization originated in Iran in 1982, as part of an Iranian plan to gain control of Iraq (International Crisis Group 2006, 17). Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim, SCIRI and the Badr Organization leader, assumed control of the organization while exiled to Iran. The Badr Organization has an estimated 20,000 members and is responsible for death squads in Iraq (Katzman 2007, 2). The organization infiltrated Iraqi Security forces and the Department of the Interior. The militiamen drive police cars, wear police uniforms, and detain, torture, and kill Sunnis based on their ethnicity.

The Mahdi Army, commanded by Muqtada al-Sadr, is responsible for sectarian violence, to include the February bombing in Samarra. Although Sadr's affiliation with Iran is not as developed as SCIRI, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the Mahdi Army received support from Iran to conduct attacks against coalition forces and Sunnis. Sadr's group heads the ministries of health, transportation, agriculture, and

tourism and antiquities (Walker 2006, 10). The Madhi Army, which is popular with the poor Shia community, controlled an estimated 60,000 members. Sadr's rapid success in politics resulted in an increased notoriety with the Iraqi government and Iran (Katzman 2007, 4). Although Iran supports both SCIRI and the Mahdi Army, it is unclear what the precise relationship between the two factions may be.

With the combined efforts of Shia majority leaders in the Iraqi government and the Iranian backed SCIRI Badr Organization and the Muqtada al-Sadr Mahdi Army the Shia have the capability to minimize the Sunni role in Iraq. The United States relaxed the de-ba'athification law to permit Sunnis to re-establish a larger role in the government. The sectarian violence conducted by the Shia militias supports the political goal of its leadership to minimize the Sunnis role in Iraq. The relationship between Hakim and Sadr is not clear and has the potential to disrupt the existence of a Shia province (Horowitz 2007, 1).

To summarize the Shia perspective in Iraq, politically the objective is to dominate the country and minimize the Sunni Arabs for the decades of oppression the Shia experienced under their rule. Iran supports the establishment of a Shia province because its influence in the Shia government could result in access to the large oil supplies in southern Iraq. The Shia coalitions have the capability to secure a Shia province, however, it would require a diplomatic solution between the Sunni and Shia president to prevent continued sectarian killings and establish recognized borders between the ethnic groups. The Shia are already pushing for a Shia province:

On July 31, 2006, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a senior official in SCIRI and Iraq's vice president, pledged that the Shia Iraqi coalition—the biggest bloc in the Iraqi parliament—would raise the issue of a Shia federal state in the coming month. A

few days before that announcement, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of SCIRI, repeated his call for a Shia federal region (Katzman, 2006, 5)

Based on the increased acceptance of a Shia province, the United States must ensure Iranian influence is minimized, and that the Shia are willing to stop the aggression against the Sunni if the province becomes a reality.

Kurds

Kurdistan refers to a geographical area, a promised nation, but not an existing state. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres promised the Kurds their own nation, however, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne rescinded that offer. The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state (O’Leary 2002, 1). The Kurds are predominately Sunni but include Shia, Yezedi, and Christians. Geographically the term “Kurdistan” refers to the northeastern 83,000 square kilometers of Iraq, however, the Kurds inhabit the eastern half of Turkey, the northern border area of Syria, and northwestern Iran as shown on Figure 6. Turkey and Iran avoid the use of the term “Kurdistan” for political reasons. To determine the feasibility of an Iraqi Kurdistan as a subordinate government to the central Iraqi government, three areas require analysis. The first area includes a short synopsis of the historic plight of the Kurds. The Kurds’ external relationship with Turkey, the Iraq regime, and internal rift between the People’s Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have potential impact on Kurdish autonomy. The second area defines the potential issues with Turkey if the Kurds gain independence within Iraq. The final area determines the Kurdish objectives in Iraq and their ability to govern and secure their own borders.

Throughout their history, the Kurds have fought to maintain their national identity. During the Ottoman Empire and Persian wars, the Kurdish area was the site of the conflicts between the two empires. The Kurdish tribal leaders sided with different empires to maintain autonomy. Once the wars were over, the only leadership was tribal chieftains (Dewhurst 2006, 2). The geographical position of the Kurds resulted in a lack of support from any neighboring country. They are ethnically distinct from Turks and Arabs. As an ethnic group, the Iranians view the Kurds as outsiders, a troublesome minority. To the Sunni and Shia Arabs, the Kurds are non-Arab. The Kurds differ from the Turks because they are considered a different race and they speak a different language (Cary, 2003, 10).




Figure 6. Map Illustrating the Region of Kurdistan in the Middle East in Relation to Iraq's Current Borders.

Source: University of Texas, Austin, US, *Kurdish Lands (location map-1992)*, (Middle East: Perry-Castañeda Library, Austin, US, 1992), 1.

Due to the Kurdish region straddling the border of the Ottoman and Safavids Empires, different tribes created alliances with each side. The Persians imposed Persian or Turkish leaders to govern the Kurdish tribes that established allegiances with them. In the 1514 Battle of Chaldiran, the Ottoman Empire captured northern Iraq. Sultan Dalim,

the Ottoman commander sent a Kurdish representative to make peace with the ousted Kurdish tribal leaders. The tribal leaders that joined the Ottoman Empire fought against the Safavid Empire. The Battle of Chaldiran is the historic break between the northern and southern Kurds (Cary 2003, 11). Kurds never achieved autonomy although Kurdish Nationalism, based on ethnicity, language, and religion, prevents the various empires from destroying them. As shown in Figure 2, the resolve of the Kurds to achieve autonomy began as early as the 7th century and their current situation is as close as they have ever been (O’Leary 2002, 24). Article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres, written in 1920, promised the Kurds an autonomous state, stating:

If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas (Elphinston 1946, 8).

Turkey rejected the treaty because if the Kurds became autonomous, Turkey would lose the eastern portion of its country. Instead of the establishment of Kurdistan, the Turks named the Turkish Kurds, “Mountain Turks.” To prevent the Kurds from gaining independence, Turkey established a campaign of assimilation. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, failed to promise or mention an autonomous Kurdistan. From 1927 to 1930, the Kurds rebelled against Turkey, but Turkey destroyed the military arm of the rebellion. The law of assimilation resulted in massacres of Kurds from 1937 to 1938. Although Turkish forces burned Kurdish villages and killed men, women, and children, the Kurdish nationalism prevented assimilation into Turkey (Elphinston 1946, 97).




Figure 7. Displays the Historic Oppression of the Kurds and Their Continued Attempts at Autonomy.

Source: Data compiled from Cary, 2003; Miller, 2005; Arthur, 2004; Bengio, 1999; Baram, 1997; Elphinston, 1946; O'Leary, 2002; Brunner, 2007; Hawramany, 2007; U.S.-Iraq ProCon.org 2007; mideastweb.org. 2007

Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the Kurds in Iraq conducted a rebellion against the Iraqi government. In 1932, with the British Royale Air Force coming to the aid of the Iraqi government, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq ended in Kurdish defeat (Elphinston 1946, 98). The Iraqi government established the League of Nations, which recognized the Kurds as a separate ethnic group based on their language. Mustafa Barzani established the KDP to include its militia, the Pesh-merga, and conducted an unsuccessful revolt that lasted for decades against the Iraqi government led by Abdul Karim Kassem.

The primary goal of Barzani's KDP was Kurdish independence within Iraq. At the conclusion of the revolt in 1970, a peace agreement between Barzani and Kassem granted the Kurds limited self-rule, which lasted only four years (Miller 2005, 15). The Iraqi government prevented the Kurds from controlling the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, which resulted in the KDP attacking Iraqi troops (Brunner 2007, 2).

In 1975, a split occurred in the KDP when Jalal Talabani founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In the continued struggle for independence, the KDP and the PUK existed in constant conflict. The Kurds in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq wars, which resulted in an attempted retaliatory genocide from Saddam Hussein's regime. According to Katzman, with the Iraqi Army freed from the war with Iran, Saddam turned the army to get retribution against the Kurds. He writes:

By 1987, however, the diminishing military threat from Iran freed the government to concentrate additional forces against the Kurds. Arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and forced resettlement of Kurds outside their area were accelerated, and Iraqi forces launched at least two lethal gas attacks against Kurdish targets in 1988, including the town of Halabja (March 16, 1988, about 5,000 killed) (Katzman 2005, 2).

Saddam oppressed the Kurds and moved Sunni Arabs into the Kurdish areas in northern Iraq to remove the Kurdish majority, specifically in the oil-rich area of Kirkuk.

In 1991, the KDP and PUK split the Kurdish population almost 50/50. The conflict stemmed from both parties belief that they had jurisdiction over all of Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDP received the backing from Saddam to fight the PUK, but later fought back against the Iraqi regime (Fact 2003, 2). The conflict between the KDP and PUK ended in 1998 with the signing of a peace agreement in Washington. This led to a joint command center in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Although the Kurds survived a long history of oppression, in Iraq they govern the Kurdish Administrative Region in northeastern Iraq. The area is secure and, with the exception of Kirkuk, the violence level is safer than in the rest of Iraq (Katzman 2007, 3). In Kirkuk, kidnappings and violence still occur because the Kurds and Sunni disagree over whether the city is in the Kurdish region or Sunni region of Iraq. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution states, “normalization and census and concludes with the referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens” (Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 140). Normalization refers to the relocations of the Arabs that Saddam moved into Kirkuk and the resettlement of the Kurds that Saddam moved out of the area. The Kurds argue that Kirkuk is geographically in the historic area of Kurdistan and Saddam’s policy of Arabization changed the demographics (International Crisis Group 2006, 6).

In Iraq, the Kurds supported the United States’ effort and continued to solidify their position as a regional leader. In the constitution, not only did they get approval for the movement of Arabs out of Kirkuk, but they also received veto power as a recognized party in Iraq (International Crisis Group 2006, 7). During the elections in 2005, the Sunni Arabs boycotted and minimized their prospective representation. The Kurds took advantage of the Sunni boycott and, “this further strengthened the Kurd’s hand by inflating their representation at both the national and provincial levels and gave them the great leverage over the Kirkuk question” (International Crisis Group 2006, 7). For the Kurds, the biggest concern is the control of Kirkuk and its vast oil supplies for economic development. The control of the oil revenue is an area for further study.

The Peshmerga currently secures the Iraqi Kurdistan area. U.S. forces shop for supplies in Dahuk and Irbil. The trips include the removal of protective vests and helmets. The soldiers safely move through the streets purchasing office supplies and other essential items to fight the war in Iraq. Near Mosul, Kurds are the majority ethnic group in several of the Iraqi Army units. Since the Kurds already secure their borders, it seems likely that if a soft partition of Iraq occurs the security in Iraqi Kurdistan will continue into the future.

The status of the Kurds proves they support a partition of Iraq. The establishment of a Kurdish lead region within Iraq would move the Kurds toward their ultimate goal of independence and autonomy. The volatile situation that may require additional United States intervention after partition is Turkey's acceptance of the Kurdish Province with relative autonomy. The Kurds already placed themselves in a position of advantage within the government, and as long as Barzani and Talabani can work together, governance of the Kurdish province can remain stable.

Bosnian Case Study

Ethnic conflict, failed governmental policies, Western and European interdiction, historical parallels all resulted in the soft partition of Bosnia. The country divided into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consisted of a union of Croat and Muslim majority areas, and the Republika Srpska (RS) or Serb Republic, which consisted of the Serb majority areas. The research of the Bosnian partition encompassed four key areas of analysis. The four areas provided critical information to the potential feasibility of a federalist government governing an ethnically partitioned Iraq. The first area of study attempted to define the war in Bosnia to determine if it was a war of aggression

started by the Serbs or a civil war based on primordial nationalism or modernistic nationalism. The second area of study analyzed the ethnic dispersion and the impact of displaced persons in Bosnia compared to Iraq. The third area studied determined the similarities and differences in the status and objectives of the militant groups within each country. The final topic attempted to determine the feasibility of the current Bosnian federalist government as a model to govern a partitioned Iraq.

The first step in analyzing the situation that resulted in partition in Bosnia is to understand the war. In Bosnia, two different schools of thoughts exist as to the nature of the war (Mace 1996, 5). Was Bosnia a war of aggression or a civil war? Both primordial and modern nationalism were addressed to determine if Bosnia was a war of aggression or a civil war. The same analysis will occur for Iraq in the current situation section of this chapter. The primordial argument concluded that it was a civil war based on deep-seated hatred and historic conflicts between ethnic groups. The modernist view suggests a war of aggression, where Serbia, the aggressor, attacked a separate state within the Federation of Yugoslavia. Although Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina previously identified with the country of Yugoslavia, at the time of the war they were not under a unified government and therefore the war in Bosnia was a war of aggression, not a civil war (Mace 1996, 5).



Figure 8. Map Illustrating the Ethnic Borders in Bosnia When the Treaty of Versailles Established Yugoslavia, Shows Ethnic Boundaries and Population Density of Each Group.

Source: U.S State Department, Office of Geographer, Yugoslav Republics, (Dan Kiser, March 10, 1992), 1.

A primordial nationalist viewpoint ascertains that the groups are predisposed to conflict and that belonging to a single nation state amplified the problem. Prior to the Treaty of Versailles in 1918, Yugoslavia existed as eight different counties and at least

ten ethnic groups. Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Hungarians all existed within the borders of Yugoslavia as seen in Figure 8. The Treaty of Versailles established Yugoslavia and Iraq, both of which combined multiple ethnic groups in one country. Similar to the grouping of the different ethnic groups in Iraq, the ethnic groups had their own identities based on religion, culture, language, or history. Historically, the ethnic strife in Bosnia closely resembles the disputes in Iraq. To demonstrate the parallelism of historic disputes that shaped the primordial nationalism in Bosnia and Iraq, the time continuum was broken down into four time-periods. As shown in Figure 9, the historic disputes in both examples share a distinct history of conflict. Both include attempts at genocide, religious differences, and the technique of divide and rule to control the areas by European entities. During the Cold War era, Bosnia and Iraq remained unified due to brutal suppression of ethnic tensions. When Tito died and the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, both countries erupted into ethnic civil wars. The ethnic groups resumed the fight for dominance in an ill-defined social/political environment.

Three conditions surrounding the partition of the Croats and Muslim from the Serbians do not exist in Iraq according to the *New York Times* (Shanker 2007, 1). The three conditions outlined by Shanker include: 1) The ethnic groups in Bosnia were already separated into areas with established boundaries; 2) In Bosnia, the militant groups fought themselves to utter exhaustion and a diplomatic solution ceased the fighting; and, 3) The outside powers supporting the ethnic groups in Bosnia came to the table to negotiate peace talks during the Dayton Accords (Shanker 2007, 4). Does ethnic partition in Iraq also require the aforementioned conditions that made the Bosnian

partition successful? Are those conditions completely unmet? The ethnic groups in Iraq intermarried and lived together under totalitarian rule for several years, which does not leave easily definable borders for partition (International Crisis Group 2006, 6).




Figure 9. Displays the Historic Parallels that Hardened the Primordial Nationalism in Bosnia and Iraq.

Source: Data compiled from Hassan 2007; Lydon 1996; Sabic 2005; Makros 2001; Bengio 1999; Betts 2002; Kumar 1998; Walter and Synder 1999; Eppel, 1998 Jabar, 2000; Shanker 2007; Brunner 2007; U.S.-Iraq ProCon.org 2007; mideastweb.org. 2007

The ethnic dispersion in Bosnia resembled the dispersion in Iraq, as shown in Figure 10. As the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina carried on the ethnic groups divided into the boundaries that Shanker used to dismiss partition for Iraq. Radha Kumar, Associate

Fellow at the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, described the Bosnian population as ethnically intermixed and thus a bad example for partition (Kumar 1998, 5). In the first months of the Bosnian war 1.1 million persons were displaced and by 1992, that number climbed to approximately 2 million (Hansen 2006, 117). Joseph and Hanlon made the following comparison between Bosnia and Iraq with regard to displaced persons and defined borders between ethnic groups:

While Iraq may not yet resemble Bosnia in 1995 in which ethnic separation had progressed to the point where fairly clear regional borders could be established, it is well beyond the Bosnia of 1992 when the separation was just beginning. Moreover, while Bosnia eventually wound up as a reasonable stable federation, as many as 200,000 may have lost their lives before that settlement. A comparable per capita casualty toll in Iraq would imply one million dead. It should be the goal of policymakers to avoid such a calamity by trying to manage the ethnic relocation process, if it becomes unstoppable, rather than allow terrorists and militias to use violence to drive this process to its grim, logical conclusion (Joseph and Hanlon 2007, X).

In Bosnia, the displacement of persons occurred prior to the planning and execution of the partition caused by the Dayton Accords. The displacement in Iraq models the movement in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. Figure 10 clearly shows that the conditions in Iraq of intermixed ethnic groups emulate the conditions in Bosnia. The timing of the two operations created the difference in conditions. In Bosnia, the separation of ethnic groups occurred before the United States intervention, whereas in Iraq, it continues to occur due to sectarian violence.

In Bosnia, not every person displaced to provinces based on ethnicity, the assumption was made that not every Iraqi will displace creating minority groups within provinces. It is obvious that Bosnians took the risk of not moving. As Figure 8 shows, the areas of Bosnia- Herzegovina are predominately ethnic centric, yet not completely so.

The existence of minority groups implies that other ethnic groups live in those areas under a different ethnic group's government in relative peace.




Figure 10. Map Showing the Similarity Between the Ethnic Distribution of Pre-War Bosnia and Pre-War Iraq

Source: Encarta, Ethnic Divisions in Bosnia, (Bosnia: Dennison Rusinow, 2007), 1 and CIA, Ethnoreligious Groups From Iraq, (Iraq: a Map Folio, CIA, 1992), 1.

The Bosnian model anticipated that the ethnic barriers to a unified country can occur over time, but Western countries could not impose it. Kumar explains, “the ideal strategy for resolving an ethnic conflict is to intervene and take partition to its logical conclusion by dividing a country along its communal battle lines and helping make the

resulting territories ethnically homogenous through organized population transfers” (Kumar 1997, 1). Figure 11 illustrates the final borders that were established in Bosnia and highlights that the ethnic areas are not ethnically pure. The international community played an enormous role in relocating internally displaced persons (IDP) during the partition of Bosnia. The implementation of partition in Bosnia required the security of borders and the safe relocation of IDPs. In Iraq, the U.S. troops will secure the newly formed borders and secure the IDPs as they move to more ethnically homogenous areas (Joseph and Hanlon 2007, 4).




Figure 11. Map Showing the Ethnic Distribution After the Displacement of 2 Million Persons and Partition was Complete.

Source: Encarta, Ethnic Divisions in Bosnia, (Bosnia: Dennison Rusinow, 2007), 1.

The ability to maintain security during a partition in Iraq will be a much larger task than in Bosnia. The militant groups in Bosnia were well organized and sought to take and control territory. Dr. DiPrizio, a political scientist explained why the ethnic groups in Bosnia accepted the Dayton Accords:

In Bosnia, NATO was charged with keeping the peace between relatively well-organized and structured warring parties that sought to take and control territory. When it became evident that none of the parties could achieve their goals in the face of NATO's determination to alter the balance of power and force a negotiated settlement, they had no choice but to accept *Dayton*. Once this happened, NATO's military presence ensured at least grudging adherence to the agreement (DiPrizio 2005, 3).

A major difference between the situations in Bosnia in 1995 and Iraq in 2007 is in the acceptance of partition and the conditions of the militant groups. The objectives of the ethnic groups in Bosnia did not include a unified state under a single government. The groups accepted the Dayton Accords as a way to conclude the fighting and attain a lesser level of autonomy.

The Dayton Accords established the Bosnian Government as a consociational state. Though the Bosniaks and Croats govern their people as a federation and the Serbs govern as a republic, both answer to the central government. Barbara F. Walter, an assistant professor of political science at the Graduate School of International relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California wrote:

The government of Bosnia hinges on the equal sharing of authority and power from each group, minimizing the internal insecurity that results in civil war. Two principles arrangements can result in the sharing of authority amongst groups. The two principles are delegation to neutral authorities or balance power sharing among interested parties (Walter 1999, 18).

At the head of the Bosnian government are three presidents, one from each ethnic group that lead the country for eight months at a time (Šabić 2005, 193). The government of

Bosnia has limited direct control over the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The national government governs through the entity governments as shown in Figure 12. It illustrates the equality of authority between the different ethnic groups.




Figure 12. Shows the Government of Bosnia Established by the Dayton Accords in 1995.

Source: Mace, The Dayton Accord: Defining Success (U.S. Army War College, Mace, Patrick D., Lieutenant Colonel, USA 2005) 22.

The Iraqi government, although already operating, may achieve greater success if they adopted the Bosnian model and became a consociational state. The exact distribution of authority and responsibilities given to the national, provincial, and local governments in Iraq is a topic for further study. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders would have to work diplomatically to determine a structure of power sharing that all three

could accept. A summary from the Dayton Accords explained what arbitration occurred to permit Bosnia to partition into the Federation and Republica Srpska. The Dayton Accords state, “The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration” (DOS 1995, 4). A similar agreement between Kurds, Shia, and Sunni could facilitate equal sharing in power and authority in the Iraqi Government.

The Dayton Accords for Bosnia provided the medium to pull neighboring countries to the diplomatic bargaining table with the leaders of the ethnic groups within Bosnia. This acceptance of a diplomatic solution helped to reach agreements that ended the fighting and prevented neighboring countries from pushing agendas that de-stabilized the area. Shanker stated:

a genius of the Dayton Process was that the outside powers arming and inspiring the Bosnian violence—Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian dictator, and Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian strongman—were at the table along with their Bosnian proxies and Muslim representatives. With their signatures on the accords, the flames of outside agitation were extinguished (Shanker 2007, 2).

The Dayton process provided a means to stabilize the area and prevent outside influence from fueling the conflict in Bosnia. Arguably, a similar process for Iraq could potentially end the growing violence. “A Dayton-like process for Iraq,” explains Rend Al Rahim, Executive Director and co-founder of the Iraq Foundation, “would be a multi-tiered international engagement. At its heart would be an Iraqi national compact forged by Iraqis with international and regional endorsement” (Al Rahim 2007, A23). The process would require attendance by Turkey, Syria, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to address all

three ethnic outside influences and key leaders from all Iraqi political parties. The U.S. Congress addressed the issue of international diplomacy thusly:

Many of the Iraq Study Group recommendations propose increased regional, multi-lateral, and international diplomacy, beyond steps already taken by the Administration...One idea, included in the Study Group report, is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on Iraq’s factions to compromise. In the 110th Congress, a few bills (H.R. 744, H.Con.Res. 43, and H.Con.Res. 45) support the Iraq Study Group recommendation for an international conference on Iraq. In the 109th Congress, these ideas were included in several resolutions, including S.J.Res. 36, S.Res. 470, S.J.Res. 33, and S. 1993, although several of these bills also include provisions for timetables for a U.S. withdrawal (Katzman 2007, 48-49).

The U.S. Congress already seems to understand the importance of bringing neighboring countries to the negotiation table to address regional stability and the future for Iraq.

A strong coalition as opposed to a United States-centric medium for the Iraqi diplomatic process may bring the key players to the bargaining process. An attempt to conduct diplomatic discussions with all key leaders could additionally bolster the support of NATO and potentially reduce the United States’ presence in the war in Iraq. Pauline Baker, from the Fund for Peace, agrees that “a regional settlement involving Iraq’s neighbors and other Arab states, all of whom want Iraq to stay whole and stable. Iraq and the UN should seek the convening of an international conference that will examine such a solution together with internal parties” (Baker 2006, 3-4).

The Dayton Accords and the partition of Bosnia provide a model to a potential plan “B” for Iraq. The intermixed status of ethnic groups in Iraq is similar to Bosnia at the beginning of the war. The United States could potentially prevent the deaths of millions by separating the ethnic groups systematically rather than by default, through ethnic violence. In Bosnia, a violent partition occurred prior to the Dayton process. In Iraq, the potential for history repeating itself is very probable (Brooks 2007, 1). The

decentralized government in Bosnia could serve as a model for Iraq. Further analysis will occur in the potential solution for Iraq portion in this chapter. It will address the question of whether a Dayton type process can occur with the state of the region in the Middle East and whether it is a potential solution.

Current Situation in Iraq

To identify a potential solution, the first step is to understand the problem. Analysis of the current situation in Iraq focused on the rifts between the ethnic groups and the current issues with the diplomatic policy and security plan implemented. The first area analyzed was the current security situation in Iraq. Looking at the history of OIF, analysis conducted to determine the potential future in Iraq if partition does not occur was critical. The second area analyzed focused on the effectiveness of the local government and its ability to make progress. The relationships between Iraq and its neighbors were analyzed to determine if stability in the region could occur through diplomacy. The final area of focus was support within the United States for partitioning Iraq and the methodology already used to argue for and against it. Due to the media focus on violence and the increased death toll in Iraq, the security situation seems to hold the focus of the international community when discussing the success and failures in Iraq.

In the assessment of the security situation, it is important to understand how the violence reached its current levels in Iraq and to understand what type of war Iraq is fighting. Walters explained that, “a number of the civil wars of the 1990s have followed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the unraveling of other Communist states, or the governmental breakdown of so-called failed states in the Third World” (Walter 1999, 16). Iraqis viewed the removal of Saddam as an opportunity to get revenge

against the Sunni minority that had ruthlessly controlled them since 1918 (Nasr 2006, 1). When the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power, they created a power void, which permitted previously suppressed power brokers to vie for control of the country (Katzman 2003, 24). Following the removal of Saddam, Katzman reported:

Although some Iraqi civilians have welcomed U.S. and British troops in areas captured, many Iraqis now want U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq, and the top U.S. military commander in the Persian Gulf theater, General John Abizaid, says that U.S. forces now face a “classic guerrilla war.” (Katzman 2003, 20).

General Abizaid identified the new threat in 2003, which grew to look more like a civil war than an insurgency. U.S. forces now find themselves fighting the type of war General Abizaid identified in 2003. As the war progressed, it turned into a guerrilla-fought civil war with the United States in the middle attempting to promote peace (Brown 2007, 1).

As cited by Walter and Snyder explained, “The breakdown of internal authority and legitimacy may generate conflict among groups because each now fears that others will move against it” (Walter 1999, 17). According to Figure 4, the Sunni and Shia spent more time out of conflict than actually fighting each other. Walter explained:

When you look at civil wars closely, what you find is that the adversaries have actually spent the vast majority of their history not fighting one another. Violence is the exception, not the norm. This turns the puzzle on its head—instead of asking why adversaries in civil wars do not reach peaceful settlements, it makes more sense to ask what makes them fight (Vedantam 2007, 1).

When the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power, the level of insecurity within the Iraqi population established an opportunity for terrorist and power brokers attempting to control the country to ignite primordial nationalism into sectarian violence and attacks against coalition forces. In Figure 13, the steady rise in attacks against Iraqi

security forces and coalition forces is evident. In 2006, the GAO described the situation in Iraq as follows:

Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and more recent Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The deteriorating conditions threaten continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals (Walker 2006, 5).

The current trend in Iraq resembles the situation in Bosnia before the United States and United Nations entered into the Dayton Accords. The situation in Iraq could likely result in partition and the establishment of ethnic borders within Iraq.

Iraq deteriorated into a civil war between Sunni and Shia with the Kurds focused on hardening their provincial autonomy. The civil war intermixed with the fight against terrorists made Iraq an extremely convoluted battlefield (Brooks 2007, 1). There are five fear-producing environments, which lead to civil war (Walter, 1999 4). The five environments include break down or collapse of a government, a minority group becoming geographically isolated, the shifting of political balance of power, economic resources rapidly changing hands, groups destabilizing to partisan armies (Walter 1999, 4). Governmental breakdown, political shift in power, economic resources changing hands, and groups destabilizing into partisan groups all deserve consideration when attempting to determine why the sectarian problem in Iraq elevated to its current level. The ethnic tensions discussed previously in this chapter demonstrated the ethnic strife that has continued to split the country of Iraq. The Fund for Peace reported in August 2007 that, "based on data tracked since before the U.S. invasion in 2001, ... Iraq is now near total collapse" (Wright 2007, 1). Reports from General Petraeus put a more positive

perspective on the state of affairs in Iraq. Most of the data found during this research focused on the war against terror and little about potential ethnic reconciliation between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. The Shia-infiltrated government failed to meet the objectives that the United States set for the successful attainment of peace and troop withdrawal. The plan proposed four years ago by Senator Biden recommending an ethnic partition in Iraq to ethnic regions seems to have taken hold by default due to rising ethnic violence (Cohen 2007, 1).




Figure 13. Shows a Steady Rise and Fall in Attacks from May 2004 to September 2007.

Source: Petraeus, Multi-National Force-Iraq Charts to accompany the testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus, (Petraeus, David H., General, USA, September 10, 2007), 3.

The U.S. Congress reported:

Section Five of the Constitution of Iraq declares that the federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, and local administrations" and enumerates the expansive powers of regions and the limited powers of the central government and establishes the mechanisms for the creation of new federal regions... the United States should actively support a political settlement in Iraq based on the final provisions of the Constitution of Iraq that create a federal system of government and allow for the creation of federal regions, consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders (Biden 2007, 1).

The U.S. Congress recognized the need to decentralize the Iraqi government and support the partition into ethnic regions, the "Sense of Congress," continued to separate Baghdad as the capitol and not part of an ethnic region.

There are three general types of solutions for the security dilemma caused by one of the five environments aforementioned. The first is to establish a sovereign government capable of enforcing a hegemonic peace. The plan for Iraq centered on the establishment of a sovereign government capable of maintaining peace. Since its establishment, it has failed to thwart sectarian violence and the civil war building in Iraq. The second solution is to establish a situation where each group protects its own members, but does not attack the other groups (Walter 1999, 17). Implementation of this solution, could result the establishment of an federalist Iraqi government with subordinate ethnic provinces. The third solution would require the groups to willingly lay down their arms and surrender all authority to the central government (Walter 1999, 17). The primordial tension between the ethnic groups in Iraq makes this solution unrealistic in the near term.

The Way Ahead

This chapter analyzed the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish perspectives with regard to forming a unified Iraq where the groups live in peace under a strong central government. The primordial nationalism that prevented the unification of ethnic groups was explained and analyzed, and was compared to the case study with Bosnia. The Bosnian case study demonstrated several parallels that provide adequate lessons learned for the situation in Iraq. The understanding that Iraq is a complex battlefield with a Sunni-Shia civil war, conflicts with Turkey and Iran, and the GWOT all defined the problem facing the campaign in Iraq. The analysis of the current situation in Iraq provided a synopsis of the state of affairs in Iraq at the completion of this thesis. In order to determine if an ethnically partitioned Iraq under a federalist government is feasible. Chapter 5 provides the conclusions made from the analysis in this chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview

This chapter addressed conclusions made concerning the viability of partitioning Iraq along ethnic rifts and ruling the country with a weakened central federalist government. The Coalition must reduce the ethnic tension and national insecurity to end the violence in Iraq and prevent immediate civil war. The conclusions made in this thesis address the assessment of the feasibility of partition and not the implementation. The topics covered included the reduction of sectarian conflict through the attainment of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish objectives, establishment of security forces required to reduce insecurity within the population, and a potential solution to the current government to grant equal power sharing between the ethnic groups to minimize political ethnic division.

Federalism based on ethnic partition is a viable solution in Iraq. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish objectives are attainable, the ethnic distrust which has survived throughout history will remain well beyond the conclusion of OIF. Based on the study of primordial nationalism and the ethnic relationships in Iraq and Bosnia, the best the U.S. Government can hope for is to achieve peace through equal power sharing in the region. This end-state would serve to reduce the level of ethnic insecurity and return the area back to a condition relative peace. It would give each group a sense of control and autonomy in the region, while the decentralized government provides international diplomacy, economic reform, and guarantees fair representation through sharing of the countries

resources. The center of gravity in Iraq is the removal of ethnic insecurities through security, governance, and economic reform.

Sectarian Conflict Resolution

The resolution of the conflict between Shia, Sunni, and Kurd will not occur during OIF and possibly will remain indefinitely. Based on the analysis in chapter 4 of the different ethnic groups' objectives and inter-relations it is overly-optimistic to believe the United States can mend the "bad blood" between the groups to achieve total peace in the region. It is more realistic to achieve tolerance based on equal power sharing and equal recognition within the region. The ethnic groups require a different set of conditions to achieve their objectives, however, every group requires security and governmental controls to reduce the level of insecurity in their province.

To reduce the level of insecurity within Iraq, the ethnic groups attain an increased level of authority by establishing their own government, running their own elections and developing provincial laws. At the local and provincial level, the people of Iraq could not blame their situation on the other ethnic groups if they are being governed by leaders that they elected from the same ethnic group.

With the establishment of ethnic provinces, the United States could anticipate the enormous task of implementing the provincial borders and securing the potential mass movement of people to their perspective provinces. This thesis assumed that the provinces would not be ethnically pure similar to Bosnia. People would have the opportunity to move or be governed by a different ethnic group. Acceptance of the provincial leadership would reduce the insecurity level and the sectarian violence would reduce. Based on the study of Bosnia and the current trends in Iraq, soft partition seems

to be occurring already. The establishment of ethnic provinces establishes safe borders for each ethnic group reducing the level of conflict through geographic separation. Requirements for each ethnic group come with the geographic separation. To provide the separation required to reduce sectarian violence the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds would have to secure their borders and provide adequate governance to their people.

Security Forces

Can security forces be established to maintain security at the state and national level? There were two levels of security forces addressed to determine the feasibility of establishing ethnic provinces and maintaining a nation state capable of protecting its borders from outside influence. The first level is local and provincial security to protect the people within the provinces from intra-Iraq influences to include other ethnic groups and crime. The second level is national security forces required to maintain status quo between the provinces, protect the national borders, and conduct military operations within the region on behalf of the national government if required.

In chapter 4, the militias were identified for each ethnic group. In most cases they are the forces we are fighting against currently to stop sectarian violence and prevent destabilization of the national government. In Kurdistan, the Peshmerga are already securing their “province”. The United States could change its strategy with regard to ethnic militia and endorse their use as local and provincial security. The Sunni could mobilize the Mujahadeen and Ansar Al Sunna to work as local and provincial police. The Shia’s Badr Corps and Mahdi Army could provide local and provincial security. In accordance with the analysis in chapter 4, the Iraqi people are already secured by the

militias, instead of attempting to fight the militia, endorse their employment to build the police force.

At the national level, the Iraqi Army is the security force to maintain the status quo between the provinces, protect the borders and conduct military operations in support of the national government. Additional analysis is required to determine how to build and train a non-ethnic centric Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Army must not have ethnic based units at any level. In order to prevent the partnership of ethnic based Iraqi Army units with any provincial security forces, the units could be manned equally with each ethnic group. The Department of Border Enforcement already secures the borders of Iraq. The new national government would have to establish the military force required and the United States could maintain the current assistance to training and equipping their forces.

Governmental Control

Because of primordial nationalism, the people will not accept a majority ruled government similar to the United States. The multi-ethnic federal government in Bosnia is a potential solution to the type of government required in Iraq. Iraq as a consociational state based on ethnic equality will reduce the ethnic tension in the country. To establish equality in the governmental organization, the government of Iraq could be aligned according the Bosnian government as shown in figure 14. Figure 14 illustrates the equal sharing of power between each national governmental organization. The provinces will establish their own distinct form of government similar to figure 12, where Bosnia-Herzegovina and RS have different government architecture that provide equal representation to the national government. In accordance with the national government, the local and provincial government is a provincial responsibility. The national

government would establish national guidelines for the provinces to operate. However, the task of establishing rule of law and providing an adequate judicial system to enforce the law is a provincial responsibility.




Figure 14. A Potential Solution to the Establishment of a Non-Majority Rule Iraqi Government.

Source: Governmental Structure gleaned from Mace, 2005.

Recommendations

Based on the conclusions that federalism based on ethnic partition is a viable solution in Iraq, the recommendations are the establishment of ethnic provinces with

Baghdad as a city-state, establishment of local and federal security forces, and the establishment of a consociational federal government. In order for partition to work a change in strategy is required in Iraq. The strategy of forming a sovereign Iraq without regard to ethnicity is unrealistic due to primordial nationalism and the ability of militias and terrorist organizations to exploit the levels of insecurity it causes within the people of Iraq. The implementation of provincial borders and population segregation in Iraq will require military planning to minimize human suffering and protect people in transit between provinces.

The recommended solution for the establishment of local and provincial security is to legitimize the ethnic militias and train them as the police force within Iraq. Legitimizing the leaders that control the militias has inherent risks, however, the employment of the militias to secure ethnic provinces allows them to protect their people from the other ethnic groups. The United States Army's mission to train and equip security forces would change from the recruitment of police to preparing militias to provide the service on behalf of their families and people.

National security incurs one additional task to maintain status quo between the provinces. It is recommended that military units at every level are ethnically equal to prevent biased units. A solution for the sharing of authority within the units is required but not addressed in this thesis. The city of Baghdad can serve as the headquarters for the Iraqi Army because it should not be included in any one province but serve as a multi-ethnic city-state. A recommended branch of the ethnically equal Iraqi Army can secure Baghdad and the national government.

The recommended government for Iraq should not have a majority party or leader. The government, similar to Bosnia requires equal power sharing for each of the three primary ethnic groups. A weak central government focusing the majority of the power to the provincial governments allows the ethnic groups to meet their ends for the conflict in Iraq. Potentially over time, the tension between ethnic groups may subside to a situation where ethnic tolerances will permit Iraqi nationalism as their primary identity reducing sectarian violence and allowing the country to unite and grow internationally.

For Further Study

This thesis concluded that federalism based on ethnic partition is a viable solution in Iraq, however there were areas that require further study to determine how feasible. The areas for further study include, economics based on oil revenue, the implementation of internal provincial borders within Iraq and relocation of IDPs, transformation of ethnic militia into viable provincial security forces, re-organization of the Iraqi Army to prevent ethnic based units at any level, and the re-organization of the Iraqi government to remove an ethnic majority and promote equal power sharing.

An objective of all ethnic groups is the control and exploitation of the vast oil supply in Iraq. A study of the feasibility of the national government controlling the oil revenues and spreading the wealth fairly to all ethnic groups is required. A recommended start point is the dividend program in Alaska, where the profits from the pipeline are distributed to every Alaskan resident. The research should include the overall economic development of Iraq to facilitate the equal sharing of resources within the country.

The implementation of the partition requires further study. This thesis determined it was feasible to partition the country into provinces however, the issue of implementation with minimal human suffering is critical. The plan required to physically divide Iraq into provinces will require both governmental and military interjection. To prevent the targeting of IDPs transiting into their perspective provinces will require substantial research prior to execution.

The change of policy toward militias and use as provincial security forces requires further study. The diplomatic engagements to transition an organization from enemy to friendly and implement them as a part of the solution requires significant study of each militant organization and the objectives of their leaders. The transition can only occur if the militia leaders accept the task of securing its province instead of engaging in sectarian violence.

The Iraqi Army must be an organization without ethnic biased. Further study is required to determine how to restructure the army without losing security within the country. The re-organization would require proper timing with the transition of militia to provincial security forces. The two areas for study are the re-organization of the force and the timing to offset the empowerment of the militias.

The final area of study is the restructuring of the Iraqi government. In this thesis, a comparison with Bosnia provided a potential solution. Further study is required to determine the actual organization to best address the situation in Iraq. Bosnia was similar but there were several differences that may impact the Iraqi Government differently.

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