The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency": A Comparison
Abstract
Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest that historical reviews of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. However, the results of such reviews tended to fail to be incorporated into military doctrine as the passage of time reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences. In reality, detailed study of past insurgency experiences is necessary if the U.S. military is to apply the crucial principles of COIN to current threat models. An example of an army that struggled to develop COIN doctrine as it combated an insurgency is the French Army in their conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. French experiences in Algeria provide information on COIN operations that achieved great success at the tactical level, but failed at the strategic level. From this perspective, it is important to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," in light of French efforts in Algeria. French COIN experiences, which were centered on influencing the civilian population, provide examples that should be compared to current U.S. doctrine. This thesis investigates whether the lessons learned in the French-Algerian War have been incorporated into current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Its main focus is differences and similarities in FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," and France's counterinsurgency methods of 1954-1962.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA475521
Entities
People
- Jason M. Norton
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College