Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa
Abstract
During the early 1990s, al-Qaida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense's Harmony Database. Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, draws on recently declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, original field work by CTC personnel and careful country studies to enrich our understanding of the terrorist group's early successes and failures in the Horn of Africa. The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qaida's first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, al-Qaida's efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qaida. Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qaida's activities. In Somalia, al-Qaida's members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA475714
Entities
Organizations
- United States Military Academy