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THESIS

**A DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESERVES
(DHS-R): SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING THE
HOMELAND WHILE ALLEVIATING THE INCREASED
DOD ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY**

by

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ALLEVIATING THE INCREASED DOD ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE
AND SECURITY**

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ABSTRACT

As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust *both* federal and state military resources, it is important to establish a domestic disaster response plan that does not rely or default to a military solution. Post-Katrina assessments highlight that the response to Hurricane Katrina has tarnished the DHS and FEMA's image and trust that Americans have in the government's ability to respond effectively to a disaster.

The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-Reserve. Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at every level of the government. Although many Americans are willing to serve their nation, many are apprehensive to serve in uniform and, specifically, in combat. The aftermaths of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, however, highlight the need for citizen involvement during *domestic* emergencies.

The unconstrained and largely uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, the lack of a national governing body or oversight mechanism, along with the over-exhausted and ill-equipped troops at home, clearly demonstrates the need for America to consider expanding the opportunities for citizen service. Enacting an emergency response volunteer system that is part of a national service system is the best way to involve Americans in homeland security.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust *both* federal and state military resources, it is important to establish a domestic disaster response plan that does not rely or default to a military solution. The federal responses, or lack thereof, to large scale man-made and natural disasters make it easy to understand why Americans feel uncertainty about domestic threats. Post-Katrina assessments highlight that the response to Hurricane Katrina has tarnished DHS and FEMA's image and trust that Americans have in the government's ability to respond effectively to a disaster.

The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-Reserve. Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at every level of the government. Although the National Guard and Coast Guard serve as default first responders, the current national security poses new challenges and threats that could impede a military response.

This thesis investigates the existing volunteer-emergency response assets and highlights some of the inherent weaknesses of the current system. The unconstrained and largely uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, the lack of a national governing body or oversight mechanism, along with the over-exhausted and ill-equipped troops at home, clearly demonstrates the need for America to consider expanding the opportunities for citizen service.

Therefore, following one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, "to emphasize the importance of first responder training and prior joint planning," the Department of Homeland Security should re-organize and synchronize the volunteer emergency response system. America has always witnessed a wellspring of citizen volunteers willing to serve their nation, however many are apprehensive to serve the nation in uniform and, specifically, in combat, however the aftermaths of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina highlight the need for citizen involvement during *domestic*

emergencies. Therefore, enacting an emergency response volunteer system that is part of a national service system is the best way to involve Americans in homeland security.

It is imperative that the nation realize the rising costs of homeland security and therefore take advantage of the semi-patriotic fervor that has inspired civilian-volunteers toward national service, especially since these forces are only paid when activated for a real-world emergency; saving not only lives, but also thousands, if not millions, of dollars. A DHS-R, with a solid structure and legitimacy, could enhance the ability to recruit, train, and retain volunteers.

A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves, made of properly trained individuals, could effectively fill the emergency response gap, especially in the absence of deployed National Guard and active-duty military forces. America can- and should-unify the disparate volunteer organizations that are willing to assist in emergency disasters. Such unity of effort would combine existing multiple resources into one systemic entity available to dispatch volunteers with specific training, various skill sets, and credentials to disasters nationwide. Such an organization is vital for an effective and comprehensive national emergency response. Developing a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves is critical and necessary for the overall domestic security of our nation.

I. INTRODUCTION

The real first responders are our citizens. We can't do our job without them. They are the key element.

— Chief Ed Plaugher, Arlington Fire Dept., 2001

This thesis will provide a conceptual idea of what a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could look like, given that there is a need to create such a volunteer organization. For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider all people living in the United States as eligible candidates and not discriminate by citizenship status. Although some matters deal with national security, it is assumed that, since individuals can enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces without legal citizenship, they should also be allowed to serve in *certain* homeland security capacities. This thesis does not attempt to criticize or replace any existing organizations; it is simply a conglomeration of ideas, policies, and research.

A. PURPOSE OF THESIS

As a result of 9/11, the security of the United States is spread across a broad spectrum that relies on several agencies. The National Response Plan calls on the Department of Defense to assist and respond to natural and man-made disasters *once* local and state resources are overwhelmed¹. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and other Presidential Homeland Security initiatives has caused the Department of Defense to assume an increased role in Homeland Defense and Security missions. Although active duty, reserve, and National Guard troops have always assisted in national emergencies and recovery efforts domestically, the current global war poses new challenges and threats that could impede a military response. Well over 100,000 National Guardsmen were activated for 9/11 for over 300 days, and during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, over 20,000 active-duty military and 50,000 National Guard troops were

¹ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan*, December 2004, 41.

called on to assist.² As the Global War on Terror continues to exhaust *both* federal and state military resources, it is important to establish a response plan that does not rely or default to a military solution. Over 150,000 troops are in Iraq, and more than half of them are either Reserve or National Guard forces.³ Thus far, the dual deployments have not hindered emergency response efforts, but with over one-third of Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard troops and equipment deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, can other states effectively fill the emergency response gap? What about the fact that many of the surrounding National Guardsmen themselves may be affected by a terrorist attack, or that an estimated 125,000 National Guardsmen live in a hurricane path of destruction?⁴ These facts highlight the importance to plan for the eventuality of a catastrophe occurring with only limited military capabilities being available. The United States, specifically the Department of Homeland Security, cannot afford to wait for a catastrophic disaster to occur before taking action to circumvent the possibility of not having a DoD “safety net.”

After 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, citizens across the nation asked, “What can I do?” and “How can I help?” as America witnessed a wellspring of citizen volunteerism, selfless service, and heroism. This sense of service to the nation continues today as the Global War on Terror continues; however, American citizens are more apprehensive to serve the nation in uniform and, specifically, in combat. The aftermaths of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina highlight the need for citizen involvement during *domestic* emergencies.

The President of the United States has continually reminded Americans that “homeland security” is a national responsibility at the federal, state, and local levels, to include each individual citizen. Therefore, securing our homeland, safety, and freedom requires a unity of effort in which every American has the opportunity to exercise a critical role of civic responsibility and participation to achieve community preparedness.

² U.S. Senate, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, Committee Report (Washington D.C., Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, May 2006), Chapter 12, 169.

³ *Christian Science Monitor: Katrina poses key test for stretched National Guard; Part time Soldier- after having served in Afghanistan and Iraq- are now called up for duty in Gulf Coast disaster*, release date: September 2, 2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0902/p02s01-usmi.html> accessed May 5, 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

Such unity of effort should combine existing federal, state, and local resources into one systemic entity available to dispatch citizens with various skills nationwide in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

Is it necessary to form or unify a citizen volunteer reserve force to assist in national emergencies to mitigate the potential risks of not having sufficient DoD resources available? If so, would a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves (DHS-R), made up of properly trained U.S. citizens fill the gap to respond to national disasters in the absence of deployed National Guard and active duty military forces? Would this solution condense the multiple and existing emergency management resources into one manageable and operational resource effective for decision makers to accomplish Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions? If so, could such a federal program effectively and efficiently concentrate volunteer efforts by providing formalized training and standardized identification credentials to create less confusion?

1. Assumptions

My initial assumptions include both a supply and demand of volunteers. Although the likelihood of needing such a large-scale program is higher due to the Global War on Terror, there is still a need for an organized volunteer response. Additionally, there will still be a need for a large-scale, interstate volunteer response because of the current dismantled state of the National Guard.⁵ Lastly, there still exists a high spirit of volunteerism among U.S. residents. Therefore, even if all the U.S. troops were to return home from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would still be a need for a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves. After all, the Army has no strategic reserve ready to protect U.S. interests domestically, while roughly half of the National Guard's equipment is in Iraq or Afghanistan and will require \$22 billion over the next five years to re-build

⁵ Lawrence J. Korb, "Caught Off Guard: The Link between our National Security and our National Guard," *Center for American Progress*, May 2007.

itself.⁶ Therefore, formalizing volunteer efforts under one *synchronized* federal department is vital for an effective and comprehensive national emergency response.

C. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH

The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines. We must plan for that eventuality. A rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.⁷

The 9/11 Commission emphasizes the importance of first responder training and prior joint planning. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also highlight the importance of coordination amongst the different responding agencies. In fact, the slow Katrina response was attributed to “coordination difficulties” between the military, law enforcement, and civilian emergency management authorities.⁸ Perhaps part of the problem is that there are too many civilian emergency management authorities — numerous local, state, and federal employees and volunteers — and, therefore, unification could lead to a solution.

Another important reason for this research is to analyze the National Guard’s evolving role from a strategic reserve force to an operational active force. As the National Guard increasingly assumes the role of the active Army’s operational reserve force, what consequences can be expected for domestic contingencies and homeland security? Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s National Guard responsibility

⁶ Fact Sheet, “The State of the U.S. Army,” found at http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/1464/CNASArmyReadiness_FactsheetNov07.pdf, accessed on November 17, 2007, 1.

⁷ The 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, 323.

⁸ *A Failure of Initiative*, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington D.C, U.S. House of Representatives, February 15 2006), 3.

for homeland defense and civil support has remained constant.⁹ Defense Secretary Robert Gates has acknowledged that Army National Guard personnel and equipment levels are the lowest since 9/11 and, according to the chief of the National Guard Lieutenant General Steven Blum, “the Army National Guard only has 30% of its essential equipment here at home...it’s the first time such a shortfall has occurred in the past 35 years.”¹⁰ The Arkansas National Guard is short 600 rifles and one-third of the Oklahoma National Guard is lacking M-4 rifles.¹¹ In May 2007, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius claimed that storm response efforts were greatly hindered since most of the National Guard’s recovery efforts are overseas supporting the war in Iraq¹². Essential emergency response equipment like high-water vehicles, refueling tankers, generators, tents, trucks, and semi-trailers are all overseas in Iraq or Afghanistan. Prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Guard units of neighboring states could be called on to assist in emergencies; however, the same personnel and equipment shortages plague other states as well. “The Iraq war has crippled Florida’s ability to respond to hurricanes,”¹³ and Major General Melvyn Mantano, the former head of the New Mexico National Guard, argues that the previous intra-state agreements are “practically nullified now because all states have people in Iraq,” and that there is no equipment to borrow since it’s all deployed.¹⁴ Clearly, it is not wise to rely solely on the National Guard to respond to large-scale emergencies. Although the Iraq conflict may not last forever, the National Guard has many shortfalls that it must overcome in order to remain a reliable state response asset.

⁹ Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 4-5.

¹¹ Ibid., 4.

¹² KCBC News: *Iraq War hampers Kansas cleanup*, <http://www.kcbs.com/pages/424076.php?contentType=4&contentId=472199> accessed on May 10, 2007.

¹³ Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 9.

¹⁴ Ibid., 6.

The latest U.S. Census reports that only 3%¹⁵ of the U.S. population serves on active military duty. This means that a great majority of U.S. citizens are available to serve the nation in other capacities. Therefore, America does not lack the manpower to respond to future emergency disasters. Currently, there are many civilian management authorities and emergency response entities. The major agencies include the American Red Cross, the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Citizen Corps, the Disaster Assistance Employee program and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to name just a few. Although each agency is unique in its own way, all support disaster relief efforts and offer emergency response assets. This multiplicity has led to confusion, competing agendas, and perhaps a duplication of efforts. Therefore, a concerted and legitimate federal effort could circumvent these problematic possibilities and offer procedural solutions. One agency could easily filter, sort, and analyze trained citizen volunteers across the nation and mobilize them according to the requirements of incident commanders and decision makers during national emergencies.¹⁶

A well-structured and organized federal agency would need to be recognized by the federal government in order for it to be effective and for Americans to be responsive — especially since such an organization could mean the difference between life and death to citizens who require assistance when local and state resources are overwhelmed. Ironically, such legitimacy and directed power already exists with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5). This directive, implemented in February 2003, specifically outlines the management of domestic incidents¹⁷. HSPD-5 specifically delegates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management; responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major

¹⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, *Special Edition; US Armed Forces and Veterans 4/10/03*, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/001630.html accessed on May 5, 2007.

¹⁶ Idea was taken from *Research Focus Symposium: N/NC J6- Automated Data Filtering*

¹⁷ Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Washington, DC, The White House, February 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html> accessed April 27, 2007.

disasters, and other emergencies¹⁸. It states, “the objective of the United States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management.”¹⁹ HSPD-5 clearly indicates that all responsible agencies at the federal, state, and local level need to understand how to integrate response capabilities prior to the next major disaster. Therefore, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to establish a DHS-Reserves program to facilitate the intent of HSPD-5 and effectively respond to future national emergencies. Doing so significantly increases the chances for a more efficient and effective emergency response, thus greatly reducing the loss of lives and property often attributed to a slow and poorly planned response. Establishing a DHS-Reserve, therefore, should be viewed as an incremental change in line with Presidential Directive-5.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Upon a thorough literature review of emergency volunteer response programs, domestic emergency responses, and the diminution of readiness of the National Guard, several recurring themes surfaced. Despite the fact that the National Guard has been enveloped by our nation’s current overseas conflicts, there is a plethora of volunteer emergency response assets at all levels of emergency preparedness. There seems to be a gap, however, in coordinating the numerous efforts. Furthermore, the need for trained first responders and citizen involvement is highlighted in the after action reviews of recent major catastrophes. Lastly, several experts in the Homeland Security arena have speculated or hinted that perhaps a citizen reserve corps or homeland security auxiliary should be formed to augment the National Guard in light of increased terrorist threats. For these reasons, I am pursuing the concept of creating a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves.

Several federal, state, and local organizations currently provide support in the event of a local or national emergency. Although the various emergency response

¹⁸ The White House, Presidential Directive/HSPD-5.

¹⁹ Ibid.

organizations are not standardized, some of these organizations require formal training, provide equitable reimbursement, and have very formal and effective recall procedures. These same organizations participate in scenario-based exercises in preparation for both man-made and natural disasters. Therefore, it seems that these organizations have the characteristics to provide an effective and coordinated response to an emergency disaster; however, the response to Hurricane Katrina has been highly criticized as being a poorly coordinated emergency response. The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed serious shortcomings in emergency response. Another case in point occurred less than a year before Hurricane Katrina in 2004 when Citizen Corps was activated in Florida — for one of the first times since its inception — in response to four hurricanes that occurred within a 44-day span.²⁰ According to one emergency preparedness expert, the large numbers of untrained volunteers, without formal credentials, training or leadership skills, added to the Florida disaster chaos.²¹ This is evidence that an uncoordinated volunteer force can be a hindrance, rather than a solution, during a large-scale emergency response if not well-established and implemented correctly.

My preliminary research suggests that there may be too many emergency response entities and that those currently in place may be outdated or no longer reliable. For instance, the Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), established in 1996, is a congressionally ratified program that provides each state a structure for interstate mutual relief.²² Although EMAC is federally administered by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), it is strictly an individual, state-driven mutual aid program that is voluntary for each state and governor. The partnership offers interstate support in the event of natural or man-made disasters. This program is a voluntary agreement upon each state and is not highly publicized as a *national* effort. Although EMAC and military assistance were highly critical in restoring law and order during Hurricane Katrina, a bipartisan report prepared for the House of Representatives

²⁰ Tampa Bay Online, “44 Days of Dread,” <http://tbo.com/hurricane2004/tribuneedition.html> accessed on May 12, 2007.

²¹ Personal Interview with Ellis Stanley, General Manager- Emergency Preparedness Department, City of Los Angeles, on May 11, 2007.

²² Emergency Management Assistance Compact, www.emacweb.org/ accessed on May 7, 2007.

concluded that “the current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited to a large-scale emergency.”²³ Furthermore, it forces states to rely on existing or in some cases, stale compacts with neighboring states to respond to natural disasters, terror attacks, or civil disturbances, despite desperate shortages of Guardsmen, equipment, and other response assets.

Another important aspect of this research will focus on incentivizing such a federal volunteer program. A federal-led volunteer program could have lasting impacts for civilian volunteers. In addition to becoming a form of national service, it could produce a well-qualified, dependable, and standardized civilian volunteer response force available to incident commanders at all levels of government. Several legislations are now being introduced in Washington, DC, to enlist citizen involvement.²⁴ Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) has introduced a national service proposal in which all citizens between the ages of 18-42 are obliged to serve a period of military or civilian (homeland) service for the common defense of the nation.²⁵ The implementation of this legislation could personalize the toll of American lives lost overseas and at home, thus creating a sense of nationalism. The incentives for such a system could be modeled after the Armed Forces-Reserves and other volunteer organizations. Such incentives, coupled with citizen’s inherent desire to serve, could provide a huge pool of willing, able, and specialty skilled volunteers. The incentives could be packaged individually for each set of specialized skills, i.e., MDs, disaster analysts, therapy counselors, police, fire, college students, military retiree’s, etc. This thesis will conceptualize some incentives for “activated” volunteers, which include pay, medical benefits, employment protection, special training, insurance, selective service credit and other types of compensation depending on their specialty and length of service. Some incentives for “stand by” volunteers include college tuition assistance, loan repayment, tax focused benefits, education privileges, monetary bonuses for “low-density” skills, and perhaps discounts at certain locations. A federal level volunteer organization could also encourage employers

²³ U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 227.

²⁴ Interview, *Congressmen Sam Farr*, March 2007.

²⁵ Korb, “Caught Off Guard,” 6.

to look favorable at those serving and offer added incentives which could also lead to increased emergency preparedness in the private sector.

Another resource that is currently not being used to its potential is to specifically recruit military personnel that are transitioning out or retiring for specific homeland security purposes. Many of these men and women already possess useful qualities, professional skills, loyal sense of duty, and in some cases, security clearances that can directly benefit DHS, and an emergency disaster response. Active duty personnel should have the opportunity to transition to the Department of Homeland Security or continue to serve in a DHS-Reserves capacity. This is particularly important right now since military active duty personnel and National Guardsmen are choosing the private sector over re-enlistment at an alarming rate. Not surprisingly the Army National Guard fell short of its recruiting goals in 2005 and 2006.²⁶ Creating the opportunity for military members to serve out their federal term as a DHS-reservist, as opposed to a military-reservist can lead to a highly skilled citizen reserve corps ready to respond to domestic emergencies.

Another potential benefit of such a high profile federal program is that colleges and privatized businesses would become introduced to homeland security. It is conceivable that colleges could require a minimum amount of homeland security course credit to graduate or offer homeland security courses as optional electives, thus eventually creating concentrated curriculums that could encourage students to declare a homeland security related major. Private businesses could give preferential credit to DHS-reservists in an attempt to improve infrastructure preparedness. The potential positives from such a program are endless, and all would include citizen preparedness, disaster alertness, and perhaps a more educated public.

Lastly, this thesis will briefly cover the challenges of implementing such a large scale volunteer response program.

²⁶ Korb, "Caught Off Guard" 3.

1. Methodology

To fully conceptualize a “Department of Homeland Security-Reserves” (DHS-R), this thesis investigates gaps in volunteer emergency response efforts to large-scale disasters. I also conducted several interviews with emergency preparedness officials and attended a Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense exercise in which several organizations converge to a large-scale disaster. This thesis focuses on volunteer responses of natural and man-made disasters in order to identify sustainable actions and flaws. Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the various capacities that could contribute to a successful volunteer emergency response and how the applicability of a mobilized DHS-Reserve force could best be used. I reviewed several after action reports and analyze the details of the volunteer responses to fully explore the concept of a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves.

Over the course of this research, I contacted various federal, state, and local emergency response organizations such as the California Office of Homeland Security, the Los Angeles City and County office of Emergency Preparedness, the FEMA/USNORTHCOM liaison, Citizen Corps, FEMA’s Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) program manager, the DoD Homeland Defense Policy Office, and the founders of the Community Emergency Response Teams. I also interviewed Mr. Frank Borden and Mr. Bob Lee, founders of the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT). They provided me with valuable information as to how they implemented a successful volunteer program. I also met with the Mr. Ellis Stanley, General Manager of Emergency Preparedness for LA City, who guided my research. I also met with Mr. Bill Carwile of FEMA and Mr. Charles Adams of DHS, whose homeland security expertise and experience played a key role in my final analysis.

Finally, there is no doubt that Department of Defense resources improve and supplement national response capabilities. Currently, DoD is the only federal department with supporting responsibilities in each of the fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of the National Response Plan.²⁷ However, it is not wise to rely so heavily on

²⁷ House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 202.

DoD efforts alone, especially as the war on terror continue to exhaust federal and state personnel and resources. Therefore, creating or unifying emergency response assets could effectively fill potential gaps, greatly increasing national response capabilities.

II. EXISTING VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS AND GAPS IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

The United States has a rich history of volunteers answering the call of civil-service duty. “Minute Men,” “Citizen Soldiers,” “Deputized Citizens,” “Volunteer Fire and Policemen,” “Auxiliaries,” “Cadets” and “Reservists” are all community volunteers of emergency and first responder organizations. While “Good Samaritans” often help out in spontaneous situations, the deliberate preparation and planning to have a group of trained ready and capable volunteers in reserve is not as defined, except maybe for military, police, and fire forces. Additionally, the degree of training required is distinctly different for “first responders” who arrive at an incident in the first 24-48 hours, as opposed to “recovery responders,” who arrive after the first 48 hours of an incident. This leads to the notion that a formalized volunteer response organization with multiple levels of training and capabilities is beneficial to mitigate future man-made and natural disasters.

The Department of Homeland Security does not directly address a concerted volunteer effort; instead it provides limited support for volunteer initiatives like Citizen Corps, which can be improved by a more concerted nation-wide effort like a DHS-R. Additionally, there are many disparate volunteer response efforts managed at every level of the government. This chapter will focus on existing volunteer emergency response organizations and identify gaps by analyzing several after action reports and investigating emergency response operations. Although there are many public and private organizations dedicated to emergency response, this chapter will highlight the most widely known and used organizations: the U.S. National Guard (USNG), the newly developed Citizen Corps, the Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE), the American Red Cross, and the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT). The organizational chart below depicts these organizations and indicates the parent organization of each volunteer unit.

<u>Emergency Response Assets</u>			
<u>Service/Agency</u>	<u>Reserve (Volunteers)</u>	<u>Auxiliary</u>	<u>Youth Programs</u>
<u>Department of Defense (DoD)</u>			
Army	U.S. Army Reserve & State National Guards		Scout Programs
Navy	Navy Reserve	Power Squadron	Sea-Scouts
Marine Corps	Marine Reserve		Devil Pups
Air Force	USAF Reserve & State Air Guards	Civil Air Patrol (CAP)	CAP Cadets
<u>Department of Homeland Security (DHS)</u>			
Coast Guard (CG)	CG Reserve	CG Auxiliary	Sea Scouts
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)			
Citizen Corps			
Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE)			
<u>Volunteers: Federal, State and Local</u>			
American Red Cross			
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)			
Police and Fire volunteers			
Search and Rescue Teams			

Table 1. Major volunteer organizations and parent units.

A. THE U.S. NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMED FORCES-RESERVES

Pulling residents from rooftops, out of attics, and directly from the water, the men and women of the Louisiana National Guard were there, saving thousands of lives.

— Major General Bennett C. Landreneau
Select Committee hearing on Hurricane Katrina

The Armed Forces and specifically the National Guard, undoubtedly has one of the most comprehensive reserve programs established. Although the U.S. National

Guard and Armed Forces Reserves are a military organization, its members must still volunteer and take an oath to serve when needed. Since its inception in 1636 as “citizen soldiers,” the National Guard has responded to natural and man made disasters, however never has there been a time in history when their motto, “Always ready, always there,” has been more challenged than by today’s impending war requirements.

The National Guard’s role has drastically evolved from aiding the victory in the Revolutionary war to providing imminent service in response to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. What began as a precautionary force against standing armies that permeated the colonies has expanded to a versatile military force that is now called up by state governors’ several hundred times each year. The National Guard is unique because of its dual-mission acting as a wartime-ready force and as a first military responder in times of domestic crisis. Its federal mission is to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergencies, or as otherwise needed. Its state mission is to provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state law. Its responsibilities include preparing for and responding to whatever nature presents including; floods, fires, hurricanes, earthquakes as well as miscellaneous events such as epidemics and domestic acts of destruction.

In order to be capable to respond to such occurrences, Guardsmen complete a standardized curriculum of training and attend sustainment training sessions once a month and two weeks each year. Coined as “weekend warriors,” these men and women maintain professional civilian careers during the week, virtually wearing a suit and tie Monday through Friday, and camouflage fatigues on the weekend. Their monthly and annual trainings usually consist of basic soldier skills and individual job proficiency. Each Guardsman has a specific occupational specialty and is trained accordingly to the level of their rank. Additionally, each person is issued a standard identification, uniform, and job skill. Most National Guard units are categorized by duty description and capability. For instance, a California civil engineer unit is specially trained and equipped to work on civil engineer projects throughout the state of California. Consequently, this type of unit is more likely to be activated to respond to certain natural disasters, such as the New Orleans response and recovery efforts during Hurricane Katrina.

The National Guard's recruitment is also unique since it recruits, trains, and maintains its forces in the same community. Since the National Guard is mainly responsible for protecting state lines, the soldiers that volunteer to serve are usually derived from their respective state and local communities. Although both the active reserve components of the Army are struggling to meet recruitment goals, the Guard has created a new incentive program that offers guard members up to \$2,000 for bringing new recruits into the organization. Soldier who participate in this program typically recruit their family, friends and neighbors for their same hometown unit²⁸. They are residents who want to serve their country and state while still living a "normal" life. The fact that the Guard recruits their members from their respective communities has a direct impact on the institution itself and the community where they are from, which indirectly fosters public opinion; essentially bringing the war on terror to the homes and communities of the guardsmen activated. This effect creates a sense of 'nationalism' since the people responding to incidents or going off to war are fathers, daughters, teachers, and other community members that often leave obvious voids in the community. It is now common for family members to serve in the same theater since many members are from the same hometown unit. This phenomenon also helps the National Guard maintain a positive image amongst the population.

Historically, participation in the National Guard or Reserve forces required little to no time away from home and the original workplace. This notion began to fade in 1991 when more than 250,000 guard and reservists were activated for the Persian Gulf.²⁹ Today, more than a quarter of a million members of the U.S. National Guard have served in Afghanistan and/or Iraq.³⁰ Some members have served multiple tours turning their nine-to-five office job and one weekend a month into a twenty-four hour, twelve month overseas deployment. Although this type of prolonged commitment would otherwise

²⁸ Michelle Tan, "Little time, big demand; Reserve chief looks to optimize deployment training," *Army Times*, June 4, 2007, 26.

²⁹ Eric Yoder, "National Guard and Army Reserve Incentives; Guard, Reserve Employment Rights," *Washington Post*, June 25, 2004, 1.

³⁰ Larry Minear, "The U.S. Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror: The National Guard experience," Feinstein International Center, September 2007, 3.

jeopardize their civilian jobs, each member of the National Guard is protected under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act³¹ of 1940. This Act protects part-time service members' rights and their employee privileges against adverse employment actions associated with an employee's extended active duty deployment. Other benefits that activated reservists receive include medical, dental, and full-time monetary compensation. Some are even awarded special bonuses and reimbursements for travel. Those on stand by, receive educational tuition assistance, certain discounts, and part-time pay, which equates to their regular pay pro-rated for the amount of time they work. Those with 20 years of service are eligible for military retirement and veterans' disability compensation. The monetary costs of maintaining a ready-reserve force is unlimited considering the inherent mission of the Department of Defense. The National Guard and Reserves manages to maintain ready, trained, equipped and capable forces at a significantly reduced cost than their active duty counterparts. Typically, one Reserve/Guard person costs 20% to 25% of what it costs to employ an active duty military person. Theoretically, the nation can employ four or five reservists for the salary of one active duty person. The Military Reserves are a unique component of the Department of Defense that allow it to maintain a substantial ready-reserve force for both domestic and overseas missions — all while staying with DoD fiscal constraints. Clearly, this capability is currently exercised as National Guardsmen and Reservists continue to be activated in support of the global war on terror.

The National Guard and Reserve forces are going through a transformation process, which has exposed some problematic circumstances. Most Army Guard units are not combat-ready in terms of personnel and equipment.³² According to Army Reserve Chief, Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, “we’re getting units ready just in time to go.” Perhaps one of the biggest problems stems from “cross-leveling,” which is a policy that fills unit personnel and equipment shortages from other not-currently deployed units. An example of this is a California National Guard transportation unit that had only seven

³¹ Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, <http://www.osc.gov/userra.htm> accessed on October 29, 2007, 38 U.S.C. § 4301.

³² William H. McMichael, “The fight to fix the Guard and Reserves; commission, lawmakers at odd over solutions to myriad problems,” *Army Times*, March 19, 2007, 34.

of the soldiers required for mobilization and had to draw 163 Reservists from a total of 65 units from 49 locations.³³ Since Guard and Reserve units are tight-knit and usually from the same community, cross-leveling greatly degrades the unit cohesion and effectiveness. National Guard leaders, including Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, director of the Army National Guard, confirm “that breaking up units and cross-leveling soldiers eats away at unit cohesion and damages unit readiness.”³⁴ Despite these problems, a recent panel discussion led by General Charles Campbell, the commander of the Forces Command, outlined the need for the Guard and Reserve to become operational forces, a huge generational shift from their traditional role as a strategic ready-reserve force.³⁵ Campbell argued that the demand for troops in the “generational conflict,” of Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the supply, making it critical to use the Guard and Reserve forces to meet the needs of commanders in theater.

Today, National Guard and Reserve units continue to fill active duty voids. Most recently, the Department of Defense announced that eight Army National Guard brigades have been alerted for deployment — seven bound for Iraq and one bound for Afghanistan, equaling more than 21,000 troops.³⁶ As of May 2007, the 144,202 U.S. force members in Iraq included 23,534 members of the National Guard or Reserves.³⁷ In addition to supporting the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, these forces must remain available and ready on the home front as first responders to domestic natural or man-made disasters as part of their homeland defense mission to support federal, state, and local authorities.

³³ McMichael, “The fight to fix the Guard and Reserves,” 34.

³⁴ Michelle Tan, “Tapping the Guard; call-up sends 21,000 soldiers to fill active duty void,” *Army Times*, October 29, 2007, 8.

³⁵ Tan, “Guard, Reserve set to take on a large new role,” *Army Times*, October 22, 2007, 22.

³⁶ Tan, “Tapping the Guard,” 8.

³⁷ Minear, “The U.S. Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror,” 17.




Table 2. National Guard Deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq, September 2001-June 2007³⁸

B. CITIZEN CORPS

Citizen Corps is a federal volunteer organization that brings community and government leaders together to involve community members in all-hazards community preparedness, planning, mitigation, response and recovery. The mission of Citizen Corps is to harness the power of every individual through education, training, and volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds. Originally created under the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Grants and Training, it has recently moved to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Citizen Corps has many of the same qualities that a DHS-Reserve program could integrate. Citizen Corps is already a derivative of the Department of Homeland Security and one of the only comprehensive efforts to link federal, state, and local governments with non-government organizations to achieve emergency preparedness. The program acknowledges that citizens must take an active responsibility in their communities and

³⁸ Minear, “The U.S. Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror,” 17.

may have to respond to local emergencies. Therefore, Citizen Corps takes an active role in planning, educating, and training citizens across the United States, at over 2,100 citizen corps councils, and establishing several private and volunteer partnerships and affiliates at all levels of government. Some of the prominent partners include the Medial Reserve Corps, the Fire Corps, the Volunteers in Police Service, and the American Red Cross. Post-Hurricane Katrina, many Citizen Corps volunteers worked side-by-side with Red Cross to give aid to those families in need.³⁹ The following table illustrates the major partnerships and affiliates associated with Citizen Corps.



Figure 1. Major Partnerships and Affiliates of Citizen Corps (From ⁴⁰).

Citizen Corps currently has 2,281 councils in every state across the U.S. and annexed territories. Figure 2 depicts the vast spread of Citizen Corps councils at the local and state level. Each council has responsibilities which include coordination between

³⁹ “Citizen Corps Newsletter; March 2007,” <http://www.citizencorps.gov/pdf/newsletter/cc-newsletter-march2007.pdf>, accessed on September 17, 2007, 4.

⁴⁰ Citizen Corps Programs & Partners, “Citizen Corps Overview,” http://www.citizencorps.gov/doc/2007_nccp/CitizenCorpsOverview.pdf, accessed November 1, 2007, 20.

C. DISASTER ASSISTANCE EMPLOYEES

The Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) program is another program managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. These employees are temporarily hired under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, which is designed to bring orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state and local governments. This Act allows FEMA the ability to federally fund and coordinate government wide relief efforts to domestic emergencies. Therefore, FEMA has the ability to hire DAEs for various purposes at specific locations to mitigate emergencies both as they happen and in recovery efforts.

Disaster Assistance Employees, sometimes called FEMA's "reservists," perform response and recovery activities, usually at sites in disaster damaged areas. Although there are several categories of DAE employment ranging from permanent-temporary (40-hrs/week) to intermittent-temporary (on-call) and part-time temporary, each vary in skill level and work required. Some jobs are event specific and require short lengths of employment while others require an initial appointment of up to one-year and may be renewed incrementally each year. DAEs are paid an equitable salary based on the type of work they perform.

FEMA relies on DAEs to provide critical functions during national emergencies. During hurricane Katrina, DAEs were integral in performing various technical and administrative keys functions.⁴² DAEs greatly contribute to FEMA's ability to assist state and local governments in emergency disasters. DAEs are selected based on their ability to produce high quality work under minimal supervision, often times under pressure in a dynamic work environment. The average DAE already works in an emergency preparedness field or at least has the capability to work in this type of environment.

Although this program deals with emergency response and recovery efforts, it is distinctly different from a DHS-R program since its employees are not voluntary and all

⁴² Frank Eloses, Disaster Assistance employee during Hurricane Katrina, personal interview on July 11, 2007.

DAEs must be U.S. citizens. DAEs are often summonsed on short notice and must be prepared to relocate to emergency sites for long periods. Most Disaster Assistance Employees are on a 24-hr recall time which makes it hard for them to maintain regular working hours, thus making the DAE program available to a specific population pool.

D. THE AMERICAN RED CROSS

The American Red Cross is perhaps the most famous volunteer organization in world and in the United States. Its Congressional Charter and fundamental structure under the International Red Cross organization, enables it to provide relief and comfort to victims of natural or man-made disasters. It is strictly a non-governmental voluntary organization with international and national support.

Red Cross response teams are among the first to arrive at a disaster, often provide emergency assistance to victims and support other first-responders. At the Pentagon attacks of 9/11, after the terrorist attack victims were evacuated, they transitioned to providing medical care and assistance for on-scene first responders. The organization's unique structure and blood services enables it to reach multiple and distant communities. Its rich history and experience in disaster preparedness and response is an asset to all levels of government.⁴³

The Red Cross provides aid to victims and their families during and after disasters. The core mission is to assist victims by enabling them to resume their normal daily activities as soon as possible. The disaster relief services focuses on meeting people's immediate disaster-related needs. Each year, the American Red Cross responds to more than 70,000 disasters and accidents including home fires, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, transportation accidents, explosions, and other domestic natural and man-made disasters⁴⁴. The Red Cross provides shelters, food, health, and mental services to victims in need. Additionally, the Red Cross also

⁴³ "America's Disasters 2004; meeting the challenge," available at <http://www.redcross.org/pubs/dspubs/amdisasters2004.pdf>, accessed on October 27, 2007, 4.

⁴⁴ American Red Cross Disaster Services, http://redcross.org/services/disaster/0,1082,0_319_00.html, accessed on October 27, 2007, 1

provides food and shelters for emergency workers, blood services and supplies to disaster victims, and valuable resource-information to victims that need additional services beyond the disaster. The Red Cross also handles inquiries from family members outside the disaster area.

In response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the Red Cross mobilized more than 233,000 workers, mostly volunteers, to the Gulf Coast region for the largest humanitarian response to a domestic natural disaster in American Red Cross history.⁴⁵ Then in the 2007 California Fires, the Red Cross mobilized close to 7,000 workers and volunteers to the help in the largest evacuation of California history. The Red Cross provided imminent services to victims that were evacuated and to those that lost their belongings. The Red Cross served meals and snacks, as well as set up shelters for many of the displaced victims. In the aftermath of the fires, the Red Cross continues to offer other types of support to the victims and their families.

Often times a disaster's impact is felt long after the initial event. For this, the Red Cross has emotional and psychological services available to disaster recovery victims. This is a very important piece of disaster recovery that is often overlooked. For many victims, the post stress trauma is just as intense as the physical damage. After Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross deployed nearly 4,600 licensed health and mental professionals to the scene to help victims cope with their losses.⁴⁶ Assisting these victims mentally is equally as vital as the monetary or physical support they receive. Clearly the American Red Cross makes significant strides to help Americans in need.

E. COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS (CERTS)

Community Emergency Response Teams were founded by Chief Frank Borden of the Los Angeles Fire Department. Chief Borden responded to Mexico City's 1985 earthquake as part of a U.S. assessment team. Chief Borden and other member of the

⁴⁵ Citizen Corps Newsletter; March 2007, 4.

⁴⁶ "The Face of Recovery; The American Red Cross Response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma-Two Year Report," http://www.redcross.org/static/file_cont6989_lang0_2850.pdf, accessed on October 29, 2007, 6.

team were amazed at the community response efforts in which spontaneous volunteers saved over 800 lives. As part of the disaster response, 100 untrained-volunteers also lost their lives while attempting to save others. The lessons learned from the Mexico City disaster and the surprising volunteer efforts convinced Chief Borden that Los Angeles should develop a plan to help themselves. Los Angeles developed a pilot program in 1986 to train volunteers in emergency response functions so that volunteers could effectively help in disaster scenarios⁴⁷.

Today, the CERT program serves state and local communities across America. The program has evolved drastically since 1986- first in 1993, when FEMA chose to adopt the CERT program and curriculum in order to make it available to communities nationwide, and then in 2002 when CERT became an affiliate of Citizen Corps. As of 2004, each state had Community Emergency Response Teams, as well as three U.S. territories, and even six foreign countries.⁴⁸

The CERT program educates people about disaster preparedness and encourages them to take a more active role in emergency preparedness. This program is one of the first grass-root organizations to enlist community members in their own preparedness, response and recovery efforts. Although Los Angeles was already a strong “neighborhood watch” community, this program brought people “out of their homes” to help each other out. As a result, Los Angeles runs one of the most comprehensive CERT programs in America through its fire department. Although each CERT varies by location, level of training and number of teams, all CERT graduates complete the same basic curriculum.

The CERT curriculum and training is open to anyone over the age of 18 and is free of charge. The curriculum consists of various levels of emergency response and first aid courses. The basic national CERT curriculum includes disaster preparedness, fire suppression (most used), disaster medical operations, multi-casualty triage and treatment,

⁴⁷ Frank Borden (Chief-Ret.), Los Angeles Fire Department and founder of the Community Emergency Response Teams, personal interview on August 17, 2007.

⁴⁸ “Community Emergency Response Teams; What is CERT,” <http://www.cert-la.com/WhatIsCert.htm>, accessed on October 31, 2007.

search and rescue, disaster psychology, disaster simulation and an overview of terrorism. Some regions add location-specific training tailored to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and terrorism. Los Angeles-based CERTs incorporate the American Red Cross's 50-hour "Emergency Response Advanced First Aid" certification as part of their advanced CERT curriculum. Regardless of location, the mere fact that citizens are coming together on their own to increase their disaster preparedness illustrates that people are willing to volunteer even if it means being put in harm's way. Perhaps an established CERT program during the Mexico City earthquake could have circumvented the loss of the 100 brave volunteers.

F. GAPS IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

This portion of this thesis will analyze various after action reports and studies dealing with emergency response operations to Hurricane Katrina and the Pentagon attacks of 9/11. It is not meant to criticize any particular organization or belittle their purpose or diminish the heroic acts of the many volunteers who often risk their lives to save others.

1. Hurricane Katrina

The 2005 Hurricane season caused so much damage, human suffering, and devastation that the name Katrina, Rita, and Wilma will never again be used for any future tropical storm.⁴⁹ These hurricanes also exposed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the emergency response system and volunteer organizations.

a. National Guard

The National Guard is unique in its versatility to fight our nation's wars while, at the same time, respond to domestic emergencies when they are called. This characteristic has become a point of contention across the U.S. as to when to use this part-time military force, especially after 9/11 since the Guard is caught in the middle of

⁴⁹ "From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross Actions to Improve and Enhance its Disaster Response and Related Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond," http://www.redcross.org/static/file_cont5448_lang0_2006.pdf, accessed October 29, 2007, 3.

committing members and equipment to the war on terror and, at the same time, maintain a ready-reserve force prepared to respond to national disasters as outlined in the National Response Plan.

In an effort to learn from the past, the U.S. House of Representatives commissioned a Select Bipartisan Committee to investigate the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. Although the Committee identified failures at all levels of government, this portion of this thesis will only highlight the National Guard's role.

The National Guard contributed heavily to Katrina response efforts including search and rescue operations, commodity distribution, air and ground transportation, and rendering much needed assistance to civilian law enforcement. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest National Guard response to a hurricane had been in 1992 during Hurricane Andrew. By contrast, the National Guard constituted 24% of the military response to Hurricane Andrew as opposed to more than 70% during Hurricane Katrina. The military response to Katrina was so massive, that according to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, "the DoD's response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since the Civil War."⁵⁰ Table 3 shows the exact numbers of military responders to Hurricane Katrina.

⁵⁰ U.S. House of Representatives, "A Failure of Initiative," 201.

Number of National Guard and active Duty Personnel in Joint Operational Area of Hurricane Katrina

Date	National Guard	Active Duty
August 26	2,505	n/a
August 27	2,633	n/a
August 28	4,091	n/a
August 29	7,522	n/a
August 30	8, 573	1,000
August 31	11,003	2,000
September 1	13,113	3,000
September 2	16,928	4,011
September 3	22,624	4,631
September 4	30,188	10,952
September 5	32,760	15,204
September 6	42,990	17,417
September 7	45,420	18,342
September 8	48,560	19,749
September 9	50,116	21,408
September 10	50,116	21,168
September 11	48,045	22,028
September 12	48,280	22,670
September 13	45,791	22,232
September 14	45,063	18,690

SOURCE: NORTHERN COMMAND TIMELINE

Table 3. National Guard and Active Duty members deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina (From⁵¹).

Many of the problems identified with Katrina are categorized by the report as “information gaps,” which are related to communication implications or a lack of information flow, leading to miscommunications and a dire lack of coordination. The report stresses that DoD, DHS, FEMA and the state of Louisiana had trouble coordinating response efforts which slowed the response. In fact, DoD had not yet implemented the lessons learned from prior joint exercises involving military assistance to civil authorities. Many of those lessons learned would have enhanced a federally coordinated Katrina response. DHS also lacked written instruction to help DoD

⁵¹ U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 202.

determine their role and responsibilities during military assistance to civil authority operations. In fact, according to the Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Pete F. Verga, “to my knowledge, no such document exists.”⁵²

Furthermore, DoD lacked an information sharing protocol which would have facilitated joint situational awareness and communications between all military components. The ‘Joint’ Task Force Katrina command and staff also lacked joint training and knowledge of the National Incident Management System, which contributed to the lack of coordination amongst federal components. Lastly, the National Guard and active duty units reported that they had never formally coordinated with Northern Command, who presumably was the lead DoD liaison and bridge between DoD and the civilian counterparts.⁵³ Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of Northern Command, stated that, “during the first four days, no single organization or agency was in charge providing a coordinated effort for rescue operations.”⁵⁴ This undoubtedly led to confusion and perhaps frustrations which led to duplication of efforts between active duty and National Guard units. For example, the 82nd Airborne Division (active duty) moved into a sector that was already occupied and patrolled by the National Guard.⁵⁵ The bipartisan report concluded that Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response.

b. FEMA

The Federal Emergency Management Agency also conducted a review regarding its mission assignments to federal agencies to provide volunteers in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Although the volunteers cited their experience as overwhelmingly rewarding, they also identified several shortcomings and lessons learned. The report itself identified a total of 1,038 volunteers deployed, including 321

⁵² U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative,” 203.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 219.

from fourteen agencies external to DHS. Both FEMA and DHS officials, however, believe that many more volunteers were present than accounted for in FEMA records.⁵⁶ These misgivings could have been prevented if FEMA would have used the proper notification chain, instead of contacting the volunteers directly. Bypassing the parent organization that was originally designated to coordinate response efforts, limited the agency's knowledge and whereabouts of their volunteers, thus hindering the record-keeping process. In some cases, agencies and supervisors were not even aware of their volunteer's deployment.

Volunteers also mentioned that loose coordination led to misunderstandings and confusion about which expenses were reimbursable, the type of work or skills needed, and other administrative and logistical type concerns. As large numbers of volunteers began to show up to the vicinity of the disaster, lodging and food establishments became scarce because of the displaced victims and lack of prior coordination. One frustrated volunteer said "there is nothing worse than having hundreds of volunteers standing around without anything to do or a place to stay." Volunteers also mentioned that there was no prior-screening to match skill sets with assignments, which wasted valuable talent and productivity. The examples cited by the report were people with computer skills doing manual labor and those with carpentry skills working in offices. There was no attempt to seek out those with bilingual language skills, psychological counseling qualifications, or other critical talents. Pre-identifying volunteers and matching them to potential assignments could benefit an emergency response when time is critical. FEMA's report concluded that it should follow proper protocol when requesting volunteers and that it should compile a database of volunteers with critical skills, knowledge, abilities, and relevant training.

c. Citizen Corps

Citizen Corps conducted five national surveys after Hurricane Katrina. The results highlighted many key elements that must be addressed prior to another mass-casualty incident such as Hurricane Katrina. The following lessons learned are a

⁵⁶ Richard L. Skinner (Inspector General), "FEMA's Volunteer Service Program following Hurricane Katrina," June 7, 2007, 1.

summary from the final review.⁵⁷ Four out of the five surveys confirm that the events of Hurricane Katrina have not increased the level of citizen preparedness, while the fifth survey claims that the level of preparedness has actually decreased. The review also concluded that people with disabilities or those caring for people with disabilities are a great disadvantage during a disaster. The surveys also confirmed the existence of an income gap in the level of preparedness and that race only plays a minor role in preparedness. Finally and perhaps the lesson with the largest implications is the fact that the events of Hurricane Katrina have tarnished the image and trust that Americans have in the government's ability to respond effectively to a disaster. These lessons learned from these surveys verify the need for a federally coordinated emergency response capability.

d. Red Cross

At the completion of the 2005 hurricane season, the Red Cross conducted an internal investigation and analysis in an effort to improve their disaster response and capabilities. The following highlights are taken from the results of their analysis titled, "From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross actions to improve and enhance its disaster response and related capabilities for the 2006 hurricane season and beyond."

Hurricane Katrina was the first disaster in Red Cross history in which they served one million meals in a single day and provided financial assistance to more than a million American families after a single disaster. Their efforts undoubtedly brought peace of mind to many residents; however "it is equally true that some issues that came to light were the result of poor coordination by the Red Cross with its partners or because of weakened systems that had not been sufficiently modernized to accommodate the catastrophic proportion of the 2005 hurricane relief effort."⁵⁸

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross realizes that it does a good job at "Red Cross-centric" responses; however it must make institutional changes in order to meet future challenges. Some of the other major lessons learned entail

⁵⁷ Citizen Preparedness Review, "A Post-Katrina Assessment," Issue 2, Spring 2006, 1.

⁵⁸ "From Challenge to Action," 4.

accountability and the strengthening of community partnerships. The Red Cross realized that it must do a better job to protect itself against fraud, waste and abuse. Red Cross leadership is concerned that the capability to respond to disasters cannot come at the expense of accountability. Therefore, the Red Cross is implanting “vigorous control measures” to protect itself against vulnerabilities related to waste, fraud, and criminal wrong-doing. Furthermore, it recognizes the need that each disaster is unique in terms of demographics, languages spoken, cultural diversity, economic status, and so on. Therefore, the Red Cross is aligning with certain diverse communities to support a more inclusive diverse response. They see the need to recruit volunteers from minority populated areas in order to better serve these areas in the future. Lastly, the Red Cross is changing their network structure to reach out to communities that have lost or have never had Red Cross services.

2. Pentagon Attacks of 9/11

The coordinated attacks of September 11 have set a standard of preparedness that was once unimaginable. The 9/11 Commission cites that “our” biggest mistake was a lack of imagination that such an attack could occur. The Virginia, Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) was among the first emergency responders at the Pentagon site, and quickly assumed the responsibility of incident commander. This terrorist attack is unique, more so than those at the World Trade Center earlier the same day, because of the multi-jurisdictions involved, the type of target selected, and the large numbers of agencies, volunteer organizations, and individuals from all levels of government that responded. Although the attack occurred in Arlington, Virginia, the facility attacked belonged to the Department of Defense, also located in the vicinity of the nation’s capitol, Washington, DC, and which elicited an increased multi-government response, media attention, and unique considerations and requirements. Nevertheless, the 9/11 Pentagon attacks are often referred to as a successful model of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS), thus evoking what is generally said to be a successful multi-interagency emergency response.

Ironically, the Washington area Council of Governments adopted the NIIMS ICS in March of 2001 and, although the ACFD performed well in responding to the terrorist

attack on the Pentagon, the actual experience of coordinating the multifaceted response proved significantly more challenging than previously envisioned. To gain a better understanding of the events and in order to draw lessons learned, the ACFD conducted an After Action Report (AAR) compiled of countless debriefing sessions, extensive surveys, and general information collected from incident managers, victims, first responders, volunteers, and others that responded to the incident. The following lessons learned are derived from the ACFD's after action report.

Establishing and maintaining command of the Pentagon attack response was extremely difficult and daunting. The chaos at the Pentagon consisted of many people and equipment from multiple organizations from every level of government, volunteer organizations, and good-Samaritans arriving to help. This posed several leadership challenges since the Arlington Fire Department usually consisted of only 260 uniformed personnel. As large amounts of volunteers began to arrive and mingle, it created congestion at the scene. The American Red Cross chapter had 80 trained volunteers at time of the incident; however close to 1,500 Red Cross volunteers showed up from surrounding chapters and the national headquarters, making it extremely difficult to control volunteer movement.⁵⁹ Many agencies reported that the massive volumes of volunteer response overwhelmed them. The ACFD acknowledged that it should strengthen its volunteer coordination to ensure personal capabilities are matched with potential response employment without interfering with official emergency organizations. The ACFD recommended that a central location with a single coordinator should coordinate and match certain skills sets with disaster requirements. Standards should be established to quickly evaluate and classify volunteers wanting to help in emergency situations.

The multi-agency response also complicated the situation. The institutional dissimilarities, training, and agency-lingo differences created unfamiliar protocols which slowed the emergency response. The military responders were unfamiliar with the ICS

⁵⁹ Arlington County After-Action Report, "The Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon," A-50.

and initially tended to operate unilaterally.⁶⁰ ICS worked well for local responders, but the overall response was uncoordinated with the on-scene Incident Command. Another challenge that was brought to light was the complicated management of the multiple communications systems. Confusion among fire brigades and other response agencies stemmed from incompatible communications equipment. Issues included different service providers, megahertz wattages, short-range versus long-range walkie-talkies, and other various inconsistencies, which led to confusion and incomplete or wrong information flow. Vital information such as orders to evacuate a building or to block street intersections was not effectively communicated. This same communication flaw was also evident the World Trade Center, Hurricane Katrina, and even during the recent Southern California fires.

G. CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined only some of the many volunteer emergency response capabilities and the challenges that each face during disasters. While each organization offers unique response assets, it is entirely possible that there may be too many organizations. One concerted effort may in fact effectively mitigate the challenges and coordinate volunteers in order to maximize a volunteer emergency response. Since the mission of the Armed Forces and the Department of Homeland Security are both sensitive to national security, the same level of importance should be given to a DHS-Reserve program as the DoD-Reserves. The following chapter will compile the characteristics of current emergency response organizations and the lessons learned in this chapter in order to offer insight into what a potential DHS-Reserves organization could most likely look like.

⁶⁰ Arlington County After-Action Report, B-9.

III. THE PROPOSED DHS-RESERVES PROGRAM AND UNIFICATION OF EFFORTS

Investing in education and training for homeland security course-work around the country is investing in a more secure future for America; these programs are vital in preparing the nation for dealing with all types of disasters.

— DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff

The previous chapter demonstrated that there are numerous disparate volunteer response efforts. Since these efforts vary greatly in training and by region, this chapter will conceptualize and explore the idea of unifying such efforts under one federal umbrella. Although the Department of Homeland Security already acts as a federal parent unit with its subordinate organizations, a DHS-Reserves program could vitalize a national volunteer movement while encouraging “homeland security” at the personal level and provide the nation with a national service system similar to those in other countries. There are currently several members of Congress and the Senate advocating citizens to get involved in matters of homeland security and several members have already called for the development of a mandatory national service system. Therefore, unifying some or all of the current volunteer organizations under one federal entity could enhance emergency response capabilities and coordination, while establishing a federal volunteer-service system.

After the Pentagon attack, in which massive amounts of volunteers swarmed the incident, the ACFD recommended that a central location with a single coordinator should coordinate and match certain skills sets with disaster requirements. Standards should be established to quickly evaluate and classify volunteers wanting to help in emergency situations.⁶¹ This chapter will conceptualize how a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could serve as a central coordinating entity and establish the above standards. Although, this chapter will not discuss specific details of such organization; it will discuss possible curriculums, standardized credentials, possible target audiences and the

⁶¹ Arlington County After-Action Report, B-11 and B-17.

capabilities it could provide. Additionally, because this type of organization may place individuals in sensitive areas vital to national or homeland security, it would need to outline the type of individuals that could best fit such an organization. A DHS-R may need to screen individuals to determine if they could be trusted in a homeland security environment. Lastly, this chapter will investigate the types of incentives that would most likely generate participation and describe the types of assets that a concerted emergency response organization could offer to incident commanders and decision makers *on the ground* during a crisis.

A. CURRICULUM AND STANDARDIZED TRAINING

1. Existing Homeland Security Programs

As the field of *homeland security* continues to evolve and define itself, it is important to establish a frame of reference in order to cast curriculums and training to build subject matter expertise. By default, the Department of Homeland Security is the principal authority of this emerging field. Although parallel organizations and related fields contribute to the study and practice of ‘homeland security,’ DHS via its Secretary and by direction of the President of United States, serves as the primary authority to synchronize homeland security education and training programs.

Although DHS, FEMA, and Citizen Corps do not have a formal volunteer curriculum or training academy, they do provide various guidelines for emergency response training. DHS has officially recognized the Community Emergency Response Team curriculum as a valid training resource and as a partner of Citizen Corps, however there are nearly 1,800 homeland security courses offered at over 227 schools nationwide.⁶² The evolving academic field of homeland security is in a “pre-paradigm phase as a professional discipline.”⁶³ Therefore, it does not appear that the homeland security academic environment has matured to the point that common core requirements

⁶² Jon Rollins, “The Homeland Security Academic Environment; a review of current activities and issues for consideration,” September 2007, 12.

⁶³ Christopher Bellavita and Ellen M. Gordon, “Changing Homeland Security: Teaching the Core,” *Homeland Security Affairs II*, No. 1, April 2006.

are taught at any level of education. The homeland security academic discipline is an evolving ungoverned process made up of a mixture of pre-9/11 courses and post-9/11 lessons learned. The Department of Homeland Security primarily outsources its education and training development system to other institutions and universities using broad national objectives and doctrines.

The DHS Office of Grants and Training has established the Homeland Security National Training Program (HSNTP). This program provides funding through cooperative and inter-agency agreements with the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and Continuing and Emerging training providers for the purposes of the development and delivery of all-hazards training for federal, state, local, and tribal emergency responders. This program in conjunction with the Competitive Training Grant Program solicits applicants to design, develop and deliver training content in accordance with DHS doctrine guidance and approved national homeland security strategies. This program awards funds to competitively selected applicants for innovative training programs that support training initiatives that are national in scope and further the DHS mission of preparing the nation to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism and catastrophic events. Since its inception, the HSNTP has funded more than \$521.5 million to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, national associations, higher education institutions, non-profit organizations, and the private sector.⁶⁴ The Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security which has been awarded \$15,700,000⁶⁵ in DHS funding for a wide range of programs focusing on assisting leaders in Homeland Defense and Security to develop policies, strategies, and organizations needed for emergency preparedness and to defeat terrorism in the United States. Since 2002, NPS's CHDS has developed a fully accredited Masters Degree program and the nation's first and largest digital homeland security research library. Given the CHDS' time in the homeland security academic environment, its established homeland security

⁶⁴ Homeland Security Pressroom, "DHS announces \$113 million for National Preparedness Training Initiatives," http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1191003660041.shtm, accessed on November 13, 2007.

⁶⁵ Homeland Security Pressroom, "Fiscal Year 2007 National Training Program Award List," http://www.dhs.gov/xgovt/grants/gc_1191007545459.shtm, accessed on November 14, 2007.

networks, the use of its graduate program as a model for other universities, and its collaboration with DHS, many institutions look to CHDS for guidance on homeland security academic issues, thus becoming the nation's premier provider of homeland security graduate and executive level education.⁶⁶

The DHS University System is another educational program that was recently established to address training and education efforts for current DHS employees at various academic institutions nationwide. It also offers grants to individuals who intend to work in homeland security-related fields. Employees can attend both resident and non-resident courses, distant learning, and independent study programs. Some programs are web-based, while others are in-class. Most of these courses are taught at the federal and state levels, while the CERT curriculums concentrate on local level responders. Another type of curriculum that not only expands the homeland security paradigm, but also attempts to bridge a civil-military gap is the United States Military Academy's newly established education-minor. West Point has recently developed a minor in terrorism studies that encompasses homeland security courses. This step is vital and ground breaking in that it teaches future military officers key components of homeland security that they can use as military responders or in support of civil authorities in an emergency disaster. The West Point homeland security curriculum emphasizes key concepts and 'civilian' strategies that many of the lessons learned highlighted that military responders were not familiar with. Students are expected to learn about the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System and Incident Command System, interagency processes, critical 'homeland security' infrastructures, the DHS organization, and homeland security budgetary and border security issues; all of which future military officers should be knowledgeable of, when encountering a homeland security/defense environment. This curriculum helps bridge the gaps between military and civilian first responders and incident management.

Therefore, it is very apparent that there is a plethora of homeland security academic and training programs. Although there is not one defined or recognized

⁶⁶ Rollins, "The Homeland Security Academic Environment," 15.

approved program, perhaps a hybrid of the current programs could establish an effective training foundation for volunteer first responders and recovery workers.

2, Propose New Program of Study

Instead of outsourcing homeland security education and training curriculums, DHS could establish a standardized approved curriculum or web-based academy for volunteer first responders. A standard DHS volunteer curriculum could address the realities that confront the modern first responder and recovery worker. It would need to prioritize the nation's homeland security training requirements and objectives in order to equip its volunteers with the necessary learning objectives and tools to respond to an emergency in a hectic environment.

During a recent Homeland Security exercise in Hawaii, volunteer medical professionals pointed out that there should be a standardized procedure and training on how to set up an Acute Care Unit (ACU), since the volunteers all came from different hospitals, had varied backgrounds and learned different methods of how to set up an ACU. A DHS volunteer-academy could establish a baseline level of competency to eliminate confusion among volunteer responders. It could also mature into a foundation that decision makers, incident commanders, and other homeland security leaders could become familiar with. The curriculum could encompass the current core courses of CERT and also include the National Incident Management System, the Incident Command System, Fire and Search and Rescue, Basic First Aid, and the Standard Operating Procedures and administrative policies of a DHS-Reserves organization. It could also include an advanced portion for those interested in advanced relevant training standards, like advanced life support, hazardous material awareness, terrorist threats, and Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) threats. A DHS-approved academy could establish a standardized curriculum for other emergency response agencies to follow.

The curriculum itself could be administered to volunteers in a variety of methods. Although formal education and training requirements increase volunteer time demands and could become cumbersome, the courses could be web-based or by correspondence.

Volunteers in rural areas could conduct individual web-based training virtually anywhere from remote locations. Those volunteers in populated areas could report to each state's Office of Homeland Security as part of their monthly or annual training requirements. This type of formal education system could also establish competencies at various levels of training, thus categorizing or ranking each individual by the amount of training they have completed. It is possible that an individual's level of training, rank, and pay-grade could be displayed on a standard identification card. As the homeland security discipline continues to mature, it is possible that a DHS-Reserve program could help to identify homeland security areas of focus that could shape program commonalities, core teaching areas, and standardize future homeland security curriculums and volunteer-academies.

B. STANDARDIZED CREDENTIALS

1. Eliminate Fraud and Identify Level of Competency

A DHS-R program could also establish a national volunteer registry to track all volunteers, not only those in DHS, but those in other volunteer programs as well that could assist in an emergency. This could lead to the establishment of a standardized credential system for emergency response volunteers that would be recognized across all levels of government during a disaster. Currently, volunteer organizations are not required to issue identification cards. Those that do issue them, are only recognized by the issuing authority, thus making volunteers obtain multiple credentials to access different areas or jurisdictions, which could result in the inconvenience and cost of obtaining multiple credentials. Incident Commanders often stress the importance of strengthening access control points in secure areas. Perhaps it would be wise to consider using biometric access control systems to verify identification of volunteer emergency responders, especially if not wearing a standard-issue uniform during a disaster. Notwithstanding the use of biometrics, it is still important and perhaps necessary to standardize a volunteer credential for first responders in order to mitigate the threat of terrorists and other unauthorized persons from accessing secure areas during an already

chaotic disaster. Therefore, creating a common identification credential that could be used and recognized by all levels of authority is essential for an effective and efficient emergency response.

On September 11, first responders swarmed to the scenes of the terrorists attacks. As chaos ensued, incident commands had a difficult time ensuring only credentialed responders had access to the sensitive areas of the scene. In the midst of fires, victim's screams, and emergency response assets moving around, one firefighter at the Pentagon attacks wondered if a volunteer firefighter tee-shirt was the only required identification.⁶⁷ Arlington County Director of Emergency Management, Robert P. Griffin said "during our 9/11 response, we learned that secure credentialing of first responders is essential to being able to efficiently provide critical emergency services."⁶⁸ Arlington County realized after the Pentagon attacks that it should work with neighboring jurisdictions, other emergency response agencies and volunteer organizations to implement a uniform identification system.⁶⁹ The report recommended that such a system could be initially used until a more comprehensible credential process is established for large scale emergencies. Remarkably, nearly six years later, Arlington County has developed the nation's first- first responder credential.

⁶⁷ Arlington County After-Action Report, A-40.

⁶⁸ "Arlington First in Nation to Issue New First Responder Credentials," <http://www.arlingtonva.us/Departments/Communications/10029.aspx> on October 31, 2007.

⁶⁹ Arlington County After-Action Report, C-28.



Figure 3. Example of First Responder Authentication Credential (FRAC)

The new first responder authentication ID cards manifested out of the First Responder Partnership Initiative, which includes the Department of Homeland Security (National Capital Region), the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Initiative itself grew out of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), which outlines a policy to enhance security, increase government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by establishing a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the federal government to its employees and contractors.⁷⁰ The new identification card, known as the First Responder Authentication Credentials or FRAC, closely resembles the Common Access Card (CAC) currently used by the Department of Defense. The FRAC has been issued to more than 1,400 emergency services workers already. These cards are each encoded with critical data that enables incident commanders at the scene of an emergency to authenticate the responder’s credentials by scanning the card’s internal content chip. The card has the ability to securely maintain emergency responder’s privacy data, verify first responders’

⁷⁰ “Arlington First in Nation to Issue New First Responder Credentials,” 1.

qualifications and specialized skills, and enhance cooperation between multiple-agencies. The new authentication cards revolutionize emergency management in that it allows incident commanders to match certain skill sets with vital jobs at the scene and properly track their whereabouts. Virginia's pilot program marks the first time that state and local emergency responders have received the federally approved credential across an entire county involving multiple Emergency Support Functions.⁷¹

Another potential security threat stems from those individuals who work in secure areas in homeland security arenas. According to the DHS and the Transportation Security Authority (TSA), many individuals that work in secure areas are currently not required to undergo a background check or a stringent identification process in order to access secure areas.⁷² Although TSA established the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program in December 2001, it was not until Congress passed the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006, that it was directed to implement the TWIC program at the 10 highest risk ports.⁷³ The TWIC program ensures that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed access to secure area of the nation's transportation facilities. Although this credential applies primary to workers within the TSA, the principles and characteristics of the TWIC program can be applied to a DHS-R standardized credential.

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential was created to help protect transportation facilities from terrorist threats by issuing identification cards only to workers who do not pose a terrorist threat and allow these workers unescorted access to secure areas of the transportation system. The TWIC program is ultimately intended to support all modes of transportation, however, TSA, in partnership with the Coast Guard, is focusing initial implementation in the maritime sector. Therefore, TSA already began to enroll and issue ID cards to maritime workers in the TWIC program. The estimated \$70 million project is expected to enroll and credential 770,000 workers at 3,200

⁷¹ "Arlington First in Nation to Issue New First Responder Credentials," 1.

⁷² U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Transportation Security, Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program," October 31, 2007, 4.

⁷³ U.S. GAO, "Transportation Security, Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program," 2.

maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels.⁷⁴ This is important to national and homeland security because of the implications that an attack on the transportation system could have. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach estimate that they alone handle approximately 43% of the nation's oceanic cargo. Therefore, any attack on such a large port would be costly. A labor dispute in 2002 shut down West Coast port operations for 10 days, totaling \$1.5 billion in economic loss per day.⁷⁵ A terrorist attack along the same lines could have the same, if not greater impact on the nation's economy.

The TWIC program itself enrolls workers by collecting personal information, including Social Security Number (SSN), address, photograph, and in some cases fingerprints. The TWIC also conducts background checks to ensure individuals do not pose a security threat. Lastly, TSA cross-checks each name with terrorism-watch lists, FBI's criminal history records, and verifies workers' immigration and mental capacity status. This type of credential program will in fact make America's ports and transportation mediums safer. Preventing unauthorized people from entering secured environments is a necessary component of securing the homeland, especially during an emergency disaster response. It is clear that DHS, TSA, and the Arlington County of Virginia have made progress toward credentialing emergency response workers and volunteers. In accordance with HSPD-12, the SAFE Act and other legislative requirements and lessons learned, it is important to identify official and 'non-official' or volunteer emergency responders during a disaster. Doing so, will contribute to an effective and coordination emergency response.

C. TARGET AUDIENCE AND INCENTIVES

This portion will outline the type of individuals and skill sets that can best serve the nation in a homeland security capacity. The target audience for a federal volunteer response program could vary in age, skill and level of commitment. It is necessary and important to match the right type of individuals to such an organization, because of its

⁷⁴ U.S. GAO, "Transportation Security, Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program," 2-3.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

importance to matters of national security. Once screened, a national volunteer program would not only provide the nation with key assets, but also a sense of national pride for those who serve. Since 9/11, individuals seem more willing to give their time to volunteer for emergency services organizations. Although emergency services are the most demanding of volunteer activities, the experience is rewarding and the training requirements offer a personal sense of value. In today's chaotic world, a strong federal support for a volunteer organization is needed in order to legitimize it in the eyes of the public in order to make emergency services the organizations that will attract volunteers.

It is important to create a system that introduces citizens at all levels of their education or career to the homeland security arena. It is crucial to capitalize on individual skills and specialties that citizens already have. In some cases, first responders such as police, doctors, and other professionals are willing to volunteer their time and unique specialties to an emergency response. Although many first responders perform many life-saving duties on a daily basis, rarely, if ever, are all first responders called on to do their jobs at the same time on a massive scale that taxes all their resources. Therefore, it is essential to not only use the existing first responder resources, but also to develop new first responders or unify the current ones into a capable and reliable reserve volunteer response force.

First responders, as the name implies, are those individuals who will respond "first" to any catastrophe, natural or man-made. They are not only police officers and firefighters. They are those who will assist others during crisis by restoring power or drinking water, giving first aid or life-saving medical attention, dispensing much needed pharmaceuticals, putting out fires, searching through rubble for bodies, evacuating victims, giving out meals, and bringing comfort to those in need. For these reasons, first responders are critical in times of need and, as previously discussed in this thesis, their heroic efforts and selfless service save thousands of lives each year. Finding the right people who are dependable and willing to serve as volunteers in a "first responder" capacity, therefore, is crucial to effectively respond to natural and man-made disasters. It is also necessary to develop a quality incentive program in order to recruit and retain dedicated emergency service volunteers.

1. College Students and College Tuition/Loan Repayment

Targeting college-age Americans is beneficial for many reasons. Despite the fact that the majority are young, physically able, and available, most Americans who graduate high school are eager to get involved. This resource would provide a large pool of people that is refreshed each year. Not only would this effort educate young people about homeland security, but it could very well spark further interest in the subject for people to serve elsewhere in related capacities. Focusing on college-age individuals would ensure a steady flow of capable recruits and offer longevity to a DHS-R program.

The increase in tuition, population, and global economy has made college education a privilege for many Americans. According to *U.S. News and World Report*, tuition rose 6 percent in 2006, which is clearly more than the national rate of inflation, income raises, or financial aid increase. The report concludes that if prices keep rising at the current rate, students who do not receive financial aid will be required to pay close to \$115,000 to earn their undergraduate degree, as opposed to thirty years ago, when the average tuition was closer to \$12,000.⁷⁶ The average year at a private university is \$33,000, and some exceed \$50,000 a year. Commuter schools, also known as two-year community colleges, are the best financial choice for most students; however, even if they live at home, their tuition still adds up to \$8,000 a year.⁷⁷ Clearly, higher education is quite costly.

Notwithstanding these facts, higher education still pays. The pay gap between those with a college education and those without continues to widen. Therefore, despite the rising costs associated with a college education, Americans will continue to desire higher education. They will need alternate and more methods to finance it, however, most students find creative ways to pay for college and use several factors as leverage to earn financial aid. A proposed Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could influence participants by helping to offset rising tuition costs, or reduce federal loans, in exchange

⁷⁶ Kim Clark, *College Tuition Keeps Rising*, found in *U.S. News and World Report*, October 24, 2006, 1.

⁷⁷ College Board estimation, *College Tuition Keeps Rising*, found in *U.S. News and World Report*, October 24, 2006, 1.

for volunteer service. As students volunteer to serve in various capacities, they could earn financial aid credits toward tuition or loan repayment. Volunteering for such an organization could also give students leverage to apply for certain federal loan programs or receive additional financial aid. Offering to help students pay for college would not only encourage students to stay in school, but also encourage students to volunteer and serve the nation in a “homeland security” capacity.

The nation’s selective service system also presents an option for participation. This system provides a vital and very important asset to the Armed Forces; however, it may be possible to share the asset while maintaining the same intention. Currently, all men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six are required to register for selective service. The purpose of registration is so that the government can maintain a database of men from which to draw in case of a national emergency requiring rapid expansion of the Armed Forces, thus ensuring that a fair and equitable draft occurs if it is needed.⁷⁸ As former President Clinton informed Congress on May 18, 1994, “

The Selective Service System and draft registration provides a hedge against unforeseen threats and a relatively low cost “insurance policy” against our underestimating the maximum level of threat... As fewer and fewer members of our society have direct military experience, it is increasingly important to maintain the link between the all-Volunteer Force and our society-at-large.

Though a selective service draft has yet to be implemented, this illustrates the need to have a civilian volunteer force on stand by. Failure to register for this program carries a penalty fine up to \$250,000 and/or up to five years in jail. Registration is also a requirement for federal student financial aid, job training, benefits, and most federal employment.

The incentives for college-age Americans who are not enrolled in school nor have any intention to pursue a higher education could include monetary benefits for time served. In addition to serving their nation, these individuals could receive additional training, volunteer to work more than one weekend a month for pay, and be among the

⁷⁸ Selective Service website, <http://www.sss.gov/Default.htm>, accessed on October 20, 2007.

first to be activated for longer periods of time in the case of an emergency. For many young Americans, a sense of responsibility is enough to captivate their attention and gain their participation.

2. Military (Term and Retirees) and Availability to Finish Federal Term in DHS-R

Another untapped resource for homeland security includes prior or retired military personnel. As the war on terror continues to increase op-tempo, many service members are choosing the civilian sector over additional military terms, while others are choosing to retire. The weight of the war has also increased the rate of divorce and the rate of Army desertion by 80%, since 2003.⁷⁹ Furthermore, 54% of the West Point class of 2000 has already left the Army, which is the lowest rate since 1977.⁸⁰ Therefore, it is important to analyze the current trends and identify viable solutions to prevent long-term implications of a stretched-military and a failed volunteer-emergency response. After all, military members are proud, talented, and are already dedicated to providing selfless-service to the nation. Most service members offer unique skills and talents beneficial to a DHS-R program. Many of these men and women already possess relevant qualities, professional skills, a loyal sense of duty, security clearances and, in some cases, valuable emergency response experience and knowledge that can directly benefit DHS and future emergency responses. According to Mr. John E. Stone, current President of the U.S. Freedom Foundation, “there are lots of well-trained military that we aren’t using; they aren’t in it for the money.”⁸¹ Therefore, creating an opportunity for military members to transition to DHS could prove to be a symbiotic relationship, improving the DHS organization, while alleviating some of the military’s societal pressures.

The current policy allows military personnel to carry-over their federal service toward the retirement timeline of any subsequent federal government agency; however,

⁷⁹ Lolita C. Baldor, “Army desertion rates increase 80 percent since Iraq invasion,” *Associated Press*, November 17, 2007.

⁸⁰ Fact Sheet, “The State of the U.S. Army,” 2.

⁸¹ Leslie Carper, “Revitalizing State Reserves,” found in *The Officer*, www.roa.org, November 2007, 1.

there are no formal agreements, and each individual must re-apply to a new federal organization. The current system almost dis-incentivizes military retirees from working in another federal organization by preventing military retirees from using their military time toward earning vacation days in the government service (GS) system. Perhaps an official agreement between DoD and DHS could facilitate a formal transition amongst federal employees that would allow active duty personnel the opportunity to transition their federal service to the Department of Homeland Security or to continue their service in a DHS-Reserves capacity. Creating the opportunity for military members to serve out their federal term as a DHS-reservist, as opposed to a military-reservist can also lead to a highly skilled citizen reserve corps ready to respond to domestic emergencies. However, until a formal agreement is achieved, DHS should specifically recruit military personnel that are transitioning out, or retiring from, the military for specific homeland security purposes.

A creative opportunity to attract military members to DHS or a DHS-Reserves is to review the current military retirement system. Leaders must realize that the military retirement systems may be outdated and perhaps counterproductive to the retention of current members and the recruitment of future ones. Although it would not be wise to make the Department of Homeland Security the scapegoat agency that military members go to, to escape further military service, it would be beneficial to review possible methods to allow some members of the armed forces to continue their federal term in a DHS or DHS-R capacity. As America continues to rely heavily on both active duty and reservists to meet increased operational requirements, studies have shown that both junior officers and enlisted personnel are less inclined to re-enlist for future service or stay until retirement, thus justifying a fresh review of the current military retirement system.⁸² The current retirement system for active duty personnel is an all-or-nothing system that requires no less than twenty years for retirement. Military reservist are the only federal employees who must reach the age of sixty to draw their retirement pay and benefits, even if they complete their military service before turning sixty. Additionally, the

⁸² Alex Keenan, "Troops near the breaking point need new retirement system," in *Army Times*, October 29, 2007, 35.

increased pace of operations has added a severe amount of pressure on the military, which begs the creation of a more flexible system that could allow military members to easily move between DoD and DHS organizations. Creating a diverse and flexible retirement system could increase retention and recruitment for both DoD and DHS employees.

A more flexible federal environment could in fact allow military service members to complete an initial or second term in the respective DoD-service and then apply to the Department of Homeland Security to complete their federal service term, thus carrying over their military service time to DHS. They could apply for either full time or part-time DHS positions in which they could work one-weekend a month, complementary to a DoD-Reservist. It is entirely possible that military members could serve DHS in the same or similar capacity of their military specialty occupation. Another benefit which has been highlighted in many of the lessons learned is that military members could integrate the DoD culture and lingo into a DHS organization, thus bridging the civil-military gap, which is beneficial during a DHS volunteer emergency response.

3. Specialty Skilled Employees

In general, people are more trusting of experts in a given field, such as doctors and first responders, over elected officials or government administrators. Therefore, using these experts to response to the public's needs during a crisis can be critical to saving lives. Currently, some volunteer organizations are dedicated to specific technical or trade-specific tasks. For instance, the Disaster Medical Association Teams (DMAT) of Hawaii is a state organization of medical professionals who volunteer their time, effort and specialty to the state of Hawaii during disasters. Similarly, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), which is a partner of Citizen Corps, is a federal organization dedicated to organizing local health and medical volunteers to prepare for and respond to emergency disasters. These types of specialty volunteer organizations enlist medical professionals to donate their time and expertise as a supplement to existing emergency and public health resources. Both the DMAT and MRC volunteers include medical and public health professionals such as physicians, surgeons, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians,

and epidemiologists. Undoubtedly, these types of volunteer organizations fill key positions during large-scale emergency disasters.

Therefore, a potential DHS-Reserve program should target key specialties that could supplement emergency workers during times of crises. The incident command system could integrate the DHS-Reserves as part of the planning process and triage of the incident. Since most of the specialty-qualified DHS-Reservists could be used as initial responders and for recovery efforts, they would play an even more important role. Well after the immediate devastation of 9/11 and Katrina, victims were in dire need of monetary, physical, emotional, and psychological help.

The most common professions that would be needed to volunteer for DHS-Reserves include police, fire, medical, mental and emotional health counselors, construction workers, language interpreters, public health officials, critical infrastructure analysts, engineers, and disaster mitigation specialists. These professions are vital during an emergency response and recovery. The Incident Command Management System could train and familiarize its members with the various capabilities and specialties of the DHS-Reserves. Having specialty response volunteers at the Incident Commander's disposal could lead to a more effective government response while mitigating unforeseen collateral damages.

The aftermath of natural and man-made disasters require as much coordination, resources, and volunteers as the disasters themselves. Many of the displaced victims from Katrina were housed in the Louisiana Superdome. According to Major General Bennett C. Landreneau, the Adjutant General for the Louisiana National Guard, the Superdome provided shelter for nearly 25,000 Katrina victims. The scenario at the Superdome required professional assistance across multiple spectrums in which DHS-Reservists could have filled. Many victims everywhere, not just at the Superdome, needed mental and emotional counselors to help them cope with the loss of their belongings, their traumatic struggles, and in some cases, grieve the loss of loved ones. Additionally, public health officials were needed to educate people of possible containments and to access the living situation inside the Superdome, where large populations were forced to cohabitate in an enclosed environment with limited resources.

Conditions at the stadium had become horrendous: there was no air conditioning, the toilets were backed up, and the stench was so bad that medical workers wore masks. In Mississippi, bodies were starting to pile up at a local morgue.⁸³ Additional police were needed, not only to restore law and order on the streets of New Orleans, but also inside the Superdome. Officials set up security check points at the Superdome entrances and confiscated alcohol, weapons, and illegal drugs from those evacuees seeking shelter. Evacuees also stole furniture and damaged stadium property causing thousands of dollars in damages. In this case, DHS-Reservists who are qualified peace officers in other jurisdictions could have helped to quell civil disturbances and perhaps added efficiency to the recovery efforts, in addition to saving lives. Specialty Reservists offer unique capabilities to unforeseen circumstances and are sometimes desperately needed during national emergencies, thus making their participation in a DHS-R program essential.

The incentives and compensations for volunteer-professionals would need to be substantive in order to recruit and maintain an acceptable number of professional volunteers. Financial compensations could exist in various forms. DHS could offer Reservists monetary benefits comparable to their professions when activated during emergency disasters. Although the nation could require key specialties to serve a mandatory term as part of a national service system, it would be more welcomed by professionals to volunteer their capabilities on their own accord. For instance, DHS could provide tuition assistance to medical students during college and ask for a predetermined number of reserve-time as collateral once they receive their MDs. DHS may also be able to grant selective service credit to those professionals who enlist their services after their schooling. Another incentive could be for DHS to pay for certifications, such as police and fire academies, apprentice programs, and other qualification-based professions in return for reserve duty. DHS could also ensure employee protection rights, similar to those offered to the National Guard, for those DHS-Reservists activated for longer periods of time. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, DHS could offer a sense of national pride and selfless service to those

⁸³ MSNBC- Associated Press, "New Orleans Mayor orders looting crackdown," <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9063708/>, accessed on November 2, 2007.

volunteer-professionals who do not already experience this in their current occupations. Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security should actively seek volunteer “reservists” with special talents to increase the range of services and skills it can offer during an emergency response.

Summarized Benefits/Incentives:

Tax Credit	Selective-Service Credit
College Tuition Assistance	College Loan-repayment
Professional School tuition	Reduced Home Mortgage interest rate
Credit Union	Waive certain federal fees
Health Care	Service Longevity program
Reduced/Credit utility bill	Private/Business supporting tax credit
DHS membership privileges	Sense of Nationalism
Reduced Airport wait time	Employment protection rights
Various DHS/EMS/First Responder Certifications	

D. CONCERTED EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CAPABILITIES

1. The Conceptual Model

An independent and re-invigorated DHS-Reserve organization would be well positioned to integrate and coordinate other emergency-response organizations into a new, more effective response network that works directly with federal entities and their counterparts at the state, local, and private levels. Volunteer emergency response organizations, as currently constituted, are composed of too many disparate entities. DHS should have the capacity to integrate various streams of volunteer organizations for the purposes of responding to local or large-scale emergencies. A DHS-R organization would address the vital weaknesses in emergency response operations. Having a pool of readily available skilled, trained, security cleared and capable personnel to meet emergency contingency needs at a considerably lower cost is perhaps the best way to fill current volunteer emergency response gaps, while energizing the American public’s interest to serve its nation.

The conceptual model could resemble many of the existing volunteer organizations, with the administrative and employment policies similar to that of the

National Guard, since it serves as the DoD's reserve entity. Another example that a DHS-Reserve organization could model is the State Defense Forces that played a vital role in U.S. homeland security during World War II as a back up to the National Guard. Although this organization has lost creditability and stature, it was once fully supported by the Roosevelt Administration, Congress, and the War Department.⁸⁴ A DHS-reservist could similarly be required to attend a basic training drill monthly and annually, and receive pay only if activated. In my view, a DHS-Reserve capability could provide large numbers of organized, disciplined, trained, and uniformed civilian volunteers to augment emergency responders, police, National Guard, and federal agencies in anticipation of and in response to catastrophic emergencies.

Once such a model is established, the role of these homeland security-reservists could take on a variety of responsibilities, perhaps even allowing volunteers to augment and participate in one of the twenty-two sub-agencies under the DHS umbrella. After each reservist completed basic web-based or correspondence training, he or she could volunteer to take additional homeland security "qualifier" courses so that each could be employed in more "official" capacities with increased responsibilities. Monthly and annual training requirements could consist of emergency response scenario training, large-scale homeland security exercises, individual job-focused training, and other homeland security-focused training. This program could also train incident commanders to handle large amounts of volunteers and employ them prior to a real-world event, thus familiarizing all personnel to the Incident Command System. DHS-reservists could also be required to work one weekend each month in addition to their annual training requirement at one of DHS's twenty-two subordinate agencies. Similar to the military-reserves who perform their specialty near their home on their respective weekend, so can DHS-Reservists, perhaps at each state's Office of Homeland Security. DHS-reservists could perform TSA-type duties at their local airports, thus filling a gap or allowing full-time TSA employees time off. Other weekend duties could include border and port access points, random anti-terrorist measures, multi-level emergency response training exercises, and other DHS-related duties.

⁸⁴ Carper, "Revitalizing State Reserves," 1.

Alerting DHS-reservists could happen several ways using multiple media and networks. An established federal reserve program would have an existing database of capable trained volunteers. Despite a low level of public trust in the media, the television is the primary choice for crisis information; therefore, using the national media to alert DHS-Reservists is a viable plan. Since each reservist will essentially have a duty description, level of training, and credential, a public announcement would be able to categorize the type and number of reservists needed and alert them of when, where, and how to report to an emergency disaster scene. Incident Commanders could relay their triaged-requirements, so that overages of unneeded volunteers do not crowd the incident scene. Using the media to alert volunteer emergency and recovery responders would facilitate an efficient and organized large-scale response.

Once activated, trained DHS-reservists could begin emergency response operations. Immediately after the attacks on 9/11 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all airlines in order to reserve all airspace for emergencies. If another emergency disaster of this scale were to take place, in which a large number of volunteers are needed at a specific location, a DHS-R system would be most beneficial. As stated in the 9/11 Commission report and earlier in this thesis, one of the biggest failures of 9/11 was “a lack of imagination.” Therefore, creating a DHS-Reserve may one day be necessary to cope with future natural or man-made disasters. A scenario could possibly require thousands of DHS-Reservists to respond from across the nation. These volunteers would range in specialties from manual labor first responders to medical physicians, police, and fire officials. The incident commander would already be familiar with the DHS-Reserve system and its capabilities, and therefore could begin to triage his requirements to determine what specialties and how many of them are needed. Once DHS-Reservists were alerted via public media, they could immediately proceed to their local airports using their credentials to board flights bound for the incident. Through prior DHS coordination and FAA approval, airlines could begin to transport DHS-Reservists to the closest airport near the incident. This type of massive coordinated response could fill much needed positions and save thousands of lives during a national

emergency. Although these types of emergencies are not a common occurrence, the same type of notification process could take place for local emergencies on a much smaller scale.

2. Federal Assets Available to All levels of Government

Unifying the emergency response volunteer efforts would not only enlist national support, but also create a conduit for integrating volunteer emergency responders and to coordinate with state, local, and private sector counterparts. A DHS-Reserve organization could also circumvent some of the procedural problems that volunteer organizations currently experience such as proper notification, administrative and logistical issues, coordinating a multi-level response, standardized training and credential requirements, and post-deployment support. As the nexus for volunteer emergency responders, it could disseminate instructions, regulate policies, coordinate program activities, match volunteer skills with disaster needs, and ensure accurate and complete record keeping. Lastly, a DHS-Reserve organization would be able to effectively compile a list of DHS and other agency volunteers willing to provide disaster response and relief efforts and categorize such list by skills, specific knowledge and abilities, and relevant training. Therefore, not only should DHS become the conduit to the various volunteer emergency organizations, but it should also act as the volunteer nexus where state and local agencies can access broader and larger assets at the national level- thus eliminating procedural obstacles, alleviating increased DOD domestic responsibilities, and perhaps initiating a national volunteer-service system.

As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, recovery operations are extensive and manpower intensive. They are also multi-dimensional in coordinating several jurisdictional agencies and resources. Trained volunteers provide the manpower needed to allow official agencies to concentrate on other critical areas. Therefore, a trained volunteer force offers a broader base of valuable resources critical to emergency response operations. This is important for two reasons. First, during Hurricane Katrina, the state of Maryland allowed state employees to volunteer in the recovery efforts; however, it stipulated that residents could volunteer

only for the Red Cross, and for only two weeks. Although the state's generosity is commendable, and the Red Cross is a valuable organization, this limited the volunteers to only one organization for only two weeks. A federal-level volunteer organization, under the Department of Homeland Security, could ensure that disaster volunteers' rights are protected for more than two weeks. Second, the County of Los Angeles alone has over eighty-eight cities, covers over four thousand miles, and there are over one hundred thirty-five languages spoken at home.⁸⁵ Clearly, this is a huge challenge for any local jurisdiction with a diverse population; especially during an emergency to communicate with insular communities that only speak their native tongue. Los Angeles and most other large counties do not have the financial or staff resources to translate every language. A federal-based support would ensure that the adequate foreign-language capabilities exist and are available to mobilize to disasters. This is very important, especially since some of the lessons learned from Katrina discussed how certain diverse populations were not able to communicate with first responders. Language translation is very time-consuming and could severely hinder an effective and timely response.

E. CONCLUSION

The employer and student demand has created a desire for many schools to see the patriotic and financial practicality of establishing homeland security programs to meet the needs of current and future security issues. This chapter has explored the concept of a homeland security-reserve using existing volunteer training curriculums, investigating possible population pools, incentives, and capabilities. The homeland security discipline is currently a conglomerate of numerous academic and homeland security-related institutions trying to define *and* refine homeland security as a phenomenon. Furthermore, since 9/11, America continues to witness an increase in volunteerism, which has created a wide variety of dispersed volunteer organizations. A newly developed DHS-R could, more-or-less, integrate these multiple organizations creating a seamless network of volunteer emergency responders, linking the various levels of brave volunteers into a coherent whole, thus serving America well.

⁸⁵ Personal Interview with Rachel A. Tyree, Public Information Officer, Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, July 7, 2007.

Although the National Guard and various disparate volunteer organizations currently have the responsibility of responding to emergency disasters, the possibility of National Guard personnel and equipment being inaccessible to state governors is a valid and growing concern. Additionally, world events, military op-tempo trends, and the desire for Americans to serve their nation, presents the perfect opportunity to establish a national volunteer-reserve force that could double as the nation's *mandatory* service system, while at the same time increasing the sense of national pride.

A fully integrated, nation-wide volunteer reserve force would not only establish strong ties with local and state governments, but also become well suited to provide governors with the support and expertise for civil, military, and homeland security contingencies, which is desperately needed in the post-9/11 era. The increase in asymmetric methods of warfare challenges the homeland security communities to review existing force structures to meet the evolving domestic security requirements. Unifying current volunteer organizations into one federal, synchronized entity, such as DHS, represents a step in the right direction.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Today's national domestic challenges are daunting. In addition to the conflict in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban, domestic threats also continue to grow. Warning signs that the global terrorist networks have infiltrated the U.S., as well as the ongoing natural disasters, pose new types of domestic challenges. The federal responses, or lack thereof, to large-scale man-made and natural disasters make it easy to understand why Americans feel uncertainty about domestic threats. Post-Katrina assessments highlight that the response to Hurricane Katrina has tarnished DHS and FEMA's image, and Americans question their government's ability to respond effectively to a disaster. Therefore, any subsequent failed disaster responses could further influence the American public's confidence in the government.

Even though our nation lacks a competently trained civilian reserve force, the United States has a history of rising to meet even the most daunting challenges, which is precisely why our nation must take advantage of the wellspring of volunteers who bravely come forward to help in times of crises. The unconstrained and largely uncoordinated disparate volunteer organizations, coupled with the lack of a national governing body or oversight mechanism, are among the primary reasons for this thesis. Following one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, "to emphasize the importance of first responder training and prior joint planning," the Homeland Security community should reorganize and synchronize the volunteer emergency response system for a post-9/11 world.

The events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and other local and national emergencies have generated great interest — across a wide spectrum of cultures, ages, skills, and professions — in the field of homeland security. Combining these interests with the organizations identified in this thesis, could create a solid unity of effort. Such an effort could double as a national volunteer service system and also as an effective emergency response asset. The federal government should make every effort to capitalize on these valuable resources, especially since the threats are changing and the environment is

becoming more dynamic. Prior to 9/11, almost all emergency drills and exercises consisted of natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, or earthquakes. Now, however, terrorist attacks, power outages, and chemical and biological scenarios are included.

This thesis has investigated the existing volunteer emergency response assets and has highlighted some of the inherent weaknesses of the current system. To date, there is no official federal volunteer force. Furthermore, neither homeland security organizations nor the academic community has reached a consensus on what constitutes the “official” homeland security reserve force. Rather than ill-equipped and untrained volunteers, and in the absence of a governing or accrediting body to regulate emergency response education, it is extremely important to establish or unify a legitimate volunteer reserve organization. DHS now employs an estimated 180,000 people; however, over 40% of the federal workforce entered service since 9/11, which projects a significant number of homeland security-trained employees retiring over the next decade.⁸⁶ With these numbers in mind, it is now more important than ever to establish a Department of Homeland Security-Reserve force, trained and ready to respond to disaster emergencies and to fill critical DHS response and recovery gaps, especially since the number of national disasters has remained steady over the past five years. The table below further illustrates this trend.

⁸⁶ Rollins, “The Homeland Security Academic Environment,” 17-18.




Table 4. Five-year trend of natural disasters in the U.S. (From ⁸⁷).

Numerous volunteer organizations are offering support to the United States in one form or another. In addition to the President’s USA Freedom Corps, there are numerous and disparate volunteer emergency response agencies. One recurring theme during this research, however, is that many government and volunteer agencies had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities within the homeland security umbrella — and specifically under the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. Although each organization promotes volunteerism and service nationwide, none of these organizations performs what a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves Corps could provide. Though the various volunteer corps offers significant selfless service to the nation, a DHS-Reserve could provide trained volunteers as part of a coordinated emergency response and perhaps provide the nation with a national service system, similar to those in other countries, to increase national pride. The

⁸⁷ “America’s Disasters 2004; meeting the challenge,” <http://www.redcross.org/pubs/dspubs/amdisasters2004.pdf>, accessed on October 27, 2007, 9.

concept of using volunteers who are paid only when activated to an emergency response is entirely different than maintaining a full-time, budgeted organization.

Therefore, volunteer emergency services are an extremely valuable national resource, saving taxpayers billions of dollars annually. Given America's uncertain security situation — and the ongoing strains on active duty, reserve, and the National Guard — a homeland security volunteer reserve force should receive greater support and relevance; they can provide domestic security at a relatively low cost while alleviating the reliance of a military response. A DHS-Reserve would operate at a fraction of the cost, and would eliminate having to pay unnecessary costs associated with unprepared and overwhelming requests. For instance, during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA issued mission assignments to more than twenty federal agencies. These agencies became overwhelmed and called for federal employees to volunteer from other regions, which cost FEMA between \$2,000 and \$2 million per agency for overtime, travel, and per diem for each volunteer.⁸⁸ Using volunteers to complete the same tasks would save an enormous amount of money. In fact, according to an Independent Sector research report, the 2006 estimated average dollar value of volunteer time across the United States is \$18.77 per hour.⁸⁹ Additionally, between September 2001 and September 2002, approximately 59 million Americans, or 27.6 % of the non-institutional public, performed volunteer service.⁹⁰ These numbers clearly demonstrate the beneficial costs of using volunteers and suggest that the American public is paying attention to President Bush's national plea for Americans to take an active role in shaping their homeland security environment by volunteering. It is imperative that the nation realize the rising costs of homeland security and take advantage of the semi-patriotic fervor that has inspired a wellspring of volunteers toward national service. This is especially important since these forces are paid only when activated for a real-world emergency, saving not only lives, but also thousands, if not millions, of dollars.

⁸⁸ Skinner "FEMA's Volunteer Service Program following Hurricane Katrina," 1.

⁸⁹ Independent Sector report, http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/volunteer_time.html, accessed on July 11, 2007, 1.

⁹⁰ Stephanie Boraas, "Volunteerism in the United States," *Monthly Labor Review*, August 2003, 3.

Today's situation is that there is no unity among our volunteer emergency response organizations. There is no clear leadership or clear line of authority, until a disaster strikes, in which the first to arrive at an emergency scene is the first to serve as the incident commander. Additionally, the federal government struggles to integrate military and non-military instruments into effective emergency response operations. These inadequacies in emergency response operations, along with the over-exhausted and ill-equipped troops at home, clearly present the need for America to consider expanding the opportunities for citizen service. The federal government cannot wait until the next terrorist attack or natural disaster, or the next major war, to fill domestic emergency response gaps. America must fundamentally transform its civilian capabilities by establishing a strategic civilian reserve corps that is qualified, flexible, and task-based.

A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could address these emergency response fallacies by dedicating itself as the primary volunteer response force. Each reservist would be familiar with his or her role and responsibility within the homeland security umbrella, understand the incident command system, and be trained in a specific job in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. In fact, the Bipartisan Committee that investigated Hurricane Katrina concluded that DHS and individual states were not prepared for the severity of Katrina. The report specifically acknowledged that

Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects...DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced staff for a Katrina response, and that, the readiness of FEMA's national emergency response teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response.⁹¹

A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves would solidify its role at the federal level and build the organizational capacity to partner with state and local emergency managers, as well as foster relationships with local government leaders and other nonprofit and faith-based partners in the community. A DHS-reserve organization would not only serve communities in need, but also provide the resources to successfully engage community leaders and build on existing networks. Such a federal organization

⁹¹ U.S. House of Representatives, "A Failure of Initiative," 3.

could also outreach to remote or often ignored communities while continuing to foster the existing DHS collaboration, education, and access among volunteer organizations. Lastly, a legitimate federal volunteer organization would also demonstrate the commitment from various government leaders within DHS. Drawing on the assets of civil society enables a DHS-R program to tap into a wider range of skills sets and capacities than currently available at the National Guard and other current volunteer programs. The fact that a DHS-R program would enlist, train, and employ locals from the same communities would have a dramatic effect among the respective communities, while providing them with an expandable force when needed, especially in the absence of the National Guard. Therefore, enacting an emergency response volunteer system that is part of a national service system is the best way to involve Americans in homeland security. Such a program, with a federal level of legitimacy and incentives, would attract the next generation of recruits for the nation's volunteer emergency service organization.

In addition to the many benefits presented in this thesis, there are several unintended benefits to creating a Homeland Security-reserve corps. Expanding the opportunities for young civilians across the nation to serve in a homeland security capacity introduces broad ethnic groups to the American culture by involving them in domestic security, thus lessening the impact of alienating and perhaps radicalizing these groups of individuals, who may otherwise be prone to terrorism or criminal activity. Undoubtedly, these civilian volunteers also bring great value to the private sectors. The costs of homeland security are inevitably felt by private industries in which airlines, realtors, industrial and energy sources, and private conglomerates bear the brunt of natural or man-made disasters. It is, therefore, important to identify and establish Corporate Partnerships designed to engage corporate employees as DHS-R volunteers who are trained, ready, and willing to respond to local disasters. Each disaster directly affects profit margins as the economy witnesses a downturn; as a result, the private sector is forced to hire more security, invest in surveillance cameras and software packages, smart ID cards, perimeter fencing, and so on. Therefore, if employees are better prepared at home and work, a company is better prepared for an emergency, thus inadvertently

making the private sector more stable. A DHS-R could, in fact, bridge cultural diversity gaps and enhance the private sector's homeland security awareness and security.

Though the new generation of domestic challenges may seem daunting, we must adapt and transform our volunteer response assets and capabilities to confront these challenges. At a time of unprecedented hazards within the United States, a homeland security reserve force is even more important to the overall domestic security. Meeting these dynamic challenges is difficult in itself and will require sacrifices from the American people. It is essential to domestic security to establish a civilian volunteer reserve force to supplement full-time emergency responders and also to fill first-responder shortages. Congress and future administrations must expand the opportunities for civilians to perform a national service by developing a new kind of civilian National Guard that serves exclusively in a domestic capacity. Establishing a domestic civilian response corps at the federal level can greatly enhance emergency response assets at all jurisdictional levels. A federal chartered volunteer organization ensures equitable education and monetary incentives, as well as enhanced training opportunities for reserve personnel. Therefore, America cannot afford to remain mired in the past. A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves could not only serve as a national service system, but also unify existing volunteer response and recovery assets and alleviate the increased DoD role in Homeland Security; only then, will DHS and FEMA begin to regain the public's confidence.

This thesis concludes that it is necessary to form or unify a citizen volunteer reserve force to assist in emergencies. A Department of Homeland Security-Reserves, comprised of properly trained individuals, could effectively fill the emergency response gap, especially in the absence of deployed National Guard and active-duty military forces. America can, and should, unify the disparate volunteer organizations that are willing to assist in emergency disasters. Such unity of effort would combine existing federal, state, and local resources under one synchronized federal department available to dispatch volunteers with specific training, various skill sets, and credentials nationwide in

the event of a man-made or natural disaster. Therefore, developing a Department of Homeland Security-Reserves is critical and necessary for the overall domestic security of our nation.

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