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THESIS

**PRIORITIZING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FOREIGN PUBLIC
OPINION OF AMERICA: APPLYING A BUSINESS MODEL TO
DISCOVER AND CREATE CUSTOMER VALUE**

by

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December 2007

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AMERICA: APPLYING A BUSINESS MODEL TO DISCOVER AND CREATE
CUSTOMER VALUE**

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. National Security Strategy contains objectives that involve winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the foreign public. A study of literature and polling data reveals worldwide resentment toward America, indicating that America may be losing this battle. Given the reality of fiscal and resource constraints, America could not possibly address all of the concerns of the foreign public; rather, America must focus its efforts on the factors that are likely to make the greatest impact. This study identifies negative factors that interfere with favorable foreign public opinion and suggests an analytic framework for prioritizing those factors. Based on the theoretical output, America's top priorities should consist of minimizing the visible presences of U.S. troops in Arab nations; increasing understanding and consideration of how U.S. activities are perceived to impact Arab-Islamic culture; and readdressing recent unilateralist policy decisions that create a wedge between America and its European allies. Further in-depth research is required in order to establish more operationally realistic and actionable output, which takes into account the variables that this study excludes.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners who share our commitment to a safer, more compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing our channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting propaganda quickly, before myths and distortions have time to take root in the hearts and minds of people across the world. (President Bush, 2006, p. 50)

These words, expressed in one of the most recent United States National Security Strategy (NSS) objectives speak to America's recognition of the importance of international relations and the battle for the hearts and minds of the foreign public. This common theme emerges, as throughout the NSS verbiage repeatedly reiterates how the United States must "[work] with existing international institutions" (p. 11), "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism (p. 13)," "work with others to defuse regional conflicts" (p. 19) and "develop agendas for cooperative action" (p. 40). America not only acknowledges the significance of strengthening public diplomacy in conflict areas in the Middle East, but also with traditional U.S. allies that share many Western values.

Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies. Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation of shared values and interests. This foundation is expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. (President Bush, 2006, p. 43)

Though the NSS contains a well articulated and comprehensive list of objectives for international relations, it does not set a stage for how the United States will prioritize its objectives. Recent studies (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2007; Arab American Institute, 2006) indicate that America may be losing that battle for hearts and minds, which may hinder U.S. efforts to counter terrorist propaganda and ideology, promote democracy, and increase worldwide collaboration. As such, one could argue that all diplomatic efforts are of equal strategic importance. However, given the reality of fiscal and resource constraints, America must identify the factors that are of greatest "value and interest" to the foreign public. To counteract negative public opinion, the United States must prioritize and focus its resources on issues that have the greatest probability of impacting America's ability to influence foreign public opinion in favor of American interests. This study attempts to first identify those negative factors that interfere with favorable foreign public opinion and, secondly, suggests an analytic framework for prioritizing these factors.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of my research is two-fold. First, the purpose is to identify the various factors that contribute

to the foreign public's generally negative opinion of America. This phase of the study is accomplished through a macro-level review of literature. In the book, *Why Do People Hate America?*, the authors alert their readers that "This is... not a book about the positive sides of the United States" (2003, p. 6). Similarly, this study does not focus on the many positive attributes of this great nation; rather, it focuses almost solely on illuminating the U.S. attributes that the foreign public perceives negatively, which the framework outlined in the second phase of this study suggests is of greatest importance. Though some negative opinions could be grounded in immature jealousy, envy or ignorance, and presents a legitimate opportunity for rebuttal against those opinions or a defense of America's stance, the scope of this study leaves that effort to further research.

The purpose of the second phase of this research is to present a framework to analyze the factors identified in the first phase. This provides an attempt to suggest how the United States could prioritize its effort to change foreign public opinion in order to further U.S. interests at home and abroad. This study does not attempt to say 'how' America should go about addressing foreign public opinions, nor whether there are 'greater interests' than addressing them, but is limited to a demonstration of another way of framing the issue. As such, this study also seeks to motivate further research to establish more operationally realistic and actionable outputs, which take into account the variables excluded by this study. There is still great value in this study, which lies in identifying and prioritizing negative opinions; it contributes to

understanding what issues make the biggest impact on foreign hearts and minds. Whether the United States chooses to address each issue by changing policy, by more effectively promoting U.S. interests, by refuting propaganda, by ignoring it, or by any other means, is outside of the scope of this study.

C. SUMMARY

This introduction has highlighted the need to conduct a macro-level review of the relevant factors contributing to unfavorable foreign public opinion of America, as well as the need for analytic methods to determine resource allocation priorities for the identified factors. Chapter II identifies some of the most prominently cited negative factors. Chapter III then suggests the analytic framework for identifying how to prioritize these factors. Chapter IV presents the results generated by using the analytic framework. Finally, Chapter V concludes the study with recommended readings and recommendations for further research.

II. CRITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.: A SUMMARY OF THE FACTORS THAT CAUSE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

When you pose a question about two disparate cultures and their intertwined relationship, common sense leads you to involve both parties. Yet, for the past six years, I have watched the D.C. circles fail to do just that. Each anniversary, I witness Americans asking Americans, discussing among other Americans, the topic of something none of them are – Arabs. Six years after the devastating attacks, Americans are still asking that ubiquitous question: ‘Why do they hate us?’...Yet, if Americans insist on posing this question, I pose another. ‘Why don’t ‘you’ ask them?’ (Elmenshawy, 2007)

Resentment, distain and outright hatred for America come in many forms and from many places all around the world (Pew Research Center, December 2003). This hatred is not confined to the Arab public, as some may think. People can be found in Africa, in Latin America, and even in allied nations in Asia and Europe that harbor deep seeded resentment for America. For the purposes of this study, the primary focus will be on the sources of resentment from our allies in Western Europe, and Arab nations in the Middle East. The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the positive U.S. attributes, but to reveal the U.S. attributes that are often perceived negatively. This information will provide valuable input for the framework outlined in Chapter III of this study, which suggests that negative attributes have the greatest potential for major impact on public opinion. The results of this study suggest ‘what’ American should prioritize, but will not address ‘how’ America should respond.

People dislike America for numerous different reasons. Some may be well founded and there may or may not be anything that American can do about it. Other reasons may be trivial, juvenile, or a natural and unavoidable consequence of American power and influence. This study does not debate the validity of these reasons nor distinguish between those reasons that are within or outside of American control; rather, this study provides a list of predominant reasons for resentment, based on literature research in conjunction with poll results. The first section, B through E of this chapter, will present the overall research findings in a narrative form to provide some explanation for the reasons for resentment, and to give the issues a voice. The second section, F of this chapter, presents the polling data which also reveals reasons for and prominence of resentment. The reasons in the first section are broken into three categories: 1) what America says, or U.S. policy; 2) what America does, or U.S. actions; and 3) who America is, or U.S. identity. The second section is broken down into time periods.

Three things are worth noting before presenting this research. First, it should be noted that in order to develop a comprehensive list of reasons for anti-Americanism, the survey of literature was not limited to scholarly works. Although scholarly works are used to validate the background and prevalence of foreign public opinion, as the quote above from Mohamed Elmenshawy suggests, it would be remiss to rely solely on them and ignore the massive realm of input from the general foreign public themselves. As such, I have cited input from published op-ed articles, unpublished writings on the

internet, and from internet blogs on the topic. Including these sources introduces biases into the study, but given that the nature of the study is opinion-oriented, this method is useful. Secondly, given the enormity of the input on this topic, it would be impossible to list every reason that people claim to resent America. Lastly, although the reasons that people resent America are separated into three categories in order to provide the reader of this study with an organized structure for framing the ideas, there is often no solid line of distinction between the reasons. In reality, one will find that the lines are blurred, as there is great correlation between what America says, what America does, and who America is perceived to be.

B. WHAT AMERICA SAYS: OUR INTEREST ARE ALL THAT MATTER

A constant source of criticism from the foreign public stems from what America says to the world. What America says to the world is defined by U.S. foreign policies, which are perceived as unilaterally-oriented. Specifically, U.S. foreign policy is perceived as being overwhelming selfish, and full of unilateralist stances that undermine collaborative efforts on a number of issues that concern the international community as a whole. Some of the policies that were most prominently cited as sources of resented were America's policy on biological weapons, landmines, the environment, the United Nations (UN) and the Middle East.

1. Biological Weapons

One example of unilateralist policy that often is cited in literature took place in 2001 when President Bush

refused to sign an agreement that would allow all countries to be susceptible to biological weapons inspections (BBC News, July 2001). The refusal came as a shock and insult to many of the other 142 signatories. It dealt a major blow to long-standing negotiations to enforce the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention that bans germ warfare agents, and was "a major setback for international efforts to agree practical curbs on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Leader, 2001). True or not, U.S. actions gave much of the foreign public the impression that America had, or was interested in having the very weapons that it demanded that developing nations never get. To some, this action was yet another demonstration of American hypocrisy, "reckless, unilateralist behavior," as well as total disregard for the UN, global consensus, and the opinion of the international community (Leader, 2001).

Should U.S. national security interests and its biotechnology commercial interests take precedence over responsible global collaboration? Some think that it should not. If the United States plans to oppose an international agreement that is favored by the majority, should it not have some responsibility for presenting a proposal to replace it? Many think so, and resent that America does not (Kirby, 2001). Though the United States gives an argument as to why it refused to cooperate, mainly that the treaty was not strong enough and could hurt U.S. industry, U.S. unilateralism is enough to cause fear and resentment from some in the international community.

2. The Land Mine Treaty

There was an empty chair at the Geneva meeting this past week on implementation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The 138 signers of the Treaty were reviewing progress made in removing mines, treating victims, and destroying stockpiles of a weapon that maims or murders 22,000 people a year... The refusal of America to sign the Mine Ban Treaty represents a particularly embarrassing contradiction, since President Clinton, during a 1994 speech to the UN General Assembly, became the first leader of a major power to demand elimination of all antipersonnel land mines. (Boston Globe, 2000)

Antipersonnel landmines kill and injure more innocent civilians than combatants, and the United States declared its commitment to help rid the world of them. In 1996, President Clinton promised that the United States would spearhead the international effort to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines, but America repeatedly broke this promise when it came to its own interest in Korea (Human Rights Watch, 2004). A U.S. proposal to keep over a million land mines on the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea has been rejected by the international community, including most of America's allies (Cloud, 2004). Despite the fact that President Clinton eventually established a compromise in 1997, committing the United States to signing the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 to eliminate all U.S. antipersonnel landmines, President Bush "retreated from a Clinton-era promise" (Cloud, 2004). Many believe that America's empty chair at the Geneva meeting demonstrated contempt for the will of the international community and is seen as a "symbolic invitation" to governments that had not signed the treaty to follow suit,

mainly China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and India (Boston Globe, 2000). As is the case with the biological weapons treaty debate, regardless of the reasons that America gives for rejecting international consensus, much of the foreign public view the American unilateralist stance as irresponsible, hypocritical and selfish.

3. Kyoto Pact on Environmental Pollution

The US contains 4% of the world's population but produces about 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions. By comparison, Britain emits 3% - about the same as India which has 15 times as many people. (BBC News, February 2002)

As the world's predominant polluter, America is resented by some because of its rejection of international efforts to curb the contribution of manmade toxins in the environment (BBC News, February 2002). Again, American actions are viewed as being in total self-interest, without regard for the opinions or wellbeing of the international community. Since the 1970s, America was at the forefront of efforts to protect the world from serious long-term environmental issues (Grumet, 2005), protection of endangered species (Annett, 1998), the ozone layer (Kamm, 1987), and global warming (Olson, 1997); but in recent years, long-term worldwide issues have taken a back seat to U.S. financial interests.

For example, in 2001 President Bush abandoned the international Kyoto Protocol, which was hailed as a "historic agreement" and signed by President Clinton in 1998, arguing that it threatened U.S. economic interests (Clinton, 1997). The Kyoto Protocol would result in reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 8 percent of the 1990 levels

before 2012 (BBC News, June 2002). President Bush's decision ignited widespread international criticism. Critics say that though the agreement was not perfect, nearly every industrial nation, including 15 European Union states, thought it was a large step in the right direction (BBC News, February 2002). The Kyoto Protocol became international law in 2004 when Russia signed on, which the foreign public hopes will put pressure on America to pull its weight (BBC News, 2004). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, "The United States is expected to remain the largest source of petroleum-related carbon dioxide emissions... with projected emissions of 3.3 billion metric tons in 2030—still 66 percent above the corresponding projection for China" (Energy Information Administration, 2007).

4. Abuse of the UN

When it suits the US, it uses the UN to seek legitimacy for its actions, to build coalition and impose sanctions on 'rogue states'. When world opinion goes against the US, it treats the UN with utter contempt... Throughout the history of the UN, America has consistently vetoed any resolution or declaration that did not reflect US priorities or business interests. (Sardar and Davies, 2003, p. 69)

Foreign governments, and hence some of the foreign public, take issue with the perceived American abuse and manipulation of the UN. America is often the sole opposition to a UN General Assembly consensus. The General Assembly has voted on resolutions that are meant to further human rights, peace, nuclear disarmament, economic justice, efforts to fight apartheid and efforts to end lawlessness. Over the three year period between 1984 and 1987, U.S.

discord in the UN was so potent that there were nearly 150 occurrences where the United States cast the sole 'no' vote against a UN resolution (Sardar and Davies, 2003, p. 69).

America's perceived abuse of the veto system, especially on any issue involving Israel, is perceived as undermining to the function and effectiveness of the UN Security Council. Any pact that condemns illegal and aggressive activities of Israel has been a nearly automatic veto by the United States (Information Clearing House, 2003). This seemingly unconditional American support of Israel is not only a source of hatred from the Middle East, but a source of great resentment worldwide when it results in America being the sole holdout on a unanimous condemnation of Israeli action.

In addition to contrary behavior, the United States did not pay its UN dues for decades. In 1985, when the UN proposed that the U.S. proportion of assessed dues be reduced with an overall cap on the maximum amount that any state can contribute, the Regan administration disagreed with this proposal and promised to pay its back-dues (Commission on Global Governance, 1995, p. 300). Many suspect that the U.S. rejected the proposal because it would lose influence and bribing power over the UN. Despite the rejection of the proposal, and promise to pay, according to Sardar and Davies, the United States still "refused to fulfill the promise" and "the resentment against the US at typical UN meetings is so intense that it can be felt in the air" (p. 69). The resentment has lead to the U.S. being expelled from UN sub-groups. In 1998, the United States was expelled from the UN Advisory Committee

that dealt with UN funding as a whole. The United States was also kicked out of the Human Rights Commission in 2001, a result of many votes from European and other 'friendly nations.'

5. Unfair Middle East Policy

There are volumes of literature on the issue of resentment from the international community based on Israeli-U.S. relations (e.g., Karkar, 2007; Pfaff, 2006). In summary, many in the foreign public have negative opinions of the United States based on its perceived unfair, imbalanced, and categorical support for Israel, at the expense of Palestinians. This support is a source of resentment for states in the Middle East who feel that Israel has long occupied territory that is not their own, and has been on the offensive against the Arab world for decades (Karkar, 2007). From their point of view, Arab nations see that America not only supports Israel's attacks and killings of innocent Muslims, but also arms Israel to do so.

Outside of the Middle East, most nations recognize the great influence that the Israeli lobbies, like the 'American Israel Public Affairs Committee,' have on American foreign policy (Judt, 2006). Americans seem to be convinced that Israeli and American national interests are inseparable. Some foreigners view America as Israeli puppets, thinking, "The influence of Israel on American policy has distorted it to Israel's advantage, and sometimes to American disadvantage" (Pfaff, 2006). One piece of evidence for this, as previously mentioned, is the resentment that stems from America's long record of vetoes

of any pact in the UN that paints Israeli actions in a negative light. Arabs perceive that America discriminates by condemning Arab attacks on Israelis, but never condemning attacks by Israelis on Arabs (USIslam.org, 2007). According to some, the U.S. government has also exercised "informal censorship and even suppression or punishment for critical discussion on the Israeli-U.S. relationship (Pfaff, 2006).

C. WHAT AMERICA DOES: SELFISH, OPPRESSIVE & SHORTSIGHTED AGGRESSION

The second category of reasons for resentment, and often-outright hatred for America, stems from what America does around the world. What America does around the world is defined by U.S. economic and military actions, which are perceived as imperialistic. U.S. actions are perceived to be not only selfish, but also overly aggressive, and the source of long-term second and third order affects that cause suffering. U.S. actions are also perceived as a danger to the world, as evident by U.S. being rated by most of the foreign public, including U.S. allies, as one of the "greatest threats to world peace" (e.g., CNN, 2003; Pew Research Center, December 2003). Some of the actions that were cited were America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gerges, 2005), history of Bombing and intervention (Global Policy Forum, 2005), political and economic oppression (Chernus, 2007), and arms trading (Blewett, 2000).

1. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

A strategy of institutional partnership with Muslim civil society requires more than redressing foreign policy... Instead of expanding the "war on terror" and embarking on new military

ventures, American policy makers would be better served to exert systematic pressure on their Arab and Muslim ruling allies... (Gerges, 2005, pp. 275-276)

American military intervention in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, is viewed as an occupation and a sign of American imperialism. Arab nations want America's help with socioeconomic grievances, but do not all desire American boots on the ground in their land. One could understand this notion; most Americans may want British help in defending the U.S. against terror, but most likely do not want British soldiers on their streets. If such a scenario were to occur, could we not find Americans who otherwise would have no problems with British people increasingly resenting the British? Similarly, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have played a major role in increasing Arab resentment toward America.

Leaders of the jihadist movement like Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri and bin Laden found a renewed pool of recruits since the Iraq invasion in 2003; this after a period in which internal strife in the Arab community over some of the terrorist methods had reduced the flow of jihad recruits (Gerges, 2005, p. 265). Even America's often criticized advocates in the Middle East, pro-Western liberal Arabs, began to publicly denounce U.S. action as "imperial hegemony" (p. 271).

There is evidence that the renewed resentment toward America over the invasions in the Middle East may have been exactly what jihadist leaders planned. An al-Qaeda handbook authored by Abu Bakr Naji, translated from al Qaeda websites, suggested that the only reason the jihad movement

failed in the past was that the world superpowers fostered proxy governments in the Middle East and convinced the masses that they were invincible. The solution, Naji said was to "provoke a superpower into invading the Middle East directly" (Brachman and McCants, 2006). The expectation was that this would not necessarily create a military victory for the jihad, but would ultimately result in a "great propaganda victory."

...[Arab] people will 1) be impressed that the jihadis are directly fighting a superpower, 2) be outraged over the invasion of a foreign power, 3) be disabused of the notion that the superpower is invincible the longer the war goes on, and, 4) be angry at the proxy governments allied with the invading superpower. Moreover, he argues, it will bleed the superpower's economy and military. This will lead to social unrest at home and the ultimate defeat of the superpower. (Brachman and McCants, 2006, p. 310)

Thus far, it appears that Naji was correct. Polling data, discussed in section F of this chapter, indicates a continuous increase in negative Arab public opinion of America since the beginning of its war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.

2. History of Bombing/Intervention: Hasty and Disproportionate

Unconstrained by any superpower rival or system of global governance, the US giant has rewritten the global financial and trading system in its own interest; ripped up a string of treaties it finds inconvenient; sent troops to every corner of the globe; bombed Afghanistan, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Iraq without troubling the United Nations; maintained a string of murderous embargos against recalcitrant regimes; and recklessly thrown its weight behind Israel's 34-

year illegal military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as the Palestinian intifada rages. (Milne, 2001)

Portions of the foreign public see the American military as a self-identified big brother that has intervened in the developing world's affairs for decades. From their point of view, America has been involved in, supplied weapons for, and secured oil or profited from many conflicts around the world in which many innocent people have died. America is perceived as always attempting to impose its will on other nations through military and economic power, or by instigation through its influence. Whether the reason is to spread democracy, or to secure oil, it is perceived as being for self-interest. Many feel that America has historically attempted to overthrow or undermine any government, through overt or covert measures, that was not a democracy or not moving in the direction of being a democracy.

Of the many examples that some foreigners point to as evidence of America's selfish, hasty or disproportionate aggression, one is the U.S. bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory in response to bombings of the U.S. embassy in Sudan (Barletta, 1998). Although the Clinton administration stated that the factory was linked to Osama bin Laden and involved in the production of chemical weapons, reportedly, this justification turned out to be fabricated and unreliable according to the Central Intelligence Agency (The New York Times, 1998). Similarly, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 under the justification that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), only to have that justification

fall apart. As a result, innocent people have been killed, and much of the foreign public views this type of U.S. aggression as a growing trend, and a source of resentment toward America (CNN, 2004).

Another example of perceived American disproportioned aggression is in U.S. attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. America remains the first and only nation to use nuclear bombs against the population of another nation, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians. Although the voice from Japan is largely considered one for peace and forgiveness, many will point to these attacks as a source of resentment (Kagan, 2006). Some of the foreign public believe that America must pay for its indiscriminate mass killing of so many people.

3. Political and Economic Oppression

Some of the foreign public resent the United States for what they perceive as oppression or repressive actions. Examples that are cited are U.S. support to authoritarian regimes, and U.S. oil and economic blockades.

a. Support to Authoritarian Regimes: Hypocrisy

The U.S. has been accused of supporting authoritarian regimes in order to "protect U.S. interests" (Chernus, 2007). Many consider this repeated behavior a contribution to the oppression of their people, and an act of "hypocrisy" given the America's long-claimed commitment to democracy, reaffirmed in Presidents Bush's 2005 inaugural address:

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world... All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When it stands for liberty, we will stand for you. (President Bush, 2005)

"Nice words" says Ira Chernus, professor of religious studies at the University of Colorado, but go tell it to "the Pakistanis...the Egyptians, or the Uzbeks, or the Palestinians, or the Nigerians, or the Saudis, or the inhabitants of all the countries where the administration has betrayed its promise to promote democracy" (Chernus, 2007). Just as America was accused of supporting oppressive groups like the Taliban in exchange for its help in fighting America's enemy during the Cold war, America is accused of supporting dictators that will help to fight America's present day enemy. "Now 'terrorist' have replaced 'communists'," Chernus says.

American support for the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both viewed by many Arabs as regimes that are "repressive, corrupt, and wholly dependent on American backing," has been cited as one reason why Arabs are drawn to Osama bin Laden (Englund, 2001). President Bush is more recently criticized for his pledged support to Pakistani dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, named a indispensable U.S. ally in the war on terror (Chernus, 2007). Moreover, this news came at a time when many Pakistanis were still angry about the decline of its society into a feminist, gun and heroin infested land, which they attribute to President Regan's decision to give billions of dollars in aid and

weapons to Pakistan's dictator in the 1980s, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. America's support allowed General Zia to arm the mujaheddin, Afghan guerillas, and warlords in order to resist Soviet occupation (Hamid, 2007).

These are a few of numerous examples that the foreign public cite as evidence of American hypocrisy through support for undemocratic entities. American interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iran and Iraq over the past several decades are all noted in literature as a source for lingering sour feelings amongst the foreign public, toward the United States. American's common justification of "national security," is viewed by some as the U.S. government's "favorite catch-all code-word for interest of the American empire" (Chernus, 2007).

b. Oil and Economic Blockades

Another common source of resentment toward America stems from America's economic activities, or activities that are perceived to be for economic gain. There is usually a suspicion that U.S. activities around the world are somehow tied to U.S. oil interests. America's Cold War to keep communism away from the Persian Gulf (Hamid, 2007); U.S. suppression of national liberation movements in the Middle East (Kagan, 2006); and U.S. Iraq policies like the Oil-for-food resolution following the first Gulf War (Lynch, 2005, p. 103) are all attributed to U.S. oil interest, along with many other U.S. decisions. American dependency on oil for "national security interests" has created an air of constant doubt in the minds of the foreign public as to the sincerity of U.S. foreign policy motives.

There is also worldwide resentment and concern, that U.S. policies cause "poverty and suffering" around the world (Kagan, 2006). These conditions are attributed to America's support to corrupt and tyrannical regimes. U.S. economic blockades led to a major "humanitarian crisis," and widespread suffering of Iraqi people in the 1990s (Lynch, 2005, p. 99), which served to unify a then divided Arab community against America. As America sets the rules for a world economy, many perceive that millions "simply have no chance to take part" and will suffer for it (Englund, 2001). What America calls globalization, many foreigners view as "Americanization," through U.S. policies that will serves U.S. economic interest while increasing the gap between the world's rich and poor nations.

4. The Arms Trade

Though there have been no wars between world superpowers since World War II, there have been over 200 wars, coups and revolutions, of which the overwhelming majority have been fought in the third world (Blewett, 2000). A source on criticism of America comes into play when considering how the combatants were armed to fight these conflicts, and the many deaths that they account for. For example, in 1992 alone, The United States accounted for 46 percent of arms trades delivered to third world countries (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). Between 1945 and 1989, approximate 23 million deaths occurred in wars in the third world. Between 1970 and 1989, the Middle East, Africa, the Far East, South Asia, and Latin America were sent \$388 billion in weapons. Of that \$388 billion,

the two major superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, accounted for 69 percent of the weapons transfers, and over 40 percent went to the Middle East (1995).

Still today, the United States transfers the highest amount of small arms to unstable countries (Lobe, 2007). From the foreign publics' point of view, America is a major enabler of the war and conflict that makes their world less safe. Chernus states that Pakistan's "democracy movement will now be suppressed with weapons sent and paid for by us, the American taxpayers" (2007). Arms trading is seen as another demonstration of how America puts its political and economical interests above everything else. Although some argue that smaller governments need these arms in order to secure peace in their nation, dissenters argue that in many cases, American arms actually end up in the hands of opposition parties to fuel conflict or support coups in countries where American interest may be in jeopardy or where America is at odds with that country's government. For example, the U.S. has armed and trained groups like the Taliban, despite their dishonorable human rights records, in order to further U.S. political interests (Rubin, 2002). In other cases, strategic considerations may take a back seat to protecting jobs and the U.S. arms industry.

D. WHO AMERICA IS: PERVERSE, NAÏVE, & SELF-RIGHTEOUS

The final major category of reasons for anti-Americanism, most prominent in Arab nations, consists of characteristics that some foreigners think define the American identity. Specifically, America often is

identified with perversity. This perverse identity is considered to be evident from America's contagious cultural perversity, blind naivety, and self-righteous patriotism.

1. Cultural Contamination

This section presents negative attributes that are cited about the American culture. The culture is perceived as one plagued by overindulgence and violence, and as a culture that spreads and compromises other cultures.

a. *Occidentalism: American Overindulgence and Gluttony*

Similar to the divide amongst opinions within the American population about the positive and negative attributes of American culture, some in the foreign public admire American culture, and others consider it a perverse culture. Those who look at it as perverse also resent the fact that its popularity is infecting their own culture, especially their youth. In the book, *Occidentalism* (2005), Buruma and Margalit reveal four criticisms of Western world that are a source of hatred, particularly from the Eastern world: 1) sinful decadent cosmopolitan cities; 2) materialism and focus on commerce and comfort over sacrifice; 3) machinelike, scientific society without a soul; and 4) idolatry or the worship of these evils. Some of the foreign public view American society as a magnification of all of these perversities.

Literature points to different assertions from the foreign public as to how these perversities manifest themselves. One perceived manifestation is American obesity.

Compared with other nations the Americans are not just big, but super-size. Yet this obsession with obese Americans is about more than body fat. Certainly there is a debate to be had about the extent to which obesity is a problem in America - a discussion best left to medical experts. But a close examination of the popular genre on obesity reveals it is about more than consumption in the most literal sense of eating food. Obesity has become a metaphor for 'over-consumption' more generally. Affluence is blamed not just for bloated bodies, but for a society which is seen as more generally too big for its own good. (Ben-Ami, 2005)

America's obesity epidemic is well documented. In 2006, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that 65 percent of American adults were overweight, and over 30 percent of American children were obese, based on body fat index (2006). Some foreigners simply consider it a symptom of American overindulgence and gluttony.

b. Violence

Another perceived manifestation of American perversity that is often cited in literature is U.S. violent crime statistics, which are the highest in the industrialized world (Giddens, 2001).

There are more reported murders each year in Detroit, with a population of just over one-and-a-half million, than in the whole of the United Kingdom, which has a population of just over fifty-eight million people. (Giddens, 2001, p. 185)

In 1991 a U.S. Senate Judiciary committee report concluded that the United States as "the most violent and self-destructive nation on earth," with the highest rates

of rape (National Center for Victims of Crime, 1992), murder and violent crime of all democracies (Weiner, 1991). These statistics are well known by foreign countries, and many of the statistics are kept and monitored in the UN today. In addition, America has had periods where its rates of poverty, rape, violent crimes, and prison populations were higher than nearly all other nations in the Western world (e.g., Weiner, 1991; Vicini, 2006). The foreign public views a nation in which 82 percent claim to be Christians, according to the Pew Research Center surveys (March, 2002), as one of the most immoral nations on earth. That alone speaks to the potential resentment toward America's predominant religion, Christianity, from people of other religions.

c. *Compromises Foreign Values*

Some of the foreign public have less resentment toward American culture than they do to the fact that it seems to be contaminating their own culture, particularly their youth. A prime example of this can be found in Iran. For the article, *Fugitives; a reporter at large* (2005), Laura Secor interviewed several hard-line Islamic fundamentalists that were loyal to the Islamic Republic system in Iran. They were elated at the prospect of President Ahmadinejad restoring Islamic ethics that had been undermined by western culture and policies under Iran's previous president, President Khatami. Fundamentalist explained how western values had begun to turn their once pure culture into one in which vulgarity, sexual promiscuity, and drug abuse, which had become more prevalent among the youth. They wanted the new president to

rid their society of what they perceived as western entertainment leading to the country falling into moral confusion and disarray. One interviewee testified that although some Iranians say that they want more freedom, they cannot define it; therefore they invent their own definitions based on what they see in western culture (2005). Their concern is that many of ways that western cultures express freedom goes against Islamic values.

The cultural resentment is not limited to Iran. A large portion of fundamentalist Muslims refer to themselves as Salafis, or followers of Muhammad with a puritanical approach to Islam. These Muslim are united in their common emphasis on "deculturation," considering culture and human intellect as the enemy of true Islam (Wiktoorwicz, 2006, p. 210). They welcome more government crackdowns on bloggers, internet pornography, sexual improprieties and more. Fundamentalists' view of Islam can be summed in one statement by Ali Belashabadi, one of Secor's young fundamentalist interviewees, "this is our identity as Muslims" (Secor, 2005). They resent America for challenging their identity.

2. Naivety: America Does Not Understand Why it is Hated

In the eyes of many foreigners, their disdain for America is further exacerbated by the perception that many Americans "simply don't get it" (Milne, 2001). The foreign public views the American public as persistently naive as to the reasons that America is disliked. Only in the aftershock of the September 11, 2001 attacks, did many Americans even realize that anti-American sentiment existed

and was widespread throughout the world. Soon after the attacks, President Bush declared that America had been "awakened to danger" and "called to defend freedom" (BBC News, September 2001). As one self-proclaimed "reluctant fundamentalist" put it, when he mentioned U.S. actions that have caused anarchy, pain and suffering around the world, like "the final [U.S.] campaign [in Pakistan] of the Cold War...few [Americans] seemed to know much about it" (Hamid, 2007). As another columnist put it, Americans are "willfully ignorant of the rest of the world...Foreigners amount to 'remote little people on TV'" (Englund, 2001).

Foreigners also argue that the Americans that do understand that they are hated attribute the hatred to the wrong things. Even before September 11th, President Clinton stated to the world that U.S. strikes in Sudan in 1998 were "a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism" (CNN, 20 August 1998). In 2004, the U.S. National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, referred to the attackers as "radical, freedom-hating terrorists" (Rice, 2004). Today, President Bush maintains that attacks on America correlated to attacks on democratic freedom, as evident from the language used throughout the most recent United States *National Security Strategy* (President Bush, 2006). It appears that this assumption alone, and the language used to articulate it, is offensive to some of the foreign public. Many foreigners believe that the attacks on America were a result of direct hatred for America and its actions, not hatred for democracy and freedom. The belief that Americans do not understand this is perceived as evidence of America's self-righteousness.

3. Perceived Patriotism & Self Righteousness

Since George Bush's father inaugurated his new world order a decade ago, the US, supported by its British ally, bestrides the world like a colossus... It is this record of unabashed national egotism and arrogance that drives anti-Americanism among swaths of the world's population, for whom there is little democracy in the current distribution of global wealth and power. (Milne, 2001)

Some in the foreign public view President Bush's stance on the September 11th attacks as attacks on freedom and democracy, as not only a display of America's ignorance of its wrongdoings, but as a self-righteous notion. Speaking of America as if it is synonymous with freedom can be viewed as a display of indifference to other political systems and other countries in the 'free world' (Gadahan, 2001). Some dissenters argue that the September 11th terrorist targets were not icons of freedom and democracy; rather, they were icons of U.S. commerce, the U.S. military, and the U.S. political leadership, all instruments of U.S. foreign policy (Petras, 2001).

Others argue that the terrorism was a tactic - a "tool of the weak versus the strong" (Bandow, 2003). They argue that attacks on America were a desperate attempt by a weaker opponent, whom had limited options for exerting influence over the United States, to strike back at America for its perceived wrongdoings against the attackers' countries, people and culture. Of the many different factors to which people attribute the attacks, very few outside of the United States attribute the attacks to the terrorists' hatred for democracy and freedom. The foreign public generally does not think that pride in one's own

country is wrong as long as that pride is informed with knowledge of the weaknesses and wrongdoings of one's country.

E. MISCELLANEOUS OTHER SOURCES OF RESENTMENT

In addition to the reasons listed above, America's missile defense policy, perceived shortsightedness, and maltreatment of foreign captives are also noted in multiple sources as causes of anti-Americanism. America garnered resentment from the international community for President Bush's vow to press forward with a missile defense plan, and U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (Federation of American Scientists, 2001). This decision widened the growing rift between America and its allies, as Europeans "[came] down firmly" against America's stance on this issue (Pew Research Center, August 2001). Today, America's missile defense program is in full swing, headed by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. Resentment toward America has also been attributed to what foreigners perceive as a general "lack of visionary leadership" (Kennedy, 2002). America is accused of adopting short-term strategies that do not take into account long-term implications, particularly when the United States takes military or economic actions that have long-term humanitarian effects (Gerges, 2005). Lastly, America is accused of hypocrisy in its treatment of prisoners, particularly Arab prisoners, which has been cited as a source of resentment. Allegations of torture (Chernus, 2007), horrific prison conditions in Guantanamo Bay

(Financial Times, 2007), and the Abu Ghraib incident (Hersh, 2004) are all alluded to in different pieces of literature.

In summation, worldwide anti-Americanism is attributed to many factors that foreigners vigorously defend. There is surely no shortage of opinions on the reasons for this resentment. Although literature reveals a great variation of reasons for this resentment, since September 11th, there has been little disagreement that this widespread resentment exists. Research organizations appear to have taken Elmenshawy's sentiments to heart, and have collected years of quality polling data, which validates and quantifies the resentment. Fortunately, much of the polling data is comprised of survey results that came directly from the source, the foreign public.

F. POLLING DATA: TRENDS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, 2001 - PRESENT

1. Opinions in Western Europe, Pre-September 11th

Anyone who believes in the importance of U.S.-European relations can only hope that the Bush administration will take these poll results to heart and return to the principle - articulated by the president during last fall's campaign - that the United States can accomplish its goals in the world only if it takes into account the interests of others. If it does, the administration can attract broad public support for policies on global warming, missile defense and other issues which advance the interests of people living on both sides of the Atlantic. If it does not, the poll results being released today suggest that we might well be facing a serious deterioration in trans-Atlantic relations which cannot be ameliorated by traditional diplomacy. (Halperin, 2001)

Since September 11th, organizations have attempted to collect survey data in order to shed some light on the trend and sources of hatred and resentment toward America. One of those organizations, the Pew Research Center (PRC), conducted particularly intriguing polls over the past seven years. The polls reveal enlightening facts on the nature of the negative trend that appears to validate the widespread existence of anti-American resentment. In choosing to use these polls for this study, an important factor that was considered was the fact that this organization went directly to the Arab public for their opinions. With one exception, their findings were not based on the opinions of politicians, so-called Middle East experts, nor Arab Americans; rather, citizens in Middle Eastern countries like, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were asked questions about their opinions of America and issues facing their society. Additionally, the foreign public in Western European nations like Great Britain, France, and Germany were asked about their opinions of America. This methodology speaks to the credibility and relevance of the polling results in assessing foreign public opinion. Collectively, several of these polling results help to uncover some intricacies about the foreign public's resentment for America, which will then be analyzed through attribute mapping to suggest how America can prioritize its effort to reverse these negative trends.

PRC conducted one poll, as part of its Global Attitudes Project, just one month before September 11th. This poll gauged public opinion of approximate 4,000 people, in four major nations in Western Europe - Great Britain, Italy, Germany and France. The results reveal that

even before September 11th, foreign opinion of American had begun to suffer. President Bush was highly unpopular, as the public disapproved of his handling of international policy. President Bush's foreign policy approval rating was 40 to 60 percentage points below President Clinton's (Pew Research Center, August 2001). Over 73 to 85 percent in each country say that President Bush made decisions based entirely on U.S. interests. The great majority also stated that President Bush understood less about Europe than previous American presidents, and less than 18 percent said that he considered Europe in his decisions.

The View From Europe: Rating Presidents...					
	<u>Fra</u>	<u>Ger</u>	<u>Ita</u>	<u>GB</u>	<u>US</u>
	%	%	%	%	%
<i>G.W. Bush's</i>					
<i>int'l policy</i>					
Approve	16	23	29	17	45
Disapprove	59	65	46	49	32
Don't know	25	12	25	34	23
	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Bill Clinton's</i>					
<i>int'l policy</i>					
Approve	68	86	71	66	n/a
Disapprove	15	9	16	15	n/a
Don't know	17	5	13	19	n/a
	100	100	100	100	
... And Assessing Bush's European Approach					
	<u>Fra</u>	<u>Ger</u>	<u>Ita</u>	<u>GB</u>	
	%	%	%	%	
<i>Bush makes</i>					
<i>decisions:</i>					
Based only on					
U.S. interests	85	73	74	79	
Takes Europe into					
account	8	18	15	14	
Don't know	7	9	11	7	
	100	100	100	100	
<i>Understands Europe:</i>					
Better than other					
presidents	12	13	18	13	
Less than other					
presidents	74	75	53	75	
Don't know	14	12	29	12	
	100	100	100	100	

Table 1. European Views on President Bush (From: Pew Research Center, August 2001)

The polling data noted two major unilateral decisions that the United States made that did not sit well with the foreign public. First was the U.S. decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol, which Europeans opposed by approximately an eight-to-one margin (Pew Research Center, August 2001). The second unilateralist decision was the U.S. stance on continuing missile defense, which 65 to 83 percent disapprove of the U.S. decision. Though the polling data indicated that the European public was divided when asked whether basic interests of Europe and the United States grew closer, further apart, or neither, it seemed clear that there was a growing concern for American neglect for European interest, and a clear sign of low confidence ratings for President Bush.

Q.4 As I read some specific policies of [American] President George W. Bush			
tell me if you approve or disapprove of them.			
List items were rotated			
	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/Refused
a.	Bush's decision that the U.S. should not support the Kyoto protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions		
US	29	44	27=100
BRIT	10	83	7=100
ITA	12	80	8=100
GER	10	87	3=100
FRA	10	85	5=100
b.	Bush's decision that the U.S. should try to develop a missile defense system even if it means withdrawing from the ABM treaty		
US	39	42	19=100
BRIT	20	66	14=100
ITA	24	65	11=100
GER	10	83	7=100
FRA	14	75	11=100

Table 2. European Views on President Bush Decisions
(From: Pew Research Center, August 2001)

2. Opinions Leaders' observations, Post-September 11th, Pre-Iraq

A second PRC poll, the only poll used in this study that is not based on a representative sample of the general public, used a methodology that consisted of assessing the observations of 'opinion leaders,' or influential people across five categories - politics, media, business, culture and government (Pew Research Center, December 2001). From the U.S. point of view, these 275 opinion leaders are closer to the foreign public than Americans are, and their observations can provide a useful gauge of the public opinions in their countries. Future polling research that was conducted by PRC collected opinions directly from the public, which served to validate this study. This phased approach to polling meshes well with the attribute mapping methodology discussed in Chapter III.

Similar to the results in the pre-September 11th survey, 63 to 75 percent of foreign opinion leaders felt that the United States was conducting the war on terrorism without regard for the interests of its allies (Pew Research Center, December 2001). In contrast, 70 percent of U.S. opinion leaders felt that America was acting multilaterally. Over half of the foreign opinion leaders thought the war on terror should be confined to Afghanistan and opposed extending the war into Iraq or Somalia, even if it was discovered that the regimes in those nations supported terrorist activities. With only 29 percent supporting a war outside of Afghanistan if the evidence warranted it, one can see how this may be fuel for U.S.

resentment, since there is no solid case that Iraq supported the terrorist attacks, and America invaded Iraq in 2003 anyway.

Leadership Views on Conduct of War			
	U.S. Acting Multi- laterally	Attack Iraq and Somalia*	(N)
	%	%	
<i>U.S.</i>	70	50	(40)
<i>Total Non-U.S.</i>	33	29	(235)
Western Europe	34	32	(41)
E. Europe/Russia	37	23	(30)
Latin America	37	34	(41)
Asia	25	27	(62)
Mid-East/Conflict Area	27	24	(41)
All Islamic states	25	32	(71)

*If it is shown they have supported terrorism

Table 3. Foreign Views on American Multilateralism and Iraq (From: Pew Research Center, December 2001)

To uncover reasons why the foreign public disliked the United States, opinion leaders were asked whether six factors had a minor, major or no impact on their publics' dislike of America (Pew Research Center, December 2001). Four factors stood out: American power, American contribution to the gap between the rich and poor, American support for Israel, and the power of America's multinational corporations. In the Arab nations, the primary reasons for disliking America were American support to Israel, and America's contribution to the gap between the rich and poor. Western European opinion leaders rated U.S. power very highly as a source of distain, as well as U.S. contribution to the rich-poor gap. Overall, a 73 percent majority believed that America was too supportive of Israel (Pew Research Center, December 2001). The highest

number of Western Europeans, 59 percent, rated the power of U.S. multinational corporations as a major source of resentment.

Major Reasons For Disliking the U.S.				
	Resentment Of U.S. Power	Causes Rich/Poor Gap	U.S. Support of Israel	Power of Multinat'l Corps.
	%	%	%	%
<i>U.S.</i>	88	43	70	40
<i>Total Non-U.S.</i>	52	52	29	36
Western Europe	66	61	22	59
E. Europe/Russia	64	53	17	47
Latin America	58	51	7	44
Asia	38	42	36	21
Mid-East/Conflict Area	54	59	57	17
All Islamic states	41	45	57	17

Table 4. Foreign Views on Reasons for Disliking the U.S.
(From: Pew Research Center, December 2001)

Despite these sources of resentment, the opinion leaders' assessments of America's overall popularity ratings were relatively high, post-September 11th. Eighty-one percent of opinion leaders in Western Europe thought that their public had a mostly favorable opinion of America. In the Muslim world, where one might suspect that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan could destroy public opinion of America, opinion in Arab nations was nearly split even, with a slight edge toward a mostly favorable opinion (Pew Research Center, December 2001).

Perceived Popular View of U.S.			
	<i>Ordinary People Have ...</i>		<i>DK/Ref</i>
	<i>Favorable</i>	<i>Unfavorable</i>	
	<i>Opinion</i>	<i>Opinion</i>	
	%	%	%
<i>Total Non-U.S.</i>	69	28	3=100
Western Europe	81	17	2=100
E. Europe/Russia	73	20	7=100
Latin America	63	32	5=100
Asia	74	24	2=100
Mid-East/Conflict Area	48	49	3=100
All Islamic states	52	45	3=100

Table 5. Foreign Favorability Ratings of Americans (From: Pew Research Center, December 2001)

3. Unfavorable Opinion of the U.S. on the Rise

Despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy for America following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, discontent with the United States has grown around the world over the past two years. Images of the U.S. have been tarnished in all types of nations: among long time NATO allies, in developing countries, in Easter Europe and, most dramatically, in Muslim societies. (Pew Research Center, December 2002, p. 1)

In 2002, PRC followed its opinion leader poll with a comprehensive public poll. It consisted of mostly face-to-face interviews of 38,000 people, in 44 nations, in 63 different languages. The surveys covered a large array of issues from local economics, to global conflict, to immigration, to health care, to public opinion of foreign countries. Notable findings about American included the fact that 44 to 75 percent of Western Europeans thought that the U.S. desire to control Iraqi oil was the principle reason the U.S. was considering war with Iraq (p. 4). In contrast, only 22 percent of Americans agreed. Despite resentment worldwide, 35 of 42 countries still gave the U.S. positive ratings, though ratings were down from

previous years. Western Europe gave America a 61 to 75 percent favorable rating, down from where the opinion leaders rated America in 2001 (Pew Research Center, December 2002, p. 1). Also notably lower than in 2001, Arab nations gave America a 6 to 35 percent favorable rating, with the exception of Uzbekistan, which did not participate in 2001 (p. 53). Uzbekistan, "a new U.S. ally in [the] fight against terror," rated America at 85 percent (p. 54).

Opinion of U.S.: Canada, Europe, Conflict Area			
	<u>Fav</u>	<u>Unfav</u>	<u>DK/</u> <u>Ref</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
North America			
Canada	72	27	3
West Europe			
Great Britain	75	16	9
Italy	70	23	7
France	63	34	2
Germany	61	35	4
East Europe			
Ukraine	80	19	2
Poland	79	11	10
Bulgaria	72	18	11
Czech Republic	71	27	2
Russia	61	33	6
Slovak Republic	60	39	1
Conflict Area			
Uzbekistan	85	11	4
Lebanon	35	59	6
Turkey	30	55	15
Jordan	25	75	0
Pakistan	10	69	20
Egypt	6	69	25

Table 6. Foreign Favorability Ratings of the U.S. (From: Pew Research Center, 2002, p. 54)

Though still very low, opinions in Western Europe on American unilateralism were either slightly better than the opinion leaders had suspected according to the 2001 poll, or favorable opinions actually increased from about 34 percent to about an average of 39 percent in 2002 (p. 58).

U.S. Foreign Policy and the War on Terror: Canada and Europe				
	<i>U.S. foreign policy considers others</i>		<i>U.S.-led war on terrorism</i>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
North America	%	%	%	%
Canada	25	73	68	27
West Europe				
Germany	53	45	70	25
Great Britain	44	52	69	23
Italy	36	58	67	22
France	21	76	75	23
East Europe				
Poland	29	59	81	11
Ukraine	29	68	86	13
Czech Republic	29	71	82	17
Slovak Republic	27	70	66	31
Russia	21	70	73	16
Bulgaria	20	69	72	10

Table 7. Foreign Views on U.S. Unilateralism and GWOT
(From: Pew Research Center, 2002, p. 58)

Other notable findings include the fact the most of the foreign public thought that “U.S. policies serve[d] to widen the global economic divide” (Pew Research Center, December 2002, p. 61); most rejected Americanization of their culture (p. 63); people were divided on their opinion of American-style democracy (p. 64); most liked American technology and entertainment (p. 66); and most thought unfavorably about American business practices (p. 68).

4. Iraq Invasion: Resentment Continues, 2003-2004

Opinion polls have been conducted every year since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in 2003, and they reveal the continued trend of worldwide negative opinion of America. In evaluating the collective results, several themes emerge: 1) American credibility and policy motives are always in questions; 2) American unilateralism has led

its traditional allies to desire more independence from U.S. policies; and 3) few support America's military actions.

In March 2003, less than a week before the invasion of Iraq began, America's rating had plummeted with its allies in Western Europe. Although negative opinions were attributed more to President Bush (p. 5) than America in general, U.S. favorability ratings dropped from 61 to 75 percent in 2002, to a dismal 25 to 48 percent in 2003 (Pew Research Center, 2003, p. 1). Spain, which was not surveyed in 2002, gave America only a 14 percent favorability rating, down from 50 percent in a 1999-2000 poll conducted by the U.S. Department of State. The polls revealed support in Western Europe for weakening its ties with America on security and diplomatic affairs (p. 2). Though most thought that the war's outcome would make the Iraqi people better off, and the Middle East more stable (p. 4), still 73 to 81 percent of Europe, except Great Britain, did not support the war (p. 1). Even in Great Britain, slightly more than half did not support the war.

In May 2003, just after the official conclusion of the Iraq war and the fall of Saddam Hussein, U.S. favorability ratings saw a short-lived increase - though still to a level that was lower than the 2002 ratings. However, 2004 polls revealed that America still had "credibility" problems as the favorability ratings dropped again (Pew Research Center, 2004, p. 1). In addition, polling data showed a steady increase in Western Europeans' desire for foreign and security policy independent of the United States. About half of U.S. and British citizens felt that

their leaders had simply been misinformed about WMDs, while an overwhelming majority of the rest of the world felt that U.S. leaders actually lied about WMDs (p. 15). Despite the low favorability ratings on America itself, Europeans have much higher favorability ratings of American people (p. 7). The majority of people in the Arab nations surveyed doubted America's sincerity in its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), saying it was actually an effort to "control Middle East oil and to dominate the world" (p. 1). Additionally, in Muslim nations only 5 to 30 percent gave America a favorable rating (p. 6), and 52 to 73 percent rated Christians unfavorably (p. 5).

5. America Resented Today More Than Ever, 2005-2007

Foreign public opinion of America has not improved. Between 2005 and 2007, American favorability ratings have only slightly fluctuated up or down, and have remained overwhelming low. The gap between positive and negative opinions of America have not grown significantly wider in most countries, but the number of countries that give America negative favorability ratings has increased (Pew Research Center, 2007, p. 3). The good news for the United States is that as polling questions have improved over the years, more apparent trends have emerged that indicate not just that America is resented, but the reasons why, how significant those reasons are, and clues as to what segments of the foreign public show opinion variations.

For example, PRC's 2005 poll revealed a slight variation in public opinion in the Muslim world based on age and gender. Of six Muslim countries, the median U.S. favorability ratings were found to be 7.5 percent and 5

percent higher among people less than 35 years of age and among women respectively (Pew Research Center, 2005, p. 14). Though Arabs were divided over the causes of the transition from resentment to Islamic extremism, the highest percentage of responses pointed to U.S. policies and influence, poverty and lack of jobs, and lack of education (p. 25). In addition, the majority of respondents felt that democracy could work in their country (p. 33), but Islam needed to play a great role in politics (p. 35).

The latest PRC poll revealed that America's favorability ratings were low, but ratings of the American people were somewhat better (Pew Research Center, 2007, pp. 88-89). Still only 5 to 33 percent in Western Europe felt that the United States took into account the interests of other countries (p. 97); and 54 to 73 percent in Western Europe and the Middle East still feel that America's policies increase the gap between the rich and the poor (p. 98). Fifty-four to 90 percent consider it a bad thing if American ideas and customs spread to their country (p. 99). Although Islamic nations think that democracy could work in their country, most dislike American ideas about democracy (p. 100), citing that America mostly promotes democracy only where it serves their interest (p. 106). Today, Arab nations overwhelmingly are opposed the U.S. led war on terror, think that U.S. troops should leave Iraq and Afghanistan, feel that America favors Israel unfairly, and feel that America is the biggest environmental threat to the world (pp. 115-129). Even more interesting is the fact that our allies in Western Europe mostly agree with that assessment. The 2007 pools reveal that environment issues are becoming an increasing source for concern for most

countries around the world, and unless America, as the nation most harmful to the environment, does not take a more active role in resolving the issues, it may become a source of even greater resentment in the coming years.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Some argue that there has always been an anti-American sentiment, and the war in Iraq has just revived it. Others blame a recent radicalization of American foreign policy under President Bush. Still others attribute it to a long history of U.S. policies and actions that have mostly belittled the significance of long-term impacts. Arguably, resentment stems from a combination these factors. Interestingly, even in places around the world where there is ramped anti-Americanism, one will most likely also find widespread affection for some American things. Despite this fact, many believe that American should not “lightly dismiss the current hostility toward the United States....International legitimacy matters” (Kagan, 2006).

Given the circumstance, what can America do to address deteriorating foreign public opinion? With there being such great variation in public opinion on the reasons for resentment, this study suggests that a preceding and more important question is, ‘Of all the reasons, which should America attempt to address?’ Given the fiscal reality and resource limitations, American cannot, nor should it, realistically implement a plan to counteract all of the factors that cause resentment. If one accepts that idea, then what factors should America prioritize? The next

chapter suggests a framework for analyzing the factors in order to answer this question and support resource allocation decisions.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. REFRAMING THE PROBLEM

As introduced in previous chapters, the second phase of this study is intended to propose a framework for analyzing the relative importance of individual factors that were identified as sources of resentment toward America. Despite the fact that the United States government and nonprofit organizations have taken traditional and innovative measures to curb unfavorable public opinion and improve international relations, polling data seems to indicate that these efforts have not had lasting results. A few examples of these efforts include foreign exchange programs (Courteau, 2005), foreign economic aid (Pincus, 2007), media campaigns (Albiniak, 2001), humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts (Ballen, 2006). To varying degrees, programs involving every instrument of national power, information, economic, diplomatic, and military means, have been utilized in this effort. This study suggests that the overall lack of success in swaying public opinion may not be due to a lack of effort, but possibly to a flawed focus.

Rather than looking at new innovative solutions, this study takes a step backward to look at an inventive way of looking at the problem. In the world of business and profit, companies are continually forced to find innovative ways to look at problems, in order to remain competitive. As such, many of tools, techniques and best practices have been developed in the business world for framing companies'

problems, which then allow companies to determine how to best bring value to their customers. One of these techniques is called attribute mapping.

B. ATTRIBUTE MAPPING IN THE BUSINESS WORLD

In the corporate sector, one of the simplest ways to improve on the value brought to customers is through the process of redesigning a company's existing offerings (products and services). The end goal of redesign is to establish a "blockbuster" design that so strongly appeals to specific target markets that it compels them to buy (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 23). A simple technique that can be used to identify opportunities for redesign is called attribute mapping. This technique gives managers the insight to predict how specific customer segments will respond to specific attributes in a product, which then arms managers with the knowledge to optimize their resource investments and strengthen their product's value for the customers.

Ian MacMillan and Rita Gunther McGrath first introduced the analytic technique of attribute mapping in 1996 in the publication, *Harvard Business Review* (pp. 58-73). They further expanded on the idea and other opportunity identification techniques in their 2000 book, *The Entrepreneurial Mindset*. MacMillan and McGrath suggest that product or service attributes present opportunities that are not blatantly obvious to managers. Attribute mapping allows managers to develop rational product strategies, despite the presence of seemingly irrational customer behavior. A rational strategy must also be profitable, which means giving customers a sufficient mix

of product attributes that they value. If a company does not sufficiently invest into attributes that customers value, it will lose the customers. If it invests too much into attributes that customers do not value, then the company loses profit.

Two keys to the attribute map deserve emphasis. First, there is the idea of what customers value, versus what customers want. Managers should focus on identifying what the customers value, and not just what customers say they want. Customers often will say they want special attributes, but the attribute map helps managers determine how important those special attributes are to the customers. All attributes come at a cost. How much is the customer willing to give up in terms of money, convenience, size, or time in order to have that attribute? Is that attribute a deal breaker or just a nice-to-have? Attribute mapping helps managers to make this determination before making decisions to redesign their offering.

The second key is that the attribute mapping process is simple and repeatable. The commercial marketplace is constantly evolving. Customers want product 'A' one year and product 'B' the next year. Competitors offer attributes 'C' and 'D' one month, and then attributes 'E' and 'F' the next month. Societal changes like those in fashion, in healthcare, in the economy or in the environment create constant change in customers needs. Corporate acquisitions and mergers, business failures, business strategy adjustments, or the growth of new small businesses create constant change in the competitive environment. In an environment of constant change, attribute mapping gives

managers a repeatable process for redesigning their offerings to ensure the best mix of attributes for the current environment.

C. UNDERSTANDING THE ATTRIBUTE MAP

1. Getting Started

The attribute map, shown in Table 8, simplifies the complexity in analyzing customer needs and a company's position in the market with respect to its competitors. To develop an attribute map, the user must first identify an offering and an important customer segment for that offering. Next, the user must categorize the attributes of the offering according to the categories in Table 8.

	<u>Basic</u>	<u>Discriminators</u>	<u>Energizers</u>
<u>Positive</u>	<i>Nonnegotiables</i>	<i>Differentiators</i>	<i>Exciters</i>
<u>Negative</u>	<i>Tolerables</i>	<i>Dissatisfiers</i>	<i>Enragers</i> <i>Terrifiers</i> <i>Disgusters</i>
<u>Neutral</u>	<i>So-whats</i>	<i>Parallel differentiators</i>	<i>No such beast</i>

Table 8. Attribute Map (After: McGrath and MacMillan, 2005)

The three columns in the attribute map help categorize attributes as basic, discriminating, or energizing (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 26). These columns are used to indicate the level of excitement that certain features generate for the customer, relative to competing offerings.

A basic feature generates no excitement. If in customers' judgments, a feature is basic, then the customer takes for granted that any competitor could offer it. A discriminator is a feature that generates some excitement, meaning that customers consider this feature as one that positively or negatively distinguishes a product. Lastly, an energizer is a feature that generates great passion. If the customers judge a feature to be an energizer, then this feature may dominate the customers buying decision.

The three rows in the attribute map categorize the attitudes that customers could have toward a feature (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 25). Positive features are those that the customer likes, or would rather have. Negative features are those that the customer dislikes, or would rather do without. Lastly, neutral features are those that the customer does not care about, or would feel the same about whether the feature was included or not.

2. Positive Attributes

When customer attitudes are positive toward certain features of an offering, it is more valuable to them, and they may even be willing to pay a premium price for it. Each type of positive feature requires the manager to take a different approach. The first type, a basic positive feature, is referred to as Nonnegotiable (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 26). Customers regard nonnegotiable features as standard, almost as a feature that the producer is obligated to provide as a matter of course. Most competitors offer this feature, so if a company does not offer it, then their product is perceived as inferior. In mature industries, there are usually many nonnegotiables,

while newer industries have many fewer. For example, in the automobile industry, features like air conditioners and built-in radios are now nonnegotiable attributes, though two decades ago they were special features.

Nonnegotiables can be a headache for managers. These features are usually not profitable. Having these features does not guarantee that a company will sell more products, but not having them almost certainly ensures that its product will not sell. Often, a company can expend valuable resources, and decrease their profit margin in order to produce nonnegotiables, only to have the consumer completely take these features for granted.

The second type of positive feature, discriminating attributes, are referred to as differentiators (p. 27). Differentiators set a company's offering apart from its competitors' in a positive way, as the offering has features that competitors' offerings do not. All else equal, the more differentiators a product has, the more likely a customer's buying decision will be swayed in that product's favor. Like nonnegotiables, differentiators also can sometimes go unnoticed unless the existence and benefits of these features are well communicated to the consumer.

The last type of positive feature, a positively energizing feature, is referred to as an Exciter (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 27). These features are so overwhelmingly attractive to the customer, that they usually constitute the primary reason for making a

purchasing decision. Since the perfect product does not exist, every product has drawbacks. Exciters can help to counterbalance the drawbacks in offerings.

According to McGrath and MacMillan, managers will often misinterpret what their exciters are (2005). Managers will intuitively correlate the company's expense and difficulty of including a feature with the excitement that customers will feel about the feature. In reality, exciters can often be features that are technically simple and inexpensive to produce. For example, Honda introduced the cup holder in 1988 as a standard feature in its automobiles. Honda credits this development with their emergence as the best-selling automobile in the United States for at least a five year period (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 28). With little else to differentiate cars in Honda's class, this small feature that made peoples' lives more convenient caused a big stir, and swung millions of buyers in Honda's direction.

3. Negative Attributes

Since no product is perfect, an offering will inevitably have some attributes that certain customer segments find undesirable. When customers attitudes are negative toward certain attributes of an offering, this is a great opportunity for innovation. Find a solution that eliminates or mitigates the negative aspects of an offering, and a competitive advantage will have been gained if the competitors do not address their negative attributes. The best way to determine what these negative attributes are, aside from asking the customers themselves, is to ask a company's customer service, technical support,

complaint handling and sales department staffs (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 30). These employees deal with the customers on a regular basis; but unfortunately, management sometimes leaves their input out of redesign decisions, instead relying on input from engineering or product development departments. Although employees can be a great source of input, if major redesign decisions are made based solely on their input, then a company could discover that some assumptions that their employees made about customer attitudes were wrong. If employee input is used, then it should be validated with customer feedback.

The first type of negative attribute is a basic negative feature, referred to as a Tolerable (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 30). Customers regard tolerables as negative attributes that they can deal with. For example, some customers consider short battery life a tolerable attribute in certain cellular phones. They may accept this drawback because the phone has differentiators or excitors like an esthetically pleasing look, or a digital music player with great sound quality. The problem with having a tolerable attribute is that as soon as a competitor develops a product that is free of that attribute, all else being equal, customers will find a product with that attribute less valuable.

Of even greater concern is the second type of negative attribute, dissatisfiers. Dissatisfiers are negatively discriminating attributes that put a product in an inferior position to its competitors. Unlike differentiators, which could go relatively unnoticed if they are not well marketed to the consumer, dissatisfiers will usually be noticed

quickly, and will more quickly sway purchasing decisions. Bad news spreads more quickly and louder than good news, which brings us to the last negative attribute, enragers.

Enragers are negative energizers, and should be avoided at all costs. This category consists of the attributes that are so overwhelmingly negative, that they can stir negative emotions like fear or disgust from customers (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 32). Enragers can occur due to a company's lack of ability to predict customer reaction, or it can result from unanticipated events and misfortunes, like the 2006 E. coli spinach outbreak in the United States (CNN.com, 2006). This event not only dramatically reduced sales for the company that was the source of the spinach, but for all other bagged spinach companies.

4. Neutral Attributes

There are two types of neutral customer responses to certain attributes. McGrath and MacMillan refer to the neutral basic response as "so-what?" (2000, pp. 33-34). "So-what" attributes are those that the customer does not care about, so it has minimal to no impact on their buying decision. "So-what" attributes may stem from features that were important in the past, but are no longer important. For example, one could argue that computer floppy disc drives were a nonnegotiable in the 1990s computer industry. In 2007, with the increased size of basic electronic files, and the advent of high storage capacity USB memory devices, many computers do not come with floppy disc drives and most customers do not care.

“So-what” attributes can also stem from features that specific customer segments want, though other segments may not care about nor be willing to pay for. For example, many Verizon Wireless cellular customers may say that they want to be able to watch news broadcasts instantly on their cellular phones, but how valuable of an attribute is it really? Although certain customer segments will pay for it, other customers want the attribute if it is free, but are not willing to pay for it.

Including “so-what” attributes in an offering could mean wasted resources and lower profit margins. However, in analyzing the “so-what” attributes, managers must recognize that attributes that are “so-what” to some customers may be positive attributes to another. Possible solutions to this conflict are to either create different offerings for customer segments with different needs, to determine who the most important customer segment is and focus on their needs, or to make an offering customizable.

The last category of neutral attributes are referred to as Parallel Differentiators (2000, pp. 35). Parallels are separate offerings that are positioned as features in parallel with the primary offering, though it has little to do with the function of the primary offering. An example of a parallel attribute is the frequent flier miles programs for airlines.

D. KEYS TO UTILIZING THE ATTRIBUTE MAP TO REDESIGN AN OFFERING

By mapping the attributes of an offering for a particular customer segment, a company can create an attribute matrix that allows it to better identify,

evaluate, prioritize and pursue innovative opportunities for redesign and value creation. McGrath and MacMillan reveal several elements to this process that optimizes results: 1) mapping the attributes; 2) checking assumptions; 3) prioritizing actions; 4) capturing opportunities; and 5) keeping an eye on dynamics (2000, pp. 35-47). The third element, prioritizing actions, is the focus of this study.

Managers should give top priority to addressing negative attributes, with the very first priority being to resolve customer concerns by addressing attributes that are enragers or brewing enragers (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 42). In the corporate world, enragers should be eliminated at all costs. Eliminating enragers serves more to eliminate reasons for customers to dislike a product than it does to entice customers to like the product.

The next priority is to deal with dissatisfiers and emerging dissatisfiers, which take away from the customer's perception of value in a product (p. 42-43). Immediate and visible short-term improvements in these areas go a long way toward sparing a company from the increasing momentum of customer backlash that result from allowing these negative attributes to linger unaddressed.

Though the most significant impact, and the primary focus of this study, centers around efforts to address negative attributes, dealing with positive or neutral attributes has its place in creating customer value. After addressing the most dominant negative attributes, the next priority is to address resource efficiency by dealing with nonnegotiables and "so-what" attributes (pp. 43-44). Since

nonnegotiables are not very profitable, they present an opportunity for managers to discover innovative ways to reduce the costs of including these attributes. The presence of "so-what" attributes is an indication that a company may be wasting valuable resources; hence, if it determines that an attribute is universally "so-what" for all of its customer segments, it should consider eliminating that attribute all together. If a company determines that an attribute is "so-what" for only some of its customers, then it must determine whether it would be more resource efficient to include the attribute for all customers or to reserve the attribute as an option for specific customers. If the attribute is inexpensive to produce, not a negative attribute for some customers, and considered by some customers as merely a nice-to-have only if it is free, then a company should consider including it for all customers. An example of this is demonstrated by the many features in Microsoft Office products that go unnoticed and unused by most users. On the other hand, if an attribute is the opposite of any of the previous description, then it should be considered as an option that willing customer segments can pay for separately.

As a last priority, after categorizing the attributes of an offering and identifying the attributes that should be given top priority, managers can look for other latent opportunities. These opportunities may come through eliminating tolerables, improving upon discriminators and excitors, or establishing positive parallel differentiators. Completing this attribute mapping process

allows managers to focus their innovation efforts on the facets of their offering that will net the most significant payoffs.

E. TRANSLATING ATTRIBUTE MAPPING FROM THE BUSINESS WORLD TO THE WORLD OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

1. Adjusting Terminology and Context

This study demonstrates that attribute mapping can be used not only to redesign offerings that are tangible products, but can be used to redesign anything that can be offered and marketed to a customer, including goods, services, experiences, events, persons, places, properties, organizations, information and ideas (Kotler and Keller, 2006). The same process that managers use in profit generating companies to refocus their product attributes, can be adapted to attack the issue of declining foreign public opinion of America. Making this transition first requires a correlation between the terms used in the business world from Chapter III, and the terms used in the realm of public perceptions and diplomacy.

Terms from the business world that warrant translations for the purposes of this study include: manager, customer, offering, attributes, and perceived value. The manager in this study is the U.S. government or any government employee in a position to shape foreign opinion. The customer is the foreign public, and the offerings are American policies, actions and identity. Just as a manager's goal is sell a company's products to the customers, a goal of the United States government could be to sell certain U.S. policies, actions and identity to the foreign public. In line with the attribute mapping

methodology, managers can best sell their offerings by prioritizing its attributes based on how the customers value the attributes. Similarly, the American government can best sell its policies, actions and identity by prioritizing American attributes based on how the foreign public values them. Accordingly, this study correlates attributes to the factors that cause resentment toward America, sometimes referred to in the remainder of this document as resentment factors.

In the business world, managers determine whether attributes are perceived as positive, negative or neutral, and more importantly, determine where the attributes stand on the customer's internal scale of importance. This valuation process reveals the final and most significant correlation that this study makes in order to apply attribute mapping to this foreign opinion context. A correlation was made between how managers determine their customer's perceived value for product attributes, and how the United States could determine the foreign public's perceived value for American attributes. To assign value to American attributes, the first task was to rank order the resentment factors that were most prominently identified by each of the two foreign public segments that were used in the study. The second task was to list the values that appeared to be most important to those segments. Finally, this information was combined with collective themes from all polling data, in a subjective evaluation, to determine how attributes might be valued. The final result was the development of theoretical attribute maps for each foreign public segment.

2. Research Scope and Limitations

Applying the attribute mapping framework to this context required that the scope be narrowed down to a reasonable level for a study of this nature, yet still effectively demonstrate the methodology. The following sections explain the adjustments that were made and approaches that were used to accomplish this.

a. Adjusting Methodology for Scope

As discussed in this chapter, for the attribute mapping methodology to be most effective, the users should narrow the evaluation process by conducting separate evaluations for different offerings, and separate evaluations for each customer segment. The cellular phone industry provides a simple example. In the cellular industry, in deciding how to redesign phones, service plans, and customer service attributes for business travelers, teenagers, and the elderly, a manager in a cellular company might develop nine separate attribute maps accounting for each possible combination of offerings and customers. Applying the methodology to public diplomacy is more complex; hence, for the purposes of demonstrating the attribute mapping process, this study uses an adjusted methodology that in a sense narrows and yet paradoxically broadens the scope of evaluation.

The scope was narrowed in a sense, due to the fact that the foreign public polls used in the study collectively disclosed the attitudes of hundreds of thousands of respondents, from over 50 countries worldwide, and spanned a number of years; yet, the two attributes maps in Chapter IV focus solely on attitudes in Arab nations and

in Western Europe. Additionally, evaluation was further limited to the following countries that participated in all relevant polls: Arab nations - Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon; and Western European nations - Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden.

In another sense, the scope was broadened in that it took the attribute mapping process from one that can be incredibly micro and focused, to one that gave a very macro view of the customers and offerings. For instance, though Arabs and Western Europeans can be further broken down into hundreds of geographic or demographic segments, with varying attitudes, for this study, they are generalized into only two major groups. And though one could also argue that American offerings and attributes can be broken down into hundreds of categories, for this study, they are lumped into only three categories of offerings, with closely related attributes joined to form less than twenty total attributes. In addition, though attribute maps should be adjusted over time to reflect attitudes during specific time periods, the attribute maps for this study were developed from a collection of attitudes that spanned 2004 to 2007.

Finally, this research is limited by the subjectivity involved in the attribute mapping process. Although the process requires that customer opinions be measured, and attempts to provide systematic and reliable procedures for analyzing those opinions, this research required a subjective interpretation of the data. In other words, this study relies not only on exact numbers that the polling data provides, but also relies on evaluation and

correlation of that data. Despite the research limitations, and the fact that more in-depth and segmented evaluation is required, the attribute maps in Chapter IV provide a good first step toward understanding how to prioritize the issues effecting foreign public opinion to support resource allocation decisions.

b. One Research Method, Two-pronged Approach

Two slightly different approaches were used to demonstrate how attribute mapping might be adapted to determine how Arabs and Western Europeans value U.S. attributes, but the overall method applied was the same. Both approaches required the use of additional polling data, and both required combining research that identified public opinions about American attributes with research that identified public opinions on values. The first approach, used to evaluate Arab opinions, relied on key data that stemmed partly from Arabs' answers to open-ended questions that specifically asked about opinions of America (Arab American Institute, 2004). The second approach, used to evaluate Western European opinions, used data that stemmed partly from close-ended general questions that were not on the topic of America (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald and Eva, 2007). This two-pronged approach demonstrates the adaptability of the attribute mapping method, and the flexibility that its users may have in obtaining input for the mapping process on issues related to foreign opinion.

Literature on this complex process of social research suggests that in the course of measuring public attitudes, both approaches have key advantages and disadvantages (Blalock, 1970, pp. 92-95). On the one hand,

questions geared toward a specific topic make the question more relevant to respondents and free them to reveal any definite ideas that they have on the topic; however, questions that are too specific could be of little general use in determining attitudes about a general topic if the respondent has a bias on the specific topic in question (p. 93). For example, if an Arab man is asked a specific question about "American democracy," he may give a different answer than he would if he were asked about the concept of democracy in general. Either way of asking the question can be effective, depending on the purpose of the study. Additionally, questions geared toward a specific topic, leave less room for interpretative error on the evaluator's part; however, respondents are more likely to tell the evaluator what they think the evaluator wants to hear, or what is socially acceptable (p. 94).

One possible advantage to the approach used to uncover Arab attitudes toward American attributes was that the open-ended questions did not limit Arab responses, which opened the door for responses that may not be prominent, but still need to be considered. A possible disadvantage was that in questioning Arabs about what was important to them, close-ended questions limited their possible responses. One advantage of the approach that was used to uncover Western European values was that the questions were worded in general terms, without reference to America, which minimized the likelihood of bias. However, a possible disadvantage was that there was more room for subjective interpretation error when evaluating the data.

For both approaches, the values that were identified were separated into higher-order values and 'basic' values, the method used in the ESS (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald and Eva, 2007, pp. 70-82). Higher-order values identify a person's overarching "value orientation" (p. 170). Within higher-order values, are 'basic' values that identify a person's guiding principles (p. 73). To prevent confusion between the term 'basic' referring to attributes, and 'basic' referring to values, 'basic' values will be referred to as lower-order values in the remainder of this document.

3. Determining How Arabs Value U.S. Attributes

In the process of creating a theoretical map of American attributes based on Arab opinions, 2004 through 2006 polling data from the Arab American Institute (AAI) were most helpful. Zogby International, commissioned and supported by the AAI and the Young Arab Leaders group, conducted polls in the Arab world to not only gauge Arab opinions on America, but also to gain more insight into how influential certain resentment factors are on their overall opinions. For the purposes of this study, this data was used primarily to categorize attributes as positive, negative or neutral, to determine the level of consensus on those attributes, and to determine what attribute adjustments Arabs might 'want' America to make. The most useful insight gained from this poll stemmed from a series of four open-ended questions in the 2004 poll, which included: "What is [your] First Thought When You Hear America?;" what is the "Best Thing About America?;" what is the "Worst Thing About America?;" and "What Should America

do to Improve its Image in the Arab World?" (Arab American Institute, 2004, pp. 5-8). The answers to these questions, are summarized in Table 9.

What Arabs 'Want' America to do?	%	First Thought (Positive, Negative, or Neutral)?	%	Worst Attributes (Negative)?	%	Best Attributes (Positive)?	%
<u>Stop Supporting Israel</u>	28	<u>Unfair Foreign Policy</u>	24	<u>Murder Arabs</u>	24	<u>Nothing</u>	26
<u>Change Middle East Policy</u>	16	<u>Oil Interest</u>	16	<u>Unfair Middle East Policy</u>	20	<u>Just Like Us</u>	21
<u>Out of Iraq</u>	16	<u>Imperialistic</u>	14	<u>All About Oil</u>	19	<u>Good Products</u>	16
Justice	11	Power	10	<u>Foreign Policy</u>	14	<u>Entertainment</u>	16
Respect Arabs	8	Other	9	Materialistic	6	Not Sure	9
Make Peace	6	Personal Freedom	7	Other	6	Other	4
Improve Arab Relations	4	Materialistic	7	Godless	5	Science/Technology	3
Help Palestinians	4	Opportunities	5	Imperialistic	3	Development	1
Other	3	Oppressive	1	Domination	1	Personal Freedom	1
Not Sure	3	Science/Technology	1	Repression	1	International Democracy	1
Be Balanced	1	Entertainment	1	Racism	1	Work	1
Leave Arabs	1	Terrorism	1	Not Sure	<1	Innovation	1
Respect Human Rights	<1	Good Products	1	War	<1	Power	1
Respect International Law	<1	Not Sure	1	Egoism	<1	Luxury	<1
		Grandiosity	1	Absence of Civilization	<1		
		Dictatorship	1	Nothing Bad	<1		
		Money/Business	1				
		Colonialism	<1				
		Bush	<1				
		Killing Arabs	<1				

Table 9. Summary of Arab Views on America (After: Arab American Institute, 2004, pp. 5-8)

Table 10 displays the most prominent responses to those questions.

What Arabs 'Want' America to do?	%
<u>Stop Supporting Israel</u>	<u>28</u>
<u>Change Middle East Policy</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>Out of Iraq</u>	<u>16</u>
First Thought (Positive, Negative, or Neutral)?	%
<u>Unfair Foreign Policy</u>	<u>24</u>
<u>Oil Interest</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>Imperialistic</u>	<u>14</u>
Worst Attributes (Negative)?	%
<u>Murder Arabs</u>	<u>24</u>
<u>Unfair Middle East Policy</u>	<u>20</u>
<u>All About Oil</u>	<u>19</u>
<u>Foreign Policy</u>	<u>14</u>
Best Attributes (Positive)?	%
<u>Nothing</u>	<u>26</u>
<u>Just Like Us</u>	<u>21</u>
<u>Good Products</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>Entertainment</u>	<u>16</u>

Table 10. Summary of Most Prominent Arab Opinions on America (After: Arab American Institute, 2004)

The results from Table 10 were evaluated in combination with results of 2005 and 2006 AAI polls. The results of the 2005 poll revealed how important concerns were in Arabs' personal lives and how important concerns were that Arab nations were faced with (Arab American Institute, 2005, pp. 4-5). The personal concerns were correlated to higher-order values and the national concerns were correlated to lower-order values. A collective summary of the results are displayed in Table 11.

Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not important and 5 is extremely important, please tell me how important each of the following is in your life.	Rank (Personal Concerns)
<u>Family/Employment/Religion</u>	
Family	1
Quality of your work	2
Marriage	3
Religion	3
Friends	5
Job security	6
<u>Political issues</u>	
Political issues in your country	7
Leisure time	8
Political issues facing the Arab nations in general	9
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "not important" and 5 is "most important," how important are the following issues facing your country today?	Rank (National Concerns)
<u>Employment/HealthCare/Corruption/Education</u>	
Expanding employment opportunities	1
Improving the health care system	2
Ending corruption and nepotism	2
Improving the educational system	4
<u>Extremism/Civil rights</u>	
Combating extremism and terrorism	5
<u>Political/conflict issues</u>	
Protecting personal and civil rights	6
Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict	7
Advancing democracy	8
Political government reform	9
Increasing rights for women	10
Lack of political debate on important issues	11

Table 11. Summary of Most Important Arab Concerns (After: Arab American Institute, 2005)

The 2006 poll revealed how divided the Arab public was about certain issues (Arab American Institute, 2006, p. 4). Following subjective evaluation of the combined data from

all polls, Table 12 was created to depict the correlations between Arabs' higher-order personal values, lower-order national values, and resentment factors.

HIGH VALUE
• Improving the health care system (Opportunities/Work)
• Improving the educational system
• Expanding employment opportunities
• Combating extremism and terrorism (Murder Arabs/Racism/war, Out of Iraq/Leave Arabs, Respect Arabs, Godless)
MID-LEVEL VALUE
• Ending corruption and nepotism
• Advancing democracy
• Political government reform (Unfair Foreign Policy)
• Lack of political debate on important issues (Imperialistic/ Domination/ Repression/ Oppression/ Colonialism /Dictatorship, Entertainment)
• Protecting personal and civil rights (Justice, Be Balanced, Personal Freedom, International Democracy, Respect International Law, Respect Human Rights)
• Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict (Unfair Middle East Policy, Change Middle East Policy, Make Peace, Improve Arab Relations, Help Palestinians, Stop Supporting Israel)
• Increasing rights for women
LOW VALUE
• Other Attributes Not Listed (Just Like Us, All About Oil/oil interest, Good Products, Materialistic/Luxury, Science/Technology/Innovation, Power/Grandiosity, Absence of Civilization, President Bush, Egoism, Money/Business)

Table 12. Summary of How Arab Values Correlate with Resentment Factors

The high value category identifies the top four lower-order national concerns and their associated factors, which relate mostly to Arabs' top four higher-order personal concerns from Table 11. The mid-level value category identifies the next seven lower-order national concerns and associated factors that relate mostly to the next five

higher-order national concerns. The low value category identifies the remaining factors that do not have a strong correlation with any of the identified values. This information was later used to help categorize American attributes as energizers, differentiators or basic, and to create the attribute map that is discussed in Chapter IV.

4. Determining How Western Europeans Value U.S. Attributes

In order to map the American attributes from a Western European point of view, 2007 polling data from PRC and the European Social Survey (ESS) were collectively evaluated. One purpose of the 2007 PRC poll was to gauge foreign public opinions on the most current issues related to U.S. policy, action, and identity (Pew Research Center, 2007). Unlike the approach used to gain insight into Arab opinions, this poll used very specific close-ended questions; which requested that the respondents identify a point of view that was closest to their own point of view, usually on a scale of favorable-to-unfavorable, like-to-dislike, or good-to-bad. Table 13 depicts a summary of the results. This data was used primarily to categorize attributes as positive, negative, or neutral based on the level of consensus and favorability on each issue.

<u>U.S. attributes/ Resentment</u>	
<u>Factors</u>	%
Unilateralism	80.0
Self-interest/American-style democracy	74.0
Spreading culture	71.6
Troops in Iraq	65.2
Business practice/ rich-poor gap	62.6
GWOT/ troops in Afghanistan	53.0
Unfairly favors Israel	52.0
Harmful to environment	47.4
American People	31.0
Entertainment	27.6
Science/Technology	26.2

Table 13. Summary of Most Prominent Unfavorable U.S. Attributes for Western Europeans (After: Pew Research Center, 2007)

The results from Table 13 were evaluated in combination with results from the ESS. The ESS was a rigorous, comparative social science research project, sponsored by the European Science Foundation, to uncover social differences between European countries and cultures (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, and Eva, 2007). Part of the project included a poll that identified basic types of values and the importance that the Europeans assigned to those values (pp. 169-202). The value categories included four higher-order values, and ten lower-order values (pp. 173-175). This information was used primarily to categorize American attributes as energizers, differentiators, or basic for Western Europeans. A summary of how Western Europeans ranked these values are displayed in Table 14.

<u>Higher-Order Values</u>	Mean Rank
Self-Transcendence	1
Conservation	2
Openness to change	3
Self-Enhancement	4
<u>Lower-Order Values</u>	Mean Rank
<u>Loyalty/Helping Others/ Equality/Tolerance/Nature</u>	
Benevolence	1
Universalism	2
<u>Creativity/Independence/Safety/ Customs/Tradition/Fun/Desire</u>	
Self-Direction	3
Security	4
Tradition	5
Hedonism	6
Conformity	7
<u>Admiration/Success/Adventure/ Excitement/Money/Possession</u>	
Achievement	8
Stimulation	9
Power	10

Table 14. Summary of the Importance of Western European Values (After: Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald and Eva, 2007)

In the final subjective evaluation of all of the data, any American attribute that best fit into the top two lower-order values were categorized as energizers on the Western European attribute map in Chapter IV. Attributes that best fit into the next five lower-order values, were categorized as differentiators, with the remaining attributes being categorized as basic.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

As discussed in this chapter, a key to effectively analyzing customer opinion data is to look for indications of what the customers, the Arab and Western European publics in this instance, most 'value,' as opposed to just what they 'want.' Business managers can accomplish this through specific solicitation of customer opinions, or by establishing a channel for gaining customer feedback about offering attributes. Collectively analyzing several key data tables from opinion polls gave insight into how the attribute mapping process might help categorize resentment factors. In the next chapter, the results of this categorization are depicted in theoretical attribute maps for each customer segment. These results identify a potential way for America to prioritize its effort to counteract negative foreign public opinion.

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IV. RESULTS

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

Prior to prioritizing the resentment factors that America should address, it is necessary to categorize the factors on attribute maps. As revealed in Chapter III, priorities should consist of first addressing attributes that are enragers or brewing enragers, then addressing dissatisfiers and emerging dissatisfiers, followed by nonnegotiables and "so-what" attributes. Finally, after addressing these top three priorities, America can take advantage of any opportunities that present themselves through an evaluation of the remaining attributes. The following section outlines the results of the evaluation process outlined in Chapter III. These results present theoretical prioritization tables similar to those that have long provided valuable insights to businesses seeking to persuade customers of the value of their products and services.

B. SUGGESTED ATTRIBUTE MAP: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARAB VALUATION OF RESENTMENT FACTORS

Table 15 presents the theoretical prioritization table of American attributes from the Arabs' point of view. It reveals several negative attributes that potentially have the greatest impact on negative Arab opinions, the attributes that most likely have the least impact, and the attributes that fall somewhere in the middle.

	Basic	Differentiators	Energizers
Positive	3. <u>Nonnegotiables</u> : People just like us; Products/luxury; Science/technology	<u>Discriminators</u> : Entertainment; Personal freedom/ Internatioal democracy	<u>Exciters</u> : Employment Opportunities
Negative	<u>Tolerables</u> : Oil Interest; Imperialism/Dominati on; Materialism/ Egoism	2. <u>Dissatisfiers</u> : Unfair Middle East policy and unbalanced support to Israel; Repression/ Oppression	1. <u>Enragers</u> : Iraq occupation & war/Murdering & Disrespecting Arabs/Racism; Godlessness/perversity
Neutral	3. <u>So-Whats</u> : Power/Grandiosity	<u>Parallel Differentiators</u> : Show of commitment to peace, justice, Palestinians issues, international law and Arab relations	X

Table 15. Attribute Map for Arabs Public

1. Enragers: Iraq Occupation, Attack on Race & Undermining Islam

Resentment factors reveal three themes that appear to be enragers for the Islamic public: America's invasion of Iraq, perceived attack on the Arab race, and undermining of Islamic values. America's identity and actions that most negatively and directly impact Arab's most important values create the strongest feelings of resentment, disgust, fear and hatred toward America. The Arab public's most important higher-order values were related to issues dealing with their family, quality of work, marriage and religion. The most important lower-order concerns were tied to health care, education, employment, and combating extremism and terrorism. Resentment factors and Arab 'wants' that fall

into this category are the invasion of Iraq, war against Arabs, killing Arabs, perceived disrespect toward Arabs, racism and Godlessness.

This interpretation suggests that in Arabs' minds, the war in Iraq may be associated with a war on the Arab people as a whole. Despite their difference, many Arabs feel a great sense of common identity, which includes their race and religion (Arab American Institute 2005, p. 1). They associate the war with the killing of Arabs. As such, they may perceive wars in their land, especially considering their view of the history of American war and intervention in the Middle East, as an attack on their race and religion. Additionally, the promotion of American culture, particularly its perceived perversities, to their nation may be viewed by many Arabs as another attack on their religion. Although there may be a segment of the Arab public that thinks of some aspects of American culture as a positive attributes, the value that it carries as a positive attribute for certain Arab segments is minute in comparison to its potential negative value.

In summation, the resentment factors that most negatively energize Islamic nations stem from American actions when they lead to perceived imperialism or result in war in the Arab world. Other negative energizers stem from the American identity, when the perceived perversities in American culture compromise Islamic values. If there is anything that America can realistically and reasonably do to impact Islamic public opinion in these areas, it should be the top priority. It is unlikely that improvements in these areas will make Arabs think positively about America,

but the improvements may go a long way toward curbing the most extreme feelings of hatred and terrorist acts.

2. Dissatisfiers: Repression, Unfair Middle East Policy, Imbalanced Support to Israel

The major themes of the resentment factors that appear to be dissatisfiers are America's perceived political and economic repression, and America's unfair and imbalanced Middle East policy, particularly its support to Israel. The Arab public's next tier of higher-order concerns, second only to energizers, concern issues that deal with friends, job security, local political issues, leisure time, and political issues facing the Arab nations in general. The lower-order concerns are tied to ending corruption and nepotism, advancing democracy, political government reform, lack of political debate on important issues, protecting personal and civil rights, resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict, and increasing rights for women. American policies that directly or indirectly have a negative impact in these value areas create feelings of resentment that may not be enraging, but are still very damaging to foreign relations. Since negative attributes are more divisive than positive attributes, the presence of these discriminators put a wedge between the United States and the Arab community, and makes it more likely that Arabs will either be apathetic to America's positive attributes or that the positive attributes will go unnoticed.

America's perceived hypocrisy, its track record for putting self-interest above the socioeconomic prosperity of other nations, and its perceived backing of Israel regardless of circumstances, put America's judgment and

motives in constant question. As a result, American efforts to promote democracy could fall on deaf ears, or be filtered through a web of doubt that weakens the message. Arabs might rationalize that - 'promotion of democracy is America's attempt to control us and keep us poor and repressed as they grow richer;' or 'America does not really care about us or else they would help fairly resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.' In addition, these resentment factors could be emerging enragers. The longer America allows the negative attributes to linger without at least demonstrating what is perceived as a sincere attempt to address them, the higher the risk is that they will turn into enragers.

In summation, the resentment factors that Arab nations use to negatively differentiate America stem from U.S. policies that are perceived to be unfairly against Arabs and in Israel's favor, as well as from American actions when they are perceived as a source of repression that keeps Arabs from prosperity. Second only to eliminating enragers, addressing these resentment factors should be America's priority. Efforts to accomplish this would not only curb resentment, but could begin to sway Arab opinions in America's favor as they find less to resent about America, and become more receptive to America's positive attributes. Since one of America's objectives is to promote democracy around the world, the message would be better received if these dissatisfiers were mitigated.

3. Nonnegotiables and So-Whats: American People, Products, Innovation, and Power

The Zogby international polls not only shed light on the negative energizers and differentiators, but also revealed positive and neutral basic attributes, nonnegotiables and so-whats. These attributes are the third priority in accordance with the attribute mapping methodology. The polls indicate that the nonnegotiables center around American people, products and luxury, and science and technology, while a so-what attribute is American power. These attributes did not appear to have a direct and significant correlation with items on the list of Arab concerns; hence, the attributes were categorized as basic, which suggests that manipulating these attributes will not have a great impact on Arab opinions. As discussed in Chapter III, the significance of these attributes lies in their potential for being manipulated in order to create efficiencies in efforts to create customer value.

Since the payoff from nonnegotiables and so-whats are low, America should discover innovative ways to reduce the amount of resources devoted to promoting or introducing the Arab public to American people, products, innovation and power in an effort to sway their opinions. Although Arabs identified these as mostly positive American attributes, they expect it and do not consider them special enough to sway their opinions. For example, America's effort to increase internship opportunities for Arab women, though a worthwhile effort, should not take precedence over America's efforts to end the war in Iraq (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2003). This does not suggest that programs that introduce Arabs to basic positive American attributes

have no value; on the contrary, if these programs were eliminated, it could result in a more prominent negative view of America in the Arab world. The point is that the value that Arabs assign to America's negative attributes greatly outweigh the value they assign to these positive attributes.

In summation, factors that stem from American identity, manifested through American people, American things, and American power, are viewed by some as negative attributes (*Occidentalism*, 2005), but according to the polls, they are also viewed as positive basic attributes by many Arabs. America's third priority in its effort to counter negative public opinion in the Arab world should be to introduce the Arab public to these aspects of the American identity, while minimizing the use of resources to do it. These improvements in resource efficiency may not directly avert terrorism or increase receptiveness to democracy, but it may prevent public opinion from growing more negative than it already is, and it might allow America to divert valuable resources toward the efforts that make the biggest impact.

4. Additional Considerations

In addition to the three suggested priorities, several other considerations become evident through analyzing the attribute map. American oil interests, perceived imperialism, and materialism appear to be tolerables, while parallel differentiators might be found through American commitment to Arab issues. Though the tolerable attributes are negative, there is no indication that they are valued to a degree that would make them worth addressing. However,

today's tolerables can be tomorrow's dissatisfiers, so opinions in this area should be closely watched. Certain factors were noted as parallel differentiators because through subjective evaluation, they could not be effectively categorized elsewhere. These factors seemed to have more than a basic value, but not quite an energizing value. They were neither positive nor negative current attributes, but had implied potential to be positive or negative depending on the direction America took them. The collective theme of these factors shows that the Arab public wants America to demonstrate a commitment to peace, justice, solving Palestinians issues, international law and Arab relations. Addressing these concerns in the right way has potential for great payoff.

Positive features included American entertainment, personal freedom, international democracy, and more importantly, employment opportunities. One of Arab's most important higher-order values concern issues dealing with quality of work, with job security also being highly valued. This makes employment opportunities the only exciter on the attribute map, making it the positive attribute, which if delivered to Arabs, has the greatest potential to help offset the negative attributes. Other positive attributes like American entertainment, personal freedom, and international democracy also can help offset negative opinion; however, further study and careful segmentation is required in this area, as it appears that these attributes are neutrally or negatively viewed by some Arabs. Lastly, potential exciters exist in areas of education and healthcare for in the Arab world. Education

and healthcare are top concerns, and if America can show that it helps address these concerns, America will be viewed more favorably.

C. SUGGESTED ATTRIBUTE MAP: AN INTERPRETATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN VALUATION OF RESENTMENT FACTORS

Table 16 presents the theoretical prioritization of American attributes from Western Europe's point of view. It suggests that there is one primary negative attribute that overshadows the impact of other attributes on anti-American Western European sentiment.

	Basic	Differentiators	Energizers
Positive	3. <u>Nonnegotiables</u> : Science/technology	<u>Discriminators</u> : Entertainment	<u>Exciters</u> :
Negative	<u>Tolerables</u> : Self-interest/American-style democracy; Business practices/increasing rich-poor gap	2. <u>Dissatisfiers</u> : Unfairly favor Israel; harmful to environment; customs spreading; troops in Iraq	1. <u>Enragers</u> : Unilateralism
Neutral	3. <u>So-Whats</u> :	<u>Parallel Differentiators</u> : American People; GWOT/troops in Afghanistan	x

Table 16. Attribute Map for Western European Public

1. Enragers: Unilateralism

The primary resentment factor that appears to be an enragers for the Western European public is America's unilateralism. The public's most important higher-order

value is self-transcendence; corresponding with lower-order values of benevolence and universalism. This suggests that U.S. policies that result in a stand-off between America and a near consensus in Western Europe have the greatest negative impact on public opinion, as it conflicts with what they value most. Resentment factors like the U.S. stance on issues dealing with biological weapons, land mines, environmental pollution, and other global concerns are the potential causes of the Westerns European's recent calls for greater independence from America. Although other factors, like economic interdependence (Ahearn, 2007, p. 16), come into play when considering foreign relations, America should give a hard look at the issue of unilateralism.

In Mark Lubell's study on "understanding the development of attitudinal support for democratic governing institutions," published as part of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-sponsored Community Based Environmental Decision Making Proceedings on "Cooperation in Environmental Decision Making," he discussed the importance of perceived procedural fairness in national policy.

Fairness evaluations have the largest effect on attitudinal support. Perceptions of procedural fairness increase effectiveness by 24% points and cooperation by 44% points. Keeping in mind how the measure of procedural fairness is related to self-interest, stakeholders obviously place a high value on the adequacy of their representation in the decision-making process. This is because gaining access to the benefits of collective action requires representation in the decision-making process. Similarly, stakeholders who believe business dominates estuary decision-making have a lower level of attitudinal support, although the effect of business domination is

much smaller (6.6% point decrease for effectiveness and 5.1% point decrease for cooperation) than overall procedural fairness. (Lubell, pp. 37-38).

Lubell's findings, and the fact that universalism has the highest value, support the idea that unilateralism could be an enraging factor to Western Europeans. If the United States intends to demonstrate its commitment to improving international relations, its top priority should be to revisit its use of unilateralist policies whenever possible, particularly on issues that concern the rest of the world. Some short-term economic or freedom-of-action sacrifices, for the sake of considering foreign opinion, could pay long-term dividends in the realm of global collaboration.

2. Dissatisfiers: Spreading American Culture, Favoritism for Israel; Environmental Issues, and Troops in Iraq

The resentment factors that appear to be dissatisfiers deal with issues of spreading American culture, perceived imbalanced support for Israel, environmental pollution, and troops in Iraq. Factors in this category were either in conflict with a mid-level value, or opinions significantly varied as to whether or not they were in conflict with a high value. This suggests that America could potentially sway public opinion in its favor by limiting American sponsored activities that are perceived as being in conflict with local tradition, or by sponsoring activities that demonstrate American respect for their tradition. Interestingly, issues dealing with support to Israel, the environment, and troops in Iraq also relate to what many perceive as American unilateralism. This indicates the

considerable potential for these dissatisfiers to become enragers for certain public segments. Similar to American attributes that are dissatisfying for the Arab world, the longer America allows the negative attributes to linger unaddressed with its allies, the higher the risk is that they will become enragers.

3. Nonnegotiables and So-Whats: Science and Technology

The attribute map reveals that the third priority, a nonnegotiable, is American science and technology. No so-what attributes were identified. Science and technology, or American innovation, was a positive attribute, but did not show a significant value to Western Europeans. They simply expect this attribute from America. This suggests that there is little to no payoff to be gained by promoting American innovation to Western Europeans, as they can innovate on their own; however, if America demonstrates a lack of innovation, it would surely be frowned upon. American efforts to introduce innovations to Western Europe, with the goal being to improve public opinion, will be in vain and a waste of resources, unless accompanied by other objectives. Note that any innovation that is perceived to be in conflict with a Western European tradition can move from being a nonnegotiable to a dissatisfier.

4. Additional Considerations

America's selective promotion of American-style democracy and American business practices that are perceived to increase the rich-poor gap appear to be tolerables. Although they are not in direct conflict with

values rated high in importance, America should take note of these concerns and watch for indications of them becoming dissatisfiers. A wide variation in opinions concerning the American people, American-led GWOT, and troops in Afghanistan, led to these attributes being categorized as parallel differentiators. These attributes seemed to have more than a basic value, but not an energizing value; and they had the potential to be positive or negative. The sole positive attribute of significant value, identified as a discriminator that may help to offset negative opinion, was American entertainment.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

A. CONCLUSIONS

The first phase of this study identified and consolidated a list of factors that contribute to anti-American sentiments. The factors vary in legitimacy, disputability, and prominence. Chapter II identified the most prominent of these factors, as revealed through a variety of sources, from scholarly works, to internet forums that were open for contributions from the general public. Many of the sources, like the polls used, included direct input from the foreign public. The United States has recognized this anti-Americanism phenomenon as a growing concern, and it may be able make a significant impact on this issue by addressing the resentment factors. Given the reality of fiscal and resource constraints, adequately addressing this issue requires prioritizing the relative importance of the factors that contribute to it.

The second phase of this study suggested a prioritization mechanism that could be used to analyze resentment factors. The suggested framework used a flexible approach to attribute mapping. To demonstrate the method, attribute maps were developed for two foreign public segments, consisting of four Arab nations and five Western European nations. Although the maps are only based on notional approaches, the illustrative model does serve as a starting point for identifying the most important resentment factors among the many that were identified in

Chapter II. In order to provide operationally valid output, further research and subject-matter expertise is required to refine the model's input data.

Based on the notional attribute maps developed in this study, several priorities emerged. America's top tier of priorities include the following: consider options to minimize the visible presence of U.S. troops in Arab nations; address U.S. direct involvement in armed conflict on Arab soil; increase understanding and consideration of how U.S.-sponsored activities and influence within Arab nations are perceived to impact Arab-Islamic culture; and reevaluate the correlation between procedural fairness and unilateralist policy decisions, and the increasing wedge between America and its European allies. The second tier of priorities should include the following: reevaluating Middle East policy -- particularly possible compromise and parity with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and increasing U.S. understanding and consideration of how U.S.-sponsored activities and influence Western European nations are perceived to impact their tradition. Conversely, the notional model suggests the relative ineffectiveness of improving Arabs' opinions about America by introducing them to American people and things, and the ineffectiveness of improving Europeans opinions by introducing them to American science and technology.

America's third priority should be to divert excessive resource allocations from programs in these areas, toward efforts within the top two tiers of priorities. After the top three priorities have been considered, America should look for innovative opportunities to improve foreign public

opinions on the remaining areas of interest: oil dependence and imperial aspirations; Arab domestic issues, like employment, education and healthcare; selective promotion of American-style democracy; American business practices that are perceived to increase the rich-poor gap; American-led GWOT and troops in Afghanistan; and American entertainment in Western Europe.

B. RECOMMENDED READING

During this study, an attempt was made to identify recommended sources for readers who are interested in further research. A study of this nature should begin by first reviewing what the United States *National Security Strategy* (NSS) has to say about handling international opinion. The U.S. stance on this issue is revealed in the most recent NSS, published in March of 2006. Based on a review of the literature, the following works were identified as the most relevant sources, and as a starting point, for future researchers who pursue similar topics.

In conducting this study, it became apparent that anti-Americanism in the last decade was the catalyst for a great deal of research on the topic of why foreigners resent America. In 2003, Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Davies, information scientist and anthropologist respectively, and well-known England-based authors, presented some of the prevailing themes of anti-Americanism in their book, *Why Do People Hate America?* This book raises key questions about American actions, the nature of power and responsibility, and argues that American activities magnify world poverty and damage the environment. U.S. policy issues also are widely covered by American and foreign media. U.K.-based

media outlets, BBC News and The Guardian, were valuable sources for the foreign perspective on decisions that America has made. As this study discusses in Chapter II, Buruma and Margalit, in their 2004 book, *Occidentalism*, present criticisms that relate to the Eastern world's perceptions of the perversity of the Western world. This controversial point of view should be studied when pursuing research in this area. Additionally, the three series of polls conducted by Zogby international, the Pew Research Center, and the European Science Foundation, proved critical and relevant to this line of research. The polling statistics in this study merely scratches the surface of the implications on anti-Americanism. There is a substantial void for more in-depth segmentation as well as broader consequential research on this topic, for which these polls could prove critical.

Finally, several writings from Rita McGrath and Ian MacMillan present techniques, like attribute mapping, for discovering innovative opportunities. Of their combined works, their 2000 book, *The Entrepreneurial Mindset*, contains the most comprehensive list of techniques for creating value. As suggested by this study, value creation is a concept that can be applied over a broad spectrum of issues.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This research effort suggested that the attribute mapping framework is a potentially powerful method for prioritizing the factors that contribute to anti-Americanism. Further research is required in order to segment the foreign public into more distinct groups, with

similar values, to further distinguish American offerings and attributes, to determine what can and cannot reasonably be addressed, and to optimize the research approach in order to create an operationally valid and useful decision-making aid.

Each of the cells in the suggested attribute map could be expanded for in-depth evaluation. This would require additional sub-attribute mapping, an expanded literature review of the topic, solicitation of direct input from subject-matter experts in each field, and a thorough analysis of the possibilities for change. Such an exhaustive study could reveal many intricacies on the topic that are outside of America's direct control or sphere of influence. This study did not make that distinction.

Finally, further research could incorporate a more refined temporal element. Attribute mapping is a process that is meant to be used repeatedly as the environment and circumstances shift over time. This study took a collective snapshot of a period of years between 2001 and 2007, though within that period, shifts have occurred. By refining the key elements in this area of research, the United States could find another valuable tool in the fight to improve international relations and in the battle for the hearts and minds of the foreign public.

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