Argentina's Tactical Aircraft Employment in the Falkland Islands War
Abstract
The aerial forces of the Argentinean Air Force and Navy found themselves in a complex, unenviable position during the April 1982 conflict with Great Britain for possession of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. Despite Argentinean numerical superiority, the modern weaponry and tactical proficiency of the United Kingdom's armed forces were a formidable threat. The Argentineans found themselves in a disadvantaged tactical situation due to a lack of preparation to include planning, intelligence, training, and the resources necessary to counter a sophisticated military threat. To lessen their disadvantage, the Argentineans reorganized their Air Force; leveraged the tactical skill, innovation, and determination of their pilots; and employed their newly acquired air-launched Exocet anti-ship missile. This paper examines the Argentinean political situation prior to the conflict, the reaction of Argentina's Air Force and Naval Air Arm to imminent conflict, and the outcomes of aerial combat between Argentinean and British forces. Simply put, Argentina lost the Falklands War. In spite of this fact, tactical aviation forced the British to pay a hefty price for victory. Argentina's tactical aviation was instrumental in the war and inflicted the most damage on the British fleet. Even though tactical aviation was never the sole solution to the junta's predicament, it could have accomplished more. An analysis of Argentina's tactical air power yields two specific root causes and two contributing factors in both the air-to-air and air-to-surface mission areas. The two root causes for Argentina's less than optimum tactical effects in both air-to-air and air-to-surface employment were inadequate equipment and training.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA475901
Entities
People
- Gabriel V. Green
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College