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THESIS

**COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE
FOUNDATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW U.S.
DOCTRINE**

by

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December 2007

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW U.S. DOCTRINE**

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ABSTRACT

In December 2006, the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual (*FM 3-24*). *FM 3-24* is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its intent is “to fill a doctrinal gap,” for fighting COIN by delivering “a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations.” The importance of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the “doctrinal” and capability gaps facing the U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be overstated. In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in *FM 3-24* for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency? *FM 3-24* outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs). With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where *FM 3-24*’s LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects? If they were not used and the state power’s desired “endstate” was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign objectives? This thesis assesses the extent to which the field manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as the new doctrine’s ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy that incorporates insights and conclusions from academia. Our findings indicate that *FM 3-24* is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3GW	third generation warfare
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CIGS	Chief of Imperial General Staff
COIN	counterinsurgency
ETZEL	Irgun Zvai Le'umi (National Military Organization)
FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front)
FM	field manual
GOC	general officer commanding
HAM	hearts and minds
HN	host nation
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAF	Israeli Air Force
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IO	information operations
LEHI	Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Israel Freedom Fighters)
LIC	low intensity conflict
LLO	logical line of operation
MEF	Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOE	measure of effectiveness
NCO	non commissioned officer
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
POI	Public Information Office
RAF	Royal Air Force
SAS	Sections Administrative Specialisees (Special Administrative Sections)
SMT	social movement theory
TCP	traffic control point
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle

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I. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter begins with a discussion of the new Joint Field Manual (FM) *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. We then examine the structure of this thesis, followed by a literature review of Counterinsurgency practices, as well as social mobilization theory. Next, we discuss the methodology used in this thesis research project. We conclude with a discussion of the common measures of effectiveness used.

A. BACKGROUND

In December, 2006 the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual (*FM 3-24*). *FM 3-24* is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its intent is “to fill a doctrinal gap,” for fighting COIN by delivering “a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations.”¹ The importance of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the “doctrinal” and capability gaps facing the U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be overstated. In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in *FM 3-24* for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency? Most would argue that this would determine its usefulness, or theoretical power, as a guide for those charged with conducting COIN campaigns.

In numerous COIN campaigns state powers apply strategies, or doctrine, based on varying degrees of hard and soft power.² Similarly, *FM 3-24* outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs). With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where *FM 3-24*’s LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects? If they were not used and the state power’s desired “endstate” was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign

¹ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24* (Washington D.C.: United States Army, 2006), Foreword.

² For the purposes of this thesis, the words “state” and “state power” will denote an established government with authority based in institutional power that provides it with an inertial quality which is contrasted by an insurgent movement which initially lacks an institutional inertia.

objectives? In this thesis we will assess the extent to which the field manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as assess the new doctrine's ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy which incorporates insights and conclusions from academia.

Just as FM 1 and FM 3.0 “[establish] the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations”³ by providing the foundational principles of U.S. Army maneuver warfare that commanders apply to specific operational and tactical situations, *FM 3-24* should be the source from which operational and tactical COIN practices spring. While the new COIN FM acknowledges that “every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges,” the Army intends to garner those “contextual” “lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies...” and “existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed.”⁴ Much as with other military doctrine, *FM 3-24*’s goal is to be a usable guide that parsimoniously defines and prescribes COIN strategies that are generally applicable. As mentioned above, the FM intends to combine these “lessons learned” and doctrine to produce strategies called LLOs for conducting COIN operations.

According to *FM 3-24* an LLO is “[a] logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).”⁵ In other words, LLOs are the guiding principles for executing COIN operations with associated tasks, or sub-objectives, included in each LLO. One of the FM’s main assertions is that achieving these sub-objectives, or “decisive points” are the actions most likely to result in a “secure and stable environment.” See Figure One below for the list of LLOs included in *FM 3-24*.⁶

As mentioned above, this manual is intended to aggregate applicable COIN lessons and practices in order to provide the all-important foundation and guide on which military planners and commanders can base their specific operations. In light of this,

³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual No. FM 3-0, Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 2001. vii.

⁴ Ibid., vii.

⁵ Ibid., Glossary-6.

⁶ Ibid., 5-5.

does *FM 3-24* provide the best theoretical/doctrinal foundation with a baseline operational articulation for U.S. COIN? It is reasonable to argue that time and perceptions will determine the answer. If Iraq and Afghanistan become states with “secure and stable environments” and U.S. forces following the LLOs in *FM 3-24* are instrumental in establishing this security, then it would be reasonable to assert that the LLOs are sound strategies for implementing U.S. COIN theory. Perhaps a more appropriate question to ask regarding the new COIN manual is how effective have the LLOs proven to be in the past?




Figure 1. Logical Lines of Operation with example “decisive points”.⁷

⁷ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24* (Washington D.C.: United States Army, 2006).

B. THESIS STRUCTURE

First, we define the theoretical foundations of new U.S. COIN doctrine by examining the social movement theory (SMT) driving the doctrine and show how it is operationalized in some key LLOs in *FM 3-24*. We also describe the states' COIN doctrines in our four historical case studies and detail how they were operationalized. We compare and contrast the case study doctrines and strategies with current U.S. COIN doctrine and LLOs. In doing this our goal is threefold: first, we intend to accurately determine different and common principles in COIN specifically applied in the Middle East; second, based on what we believe to be the primary and common measure of effectiveness (MOE) of the case studies and current U.S. COIN doctrine (a "secure and stable environment"), we intend to determine the possible sufficiency and necessity of some LLOs and their supportive sub-objectives, or "decisive points," in achieving the common MOE; third, we discuss the implications of our findings and determine their role in recommending changes to the field manual or affirming its relevance as is.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Numerous military, academic, and political theorists/experts proffer answers and debate strategies on how the sole remaining superpower should address the challenge of COIN. Most acknowledge that today COIN is a hybrid type of warfare combining an age-old cat and mouse game which insurgents and states have engaged in for millennia with the globalized world of instant information flow and remarkable technology. As mentioned above, *FM 3-24* is the U.S. military's answer to the doctrinal gap evidenced by the difficulties of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In order to develop an effective and interdisciplinary COIN FM the authors of *FM 3-24* relied on some key theoretical foundations regarding rebellion and contentious group behavior. As mentioned, we will discuss the SMT providing the broader framework for *FM 3-24*'s COIN doctrine and its LLOs. First, in accordance with a broad cross-section of scholarship, we will describe the causal roots of insurgencies in a broad aspect.

A large body of contemporary scholarship asserts that insurgencies and other violent social events, such as revolutions and riots, are extreme examples of what Sidney Tarrow calls “contentious collective action” and that they should be studied and explained in the context of social movement theory.⁸ Likewise, Charles Tilly describes “social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people [make] collective claims on others.”⁹ While there is considerable debate among scholars as to the most significant causes of “contentious collective action” occurring outside of the accepted state institutions and with the purpose of overthrowing those institutions, it is widely accepted by many scholars that the sufficient and necessary causal factors of insurgencies must be conceptualized within SMT as part of a contentious political relationship between an authority and a group resisting authority.¹⁰

We will discuss SMT and its incorporation into *FM 3-24* in more detail later, but as an initial explanation for the purposes of this thesis, *social movements are defined as collective, contentious and sustained actions taken by people to challenge another group of people based on a claim*. Therefore, in the most basic sense, social movement theories seek to explain how, when and why people act collectively in support of or against another group of people. Therefore, SMT provides crucial explanatory power for understanding insurgencies and implications for developing effective COIN doctrine.

⁸ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 271.

⁹ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978), 349.

¹⁰ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), 217. ;Ted Robert Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University by Princeton University Press, 1970), 421.;Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism : A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 316 ;Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel : Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 253. Johnson uses a structural explanation in his “social disequilibrium theory” to addresses the causative elements and the process of revolution and other anti-state political actions.

As John Nagl accurately asserts, there are essentially two strategies that states apply to COIN campaigns: “the direct approach” and “the indirect approach.”¹¹ In the kinetically-based “direct approach” states use attrition warfare and focus their efforts on annihilating the insurgents by killing or capturing them and destroying their operational abilities. Of course, this strategy is rooted in the trinitarian war concepts most notably articulated by Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Jomini asserted that “these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.”¹² In fact, the idea of an enemy center of gravity came from Clausewitz; it was the concept of *schwerpunkt* he described in *On War*. The “direct approach” or, Clausewitzian doctrine, has been the foundation for American military strategy, force structuring, and training for decades. The vast majority of US Army FMs are grounded in the basic principle of massing combat power to destroy the enemy.¹³ As mentioned above, the “direct approach” mandates that the ability to defeat the enemy is a function of finding his all-important center of gravity, focusing all available killing power on that point, and destroying it. All conventional U.S. Army units are built around these core principles.

Of course, the fundamental assumption of those espousing the “direct approach” in COIN is predicated on the state’s ability to find, isolate, and focus its killing power on the insurgent’s decisive point which ultimately results in unrecoverable attrition of insurgent forces. Arguably, in light of the current war in Iraq, the most-studied and best example of American application of this strategy and its ultimate failure is the Vietnam War. A huge volume of “Vietnam conflict” scholarship critically details the ineffective American strategy of applying more force to a decaying political and military situation in South Vietnam during this period.¹⁴ Most recent COIN scholarship is highly critical of

¹¹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* [Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam], Paperback ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 249.

¹² Jomini quoted in Nagl, 17.

¹³ FM 3-0. *Operations*. 17 May 2004.

¹⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 318.

the “direct approach” and its simplistic, force-oriented principles. A good example of this scholarship is Ahmed S. Hashim’s *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Iraq* in which he is highly critical of the U.S. Army’s conventional, or “direct approach,” to the in Iraq and the Army’s failure to adapt its strategy to the sophisticated Iraqi insurgency.¹⁵

In contrast to “the direct approach,” the “indirect approach” is based on a series of more sophisticated assumptions about the nature of insurgencies which logically dictate different and more effective COIN strategies. Nagl asserts that chief among these effective counterinsurgency strategies is the requisite division of “the people from the insurgents.”¹⁶ This principle is the fundamental element of most theories that fall into Nagl’s “indirect approach.” Similar to Nagl, Thomas X. Hammes in *The Sling and the Stone* asserts that COIN is a different kind of war. According to him, war has evolved over the last 70 years. We have moved from 3rd generation warfare (3GW), or blitzkrieg warfare, to 4th generation warfare (4GW) which is centered on the battle of ideas and winning the neutral population’s support.¹⁷ He asserts that the political will of the population should be the focus of operations, not the destruction of enemy forces. Hammes does leave a place in 4GW for kinetic operations, but insists that they must be used in conjunction with nation building and state reform. In fact, the “indirect approach” and 4GW described by Nagl, Hammes and others involves a methodical separation of insurgents from their sources of support in the population, securing the population against insurgent threats, an establishment or securing of functional government institutions, and the enforcement of the rule of law according to the state. These strategies are designed to counter the fundamental principles of insurgent doctrine which is mostly based on the “body of strategic thought on ‘protracted war’ developed by Mao Zedong in the 1930s and 1940s.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 482.

¹⁶ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 249.

¹⁷ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone : On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 321.

¹⁸ G. H. McCormick, "People’s War" In , ed. James Ciment (New York: Shocken Press, 1999), 1.

FM 3-24 attempts to operationalize this requirement through its LLOs in order to systematically employ focused strategies that offset insurgent efforts and allow state forces to “establish government legitimacy.”¹⁹ The fundamental assumption on which some of LLOs are based is that Host Nation [HN] legitimacy is partially rooted in the preference for the government over the insurgents by the population’s “uncommitted middle.”²⁰ As mentioned above, *FM 3-24* characterizes victory, or a successful counterinsurgency, as one that establishes “a stable and secure environment” which in turn results in the “recognition of the legitimacy of the HN government.”²¹ The theoretical underpinnings for this assumption are partly based on social movement theory, lessons learned from “previous counterinsurgencies” like the British campaign in Malaya in the 1950s, and “relevant combat operations.”²²

While most current scholarship concurs with its assertions that COIN requires the methodical application of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies in order to achieve success, one could effectively argue, as in the case of Leites and Wolf, that the assumption that the battle between state and insurgents is fundamentally “a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people” is problematic.²³ Instead, insurgencies and COIN campaigns are fights for control of resources, or “inputs” such as “recruits, information, shelter, and food...”²⁴ The “uncommitted middle” may prefer the state over the insurgents, but if the insurgents are exerting control of the population through coercion and persuasion and the state cannot counter the insurgent’s controls, then the population’s preference for one side or the other becomes less important. According to G. H. McCormick, in a conflict between the state and insurgents the “defining operational problem for the insurgents is overcoming the conventional military superiority of the state (or occupying power)

¹⁹ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, 5-2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-15.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 5-2 to 5-3.

²² *Ibid.*, vi.

²³ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority; an Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co, 1970), 174.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

through an asymmetrical campaign based on the support (and resources) of a constituent population.”²⁵ Conversely, the problem for the state is to develop an effective strategy to eliminate the elusive insurgents, their support mechanisms within the “constituent population” and retain control of the state by means of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

In light of this and as an indicator of the relative importance of popular preference versus control of resources in COIN, an examination of past COIN doctrines and campaigns in our case studies should indicate how important winning “hearts and minds” may have been in achieving the common MOE (a “secure and stable environment”). As mentioned, *FM 3-24* is intended to provide the theoretical foundation for COIN and a guide to operationalizing that theory in the LLOs. Our intention is to use the four Middle Eastern case studies in this thesis to shed some light on the validity of the FM.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is an examination of the *FM 3-24*. Using the FM as a COIN theory, we will determine if the new FM is relevant as a strategic guide for executing COIN operations as specifically outlined in the manual. The FM clearly states that LLOs must be used in cooperation with one another, and that “neglecting objectives along one LLO risks creating vulnerable conditions along another that insurgents can exploit.”²⁶ In addition and in an apparent contradiction, the FM states that

[t]hese lines [LLOs] can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy of the HN government.

We compare and contrast the LLOs outlined in the FM to COIN doctrine and strategies of the states in four case studies: the British occupation of Iraq following World War I and the resulting Iraqi rebellion against their control; the rebellion by the Zionists

²⁵ McCormick, “*People’s War*.”

²⁶ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, 5-2.

in Palestine against the British from 1943-48; the French campaign in Algiers from 1954-62; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the second or, “al-Aqsa,” Intifada from September 2000-2004. These cases were chosen based on several comparable similarities: 1) the state forces possessed a huge force and technology advantage; 2) the insurgencies were Middle Eastern and included some religious framing; 3) the state forces assumed that technology and force provided a decisive advantage over the insurgents; 4) the insurgencies were protracted conflicts that compelled both parties to modify tactics and strategies to one degree or another. While it is important to acknowledge some fundamental difference in the cases, for example Israel’s principle goal of physically remaining on much of the contested lands in the occupied territories and Britain’s desire to retain influence in Iraq while exerting minimal effort, all the states had fundamental designs on retaining some significant element of control in the contested areas.

E. THE COMMON MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

As mentioned above, to determine the effectiveness of the LLOs in *FM 3-24* and the strategies employed by the states in our case studies we must first have a common measure of effectiveness (MOE) to assess their success. As illustrated in Figure One, the “end state” for LLOs in *FM 3-24* is a “secure and stable environment.” It is important to note that this “end state” is divorced from political or ideological overtones indicating the superiority of one political system over another and strictly centered on achieving calm conditions that may or may not lead to a democratic state. With this in mind, we delineate the main objectives of the COIN campaigns, or the victory conditions, as articulated by the government/forces conducting COIN operations in our case studies. However, we also describe the success or failure of the COIN campaigns in each case in terms of establishing a “secure and stable environment.” We believe this is an appropriate overall MOE because it is a common goal shared by all the states in our case studies as well as being the stated objective of current U.S. COIN doctrine.

II. *FM 3-24*: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, OTHER KEY THEORIES AND THE LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION: DISTILLING THE ENIGMATIC RELATIONSHIP

A. INTRODUCTION

In this section we discuss the key elements of social movement theory (SMT) and other theories incorporated into *FM 3-24*. We detail the fundamental theoretical social-science driving the FM's assertions about peoples' motivations for starting, joining, or supporting insurgencies. By doing this we illustrate the major influences of these theories on the guidance offered to the forces in the field for successfully conducting COIN campaigns. This guidance is articulated in *FM 3-24*'s LLOs and by briefly describing SMT and the other social theories we can analyze how they are manifested in these LLOs and better understand their influence on U.S. COIN doctrine. While the FM contains bedrock theories that analyze and attempt to identify the primary causal factors of contentious collective actions like insurgency, many of them lack sufficient explanatory power. In general, the deprivation-based frustrations that Ted Robert Gurr and Eric Hoffer identify as a primary, or independent variables, from which rebellion springs are problematic because they fail to sufficiently consider and incorporate other causal factors and intervening variables such as the "political opportunity structure" described by Mohamed M. Hafez in his book *Why Muslims Rebel*. In addition, the alienated and poor individual "true believer" that Eric Hoffer identifies and the frustrated, monolithic Muslim mass that Lewis describes in *The Crisis of Islam* fail to consider that the relatively educated middle class in Muslims states, who are functioning members of their societies, compose a large and active part of insurgent groups and that they are definitely motivated by issues beyond religion. Still, by including these theories the FM moves U.S. COIN doctrine well beyond the rudimentary approaches and theories that characterized it just three year ago.

B. DEFINING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND ITS RELEVANT COMPONENTS FOR U.S. COIN DOCTRINE

Before we examine the elements of social movement theories employed in *FM 3-24*, we must establish a common working definition of social movement and its relevant components for the purposes this thesis. It is important to acknowledge that the definitions applied here are narrow with respect to the volume and sophistication of various social movement theories. Nonetheless, our goal is to establish a set of parsimonious definitions that are generally accepted by scholars and are usable for understanding the SMTs included in *FM 3-24*.

Charles Tilly describes “social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people [make] collective claims on others.”²⁷ Similarly, Sydney Tarrow defines social movements as “those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents.”²⁸ Tarrow also asserts that social movements “fall within the broader universe of contentious politics” and that “the irreducible act that lies at the base of all social movements, protests and revolutions is *contentious collective action*.”²⁹ Therefore, we define social movements as *collective, contentious and sustained actions taken by people to challenge another group of people based on a claim*. Therefore, in the most basic sense, social movement theories seek to explain how, when and why people act collectively in support of or against another group of people. In this respect social scientists are attempting to scientifically determine the dependent, independent and intervening variables that are generally applicable to most, if not all, cases of “contentious collective action.” SMT seeks to explain the necessary and sufficient causal factors common to insurgencies as well as other contentious mass movements.

²⁷ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3.

²⁸ Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

1. Mobilization

Mobilization in the social movement context encompasses the “how” and “why” of social movement theory. We will again draw from Tilly for our explanation. He asserts that *mobilization* is one of “five big components” which make up collective action: “interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself.”³⁰ According to Tilly, “*Mobilization* is the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. Those resources may be labor, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of things, just as long as they are usable in acting on shared interests.”³¹ Tilly’s definition includes the reason, or “why,” of social movement theory because groups must have defined “shared interests” which provide the motivation for sustained action. Additionally, his definition includes the “how” of social movement theory because the very act of mobilization means collecting and using resources in support of a claim. Tilly’s *mobilization* definition is accurately descriptive, generally acceptable to most social scientists, and we will use it as our definition of *mobilization* in this thesis.

2. Repertoires, Framing and the Agent

Next, we will briefly examine three important elements of *mobilization* that are also part of the “how” and the “why” of SMT: *repertoires*, *framing*, and the *agent*. A *repertoire*, as part of *mobilization*, is the way in which groups act collectively. Riots, protests, and strikes are examples of *repertoires*. Charles Tilly details the finer elements of “social movement repertoires” in his book *Social Movements, 1768–2004*. But, for our purposes, a *repertoire* is an integral part of *mobilization* which is an element of the “how” in SMT. McAdam, McCarthy and Zaid assert that “[a]t a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem... [c]onditioning the presence or absence of these perceptions is that complex of social dynamics – collective attribution, social

³⁰ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 7.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

construction – that David Snow and various of his colleagues (Snow et al. 1986: Snow and Benford, 1988) have referred to as *framing processes*.”³² Simply put, framing articulates a message, or call to action, to a group which convinces them to act. An example of *framing* is the recruiting slogan used by the U.S. Marine Corps: “*The few, the proud, the Marines.*” This *frame* has been a very powerful motivator that has inspired thousands of young men and women to become Marines. The tool for delivering a framed message is often a person, or *agent*, who *frames* a message, or cause, in a nuanced manner appropriate for different social environments and also incorporates local interests into a larger cause. The military recruiter is an example of an *agent*.

3. Opportunity

Next, we must consider the “when” of social movement theory which is the explanation of combined conditions, timing, and other factors that facilitate the rise of “contentious collective action.” The “when” is a function of *opportunity*. In Tilly’s estimation “[o]ppportunity concerns the relationship between the group and the world around it.”³³ More precisely, opportunity is the space and time in which a group is capable of organizing and acting, or mobilizing, in support of its claim. Most social movement scholars refer to a group’s ability to mobilize in a state as a function of *political opportunity* which is composed of four main factors according to Doug McAdam: “(1) relative openness of the institutionalized political system; (2) instability of elite alignments; (3) presence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s reduced capacity or propensity for repression.”³⁴ If we combine these factors with solid organizational leaders who are capable of managing the other mobilizing elements discussed above, then a group can take advantage of the *opportunity* to collectively act against state institutions. While this oversimplifies the concept of *opportunity*, the assertion that *opportunity* is the

³² Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald N., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.

³³ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 7.

³⁴ McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 25.

time and space in which a group can collectively act sufficiently captures the concept for our purposes. Based on the concepts detailed above, it is reasonable to assert that SMTs are extremely important in understanding the fundamental nature of insurgencies because they attempt to scientifically analyze and explain the causal relationships between different variables that are the connective social tissue between contention and violence in societies. With this in mind, any effort to understand and then combat insurgencies should start with the essential elements conceptualized in SMT. Indeed, *FM 3-24* clearly asserts this: “Knowledge of the history and principles of insurgency and COIN provides a solid foundation that informed leaders can use to assess insurgencies. This knowledge is also invaluable to leaders deciding what instruments of national power to employ against these threats.”³⁵ With this in mind, we will discuss the elements of major SMTs included in *FM 3-24*.

C. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND OTHER KEY THEORIES IN *FM 3-24*

1. Relative Deprivation Theory: Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr

Relative deprivation theory is one of the more established branches of social movement theory incorporated into *FM 3-24* which generalizes about the causes of contentious collective political action. Ted Robert Gurr defines relative deprivation and its impact on society in his book *Why Men Rebel*. While Gurr’s theory has significant merit it fails to sufficiently incorporate the role of political entrepreneurs as the agents of change and organizers of collective contentious action. Most of these political entrepreneurs come from the educated middle class who are relatively less deprived than the poor who lack the basic organizational capacity to conduct sustained contentious collective action.

³⁵ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, vi.

In this work Gurr maintains that contentious collective political violence is based on

a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent...³⁶ use "quote" style for all quotes

Furthermore, Gurr maintains that "[d]eprivation-induced discontent is a general spur to action" which implies sufficient causality for rebellion and other forms of political violence in states plagued by extreme socio-economic disparities. In fact, "the greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence."³⁷ In addition, Gurr asserts that the degree of political violence focused against the state by groups resisting it is subject to "[s]ocietal variables" such as cultural "sanctions for overt aggression," the varying "success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of their political system, and the kinds of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation."³⁸

Gurr's structural theory incorporates the previously defined elements of *mobilization*: the "why," which are the relative deprivations that sectors of societies perceive and are in turn *framed* by *agents* who provide the "articulation and dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence."³⁹ Gurr also explains the "how," which is primarily violence against the state institutions even to the extent of rebellion or

³⁶ Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies, *Why Men Rebel*, 12.

³⁷ Ibid., 12.

³⁸ Ibid., 13.

³⁹ Ibid., 13.

“internal war.” Finally, he asserts that the “when” is a function of the “social variables” (*political opportunity*) such as the repressive capacity of the state or the organizational abilities of resistance groups.⁴⁰

2. The Nature and Appeal of Mass Movements: The True Believer by Eric Hoffer

Initially published in 1951, *The True Believer* discusses a specific type of deprivation as a motivation for individual participation in contentious collective action and the frustrated and alienated people who join these groups. Hoffer’s theory is centered on an individual’s isolation from society and his perceived deprivation. In contrast to Hoffer’s assertions, more recent research indicates that, many individuals who participate in contentious social movements, particularly in Muslim states, are deeply connected to their societies. As Quinton Wiktorowicz notes, these individuals and the organizations they join

are not merely psychological coping mechanisms; they are often explicitly focused and directed toward the political arena. In addition, participants are not “dysfunctional” individuals seeking psychological comfort, but instead frequently represent educated and well-adjusted members of society.⁴¹

As mentioned above, Hoffer asserts that people are spurred to join mass movements mostly by a sense of frustration based on a lack “of opportunity for self-advancement.”⁴² He says that

[w]here self-advancement cannot, or is not allowed to, serve as a driving force, other sources of enthusiasm have to be found if momentous changes, such as the awakening and renovation of stagnant society or radical reforms in the character and pattern of life of a community, are to

⁴⁰ While our description of Gurr’s theory does not include the entire sophistication of his arguments, it accurately and sufficiently illustrates his generalizations about “*why men rebel*” which are important theoretical foundations of U.S. COIN doctrine in FM 3-24s.

⁴¹ Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism : A Social Movement Theory Approach*, 9.

⁴² Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, 1st Perennial classics ed., 2002), 3.

be realized and perpetuated. Religious, revolutionary, and nationalist movements serve as generating plants of general enthusiasm.⁴³

In addition, Hoffer contends that “frustrations” of various groups (“The Poor, Misfits, The Inordinately Selfish, The Ambitious Facing Unlimited Opportunities, Minorities, The Bored, and The Sinners”) render them particularly susceptible to the lure of contentious political groups who use violence to resist the state. He claims that some people who commit themselves to violent social movements and who go through an “effacement of individual separateness” to the degree that “[h]is joys and sorrows, his pride and confidence must spring from the fortunes and capacities of the group rather than from his individual prospects and abilities” constitute the “true believer[s].”⁴⁴ Hoffer maintains that a “true believer” shares a willingness to sacrifice all because “as long as [the collective] body lives he cannot really die.”⁴⁵

Just as Gurr later asserts in *Why Men Rebel*, Hoffer maintains that people are *mobilized* by their frustrations. However, these frustrations and the act of “undermining the existing institutions, of familiarizing the masses with the idea of change...can be done only by men who are, first and foremost, talkers or writers...”⁴⁶ In other words, a claim must be *framed* by an *agent*. Hoffer maintains that “the militant man of words prepares the ground for the rise of mass movement” which partially sets the stage (*political opportunity*) for the “true believer[s]” to act. In social scientific terms and based on Hoffer’s assertions, *political opportunity*, the *agent*, and *framing* are all necessary, but not sufficient, causal factors for frustration-based individual and mass violence to occur. This is important point to understand. Individuals can be frustrated for various reasons and *agents* can *frame* these frustrations in *mobilizing* terms, but the actual cases when all of these factors align to produce sustained contentious political action are infrequent.

⁴³ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, 1st Perennial classics ed., 2002), 3.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 62.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 61.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 129.

Hoffer's assertions about the conditions that produce the "true believer" are important to understand because they are part of the theoretical foundation of U.S. COIN doctrine in FM 3-24. However, what is more important to understand is that these conditions and the act of sustained contentious political actions with true believers completely surrendering their identity to the movements are infrequent and contingent on numerous intervening variables as we have alluded to above.

3. Explanations for Global Jihadism: Understanding Terror Networks by Marc Sageman

Marc Sageman uses Al Qaeda as a case study to generalize about the internal dynamics of growth in transnational terrorists organizations. According to Sageman, while we can find evidence supporting Gurr's social deprivation theory as a partial source of Al Qaeda's membership, this is less of a *mobilizing* factor than the a common belief among members that "iniquitous" governments ruling predominantly Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, must be forcibly removed "so that an Islamic government would form spontaneously."⁴⁷ Additionally, what he calls "Salafi Jihadi" terrorist ideology is *framed* in a claim that the United States (or the "far enemy") is a clear threat to the Muslim world and by "occupying" Arab/Muslim lands it has made a clear declaration of war on Allah, his Messenger and Muslims."⁴⁸ The majority of this framing is based on huge volumes of work produced by "Islamists" like Sayid Qutb who, among other things, assert that the Muslim world has slipped back into an age of ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and the corrupt, repressive, ineffectual ruling governments of the Muslim world are evidence of this.

Sageman maintains that the "Salafi Jihadist" *framing* mentioned above combined with members of Al Qaeda believing that the repressive "apostate government[s] would never voluntarily relinquish power" limited the *political opportunity* for Jihadists to resist the corruption their home countries. Consequently, many Al Qaeda members chose to

⁴⁷ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

pursue extra-institutional, transnational violent action which accounts for the international composition of the organization. A logical implication from Sageman's assertions is that repression, while not sufficient, is a necessary causal condition for the transnational and violent nature, or the "why" and "how" of Al Qaeda's infamous terrorist operations.

An interesting fact that Sageman discusses in his book is that 60% of the 172 Al Qaeda members he used for his study had at least a year of college. In addition, their areas of study were in hard sciences like engineering. This fact contradicts some popular notions asserting terrorists predominantly come from deprived backgrounds. Admittedly, this is an oversimplification of Sageman's theories. But, Sageman's evidence seems to diminish the relative causal potency of social-economic disparity for *mobilizing* groups of people into collective political violence. The important thing to understand here is that Sageman is using a social science approach to Global Jihadism which is centered on determining causality based on analysis of data from the field. This is key theoretical material that has been incorporated into the LLOs of *FM 3-24*. As we shall see the LLOs attempt to develop strategies that are designed to respond to more than economic deprivation and individual alienation. They include political reconciliation as a crucial element of COIN. This is clearly based on contributions from Sageman and others who have analyzed these causal factors.

4. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis

In *The Crisis of Islam* Bernard Lewis attempts to describe historical and cultural underpinnings of transnational Islamist terrorism. His basic assertion is that "Islamic history, for the Muslims, has an important religious and also legal significance, since it reflects the working out of God's purpose for His community-those that accept the teachings of Islam and obey its law."⁴⁹ This sense of history coupled with American presence on Muslim soil, support for Israel and repressive governments in predominantly

⁴⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Modern Library ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2003), xix.

Muslim countries in the Middle East has produced resentment among a significant portion of the Muslim world. In addition, Lewis maintains that historical examples of American interference in Muslim countries' domestic affairs such as the U.S. "overthrow of the Mosaddeq government in 1953, demonstrates a long and threatening record of American aggression in the Muslim world."⁵⁰ Lewis asserts that an additional element of the perceived American threat is that "[b]roadly speaking, Muslim fundamentalists are those who feel that the troubles with the Muslim world at the present time are the result not of insufficient modernization but of excessive modernization, which they see as a betrayal of authentic Islamic values."⁵¹ Islamists use this *frame* to *mobilize* frustrated and suspicious Muslims to attack America ("the great Satan") and "the false and renegade Muslims who rule the countries of the Islamic world and who have imported and imposed the infidel ways on Muslim peoples."⁵²

Finally, similar to other SMTs explaining collective political violence included in *FM 3-24*, we have not fully detailed Lewis' arguments concerning what he describes as the tendency for some Muslims "to define the struggle, and sometimes the enemy, in religious terms and to see American troops...as infidel invaders and occupiers."⁵³ However, we have detailed the significant components of his contentions about the roots of Islamist-based *mobilization* to see how they influence American COIN doctrine as articulated in *FM 3-24*. It is important to acknowledge that many Middle Eastern scholars are critical of Lewis' arguments and he is considered by many in the field to be part of the "Orientalist" population of Middle Eastern academics. This issue was described by Edward Said in his 1978 book *Orientalism*. According to Said, "Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient's difference with its weakness...As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-

⁵⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Modern Library ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 73.

⁵¹ Ibid., 134.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., xxxii.

to-truth, and knowledge.”⁵⁴ The criticism is important to understand because it questions the validity of Lewis’ arguments based on assertions that “Orientalists” lack scientific objectivity because their theories are muddled by inaccurate assumptions regarding Middle Eastern society. In fact, it is accurate to assert that many contemporary Middle East scholars do not consider “Orientalist” theories applicable in terms of analyzing and explaining contentious political violence in the Middle East. Regardless of the debate, Lewis is a noted author and his influence of U.S. COIN doctrine and Middle Eastern policy is very important.

The works discussed in this section certainly do not encompass the entire body of SMT and other social theories included in *FM 3-24*. However, as mentioned above, it is reasonable to assert that they illustrate the core social science theories employed in the FM. These theories have been crucial in forming U.S. COIN doctrine, thus warranting their selection in comparison to some others that could have been included in our discussion. With this in mind we now illustrate one way these theories were employed in *FM 3-24* by examining their influence on the FM’s LLOs.

C. THE LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION: APPLICATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY IN U.S. COIN DOCTRINE

According to *FM 3-24* “[c]ommanders use LLOs to visualize, describe and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance.”⁵⁵ The LLOs are the key to successful counterinsurgency. They formalize the paradigmatic shift from conventional Army doctrine and are intended to give commanders the ability to focus their forces’ efforts in the complex COIN environment. In this section we will describe the LLOs and the influence of the SMTs discussed previously on them. The LLOs manifest U.S. COIN doctrine in clear and parsimonious terms and illustrate the U.S. COIN doctrine’s interdisciplinary nature. Additionally, the LLOs highlight the variables, or themes, that the FM’s authors consider to be most crucial in successful COIN

⁵⁴ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 219.

⁵⁵ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, 5-3.

campaigns. As we will see these variables are not confined to one LLO and thus are generally applicable and relative importance in COIN efforts.

1. A Brief Definition of the LLOs

As Figure 1 indicates the LLOs are conceptually centered on the influencing the “attitude of the populace” rather than the enemy. The successful “End State” of a COIN campaign is defined by a public attitude predominantly supporting or neutral to the government rather than destruction of the enemy. This is a major departure from traditional U.S. military “conventional war” doctrine that has been the theoretical engine driving American training, force structure and strategy for decades.

According to the FM, the LLOs depicted in Figure One are crucial for success. Yet, they are far from fixed doctrinal axioms that constrain commanders. As the FM indicates,

[t]hese lines [LLOs] can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy of the HN government.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-7.




Figure 2. The Logical Lines of Operation in a Counterinsurgency.⁵⁷

The LLOs are “similar to the strands of a rope” that are selected by the commander and woven together to support the “overall operation.” Additionally, commanders constantly employ Information Operations (IO) to “strengthen” the effects of the LLOs by “highlighting the successes along each one.”⁵⁸ Before proceeding we will define the LLOs listed in Figure One. This will illustrate how SMT is integrated into specific LLOs and broader SMT themes used by the FM’s authors in more than one LLO.

a. Combat Operations/Civil Security Operations:

These operations are most familiar to military commanders. While these operations are necessary in many COIN campaigns, the manual stresses some key considerations which are indicative of SMT’s specific integration into this LLO and its broader influence which stresses non lethal operations over lethal ones because of the effects on public perception and ultimately the success of the COIN campaign. In this LLO forces may “conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations.”

⁵⁷ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

All of these operations fall into the Army's "full spectrum" category.⁵⁹ Significantly however, the "Civil Security Operations" portion of this LLO is the primary focus whenever possible. The FM emphasizes this:

[c]ombat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to minimize or avoid injuring innocent people. Not only is there a moral basis for the use of restraint or measured force; there are practical reasons as well. Needlessly harming innocents can turn the populace against the COIN effort.⁶⁰

This passage illustrates the fundamental principle that public security and perception are the center of gravity for these operations rather instead of destroying the enemy. Public security and the COIN forces' "fluidity of action" are the most crucial elements of this LLO. In addition, agile, small units that operate close to the public and "glean the maximum amount of quality information" about insurgents are the optimum force for executing this LLO according to the FM.⁶¹ While this is an obvious point to most COIN students and practitioners, it is diametrically opposed to conventional Army war-fighting doctrine. More importantly, *FM 3-24* emphasizes some very non-lethal and non-combat related "considerations" for commanders employing this LLO which are based on SMT. In effect, the "Considerations for developing the combat operations/civil security operations LLO" identify tasks that commanders should integrate into their COIN operations. The tasks illustrate the authors' awareness of heavy handed military operations can provide *opportunity* for an *agent* to *frame* negatively and turn the public against the COIN force. This is beyond the obvious "collateral damage" that often results from kinetic operations. The FM maintains that commanders should "[c]onsider how the population might react when planning tactical situations" like "traffic control points (TCPs)" which are generally disruptive and can potentially alienate the COIN force from the public.⁶²

⁵⁹ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-11.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 5-12.

⁶² *Ibid.*

Additionally, commanders are urged to “[s]upport efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society members of armed groups outside of government control.”⁶³ This guidance clearly places emphasis on reintegration of society over defeat of the enemy. In order to “demobilize” groups, one must first understand what mobilization is and the causes of it. Of course, SMT provides is the theoretical framework for this LLO and it is the foundation for imperatives included in it like the one discussed above.

b. *Train and Employ Host-Nation Security Forces.*

This LLO based on the fundamental assertion that “the host nation must secure its own people.”⁶⁴ Again, this LLO incorporates an inherent philosophy that understanding and respecting the host-nation’s culture. According to the “Considerations” for employing this LLO, commanders are urged to “[t]ake a comprehensive approach” to planning and implementing training strategies for developing and employing the host-nation’s security forces. Commanders are urged to integrate civic, military and political leaders into developing these programs with the dual goals of developing a capable force that is able to “achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.”⁶⁵ However, commanders are also cautioned “not to tolerate abuses” by the security forces.⁶⁶ These considerations are based on an understanding of contentious political action’s causative variables that Gurr, Hoffer and others describe in their works. Continuing the theme of societal reintegration in contrast to defeating an enemy as an overarching theme, host-nations are encouraged to “establish reparation or amnesty program[s] to allow insurgents an alternative to the insurgency.”⁶⁷ The FM clearly relies on tactics for resolving “[d]eprivation-induced discontent” as a major theoretical framework for its prescriptions. It is also significant that the majority of the

⁶³ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-12

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-13.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

“considerations” for developing host-nation forces are focused on enhancing state’s ability to secure the population and maintain the rule of law as opposed defeating the enemy.

c. *Establish or Restore Essential Services.*

Similarly to the others, this LLO is clearly rooted in addressing the needs and grievances of the population. Beyond the obvious benefits to COIN and host-nation forces efforts’ to counter the insurgency, when the population’s basic needs (e x: water, electricity, medical) are being met, this LLO provides COIN and host-nation forces with another opportunity to integrate society. The “Considerations” for this LLO urge commanders to “[u]se as much local leadership, talent, and labor as soon as possible.”⁶⁸ Just as in other LLOs, some of the main imperatives of this LLO are rooted in understanding, addressing and shaping public perceptions and expectations. Similar to above-mentioned LLOs, commanders are urged to “appreciate local preferences” and help “the populace understand what is possible” when establishing or restoring “essential services.”⁶⁹ Also, the ability of the host-nation to supply these services in a fair and efficient way is a clear demonstration of its control of the country and the rule of law which are essential for host-nation governments to establish and retain legitimacy. This is clear evidence that this LLO, like the others, is based on addressing SMT’s casual variables specific to it and focusing commanders on broader SMT themes like legitimacy, public perception, and expectations.

d. *Support Development of Better Governance.*

According to the FM:

[t]his LLO relates to the HN [host-nation] government’s ability to gather and distribute resources while providing direction and control of society...Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy of the HN government. When well executed, these actions

⁶⁸ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-14.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation.⁷⁰

This LLO, like the others, is rooted in addressing and repairing the divisions in a society that are produced by the conditions Gurr, Hoffer and others describe. The “Considerations” in this LLO urge commanders to “help (or encourage) the host-nation government to remove or reduce genuine grievances, expose imaginary ones, and resolve contradictions...”⁷¹ Again, we see the themes of reintegration and expectation and perception management as the overarching themes that are applicable to this LLO and the others. The decisive factors for successfully executing this LLO and the others are clearly derived from SMT. Commanders must find the roots of the insurgency, some of which are based perceived and actual exclusion from the government, and “[c]reate a system for citizens to pursue redress for perceived wrongs by authorities.”⁷²

e. Support Economic Development

The FM maintains that there are “short- and long-term aspects to this LLO.”⁷³ Commanders must help develop strategies to address “immediate problems, such as large-scale unemployment...” and facilitate “indigenous, robust, and broad economic activity” as part of an extended economic growth strategy. Again, employing this LLO has benefits and effects beyond those related to the host-nation economy. Employment not only provides citizens with a means to care for their families, it also promotes government legitimacy and undermines the “false promises offered by the insurgents.”⁷⁴ An implication of successful economic development is that public expectations of the eventual success of COIN force and host-nation government’s COIN campaign will be more likely. Of course, host-nation and COIN force failures in this LLO serve to bolster

⁷⁰ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-15.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 5-16.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-17.

expectations of the insurgents' power and likelihood of victory. In the broadest sense and in accordance with "relative deprivation theory," many people will act out of economic need/frustration and support the side who they expect will win in an insurgency in order to simply better their lives. Supporting economic development does much to shape the populations expectations and attitude.

f. Information Operations (IO)

According to *FM 3-24* the "IO" LLO may often be the decisive LLO."⁷⁵ Among other things, IO is intended to "[m]anage the populace's expectations regarding what counterinsurgents can achieve."⁷⁶ IO is the way the COIN forces and host-nation governments can "discredit" the insurgents' claims, publicize host-nation achievements." In other words, "[w]hen effectively used, IO address the subject of the root causes that insurgents use to gain support."⁷⁷ According to the FM's IO "Considerations," IO should provide "the populace some way to voice their opinions and grievances...;" help "[d]etermine a populations relative lines of loyalty as accurately as possible," and encourage "host-nation leaders to provide a forum for initiating a dialog with the opposition."⁷⁸ While this certainly doesn't cover the full spectrum of IO's purposes in COIN, it illustrates the main SMT themes running through all the LLOs we have discussed. As we can see managing perceptions and expectations are key tasks in this LLO as well as deligitimize the insurgents and legitimizing the host-nation government. In addition, the focus of this LLO is also on reintegration of the population. These are all key and basic elements of SMT and it would appear that the authors of *FM 3-24* believe that SMT identifies the primary causes of insurgence and therefore they have designed a doctrine firmly rooted in these theories.

⁷⁵ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, 5-8.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-8.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-9.

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III. BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY: SMALL WARS AND IMPERIAL POLICING

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of British COIN doctrine and highlight the key concepts governing it during the first half of the twentieth century. We then examine two British COIN campaigns: the 1920 Iraqi rebellion and the Zionist revolt in Palestine in 1945. We briefly recount the major events of these insurgencies to provide the proper background and clarification of the objectives of the British COIN campaigns. Next, we focus on specific British tactics employed in each campaign and determine their effectiveness in achieving the state's declared objectives and the common MOE. Finally, we discuss where the LLOs in *FM 3-24* align with British COIN practices and the implications of the similarities and differences between British and U.S. COIN.

The evidence illustrates the conflicted nature of British COIN doctrine in the early 20th century and the impact of these contradictory concepts on the British COIN campaigns in Iraq and Palestine as well as the role of these campaigns in the evolution of British COIN. Rooted in the “small wars” doctrine and the “white man’s burden” concept of the 19th century, British COIN doctrine evolved over the course of five decades through the concepts of “small wars” against external threats and “imperial policing” of the empire until it matured into an effective set of COIN principles that were refined and implemented in the noted Malayan campaign. As the case studies indicate, the British employed some tactics and strategies which are incorporated into the LLOs of contemporary U.S. COIN doctrine. In both campaigns, they struggled to reconcile effective COIN imperatives such as separating insurgents from innocent civilians with the perceived effectiveness of “crushing resistance in colonies by the most expeditious methods.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London ; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), 34.

During the early 20th century, the British discovered effective tactics and strategies for achieving their objectives in COIN campaigns from which they developed a more refined sense of the causal dynamics in insurgency. In this respect, some British military leaders were aware of the necessary conditions for success in COIN such as addressing the host nation populations' grievances. In fact, both case studies have examples of British attempts to address these causal issues. However, in the case of Iraq, these efforts were clouded by the flawed 19th-century concepts and political pressures that diluted British progress in this area and pushed the British to find, what they considered, an expedient military and political solution. This, combined with domestic Iraqi issues, resulted in anything but a stable and secure state. In the case of the Zionist rebellion, the British command structure was plagued by internal struggles for strategic direction which was endemic to the conceptual evolution of British COIN. This resulted in strategic confusion and operational shifts in the campaign that produced operations that were generally considered punitive by the population and lacked the proper integration of intelligence and political strategy to make them effective. In addition, the British lacked the political leverage to coerce or co-opt the Zionists into compromising on their objectives which would have almost certainly doomed their campaign to failure even if they had employed effective COIN tactics and strategies. In both cases, the British victory conditions were defined by the establishment or "restoration of law and order."⁸⁰ It is on this significant point that British and U.S. COIN doctrine align. The common MOE (a secure and stable environment) is an objective shared by both states in COIN campaigns. In other words, both British and American approaches to COIN put a premium on order. Order produces political opportunity of HN governments and COIN forces to establish and increase government legitimacy. However, as the evidence indicates, order does not always equate to sustained stability or legitimacy of the HN government.

Much as the U.S. military has had to adapt its conventional war thinking to asymmetrical warfare in 21st century, the British were forced to adjust their concepts

⁸⁰ Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London ; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), 33.

throughout the 20th century. In both the British and American cases, the learning and institutional changes occurred while the countries were still fighting. For the British, this process took fifty years before they learned the lessons and developed what is considered an effective COIN doctrine by most. The United States does not have fifty years to learn from its mistakes in Iraq or Afghanistan. Therefore, it would seem prudent to assess the effectiveness of our COIN doctrine by comparing the approaches detailed in this Chapter.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH COIN DOCTRINE IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY: A REVIEW OF ITS KEY INFLUENCES AND ELEMENTS

In nearly every corner of the globe, the British have fought in conflicts ranging from small *police actions* to protracted campaigns with large armies fighting major battles. Insurgencies have composed a sizable portion of these conflicts and consequently they have had substantial impact on British military doctrine and foreign policy. Perhaps more than any other kind of conflict, insurgencies created tactical, operational, strategic and political challenges that shaped the British military and the guiding principles governing its doctrine. In this context, British COIN theory and practice have essentially been evolutionary process.

As with many evolutionary processes, the developmental phases of British COIN doctrine overlapped. In fact, throughout the first half of the 20th century, competing ideas of the 19th-century “small wars” and early 20th-century “imperial policing” doctrines were regularly and simultaneously employed in the same theater of operation. We will discuss these concepts in detail below. The important point to understand about this evolutionary process is that the practical and theoretical overlaps render attempts at pinpointing absolute temporal, theoretical and practical divisions of these strategies inadequate for understanding British COIN doctrine and its application during the Iraqi and Zionist rebellions. A more productive approach to examining British COIN doctrine during these periods is to describe the conceptual roots and fundamental elements of the “small wars” and “imperial policing” doctrines. These principles and their application were in full flux during much of this time. In general, the changes were a product of concurrent international political maturations, conceptual shifts in British leadership,

economic pressures on the British, and lessons learned from the field in various parts of the world. Fundamentally, it appears that Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl's assertion that "doctrinal change is in many ways a trailing indicator of institutional learning" is correct in the case of British adaptations to irregular warfare challenges during this period.⁸¹

In his book *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* Thomas R. Mockaitis contends that an "absence of an extensive body of official [British] literature on counterinsurgency prior to the 1960s has led many observers to the mistaken conclusion that lessons were not being absorbed and transmitted."⁸² However, there is considerable evidence that the British were formalizing doctrine and attempting institutional reforms in response to insurgencies during this period. But, as Mockaitis contends, these efforts were not condensed and articulated in a unified doctrine. Instead, military theorists authored distinct publications in response to particular insurgencies. While the British lacked a truly cohesive COIN doctrine during this period, according to Mockaitis, the "conduct of internal-security operations from Ireland to Malaya were based on three broad principles..."⁸³ These were: employ minimum force to suppress disorders, assure "close cooperation between all branches of the civil government and the military" in COIN campaigns, and emphasize that military units "had to dispense with conventional tactics and adopt a highly decentralized approach[es] to combating irregulars."⁸⁴ These were principles the British developed over a fifty-year period that included two world wars, several insurgencies and which were employed within the transition from the "small wars" to the "imperial policing" concept. All of these experiences had profound altering effects on British military, political and economic aspirations. In turn, this affected military doctrine and strategy. Again, it is important to understand that the three principles Mockaitis describes were "diffuse assumptions shaping the conduct of

⁸¹ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 7.

⁸² Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 13.

⁸³ Ibid., 13

⁸⁴ Ibid., 14-15.

operations.”⁸⁵ They were only coalesced into a comprehensive strategy during the British COIN campaign in Malaya which many consider to be the contemporary standard of a successful COIN model.

In the process of developing their COIN doctrine in the early 20th century the British first struggled with defining the nature of insurgencies which, in turn, mostly determined the nature of their responses to them in a changing world. One important issue influencing British responses to “disorder” at the dawn of the 20th century was the British shift from treating many insurgencies as external incidents, or “small wars’ in unconquered and *uncivilized areas* to addressing insurgencies as internal issues of the empire, or “policing the empire.” According to Mockaitis,

the disappearance of the last open spots on the maps of Africa and Asia in the race for colonies meant that future conflicts, with the exception of the Northwest Frontier of India, would take place within the empire. They would thus be considered civil unrest rather than war.⁸⁶

In general, colonial expansion for European powers paused at the conclusion of the 19th century. The written articulation of the doctrine guiding British conduct during this period, which included conflicts with “irregulars,” was C.E. Callwell’s *Small Wars*. First published in 1896, *Small Wars* was intended to “give a sketch of the principles and practice of small wars as regards strategy and tactics, and broad rules which govern the conduct of operations in hostilities against adversaries of whom modern works on the military art seldom take account.”⁸⁷ Callwell explained that “small wars” were military operations “undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in open field...”⁸⁸ In addition, many times a “small war” against an enemy who had “no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no celebrated strongholds to capture, and no great centers of population to occupy...”

⁸⁵Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 14.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁷ C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars : Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 22.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 21.

required regular military forces “to resort to cattle lifting and village burning.”⁸⁹ He asserts that while these actions might “shock the humanitarian,” they are necessary to win against a foe that “cannot be touched by his patriotism or his honour.”⁹⁰ While this is an oversimplification of the British perception of people they were engaging during colonial expansion, the assumption for Callwell and many in the British ranks was that to “ensure lasting peace” in what would be colonial areas, especially the more “semi-civilized” ones, the fundamental objective was the “overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy.”⁹¹ In other words, demonstrations of power in varying degrees were necessary, if not sufficient, in defeating and controlling “irregulars” and “semi-civilized” people. Once the British had “overawed” those resisting, they were then obligated to help develop new “semi-civilized” subjects into civilized ones.

These assumptions were rooted in the “white man’s burden” concept. While we cannot discuss the concept fully here, basically the “white man’s burden” concept was a belief in the inherent superiority of Western civilization over those of the non-Western colonies. According to Mockaitis, within this context, the British tended “to view colonials as children...”⁹² Mockaitis also contends that, in general, the British believed that colonial subjects “were far more concerned with bread and butter issues than they were with political freedoms, which they had not enjoyed prior to British rule anyway.”⁹³ Any semblance of political unrest could be muted by “improving the native standard of living” and “[d]isturbances had to be quelled just as schoolboys had to be disciplined.”⁹⁴ As this indicates, British policy was partly rooted in an objectification of “semi-civilized” colonial subjects to essential groups of people desiring the basics (food, shelter, peace)

⁸⁹ C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars : Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 40.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 40.

⁹¹ Ibid., 42.

⁹² Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, 65.

⁹³ Ibid., 64.

⁹⁴ Lucien Pye, ‘The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions’, in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*. New York, NY: 1964, pp. 159-60: quoted in Mockaitis, 64.

with little desire for political development beyond that which gave them these basics. While our description of the role of the “white man’s burden” as a theoretical influence on Britain’s policies oversimplifies the matter, it was an undeniable part of the British schema during the colonial expansion and the Mandate periods. As we will see, this schema would adversely affect British policies and decisions, particularly during the management of the Iraqi Mandate. By the end of the 19th century, many of the “savages” or “semi-civilized races” were no longer resisting British forces on the external fringes of the empire where a “small wars” approach to these issues was generally employed with little British consternation. At the dawn of the 20th century, through conquest, many of the “savages” became British imperial subjects who would have to be policed in instances of unrest. Thus, there was an implied and practical need for the conceptual adjustment in British doctrine and force application which would mostly involve British subjects.

In his book *Britain’s Civil Wars* Charles Townshend echoes Mockaitis’ assertion regarding the British drive for a conceptual modification to the model of these conflicts. Townshend also adds an important assertion about the implication of the change for the British:

[o]ne small but clear signpost of change in the twentieth century has been the growing use of the word ‘peacekeeping’ in place of ‘pacification’. The change implied not only that the process of pacifying turbulent and uncivilized peoples had been brought to a successful end, but also that the old dynamic of self confidence had given way to a more tentative attitude.⁹⁵

Although Townshend is referring to this “small but clear signpost” as a more contemporary event, the conceptual change started in the early 20th century. As he noted, one implication of this change was “a more tentative attitude” when dealing with unrest. Townshend asserts that the “tentative attitude” was based on an inherent restraint against force built into British common and statutory law. According to Townshend, this “dominant minimalist doctrine,” or “principle of ‘necessary force’,” restricted the legal right of an official to use force in the restoration of order to that which was “no more and no less than absolutely necessary to

⁹⁵ Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 16.

restore peace.”⁹⁶ This was a problematic concept for many British military commanders. In fact, Townshend maintains that “[a]s a formula for practical action this doctrine was transparently unworkable by the eighteenth century.”⁹⁷ As a response to this issue, the British passed “Acts of Indemnity” to relieve military and police officers from the burden of recriminations for inadequate or excessive force in attempting to restore order. Regardless of “Acts of Indemnity,” British officials operated within a legal framework in the context of *internal disturbances* that made force an option requiring significant calculations by those intending to use it. Townshend asserts that despite the problematic nature of the *necessary force principle* it governed the whole spectrum of internal security action, from military aid to the civil power through martial law.”⁹⁸

While it is true that the *necessary force principle* guided British actions in their colonial territories, history is replete with examples of their application of extreme force when fighting insurgencies during the early 20th century. In his book *British Counterinsurgency*, John Newsinger asserts that the essence of “Imperial Policing” was the employment of “[o]verwhelming force” such as “mobile columns and punitive expeditions marauding through rebel territory” against “insurgents, who would be battered into submission and taught a healthy respect for British power.”⁹⁹ However, it is more accurate that tactics like these, which the British did employ, illustrate the previously-mentioned, conflicted nature of British COIN as it was evolving from the “small wars” approach to “imperial policing” and finally into the mature British COIN process. The British military was populated with officers with a “small wars” schema who had conducted operations against “irregulars” during the late 19th century and the early 20th century. These men had to reconcile the perceived effectiveness of demonstrated British power as means to “overawe” insurgents into quiescence with the more sophisticated COIN principles Mockaitis discussed in his book. In fact, the major

⁹⁶ Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 19.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁹ John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency : From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), 15.

tenants of “imperial policing” were rooted in the *necessary force principle* because, in the cases of internal uprisings, “[t]he military object is to restore civil government, and no measures should be taken which would inflict needless indignities on the civil population, or lead to subsequent bitterness.”¹⁰⁰ Although this quote is from a 1947 manual on *Internal Security Duties*, it illustrates Mockaitis’ and Townsend’s assertions that, at the dawn of the 20th century, the British understood the differences between the “small war” and matters of “imperial policing.” A more accurate description of “imperial policing” would be a strategy in which, as Mockaitis claims, the British grasped the essential “importance of civil-military co-operation” to divide insurgents from the civilian population and use tactics to support this strategy. However, in practice they often resorted to “punitive measures” rooted in the “small wars” philosophy, such as the destruction of villages in Iraq during the 1920 rebellion, to “cow the people or break the grip of terrorism.”¹⁰¹ In fact, “imperial policing” was a transitional strategy that incorporated effective COIN tactics rooted in the notions of population control and civil-military cooperation, without “the political reform” process, with the extremely violent “small wars” practices.¹⁰² Again, to assert a dichotomy between these strategies is problematic. The crucial point is that the British were operating in this conflicted doctrinal context during the Iraqi and Zionist rebellions.

C. THE FIRST BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN IRAQ: “SMALL WAR” MEETS “IMPERIAL POLICING”

In this section we analyze the British COIN campaign in Iraq during the 1920 rebellion. The rebellion pushed the strategic, operational, and tactical limits of the British and, on several occasions, they were handily defeated by rebels who employed mobile raiding tactics to isolate and attack the them. As we will discuss, the Iraqi rebellion was a catalyst for change in British COIN and solidification of their political policy in Iraq.

¹⁰⁰ *Internal Security Duties* 1947, pp. 75-77; CO 537 1971 in Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 35.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰² Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, 64.

The political outcome of the revolt was the unchallenged policy exclusion of the Shi'i and Kurds from Iraqi government institutions by "reverting to the Turkish practice of letting the Sunni Arab minority of Iraq rule the rest of the population."¹⁰³ The rebellion was also a catalytic event that shaped British political policies and COIN practices in the Middle East for decades. The British objective was stability in Iraq that was conducive to British political objectives, cost-effective and designed for marginal political development of the country. As the section on British policies leading to the rebellion indicates, the instability that exploded into large-scale war was mostly caused by British actions designed to achieve stability in Iraq from 1914 to 1920 which is exemplified by the actions of British political officers. These men are illustrative of the British efforts to employ soft power to influence local leaders and implement modified imperial policies. Additionally, they exemplify the conflicted nature of British policy in Iraq between those who favored an approach that allowed for Iraqi self determination and those who believed in and supported policies and strategies that were designed to expediently ensure British influence in Iraq and the region. These policies and the political officers shaping and enforcing them ultimately caused instability and contributed to the outbreak of the rebellion. Similarly, as the section on British tactics and policies during the rebellion shows, the political expediencies and the success of harsh "small wars" tactics in putting down the rebellion resulted in a sustained instability in Iraq that would boil over in revolutions, coups, and wars throughout the 20th century.

How did the British end up in such a threatened position in Iraq in 1920? Much of their predicament was the result of the evolutionary process of British COIN from the "small wars" approach to the "imperial policing" concept within the developing international pressures for self determination of developing states and a limited budget. As previously discussed, this resulted in conflicted policies at high levels and the employment of many contradictory and kinetic tactics in the Iraqi theater. While some of these approaches fall firmly in the best practices of COIN and are reflected in *FM 3-24*'s LLOs, others are traditional or modified "small wars" tactics centered on

¹⁰³ Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, 358.

technology. Whatever progress the British made in leveraging soft power through political officers as a part of their COIN approach in Iraq was offset by their contradictory and expedient political, civil and military policies. Ultimately, British tactics prior to the rebellion were powerful causal variables that decisively contributed to insurgency and full rebellion.

1. Background: The 1920 Rebellion: A Brief Summary

By most accounts the actual large-scale rebellion in Iraq against the British started in June of 1920.¹⁰⁴ According to Vinogradov, “the first shot signaling the revolt was fired on 30 June 1920 at Ramaytha in the Diwaniya province” when elements of the Zawalim tribe attacked a British stockade holding their shaykh, freed him and “declared rebellion” against the British. Lightly-manned British garrisons in several locations along the mid-Euphrates were isolated and attacked by “tribal warriors”¹⁰⁵ Whether the attacks at Ramaytha constituted the “first shot” of the rebellion or the seizure of Tel Afar on 4 June marks its start, by mid-July much of the mid-Euphrates had been rapidly seized or isolated by various tribes and, according to Tripp, this “gave heart to others and the rebellion spread to the tribes of the lower Euphrates, as well as to districts south, east and west of Baghdad.”¹⁰⁶ As these events unfolded, Kurdish chiefs in southern Kurdistan rebelled as well and took the opportunity to seize villages on the Iranian border. Over the course of about five months the British and various Iraqi groups were engaged in large-scale open combat on several occasions. The rebels continued to raid vulnerable British positions, assassinate and kidnap British officials, and sabotage lines of communication during the rebellion. But the coordination, size and tenacity of the attacks were in stark contrast to the infrequent and opportunistic raiding conducted by tribal and “Sharifian” elements in the two years preceding the rebellion.

¹⁰⁴ For expediency, the word Iraq refers to the region containing the three former Ottoman vailiyets of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad which is also referred to as Mesopotamia in various works.

¹⁰⁵ Amal Vinogradov, “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 2 (Apr., 1972), 136.

¹⁰⁶ Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43.

Perhaps the most noted of these examples is that of the Manchester Regiment. One July 23rd, a “small mixed column of four infantry companies and two Indian cavalry squadrons” was dispatched to set the conditions for the relief of “a small body of British civilians, troops, and levies” besieged in Kufa.¹⁰⁷ In the spirit of demonstrating British power and resolve to the “natives,” the column, like many others, would show the flag as well as tactically position itself to support the relief of Kufa. In fact, Jacobsen contends that the Manchesters constituted the bulk of the British mobile reserve in theater at the time. In the late morning, “in the full heat of mid-summer Iraq (120F) and without adequate supplies of water,” the column moved six miles south of Hilla to Imam Bakr.¹⁰⁸ When the column halted for the evening, its reconnaissance elements discovered “several thousand Arabs advancing on the camp from the north.” Cut off from Hilla and surrounded, the Manchester’s commander R.N. Hardcastle attempted to withdraw to Hilla to prevent the Arabs from seizing the town. Taking advantage of the dark and the general confusion associated with moving any large and exhausted military element at night, the “Arabs” attacked. According to Jacobsen, “only the tenacity of the Indian cavalry saved the column” from complete destruction at the hands of Arab tribesmen.¹⁰⁹ In the end, the Manchesters suffered 380 casualties with 20 confirmed dead and 360 wounded or missing.

Ultimately the Manchester disaster exposed several key issues to which the British were forced to adapt: it exposed the immobility and insufficient numbers of the British forces; the desperate fight of this exhausted column also showed the tactical insufficiency of the British in light of the rapidly developing and decentralized rebellion; finally, as a single event in a series of tactical set backs, the Manchester disaster showed British leaders in Iraq, India and London that they could, or would, lose Iraq unless they adapted to the situation on the ground. In fact, the British did adapt. Mostly in response to Manchester incident, the British General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Iraq, Sir

¹⁰⁷ Mark Jacobsen, “‘Only by the Sword’: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 2, no. 2 (1991), 340.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 341.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 341.

Aylmer L. Haldane, reluctantly changed his opinion of rebel capabilities and the forces he would need to put down the rebellion. He began to push hard for additional troops, cabling the request to the war office on 25 July.¹¹⁰ According to Jacobsen, by October Haldane was reinforced with 4,883 British and 24,508 Indian troops in addition to the 80,000 he commanded in June 1920.¹¹¹ In reality Jacobsen contends that Haldane could actually only maneuver about 53,000 men (“2,400 British and 45,000 Indian effectives...and 5,000 Iraqi levies) when the rebellion erupted in June.¹¹² Regardless, with these additional troops (many of whom were inexperienced and poorly-armed Indians) and employing modernized “small war” tactics such as aerial raiding, the British finally projected enough power to end open revolt in October.

During the course of the rebellion, the rebels cut multiple lines of communication including all but one railway leading into Baghdad. At different times, they isolated or seized Tel Afar, Kufa, Diwaniya, and Samawa as well as other significant locations. Shi'i leaders in Najaf declared “rebellion” and “the town proceeded to set up a Provisional Revolutionary Government...”¹¹³ Tens of thousands of Arabs and Kurds fought the British in both coordinated and opportunistic battles ranging from small raids to capture booty, offensive operations to seize land, and prepared defenses to retain control of territory. Toby Dodge maintains that the British faced “an estimated 131,000 men across Iraq” during the height of the rebellion.¹¹⁴ By most accounts, between 15,000 and 20,000 of these rebels were armed with modern rifles. According to Jacobsen, British casualties were relatively light: 426 killed, 1,288 wounded, and 615 missing.¹¹⁵ Jacobsen puts the British estimate of insurgent casualties at 8,450.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Mark Jacobsen, “‘Only by the Sword’: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 2, no. 2 (1991), 341.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 326.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Vinogradov, *The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics*, 136.

¹¹⁴ Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 135.

¹¹⁵ Jacobsen, *‘Only by the Sword’: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920*, 357.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Yet, as the rebellion rapidly and decisively developed in mid-June of 1920, considerable elements of the British command structure in Iraq and abroad considered the various agitated, indigenous parties unwilling and incapable of conducting effective and coordinated operations despite mounting evidence to contrary. General Haldane and Winston Churchill were chief among this group. However, less than a month later and following the Manchester disaster, Haldane was calling for reserves and rapidly adjusting his force's dispositions and tactics. In the next two sections we analyze key tactics the British employed prior to the rebellion and during its height.

2. The Path to Rebellion in Iraq: Hearts, Minds and the Political Officer

In this section we see how the British attempted to employ political officers as a means of soft power with the intent of shaping Iraqi institutions into elements of a state structure that was ultimately intended to maintain stability, facilitate British interests and placate calls for self determination in the international community. The British political officers were key instruments of the British strategy both prior to and after the rebellion. However, it is their actions prior to the rebellion that contributed to instability in the country they were attempting to prevent. In addition, their proclamations and actions are indicative of the conflicted evolution of British COIN doctrine and political policy in Iraq. As this section will illustrate, much of the debate between and actions of the British political officers attempting to craft acceptable policies in Iraq were instrumental in the instability that still plagues Iraq today. In addition, the conflicted nature of the British COIN strategy in which the political officers were such an important part demonstrates the necessity of political strategies in COIN and also the danger of political exclusion.

On November 6, 1914 the British Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF) landed on the Fao peninsula with the intent of pushing the Ottoman army out of the territory known as the Basra Valliyet. According to Amal Vinogradov, Sir Percy Cox, a political officer and future British Civil Commissioner of Iraq, "immediately proceeded to issue a proclamation to the effect that the British were not at war with 'Arab

inhabitants of the river banks' so long as they did not fight them first."¹¹⁷ Over the next four years, the British fought a difficult campaign to dislodge the Ottomans from the rest of Mesopotamia, gain Arab and Kurdish support in the process, and formulate an occupation policy that was bounded by competing COIN concepts, economic restrictions and maturing international notions of political self determination for developing states. As Charles Tripp notes, "it was not until the late summer of 1918 that they [the British] occupied Kirkuk and effectively destroyed the Ottoman 6th Army."¹¹⁸ During this period, the British were politically and militarily countering diverse Iraqi insurgent elements while conducting a full-scale military campaign against the Ottomans. In fact, Vinogradov asserts that, through men like Percy Cox, the British attempted to depict themselves "not as conquerors but [as] liberators" in Iraq.¹¹⁹

In the context of conventional and COIN campaigns, proclamations made by invading forces depicting themselves as liberators of the local population from the yoke of an occupying power or insurgent force are common and necessary for many reasons. Primary among these is the strategic goal of every invading force to either gain the support or neutrality of the local population when fighting these campaigns. This is commonly known today as the Hearts and Minds (HAM) strategy in COIN.¹²⁰ Throughout the British Mandate period in Iraq, it is clear that elements of the British command structure and policy makers understood and tried to employ elements of this strategy. For example, "in the summer of 1919 when three young British captains [political officers] were murdered in Kurdistan" by local Kurds, "an experienced official" was sent to replace them. He was killed in November as well.¹²¹ While the circumstances of these killings are far from clear, they illustrate the commitment of the

¹¹⁷ Vinogradov, *The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics*, 132.

¹¹⁸ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 32.

¹¹⁹ Vinogradov, *The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics*, 132.

¹²⁰ Austin Long, United States. Dept. of Defense and National Defense Research Institute, *On "Other War" : Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2006), 23.

¹²¹ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace : Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922*, 1st American ed. (New York: H. Holt, 1989), 451.

British to the HAM effort and the dangerously complex environment in which their political officers were operating. Political officers functioned outside of the military realm as “advisors” and administrators of colonial governments. Moreover though, they were key implementers and facilitators of imperial strategy. Based on the priority the British put into manning these billets, it is clear that they understood the pivotal role a political officer could play.

This was particularly true in Iraq. According to Jacobsen, “most regiments [in Iraq] had only seven officers compared with the peacetime 12, since many had been detailed to civil administration.”¹²² Prior to the rebellion, political officers were distributed with small garrisons throughout the Valliyets that would become Iraq. In order “to support the nascent civil administration,” A.T. Wilson (the British Civil Commissioner in Iraq from 1918 to 1920) had convinced Haldane’s predecessors that British forces “had to establish a presence in as many towns as possible.”¹²³ In terms of COIN, this strategy of dispersing forces into strategic locations in order to separate the population from the insurgents and establish the control and legitimacy of state forces is among the most important measures. Indeed, it is echoed in the LLOs of *FM 3-24* today. In the case of the British however, two crucial issues stand out: first, as we will see, the political officers were mostly shepherding the development of an extractive and exclusionary state apparatus that eroded state legitimacy rather than bolstering it; second, because these isolated outposts lacked a crucial supportive relationship with local levies and a constabulary, they were weak, vulnerable symbols of imperialism, and in most cases, targets. Therefore, as the rebellion spread in 1920, these garrisons and their political officers were isolated, captured, or killed such as in Tel Afar where the entire British garrison was killed by tribesmen and Iraqi levies who also rebelled. This was obviously problematic for Haldane as he attempted to reestablish order in Iraq.

Cox’s 1914 proclamation illustrates an additional important issue in the scope of the British occupation of Iraq and COIN: it marks the beginning of a conflicted and

¹²² Jacobsen, *‘Only by the Sword’: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920*, 326.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 324.

contrary British political and military policy in Iraq. The conceptual struggle to reconcile “small wars” doctrine and emerging “imperial policing” tactics within the effort to establish sustained British control in Iraq is clearly illustrated by the changing proclamations and actions of political officers prior to and after the rebellion. Arguably, British political officers’ actions between 1917 and 1920 to create a state that would support British regional aspirations while ostensibly accommodating the spirit of self determination was a key causal variable leading to the 1920 rebellion. While it is important to acknowledge that the Mandate policies alone were crucial sources of discontent. The political officers’ interpretations and manipulations of these policies grounded in their personal biases, the manner in which they implemented directives and influenced British policies were catalysts providing a local focus for agitation and mobilization among various groups such as the Shi’i ulama and Sharifian loyalists. These policies and the political officers’ roles in developing and implementing them may not have been sufficient for rebellion in Iraq, but they developed the key conditions of political exclusion, frustration and expected foreign political domination which was necessary for rebellion.

As the MEF fought the Ottomans and attempted to consolidate British gains, Arab responses to the British policies and campaign in Iraq were mixed at best. According to Tripp, “[t]he inhabitants of the three provinces [Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra] reacted in a variety of ways to the events which engulfed them.”¹²⁴ We can see early evidence of nationalist and religiously-based sentiments within segments of the Iraqi population as they resisted both Ottoman and British forces depending on the circumstances. Large sections of the Iraqi population were quick to attack the Ottomans or desert their ranks as the Ottomans’ power in the region began to wane. According to Tripp

[l]arge numbers of tribesmen did join the Ottoman forces as auxiliaries, but many deserted after the defeat at Shu’aiba, sometimes turning on their erstwhile allies. In Najaf and Karbala in the months following Shu’aiba, uprisings against the Ottoman authorities broke out. These uprisings were

¹²⁴ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 32.

anti-Ottoman in a broad sense, often sparked by particular local resentments, but they were not in support of the British war effort.¹²⁵

P.W. Ireland maintains that “[t]he pre-war Nationalist Movement had been occasioned less by the evils of the Turkish administration...than by the fact that the Turks, in spite of a common religion, were non-Arab rulers and that they barred the way to independence...”¹²⁶ During the six years between the invasion of the MEF in 1914 and the Iraqi rebellion in 1920, Ireland maintains that “Arab Nationalism flickered fitfully in ‘Iraq.”¹²⁷ Iraqis rebelled against Ottoman control in Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, Kufa and Tuwairij. Based on this, it would appear that many Iraqis were eager to eject the Ottomans, but they were not interested in trading Ottoman control for British occupation. As this illustrates, the 1920 rebellion did not happen in a vacuum. Indeed, it was the series of increasingly confused policies formulated, resisted and articulated by the political officers on many occasions that solidified Iraqi resistance to the British.

On March 11, 1917 the MEF, under command of General Maude, seized Baghdad. On this occasion, a statement was issued in his name to the people of Baghdad. Among other claims, it asserted that British were “liberators” and not “conquerors.” But most importantly to many Iraqis regardless of their ethnicity or sect, it proclaimed that

the people of Baghdad,...are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized again...O! People of Baghdad...I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realizing the aspirations of your races.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 33.

¹²⁶ Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq: a Study in Political Development* (London: J. Cape, 1937), 243.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 239.

¹²⁸ Ghassan R. Atiyah, *Iraq: 1908-1921, A Socio-Political Study* (Beirut, Lebanon: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973), 151.

This proclamation was actually “a story of irony” according to Ghassan R. Atiyah.¹²⁹ Written by Sir Mark Sykes who was the noted co-author of the Sykes-Pico Agreement of 1916 which secretly divided portions of the Middle East between Britain and France, the 11 March Baghdad proclamation clearly signified British support of Iraqi political development. However, General Maude and Percy Cox both opposed its publication. As well, there was little support for the declaration from A.T. Wilson. According to Atiyah, Wilson called it a “piece of ‘politics’... designed for local consumption.”¹³⁰ Maude, Cox and Wilson all favored statements and policies grounded in direct British control and Arab cooperation. Indeed, in a draft proclamation he wrote to the residents of Baghdad on March 8, Cox stated that for the Iraqis “to ensure their own emancipation” they should continue “going quietly about their daily vocations and assisting the British authorities to carry on normal administration.”¹³¹ The different visions for Iraq’s future articulated in the 1917 Sykes and Cox proclamations illustrates two important points. First, the Sykes proclamation was rooted in the ideas of Arab independence that were articulated in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the 1918 British and French “joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to self-rule by the indigenous populations of Mesopotamian and Syria,” and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. These all encouraged regional and Iraqi expectations of tangible British policies supporting self determination and Iraqi political development which is consistent with the HAM strategy. Second, it shows the internal divisions in the British policy and military agencies. While the details of this are far too complex to sufficiently discuss here, there were numerous conflicting opinions within the British ranks about their method of governance in Iraq and Iraqi independence. This illustrates the struggle to reconcile the “white man’s burden” and “small wars” mentality with the appreciation for the soft power partially included in the “imperial policing” approach.

It was during these years that the British struggled to formulate a policy in Iraq that would reconcile their political objectives, the ideals of self-determination propagated

¹²⁹ Ibid., 151.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 152.

¹³¹ Ibid.

by Wilsonian doctrine, strong Iraqi independence sentiments, and the conceptual evolution of British COIN discussed previously. These policies were not only designed to secure British interests in Iraq and influence in the Middle East, they amounted to COIN strategy as well. In effect, the British attempted to create an Iraqi state structure using political officers and other tactics that would counter elements the British considered threatening to their objectives in the region. According to Charles Tripp, in the case of Iraq, the British “needed and found subjects to constitute the order which they believed best suited the idea of the Mandate and the protection of British interests.”¹³²

Within this context, the diverse populations of the three “Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul” were formed into the modern Iraqi state structure as designed by the British. Facilitated by political officers and similar to the Ottomans, the British empowered minority groups to govern the newly formed state and politically excluded other populations “who aspired to different kinds of order.”¹³³ For example, when A.T. Wilson conducted a “plebiscite” in the fall of 1919 to determine sentiments among “notables” across Iraq about the constitutional development of Iraq, the answers varied. According to Yitzhak Nakash, even though the desires of many “Arab Shi’i merchants, notables, tribal shaykhs, and even some mujtahids for the continuation of British rule...” was clear, “important Najafi mujtahids and other figures in the city expressed a wish for an independent state extending from Mosul in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south.”¹³⁴ Varied opinions like these in the plebiscite and calls for independence presented in a January 1919 petition from “prominent mujtahids, sayyids, [and] other religious functionaries in Karbala” were not included in the “group [of petitions] sent to London.”¹³⁵ In the case of the Karbala petition, “the British official in charge” refused to accept it because it was tendered after the deadline for submitting

¹³² Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 30.

¹³³ Ibid., 31.

¹³⁴ Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq : With a New Introduction by the Author*, 2nd pbk. , with a new introduction ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 63.

¹³⁵ Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shiis of Iraq : With a New Introduction by the Author*, 2nd pbk. , with a new introduction ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 64.

“opinions on self-determination.”¹³⁶ This illustrates the conflicted nature of British policy and the impact of the political officer in Iraq. While it is reasonable to assert that the political officers shaping the information going to their higher headquarters were acting in what they saw as the best interests of the crown by elevating those Iraqis who supported British interests, these officers were also setting the conditions for open rebellion by not even ostensibly including potential resistance groups in the political process. This made it clear to independence-minded Iraqis that they could not gain anything by operating within the system. This exclusion was an important causal variable setting the conditions for large-scale rebellion. As it turned out, all that was needed was a catalytic event in this environment to push many Iraqis to unite and openly fight the British.

The San Remo agreement of May, 1920 was that event. It divided much of the Middle East into zones of control, or Mandates, between France and Britain. With Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points extolling “self determination,” British support for Arab independence in the form of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence during the First World War, and the 1918 British and French “joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to self-rule by the indigenous populations of Mesopotamian and Syria,” one can only imagine the frustration and mistrust felt by independent-minded Iraqis with the announcement of the Mandates. If it is possible to point to one event that was an external catalyst for the 1920 revolt, the San Remo agreement would be it because it was an official declaration of British intent to stay in control of Iraq regardless of what the Western powers decided to call it. If this event is considered in conjunction with other Iraqi motives such as resentment that was surely felt by Iraqis who “[a]s proof of their loyalty to His Majesty’s Government...provided ‘volunteer’ money for such causes as the Red Cross, army shelters in England, and the [e]rection of a monument for General Maude,” it is easy to see its causal power.¹³⁷ The San Remo agreement was truly a watershed moment in Iraqi-British relations and an easily identifiable rallying point for

¹³⁶ Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shiis of Iraq : With a New Introduction by the Author*, 2nd pbk. , with a new introduction ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 64.

¹³⁷ Vinogradov, *The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics*, 133.

all Iraqis interested in independence regardless of their motives. In June these catalysts, frustrations and military opportunities developed into full rebellion. In the next section, we will analyze the key British tactical and political response to this and its implications.

3 Countering the 1920 Rebellion: Hard Power, Soft Power and Expedient Stability

How did the British manage to defeat the Iraqi insurgency without conducting the long and costly campaign associated with most COIN efforts? The very basic answer is that they quickly ended open rebellion by employing crushing military technology when they needed and could, and co-opted significant elements of Iraqi society to expediently establish order. In June 1920 the British faced a potent military challenge in Iraq: much of the British forces were disbursed in weak, small outposts throughout the Mandate; their ability to maneuver, communicate and mutually support each other was severely restricted by terrain, weather, logistics and the enemy; they lacked a clear picture of the enemy situation; and the British chain of command from the highest to the lowest levels was far from unified. However, in the course of five months the British regained control of Iraq and soundly defeated the rebellion. The British returned to the one strategy they knew would establish order: punitive strikes and sweeps. As we discuss below, order was ultimately the objective because all other progress was contingent upon its establishment. We will discuss some of these tactics and their implications in more detail below. Before moving on to this discussion however, it is important to once again emphasize that the British military campaign to end the 1920 rebellion solved the immediate tactical and operational issues for the British, but history has demonstrated the inadequacies of the British solutions in Iraq. Jacobsen also makes this important and accurate point:

[a]t its most fundamental, the Arab revolt taught that Iraq could not be held as a dependent state. For financial as well as strategic reasons, there was no alternative to the mandate and to hoping that rule by ‘moderates’ would succeed. The 1920 revolt...paradoxically facilitated the transfer of

power to Feisal and the Sherifans, weakening the power of the two most intractable elements of the Iraqi body politic [Shi'i and Kurdish] at a time of political transition.¹³⁸

While the inclusion of the minority Sunni “sharifian and ex-Ottoman administrative elites” and exclusion of others, such as the “Shi'i mujtahids” and “Kurdish leaders,” from the state institutions may have seemed an expedient policy guaranteeing British interests, it reinforced the Sunni minority’s “authoritarian inclinations...[and] was not a promising basis for the national integration that was in theory intended to accompany the construction of the modern state.”¹³⁹ In fact, the problematic lessons the British took from the 1920 COIN campaign in Iraq (modernized “small wars” tactics and rule through political exclusion of uncooperative elements) were foundational elements of their COIN efforts in the region for decades. Their fundamental assumption based on their experiences in Iraq was that updated versions of “small wars” tactics were effective and decisive in achieving their primary objective: order.

In the British schema, order mostly equated to stability and nascent public support. Townshend maintains that “the consistent aim of British counterinsurgency action has been the ‘restoration of law and order’. Whilst soldiers sometimes take a rather formalistic view of order-as the mere absence of disturbance-civil administrators see it as the embodiment of the spirit of consensus, a positive endorsement of the political system.”¹⁴⁰ This colonial “small wars” philosophy was only reinforced by the rapid defeat of the rebellion. Ultimately, according to Jacobsen, the

British conduct of operations looked backwards to the Boer War and to Indian frontier wars. General Callwell’s *Small Wars*, the summa of nineteenth century British counterinsurgency, illuminates Haldane’s conduct of operations at every turn.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Vinogradov, *The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics*, 138.

¹³⁹ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 31.

¹⁴⁰ Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 33.

¹⁴¹ Jacobsen, *'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920*, 358.

General Haldane, a veteran of World War I and the Boer War, used his experiences, leadership capabilities, and technological advantages to adapt to the situation and retake the initiative in Iraq. In a combination of conventional warfare and “small wars” strategies and new technology, he consolidated his available forces into strike elements, secured lines of communications and key locations, and attacked the enemy when and where he could. Below we analyze the key COIN tactic the British employed in Iraq during and following the rebellion, the punitive strike and sweep

a. *Punitive Strike and Sweep*

As discussed earlier, many British military and political leaders placed a lot of stock in the concept of demonstrated power and punishment when dealing with “semi-civilized” populations. Rooted in the “small wars” philosophy, punitive strikes and sweeps operationalized the “idea that a ‘short, sharp shock’, an exemplary application of force, will permit a quicker return to normality...” when fighting a COIN campaign.¹⁴² Although there were acknowledged limitations to their effectiveness and questions about the morality of punishing “semi-civilized” people into acquiescence, punitive strikes and sweeps were a fundamental element of British COIN doctrine and these tactics were main stays of British COIN for decades. In fact, their perceived efficacy was arguably the primary COIN lesson the British garnered from their campaign in Iraq. As we will see, they carried this flawed lesson to its logical conclusion by attempting to improve their punitive strike effectiveness through technology and build their COIN strategy around punitive strikes and sweeps. In the end, the British believed that the restoration of order they achieved in Iraq validated punitive strikes and sweeps as one of the primary means of achieving victory in COIN. As the historical record indicates, this was flawed thinking.

Because of their kinetic nature, punitive strikes and sweeps evolved with technology. Prior to World War I, they were characterized by the slow-moving punitive columns of infantry and mounted cavalry troops sweeping into villages, burning homes,

¹⁴² Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 34.

destroying or confiscating livestock, and in the case of Iraq, levying fines. For example, once General Haldane received his reinforcements in Iraq and consolidated his units into strike forces, he deployed “as many as 12 simultaneous separate columns...throughout Iraq to collect fines.” According to Jacobsen, “[o]ne regimental history’s account of a punitive sweep north of Hilla in late October counts 800 prisoners and 7,000 head of cattle, sheep, and horses as the take.”¹⁴³ As this indicates punitive strikes were often part of larger sweeps designed to drive insurgent forces out of territories that the British would then occupy, or as in the “sweep north of Hilla,” the columns punished the population for supporting the insurgents and withdrew from the area to a larger base in true punitive strike fashion.

These tactics were effective means of projecting power and temporarily seizing the initiative from insurgents by denying them logistical support and sanctuary in areas. When they were employed in conjunction with the British political strategy of emplacing and elevating proxies, punitive strikes and sweeps were effective as a means of controlling the population. According to Toby Dodge, “[i]n the case of state-society relations under the Mandate, it was the state’s ability to deploy violence simultaneously with the influence given to it by the exercise of largesse that defined the nature of its relations with the Iraqi population.”¹⁴⁴ While this coercive combination of hard and soft power was hardly a recipe for extended stability, it was definitely a means for quickly establishing control of areas. As long as the elite, a shaykh in most cases, could muster enough physical support within his tribal structure and the British were capable of delivering lethal punitive strike support for him as well, areas were controlled.

However, as part of the punitive strike and sweep tactic, the punitive column did have its disadvantages. As the Manchester disaster demonstrated, infantry and horse-mounted cavalry columns were vulnerable to weather, terrain, and a mobile enemy who was familiar with the land. The punitive columns were slow and their range was severely restricted by their logistical support requirements. This was particularly

¹⁴³ Col. Brian Mullaly, *Bugle and Kukri: The 10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles*. (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1957) p.136, in Jacoben 139.

¹⁴⁴ Dodge, *Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied*, 32.

true in the case of Iraq. The British looked to the technological innovations of World War I as part of the answer to this problem. In particular, they relied on machine-gun equipped cavalry, armored cars, and the airplane.

According to Jacobsen, when employed with the right weapons, “cavalry’s effectiveness in 1920 Iraq demonstrated anew that cavalry was a weapon with a future as well as a past.”¹⁴⁵ What Jacobsen means is that when the cavalry troops were equipped with light machine guns, this added fire power to their mobility which allowed them to dominate the equally mobile, but outgunned insurgents. Indeed, the speed and fire power of the cavalry were interpreted as the key to defeating highly mobile insurgents. In the minds of many British tacticians, mobility was the decisive capability in COIN. The British forces’ ability to focus their superior combat power at decisive points was contingent on their ability to match the speed of the insurgents. The more mobile the force, the more capable it was of defeating the insurgents whenever they would “pop up.” As we will discuss, the “successes” of the increasingly mobile and lethal capabilities developed and employed by the British in Iraq were seen as the validation of the kinetically-grounded military planners’ and politicians’ beliefs in these as a sort of cost-effective tactical panacea for British imperial woes in the early and mid 20th century.

It is important to understand that this faith in technology combined with mobility and massed combat power was not unanimous among British military leaders. As Mockaitis notes, while developing, implementing, and experiencing perceived success with these methods in Iraq, the British were employing “small-unit operations...” as ‘a matter of official strategy’ in Northern Ireland by April 1921 because large-scale motorized and mounted sweeps were relatively ineffective against the rebels there. With good intelligence and stealth, British forces were able to “beat the IRA at its own game.”¹⁴⁶ In the case of Northern Ireland, British military leaders were coming to understand the importance of intelligence in conjunction with mobility. Nonetheless, in

¹⁴⁵ Jacobsen, *'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920*, 359.

¹⁴⁶ Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, 151.

Iraq mobility and fire power seemed to be sufficient to win militarily in a COIN campaign and this belief characterized much of British strategy in the Middle East for decades.

Building on the advantages of light machine guns and cavalry, the British employed two more very important technological innovations in their COIN campaign in Iraq: the armored car and airplane. Of the two, the airplane was truly seen as the pinnacle of efficiency and effectiveness in terms of mobility and force projection. While armored cars offered added protection from small arms, faster movement, and greater range for infantry soldiers, “their drawbacks, liability to break down or to be ambushed, were not forgotten, and their promise was heavily qualified.”¹⁴⁷ Despite their disadvantages, armored cars were rapidly integrated into the British arsenal and they were employed in mostly a supportive role by them. In reality, they never materialized into the advanced, mobile fighting platforms for countering insurgents’ mobility that many military planners hoped they would.

However, several British political and military leaders, including Churchill and Haldane, saw the airplane as the ultimate force projection platform and an effective population control tool in the COIN environment. When the airplane is considered in the context of the conceptual evolution of British COIN doctrine, its employment in Iraq marks a decisive turn toward favoring lethal, inexpensive stand-off weapon systems as a means of achieving tactical and operational dominance in support of British policies. According to Jacobsen, the actual effectiveness of the airplane in Iraq was “modest, consisting of reconnaissance, presence, and something resembling close air support, none of which demonstrated that air power could substitute for ground forces in holding restive natives at bay.”¹⁴⁸ Dodge also makes this assertion: “[u]ntil October 1922 air power was not the main coercive tool used to enforce order across Iraq. It acted as a useful and novel ancillary tool used to enforce order across Iraq.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Jacobsen, *'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920*, 359.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 358.

¹⁴⁹ Dodge, *Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied*, 149.

But, the airplane's tactical capabilities and successes in Iraq were not the most important factors to consider in the scope of British COIN. The notion that air power, as a part of the punitive strike tactic, could be substituted for the punitive column was entrenched in British thinking less than two years after its introduction into the Iraqi theater of operations. Toby Dodge maintains that, for the British, there were three "dominant themes" that emerged from the introduction of the air power into COIN in Iraq:

[f]irst, efficiency: it could get to places troops could not or should not go. Secondly, knowledge: the maps planes provided confirmed and consolidated the dominant understanding of rural Iraq. Third, triumphalism: the destructive force of the new weapon was widely celebrated as a vindicating testament to western superiority over the world's backward peoples.¹⁵⁰

Based on the fact that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was given responsibility for "military order" in Iraq in October of 1922, it appears that the highest levels of British leadership believed in air power as the answer to the difficulty of managing disparate threats in Iraq from non-compliant villages to swarms of tribal warriors.

Eventually the Mandates were supposed to develop into independent states. Considering the very public British support for this policy and their shrinking defense budget following World War I, the airplane was an ideal way of projecting British power in support of the weak Iraqi government and the tribal shaykhs who were supposed to keep order in Iraq. In his book *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, Toby Dodge maintains that air power was firmly entrenched "as the state's main weapon of coercion" in Iraq by 1923. While this is an important and accurate point, he also makes another vital assertion in terms of understanding the effects of British military and political policies that shaped the Iraqi state in which the airplane was the final arbitrator. The expediency of the airplane was matched with the perceived practicality of using the "nominal shaikh[s]" in previously uncontrolled areas as the mediators between the state and the populations they theoretically lead in these troubling regions. According to Dodge, many of these shaykhs

were in reality weak and ineffectual. But, in the two years following the rebellion the British transformed Iraqi society by surveying and sectioning off these regions. The British restructured them into what they perceived as the “authentic social structures” that was disrupted under the Ottomans.¹⁵¹ However, Dodge maintains that British perceptions of Iraqi social and tribal structures in the rural areas in which the “nominal shaikh” was the classical community leader were often contrary to the reality on the ground. Therefore, when the British demanded the shaykhs from the al Sufran and Barakat tribes collect a penalty tax from their tribal villages for the “frequent raiding” in areas believed to be under their control, both shaykhs failed to deliver any money because they could not. In fact, “Khahan al Jazi, the nominal shaikh of the Barakat” informed the “Administrative Inspector” that he would need “police support to maintain his own village.”¹⁵²

While this is only a single example of this, Dodge presents several in his book. The key point for our purposes is that the British rapidly abandoned their oversight of Iraq to proxies and applied a modernized punitive strike tactic as their primary means of control there. There were two important ramifications of their policies: first, as history has demonstrated, the political and military expediencies of the British channeled Iraqi institutional development along a violent and exclusionary path that was anything but stable in the long term; second, British political and military leaders in this period, especially Winston Churchill, concluded that order in the Middle East could be achieved by technologically advanced hard power combined with convenient support for groups whose fortunes were tied to British interests. Granted, the British employed highly lethal “small wars” tactics to defeat the rebellion in Iraq. However, their perceptions of success were grounded in the flawed beliefs in demonstrated power’s ability to cow “natives” into submission and the supremacy of rapid mobility and fire power in COIN.

¹⁵⁰ Dodge, *Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied*, 149

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 152.

¹⁵² Ibid., 153.

It is important to acknowledge that members of the British military, British politicians and Iraqis disputed the effectiveness and morality of the expedient political and military strategies employed by the British in Iraq. Dodge sights the “damning indictment of the political officer in Amarah in 1920, Major S.E. Hedgecock, who challenged “the whole policy of supporting the shaikhs to the exclusion of all other sections of society.”¹⁵³ Townshend quotes “Churchill’s successor [British Secretary of State for War], Worthington-Evans” from a 1921 “Cabinet memo” on ‘Policy and Finance in Mesopotamia’:

‘the only weapons which can be used by the Air Force are bombs and machine guns’. These might suffice to repel external attack, but the forces in Mesopotamia were ‘intended to keep order and gradually to reconcile hostile tribes to a civilized rule’. For this task ‘the only means at the disposal of the Air Force, and the means in fact now used, are the bombing of women and children in the villages’...’If the Arab population realize that the peaceful control of Mesopotamia ultimately depends on our intention of bombing women and children, I am very doubtful if we shall gain that acquiescence...’¹⁵⁴

Regardless of these protests, the British developed and based their rule and COIN doctrine on these tactics. They continued to employ political officers to manage and tutor Iraqi officials. However, they abandoned all practical applications of COIN tactics rooted in building rapport with the indigenous populations beyond that which they developed with the minority elites who would implement order. This order was enforced by the coercive power of the airplane and later the Iraqi military establishment. In the next section, we will discuss the evolution of these flawed tactics and strategies and their implications during the 1945 Zionist revolt in Palestine.

D. THE ZIONIST REVOLT IN PALESTINE: THE LAST GASPS OF BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICING

In this section we analyze the key COIN tactics employed by the British during the Zionist rebellion in Palestine from the end of World War II until their withdrawal

¹⁵³ Dodge, *Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied*, 115.

¹⁵⁴ Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century*, 97.

from the area in 1948. Just as in the 1920 Iraqi rebellion, the British employed some COIN tactics in Palestine that they would later develop and integrate into a comprehensive and effective COIN doctrine. However, their campaign in Palestine was plagued by internal conflicts within the British high command and characterized by a combination of ineffective punitive strategies and effective COIN tactics. These factors combined with the increasingly complex internal issues in Palestine and matched by building international support for Jewish immigration and statehood ultimately pushed the British out. In 1945, the British had formidable political, military and police forces in Palestine, they faced a small insurgency with minimal popular support in the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine), and they were members of a victorious alliance emerging from the largest war in history. How then, did the British suffer “one of the most humiliating episodes in immediate postwar British history” and surrender their position in Palestine to the Yishuv in early 1948? The answer is complex. But, it can be reduced to some vital basic elements. First, because of internal conflict at the highest levels in the British command structure which resulted in shifting policies in Palestine and their “imperial policing” doctrine, they ultimately relied on flawed tactics that were rooted in the punitive, “small wars” approach to counterinsurgency. Second, the British faced a uniquely problematic situation in Palestine because the prospects for their success were severely diminished by the key fact that, by 1947, the Zionists saw no real utility in cooperating with the British. The Yishuv had garnered significant international support for Jewish immigration to Palestine and establishment of the Jewish state there. This meant that the British ability to apply economic and political leverage against the Yishuv quickly diminished between 1945 and 1947. Finally, ambiguous policies intended to placate both the Yishuv and Palestinians while maintaining British interests in the region were ineffective and frustrating to all involved and this created an atmosphere of perceived irreconcilability. Ultimately, these factors combined to make the British position in Palestine untenable. In terms of analyzing the relationship of British COIN doctrine and practice during this period to the LLOs in *FM 3-24*, the implications of the British failures in Palestine illustrate the importance of a unified command structure, the necessity of clear and attainable objectives, the primacy of intelligence in COIN

campaigns, and the relative ineffectiveness of punitive measures. Finally, the Zionist rebellion exemplifies the necessity of a perceived comparative advantage, or utility, within the uncommitted population to supporting a state's COIN campaign. Without this, the state has no real hope of winning.

1. Background: The British and Zionist Situations in Palestine in 1945

At the end of World War II the British were broke and battered yet, once again, members of a victorious alliance that had defeated the Germans. Although it was considerably diminished, the British Empire was intact and the Union Jack still flew in many corners of the world. The Middle East was one of those areas. The British continued to control Palestine and according to John Newsinger, they “considered Palestine to be a territory of vital strategic importance, providing a military base from which to dominate the rest to the Middle East.”¹⁵⁵ Indeed, just as at the conclusion of World War I, the British were again trying to craft a Middle Eastern policy that would reconcile their imperial ambitions, regional security concerns, and the mounting and more sophisticated pressure for self-determination in the Middle East. The situation in Palestine in 1945 was characterized by an increasingly intense Zionist drive, supported by the United States and much of the international community, for a Jewish state in Palestine, an indigenous Arab population that, while fractured and plagued by in-fighting, was almost unanimously opposed to Jewish immigration and aggravated by international support for Zionist expansion in Palestine, and a unanimous frustration shared by British, Jews and Arabs with the apparently irreconcilable objectives of the others.

In this context, Newsinger asserts that Palestine and the rest of the Middle East were so important to the British that “in the event of war with the Russians the British... planned to defend the Middle East at all costs, according the area a priority second only to the defense of the British Isles themselves.”¹⁵⁶ The British, although weakened by the war, had an impressive array of forces with which they could maintain order in Palestine. The British garrison consisted of 100,000 troops in November of 1945. According to

¹⁵⁵ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency : From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, 3.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

David Charters, of these 100,000 soldiers the British had a total of 29 infantry battalions from one infantry and one airborne division that they could effectively deploy and maneuver. In addition “the principal law enforcement and security force in Palestine,” the Palestinian police force, had 20,000 “regular and auxiliary personnel during the 1945-47 period.”¹⁵⁷ The police had several “specialized unit[s]” who were equipped and trained for different paramilitary operations including a “gendarmerie” that could supply the “police with some internal security ‘muscle’ when the British army had few troops to spare.”¹⁵⁸ In addition, the Political Branch of the Palestine Criminal Investigations Department (CID) had approximately 80 policemen dedicated to “counter-insurgency.” According to Charters, the Political Branch was separated into the Jewish, Arab and European Affairs “desks” and the “Jewish desk” was further divided into the” political intelligence, terrorism and illegal immigration sections.”¹⁵⁹ In addition, the British developed a Public Information Office (PIO) that

served a dual role: first, public relations, by serving as the link between the government and the population; and second, propaganda, to help maintain internal security and to promote the war effort.¹⁶⁰

Finally, the British had the local sections of their British Security Service (MI5) operating throughout the Palestine. According Bruce Hoffman and most scholars of this event, the Zionist resistance elements in Palestine that conducted armed insurgency against the British consisted of a “minority of some 4,500 persons, organized within the Etzel [the *Irgun Zvai Le’umi*-the “National Military Organization”] and the Lehi [*Lohamei Herut Yisrael* “Israel Freedom Fighters”].”¹⁶¹ Hoffman asserts that these elements “did not enjoy the support of the vast majority of the *Yishuv*...and were, for much of the period, fiercely opposed by the *Haganah*, the third and largest of the Jewish

¹⁵⁷ David Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 89.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 90.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 91.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 93.

¹⁶¹ Bruce Hoffman, *The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939-1947*, Vol. 1 (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1983), 9.

underground movements.¹⁶² It would appear that the British, with a large and capable force that was apparently task-organized to deal with the issues in Palestine facing the comparatively small and weak insurgent force, should have dealt quickly with the Zionist revolt. Instead, the British were driven out of Palestine three years after World War II. In the next section we will discuss some the major issues leading to British defeat and the implications for U.S. COIN doctrine.

a. *Key British Coin Strategy and Tactics in Palestine: Punitive Strike and Sweep Operations versus Security Operations*

In this section we examine the two overarching strategic and tactical categories defining British operations in Palestine during the Zionist rebellion: punitive strike and sweep operations and security operations. In reality, punitive strike and sweep operations are distinguished from security operations by the sudden deployment of large troop formations into areas and their short, intense sweeps through those problematic zones. Just as in the sudden and concentrated punitive strike and sweep operations, during security operations the British troops conducted searches and made arrests. However, in security operations the British units were deployed into areas and conducted sustained actions in which they also secured vital infrastructure. these two categories accurately reflect the British approach to COIN in Palestine during the Zionist rebellion and the conceptual evolution of British COIN we have been discussing in this Chapter. Much like the British COIN campaign in Iraq, the British campaign in Palestine illustrates the conflicted nature of their COIN doctrine and the flawed application of force in place of potentially more effective tactics.. Before analyzing these two categories in detail we must address the reasons for the alternative British strategies in Palestine beyond the changes required by the apparent tactical and strategic necessities on the ground: namely, the conceptual struggle in the British high command between those favoring the “small wars” and ”imperial policing” strategies and those who advocated alternative COIN strategies. It is important to discuss this internal conflict because it also

¹⁶² Bruce Hoffman, *The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939-1947*, Vol. 1 (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1983), 9.

illustrates the conceptual evolution of British COIN doctrine during this period and the resultant strategic confusion in the British command which produced operational shifts in Palestine. Strategic confusion and operational shifts are the consequential changes in the types, sizes and tempo of operations produced by internal debates at highest British command levels about the nature and objectives of the conflict in Palestine. While this is an oversimplification of the dynamics effecting the British strategic direction in Palestine during the Zionist revolt, much of the strategy there was employed or changed based on the conflicts between the British political and military branches in the country. This conflict has several significant implications for our understanding of British COIN doctrine and the impact of the Zionist revolt on it. Primarily, it demonstrates the army's conceptual and institutional inertia in Palestine at the commanding levels that in turn negatively effected their tactical COIN operations. The struggle to reconcile "small wars" and "imperial policing" tactics with the military and political complexity of the insurgency in Palestine again pushed many British military and political leaders up to and beyond their conceptual capabilities. It also illustrates the significance of command unity in COIN which was a lesson the British successfully learned in Malaya. Again, the British were politically and militarily committed to retaining considerable influence in Palestine following World War II, they faced a small insurgent group and a Jewish population that was initially uncommitted to violent resistance against the British. Yet, the strategic confusion and resulting operational shifts produced by the internal conflicts in the British command structure were instrumental in their failure in Palestine. While this factor was certainly not sufficient to cause British defeat in Palestine, it was necessary.

According to David Charters, the British COIN campaign in Palestine can be divided into "four distinct phases of operational activity" from 1945 to 1947 based on the influences of "strategic policy debates" at the highest military and political levels:

[f]irst, from October 1945 to the end of June 1946, the security forces carried out a peacekeeping role, involving searches and security operations. The second, phase, from 29 June to early September, was characterized by a major offensive against the insurgents, including two division-sized operations. The security forces returned to peacekeeping in

the third phase, which continued until the end of February 1947. During the final phase, from March through August, the security forces went on the offensive again, this time employing martial law and special operations.¹⁶³

While others scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, divide the British occupation and COIN campaign at different points in time, they all roughly correspond to the conflicted strategic changes and operational shifts mentioned above.¹⁶⁴ Discussing each of these phases in detail is not in the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to examine dynamic in the British high command in Palestine to understand its impact on the COIN campaign there.

As an illustration of this problematic issue, we will briefly analyze the conflicted relationship and actions of the final British High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Alan Cunningham, with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. Cunningham, a former military officer, and Montgomery, the British hero of World War II and veteran of the 1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, represent the conceptual and actual divisions with the British command structure that produced the dissonant strategies there which was a major contributing factor to British failure. Again, it is important to acknowledge that Cunningham and Montgomery were only part of a very complex conflict involving multiple international, regional and domestic variables. Still, their opinions and conflicts with each other not only illustrate the importance of agency in almost any COIN campaign, it also exemplifies the near culmination of the British conceptual struggle to define effectively COIN and employ truly successful strategies. In effect, Cunningham typifies the realization that politics, intelligence and soft power were the key factors in COIN and Montgomery illustrates the British belief in the effectiveness of punitive measures in COIN.

¹⁶³ Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47*, 111.

¹⁶⁴ Hoffman, *The Failure of British Military Strategy within Palestine, 1939-1947*, 1-34.

John Newsinger captures the essence of the conflict between Cunningham and Montgomery and the conceptual struggle between those favoring punitive measures and those pushing for more comprehensive strategies in Palestine. In mid 1946, as attacks on British soldiers were increasing and becoming more vicious and calls for reprisals against the Yishuv were growing louder from the British military command in Palestine, General Montgomery became the CIGS. According to Newsinger, following Zionist attacks on the 6TH Airborne Division's car park in Tel Aviv in which seven paratroopers were killed, attacks by the Haganah on "eight of the nine bridges connecting Palestine with its neighbors," and an IZL "kidnapping of five British officers" in Tel Aviv, Montgomery "visited the Mandate as part of an overseas tour in June and subsequently confesses himself 'much perturbed by what I heard and saw.' He thought Cunningham completely unsuited to cope with a crisis situation..."¹⁶⁵ Newsinger goes on to assert that, based on their experiences during the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1939, "Montgomery and others believed that repression consistently and relentlessly applied could crush the revolt..."¹⁶⁶

According to David Charters, "it was clear that the nature of this counter-insurgency campaign escaped him [Montgomery]..."¹⁶⁷ Additionally, Charters believes that Cunningham understood the nature of the Zionist rebellion and its differences with the Arab revolt while Montgomery and the other military leaders did not. This is clear in a telegram from the High Commissioner to the British Colonial Secretary in November of 1946:

¹⁶⁵ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency : From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, 20.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47*, 100.

There is, of course, no comparison between that situation and the present. Moreover, I have seen a telegram to CINCMELF to the effect that as a soldier he must not be concerned with the politics and must visualize matters from a purely military angle. I need hardly comment on this so far as Palestine is concerned.¹⁶⁸

Cunningham believed that the path to victory in Palestine was through a combination of political and military strategies. He wanted to “split the Zionist movement in such a way as to isolate and neutralize the more extreme elements, thus allowing the moderates to regain control.”¹⁶⁹ In Cunningham’s estimation this involved measured responses to Zionist attacks that would allow the army to disrupt and counter Zionist operations without alienating the remainder of the Yishuv which would entice the moderate leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine to cooperate with British efforts and provide useful intelligence to British forces which would lead to reestablishment of order. However, as we noted above, when it became clear that the United States and the international community supported the Jewish efforts in Palestine and the British government was unwilling to ease restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Jewish leadership no longer motivated to cooperate with the British. According to Mockaitis, while Cunningham was correct about the necessity of political reconciliation for British victory in Palestine (establishing stability and security), without concessions on Jewish immigration “he could not win over the moderates, and without the winning over the moderates he could not obtain the co-operation which would yield the information upon which effective counterinsurgency operations could be based.”¹⁷⁰ While Montgomery believed that offensive operations were the key to winning, Cunningham asserted that mass sweeps and arrests without adequate intelligence about the insurgents were ineffective and alienated the innocent population. Although this is a brief analysis of the Cunningham-Montgomery rift and its conceptual meaning, it illustrates the conflicts that plagued the British command structure in Palestine throughout the insurgency. This rift manifested itself in the strategic confusion and operational shifts described above. The

¹⁶⁸ Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47*, 100.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 98.

¹⁷⁰ Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, 102.

impacts of these operational shifts were rapid and massive intensifications of punitive COIN tactics the British employed in Palestine.

(1) Punitive Strike and Sweep Tactics and Security Operations during the Zionist Revolt. As we have discussed, punitive operations were rooted in the British COIN “small wars” doctrine articulated by Callwell and refined during British COIN campaigns in throughout the early 20th century, including the Iraqi rebellion in 1920. These tactics were also modified and implemented as an integral part of the “imperial policing” doctrine used in the 1939 Arab revolt prior the Zionist rebellion. Based on this experience and their institutional schema favoring kinetic operations, General Montgomery and many other British commanders believed that if British forces were given enough latitude in Palestine by the British civil authorities to employ large-scale, offensive operations, they could crush the Zionist insurgency by destroying its active elements, coercing other members of the Yishuv into opposing the insurgents, and controlling Jewish population centers. History has demonstrated that these were flawed assumptions..

According to Charters there were two periods during the Zionist revolt when the British conducted “offensive operations”: June 29 to September of 1946 and March through August of 1947. While Charters calls these “offensive operations” the truly distinguishing difference between “offensive operations” and security, or “peacekeeping phase[s]” of the British COIN campaign in Palestine was the size, suddenness and intensity of the “offensive operations in comparison to the sustained actions of British units during the “peacekeeping phases. In true punitive strike and sweep fashion, troops executed massive cordon and search operations, raids and mass arrests. They were therefore offensive in the same sense that previous British punitive strike and sweep operations were offensive: troops deployed into and secured areas, conducted an intense series of searches and arrests, and either withdrew completely or left a reduced force in the area to conduct security operations. This was completely consistent with “imperial policing” doctrine and also rooted in the “small wars” philosophy. Montgomery and other British commanders envisioned theses operations as the key to striking the insurgents in a decisive blow and regaining control. In Palestine,

the British imposed a modified version of martial law they designated as “statutory marital law” which was distinguished from the standard act of military rule by retention of executive power by the British High Commissioner. Although these operations were intended to take the initiative from the insurgents in one swift blow and reestablish British control in Palestine, in reality they mostly had the punitive effects of completely disrupting and punishing the Jewish population.

In Operation AGATHA, the first major British sweep operation, the stated objectives were to search the buildings belonging to known and suspected insurgents and organizations supporting insurgents, like the Jewish Agency headquarters, and arrest as much of the suspected and know insurgent leadership as possible. According to Charters, before dawn on the 29th of July “parties of the Royal Signals troops...occupied all exchanges and suspended all telephone communications across Palestine for more than three hours.”¹⁷¹ As communications were being cut off “10,000 troops and 7000 police deployed to their operational targets, the three main cities and 30 rural settlements.”¹⁷² Almost 3,000 men were arrested, and 33 weapons caches were discovered during the operation. Operation AGATHA’s effects on civilians and the Yishuv’s reaction were almost entirely negative. With the memory of the Holocaust undoubtedly very fresh in the Jewish population, Jewish civilians were angered at the sight of masses of Jewish men and women being rounded up and caged for interrogation even though most were released. In one brief account of the operation Nicholas Bethell describes the interactions between soldiers and civilians during the operation:

[t]he troops faced widespread passive resistance from the settlers, who locked their gates, blocked the entrances with tractors and their own bodies, refused to cooperate in identification and fingerprinting, shouted insults and occasionally threw missiles at the soldiers. According to Jewish witnesses, some soldiers retaliated by shouting Nazi slogans, looting property and using unnecessary violence.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47*, 117.

¹⁷² Ibid., 118.

¹⁷³ Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle : The Struggle for the Holy Land, 1935-48* (New York: Putnam, 1979), 249.

Bethell's account illustrates one important effect of the operation that was completely contrary to its intent. Operation Agatha provided fodder for Zionist propaganda cells who could frame British actions as Nazi-like and whether the British brutality was as harsh as some of the Jewish settlers claimed was not as important as the fact that the British further alienated the population by conducting the operation. While the British tactics were far from being as vicious as those employed in previous insurgencies, like Iraq, Operation Agatha was still considered punitive in nature by many Jews and the operation failed to achieve its tactical objectives.

The primary purpose of these operations was to eliminate or severely diminish the operational capabilities of the insurgency by capturing its leadership. The British actually arrested many of the more moderate leaders of the insurgency from the Haganah and the Jewish Agency but missed the more radical and violent members of IZL and LEHI. With the moderate leaders of the Jewish Agency either gone or alienated from the British and the Haganah out of the picture, the IZL and LEHI were able to consolidate their power then execute operations with minimal interference. The ineffectiveness of the British sweeps and the capabilities of the insurgents were clear less than a month after Operation Agatha on 22 July when the IZL bombed the British Army headquarters and the offices of the Palestinian Secretariat in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The bombing killed 91 people (48 Arabs, 17 Jews, 28 British and five others). The British responded to this attack with Operation Shark in which they sealed off Tel Aviv and conducted house to house searches. However by most accounts Operation Shark was also a failure because the British lacked accurate intelligence which would have allowed them to target and capture insurgent leaders. Ultimately, like Agatha, Operation Shark had no appreciable effect on the insurgency.

In the second episode of "offensive operations" from March to August of 1947 the British essentially pulled out all of the stops in a final effort to regain control of Palestine and retain influence there. They imposed "statutory marital law" in urban centers including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, employed special operations units who carried out covert actions based on intelligence they gathered through surveillance, executed countless cordon and search operations, and arrested hundreds. According to

Charters for example, in Tel Aviv alone the British “carried out 63 search operations from May through July 1947.” In “controlled areas” where the British imposed martial law, conducted constant patrolling, and multiple searches they were able to counter the insurgents’ operations. For example, in Tel Aviv the “rate of insurgent operations declined by more than 50 per cent in the last quarter of 1947.

The fact remains though that these operations were only marginally successful and did not strike the decisive blow to the insurgency, create political and military opportunity for Zionist-British rapprochement, or reestablish sustainable British control in Palestine as the commanders had planned. Regardless of whether these tactics were employed as part of sustained “peacekeeping operations,” or in the large-scale sweeps, they failed to achieve the British objectives for many reasons and primary among these was the lack of British intelligence about the insurgents. In fact, to a large degree this was a function of British-Zionist antagonisms produced by the tactics employed by the British during all phases of their operations. As we have discussed, there were numerous other factors leading to the British defeat in Palestine, but on a tactical level, the British inability to gain an accurate awareness of the enemy situation was a decisive factor because they attempted to compensate for missing intelligence by increased activity. While Montgomery and other like-minded officers constantly pressed for more operational freedom in Palestine to crush the rebellion, they never really invested their organizational energy into pursuing other strategies beyond those that Cunningham and his supporters could enforce when the strategic tide shifted in the High Commissioner’s favor. Again, this reduces the matter for ease of analysis, but it does accurately illustrate the situation in Palestine during the revolt and a crucial factor contributing to the British failure there. While it is important to acknowledge that effective COIN strategies include tactics that deny sanctuary and maneuverability to insurgents through focused and constant efforts by COIN forces to do so, these tactics are counterproductive unless they are driven by intelligence. These lessons as well as the counterproductive effects of punitive operations were clearly illustrated in the British campaign in Palestine.

E. CONCLUSION

FM 3-24 reflects a clear relationship between the ultimate lessons the British learned in their COIN campaigns during the first half of the twentieth century and the considerations included in LLOs. Even though they failed to adequately do so, the British understood the importance of building host nation forces, deploying their units into the population and developing the host nation government. For example, they employed these strategies in Iraq through political officers and the establishment of a 20,000-man police force in Palestine. The British conducted a “plebiscite” under A.T. Wilson’s supervision in Iraq to ostensibly garner input from Iraqis on the type of government they desired. However as we have seen, this was at best a half-hearted effort by the British to include Iraqis in determining their own political future. At worst, this is an illustration of the cynical manipulation of a system by one man to fit his visions of what Iraq should be. It also demonstrates how potentially effective strategies focused on the population and political institution development can be mostly negated by their inconsistent employment and other strategies that focus on the insurgents as the center of gravity in counterinsurgency. Likewise, British strategies against insurgents and tactics designed to crush and cow rebels into submission, establish expedient order by excluding uncooperative elements of society from political development, and infighting in the British civil and military command structure negated the progress produced by the effective British strategies. The LLOs in *FM 3-24* illustrate a keen awareness of this and articulate strategies that attempt to avoid these pitfalls.

Therefore, the relationship of the LLOs in *FM 3-24* to the two British case studies is one in which the British COIN strategies in Iraq and Palestine revealed the importance of intelligence, political development, and sustained operations by the British failure to adequately employ these which has helped the authors of *FM 3-24* to focus the LLOs in these important areas. Most importantly, all of the LLOs in *FM 3-24* reflect a keen awareness of the damage of punitive actions and the importance of public perception and political inclusion. In both Iraq and Palestine, the British failed to grasp this important causal dynamic even though there were members of the military and civil command

structure, like Major S.E. Hedgecock and Cunningham, who clearly appreciated the consequences of punitive actions and public perception. This is where *FM 3-24* truly distinguishes itself from British COIN doctrine in Iraq and Palestine. The primacy of political and public development and the rule of law and the damage of punitive, large-scale operations are clearly illustrated in the LLOs. It is undeniable that the British defeated the rebellion in Iraq by sheer force and reestablished order. But, this expedient application of force ultimately served to destabilize Iraq and set the precedent for brutality in the country as an acceptable instrument of state control. *FM 3-24* clearly asserts that combat operations are part of COIN, but as the British actions in Iraq and Palestine indicate, these tactics must be measured and selective. This, of course, is another major lesson the FM has incorporated into the LLOs and one that is also woven into other chapters of *FM 3-24*.

IV. FRENCH PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1954-1962

It is inconceivable that Algeria should secede from Metropolitan France. This should be clear forever to all, in Algeria, in Metropolitan France, and abroad. Algeria is France, and not a foreign country under our protection.

-M. Mendes-France, 1954¹⁷⁴

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the French war in Algeria against the *Force de liberation national* (FLN) from 1954-1962 when independence was declared for Algeria. We begin this Chapter with a brief discussion of the background of French Algeria and the events that led up to the November 1954 revolution. Following that we discuss the counterinsurgent doctrine that was developed by the French during the war. Next we discuss the specific tactics that the French employed in an effort to follow that doctrine and defeat the FLN or *fellaghas*. In the conclusion we look at how the French tactics and doctrine during the war in Algeria match up with the new US COIN manual and the logical lines of operation that are used there. We conclude that while French doctrine and tactics match with the new FM, they still were unable to translate tactical victory into strategic success.

B. BACKGROUND

The French first landed in Algeria in 1830 in an attempt to colonize the country and stop the piracy that had become a real problem emanating from Northern Africa.¹⁷⁵ France officially annexed Algeria in 1834 and for the next 128 years dominated the country. France saw Algeria as an important colony for many reasons, not the least of

¹⁷⁴ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 8.

¹⁷⁵ Tony Smith, *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 49.

which was the expectation of large oil and gas reserves in the Sahara in western Algeria, which were discovered in 1956.¹⁷⁶ Also important to the French was that Algiers had served as the main base for the forces of Free France during WWII.

Twice before the revolution that began in 1954, the French army had put down independence movements in Algeria. The first time, from 1832-1847, the French army battled against Abd-el-Kadr, a young Algerian seeking to unite Algeria and fight against the occupiers.¹⁷⁷ The French adopted a heavy handed scorched earth campaign that eventually caused el-Kadr to surrender. The second movement began in the town of Setif in 1945 following V.E., or victory in Europe day when the Nazis surrendered to the Allied forces. Muslims in Setif marched in protest seeking independence and broke out in a riot with French officials when shots were fired. The riots continued for five days, during which over 100 European settler, or *pied noirs* were killed. The French retaliated again with a heavy handed military solution killing, by some conservative estimates, 1300 Muslims.¹⁷⁸

As this evidence points out, the movement for independence in Algeria was hardly a new phenomenon in 1954. This Chapter of independence and nationalism began in earnest with the meeting of leading revolutionary members from all over Algeria in July of 1954 following the French defeat in Indochina. This group decided that it was time to begin the revolution, and decided on 1 November 1954 as the time to begin, which was All Saints Day.¹⁷⁹ The aim of this movement was to be “an unlimited revolution to continue until full independence was achieved.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ Tony Smith, *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 22.

¹⁷⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace : Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006), 30.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

C. FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENT DOCTRINE – *GUERRE REVOLUTIONNAIRE*

The French army came into the war in Algeria fresh from a defeat at the hands of the Vietminh in Vietnam. This defeat had been a stinging one for the French army, and France as a whole. The war fought there had been a people's war to use the words of Mao. The French had been defeated by a smaller force of guerilla fighters, badly equipped, that had gained the support of the population, a stunning defeat for them. It could then be expected that an army coming out of a fight that it had lost, might take a few lessons that it had learned and adopt a new way of fighting to deal with the threat that they had just faced. This however was not the case for the French army. No manual of how to fight a counterinsurgent (COIN) war was produced before the war in Algeria began.

That there was no new doctrine was one of the main points made by David Galula. Galula states "[t]he sad truth was that in spite of all our past experience, we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare."¹⁸¹ Galula argues that the lack of new doctrine was one of the main reasons that prior to 1956 the French were not doing well militarily in Algeria. The lack of doctrine created an ad-hoc atmosphere where leaders fell into one of two groups, either warriors or psychologist.¹⁸² The warriors were focused on military action, failing to see that the population was key in this battle. The psychologists on the other hand believed that psychological action was the key to everything, and would bring about victory in Algeria.¹⁸³ Company commanders were left on their own with orders that stated nothing more than "pacify."

During the early stages of the war in Algeria a corps of officers that had served in Indochina were brought together to come up with a doctrinal answer to the challenge of insurgent warfare. Members of this group included Colonels Antoine Argoud, Charles

¹⁸¹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 64.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 65.

Lacheroy, and Jean Gardes.¹⁸⁴ These men were deeply affected by their service in Indochina and saw the struggle as a struggle in which the political and social aspects of the fight were more important than the military one. They were heavily influenced by Mao, and the basis of their strategy was a counter to Mao's theory on revolution. French COIN doctrine was rooted in the notion of "eradicating the benign environment" that guerrillas lived in.¹⁸⁵

Based on their experience in Indo-china they saw the insurgents as being created by an outside force and the outside force that they feared was communism.¹⁸⁶ They did not believe that a local movement, i.e. nationalism, was capable of creating a movement that would lead to an insurgency. They also did not believe that it was possible for the incumbents to fully win a COIN campaign. They believed that

The best that the incumbents might hope for is to restrict the insurgents to the establishment of cells, to the spreading of propaganda, to a degree of sabotage and terror that can be accepted by the government and society.¹⁸⁷

Their idea of to defeat the insurgents can be best summarized by a statement that was used by one of the formulators of the French doctrine, Colonel Argoud, who used the phrase "Protect Them; Involve Them; Control Them" referring to the population that was to become the center of the French doctrine.¹⁸⁸ In order to accomplish this there was a five step process outlined in the French doctrine, followed by two types of missions to complete the five steps. Peter Paret did a very succinct job of outlining these steps in his book *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*. The first of the five steps was to cut off the rebels from all foreign assistance, something that had haunted the

¹⁸⁴ Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, Vol. 6 (New York: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, by F.A. Praeger, 1964), 7.

¹⁸⁵ Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy* (London ; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 11.

¹⁸⁶ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 22.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, 11.

French in Indochina where the Vietminh had been assisted by the Chinese. The next step was to destroy the large groupings of guerrilla fighters. This was to be done not purely with military might, but through the use of psychological operations to take advantage of military successes and demoralize the enemy. The third step included protecting the essential economic centers in the country as well as the population. The writers of the doctrine saw the best way to do this as through the use of a “network of small posts over the area” that could protect hamlets as well as be useful in influencing the local population.¹⁸⁹ Step four was to resettle communities as necessary to facilitate their protection as well as deny the enemy access to them. Lastly, any captured guerrillas must be re-educated.

These five steps could then be consolidated more easily into two main mission types that were to be used, destruction and construction. Each of the steps fell into one of these missions and they were to be executed together. Destruction was to come first and set the conditions for construction, though the two missions could be occurring simultaneously in some areas. General Allard, a French Corp Commander at the time of the war in Algeria summed it up best when he said “To destroy without building up would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion.”¹⁹⁰ We will go into further detail on the tactics used as part of each of these missions later in the Chapter.

As part of the new doctrine the French saw psychological operations as an integral aspect of every operation. To this end the army inserted a section into staffs and at command headquarters called the 5th Bureau. This bureau was responsible for two missions. The first was to protect French morale and unity of purpose.¹⁹¹ Their other mission was psychological warfare against the enemy. In order to accomplish their first mission the bureau focused on the army units in Algeria, as well as the French public. They would show current event films, as well as press releases that emphasized French

¹⁸⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 23.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

successes. In targeting the Algerians they would execute leaflet drops, broadcast music and propaganda, and create posters that emphasized the French aspects of Algeria.¹⁹² Each Corp in Algeria was equipped with a loudspeaker and pamphlet company that was responsible for producing their psychological operations products. This company was equipped with duplicating machines, printing presses, loudspeakers, screens and projectors, and a workshop to produce posters.¹⁹³ So psychological operations were an important part of the French effort in Algeria.

The tactics that the French army employed to successfully execute this doctrine is the focus of the rest of this Chapter, however it is worth noting here that during the war in Algeria there was a training school set up to teach those officers and non-commissioned officers heading to Algeria the new doctrine, as well as the specifics of Algeria. This school was located at Arzew east of Oran. It was the last step before joining a unit for those headed to Algeria, and was opened in 1956. There were four major themes taught at Arzew: Muslim sociology, revolutionary warfare (the new doctrine), the adversary and his ways, and the tactical and psychological struggle against the rebellion.¹⁹⁴ The school was broken down in to groups based on what the individuals job was going to be. Majors and Captains attended the school for district and sub-district commanders and Colonels attended the school for sector commanders.¹⁹⁵ The center closed in 1962 when the French left Algeria.

D. FRENCH TACTICS - DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION

As noted earlier, at the beginning of the war in Algeria there was no unifying French doctrine on how to fight a COIN campaign. This lead to widely disjointed efforts early on, with dramatically different outcomes in neighboring sectors. Initial French

¹⁹² Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 30.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 60.

¹⁹⁴ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, 43.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

efforts focused on search and destroy missions to hunt down and kill the *fellaghas*. Ineffective techniques coupled with too few soldiers in Algeria led to a gradual worsening of the situation until 1955 when the French government decided to recall reservists to send to Algeria. The increase in troop levels combined with the new doctrine that started to trickle down in 1956 led to a dramatic change in the situation militarily in Algeria.

1. Destruction

The main goal of the destruction phase of French operations was to uncover, dismantle, and repress the FLN politico-admin centers as well as to chase down and annihilate the insurgents.¹⁹⁶ This phase of operations was essentially an attempt to establish a basic level of security for the population in order to move on to the next phase of operations, construction.

The first step in this phase was to divide the country up into what was known as the *quadrillage* or grid. The whole of the country was divided up into sectors that static forces were permanently assigned to. That sector was their responsibility; they would track the rebels there and work with the population. This was supplemented with a contingent of mobile forces that would be used to reinforce sectors that needed more support during periods of intense *fellagha* activity.

Another important aspect of this phase, one which came directly from the five steps necessary to defeat insurgents in the new French doctrine, was the sealing of the Algerian border to close off the support that the FLN had been receiving from Tunisia and Morocco. Between 1956 and 1958 a fence on both borders of Algeria was constructed to stop the flow of men and arms into Algeria. Prior to the construction of the fence an average of 1000 weapons a month were flowing into Algeria.¹⁹⁷ This fence became known as the Morice Line and was constructed out of a series of electrified

¹⁹⁶ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 30.

¹⁹⁷ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 62.

fences, barbed wire, land mines, floodlights and watchtowers.¹⁹⁸ Portions of the border not covered by the barrier, largely desert regions, were patrolled by French reconnaissance aircraft as well as helicopters. If an FLN convoy was spotted in the desert, French Para's were flown in by helicopter to interdict them.¹⁹⁹ The completion of this barrier had a devastating effect on the FLN. Prior to its completion the FLN was able to recruit and arm a replacement for every fighter that it lost. Afterwards, as Gil Merom states,

The FLN was deprived of much of the weapons, fresh manpower, and other essential logistics that it needed in order to replace its losses and continue to initiate actions.²⁰⁰

In each sector of the *quadrillage* search and destroy mission were still executed. These missions followed a typical operational setup. There were two forces in the search and destroy mission, *le bouclage*, the ring, and *le ratissage*, the rake. An area where *fellaghas* were suspected of hiding was surrounded on three sides by the ring, the rake would then begin in the open side and comb the area, hopefully either engaging the enemy that was forced into the open, or pushing the *fellaghas* to the units making up the ring. This type of mission was carried out in every sector in Algeria right up until the end of the war.

Later in the war, after 1958, an operational shift took place. There was a realization that operations carried out with large forces were not the way to ultimately defeat the FLN, and there was a shift to smaller more targeted operations against point targets. This realization, coupled with the addition to the French arsenal of American helicopters, led to the shift of more a more air mobile focus, carried out by smaller more

¹⁹⁸ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, 11.

¹⁹⁹ Charles R. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War : Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 216.

²⁰⁰ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars : State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 85.

elite units.²⁰¹ FLN forces were located typically by reconnaissance aircraft, and French forces were flown, either by helicopter or troop transport, and inserted to interdict the rebels.²⁰² Once a reasonable level of security had been achieved it allowed the French to switch from destruction operations into construction operations, which were the focus of the static forces assigned to each sector in the *quadrillage*.

2. Construction

One of the most important ideas to come out of the new French doctrine was the importance of protecting the population. The French accomplished this in a few different ways. The first way that they protected the population was through the establishment of local garrisons in most of the hamlets located in the countryside. By garrisoning troops in the town with the locals the army attempted to “put French troops in direct contact with the Muslims, turning each (soldier) into a kind of ambassador to the Muslim population.”²⁰³ Soldiers that lived in the hamlets would conduct a census of the local population, and by living with the population for months or even years at a time, they would come to have a sense of who belonged and who didn’t. This made it extremely difficult for the FLN to infiltrate anyone into a town that had a garrison.

Another important, although controversial, tactic to protect the population for the French as part of their construction operations, was the resettlement of entire villages that were deemed either too distant or isolated to be controlled, or the village was located too close to the border and therefore too easy for the FLN to control. These villages were then placed into what the French called self-defense hamlets, compounds constructed by the French that had been surrounded by barbed wire and watchtowers. Eventually once a

²⁰¹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 36.

²⁰² Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, 11.

²⁰³ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 36.

period of indoctrination had been completed, in which the villagers were educated on French power, the villagers were given arms and following a period of training, expected to defend themselves from the FLN.²⁰⁴

This system had its benefits, as FLN activity in these resettled villages was almost nonexistent; however as a long term policy it had its negatives as well. Resettling an entire village, against their will, is certainly not the way to win over a population that has been supporting the FLN up to this point. It was nearly impossible to completely prevent FLN infiltration of the camp, and they became a breeding ground for new FLN members. By 1959 the French government had realized that this was a serious problem in the making, and ordered the resettlement efforts to stop, as well as ordering improvements to be made to the camps that already existed.²⁰⁵

One prominent aspect of the French construction effort was the establishment in 1955 of the *Sections Administratives Specialisees* or SAS. The SAS were an elite corp. of highly trained Lieutenants and Captains that spoke fluent Arabic, and were experts on the culture and traditions of the area. Essentially these men became the French administrators in remote areas of Algeria and were experts on everything from agriculture to how to build houses.²⁰⁶ To help them accomplish their task they were organized into sections with the officer, an interpreter, a few civilian specialists in either agriculture or education, a clerical soldier, and a radio operator.²⁰⁷ Often operating in isolation with nothing more than local guards to protect them, these men were frequently the targets of FLN attacks.²⁰⁸ Their job was complex, and included civil administration, from improving local sanitation, to achieving better health care for Muslims in their area, as well as military functions. They became important sources of intelligence for French

²⁰⁴ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 34.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 45.

²⁰⁶ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace : Algeria, 1954-1962*, 109.

²⁰⁷ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 43.

²⁰⁸ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 4.

units operating in their sectors. Though these units were highly effective, there were never enough of them during the war in Algeria. High selection standards combined with the dangers involved in the duty limited the number of candidates. By the end of 1959 there were “1287 officers serving in the approximately 660 sections, assisted by 661 NCOs and 2921 civilian specialists.”²⁰⁹

The SAS played a highly important role in the French campaign in Algeria, and were effective in their tasks. However, not all of the Blue Kepis as they were called, were focused on improving life for the Algerians. There were many bad SAS officers in Algeria who ran what were known as “intelligence centers” where torture of suspects was the norm.²¹⁰ One of the lasting legacies of the French campaign in Algeria is the widespread use of torture by the French to gain information to use against the FLN. Torture was not a part of the French doctrine of *guerre revolutionnaire* but was an unfortunate part of its reality.²¹¹ Detailed accounts of the use of torture to gain intelligence are readily available. One account of the battle of Algiers written by General Paul Aussaresses, a French intelligence officer at the time of the battle, called *the Battle of the Casbah* goes into great detail on the French use of torture. Since it was not an official part of the French doctrine in Algeria we will not go into further examination of torture other than to say that it was widely used as a tactic.

Establishing a sizeable force of native soldiers was also important to the French doctrine. This manifested itself in Algeria through the establishment of a variety of host nation security forces. The largest and most widely used of these forces was the *Harkas*. These were made up of Muslim troops organized into squads commanded by a French NCO or Officer.²¹² These soldiers were used as a supplemental force to the French where there were not enough French soldiers. Commanders in their own quarter were

²⁰⁹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 50.

²¹⁰ Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War, 1954-62 : Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, 5.

²¹¹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 60.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 40.

allowed to recruit *harkis* from their area to serve in their units. These men would undergo a period of training, after which time they served as auxiliaries to the French forces. Frequently the *harkis* lived in their own hamlet, worked with the French during the day, and went home at night to help defend their hamlet.²¹³ As time passed and the French were more and more successful against the FLN, more and more Algerians volunteered to become *harkas*. In January of 1957 there were approximately 2200 *harkas* working with the French; by June of 1960 the number had grown to nearly 58000.²¹⁴

The *mahkzan* were another of the Algerian security forces used by the French. These men were used as guards and messengers by the French civil affairs teams, and also to guard the SAS.²¹⁵ The number of *mahkzan* was considerably smaller than the *harkas*, however they played a vital role in protecting the vulnerable SAS in isolated locations. Also hired by the French were local police, auxiliary police, and several special commando groups made up of former FLN terrorists that were employed to help track and capture members of the FLN.²¹⁶ The large number of Muslims employed by the French and assisting in the effort to help destroy the FLN helped to give legitimacy to the French effort in Algeria.

There was another aspect to the construction phase of operations for the French, the political aspect. This area was largely handled by the SAS officers in each area that were responsible for the administration of that area. The SAS officers fell under the authority of the civilian administrators and took their orders from the sub prefect or prefect that was in charge.²¹⁷ There was an effort on some levels to include the local Algerians more in politics. David Galula writes that he and other members of his battalion took to install local mayors in each hamlet that were then responsible for

²¹³ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 170.

²¹⁴ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, the Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine*, 40.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 48.

projects and administration of their hamlet. This was not the norm across the country as a whole however, and a comprehensive political solution, other than the SAS that were originally only intended as a bridge between the French and the Algerians, was lacking. This was symptomatic of French policy in Algeria as a whole. There was no one overarching policy for the duration of the war, it took many different paths during the course of war. This was due to the domestic political situation in France at the time, a situation in which the government collapsed and changed hands no less than three times.

E. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the war in Algeria there was no French COIN doctrine. One was developed while the army was closed with and engaging the enemy. A very similar experience recently happened in the US Army with the new FM3-24, it was developed to deal with the lack of doctrine facing an army at war. This is only the first of a number of similarities between the US doctrine and the French doctrine, as well as the French actions in Algeria. The doctrine that was developed by the French in Algeria could have served as the basis for the doctrine in the new FM.

When looking at the LLOs described in the new FM the first is combat operations\civil security operations. Clearly the French followed this LLO in the war in Algeria. For the first two years it was the focus of their efforts there. That changed in 1956; however the French maintained executing combat operations for the duration of the war. Combat operations were the focus of the first mission that the French carried out following their new doctrine, destruction. The establishment of the *quadrillage* and the ring and the rake search and destroy missions would fall into this LLO. Much like the US doctrine states that combat operations “maintain a secure environment for the populace,”²¹⁸ the French used destruction operations to establish security for them to move on to construction operations.

In line with the next LLO, establishing host nation security forces, the French established a variety of Algerian populated units. The *harkas*, the *mahkzans*, and the

²¹⁸ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, 5-7.

local police auxiliaries are a few of these units. Each unit served a different purpose, but all helped the French to defeat the FLN. The large number of Algerians working alongside the French also helped to give them legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the Algerian population. The exponential increase by year in the number of Algerians recruited into these forces is a testament to the increase in legitimacy that the French saw.

There was one force in Algeria that was largely responsible for the next LLO, essential services, and that was the SAS. The SAS corps was in charge of administration of local hamlets, education in their area, health care improvements, as well as civil infrastructure development. These young officers had civilian experts to help them out with their efforts. While the use of civilian experts is not explicitly stated in the new FM for this LLO, is most certainly alluded to as the US Army does not have the expertise on its own to conduct operations in this LLO. The US Army's version of the SAS, Civil Affairs officers, fill many of the same roles as the SAS, but have no civilian counterparts to assist them.

Governance is the next LLO, and it is one that the French in Algeria did not follow very well. This is partially understandable as it was their stated desire from the beginning of the war that Algeria was to stay a part of France. There were already French administrators in Algeria, and so no large scale changes were implemented. The SAS filled their role in helping to bridge the gap between the French prefects and the Algerian population, however there were too few of them to make a real difference nationally. Merely having more French representation was not what the Algerians wanted anyway, they desired independence. The French would have needed to have a vastly expanded program of including local Algerians in the political administration in Algeria to have any hope of having an effect on the population. If a more comprehensive political program could have been devised and implemented at the peak of the military effectiveness in 1958, maybe there could have been a different outcome in Algeria. It is, however, hard to have a lasting political solution to the problem in Algeria, when the political situation in France was so fragile at the time. Therefore somewhat understandably the French efforts along this LLO were extremely weak at best.

The last LLO is economic development and here once again the French effort was less than whole hearted. Prior to the war, Algeria was France's number one trading partner in all of its colonies. France was not attempting to build up economic infrastructure in Algeria, it was attempting to at least hold on to its own economic power by retaining its control over Algeria. There were minor economic programs implemented, mostly by the SAS in the form of agricultural reforms, and an increase in jobs through local rebuilding efforts, but it was not a widespread national campaign. As mentioned previously, another reason that France wanted to retain Algeria was due to the expectation that oil and gas reserves would be found in the Saharan portion of the country. France was desperately in need of oil and gas after WWII, and so could hardly afford to walk away from a potentially large discovery of those commodities in Algeria.

In following these LLOs for the most part, France had achieved a military victory over the FLN by 1959. The number of FLN members in Algeria was dramatically reduced, and their access to weapons virtually non-existent. As we showed earlier large numbers of Algerians were joining French security forces, and the situation in Algeria was drastically improved from two years before. This all changed however when General Charles de Gaulle came to power. By opening up negotiations with the FLN in 1960 and stating that France would not stay in Algeria forever, he essentially killed the tidal wave of support that the French had won. With no expectation that the French were going to stay in Algeria now, and the new found legitimacy that the FLN gained through de Gaulle agreeing to negotiate with them, the Algerian population once again turned its support back to whom they perceived to be the eventual victors. That spelled doom for France, and two years later in 1962 Algeria gained its independence and the FLN came to power. Once again, tactical victory could not be translated into strategic success.

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V. ISRAEL AND THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

The legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint, whilst his mother is the house demolition.

Zuhair Kurdi, Israeli journalist²¹⁹

A. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter describes the tactics that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) used to counter terrorist threats during the al-Aqsa intifada. We begin with a background on the intifada and discuss the evolution of IDF strategies and doctrine used during this time. Specific Israeli tactics that will be covered in this Chapter includes targeted assassinations, collective punishments, targeted raids, house demolitions, the construction of the security fence, and the use of checkpoints. We conclude this Chapter by evaluating how effective IDF tactics were in achieving Israeli strategic objectives and the common MOE described earlier. Additionally, we highlight similarities and differences between Israeli Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine and current US COIN doctrine. In the conclusion we find that Israeli tactics were not in line with the new FM, however they still managed to gain tactical success that they were unable to translate into strategic success.

B. BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2000 the Israeli government was invested in another round of negotiations with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA). This was the latest in a series of talks over the course of the previous 25 years in an attempt to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The breakdown of these talks, the Camp David II summit,

²¹⁹ Sergio Catignani, "The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (Feb, 2005), 61.

combined with the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and the killing of several demonstrators there the next day set off what would come to be known as the al-Aqsa intifada.²²⁰

This was a much different uprising than the first intifada had been thirteen years earlier. While both originated out of a groundswell of public outrage, the first intifada carried mass Palestinian public support and participation all the way through to the end.²²¹ In the second intifada, the mass public uprising only lasted for two months, after that it became a battle between the IDF and numerous factions of the Palestinian Security Services, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement; the civil uprising became a guerilla war and a terror campaign.²²²

The IDF reacted to the intifada in the manner that it had reacted to all other attacks against the state of Israel, that is, with reprisals. Initially the IDF began by merely reacting to Palestinian attacks against both the IDF as well as Israeli settlers with disproportionate force in an effort to break up protests and stop attacks.²²³ Typical engagements consisted of small arms fire from Israeli soldiers targeting Palestinians throwing Molotov cocktails or rocks. During October 2000 alone estimates hold that the IDF fired over 1 million 5.56 caliber bullets.²²⁴

However, as the intifada progressed Israel changed from reactionary defensive tactics to offensive tactics in 2001 following the election of Ariel Sharon to the Prime Ministry. Sharon set a new strategy for defeating the intifada. His new strategy was based on a policy with four main elements: securing Israeli citizens; ending Palestinian violence; preventing Palestinians from attaining any objectives through violent means;

²²⁰ Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, "Anatomy of another Rebellion," *Middle East Report*, no. 217, Beyond Oslo: The New Uprising (Winter, 2000), 3.

²²¹ Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 263.

²²² Sergio Catignani, "The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror," *Terrorism & Political Violence* 17, no. 1/2 (Winter, 2005), 255.

²²³ Michele K. Esposito, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 2 (Winter, 2005), 85.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 85.

and keeping open the possibility of returning to the negotiation table, but not under fire.²²⁵ The offensive tactics used included targeted assassinations, raids of Palestinian homes, as well as patrols in the occupied territories. These offensive tactics took center stage as Israel adopted a more aggressive stance following the Passover massacre on March 27, 2002 in which thirty Israeli civilians were killed.²²⁶ Operation Defensive Shield was the first in a long series of offensive operations inside the occupied territories over the course of the next two years. These operations were designed to “systematically dismantle terror infrastructures in the entire region,” as well as confiscate weapons, arrest Palestinians involved in violent acts, and to neutralize suicide bombers through a reoccupation of the towns in the occupied territories.²²⁷

There were two key elements of the new defensive strategy: Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to reduce Palestinian resentment of Israeli occupation, and construction of a new security fence to close the border between Israel and the West bank. The Gaza strip is already surrounded by an electric fence, so no border was deemed necessary there. As early as the summer of 2003 Ariel Sharon and his generals knew that these tactics were not having the desired effect and so sought a new strategy.²²⁸

C. ISRAELI LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE

Since the declaration of Israeli independence in 1948 the state of Israel has been in a nearly continuous state of conflict. Israel has a unique history of LIC, beginning with operations against the British in what was then Palestine during the British Mandate period. They have continued to fight LIC operations throughout the course of their history, though the majority of their wars between 1948 and 1982 were large scale high

²²⁵ Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 127.

²²⁶ Catignani, *The Security Imperative in Counterterrorism Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror*, 256.

²²⁷ Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, 130.

²²⁸ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, 267.

intensity conflicts. Since 1982 this has changed and Israel has been involved almost exclusively with LIC. The nature of the engagements that Israel has been involved in has naturally shaped the formation of their national strategy and military doctrine.

Sergio Catignani states that Israeli strategy has always been a three part strategy based on deterrence, early warning, and winning a decisive battle.²²⁹ This strategy is based on the fact that Israel is a small country and therefore cannot afford to be engaged in a war of attrition with another nation, therefore any conflict must be violent and end quickly.

Zeev Maoz goes further in dissecting Israeli strategy and he argues that there are nine basic tenets to Israeli strategy. His points are similar to Catignani's, but more in depth. First, Israel must have a qualitative advantage over its enemies. This means that Israel must have the most up to date equipment, hardware and software, in order to have a technological advantage over its enemies. Second, Israel must be a nation at arms. This can be seen in the makeup of the Israeli army. The army is a force of conscripts backed up by a substantial reserve force. This allows for a quick transition from peace to having a large army, without having the cost of maintaining a large army continuously. Third, Israel must have an operational offense. Israeli doctrine is offensive in nature because the decision makers believed that it was not possible for Israel to successfully fight a defensive battle. Fourth, wars must be short to affect a quick decision, for the reasons explained above. Fifth, Israel must obtain major power support for its wars. Israel believes that they must have a major power backing them in each war for two reasons. Superpower support helps Israel obtain international consent for the military operations, which the country seeks, but more importantly superpowers provide a steady supply of munitions in the event of a protracted conflict.²³⁰ Sixth is the importance of autonomy of action. Israel would prefer to go it alone in any engagement before having to resort to an alliance. This allows Israel greater freedom of action. Seventh is Cumulative deterrence. Israel believes that by constantly engaging in small conflicts with its neighbors it can

²²⁹ Catignani, *The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, 60.

²³⁰ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, 15.

eventually wear down their desire to engage in another conflict. Eighth is the controversial Samson option, i.e. Israeli use of nuclear weapons as a last resort. This is purely theoretical tenet since Israel has never openly admitted to having nuclear weapons. Ninth is Israel's determination of its final borders through the use of settlements.

These tenets have formed the basis of Israeli doctrine for the last half a century, approximately. As stated above, these tenets have led to Israeli doctrine being centered on the overwhelming use of force in small engagements in order to deter their opponents from wanting to engage in another conflict. This is known as the policy of escalation dominance.²³¹ The doctrine was focused on offensive operations using the most advanced technology available. This started to change in the early 1990s following the first intifada.

Taking the lessons learned by fighting the PLO in the first intifada the Israelis wrote a new doctrine based on what they called LIC. The architect of this new doctrine was a reserve Military Intelligence officer named Colonel Shmuel Nir. His doctrine was termed *The Limited Confrontation*.²³² This doctrine was not a large change from previous IDF doctrine. Essentially Nir saw LIC as a battle between the insurgents and the army to see who would wear down who first. Nir stated that the purpose of the doctrine was,

To undermine the adversary's determination and to lead to the adversary's abandoning his objectives, through a cumulative process of inflicting physical, economic, and psychological damage, and to lead the adversary to realize that his own armed engagement is hopeless.²³³

This was similar to Israel's strategy of cumulative deterrence, attempting to wear down the enemy through the use of prolonged engagement.

The major difference between Nir's doctrine and the previous Israeli doctrine was the importance of political considerations in Nir's version. In major conflict political considerations are secondary to military operational considerations, but for Nir in LIC

²³¹ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, 16.

²³² Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, 123.

²³³ Ibid., 125.

military operational consideration must come second to political considerations. This is similar to the strategy stated in the new Army FM on COIN. The other major distinction from previous Israeli doctrine was the emphasis in LIC as a prolonged struggle of attrition. This was in sharp contrast to the Israeli tenet of short wars fought with a maximum of violence in order to reach a quick solution.

This new doctrine of LIC was followed for the first two years of the second intifada and was the basis of the Israeli defensive strategy during this period.²³⁴ After the Netanya bombing, a suicide attack at the Park Hotel on the night before Passover in March 2002 that killed 30 Israelis, the Sharon led government disregarded this doctrine and resumed an offensive nature believing that the LIC doctrine had been a failure.

D. APPLYING THE STRATEGY: ISRAELI LIC TACTICS DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA

During the al-Aqsa intifada Israel used a wide range of tactics to counter the terrorist attacks against it. These were a combination of offensive tactics, defensive tactics, as well as collective punishments. Offensively the IDF used targeted assassination, targeted raids, and cordon and search operations. Defensively the IDF relied on checkpoints on major Palestinian roads, the construction of the security fence, a vast human intelligence (HUMINT) network, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage of the occupied territories.²³⁵ Some of the collective punishments implemented were the closure policy, curfews, house razing, and administrative detention.

1. Offensive Tactics

The most widely used IDF offensive tactic during the second intifada was targeted assassinations. The use of this tactic was continuous during the intifada and was independent of the overall change in Israeli tactics from defensive to offensive. During

²³⁴ Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, 129.

²³⁵ Catignani, *The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, 64.

the intifada Israel assassinated 273 targeted Palestinians, killing 170 bystanders in the process.²³⁶ Targeted assassinations fall under the Israeli “ticking bomb” policy, in which the IDF is allowed to kill any terrorist whom they have indications will conduct, or is planning, a suicide attack.²³⁷ A few examples of the tactic of targeted assassination include: November 9, 2000 Tanzim leader Husayn Abayat was killed with a laser guided missile; February 13, 2001 Hizbullah activist Ma’sud Iyyad was also killed with a laser guided missile²³⁸; July 22, 2002 Salah Shihada, a Hamas leader in Gaza was killed by a one ton bomb dropped from an F-16.²³⁹

As we can see from the examples above, the Israelis employed various highly destructive weapons in targeted assassinations. Initially Israel targeted individuals by dropping bombs from fighter aircraft such as the F-16. Realizing the negative public relations impact of collateral damage, gradually the IDF and Israeli Air Force (IAF) transitioned to using attack helicopters, namely the Apache and Cobra gunships, firing laser guided missiles which provided more accurate fires and limited collateral damage.²⁴⁰ Recently the IAF has also started using UAV aircraft to fire these precision guided munitions, a platform that was most likely used in the 2004 killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.²⁴¹

These assassinations have also been conducted using sharpshooters in the occupied territories. These sharpshooters are equipped with thermal imaging technology

²³⁶ Esposito, *The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years*, 121.

²³⁷ Gal Luft, "The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing," *Middle East Quarterly* X, no. 1 (2003), 5.

²³⁸ Iyyad was a Force 17 Officer attempting to establish a Hizbullah cell in the Gaza Strip when he was killed.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁴⁰ Nadav Morag, "Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2005), 312.

²⁴¹ David Eshel, "Israel Air Force Transforms for "War Against Terror"," *Military Technology* 30, no. 3 (2006), 26.

and laser rangefinders.²⁴² While the more spectacular assassinations using missiles and booby traps have garnered more attention, the majority of Palestinians targeted have been killed using sharpshooters.²⁴³

For the most part Israel has limited its targeted assassinations to mid-level cell leaders in the occupied territories, those that actually choose the goal and method of targeting.²⁴⁴ This is in an attempt to break the contact between top leaders of cells and the foot soldiers carrying out the attacks. Not focusing on senior leaders, unless necessary, also has the advantage of not creating as much public outcry, since most mid level leaders are unknown to the public.²⁴⁵ The theory of who to target is explained by Gal Luft:

Israel has always believed that draining the swamp is more important than fighting the mosquitoes: the infrastructure of terrorist organizations, those who initiate, plan, or facilitate terror attacks are just as culpable as those who actually pull the trigger.²⁴⁶

While targeted assassination has been a favored tactic of the IDF and the Israeli population, it has also been the tactic that has garnered the most condemnation internationally. Many have challenged the legality of the tactic, citing customary international law that outlaws assassinations.²⁴⁷ Israel counters this with the argument that they are at war with the Palestinians and so are merely attacking military targets.²⁴⁸ The legality of this issue is open to debate, however the tactic remains in use for Israel.

The next tactic that Israel has used extensively in the occupied territories is the targeted raid. Israel has a vast HUMINT network, supplemented by UAV coverage, that

²⁴² Catignani, *The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, 67.

²⁴³ Hammami and Tamari, *Anatomy of another Rebellion*, 9.

²⁴⁴ Morag, *Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case*, 309.

²⁴⁵ Luft, *The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing*, 7.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁴⁷ Efraim Inbar and Merkaz Besa le-mehkarim asṭraṭegiyim, *Democracies and Small Wars* (London; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2003), 148.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 150.

supplies them with real time intelligence.²⁴⁹ This intelligence is then exploited to kill or capture specific terrorists and prosecute what are sometimes known as “Time Sensitive Targets.” A tactic also employed by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, targeted raids provide the added advantage to the Israelis of minimizing collateral damage. These missions are also less invasive, more effective, and “domestically and internationally less controversial due to the stealth and rapidity with which they are carried out.”²⁵⁰

The opposite of the targeted raid is the cordon and search operation. This tactic is used to seal off a whole town, or portion of a town, the cordon, and then systematically search and clear that section. This tactic was first used in the intifada during October and November of 2001 when the towns of Bayt Jala, Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm were isolated and searched in an effort to find those responsible for the assassination of Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze’evi.²⁵¹ This tactic was used extensively from February 2002- October 2004 in an effort to locate supplies used for suicide bombings, as well as keep the terrorists moving and occupied with trying to stay alive rather than planning terrorist attacks.

2. Defensive Tactics

The IDF has also used a number of defensive tactics to combat the Palestinian terror threat. The most commonly used defensive tactic by the IDF is the use of checkpoints on major roads, both inside the occupied territories as well as roads leading into Israel itself. These checkpoints are most often used to search people and vehicles to curb the flow of weapons and explosives between cities and into Israel. These checkpoints may be set up for extended periods, or may only last for a few hours. Used in conjunction with these checkpoints is a pass system, that allows only those that have a pass entrance into Israel, and then only for work.

²⁴⁹ Catignani, *The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, 64.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 66.

²⁵¹ Esposito, *The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years*, 89.

The most provocative defensive tactic used by Israel is the construction of the security fence between the West Bank and Israel. This fence was constructed in order to prevent the entry of Palestinians, especially suicide bombers, into Israel.²⁵² According to the Israeli Ministry of Defense there are five main reasons for the security fence, these are:

Prevention of terror and weapons emanating from Judea and Samaria into Israel; prevention and thwarting of uncontrolled passage of pedestrians, cars and cargo from Judea and Samaria into Israel; minimizing transfer of weapons from Israel to the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority; prevention of effective shooting against Israeli population and vital infrastructure installations; and law enforcement.²⁵³

The idea for the fence was actually not conceived in either the military or political arena in Israel, rather it came from an outcry of public opinion. Ariel Sharon had opposed the construction of the fence believing, “that it would cut off Israel from the occupied territories, which he hoped to eventually annex to the Jewish state.”²⁵⁴ Construction of this fence began in the summer of 2003, and continues today.

The fence is a mix of concrete barriers, concrete sections of wall, barbed wire fencing, guard towers, and electronic sensors and monitors. In some areas that fence is more than eight meters high, with the stated purpose of, “preventing sniper attacks against Israeli citizens in the area.”²⁵⁵ Other sections of the fence are nothing more than chicken wire fence with barbed wire strung along the top, often in multiple layers. (See Figure 1 for current route of the security wall.)

The routing of the wall has been a major political concern for Israel since it began. The fence has been condemned internationally because it does not conform to the green line, which is the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. Many

²⁵² Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, 150.

²⁵³ "Israel Security Fence - Ministry of Defense," <http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm> (accessed 9/10/2007, 2007).

²⁵⁴ Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room : How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, 150.

²⁵⁵ *Israel Security Fence - Ministry of Defense*.

Palestinians argue that the fence is not being used for security purposes to stop terror, rather it is being built to separate many Palestinian farmers from their crops, and villages from their water resources.²⁵⁶ In 2004 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory ruling to the United Nations that the security fence that Israel was constructing was illegal under international law.²⁵⁷

The legality of the fence aside, it has been an effective tool for Israel. Since the construction of the fence began in 2003, terror attacks in Israel have declined approximately forty percent. The numbers of Israelis killed peaks in 2002 at 451, the year before construction of the fence began, and drop precipitously every year thereafter. In 2003 214 Israelis were killed as a result of terror attacks. That number fell to 117 in 2004, and the numbers of Israelis killed and wounded in terror attacks has continued to fall till the present day. While there are other factors that may impact the number of casualties that Israel suffers, such as political infighting between Palestinian groups or truces between Israel and the Palestinians, it is hard to argue that the barrier has not had a significant impact. Figure 2 shows the Israeli casualties, both killed and wounded from 2000 when the Intifada started, until 2006.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ "The Fence," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/fence.htm> (accessed 9/10/2007, 2007).

²⁵⁷ Ibid.,

²⁵⁸ "Victims of Palestinian Terror since Sept 2000," <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+si nc.htm> (accessed 9/10/2007, 2007).




Figure 3. Image of the route of the Israeli security fence.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ Israel Security Fence - Ministry of Defense.




Figure 4. Graphs showing the decline in Israeli casualties from 2000 to 2006.²⁶⁰

3. Collective Punishments

Since the early 1990s Israel has employed a number of restrictive policies against the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. They are intended to restrict the flow of terrorists and materials from one portion of the territories to another, and to limit

²⁶⁰ *Victims of Palestinian Terror since Sept 2000.*

the flow of these people and material into Israel. The Israelis employed three restrictive tactics during the second intifada: general closure, internal closure, and curfew.²⁶¹

During a general closure period, the occupied territories are essentially divided into three areas: the West bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem. Movement between these areas is extremely difficult as even those that have the required permits may not be able to exit any of these territories, not even to go to work.²⁶² Previously issued permits may be revoked, and new permits are not issued during this time. Goods traveling between the occupied territories and Israel are also restricted during a general closure.²⁶³ General closures are typically implemented as a response to suicide bomb attacks in Israel, and also as an extra security measure during Jewish holidays.

The second type of collective punishment is an internal closure. Internal closures are different than general closures in that only a specific town or village is isolated and sealed. These towns are usually sealed off using a combination of checkpoints manned by IDF forces, blockades on alternate exit points, and ditches dug around the town.²⁶⁴ The blockades usually consist of concrete barriers or some other kind of obstacle. During an internal closure, the only traffic allowed to come and go from the towns are emergency vehicles as well as food and medical supplies.²⁶⁵ Typically an internal closure is in response to specific intelligence that a terrorist, or terrorist group is hiding or operating from a specific town. This closure is also used in conjunction with the targeted raid, or as part of a cordon and search operation.

The use of a curfew is another collective punishment that is frequently used by the IDF. The IDF has employed the tactics of curfews since 1987 during the first intifada. During a period of curfew there is to be no traffic, either foot or vehicle, on the roads of

²⁶¹ Yehezkel Lein, *Civilians Under Siege : Restrictions on Freedom of Movement as Collective Punishment* (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2001), 4.

²⁶² Ibid., 4.

²⁶³ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, 261.

²⁶⁴ Lein, *Civilians Under Siege : Restrictions on Freedom of Movement as Collective Punishment*, 6.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 6.

the area under curfew. Curfews confine individuals to their homes.²⁶⁶ These curfews may last only a few hours at a time, or may be imposed for days. Curfew is usually imposed in an effort to halt attacks during a specific time period, or from a particular town.

The final collective punishment that is in use by the IDF is the razing of homes of suspected terrorists. In some areas homes surrounding roads used by Israeli settlers have been destroyed along with any crops within a three hundred meter range of the road.²⁶⁷ Israel also has demolished the homes of suspected terrorists and their closest relatives.²⁶⁸ Homes have also been demolished during combat operations in specific towns. During Operation Defensive Shield Israeli bulldozers were used to knock down buildings creating alternate avenues of approach to specific targets due to the threat of some areas being booby trapped.²⁶⁹

E. CONCLUSION

The tactics that the IDF used during the second intifada were not consistent with the tactics outlined in the new FM, *FM 3-24*. They did not take into account all of the logical lines of operation, instead focusing their efforts on offensive operations. There was no emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure or on building up the local government in order to help affect a solution. In fact, there was the opposite of both of these goals during the intifada. Israel's policy of assassinating terrorists and political leaders in Hamas has weakened the government instead of strengthening it. While this tactic falls in line with Israel's goal of lessening attacks on its citizens, it does nothing to help the root causes of the terrorism.

Local infrastructure was also demolished, through home razing as well as through collateral damage during either airstrikes or artillery bombardments of Palestinian cities.

²⁶⁶ Lein, *Civilians Under Siege : Restrictions on Freedom of Movement as Collective Punishment*, 9.

²⁶⁷ Hayim Gordon, Rivca Gordon and Taher Shriteh, *Beyond Intifada : Narratives of Freedom Fighters in the Gaza Strip* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 129.

²⁶⁸ Catignani, *The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, 70.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 65.

Essential services needed by the Palestinians are then supplied by groups like Hamas, which has the exact opposite effect of what Israel is trying to accomplish. Instead of making them weaker, Hamas becomes stronger.

As for the last LLO, economic development, Israel did nothing to help the occupied territories economically during the second intifada. In fact the policies of closure and curfews devastated the Palestinian economy. Eighty percent of the economic trade of the occupied territories is with Israel.²⁷⁰ This was almost completely halted during the periods of closure. Curfews also hurt local businesses, as no one was allowed to leave their homes to shop, and so the businesses remained closed. If the population was allowed to move around, it was for only one day a week, or for a few hours a day.²⁷¹

The focus of Israeli forces during the al-Aqsa intifada was clearly on offensive operations. Israelis focused on attempting to kill or capture terrorist and suspected terrorists. The strategy of the IDF went through three clear stages during the intifada. The first stage was from the beginning of the intifada in September of 2000 until Ariel Sharon was elected as the Prime Minister in March of 2001. During this stage Israel was relying on their doctrine of reprisals, in line with their new LIC doctrine and was mainly reactive. They predominantly employed the defensive tactics that I have outlined earlier in this Chapter, supplemented by some offensive measures.

The second stage was from March 2001 until the summer of 2003. During this stage Israel went on the offensive, striving to take the initiative in the battle and take the fight to the terrorists. This was due to Sharon's government believing that the LIC doctrine had been a failure up to that point. This is evidenced by the large number of official operations that were executed by the IDF, to include Operation defensive Shield and Operation Determined Path. This period ended in the summer of 2003 when the security fence's construction began. Though some offensive operations continued after the summer of 2003, they were not the focus as they had been during the previous fifteen months.

²⁷⁰ Lein, *Civilians Under Siege : Restrictions on Freedom of Movement as Collective Punishment*, 11.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 9.

The last phase was a return to defensive operations. This was in response to the admission by Ariel Sharon of the failure of his offensive campaign, and political pressure from within Israel.²⁷² During this phase Israel focused once again on the security fence as well as checkpoints and curfews. Offensive operations were conducted, but not on the scale of the operations conducted the year prior.

While Israel has a new LIC manual that follows along with many of the ideas in *FM 3-24* it clearly did not follow it during the entire Intifada. However, this did not really hurt Israel all that much. The tactics of the Intifada must be seen as a success given the Israeli stated policy of reducing the number of attacks to a livable level. This Israel has clearly managed. A cursory look at the casualty figures for Israeli civilians over the period of the Intifada shows a sharp decrease. However, tactical victory has not translated to strategic success. There still remains no solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, and until a political solution is found, Israeli civilians will continue to be killed by Palestinian terrorists.

²⁷² Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, 269.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

This thesis attempts to determine whether *FM 3-24* provides the best operational articulation of counterinsurgency theory and doctrine for U.S. COIN. We assert that this is a function of how the new guidelines in *FM 3-24* for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency. To determine this we analyzed the key elements of social science theories explaining contentious collective action, Islamic and Arab grievances and participation in organized violent behavior. In addition, we analyzed where the Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) in the FM aligned and diverged with COIN strategies employed in four Middle Eastern COIN campaigns.

Based on the evidence, our finding is that *FM 3-24* is a valuable base line doctrinal source for conducting COIN. It provides focused strategies in the LLOs that integrate interdisciplinary sources from academia, existing COIN doctrine, and historical case studies. The LLOs clearly situate the population as the centre of gravity in COIN and articulate strategies that are designed to develop mutually supporting efforts to establish stability and security which the FM identifies as the objective end state and we have defined as the common measure of effectiveness (MOE). According to the FM, stability and security lead to Host-Nation legitimacy which is mostly a function of popular perception. With that said, there are some significant problematic issues that we have identified in the FM that should be addressed. In the next two sections we analyze these key issues and submit recommendations to resolve them.

B. ISSUES

1. Social Science Issues in FM 3-24

As we discussed in Chapter II, the FM incorporates certain social-science theories that attempt to identify causality in contentious collective behavior such as those that employ social movement theory (SMT) to explain individual and group action. For example, in Ted Robert Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* and Eric Hoffer's *The True Believer* the authors propose socioeconomic and psychological explanations as the primary causal factors for rebellion. However, their conclusions are problematic. Contemporary research and alternative social movement theories indicate that collective and individual violence based on grievances and in support of causes is subject to significant intervening variables that significantly affect the opportunity and willingness of people to act against the state. This is particularly true in the case of the Middle East. For example according to Mohammed M. Hafez, "despite their plausibility and parsimony, the validity of socioeconomic and psychological explanations of Islamist rebellions must be challenged on both empirical and theoretical grounds."²⁷³ Hafez asserts that the "psychological approach" claims that Islamist militancy is a product of "psychological alienation" resulting from the "breakdown of traditional solidarity" in Muslim societies which resulted from rapid and flawed modernization.²⁷⁴

In his critique of these approaches Hafez contends that the majority of "Muslim societ[ies] experienced major social, economic and political changes and crises of poverty of excessive Westernization in the postcolonial era. Yet many of these societies have not had to contend with high levels of Islamist rebellion or violence."²⁷⁵ He cites "basic economic and demographic indicators of...-Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia –prior to and during the early 1990s" to demonstrate that these countries were economically similar and as evidence that "[t]he mere existence of poverty and

²⁷³ Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel : Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*, 9.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 8.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.,10.

deprivation is not sufficient to explain levels of Islamist rebellion.”²⁷⁶ In addition, he maintains that “Gurr’s frustration-aggression approach” is flawed because “as Leon Trotsky (1961:249) observed in 1932, “the mere existence of privation is not enough to cause insurrection; if it were, the masses would be always in revolt.”²⁷⁷

Adopting the theory originated by McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, Hafez submits an alternative, or “political process approach” for explaining Muslim rebellion. His basic assertion is that “[t]he key to explaining their [Muslim] militancy is not economic stagnation or excessive secularization, but the lack of meaningful access to state institutions.”²⁷⁸ Indeed, he asserts that “[w]ith few exceptions, the combination of political exclusion and reactive and indiscriminate repression is both necessary and sufficient to explain the timing and scale of Islamist rebellion.”²⁷⁹ Hafez maintains that “Muslims rebel because of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and on the other, reactive and indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resources and personal lives of Islamists.”²⁸⁰ In fact, greater degrees of repression and exclusion from the state’s political institutions produce more radical and violent Islamists.²⁸¹ He asserts that “rather than ask *why* does a movement become rebellious, a more appropriate question becomes *what is the process* by which a movement becomes rebellious.”²⁸² We cannot completely detail the supporting elements of Hafez’s argument here. But, the findings he details in *Why Muslims Rebel* as well as those presented in the book *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* illustrate the more complex and sufficient explanations for rebellion in Muslim states than those presented by Gurr and Hoffer.

²⁷⁶ Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel : Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*, 14.

²⁷⁷ Leon Trotsky. *The History of the Russian Revolution*. New York: Monard Press, 1961. p. 249, cited in Hafez. *Why Muslims Rebel*, 17.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 19-24.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 21.

2. Strategic Development Issues

As we discussed in Chapter Two, *FM 3-24* contends that LLOs

can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy of the HN government.²⁸³

Based on our findings this assertion is problematic because it implies that LLOs have equal importance and omission of one of these strategies can and should be based on a commander's assessments. Each of our case studies and the contemporary SMT works discussed above indicate that omitting or insufficiently employing the "Governance" LLO is severely damaging to COIN campaigns. While subordinating this LLO to others during the conduct of COIN a campaign maybe necessary at certain stages, doing so without reintegrating it into the campaign and making it a priority almost guarantees failure. In fact, this is asserted in the manual. The FM acknowledges the necessity of "eliminate[ing] the root causes of the insurgency" in order to achieve lasting stability and security.²⁸⁴ It also maintains that "[g]ood governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy of the HN government."²⁸⁵ If these assertions are true, than omitting, subordinating, or ignoring HN political development, except as a temporary measure, is unacceptable if one plans to execute a successful COIN campaign that produces sustainable stability and a legitimate government. With this said, the "Governance" LLO appears to be a necessary strategy in any COIN campaign.

²⁸³ United States Army, *Counterinsurgency*, *FM 3-24*, 5-7.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-15.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 5-15.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Primacy of Political Inclusion

Based on the evidence detailed above, leaders planning COIN campaigns must focus on emphasizing the rule of law and ensure political inclusion is an integral part of their strategic planning in COIN. This assertion may seem obvious to most and possibly not groundbreaking in terms of understanding the COIN environment. But, as leaders attempt to prioritize efforts in COIN campaigns with limited resources and under political pressure to achieve results, it would seem prudent to focus on the roots of contention in order to resolve it. *FM 3-24* acknowledges this. Yet, as we have discussed, it fails to identify the “Governance” LLO as a necessary element of all COIN campaigns. We do not contend that including this LLO in a COIN campaign is sufficient for success. But, based on the evidence in contemporary SMT and our case studies, ensuring this LLO is fully developed and implemented is a necessary condition for success in COIN.

2. Establish a Corp of Political Officers

With the realization through our analysis of the primacy of political inclusion as a necessary element of a COIN campaign, the Army needs to make institutional changes to support strategic, operational, and tactical success in this area. Up to this point, including our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main effort in attempting to achieve political inclusion has been performed by Army and Marine officers with no formal training in a political science curriculum that prepares them to assist the HN develop good governance. While there have been some efforts at the national level that have the assistance of the State Department, there are far too few State Department officers available to have the needed impact at the tactical level. In fact, the tactical, or grass roots level, is where effective and legitimate governance begin. This is the decisive level for COIN. In an effort to combat the shortage of trained officers needed to handle grass roots political inclusion on a wide scale, we recommend that the Army develop a corps of political officers to handle this role.

The role of the political officer was of primary importance to the British campaigns in Iraq and Palestine, as well as the French effort in Algeria. The SAS officers in Algeria were very successful at beginning the necessary political inclusion to garner the support of the local population. While this was not their only role, it was one that had a positive impact on the direction of the French campaign. As we have discussed, British political officers in Iraq had decisive effects on the development of the Iraqi state institutions. Although, their role was decidedly disruptive to the development of a legitimate Iraqi government, it is reasonable to assert that if the British had adopted more inclusive political policies, then the political officers would have been instrumental in establishing a stable, secure and legitimate Iraqi government.

The U.S. Army corps of political officers should be educated in the techniques of establishing local governance, supervising elections, and establishing civil administrations. In addition, they should work in cooperation with U.S Army Civil Affairs officers. These two branches could work together to establish local governance in conjunction with building local infrastructure. Political officers would be billeted at every level of the Army down to the Battalion level, to correspond with the different levels of government in order to ensure continuity in employing the “Governance” LLO. Whether the HN government institutions are based on the U. S. system, or a different one that is linked to local preferences and historical precedents, political officers could assist this development and focus U.S. forces’ strategies to support the HN’s efforts. Much like the career path of civil affairs officers, this branch could be a functional area designation once the officer reaches his fifth year of service. The establishment of a corps of political officers would go a long way toward bridging the current gap between the few trained State Department officials that are supposed to fill this billet, and the untrained Army officer conducting operations in his sector while simultaneously attempting to establish some semblance of local governance.

3. Seal the Borders to Gain Control

The establishment of a stable and secure environment, or common MOE, is the standard of success for COIN campaigns that we have been using throughout this thesis. With this goal in mind, one lesson that seemed to come out of all of our case studies was the necessity to gain control of state's borders. Control over the border provides many advantages for the COIN forces, not the least of which is the denial of material and men to the insurgency. As Leites and Wolf espoused in their RAND study on COIN "what an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular support....but rather a steady supply of certain inputs."²⁸⁶

If one looks at the men and material supplied to the insurgency as inputs, then this theory has obvious applicability. In the Algerian case study, the impact of sealing the country's borders had on the insurgency is readily apparent. Prior to the establishment of the Morice line, approximately 1000 weapons a month were flowing into Algeria from Morocco and Tunisia, as well as unknown numbers of supporters. As a result, the FLN was fighting a successful insurgent campaign.²⁸⁷ Once the border was sealed, "the FLN was deprived of much of the weapons, fresh manpower, and essential logistics that it needed,"²⁸⁸ and the French gained the advantage.

A similar effect can also be seen in Israel with the establishment of the security fence around the occupied territories. However, in this case it was not the denial of inputs to the insurgency that mattered; rather it was the denial of targets. As our graphs in the Chapter on Israel indicate, the construction of the barrier had a dramatic impact on the number of attacks that the Palestinians were able to carry out in Israel, and therefore Israeli casualty numbers dropped dramatically. While the fence around the occupied territories has not stopped violence in Israel and the terrorists have found ways around it, violence has decreased to a level acceptable to the Israeli government.

²⁸⁶ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority; an Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, 5.

²⁸⁷ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*, 62.

²⁸⁸ Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars : State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*, 85.

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