Cognitive Biases and Structural Failures in United States Foreign Policy: Explaining Decision-Making Dissonance in Phase IV Policy and Plans for Iraq

Abstract

After planning from September 2001 to May 2003, the George W. Bush administration failed to implement a coherent national plan at the transition to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in Iraq. This thesis applies four decision-making perspectives the rational actor, organizational process, bureaucratic politics, and individual level approaches to the Phase IV planning process to analyze how senior decision makers within the national security system selected foreign policy options. Despite an experienced national security team, officials were unable to coordinate and integrate various agency planning efforts, failed to decide on specific policy objectives, and limited the consideration of multiple courses of action.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2007
Accession Number
ADA475957

Entities

People

  • Ferinand Hafner

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Cognition
  • Combat Operations
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Foreign Policy
  • Foreign Relations
  • Information Processing
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Political Science
  • Psychology
  • Security
  • United States
  • United States Central Command
  • War Colleges

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Team-Based Human-Centered Cognitive Task Decision Making and Information Performance.