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Distributed System Security via Logical Frameworks

ONR N00014-04-1-0724
Final Report

Frank Pfenning, Carnegie Mellon University

Michael Reiter, Carnegie Mellon University
Lujo Bauer, Carnegie Mellon University

1 Objectives and Approach

We conducted a research program with the goal of advancing security in distributed systems via the application of logical frameworks. Our work targeted multiple facets of the life-cycle of a distributed system, ranging from design through execution, and from sound mechanism design through sound policy enforcement. It consisted of three major interconnected thrusts.

First, we investigated how to exploit existing technologies to mechanically reason about security policies as specified in a logical framework. This closed an important security gap, helping users and managers understand the consequences of their policies.

Second, we demonstrated the use of logical frameworks for encoding and enforcing access-control policies in a practical distributed system. Access-control mechanisms today, whether it be physical keys for doors or password protection for computer accounts, reflect access-control policies that are explicit only in the manual procedures of the organization that manages these resources. As such, any change in policy, e.g., creating a new computer account, or permitting a person to unlock a door, is effected through a manual process. We utilized logical frameworks to encode organizational policies within computer systems, thereby harnessing the power of these frameworks to support the management and enforcement of access-control policy, and gaining security and flexibility by doing so. We demonstrated this capability in a ubiquitous computing test-bed at Carnegie Mellon.

Third, we developed and implemented a framework for the specification of distributed and concurrent systems and their implementations, specifically targeting our test-bad architecture. This work extends a previous collaboration between NRL and Carnegie Mellon that resulted in the design of CLF, an innovative logical language for the specification of concurrent systems. CLF incorporates ideas from logical frameworks, linear logic, and monads into an expressive meta-language.

Prior work was supported by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Grant N00173-00-C-2086 – *Efficient Logics for Reasoning about Security Protocols and Their Implementations*. CLF is now fully specified and has been successfully validated on mainstream concurrency formalisms (e.g., Petri nets, the pi-calculus), advanced concurrent programming languages (Concurrent ML), and security protocol specification languages (MSR). In the context of the present contract, we facilitated the transition of CLF from a foundational language into an implemented tool that can be applied to the specification of complex distributed and concurrent systems through the LolliMon prototype.

2 Technical Accomplishments

The research carried out under this grant accomplished the stated objectives. We will line them up with the threads of inquiry listed above. An overview of the project and accomplishments in the middle of the grant period can be found in [BPR07].

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Reasoning about security policies. In an invited workshop talk [Pfe05] we mapped out a constructive logic for specifying security properties of distributed systems. We analyzed its properties and developed several criteria to establish noninterference between principals in [GP06]. In an approach to security based on formal logics and their proofs, this is a critical component.

Practical implementation. We implemented our designs as part of the Grey system for universal access control via convergent devices [BGM$^+$05]. This system is currently in use on the Cylab floor of the Collaborative Innovation Center at Carnegie Mellon University, where students, faculty, and staff use smart phones to control access to their offices and log into their computers.

The experience with this implementation led to several further developments on the logical side. Specifically, we considered linear extensions to handle consumable (use-once) certificates [BBG$^+$07] as well as an explicit representation of the knowledge of principles [GBB$^+$06]. These advances were only partially implemented during the course of the contract, but make important conceptual contributions.

A crucial aspect of the practical implementation side is proof search, because access to a resource is granted when a formal proof of compliance with the access control policy is presented. For the Grey system this was solved through a distributed backward-chaining proof search engine [BGR05].

For extensions with consumable resources, we developed a separate, stand-alone theorem prover for linear logic [CP05a, Cha06]. Further development of this prover required a number of fundamental advances in our understanding of proof search for linear logic [CP05b, CPP06]. All these insights are integrated into our distributed software.

Specifications for Concurrent Systems. The focus in this thread was the development of an operational semantics so as to simulate the distributed systems specified in the Concurrent Logical Framework (CLF). In order to make this feasible, we restricted ourselves to a large fragment of CLF that is sufficient to express much of the proof-carrying authorization architecture of Grey. The design of this language [LPPW05] is a significant result of the work under this grant. The implementation is complete and publicly available.

A sideline was the analysis of causal dependencies in a logical framework, at present published only as a technical report [LWP07].

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4   Software Prototypes

We are distributing two software prototypes developed with funds from this grant.

- A theorem prover for first-order linear logic.

- An implementation of the LolliMon logic programming language.

Both are available at the project home page at `http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~self`.