Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Abstract
Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq became violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. U.S. casualties and financial costs without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq s major communities stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention - a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism could be achieved, and at what cost. The Administration is claiming relative success in reversing the deterioration in security in 2006, attributing the gains to the troop surge strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 ( New Way Forward ). Some commanders say that violence has now dropped to levels not seen since 2004. The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ( troop surge ) to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. However, critics say that the strategy was primarily intended to promote Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as benchmarks of political progress. According to congressionally mandated White House reports in July and September 2007, as well as subsequent events, overall national political reconciliation has not progressed substantially, and U.S. officials are looking for more modest signs of political accommodation rather than broad, sweeping reconciliation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 10, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA476106
Entities
People
- Kenneth Katzman
Organizations
- Library of Congress