U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: The Iraq Experience

Abstract

In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, critics have charged that the U.S. Intelligence Community failed to provide accurate information about Iraqi capabilities to develop and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Congressional intelligence committees are reviewing the Intelligence Community's performance, but there are disputes over the need to evaluate the processes used by the executive branch to collect, analyze, and use intelligence. This report explores in broad terms the relationship between the production of intelligence and the making of policy as reflected in the period prior to the war against Iraq in March 2003 and the implications for Congress. This report will be updated if circumstances warrant.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 16, 2004
Accession Number
ADA476267

Entities

People

  • Richard A.. Best Jr.

Organizations

  • Library of Congress

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Chemical Warfare Agents
  • Congress
  • Fissile Materials
  • Governments
  • Human Intelligence
  • Intelligence Analysts
  • Intelligence Community
  • Iraqi-War
  • Judgment
  • Law
  • Materials
  • Military Operations
  • National Security
  • Nuclear Materials
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • United Nations
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Strategic Security Studies