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THE MODERNIZATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR
A NEW TREND IN GERMANY'S SECURITY POLICY

by

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14. ABSTRACT

This paper examines the current reform of the German armed forces and how ongoing reorganization is being influenced by a new security policy and threat analysis. The thesis is that the ongoing transformation of the Bundeswehr is in line with Germany's expanded security role and reflects an appropriate adjustment to post cold war realities. However, there are concerns that an unsuitable defense budget may prevent Germany from attaining its stated reform goals and therefore from fulfilling its commitments to the European Union and NATO. After assessing the overarching guidelines set by Germany's defense policy, which is embedded in the European framework of a common security policy, the focus shifts to analysis of the current reform. This chapter addresses the three main issues related to the transformation of the Bundeswehr: the value of conscription to the current mission of the armed forces, its structure, and its capabilities. I will review the influence of these three issues on the ability of the Bundeswehr to take quick and targeted action across the possible risk spectrum by evaluating endeavors to reorganize the structure and to enhance capabilities. German policy makers have determined these capabilities to be critical to meeting the demands of the new spectrum of tasks. By analyzing the integration of new military capabilities, resulting from the reform, into European and NATO obligations, additional requirements and capability needs to fulfill these commitments are identified. Furthermore, the analysis of capability integration into current alliances provides an appropriate measurement instrument and feedback mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the transformation process in creating a modern and powerful military force. vi The next chapter discusses implications for the future. Specifically, it establishes a nexus between ongoing reforms, and indispensable adaptations, which are caused by budgetary constrains or operational necessities derived from future battlefield requirements. In concluding, the paper argues that the designated defense budget must be reevaluated in the near term to ensure the unrestricted completion of the reform and to retain the credibility of Germany as a reliable partner to Europe and the United States.

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Preface

Recent debates over a more effective European security policy have raised questions about the German contribution to a more robust European military capability. Lacking military capabilities of the Bundeswehr have served to undermine the credibility of Germany's determination to act as a reliable partner of the transatlantic alliance. Specifically, the United States has become increasingly dissatisfied with German military influence and leadership in all level of crisis. Germany has failed to take action and to contribute more to shared global security concerns. The failure to transform and modernize the Bundeswehr would result in a serious loss of German influence within the EU and NATO and would motivate the US to adopt a more unilateral posture in its foreign policies.

The following examination focuses on the German endeavor to attain the capability of taking action in foreign affairs and security matters by reorganizing the Bundeswehr into a modern and powerful military force. It addresses the disposition of the Bundeswehr reform as well as its political environment and the integration of this new force structure into European and NATO commitments.

I would like to thank Dr Alexander Lassner on the ACSC Staff for his patient editing and helpful advice on this project.

Abstract

This paper examines the current reform of the German armed forces and how ongoing reorganization is being influenced by a new security policy and threat analysis. The thesis is that the ongoing transformation of the Bundeswehr is in line with Germany's expanded security role and reflects an appropriate adjustment to post cold war realities. However, there are concerns that an unsuitable defense budget may prevent Germany from attaining its stated reform goals and therefore from fulfilling its commitments to the European Union and NATO.

After assessing the overarching guidelines set by Germany's defense policy, which is embedded in the European framework of a common security policy, the focus shifts to analysis of the current reform. This chapter addresses the three main issues related to the transformation of the Bundeswehr: the value of conscription to the current mission of the armed forces, its structure, and its capabilities. I will review the influence of these three issues on the ability of the Bundeswehr to take quick and targeted action across the possible risk spectrum by evaluating endeavors to reorganize the structure and to enhance capabilities. German policy makers have determined these capabilities to be critical to meeting the demands of the new spectrum of tasks.

By analyzing the integration of new military capabilities, resulting from the reform, into European and NATO obligations, additional requirements and capability needs to fulfill these commitments are identified. Furthermore, the analysis of capability integration into current alliances provides an appropriate measurement instrument and feedback mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the transformation process in creating a modern and powerful military force.

The next chapter discusses implications for the future. Specifically, it establishes a nexus between ongoing reforms, and indispensable adaptations, which are caused by budgetary constraints or operational necessities derived from future battlefield requirements.

In concluding, the paper argues that the designated defense budget must be reevaluated in the near term to ensure the unrestricted completion of the reform and to retain the credibility of Germany as a reliable partner to Europe and the United States.

Chapter 1

Changes and new Centers of Gravity in Germany's Security Policy

The past decade has seen a quantum leap in quality, intensity, and size of German participation in international crisis management missions, reflecting changes in the security environment and the readiness of the unified Germany to assume more responsibility for safeguarding peace.

— Rudolf Scharping (former Minister of Defense)

Over the last decade, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the German geopolitical environment has changed drastically. Instead of being directly confronted with a massive military threat on its homeland borders, Germany is now surrounded by allies and friendly nations. The reunification of Germany and its new unrestricted sovereignty imposed new expectations concerning its political as well as military contribution within the European framework. European neighbors and in particular the United States are demanding a more active role in accepting international responsibilities and an expanded security role. In the words of Karsten Voigt, coordinator for German-American cooperation, Germany should “no longer be solely a consumer but primarily a producer of stability and security in Europe.”¹ The following chapter will give a brief survey of German security policy approaches and concepts and its integration into the overall European security policy and transatlantic relations.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and its consequences

The fall of the Berlin wall symbolized two fundamental events in the beginning of the 1990's: the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. The wall not only epitomized the dividing of two German nations, but also a borderline between East and West. The new national and international situation required essential adaptations in Germany's security and defense policy. The reluctance of the German government to contribute military forces during "Desert Storm" in 1990/1991 reflected a political outlook based on recent historical experience (WW II) as well as constitutional constrains. The main problem was that the Basic Law stipulated an employment of the armed forces only within collective defense systems like NATO, and excluded combat missions of the Bundeswehr out of NATO region. The ruling of the Constitutional Court on 12 July 1994 set the stage for out of area employment of German forces. In its judgment, it announced that the participation of German armed forces in collective activities does not require an amendment of the constitution. The new shift in Germany's security policy was done very carefully and started with pure peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Cambodia/Somalia). Thus, a "step by step withdrawal from the traditional culture of reticence"², backed up by the ruling of the Constitutional Court, was the essential condition in accepting the new role and extended responsibilities as a primary European player. The move, from a strategic concept focused on defense of the homeland against an overwhelming adversary, to a current global deployment of almost 10,000 soldiers outside Germany "represents an important historical evolution in a short period of time"³ and symbolizes the historical turning point for Germany's security policy. The increased willingness of politicians to employ the Bundeswehr without regional limits, as well as their perception that "Germany cannot afford to

shirk its responsibilities of international solidarity”⁴, has called for new capabilities and a fundamental renewal of forces.

This step-by-step process of accepting more international responsibilities is not a single-handed effort. Rather, it is embedded in a European framework and realized through a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The term European Security and Defense Identity had its origin at the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) in Maastricht in December 1991. The WEU member states released a statement in which they recognized the need for greater European responsibility in terms of global security matters and the development of a defense and security identity”.⁵ Germany does not consider ESDI as a parallel defense alliance competing with NATO. Rather, Germany emphasizes this initiative as an endeavor to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to enhance the European ability “to be a reliable and strong partner of the US”.⁶ Thus, supporting and reinforcing the transatlantic alliance is the underlying assumption instead of duplicating or even replacing it.

The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ of humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peacemaking actions (employment of combat forces), designed in 1992, currently limit ESDI to crisis management missions, where NATO is not engaged.⁷ To this end, ESDI capabilities deal with limited crisis employments like humanitarian and peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement missions. German politicians consider ESDI as a tool for peace settlement and conflict prevention, rather than for coercion and enforcement of European or national interests. The achievement of political solutions “without excluding the use of force as a last resort”⁸ reflects the main characteristic of Germany’s interpretation of ESDI. Because of its reticence towards military action, “Germany’s key contribution must be political”.⁹ Therefore, parallel to the use of the

military forces to ESDI requirements, the reinforcement of civil conflict prevention and crisis management assets is deemed necessary.¹⁰

NATO- new challenges and commitments

After the Cold War, NATO had to adapt to a new security environment and extended its tasks in 1999 at the summit in Washington to conflict prevention, crisis management, partnership and co-operation.¹¹ These 21st century missions were integrated into the “Defense Capabilities Initiative”(DCI). German security and defense policy focuses on enhancing the military capabilities in three key areas identified in the DCI. These three areas are Strategic deployability, global intelligence and command, control and communication capability. They have been established as priorities to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.¹² Although Germany considers NATO as the only collective defense alliance capable of securing stability in Europe,¹³ NATO’s deterrence function lost significance as an alliance protecting Germany from the immanent threat of a Soviet aggression. Surrounded only by friendly nations, Germany’s strategic position has favorably changed from the perimeter of NATO’s “umbrella” in Europe to its regional center. Increasingly, the enlargement of the Alliance is a central aspect in Germany’s security policy. This is for two reasons. First, new members on the eastern border provide a “buffer-zone” to Russia, which is still suffering from unstable political conditions. Secondly, Germany has a key role in providing cooperation with eastern European countries. Strong economic ties and military support, rooted in its geographical position, economic power, and “gate to the west”-function are appropriate conditions for Germany to be the main player in integrating the new members into the Alliance. For central and eastern European countries, military teamwork with Germany is the easiest way to get access to NATO.¹⁴

Basic Principles and interests of Germany's Security Policy

Largely, due to historical experience, German politicians consider the use of the military instrument of power as a last resort. Combat missions of German military forces are only foreseeable within a multinational alliance. The lessons learned from two world wars and the negative role and influence of German military in national affairs shaped a “German policy founded on a national security culture of civilian power.”¹⁵ Although recognizing that Germany's importance as a nation has increased, the Federal Government understands its security policy as a part of ESDI within the framework of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The national state in itself is considered too weak to deal with global competition and future challenges concerning international stability. Foreign minister Fischer's vision of Europe as a “federation of nation-states”, a division of sovereignty between the federal and national levels, and his rejection of any kind of renationalization as well as his advocacy of political self-restraint¹⁶ reflect the passionate German support of a European integration.

Resulting from the perception that the European integration is the only way to guarantee global influence and authority, EU enlargement is in the vital interests of Germany.¹⁷ The more countries that are integrated into the EU, the greater the European economic and political power. Especially in terms of military capabilities, no single European country can afford to cover all military functions due to limited defense budgets. Furthermore, an enlargement of the EU extends the area of common values and stability in Europe. Germany's policy focuses on four key interests, derived from the Constitution, namely, the consolidation of transatlantic partnership; the preservation of peace and prosperity for the European Union Community; the creation of a co-operative security structure including all European states; and the participation in shaping the international order, enclosing active support of arms control, disarmament and

measures against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction¹⁸. If one examines these key areas, it is obvious that interests are expressed in a more European sense than from a national perspective. The visible tendency to move away from a security policy influenced by pure national vital interests reflects the acceptance that German interests can only be defended within the European context.

Consequences for the reform

After 1990, Germany's security policy shifted from a strategy of deterrence and defense to a broadened concept of security founded on global crisis management, conflict prevention, and peace building. Germany's political and security interests are strictly defined within the context of transatlantic alliance and European integration. Its policy makers set the framework for the modernization of the Bundeswehr by focusing on two principles. First, the willingness to play a more active role within multinational alliances to secure global peace and stability calls for highly mobile, rapidly deployable forces, which are capable to operate within a multinational force structure. Secondly, the commitment to the Petersberg Tasks requires forces that are able to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management actions. These two principles establish the basis and guidance for future orientation and composition of the Bundeswehr. To that effect, the reform of the Bundeswehr will restructure the German armed forces primarily for global crisis management missions embedded in a European force contingent at the expense of the standing main defense forces. The shift towards a more mobile and flexible force design is indispensable to meet the demands of missions around and beyond Europe according to the Petersberg tasks.

Notes

¹ Voigt, Carsten. *ESDP and NATO: A German perspective on the new transatlantic bargain*. Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, 2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 20 January 2003, available from <http://www.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/8/12.php>

² The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) John Hopkins University. *Redefining German Security: Prospects for the Bundeswehr Reform*. German Issues Volume 25. Washington, D.C., September 2001, p.2

³ Ibid, p. 2

⁴ Scharping, Rudolf. *The EU's Headline Goal and the Reform of the Bundeswehr*. Speech by German Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, at the 13th NATO Review Conference in Berlin, 21 September 2000; n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0101/scharping210900.html>

⁵ Evolution of the ESDI. *NATO Handbook*, 02 October 2001; n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>

⁶ Voigt, Carsten. *ESDP and NATO: A German perspective on the new transatlantic bargain*. Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, 2001, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 20 January 2003, available from <http://www.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/8/12.php>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Fischer, Joschka. *European Challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the center of Europe*. Speech by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the "Weimarer Lectures on Germany" on 10 April 2002, n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). *The Bundeswehr 2002: The current Situation and Perspectives*. Berlin, April 2002, p. 17

¹¹ Ibid, p.14

¹² Ibid, p 14

¹³ Ibid, p.14

¹⁴ Ruehl, Lothar. *Die Bundeswehrreform aus bündnispolitischer Sicht-Die gewandelten politischen und strategischen Rahmenbedingungen*; n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/12/18.php>

¹⁵ Dyson, Tom. *Civilian Power and "History-Making" Decisions: German Agenda-Setting on Europe*. European Security Volume 11, Spring 2002, Number 1, p.46

¹⁶ Fischer, Joschka. *European Challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany's responsibility at the center of Europe*. Speech by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the "Weimarer Lectures on Germany" on 10 April 2002, n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html>

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). *The Bundeswehr 2002: The current Situation and Perspectives*. Berlin, April 2002, p. 13

Chapter 2

Transforming the Bundeswehr

The original function of national and Alliance defense forces is being expanded by a variety of new tasks; the forces are becoming multifunctional.

— Klaus Naumann, former German Chief of Defense

The change in the international security environment from a bipolar to a multipolar distribution of power and the gradual adaptation of Germany's defense policy to a new world order required a significant restructuring and conceptual reorientation of the Bundeswehr. Its force structure and equipment evolved during forty years of political and military confrontation in central Europe and was designed for a major war, in which the Bundeswehr was to fight in a limited territory.¹ The defense posture of the armed forces was designed to counter a Soviet attack mainly on German terrain. Due to the focus on a Cold War scenario, the Bundeswehr was big on manpower but was deficient in operational forces: it lacked essential capabilities, such as the resources to project forces over big distances, light intervention forces, independent air defense and strategic reconnaissance capabilities.² These important capabilities are fundamental to globally fulfill future tasks of multinational crisis prevention and crisis management.

As opposed to other European forces, German combat forces were always completely integrated into NATO structure. Their command composition as well as their defense posture was constantly orientated to NATO demands. NATO's post- Cold War agenda changed the alliance defense requirements. To that effect, the new missions of conflict prevention,

stabilization and peacekeeping sometimes resulted in an inability of the Bundeswehr to provide contributions to internationally agreed tasks assured by Germany's policy-makers and increased the call for a fundamental reorganization. The current German Minister of Defense, Dr. Peter Struck, outlined a new force structure, capable of a broad spectrum of multinational employments outside the German homeland.³ This modified concept reflects an orientation towards an intervention force, focused on power projection abroad within an international alliance, mandated by NATO or the UN Security Council.

Current mission and tasks

The primary mission of German armed forces is derived from the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), national defense and under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which together provide for the protection of allies within the framework of collective defense. Furthermore, the mission includes the contribution to peace preservation and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, promotion of global peace, the provision of disaster relief, and support for humanitarian activities.⁴

According to the basic document of the Bundeswehr reform, "The Bundeswehr in 2002- the current situation and perspectives", six tasks derive from the overall mission.⁵ The first task concentrates on domestic duties, the preservation of Germany's sovereignty in peacetime. It encompasses all measures of airspace and water surveillance, air policy, securing the borders, and Host Nation Support (HNS). This routinely performed task preserves Germany's national integrity. The second task is collective defense, and refers to an attack upon the Alliance as a whole. It encompasses the protection of Germany's national integrity, as well as the provision of military assistance to NATO members in the case of attacks on their territory. This "classical" responsibility is currently considered as a very unlikely option⁶ and requires the commitment of

all the armed forces. The third task covers conflict prevention and crisis management. This task, which is central, calls for national crisis prevention and crisis containment capabilities. Military forces tailored to this duty may have to be deployable to the theater within a few days and sustainable for up to several years. The fourth task encompasses rescue and evacuation operations. These operations may become necessary worldwide and require readily deployable specialist forces. The fifth task, assistance, refers to Bundeswehr support dealing with natural catastrophes, accidents or global humanitarian and disaster relief. The last task, partnership and cooperation, are routine military responsibilities carried out in support of political measures to intensify international collaboration and stability.

Based on the guidelines given by the mission, according to “The Bundeswehr in 2002- the current situation and perspectives”, and its derived tasks, the former German Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping (member of the current Red-Green coalition), set the framework for the desired pattern of force modernization. The new Bundeswehr must be lean, light and highly mobile and its readiness forces must be able for worldwide-sustained operations over a long period of time. German forces are only deployed as a part of an international coalition to contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping measures as well as to post-conflict reconstruction. In a 1994 ruling, the German Constitutional Court approved the participation of the Bundeswehr in multilateral military operations when those operations ultimately serve peaceful purposes, are embedded in collective security organizations such as UN, OSCE, NATO and WEU. The employment of German armed forces must be approved by a simple majority of the Parliament (Bundestag).

Compulsory military service: obstacle or political necessity?

Although the transformation of the Bundeswehr will result in a drastic downsizing of its personal strength, the Federal Government deems the conscript system as the proven form of military service that “continues to be appropriate for Germany.”⁷ From a total strength of 282.400 soldiers, 80.000 will be conscripts (28%), the rest are regulars and temporary- career volunteers. The government’s intent behind this concept is not operational necessity or strategic concerns, but making the armed forces transparent and integrated in democratic order. “It enables society to exercise control over the armed forces and it ensures that people remain aware of defense.”⁸ The underlying assumption of conscription is that collective defense (mainly in Europe) is the Bundeswehr’s primary function, and a sufficient number of reserves is needed to accomplish the mission. However, as previously mentioned above (see Chapter 2, p. 8), German policy makers see the primary role of armed forces abroad⁹. Conscripts are not necessarily available for crisis management missions out of the country, since no conscript in basic military service may be deployed outside Germany without his consent. The likelihood that conscripts would be unwilling to participate in dangerous operations is high. An average ratio of 30 % conscripts of the total forces¹⁰ (in some army units about 50%) significantly decreases readiness of the affected units, because conscripts are included in the Readiness Force element designed for military operations abroad. So far, there have not been problems in encouraging sufficient numbers of conscripts for voluntary participation in current peacekeeping missions. However, these missions are post conflict operations where the risks are acceptable. Dangerous combat missions are more likely to be refused. Therefore, the force packages are likely to be filled up with professionals. An infantry unit assigned for a combat mission must then be composed of

additional professionals from other units to replace unwilling conscripts. That won't do much for small unit cohesion.

Additionally, the duration of the basic military service (9 months) is too short for sufficient military training and makes little sense from a military point of view. Modern armed forces are becoming more and more technical and conscripts do not stay in service long enough to acquire high-level military skills. Military leaders cannot rely on participation of conscripts when German forces deploy out of area. The retention of the compulsory military service is a political will founded on a collective German memory that still perceives a danger of a voluntary, professional military that may become refuge and breeding ground for right wing extremists as happened in the Reichswehr during the Weimar Republic.¹¹

Overall, the new concept of mobile and flexible crisis reaction forces requires professional soldiers, trained and equipped for global deployments, and the reduced needs of national defense are undermining the basis for compulsory military service. Conscripts are no specialists, but specialists are needed for those military functions that go beyond the immediate needs of national defense. Enhanced and more complicated technology as well as the dominant focus on crisis management missions requires a level of training, which can only be acceptably attained by soldiers serving for relatively long periods.

New Capabilities and Structure

The extension of the spectrum of tasks causes new demands and calls for additional resources. Scharping, who initiated the reform, faced a declining defense budget and the jeopardy of under-funding the transformation process. The gap between equipment urgently needed (procurement program set up by the General Kujat, former Chief of Staff) to modernize

weapons systems and platforms and the budget actually provided, is about 3.6 billion Euros per year.¹² Expectations from selling abandoned military installations, privatizations, outsourcing and renting out Bundeswehr property to reduce the operating costs, have been not fulfilled. But costly modernization measures will have to be made to bring material and equipment up to modern standards and to reduce the operating expenditure. Due to the fact that the Red-Green government is unwilling to make defense a priority, the room for maneuver to transform the armed forces is limited. Without initial financing, the transformation process will take far longer and may endanger Germany's credibility as a serious partner for the US and European allies¹³. The structure and capabilities of the new Bundeswehr concept, as analyzed in the following paragraphs, reflects a theoretical framework, that has to be put into practice, even with budgetary constraints. However, the concept as described in the DoD reform document "The Bundeswehr 2002 – The current situation and perspectives" is not absolute and Struck has already ordered an examination of further weapons systems reductions and cost savings to increase the budget for urgently required procurements (see Chapter 4 below).

New Capabilities

The German government's priorities in terms of new capabilities are derived from the five key areas (see Chapter 1, p.4) of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), announced at the NATO summit in Washington 1999. The identified capabilities shortfalls of the Bundeswehr include strategic deployability, global intelligence and command, control and communication capability as well as asset interoperability.¹⁴ The founding of a German-French initiative on development of a European air transport command was the first step to establish a multinational role sharing effort. The pooling of transport assets could make the so-called "Eurolift" effective since Britain, Germany and France have declared their intention to develop and to buy the

Airbus A 400. Joint logistics and maintenance for these aircraft, along with the establishment of a joint command, enhance military effectiveness and offer significant cost savings. The European coordinating cell for air transport has been successfully operating in the Netherlands (Eindhoven) since June 2002.

Also the enhancement of global intelligence is being pushed forward through a German-French development of a European satellite-based reconnaissance unit. The SAR-Lupe (Synthetic Aperture Radar) reconnaissance spacecraft, the first German military satellite, will be launched in 2005¹⁵. A constellation of five is planned at a cost of 300 million Euros. Germany will provide an all-weather radar satellite system, while France contributes its optical satellite system (HELIOS II). This bilateral initiative is the foundation for a European satellite-based global intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance capability.

In terms of enhancing the command, control and communications capabilities (C3), Germany is developing a wideband, wireless command post communication network that will be capable of providing voice, digital data and video connectivity among command facilities. This so-called MIDS system (multifunctional information distribution system) is a key facility for joint operations and international C3 systems interoperability, primarily with the US forces, which are the current benchmark for C3 technology¹⁶.

The above programs are a noticeable step towards significantly increasing the military capabilities of the Bundeswehr in taking worldwide action through enabling German forces to project power over long distances. The plans indicate the shift from a Europe-centered defense policy to a security policy of global engagement. The cooperative procurement efforts within Europe are an important measure to pool capabilities and resources on a cost-effective basis in the context of declining national defense budgets. Furthermore, multinational procurement

solutions are a consistent further development of the political will to integrate the Bundeswehr into an European alliance. The German capabilities enhancement program is based on a multilateral integration within the European framework.

The new Structure of the Bundeswehr

Table 1. New Personnel Structure

Officers	38,500	13,7%
Noncommissioned Officers	131,300	46,5%
Other ranks	32,600	11,5%
Total number of Professionals	202,400	71,7%
Conscripts	80,000	28,3%
Total number of active personnel	282,400	100%

Source: Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). The Bundeswehr 2002: The Current Situation and Perspectives. Berlin, April 2002, p.29

The personal strength of the Bundeswehr will be reduced significantly from 340,000 soldiers to a total of 282,400 soldiers. 150,000 soldiers (including 80,000 conscripts) are assigned to a Readiness Force element, which is the basis for task forces extracted and employed in NATO or UN missions. In comparison to the old structure, the readiness force component has virtually tripled in strength¹⁷ and therefore considerably increased the number of forces available for crisis management functions. This measure is a further indication for the substantial change of Germany's defense strategy, namely the provision of force modules, ready to take action under a UN mandate or to make an essential contribution to the NATO Response Force beyond German borders. Furthermore, it indicates the intent to tailor the armed forces to joint structures. The

personnel not assigned to the Readiness Force will stay in the Basic Military Organization to perform national territorial tasks and administrative, logistical or medical support functions.

The increased focus on operational command functions has resulted in a streamlining of the command and control organization of the armed forces and the establishment of a unified command responsibility. The number of command levels between the services' Chiefs of Staff and the wing/ regiment level has been reduced from three to two. The position of the Chief of Staff (*Generalinspekteur*) of the Bundeswehr has also been strengthened. He received additional responsibilities for force arrangements as well as for mission planning and execution¹⁸. Additionally, all German armed force missions abroad are planned and conducted by Joint Operations Command. This command is also available as a functional headquarters for those Petersberg tasks authorized by the EU/WEU.

The outcome of this new command arrangement is that in future multilateral missions, the services will essentially play the role of a force provider, which means that they will contribute to the Joint Operations Command with tailored force contingents, trained for specific tasks. The establishment of a unified command authority and structure avoids interservice rivalry, which would interfere and delay the effectiveness of multinational crisis management missions. Furthermore, the Joint Operations Command allows a concentrated and more efficient implementation of logistical and operational functions. Combining common tasks in the areas of command and control as well as in logistics and support roles reduces redundancies in the new Bundeswehr, which existed in the old structure.

The principle of streamlining command responsibilities is also reflected by the conjunction of logistic support functions in the Joint Support Service with its own Chief of Staff and the integration of all medical personnel into a Central Medical Service, headed by a Surgeon

General¹⁹. Both of these elements are under a single administrative and technical control, which guarantees an effective management over low density/ high demand logistical and medical functions in order to support those task forces, which are globally deployed. Scant logistic resources and limited medical specialists require centralized allocation of all available capacities. In terms of logistic responsibilities, assets are and will be transferred from the single service (Army, Air Force, Navy) to the Joint Support Service and only logistic functions in the mission area and single manager responsibilities for specific weapons systems will remain in the single service. The cause behind this reason is that a joint employment of the Bundeswehr, including at least two services, is the most likely type of crisis management mission. Separate logistic and medical supply would be overlapping and cumbersome under these circumstances.

The establishment of a Strategic Intelligence Command within the Joint Support Service is an important measure to combine limited intelligence resources for joint operations and to avoid parallel and separate structures within the services. The Strategic Intelligence Command will play a key role in providing the national leaders and joint forces commanders with essential data of an actual or potential threat. It will set the stage for a qualified risk analysis and conflict assessment for crisis management tasks. Overall, the concentration of support and supply function in the Joint Support and Medical Service, enables the Army, Air Force and Navy to become more focused on combat roles. According to the current Bundeswehr planning the organization and core functions of the “traditional” services are designed as follows:

Army (Heer)

The highest level of the Army’s command organization, below the Chief of Staff, is composed of the Army Forces Command and the Army Office. Because of its relevance for operational missions in terms of crisis management, a brief look at these command structures and

their subordinates is necessary. The Army with its total of 134.00 soldiers contributes to six multinational corps. Its operational component consists of five mechanized divisions, one special operations division, one airmobile division and the Army Support Forces Command²⁰. The functional areas are command and control, intelligence and reconnaissances, combat, combat support and combat service support. These areas include armored, infantry, mountain infantry, airborne, NBC-defense, logistic and aviation capabilities at the brigade- level. The division headquarters are able to handle the tasks of a tactical/operational planning staff, including any integration into a multinational task force.

The part of light operational forces recently increased considerably. The capability to oppose an enemy with heavy platforms and weapons systems as well as to delay his maneuverability is to be reduced while the capability to engage an adversary with high precision long-range weapons systems is to be increased.²¹ Low intensity conflict operations are the most likely type of operation for future crisis management missions. However, the retention of five mechanized divisions (approximately 800 tanks) still provides the capability to employ decisive firepower on the ground. The Army must be able to provide sustainable forces consisting of one division for a large-scale operation or of two brigades contributing to two multinational contingents (medium-scale operations). Parallel to these kinds of mission, it must be capable to participate in small-scale operations with group/battalion- sized units²².

Air Force (Luftwaffe)

Like the Army command structure, the Air Force's head organization also consists of the Air Force Command and the Air Force Office. The Air Force Operational Command is directly subordinated to the Air Force Command and is capable, after personnel augmentation, to plan and to conduct air force operations on the operational/tactical level²³. There are four divisions

that command a total of one reconnaissance wing, four fighter-bomber wings, three fighter wings and four ground based air defense wings. Air Transport Command is equipped with three air transport wings enables and coordinates all in-theater air mobility tasks. In order to back the Joint Support Service, two support and maintenance regiments and a center for logistics are established by the new force structure. All functions and tasks are adjusted to facilitate the achievement of air space control to conduct operations deep into space and to protect own forces against attacks from the air. Ground based air defense will focus on ballistic missile defense²⁴.

The Air Force's capabilities are designed to serve operational/tactical objectives. There is no intention for global attack or nuclear capabilities on a strategic level. In order to effectively support crisis management missions, precision engagement capabilities as well as all weather capabilities were identified to be indispensable for the new role. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) plus Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capabilities are deemed as an essential prerequisite for effective offensive air operations. The overall objective of the newly designed Air Force is to contribute to two force contingents for multinational combined air operations.²⁵ Its peacetime strength will be 51,000 personnel.

Navy (Marine)

The new command organization of the Navy consists of the Fleet Command and the Naval Office. The Fleet Command exercises command and control over five flotillas. The Navy retains one Naval Air Flotilla, a Mine Warfare Flotilla, a Frigate Flotilla, a Fast Patrol Boat/Corvette Flotilla and a Submarine Flotilla. Its mission is to gain and maintain the freedom of operation in designated sea areas. This includes the tasks of surveillance, protection of sea/ coastal areas and ports as well as control of strategic naval positions and control of embargos.²⁶ The capabilities of precision engagement, far reaching weapons systems and the interoperability within

multinational naval task forces are established priorities. Additionally, shortfalls in air defense and C4 structure have been identified and are planned to be resolved. On the other hand mine laying and sea warfare in littoral waters, typical Cold War capabilities of the German Navy, are less important. Personnel and equipment allocated to these tasks will be reduced. The new Navy must be capable of providing two operational contingents for a multinational combined sea force.²⁷ The peacetime strength of the Navy will be 20,000 soldiers.

Modernizing the equipment of the Bundeswehr

One main aspect of the Bundeswehr reform is the modernization of its equipment, including weapons systems and command and control facilities. The procurement and equipment concept (*Material und Ausrüstungskonzept*), published by the Chief of Staff in 2001, listed over 200 different programs to be modernized or expanded. The implementation period is planned from 2001 to 2013 and it is based on the Defense Capabilities Initiative concept (see Chapter 1, p.4), and its identified capability shortfalls. To meet the new capability profile and to make the Bundeswehr a reliable partner, the following areas have been identified as being subject to German procurement efforts.

In order to realize the top priority of strategic mobility and deployability the German government has decided to develop and procure the Airbus A 400M as the future transport aircraft²⁸. This plane is designed for tactical airlift, humanitarian relief missions, medical evacuation, special operations and air refueling. The range of the A 400M is 4100 kilometers with cargo. Germany intends to order 60 planes²⁹.

To improve the engagement efficiency of aircraft platforms, several measures are planned or already put into practice. The procurement of 180 Eurofighters enhances the offensive and defensive air defense capability of the German Air Force significantly³⁰. The successor of the out-of-date Phantom (F-4) enables the Bundeswehr to contribute key and “state of the art” weapons systems to multinational operations. Equipped with high tech radar guided and infrared missiles as well as laser guided ammunitions, the Eurofighter provides the Air Force with a credible capability to play an essential role in an international task force.

Additional steps to modernize equipment and to catch up with the technology standard set by US forces are taken to improve weapons system capabilities. Those measures include an enhanced extended air defense capability (improved PATRIOT missiles), the procurement of new fighter helicopters (Tiger), stealth technology, the development of various types of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), HARM upgrades and precise stand- off weapons³¹. The focus on light and deployable armored infantry vehicles reflects the intent to increase the survivability of rapid deployed first on the scene. Survivability is also improved through several programs including NBC protection, Combat Search and Rescue, counter electronic warfare and anti- submarine warfare.

In the aggregate, the concept of procurement and equipment is a reliable effort to transform the Bundeswehr from a force that was too heavy to be deployed over long distances, to a streamlined force that is capable to meet the hi-tech standards and requirements set by the DCI. The retention of heavy armored mechanized divisions still provides an indispensable flexibility for certain conflicts, which require decisive and overwhelming firepower on the ground. However, it remains to be seen on what scale the drop in defense matters reflected by the decline of the German defense budget impacts the budget devoted to procurement. Without the financial

support needed, the Bundeswehr's new capability profile is jeopardized or at least delayed for several years.

The bottom line of the reform

With its new structure, the Bundeswehr is oriented toward operations under the extended mission spectrum based on the Petersberg tasks. The current trend to invest in strategic transport capabilities, strategic reconnaissance, precision guided ammunition, and information technology is appropriate to transform the Bundeswehr into a modern force. By combining cross-sectional functions related to command and control, training and support within the Central Medical Service and Joint Support Service and by handling those functions largely in a joint manner, redundancies will be reduced and the services (Army, Air Force, Navy) can increase the focus on their inherent operational missions. However, the retention of the conscript system is inconsistent and does not fit into the concept of a highly skilled and professional intervention force mainly designed for crisis management missions. The current government seems to want to avoid the choice that must be made between a flexible all-mission professional force and a conscript force that was designed for territorial defense.

As mentioned above (Chapter 4, pp. 12 – 13), the main problem jeopardizing the concept of the reform is the defense budget, which is inadequate to finance the reorganization and which is stalling the reform efforts. Germany cannot afford to reduce the defense budget below 1.5 percent of GDP and reorganize at the same time. Some of the severe resource constraints can be solved by resource pooling among the European members as already realized in some projects

(Eurolift). But it is clear that the modernization of the Bundeswehr and therefore the German contribution to European military capabilities is put at risk by a drastic under-funding.

Notes

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¹³ Burns, Nicholas R. (US Ambassador to NATO). *Launching NATO'S Transformation at Prague*. Speech during the Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, October 30, 2002. Available from the US Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls7rm/2002/14907pf.htm>

¹⁴ Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). *The Bundeswehr 2002: The current Situation and Perspectives*. Berlin, April 2002, p. 34

¹⁵ Ibid., p.37

¹⁶ Ibid., p.37

¹⁷ Ibid., p.47

¹⁸ Ibid., p.46

¹⁹ Ibid., p.49, 50

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²⁰ Ibid., p.47

²¹ Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr. *Material- und Ausrüstungskonzept für die Streitkräfte der Zukunft (MatKonz)*. FueS VI 2-AZ-09-50-00/VS NfD. Berlin, 16.03.2001, p.15

²² Ibid., p.26

²³ Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). *The Bundeswehr 2002: The current Situation and Perspectives*. Berlin, April 2002, p. 48

²⁴ Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr. *Material- und Ausrüstungskonzept für die Streitkräfte der Zukunft (MatKonz)*. FüS VI 2-AZ-09-50-00/VS NfD. Berlin, 16.03.2001, p.15

²⁵ Ibid., p.26

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³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

Chapter 3

Integrating new capabilities into European and NATO commitments

WE cannot succeed in NATO without Europe doing more.

—R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to NATO

The integration of the Bundeswehr into a European and NATO framework, embedded in a multinational force structure, means that the Bundeswehr does not have to be autarkic and entirely focused on national defense¹. In addition, the incorporation of the Bundeswehr into multinational alliances requires a force set up, which can be integrated within Europe as well as being interoperable with NATO. This means that the development of European military capabilities can only proceed in close coordination and conjunction with the new NATO capabilities initiative.² Based upon the readiness force of 150,000 troops, the reorganized Bundeswehr is designed to provide the EU and NATO with forces involving up to 65,000 soldiers for sustaining a major operation up to one year, or to support two medium-sized operations with 10,000 soldiers simultaneously for a number of years³.

The spectrum of tasks to be undertaken by the Bundeswehr both for NATO and the EU ranges from partnership activities to humanitarian relief and from peacekeeping/ enforcement operation to national and Alliance defense. To avoid duplication of capabilities and parallel structures, Germany's operational force is assigned to NATO and a major component of it is part of the European Rapid Reaction Force, which was derived from the "European Headline Goal".

Contributions to the “European Headline Goal”

The “European Headline Goal”, established at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, reflects the intent to increase the European capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces in order to respond to international crisis without depending on US support. The operational spectrum was determined by the “Petersberg tasks” of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks including combat forces. Germany contributes 32,000 troops (18,000 at any one time) to a total EU Rapid Reaction Force of 50- 60,000 soldiers⁴. The German contribution includes armored, air assault, and light infantry brigade headquarters and seven combat battalions. The Air Force provides core elements of air component headquarters, six combat squadrons with 93 aircraft, eight surface-to-air missile squadrons, and air transport. The Navy makes available maritime headquarters, 13 combat ships and support elements. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr is manning a permanent military operations headquarters at Potsdam, which can be transformed into the core element of a multinational operational headquarters.⁵ As mentioned before, the Headline Goal forces are additionally tasked to existing NATO assignments. The maximum size of a German initial contingent is set at 18,000 personnel.⁶ The German/ French Eurocorps forms the core of this European crisis reaction force. The provision of headquarters for multinational military operations, underpins Germany’s motivation to take on the role of a lead nation in crisis management missions. The improvement of command and control capabilities and realization of a combined interoperability is therefore a major concern and top priority of the Bundeswehr reform. The integration of national military contingents into a European framework and the capability to lead a multinational task force is the desired end state of the German contribution.

The “Prague Capabilities Commitment”

At the Prague summit on 21 November 2002, NATO decided upon a US proposal to create a NATO Response Force (NRF). This is to be a unit comprised of 21,000 soldiers and deployable from October 2006. One priority that was announced was the establishment of an efficient airlift capability to deploy the NRF over long distances at very short notice. Germany chairs a working group, which aims to mitigate the shortage of air cargo planes and is the first step of a “Statement of Intent Strategic Airlift”, which was signed by Germany and ten other NATO members at the Prague summit⁷. The objective is to bridge the gap in airlift capabilities until delivery of the Airbus A400M aircraft. As an interim solution, Germany is committed to lease C-17 transport aircraft for a European airlift pool⁸. Furthermore, Germany has committed to improve maritime counter-mine capabilities. The German contribution encompasses Army, Air Force and Navy forces. The composition of NRF force packages and deployment decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis and will always be conditional on approval by the German parliament. The Bundeswehr contingents allocated to the NRF are also assigned to the “Headline Goal” commitment, so that both, NATO and the EU are mutually reinforced. This “single set of forces”- concept⁹ is a central characteristic of all German NATO and Headline Goal contributions. Final decisions concerning details of the force structure and specific military contributions of each country are to be taken by NATO Defense Ministers in June 2003.

German contributions to current international operations

While still engaged in transformation, the Bundeswehr is widely involved across the spectrum of international missions. The German armed forces are already providing about 10,000 soldiers in multinational missions worldwide¹⁰.

Approximately 7,000 soldiers are deployed in the Balkans¹¹ in a peace- settlement mission where they are protecting and supporting local and international organizations. The Bundeswehr's tasks also include securing and stabilizing living conditions for local inhabitants. The Balkans missions are in harmony with the Petersberg concept of peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction operations. Moreover, these missions fit the logic of Germany's policymakers. In particular the SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia Herzegovina aims at creating the conditions for the peaceful reconstruction of the country. The mission in Kosovo differs slightly from the SFOR mission. Although both are post conflict operations, the military presence in Kosovo is required for the protection of ethnic minorities and for the free return of all refugees to their homes. The main reason behind the extensive German contribution to the Balkans missions is the deep concern about the revival of nationalism in South East Europe, which the German government considers as a serious risk for the European stability and security.

The experience of the Kosovo conflict proved the Bundeswehr's lack of high technology military goods. The USA provided most of the combat aircraft and precision-guided ammunition. The inability of German interdiction strike Tornado aircraft to bomb with pinpoint accuracy was the main reason for not being earmarked to contribute to the air operations against Serbia.

On November 16, 2001, the German parliament approved a government plan to make up to 3,900 soldiers available for operation Enduring Freedom.¹² The German contribution includes several assets. An Airbus A 310 is kept available on 12 hours notice for medical evacuation of wounded or sick military personnel. Transport flights in support of US troops in Afghanistan were terminated in January 2002. Flights for German troops of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are ongoing. Germany is also providing NBC defense units (50 soldiers deployed / 190 in stand-by with 72 hours notice) as part of a multinational force in Kuwait. The

German Navy provides three frigates, five fast patrol boats and several support ships with an overall personal strength of about 1,300 soldiers, stationed around the Horn of Africa¹³.

At the beginning of 2003 Germany and the Netherlands assumed the lead nation function for the ISAF. The size of the German contingent was gradually increased to 2,500 soldiers¹⁴. The mission mandate is limited to Kabul and the surrounding area. The German contingent includes professionals, enlisted, and drafted soldiers as well as reservists and civilians with specialized skills. The Army bears the brunt of the ISAF operation by providing infantry, helicopter and support units. The mission of the deployed contingent is to safeguard the rebuilding process of government institutions, as well as strengthening the economic and political stabilization process. The Bundeswehr's engagement in Afghanistan reflects the "Defense in the Hindu Kush"- idea of the Minister of Defense, Peter Struck.¹⁵ Triggered by the events on September 11, he no longer deems only national states as prime cause for German security concerns but also non-state actors and asymmetric threats like international terrorism that impose an uninsurable risk to national integrity. Hence, the commitment in Afghanistan is not only a post-conflict mission to help the Afghan people restructure their country. According to Struck it is in Germany's security interests to stabilize the political conditions in Afghanistan in order to "deprive international terrorism, which poses an immediate threat to us all, of its most important retreat and training area in the long term."¹⁶ By taking over the strategic command of ISAF along with the Dutch contingent, Germany is accepting yet another new security role beyond its borders.

Conclusion

The German involvement in the above operations highlights that the completion of the transformation is more urgent than ever. The identified shortfalls of the old Bundeswehr, which

include lacking readiness, deployability, modernized equipment and streamlined command structures have proved their relevance in all missions. In particular Operation Enduring Freedom revealed the need of strategic reconnaissance and surveillance and verified that the SAR Lupe satellite procurement was an appropriate choice. The Afghanistan deployment exposed the severe lack of airlift capability, hindering swift response and calls for an interim solution prior to the introduction of the European collaborative airlift program, the A 400M. Operation Enduring Freedom called for precision engagement capabilities that are now addressed by the reform.

All in all, the current operations provide a useful tool for evaluating what will really be necessary to counter future conflicts. They all prove that transformation is on the right track by addressing appropriate capabilities and by increasing the numbers of available Readiness Forces up to 150,000 troops.

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Chapter 4

Conclusions

Germany's security policy has come a long way since the end of the Cold war and has gradually adapted to new security policy realities. The federal government has accepted its new international responsibility and recognized that the Bundeswehr must be modified in line with an altered geo-strategic environment. The modernization of the Bundeswehr is guided by a reasonable concept and increasing the ability of German armed forces to participate in international crisis management missions. However, the decline of the defense budget and the reluctance of the current Red-Green coalition to prioritize defense matters jeopardizes the financial support needed to pursue the necessary reforms. It is obvious that the Red-Green government will not increase resources for defense in the near or medium term. But the stakes are high and the Bundeswehr could soon cease to count as a serious partner for the US and NATO, because defense funding is not only a German domestic issue but one with far reaching implications for the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship and Germany's role in Europe. As the most powerful member of the EU, economically speaking, a military weak and insignificant Germany may jeopardize the emerging ESDI and European credibility within NATO.

Minister of Defense, Struck realized that the reorganization is underfinanced and determined to reduce intended acquisitions and to streamline the current force structure more effectively than his predecessor has planned. The Chief of Staff, General Schneiderhan, was

commissioned to re-examine military spending projects. The result is that forces will retain 282,400 soldiers and money will be saved mainly on reducing procurements and restructuring units. This new endeavor aims to reduce the day-to-day operating costs of the Bundeswehr to 70% of the defense budget. Currently operating costs amount to 75% of the defense budget. The proportion of expenditures for procurement, research and development is to be raised to somewhere near 30%. The measures include the reduction of the Army Tiger attack helicopter from 212 to 80. The Navy will retire about 12 fast boats and will relinquish its Tornado fighter aircraft to the Air Force by the end of 2005. The Air Force will gain reduced numbers of the new generation radar guided and infrared missiles and will phase out the dated Hawk air defense system and UH-1D helicopters earlier than planned.

The idea is to cut down on numbers without reducing effectiveness or hindering efforts to modernize the Bundeswehr. Defense Minister Struck hopes that the intended cuts will define a framework for the long term. He tries to avoid being confronted like his predecessor with the reproach of muddling through the reform and hoping that time will bring a reduction of the financial problems produced by an inappropriate budget.

Structural changes in the future will mainly focus on the Army. Currently, there are still five mechanized divisions, but these may no longer be relevant and may have to be restructured. The reduction of heavy armed troops and more emphasis on transport, logistics, intelligence and command and control is indispensable to deal with the current tendency towards numerous smaller operations taking place at the same time.

Additionally, there are initiatives to ease the pressure from a declining defense budget by coordinating defense and armament planning, developing major projects jointly and sharing

common assets among the Europeans. Nonetheless, those measures are still in their infancies and are no surrogate to compensate for inadequate national defense funding.

Overall, the Red-Green coalition is unlikely to give priority to defense. Defense Minister Struck is in a quandary: the Finance Minister determines his budget instead of being established on geo-strategic obligations. To that effect, Struck must reduce the operating costs and raise the proportion of expenditure that goes on investment. One step in this direction may be the abolition of conscription. Some leading members of the Green party are already in favor of this idea. Tough decisions now are definitely preferable than continuing to muddle through. Under the given circumstances, Struck's concept of cutting down numbers without reducing effectiveness is on the right track but no long-term solution.

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