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14. ABSTRACT Current military doctrine is insufficient to address complex networks which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual non-state actors. Although the military has the capability to find, fix, and track many of these threats, the DOD lacks the legal authorities to target and engage many of them. Establishing a global strategic targeting organization within the DOD to better address transnational threats is a critical requirement. A history of how and why the current doctrine and structure has evolved is vital to understanding the deficiencies of the military's current organization. It is important to recognize that future targeting organizations be created with the necessary authorities to carry out future missions across the globe, unrestricted by geographic boundaries. By implementing a global strategic targeting system, based on Joint Targeting doctrine, the DOD will better synchronize targeting between the unified commands and streamline the decision loop.					
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Defeating Global Networks: The need for a Strategic Targeting Organization

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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06 November 2007

Abstract

Current military doctrine is insufficient to address complex networks which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual non-state actors. Although the military has the capability to find, fix, and track many of these threats, the DOD lacks the legal authorities to target and engage many of them. Establishing a global strategic targeting organization within the DOD to better address transnational threats is a critical requirement. A history of how and why the current doctrine and structure has evolved is vital to understanding the deficiencies of the military's current organization. It is important to recognize that future targeting organizations be created with the necessary authorities to carry out future missions across the globe, unrestricted by geographic boundaries. By implementing a global strategic targeting system, based on Joint Targeting doctrine, the DOD will better synchronize targeting between the unified commands and streamline the decision loop.

INTRODUCTION

Adversaries threaten the United States throughout a complex battlespace...spanning the global commons...Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities: such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004

The United States National Military Strategy clearly articulates the diverse global threats that face the United States, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented a process to deal with these adversaries effectively. Current threats involving transnational and non-state actors operate across the Areas of Responsibility (AOR) of multiple combatant commands. In order to deal with these threats, there must be a single DOD entity empowered to globally integrate and prioritize targeting.

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) are assigned a wide range of missions such as conducting Global Strike, waging the Global War on Terrorism, supporting counter-narcotic operations, and countering weapons proliferation. In some of these mission areas, the combatant commander's geographic boundaries are insufficient to clearly delineate where one combatant commander's responsibilities end and another combatant commander's begins. Therefore, it is imperative that the DOD adapts in order to cover the seams created where global networks are formed to threaten United States interests. Current doctrine is insufficient to address these complex networks which link adversary states, terrorists, narcotics dealers, international criminal organizations, financiers, weapons proliferators, and individual non-state actors.

Although the military has the capability to find, fix, and track many of these threats, the DOD lacks the legal authorities to target and engage many of them. Often the threats exist in sovereign nations outside of designated combat zones and are criminal vice military in nature. An interagency process must be an integral part of resolving this targeting issue, but the DOD needs to first establish a body to function as the global targeting synchronizer within the DOD.

Establishing a global strategic targeting organization within the DOD to better address transnational threats is a critical requirement. A history of how and why the current doctrine and structure has evolved is vital to understanding the deficiencies of the military's current organization. It is important to recognize that future targeting organizations be created with the necessary authorities to carry out future missions across the globe, unrestricted by geographic boundaries. By implementing a global strategic targeting system, based on Joint Targeting doctrine, the DOD will better synchronize targeting between the unified commands and streamline the decision loop.

BACKGROUND

Joint Targeting doctrine was created for operational-level commands and their subordinate components to plan, coordinate, and execute targeting successfully.¹ Regardless of the level for which the doctrine was written, targeting fundamentals are applicable at all levels of command from an infantry squad up to the National Security Council. Additionally, it is crucial to disassociate the idea of targeting from its air-centric roots founded in second and third generational warfare. Targeting at the global-strategic level must be viewed from a

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 13 April 2007, i.

fourth generational warfare perspective where objectives are rarely achieved by putting bombs on target.²

To begin; what constitutes a target? Joint doctrine provides the following definitions:

A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or action. It may be an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, individual, group, system, entity, or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent...Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities."³

Moreover, targeting helps a commander synchronize operations and supports the process of assigning targets to a subordinate commander for engagement or action.

Targeting is a commander's responsibility. CCDRs and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) normally assign targeting responsibilities to a Joint Targeting and Coordination Board (JTCB). The JTCB's primary participants are operations, plans, and intelligence personnel from the JFC's staff, representatives from all components and functional commands, supporting commands, and supporting agencies. The JFC normally appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair the JTCB. The JTCB integrates and synchronizes target planning, execution, and assessment. It validates all target nominations and provides the commander a Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) for approval.⁴

The JTCB also maintains the Joint Target List, which is a consolidated list of all targets upon which no restrictions are placed; the No-Strike List, targets for which no targeting authorities exist and are protected under international law and/or rules of engagement; and the Restricted Target List, targets upon which certain targeting restrictions

² William S. Lind, et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, 22-26. Fourth generational warfare encompasses dispersed entities that blur the line between war and peace, boundaries are often undefined, and effectiveness is dependant on interagency unity of effort as lines between responsibility and mission cross.

³ JP 3-60, vii & I-1.

⁴ Ibid., x.

apply. By coordinating these functions and maintaining these lists, the JTCB assures proper de-confliction, prioritizes allocation of resources, identifies shortfalls, and applies appropriate restraints into the targeting system. This provides centralized command and facilitates decentralized execution while preventing duplicative efforts.⁵

Targets should be developed from the lowest levels of the chain of command based on their assigned objectives. Subordinate commanders must be able to nominate targets in their area of responsibility (AOR) which they do not have the resources or authority to prosecute. To prevent fratricide and unintended consequences, one final tenet is required; in order to engage targets in another command's AOR, actions must be coordinated through the command that owns the area.⁶

In one way or another, albeit less formally, joint targeting has taken place in every war the United States has fought. It was first addressed at the DOD level during the 1950s to synchronize all the services' strategic nuclear capabilities into one integrated operational plan. From 1954 until the Secretary of Defense establishment of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) in 1960, attempts to resolve targeting conflicts and achieve mutual support or unity of strategic effort between the service Chiefs and operational commanders were unsuccessful. The Secretary of Defense at the time considered forming the JSTPS as the most important decision of his tenure.⁷

According to Strategic Air Command history, "In 1954, the JCS asked each appropriate commander to submit...a target list to his war plan and to coordinate it with

⁵ Ibid., II-8 to II-9.

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, 13 November 2006, viii.

⁷ U.S. Strategic Air Command, "History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62," (Offutt AFB, NE: History and Research Division Headquarters Strategic Air Command, declassified 1980), 1, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/16.pdf (accessed August 27 2007).

theater commanders and CINCSAC.”⁸ This was not effective, and led to annual World Wide Coordination Conferences which also failed to solve targeting conflicts. These conferences in 1957 and 1958 revealed that duplication and triplication had not been significantly reduced. Although the Joint Chiefs could not agree on a policy, there was consensus that a targeting policy and a national target list were needed⁹

Ultimately, and in keeping with current doctrine, the Secretary of Defense decided to create a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (a strategic JTCB) to solve this issue. He then designated the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command (a component commander) as the director. The biggest debate between the services appears to have centered on where the staff should reside; not wanting to cede control to a single commander, the Marines and Navy favored leaving responsibility with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).¹⁰

The services pursued their own targeting and fire support coordination initiatives until 1986 when Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This act imposed Joint Operations on the armed forces and empowered the combatant commanders. Ironically, the first authoritative joint targeting publication was not released until after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11).¹¹ Fortunately, the *Joint Targeting* publication was grounded in experience from real world operations and not merely theory. Operations in the first Gulf War and the Balkans served as the test bed for joint targeting and provided solutions to the contentious issues between the Services.

⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁹ Ibid., 4 & 10.

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ Thomas J. Murphy and Bernd L. Ingram, “Joint Targeting Doctrine,” *Field Artillery* (September-October 2001): 36-38. *JP 3-60 Joint Targeting* was first released in January of 2002. However, in July of 1997, the Air Land Sea Application Center released *FM 90-36 The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets* which served as the foundation for *JP 3-60*.

The first Gulf War provided several targeting lessons, both good and bad. First, it demonstrated that modern communications offered a means to centralize targeting despite the separation of forces. “Reach back,” the ability for a deployed unit to leverage network technology to access all-source intelligence supplied by non-deployed units, obviates the need to centralize collection and analysis sources.¹² Technology and experiences since 9/11 have significantly improved upon this capability.

Second, execution of the Gulf War air campaign raised animosity between the Services when the Joint Force Commander delegated responsibility for targeting to a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) who disregarded targets submitted by the other component commanders. In this instance, the JFC delegated responsibility of a command function to a component commander who proved to be less than impartial. Ultimately, the Army and Marine component commanders argued that the JFACC was not shifting priority to Iraqi forces in Kuwait as the ground war approached. This friction between component commanders forced the JFC to appoint his deputy as the JTCB lead.¹³

Third, the Gulf War showed the necessity to properly translate objectives and commander’s guidance into a complimentary targeting strategy that accounted for second and third order effects. Despite guidance from the President to minimize casualties among Iraqi noncombatants and prevent excessive damage in order to accelerate postwar recovery, the JFACC targeted oil refineries and electrical power systems at the expense of this

¹² Edward B. Schmidt, “Targeting Organizations: Centralized or Decentralized?” (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, 1993), 54-55.

¹³ Eliot A Cohen, et al., *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, Summary, (Washington D.C. GPO: 1993), 154-155.

guidance. Although very effective militarily, it disrupted water purification and sewage treatment plants causing major health problems for the civilian population.¹⁴

Lastly, difficulty attaining all source intelligence during the Gulf War demonstrated a need for access to coordinated interagency target intelligence. As a result, the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (JS-J2) established a National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to support the combatant commander's Intelligence Directorate (J2) attain national-level targeting intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. The NMJIC proved effective at providing all-source targeting intelligence and was able to leverage modern communications to rapidly share it with the JFACC. Although valuable, this initiative also caused friction and disrupted operations when the NMJIC and JFACC bypassed the combatant commander's J2.¹⁵

Based on lessons learned from the first Gulf War, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, and the Somalia crisis, the JS-J2 formed a permanent targeting intelligence support section in August 1993. Its responsibilities expanded further after a 1994 Defense Intelligence Agency study which also resulted in aligning the Joint Warfare Analysis Center and Joint Electronic Warfare Center to better support national-level targeting. In addition to coordinating targeting and combat assessment for CCDRs, the target intelligence support section also supported Theater Missile Defense (TMD) targeting of mobile missile systems, special programs for the Joint Staff (JS) Operations Directorate (J3), and Special Technical Operations (STO).¹⁶

¹⁴ Matt McKeon, "Joint Targeting: What's Still Broke?" (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University, 1999), 29.

¹⁵ Mark C. Christian and James E. Dillard, "Why we Need a National Joint Targeting Center," *Air & Space Power Journal – Chronicles Online Journal*, 6 January 2000, 3, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Dillard.html> (accessed August 27 2007).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

From an intelligence perspective, these adjustments made a significant impact in subsequent crises in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea.¹⁷ But, as identified in *Air & Space Power Journal* prior to 9/11, the “establishment of JS-J2 Directorate of Targets and the intelligence community’s realignment...are only a “band-aid fix” to a deeper problem—a void in the operations-intelligence interface.”¹⁸ The authors proposed building upon the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff model discussed earlier to develop a national-level joint targeting organization.

The principle of centralized command and de-centralized execution is essential to accelerate the decision cycle especially when conducting dynamic targeting.¹⁹ Since the first Gulf war, technological advances have vastly shortened the “kill chain,” the time between identifying a target and then engaging it. Subsequent conflicts, namely Operations ALLIED FORCE in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, demonstrate that leaders with access to real-time targeting information take more time to decide; it was the only step in the “kill chain” to expand. Strategic and Operational leaders have not sufficiently delegated authority down to their subordinates, resulting in slower execution and decreased efficiency. For example, during Operation ALLIED FORCE President Clinton and NATO’s strategic political and military leaders controlled the aerial bombing campaign. This interference hamstrung the Air Component Commander’s targeting

¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹ Ibid., I-7& II-14. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Dynamic targeting steps consist of Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Access. It is commonly referred to as the “kill chain.”

efforts; creating frustration at the operational-tactical level, and lengthening the decision loop.²⁰

DISCUSSION

Since 9/11, DOD has attempted to synchronize global operations by designating a combatant commander as the global synchronizer for certain mission sets. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the global synchronizer for operations against terrorist networks and US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the DOD synchronizer for combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.²¹ At first glance, assigning these tasks to a capable combatant commander appears logical. Both SOCOM and STRATCOM have the expertise and capability to provide global command and control of forces conducting those missions.

However, a problem arises when one takes into account the regional CCDRs. The regional CCDRs have authority and responsibility for all operations within their respective AOR. Those responsibilities are clearly defined in the Unified Command Plan. Similar to the situation normally encountered by a JFACC, neither SOCOM nor STRATCOM own the battlespace where their target is intended to be engaged. Adding to the problem, the term “synchronizer” is not a clearly defined or recognized command relationship.²² Ultimately, the idea of placing a functional CDR as a “global synchronizer” leads to friction and defeats the intent. It certainly is not as clear as operational control (OPCON) or supported/supporting command relationships.

²⁰ Richard M. Gomez, “Centralized Command – Decentralized Execution: Implications of Operating in a Network Centric Warfare Environment” (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College 2004), 11-12.

²¹ Mission statements from the combatant commanders’ websites http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command_Mission-060214.pdf and <http://www.stratcom.mil/about.html> (accessed 13 October 2007).

²² See JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, for recognized command relationships.

Putting aside the above complications, even if the global synchronizer relationship worked perfectly there would still be gaps created by overlap in CCDR responsibilities. Clearly, denying terrorists Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is of primary concern; the possibility of Saddam Hussein's supplying WMD to terrorists was one of the justifications for the war in Iraq.²³ Under this premise both SOCOM and STRATCOM have shared interests and have probably identified some of the same targets.

Who is responsible for synchronizing and prioritizing their two separate target lists? This is not clear. Each command has a JTCB of some form, but there is not a higher level command JTCB to synchronize both target lists and set priorities for intelligence collection. This problem is compounded when the regional CCDR's missions are added into the mix.

STRATCOM could divert targeting resources away from a supported CCDR to conduct their own missions, even if STRATCOM is attempting to act impartially. Due to the missions and forces assigned to them, STRATCOM is the de facto prioritization authority for numerous national targeting resources. In addition to its role as DOD synchronizer for combating WMD, it also controls national-level resources for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; network warfare; and information operations. STRATCOM's implied authority for apportioning these assets could upset a regional CCDR. This friction would mirror how Army and Marine commanders felt about the JFACC during the first Gulf war. Arguably, the DOD did not intend to put STRATCOM in this position of authority.

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, "Paul Wolfowitz interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair," <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594> (accessed 13 October 2007). In the interview he stated, "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two."

Another major area of concern is cross-boundary operations. In a 2000 *Joint Forces Quarterly* article, Richard Lechowich from U.S. Central Command's Directorate of Plans and Policy captured the challenges combatant commanders are presented with:

Drugs originating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility could be detected by SPACECOM, survive crop eradication, and be tracked across the AOR in transit to EUCOM for transshipment. EUCOM would then monitor the movement while alerting friendly law enforcement agencies. Finally, either SOUTHCOM or U.S. Joint Forces Command could help domestic law enforcement agencies interdict the shipment and arrest the perpetrators...Crossing the invisible boundaries that separate CINC responsibilities is perhaps even more difficult today than when Clausewitz first formalized the concept of friction. Such battlefield seams as cross-boundary situations are a weak point for enemy exploitation. Commanders on all levels will still have to spend additional effort to ensure that these seams are covered.²⁴

Cross-boundary and interagency operations in a post-9/11 world are just as complicated. Afghanistan provides an excellent example. Afghanistan falls in CENTCOM's AOR, but NATO forces conducting stability and reconstruction operations in support of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan are under the OPCON of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who also happens to be double-hatted as Commander U.S. European Command. NATO forces are not OPCON to CENTCOM, but they do operate in its AOR.

However, CENTCOM does have OPCON of forces supporting the United Kingdom led counter-narcotic operations in Afghanistan, not SACEUR. Recently, the *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007* reported that the Taliban is funding operations with opium and that a major responsibility lies with the opiate consuming countries, namely the European Union

²⁴ Richard A. Lechowich, "Cross Boundaries: Commanders in Chiefs and Areas of Interest," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Spring 2000); 37-38. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0924.pdf (accessed 13 October 2007).

(EU) and China.²⁵ CENTCOM has a keen interest in targeting narcotics networks operating in both China and the EU, but both countries are outside of its AOR. The supported commander for targeting these Taliban narcotics networks is not clear. It is not in SOCOM's purview because the USG has not declared the Taliban as a terrorist organization and CENTCOM is neither designated as the global synchronizer for counter-narcotics nor does it have authority to capture Taliban outside the designated combat zone.

The issues highlighted here provide some of the many reasons why a DOD level entity is needed to globally integrate and prioritize targeting. The experience gained developing the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) back in the 1950s and lessons learned fighting wars since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted should be combined to better conduct targeting in the post-9/11 world. The nature of the adversaries facing this nation requires the DOD to face reality and make adjustments.

Regardless of the name of this new organization, it should combine the intelligence and operations targeting functions performed by a JTCB. For simplicity this organization will be referred to as the Strategic-JTCB or S-JTCB for short. In addition to traditional kinetic targeting, the S-JTCB needs to leverage all instruments of national power to include information operations, network warfare, strategic communications, law enforcement, financial warfare, and Special Access Programs. Because transnational threats blur the line between combatant and criminal, close coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate is necessary to ensure legal boundaries are not violated and proper authorities exist. If legal authorities exist in other USG agencies, the S-JTCB should have unfettered access to those

²⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, Executive Summary," v-vii. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf (accessed 25 October 2007)

agencies. If no authorities exist, this organization should have access to appropriate principles that may grant them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Three possible arrangements stand out as possible solutions to the problem. First, because of its experience dealing with strategic targeting, current assigned missions, and resources at its disposal, the Secretary of Defense could designate STRATCOM to host and chair the S-JTCB. This would most closely mirror the JSTPS endorsed back in the 1950s and still align with doctrine. STRATCOM's geographic location makes it difficult to create and maintain day to day contacts with decision makers from other USG agencies. As expressed earlier and in keeping with the dissenting opinions of the Navy and the Marines back in the 1950s, delegating this responsibility to peer-CCDR could lead to friction between combatant commands.

Second, the most obvious possibility would be to place the S-JTCB within the Joint Staff. This would elevate the S-JTCB above the CCDRs which would silence any arguments of impartiality. As intelligence targeting functions are already being carried out by the JS-J2, placing the S-JTCB in the Joint Staff would only require tying the JS-J3 into the process. Being located within the beltway would allow it to create and maintain close contact with decision makers, and afford interagency representatives the opportunity to attend the S-JTCB. This would significantly shorten the decision loop by placing it closer (in both time and location) to USG decision makers that have or can attain targeting authorities. In this arrangement the S-JTCB could be chaired by the Vice Chairman or perhaps the Director of

the Joint Staff. The new Vice Chairman, General Cartwright, previously commanded STRATCOM and could leverage his experiences from there.

One major problem with this arrangement is that by law the JS has no executive authority over combat forces.²⁶ However, a third option exists; the S-JTCB could be placed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and chaired by an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD). This would generate the same benefits described above and would shorten the decision loop even more. The JS-J2/J3 would form the backbone of the Joint Targeting Working Group which could consolidate input from the CCDRs and perform the administrative leg work. This arrangement would ensure that the Chairman of the JCS maintained oversight in his role as senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and President. The OSD also has access and tasking authority of unique capabilities resident in Special Access Programs which could be leveraged for targeting purposes. An added benefit to this option is that the OSD could form a cadre of permanently assigned civilian targeting professionals who could maintain corporate knowledge and develop long-lasting ties with other USG agencies that would span presidential administrations and tenures of military leaders.²⁷

CONCLUSION

For a strategic targeting process to work and not just create another unnecessary layer of bureaucracy, several initial conditions must be met. Foremost, strategic leaders must understand and conform to the principle of centralized command – decentralized execution. Targeting planners must move past the “warheads on foreheads” mentality and understand

²⁶ http://www.jcs.mil/cjs/jcs_mission_statement.html (accessed 13 October 2007) Since its establishment in 1947, statute has prohibited the Joint Staff from operating or organizing as an overall armed forces general staff; therefore, the Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces.

²⁷ Schmidt, 55.

how to incorporate all instruments of national power. To effectively accomplish this, a Strategic-JTCB must include representatives from all USG agencies. Finally, to produce synchronized target lists the combatant commands need to adopt a common targeting database.

The DOD will see many benefits if a Strategic Joint Target Coordination Board is established. Strategic targeting will be better matched to USG objectives and the high demand – low density national-level targeting resources will be better managed. There will be improved synchronization and de-confliction of operations between CCDRs. Combatant commands access to all-source intelligence and resources of other U. S. Government Agencies will be enhanced; which will ultimately lead to an accelerated decision loop and authorities approval process.

In conclusion, because combatant commanders are conducting targeting independently a myriad of networked adversaries are able to exploit porous seams. In order to better combat these adversaries it is imperative that the DOD implement changes based on lessons learned developing the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and Joint Targeting doctrine. A Strategic Joint Targeting Coordination Board chaired inside the Pentagon should be formed to eliminate those seams and improve synchronization between combatant commands.

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