

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 06-11-2007		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Adaptive Intelligence Planning: The Combatant Command J2 Fulcrum for Leveraging National Intelligence Support and Resources Today and Tomorrow				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Michael L. Current, United States Army Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement: Approved for public release.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The development of national Intelligence Campaign Plans (ICP), recently changed to Adaptive Intelligence Planning (AIP), was a Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) initiative in response to perceived intelligence failures surrounding the events on 11 September 2001, and part of an overall plan to transform US defense intelligence. AIP would define, link and integrate defense intelligence support to Geographic Combatant Command/Functional Combatant Command (GCC/FCC) requirements in their Operation Plans (OPLAN). Given the amount of attention on viewed disconnects between the IC and the warfighter, it may come as a surprise that some GCC/FCCs remain reluctant to invest time and attention to AIP. But is this reluctance warranted? The answer is no. AIP provides unity of effort between the IC and the GCC/FCCs in support of the Commander's intelligence requirements. It achieves this end by first articulating the GCC/FCC's information needs and then delineating which IC organization will answer each. AIP then defines and prioritizes national collection based on information gaps identified. The process also addresses the communications architecture needed to support the rapid flow of intelligence requirements upward as well as the dissemination of actionable intelligence downward. Lastly, AIP clearly articulates intelligence collection and analysis gaps based on current capabilities, providing justification for future resource allocation at both the theater and national level. These facets of AIP, both individually and collectively, benefit the GCC/FCCs. After a brief history of AIP and a concise description of its components, this paper demonstrates why it is in the GCC/FCC's best interest to invest time and manpower to the process. This paper also dispels some common misperceptions about AIP and provides some recommendations on how to improve the process.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Intelligence Campaign Plan, ICP, AIP, Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center, DJIOC, DIOCC, Adaptive Intelligence Planning					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.



Adaptive Intelligence Planning: The Combatant Command J2 Fulcrum for Leveraging National Intelligence Support and Resources Today and Tomorrow

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Date: 06 November 2007

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Abstract

The development of national Intelligence Campaign Plans (ICP), recently changed to Adaptive Intelligence Planning (AIP), was an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) initiative in response to perceived intelligence failures surrounding the events on 11 September 2001, and part of an overall plan to transform defense intelligence. ICP would define, link and integrate intelligence support to Geographic Combatant Command/ Functional Combatant Command (GCC/FCC) requirements in their Operation Plans (OPLAN). Given the amount of attention on viewed disconnects between the Intelligence Community (IC) and warfighter, it may come as a surprise that some GCC/FCCs remain reluctant to invest time and attention to AIP. But is this reluctance warranted? No, it is not.

AIP provides unity of effort between the IC and the GCC/FCCs in support of the Commander's intelligence requirements. It achieves this end by first articulating the GCC/FCC's information needs and then delineating which IC organization will answer each. AIP then defines and prioritizes national collection based on information gaps identified. The process also addresses the communications architecture needed for the dissemination of actionable intelligence. Lastly, AIP clearly articulates intelligence collection and analysis gaps based on current capabilities, providing justification for future resource allocation at both the theater and national level. These facets of AIP, both individually and collectively, benefit the GCC/FCCs. After a brief history of AIP and a concise description of its components, this paper demonstrates why it is in the GCC/FCC's best interest to invest time and manpower to the process. This paper also dispels some common misperceptions about AIP and provides recommendations on how to improve the process.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of developing national Intelligence Campaign Plans (ICP), recently changed to Adaptive Intelligence Planning (AIP),¹ originated in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) in 2003/4. The concept was in response to perceived intelligence failures surrounding the events on 11 September 2001 and part of an overall plan to transform military intelligence. ICP would define, link and integrate intelligence support to Geographic Combatant Command/Functional Combatant Command (GCC/FCC) requirements, either specified or implied, in their Operation Plans (OPLAN). The objective was to “bring together DOD and IC capabilities in a more synergistic effort” and “focus the intelligence community’s capabilities on the commander’s critical decision requirements.”²

Given the amount of attention on viewed disconnects between the IC and warfighter, it may come as a surprise that some GCC/FCCs remain reluctant to invest time and attention to AIP. Some less than enthusiastic GCC/FCCs view AIP as an infringement on their coordination authorities, as an isolated intelligence endeavor and therefore invalid outside the already established planning process, or as simply not a priority today given everything else currently on the plate.³ But is this reluctance warranted or wise? No, it is not. In the future, the GCC/FCC that has remained reluctant to develop AIP for its OPLANs may find itself intelligence blind and baffled as it attempts to duplicate AIP’s advantages while in crisis.

AIP provides unity of effort between the IC and the GCC/FCCs in support of the Commander’s intelligence requirements. It achieves this end by first articulating the GCC/FCC’s information needs and then delineating which IC organization will answer each. AIP then defines and prioritizes national collection based on information gaps identified. To aid in the prosecution of these two activities, the process also addresses the communications

architecture needed to support the rapid flow of intelligence requirements upward as well as dissemination of actionable intelligence downward. Lastly, AIP articulates intelligence collection and analysis gaps based on current capabilities, providing justification for future resource allocation at both the theater and national level – it identifies where to put money.

These facets of AIP, both individually and collectively, benefit the GCC/FCCs. While one could highlight faults in the process, suggest improvements or even recommend discarding the current construct for another, one cannot dispute that AIP, like any OPLAN process, provides a base for the development and execution of an operation. Additionally, AIP generates dialogue between the GCC/FCC and the IC at a level of specificity not seen heretofore. Discussion is good. It focuses the IC on the warfighter. After a brief history of AIP and description of its components, this paper demonstrates why it is in the GCC/FCC's best interest to invest the time and manpower to the process. This paper also dispels some misperceptions about AIP and provides recommendations on how to improve the process.

HISTORY OF AIP

Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania, and in response to perceived intelligence failures subsequently identified surrounding these events, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) initiated a series of programs to reshape US defense intelligence. The Defense Department realized, “the threat had changed, the environment had changed.”⁴ Defense intelligence needed to transform to become more agile and more adaptable. It needed to break away from the support mantra formulated and entrenched during the Cold War.

As part of this transformation the USD(I) position and office were created, which upon its founding in 2003 directed a study entitled “Taking Stock in Defense Intelligence”

(TSDI) to identify what was wrong with defense intelligence and how to fix it. “That meant going out with a team, surveying everybody, listening to them, finding out what was broken and coming back and setting a way ahead to fix these problems.”⁵

The TSDI study concluded that intelligence planning was: not synchronized or proactive; inadequate for orchestrating blue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; incomplete and focused heavily on targeting; and sometimes joint but rarely combined.⁶ Additionally, the study highlighted that GCC/FCCs did not involve the Combat Support Agencies (CSA) – such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), or the National Security Agency (NSA) – early enough in their planning process.⁷ To rectify these shortfalls, the IC needed a planning process to compliment that of the GCC/FCCs so that when executed, the former would be able to support the latter in the accomplishment of its mission. Additionally, on a broader perspective the IC needed a process that could prioritize and assign the finite number of collection and analytical assets and efforts across the GCC/FCCs during crisis and war. Basically, the IC needed a planning process.

From TSDI recommendations the USD(I) developed ICP, and almost overnight the term became coined to address horizontal and vertical intelligence coordination shortfalls. Then USD(I) Dr. Stephen A. Cambone outlined ICP during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in April 2004.⁸ The USD(I) was subsequently directed to “support the Combatant Commanders’ development of intelligence support plans and intelligence campaign plans” in support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconnaissance (SSTR) Operations.⁹ ICP was highlighted in the 2005 Contingency Planning

Guidance (CPG), the Strategic Planning Guidance FY2008-2013 and in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).¹⁰ The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) states,

Intelligence campaign plans implement these strategies by defining the comprehensive intelligence needs for all phases of operations and campaigns, including intelligence all-source analysis and production, multi-discipline collection, processing, and supporting information architecture. Such plans also ensure national and international unity of effort without compromising security. By addressing all aspects of intelligence operations, these plans focus the intelligence capabilities of the Department and the broader intelligence community on providing the critical information that leads to decision making.¹¹

Of historical note is that when these NMS words were written, as well as those describing ICP in some of the other early references listed above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J2 staff that was placed in charge of making the ICP concept a reality had only a basic idea of how it was going to accomplish this mission.

In contrast to the national military leadership's defining portrayal of ICP in its first act on the national stage (NMS, CPG, JSCP, SASC), little manning or funding was subsequently directed towards the effort for the acts to follow. There was no meat on the bones, and some would argue no bones.¹² In USD(I)'s defense, a number of ideas were being pumped out of the office in rapid succession to transform intelligence. ICP was only one of them. Others included the formation of Joint Intelligence Operation Centers (JIOCs) and improving Defense Human Intelligence. In retrospect, these too may have benefited from a longer gestation before introduction. However, it seemed imperative to get concepts out to the IC for discussion, development and implementation – seize the climate for change brought about by 9/11 and implement fixes before bureaucratic inertia reemerged to stymie further institutional progress. So fix things now; fix the fixes later.

The JSC J2 ICP staff went to work. “Spiral development” became the most used phrase by the action officers, as each step in ICP brought a new a challenge. Through

overcoming these challenges, the processes were formed, and the current construct of the document emerged. The original crafters ensured ICP had the same look and feel as an OPLAN. They wanted the document to be Commander/Operator friendly.¹³

ELEMENTS OF AIP

It is important to understand the components of AIP to fully grasp and appreciate how the process and its products can aid a GCC/FCC in the accomplishment of its mission. There are three documents that comprise AIP: the Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA), the GCC/FCC's OPLAN Annex B, and the National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP).¹⁴ DTAs are baseline intelligence assessments written by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that detail threat intentions and capabilities for each priority plan listed in the CPG. These assessments are coordinated throughout the IC and with the respective GCC/FCCs, maintained electronically on the DIA homepage, and updated as the situational environment warrants. GCC/FCCs will cite the respective DTAs used in the development of their OPLANs to "help ensure that military planning is based on valid assumptions and is consistent with national strategy and priorities."¹⁵

Annex B from the GCC/FCC's OPLAN includes the theater's threat assessment, concept of intelligence operations, and tasks to appropriate elements. Its inclusion in AIP provides the IC an understanding and framework of how the GCC/FCC J2 views the threat and plans to conduct intelligence operations. Annex B is the foundation for the NISP.

The NISP is the largest portion of AIP and requires the most effort to formulate. However, the majority of the work for the NISP is conducted by the national defense intelligence agencies under the guidance of the GCC/FCC J2 staff. The NISP consists of a basic plan and approximately 15 annexes. The basic document provides general guidance to

the IC. It highlights the operational environment to include the GCC/FCC's mission, campaign objectives, and priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and then outlines the NISP mission and concept of operation. The plan includes assumptions and limitations as defined during the planning process. Additionally, the basic plan identifies and provides guidance to CSAs assigned to answer the intelligence tasks listed in NISP Annex A.¹⁶

NISP Annex A is the Intelligence Task List (ITL). As the name implies, this annex is an exhaustive list of intelligence tasks defined by the GCC/FCC to support its OPLAN. Each task is linked to a PIR, operational objective and effect, and prioritized by phase. Production parameters, timelines, dissemination, and measures of performance are also identified. Responsible Analytic Centers (RAC) and Collaborative Analytic Centers (CAC) are then assigned. The former are responsible for the overall coordination, answering of, and dissemination of the intelligence task. CACs work horizontally or vertically with the RAC to accomplish this mission. The end state of the ITL, "is a synchronized collection, analysis and production effort, from tactical to National level, that will support the successful achievement of the GCC/FCC's operational objectives."¹⁷

NISP Annex B is the Collection Assessment Matrix. It depicts theater and national intelligence asset limitations, by discipline and phase, for each Annex A task. Limitations are evaluated and assigned a number ranging from 0 (no capability) to 3 (excellent capability), and an ISR code based on the mitigation strategy. Some limitations are technical or access based, while others are due to resource priority (coverage, exploitation, or requirement), legal, and tipping and cueing capabilities.¹⁸

NISP Annex C is the Analysis and Production Capabilities Assessment Matrix. Similar to Annex B, the matrix highlights analytical and production limitations. Limitation

capability numbers and strategy codes are assigned. These include source capability/resource/priority, analytic resource priority, linguist resource/priority, expertise capability, requirement resource/priority, and interagency coordination/policy.¹⁹ NISP Annex D is the Federated Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Support Plan. Essentially, the annex describes how the IC supports federated targeting and BDA.

NISP Annexes E through Q are the Functional Support Plans (FSP), customarily delineated by intelligence specialty (i.e. signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence) and assigned a lead agency (i.e. NSA, NGA). The FSPs are the CSA or Service Intelligence Center (SIC) OPLANs describing how each will support the GCC/FCC OPLAN. Mission, concept of the operations, activities and organization, and tasks are nested with those of the GCC/FCC and with other supporting agencies. FSPs are coordinated and de-conflicted across the IC, and when final signed by their respective agency commander or director.²⁰

The NISP depicted above is the ideal format as listed in joint doctrine, a process formulated “on the fly” during the crafting of the first NISP. The first one focused on a traditional, long standing OPLAN, and terms and processes were developed to address that type of plan. The process continues to mature with some challenges remaining. These include the integration of the non-DOD IC agencies and the formatting of transregional NISPs.²¹ Nonetheless, ICP, now AIP, has come a long way in four years.

WHY A J2 SHOULD EMBRACE AIP

There are a number of reasons why GCC/FCC J2s should become engaged in AIP and an equal number of misperceptions that cause some to shy away. This paper will first address the reasons to become involved and then analyze and dispel the misperceptions. The first reason for a GCC/FCC to devote manpower and time to AIP is for the money. In

addressing this issue first, however, this paper does not mean to diminish the operational benefits of AIP. Resourcing benefits are addressed first because it is through funding that operational challenges, such as intelligence gaps and systems architectures, can be overcome, ultimately leading to synergy and unity of effort between the IC and GCC/FCC.

What J2 will stand up and say his/her GCC/FCC does not need any more resources to accomplish its intelligence mission? Probably none. A NISP over any other document justifies intelligence resources, both in theater and at the national level. All the GCC/FCC has to do is introduce NISP Annexes A to C to the people who write checks.

GCC/FCCs develop OPLANs based on guidance contained in the NMS and direction and priorities listed in the CPG and JSCP. After the Commander signs the OPLAN, it is forwarded for SECDEF approval to ensure the GCC/FCC has met Defense Department strategic guidance. A NISP is nested with its supported OPLAN. As stated, each NISP Annex A (ITL) task is tied to a GCC/FCC objective and effect, by phase, and linked to a PIR. Once signed, all DOD IC agencies have collectively agreed that for the GCC/FCC to accomplish its mission – to carry out the plan signed by the Commander and approved by the SECDEF – the IC needs to accomplish the tasks listed in NISP Annex A. Now to the limitation annexes.

NISP Annexes B and C identify theater/national collection and analytic limitations, respectively, for each task identified in the ITL. In other words, these two annexes list how the IC is currently unable or limited in its ability to address Annex A tasks, which all have already agreed are necessary for the GCC/FCC to accomplish its mission. The two annexes also categorize how these collection and analytic limitations could be mitigated or overcome.

Fix the limitation, get the task. Don't fix it, accept risk. The question then is: how many intelligence risks can the GCC/FCC accept before the OPLAN becomes invalidated?

Some limitations in NISP Annexes B and C are because of a finite number of intelligence resources, and these assets are addressing higher precedent priorities elsewhere. The mitigation strategy is to move resources as a GCC/FCC approaches or reaches crisis. Like Wackaball,²² the hope is that not too many crises pop up at once. Additionally, juggling of resources may work to mitigate some limitations, but not all.

Resource shifting does not work for two types of limitations: those that take a protracted amount of time to accomplish and those where a systemic intelligence gap in capability exists. An example of the first is linguists. It takes time to train a linguist. One cannot at a moment of crisis take a Farsi speaker and have him/her translate Korean. If the IC and GCC/FCC determine it will take X number of linguists to accomplish the mission outlined in the NISP, then resources need to be allocated years in advance. If not, though perhaps not in the linguist example but in some other such as human intelligence where it takes years to develop a network, the intelligence risks may be enough to invalidate the OPLAN as currently written. Then there are the "uh-oh" limitations.

In the course of developing NISP Annexes A to C, the AIP staff may determine that even if all US defense intelligence assets were directed solely in support of the GCC/FCC's OPLAN, a gap in capabilities would still remain to where the task/s could not be accomplished. A satellite couldn't get at it, a spy plane couldn't reach it, or a sensor couldn't measure it. That is when the AIP staff collectively goes "uh-oh." Unlike the Farsi linguist square peg in a round hole example, in this instance there are no pegs. Furthermore, "uh-oh" limitations are not confined to NISP Annexes B and C.

Under NISP Annex A (ITL), the GCC/FCC articulates each task on how it needs to be disseminated: who needs it, what format, what classification level, what system or systems, and how quickly does it need to get there. Each of these could lead to a systems architecture limitation. Conversely, system limitations upward may hamper answering tasks in a timely manner. Given these two limitations combined, a GCC/FCC may not be able to get an intelligence requirement up to the appropriate agency for collection, exploitation and analysis, and then the product disseminated in the time necessary to affect the commander's decision cycle. Because of the lack of unity of command over the DOD intelligence systems architecture, ITL requirement management/dissemination is riddled with "uh-oh" limitations.

Armed with a list of "uh-oh" limitations, in going after additional resources the GCC/FCC J2 can walk intelligence shortfalls through the NMS, CPG, JSCP, OPLAN, and NISP, as each limitation is tied to an intelligence task, tied to an objective and effect, tied to a PIR, tied to the plan, tied to DOD strategic guidance. The Integrated Priority List (IPL) – where the Combatant Commander (CCDR) articulates critical shortfalls in key programs that in his judgment affect his ability to accomplish his mission – dwarfs in comparison in its level of specificity and clarity to tie requirements to mission.²³ Additionally, whereas the IPL focuses on the defense budget, AIP arms the J2 to go after the intelligence budget. In this light, all the agencies under that pot of money have already tacitly agreed funds need to be spent on the GCC/FCC's limitations, per signature of the FSPs and NISP.

The J2 can request funding to address those limitations identified as theater level GCC/FCC shortfalls. The J2 can also advocate for national agency (CSAs and SICs) funding for their programs that will rectify shortfalls supporting the warfighter. Furthermore, the J2 can provide oversight of this national funding allocation to ensure monies are properly spent.

Through the Combatant Commander's various funding forums, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and USD(I), the GCC/FCC J2 can ensure national agencies, in short-term funding requirements and long-term budgeting projections, are prioritizing towards support for the warfighter. In addressing intelligence funding, United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General B.B. Bell's statement before the SASC on 7 March 2006 begins, "As evident in the intelligence community's recent completion of our Intelligence Campaign Plan there are a number of intelligence shortfalls in our national and theater coverage that require immediate attention."²⁴ The statement continues outlining a litany of requirements. In the battle over increasing priorities and finite resources, the J2 who steps on the field armed with AIP wins. But AIP isn't all about money. It is also about processes.

The NISP development process forces the GCC/FCC and IC to discuss how the latter supports the former during the execution of the OPLAN. It creates a level of synergy a GCC/FCC would have difficulty achieving working individually through each of its Functional Support Elements (FSEs) and wouldn't have time to conduct while in crisis.

To illustrate this point, this paper will walk through a fictional dialogue between AIP staffers addressing a task for a GCC responsible for country Illustratistan. *What DOD agency will be overall responsible for answering ITL Task 1: Analyze and assess Illustratistan's intentions and capabilities to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?* DIA agrees to be the RAC. *Who will support DIA in answering the task?* The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) agree to be CACs for Task 1, as the task includes Illustratistan's missile capabilities. *How will DIA, NASIC, and MSIC collaborate on the task?* They agree to utilize the Information Work Space (IWS) collaboration tool on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communications System (JWICS). For this illustration, MSIC identifies it does not have IWS, so this becomes an “uh-oh” limitation for them. *On what system does the GCC want the final product?* The GCC J2 states it needs products supporting Task 1 on the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) to enable rapid dissemination of the information to its coalition partners. For illustration purposes, DIA then identifies that for them the movement of intelligence products from the JWICS network, where MSIC and NASIC provided their input, to CENTRIX is an “uh-oh” limitation.

While simple, this fictitious illustration demonstrates two important points. First, it identified two “uh-oh” limitations, both of which may not be hard to fix but may have proved hampering if they not had been identified until crisis. Second, it identified three supporting organizations (DIA, NASIC, MSIC) to answer the task. The GCC would not be forced to stovepipe manage this process. If the OPLAN were executed, without prompting DIA would contact NASIC and MSIC using IWS, combine their inputs, and then send the final product to the GCC on CENTRIXS at the time specified in the ITL. The IC would take this coordination burden off the GCC/FCC J2, so it could focus on the mission.

The AIP process also identifies how a GCC/FCC can change its mind on the ITL. In crisis, the J2 can rearrange the task priority of effort, add new ones, or start from scratch. While tasks may change, general categories probably would not. In this light, the RACs have already identified their respective CACs, collaboration tools, and systems architecture for dissemination. A GCC/FCC intelligence message equivalent to a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) – via email, Share Point, or STE – is all that would be needed to adjust national focus. Additionally, exercising procedures identified in NISP development could be tested during theater command post exercises (CPX), such as USFK’s Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL).²⁵

The GCC/FCC and IC could solidify AIP processes and rectify identified challenges before OPLAN execution. Given the unity of effort generated between the IC and GCC/FCC during NISP development, along with the monetary benefits for resource allocation illustrated earlier, it is unfortunate some J2s remain reluctant to dedicate resources to AIP.

AIP MYTHS AND MISPERCEPTIONS

The top five reasons why some J2s do not become involved in AIP are addressed below.²⁶ However, most of these reasons are because of misperceptions about AIP, while those that are actual AIP limitations should not be show-stoppers. This paper describes each of these J2 reasons not to become involved in AIP and, following each, dispels the argument as myth or misperception, or if appropriate provides reasons why the limitation should not deter a GCC/FCC J2 from still embracing the AIP process and its products.

The first argument against GCC/FCC AIP involvement is that the document lacks authority of execution. Under the original concept, the SECDEF would sign each NISP upon completion, thus ascribing the document the same status and authority as the GCC/FCC OPLAN. This did not happen. When the first completed NISP was ready for signature and started its way up the chain, a debate then ensued at the senior military level on who should sign NISPs. Should it be the SECDEF, the CJCS, who? After a fifteen-month signatory delay, the first NISP was finally signed by the USD(I).²⁷

Without SECDEF signature, as originally envisioned, the perception is the document lacks the same authority as its supported OPLAN. This is not the case. The USD(I) is the SECDEF's senior intelligence representative. The SECDEF charges the USD(I) to oversee AIP in support of the GCC/FCC's; therefore, the latter conducts this mission under the former's authority. Additionally, unlike supported and supporting OPLANs that are

developed primarily and signed certainly independent of each other, AIP is conducted collectively across the DOD IC, and so carries the authority of each FSP agency as well.

The second argument for GCC/FCC nonparticipation is the document's redundancy with the established requirements validation and tracking process. AIP does not replace Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM): a legacy DIA automated production/requirements management system. Once a NISP is finalized, a GCC/FCC has to input Annex A tasks into COLISEUM for validation.²⁸

The justification given for this time-consuming, redundant step is that the AIP requirements management automation system is not robust enough or universally accepted to replace COLISEUM. Therefore, the GCC/FCC question is why go through all the trouble with AIP when, afterwards, the same requirements have to then go through the system the old fashion way? The reason is simple. AIP enables a GCC/FCC to validate a myriad of requirements at one time, before they are needed, and with the entire IC. COLISEUM is a one requirement at a time process. AIP also allows the GCC/FCC to establish communication links with RACs that can be used after the original requirement has been completed. AIP automation tools will improve and eventually replace COLISEUM.

The third argument against GCC/FCC participation is that AIP does not include non-DOD intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and as such is an incomplete process. This is an unfortunate glaring AIP limitation. As a consequence, GCC/FCC ITL requirements concerning areas not traditionally covered by military agencies, such as political leadership or economics, do not have the normally designated IC agency identified as the RAC. This position is left blank or filled in by a less-suitable DOD office.

In reviewing the 2004 NMS, non-DOD agency involvement in AIP was the CJCS's intent. The NMS ICP paragraph states, "Achieving decision superiority... requires the synchronization and integration of all sources of intelligence and information to include...DOD and non-DOD agencies...these plans [ICP] focus the intelligence capabilities of the Department and the broader intelligence community on providing the critical information that leads to decision superiority."²⁹ Some non-DOD agencies participate in AIP informally, but any agreements made do not carry the weight of the agency's director. Additionally, there is no corresponding FSP, so communication issues are left unresolved. Other non-DOD IC agencies do not participate simply because they do not have the manpower to devote to planning. The reasons for non-DOD participation are unfortunate. However, the CJCS's vision to incorporate all the IC under AIP may yet be realized.

The DNI's 500-day plan states that to meet the new complex threat environment, "the IC must have people, process and technology that provide seamless integration and cross-agency collaboration."³⁰ The plan outlines six focus areas to achieve this objective: (1) create a culture of collaboration, (2) accelerate information sharing, (3) foster collection and analytic transformation, (4) build acquisition excellence and technology leadership, (5) modernize business practices, and (6) clarify and align DNI's authorities.³¹ AIP and the information technology it promotes nests into all six objectives and so may serve the DNI as the proven collaboration plan.

In March 2006, the Office of the DNI (ODNI) was provided a completed NISP.³² As the document personifies DOD IC collaboration, it is possible it or its next evolution may be incorporated or adopted by the DNI. If this were to occur, the NISP would then carry the authority of the DNI. All non-DOD IC agencies would be obligated to participate.

The fourth argument against GCC/FCC AIP participation is that it is an intelligence centric manifestation outside and inconsistent with joint planning. Tied to this argument is the notion that the process is national tinkering in the OPLAN, circumventing GCC/FCC authorities and duplicating effort with OPLAN Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex V (Interagency Support). These arguments are misperceptions that can be dispelled by doctrine.

One only needs to read Joint Publications (JP) 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) and 2-0 (Joint Intelligence) to realize AIP is an integral part of joint planning. JP 5-0 states, “the CJCS is responsible for...preparing strategic plans and supporting plans for joint intelligence.”³³ In JP 2-0, almost the entire planning section is dedicated to NISP and AIP.³⁴

JP 2-0 details GCC/FCC primacy in guidance and direction, involvement in the process, and finally the CDR’s approval of the NISP prior to final signature. “The DJIOC [Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center] sends the final NISP, functional intelligence support plans, federated intelligence agreements, and intelligence task list to the CDR for approval.”³⁵ Additionally, the NISP does not replace GCC/FCC Annexes B or V. Indeed, the former is an integral part of AIP, as described in JP 2-0.³⁶ The NISP is a national intelligence supporting plan to the GCC/FCC’s OPLAN. Upon execution, the IC becomes the supporting organization for national intelligence; the GCC/FCC, the supported command.

The fifth argument against GCC/FCC AIP participation is that it is not mandatory, and thus must not be important enough to be directive in nature. The perception of voluntary GCC/FCC participation is an unfortunate evolution in the process, not part of the AIP’s original intent, and a current inconsistency in doctrine. Based on the 2004 NMS, one would conclude AIP must be conducted for all top-priority plans specified in the 2005 CPG and JSCP. Indeed, JP 2-0 states, “A NISP is completed for each of the top priority plans.”³⁷

However, the new CJCS AIP Manual (still in draft) states the GCC/FCC J2, “determines if the plan requires a formal DOD IP effort including a NISP.”³⁸ Given the amount of GCC/FCC effort required to support AIP, juxtaposed with other priorities, even with its advantages NISP development may now be left to those with the most vision or least to do.

Hopefully, this paper in its totality serves as a counterargument to this final reason why GCC/FCC’s should not engage in AIP. From additional resources to dissemination architectures to establishing processes with the IC, AIP is worth GCC/FCC investment. If GCC/FCCs are not involving themselves in AIP for any or a combination of the five reasons listed above, others alluded to in this paper or still others not mentioned, then it is unfortunate. AIP was created to support the GCC/FCC, and engagement in the process at any level is to their benefit. The IC cannot do it alone. It is the GCC/FCC J2s involvement, actions, guidance, direction, oversight, and support that make AIP work. From one AIP action officer, “The promise of ICP’s great potential lies in the hands of those who need it most. Commanders and Intelligence Chiefs need to do more hand shaking and less hand washing to realize its true potential.”³⁹

TAKING AIP TO THE NEXT LEVEL

The following recommendations to improving AIP are offered in hopes that their implementation may clarify doctrine and streamline procedures, and in doing so spawn new interest in those GCC/FCCs who remain reluctant to engage in the process.

- Eliminate inconsistencies in policy and doctrine concerning AIP participation. A NISP should be mandatory for all priority plans, per its original intent and JP 2-0.⁴⁰
- Through the DNI, compel non-DOD intelligence agencies to participate in AIP.

- Clarify NISP authorities and eliminate inconsistencies in doctrine. The final NISP is signed by the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center Commander and approved for execution by the USD(I). GCC/FCC J2's provide a letter of endorsement.⁴¹
- Streamline AIP to help eliminate some of the duplication of effort in all the priority OPLANs listed for a specific GCC/FCC. For example, develop one systems architecture support plan for each GCC/FCC, so references to collection, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination processes could be eliminated from the NISP and FSPs, or addressed on an exceptional basis only. This would lighten the GCC/FCC workload.
- Eliminate the need to wed AIP to antiquated intelligence programs, such as COLISEUM.

CONCLUSIONS

AIP was created to integrate defense intelligence support into the GCC/FCC mission. Through its meticulous and exhaustive attention to detail during NISP development, AIP clearly articulates the GCC/FCC OPLAN national defense intelligence requirements, selects the agencies responsible to answer them, outlines a communication architecture to support the process, and lastly identifies collection and analytical gaps based on current capabilities. As such, AIP is a solid base to develop and execute intelligence support to GCC/FCC operations. Because the NISP is so nested with its supported OPLAN, it becomes an excellent document for the J2 to advocate for intelligence dollars at the theater and national level. Additionally, the vertical and horizontal collaboration generated during planning and subsequent validation exercises enables a level of intelligence synergy that would not be possible otherwise. Though AIP is still a maturing concept, it has already become the best GCC/FCC J2 tool to leverage national and theater collection and analytical resources.

NOTES

¹ Lt Col Joe Siedlarz, Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC), e-mail message to author, 24 October 2007. The term AIP replaced ICP on 01 October 2007. However, the term has not been formalized in doctrine.

² Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence, “Testimony,” Senate, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Statement for Record Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee*, 7 April 2004, 12-13.

³ Results compiled from an author developed questionnaire sent to six IP planners in the IC, see Appendix.

⁴ US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Press Availability on Joint Intelligence Operations Centers,” News Transcript, quote by LTG William G. Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Intelligence and Warfighting Support, 1, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1234> (accessed 7 September 2007).

⁵ Tom Mathews, Office of USD(I), as a guest speaker accompanying LTG Boykin, *Defense Intelligence and Transformation*, Lecture, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. May 2007, transcript notes, 16, http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/boykin%5Cboykin-i07-1.pdf (accessed 7 September 2007).

⁶ Chairman, U.S. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 33XX (Draft), *Intelligence Campaign Planning Guidance*. (Washington, DC: 1 February 2007), A-1 to A-2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Cambone, *Statement for Record*, 7 April 2004. Excerpt page 12: “We have begun exploring the concept of Intelligence Campaign Planning, which is designed to synchronize and integrate intelligence into the commander’s adaptive planning process and, when fully developed, will bring together DoD and IC capabilities in a more synergistic effort. Intelligence Campaign Plans are designed to focus the intelligence community’s capabilities on the commander’s critical decision requirements. Under the old paradigm, intelligence developed stove-piped plans that were poorly coordinated. Recent lessons learned and new operational concepts require intelligence plans that are, fully integrated, multi-discipline, holistic and support all phases of operations.”

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive no. 3000.05, (Washington DC: DOD, 28 November 2005), 5.

¹⁰ 33XX (Draft), A-1.

¹¹ Chairman, U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004; A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*. (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2004), 25.

¹² Results from questionnaire and author’s personal experience as a USFK ICP planner from October 2004 – May 2005 and part of the USFK ICP coordination team from June 2005 – June 2007.

¹³ The first draft IP FSP review occurred in April 2005 at the Pentagon. Action officers included the author, COL Peter Diaz, Maj Rachel McCaffrey, Maj Forrest Hare, and others.

¹⁴ Chairman, U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 June 2007), IV-3.

¹⁵ 33XX (Draft), A-3 to A-4.

¹⁶ Ibid, A-3.

¹⁷ Ibid, GL-8.

¹⁸ Ibid, G-1 to G-3.

¹⁹ Ibid, H-1 to H-3.

²⁰ Ibid, E-1 to E-3.

²¹ Ibid, 2.

²² Wackaball is an arcade game where using a plastic mallet one knocks down recessed plastic heads on a board as each randomly and rapidly pops up.

²³ Chairman, U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 April 2001, as amended 22 March 2007), 266.

²⁴ GEN B.B. Bell, Commander, United States Forces Korea, Statement Before the Senate Arms Services Committee (SASC), 7 March 2006, 31. Excerpt: “As evident in the intelligence community’s recent completion of our Intelligence Campaign Plan there are a number of intelligence shortfalls in our national and theater coverage that require immediate attention. Chief among these are the need for persistent national and theater

surveillance systems that provide continuous multi-discipline base-lining of the threat. Central to this is the accelerated fielding and installation of state of the art Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and Measurement and Signal Intelligence (MASINT) sensors that are relevant to target sets. In addition to the fielding of long-range unmanned aerial sensor, upgrades for the theater's aerial sensors and modernization of our SIGINT and Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) architectures, the theater will benefit greatly from increased access to space systems supporting ISR operations."

²⁵ USFK tested information management tool Share Point during UFL 2007 to manage IP tasks. Using this tool a new information need was sent to the DIOCC who then assigned the RAC and CACs. This process took hours as compared to days in all probability if COLISEUM had been used.

²⁶ Results compiled from questionnaire and personal experience as an IP action officer.

²⁷ Siedlarz.

²⁸ 33XX (Draft), J-1.

²⁹ Chairman, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*, 25.

³⁰ Director of National Intelligence, *United States Intelligence Community 500 Day Plan: Integration and Collaboration*, (Washington, DC: 10 October 2007), introduction.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Provided by the author and LTC Robert Rasmussen under the direction of USFK J2 BG Theodore Nicholas at the ODN(I)'s request.

³³ Chairman, U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006), I-8.

³⁴ JP 2-0, IV-3 to IV-9.

³⁵ Ibid, IV-9.

³⁶ Ibid, IV-3.

³⁷ Ibid, IV-9.

³⁸ 33XX (Draft), A-8.

³⁹ From questionnaire, question 9 (See Appendix). Quote by Richard A. "Dick" Shore, Chief, Office of Operations, National Media Exploitation Center.

⁴⁰ JP 2-0, IV-9.

⁴¹ Seidlarz.

APPENDIX

Below is the questionnaire sent to six AIP planners across the IC. Their thoughts on the status of AIP, and the pros and cons of the process were incorporated in this paper.

Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP) Survey

20 September 2007

I am LTC Mike Current, US Army. I am attending the Naval War College, and as part of the requirements for graduation, I have chosen to write a paper on ICP. Some of you may recognize my name as one of the USFK ICP action officers from 2004 – 2007.

I ask each of you who have received this questionnaire to take a few minutes to complete it. Your answers can be as long or as short as you like, but they need to be at the unclassified level. Please complete the survey by 8 October 2007 and forward to me on NIPR at michael.l.current@us.army.mil or michael.current@nwc.navy.mil.

Except for question 9 (see below), I will not quote you or use your response to directly implicate your organization. The questionnaire is designed to get a general impression of how ICP is working right now, its current state of play, positives about the process, challenges, and where improvements might be made. I thank each of you in advance for your timely, candid, and complete responses to the questions below.

1. Please list what organization you are from (i.e. DIA, NGA, PACOM, USFK, etc.).
2. How long have you been involved in the ICP process?
3. How many ICP plans has your organization completed; has in draft?
4. How has ICP changed your organization (increased funding, manpower changes, systems architecture)?
5. Do you feel the ICP process is currently effective in linking the GCC/FCCs with the national intelligence agencies? (please explain your yes or no answer)
6. What do you like best about the process?
7. What improvements would you like see to the process?
8. What are your thoughts on non-DOD intelligence agency (CIA, INR) involvement?
9. The quote question. If I were to incorporate a quote from you/your organization, what would be the sentence that you would like to communicate.
10. This is the anything I have missed in the questions above that you would like to state about ICP, please include here.

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