

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 06 November 2007		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Please Don't Break the China in State's Africa Bureau				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Paul P. Pometto II Paper Advisor (if Any): Professor Thomas C. Hone				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The U.S. Africa Command is a considerable shift in attention and allocation of resources that has spurred debate about the true intentions of the Government of the United States of America. This has happened concurrently with China's growing involvement in Africa. Does this matter? There has been disagreement at the Department of State about the formation of AFRICOM. Is this still a problem at State? This paper attempts to answer these questions and to present some suggestions on how future AFRICOM commanders could approach their new responsibilities.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS AFRICOM, China, Department of State, Embassy Operations					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 21	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Please Don't Break the China in State's Africa Bureau

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

6 November 2007
(Date of submission of paper)

Abstract

Please Don't Break the China in State's Africa Bureau

The U.S. Africa Command is a considerable shift in attention and allocation of resources that has spurred debate about the true intentions of the Government of the United States of America. This has happened concurrently with China's growing involvement in Africa. Does this matter? There has been disagreement at the Department of State about the formation of AFRICOM. Is this still a problem at State? This paper attempts to answer these questions and to present some suggestions on how future AFRICOM commanders could approach their new responsibilities.

“My concern is with the inescapable fact that the West seems today no nearer to understanding Africa than it was a hundred years ago, on the dawn of the colonial enterprise.” Patrick Chabal¹

¹ Patrick Chabal, Lecture at King's College, London, 12 March 1997. Author of *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Africa Command is one-month old. The organization is an answer, in part, to pleas from the continent for Americans – particularly the U.S. military – to do more to help feed the hungry, stabilize regional conflicts, and promote democracy and human rights. But how can we convert the energies of warriors to engage in protecting food deliveries, mentoring child soldiers, and dealing with warlords effectively? How can we convince soldiers who are accustomed to quick results in a very organized fashion to be patient and creative? Given the time that it has taken me and many of my colleagues to love and understand the continent and its peoples, how are Americans with a limited knowledge of and no affection for Africa, coupled with the dedication to a military culture, going to inaugurate successfully this new U.S. African Command?

A Pan American Airways flight, from New York to Dakar, first brought me to African soil in 1974. During tours as a Peace Corps Volunteer and a Foreign Service Officer, I have visited 50 of the continent's 53 nations, missing only Angola, Comoros Islands, and Libya. Aside from regular two- or three-year tours of duty in Benin, Cape Verde, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal, there were two tours as a "rover," during which I assisted or substituted for officers in embassies for periods of less than a year.

Many of my observations and impressions are a result of this experience. It is an honor for me to be amongst American leaders – civilian and military – being trained at the Naval War College for strategic responsibilities that may soon involve some of us directing and supporting the new AFRICOM.

Some key questions at this juncture are how our commanders can best prepare for this awesome responsibility. Does the growing presence of China's economic competition matter? How is the State Department reacting to AFRICOM moving into a region that has been an area more familiar to State and to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)? What approaches to modern African leadership might help or hinder the success of this new command?

This paper will consider some of the concerns of China's growing presence in Africa and some of the concerns at State. It will conclude with specific recommendations for several approaches – to alliances, to organization, to location, to modern African leadership, and to training. The ultimate concern is this: How to best use this valuable resource without disturbing a delicate diplomatic balance that exists today between China and the United States, and without disrupting successful programs now in progress between our U.S. Missions in Africa and the individual African governments.

BACKGROUND

AFRICOM's area of responsibility is quite different from that of CENTCOM or EUCOM or PACOM. Most Americans are unaware of the historic links between our lands. Here are just a few background notes to illustrate our special connection and to differentiate this continent from others.

First, we are all from Africa. Anthropologists have thus far dated the birth of our species to about four to six million years ago in the eastern savannas of Africa.²

² April A. and Donald L. Gordon, eds., *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 3rd ed., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 24.

Secondly, there are 53 independent nations on the continent with unique cultures, languages, histories, and relationships with each other and with the rest of the world. We cannot just lump together two or three African countries – culturally or politically – like Europeans can, for example, with Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX). Despite a serious attempt, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda failed to remain an economic threesome in East Africa. Senegal and Gambia were but briefly Senegambia, in West Africa. Lesotho and Swaziland are geographically part of South Africa; however, each is an independent nation and culture.

Thirdly, while the Europeans were fighting the New World, as well as amongst themselves, it was an African nation – Morocco – that became the first in the world to recognize the independence of the United States of America. “From the servant of God, Mohammed Ibn ‘Abd Allah – may God help him – to the President of the United States of America,” proclaimed the Moroccan sultan in the Treaty of Marrakesh. “Salvation be upon him who follows the Righteous Path. We have also contacted Tunis and Tripoli regarding what you solicited from Our Majesty and all your requests will materialize God willing. Written on the 15th Dhu al-Qu’da 1202 (18 July 1787).” In 1820, Morocco granted the American government a palace in Tangiers, one that is still used today as a U.S. Consulate.³

Fourthly, African diasporas are numerous and active in the United States. It is common knowledge in Cape Verde, for example, that more Cape Verdeans live outside of its archipelagic nation than on the islands themselves. Presidents and prime ministers campaign here, in the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for votes in Cape Verde’s general elections!

³ “Treaty of Marrakesh,” written by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson, 1787. *Arab-American Historian Newsletter* 1, no. 1 (Winter 2005), <http://www.arabamericanhistory.org/newsletter.htm> (accessed 4 September 2007).

PERCEPTIONS

Future commanders shall face criticism that the United States is establishing the U.S. Africa Command only to secure control over oil and other energy resources. Moreover, some critics have enunciated the belief that AFRICOM's chief role will be "to counter the growing influence of China in African affairs."⁴ The head of TransAfrica, Nicole Lee, said earlier this year that starting this new command "is nothing short of a sovereignty and resource grab."⁵ There is wide concern on the continent about an Africa "governed by U.N. proconsuls, U.S. marines, and World Bank economists."⁶

There was evidence of interagency discord during the discussions of this new command. I sent an e-mail enquiry to Department of State officers who were part of my Deputy Chief of Mission/Principal Officer Class of June 2004. Some of their comments are part of the analysis section of this paper.

The U.S. Pacific Command worked well alongside over a hundred non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from 20 different countries to help coordinate relief efforts following the tsunami that hit Asia on 26 December 2004.⁷ Nonetheless, some people on the African continent wondered if racism factored into recent American decisions to send troops to aid the people of Kosovo and Indonesia but not those of Congo and Rwanda. This idea may be false, but it is representative of perceptions we shall continue to encounter in Africa.

⁴ Meghan Tinsley, "AFRICOM: American and African Security Plans in Conflict." The International Institute for Justice and Development, 31 August 2007, <http://www.iijd.org> (accessed 4 September 2007).

⁵ Dalue Mbachu, "Skepticism Over U.S. Africa Command." Global Policy Forum, 19 February 2007, <http://gobalpolicy.org> (accessed 10 September 2007).

⁶ Gordons, *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 175.

⁷ William J. Fallon, "Testimony," Senate, *U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 8 March 2005, <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches>.

ANALYSIS OF CONCERNS

- China -

During early research, I had read that little attention was being paid to China's expansion on the African continent. This surprised me because those of us living on the continent have been watching this evidence for decades – from the Chinese construction of great government palaces, football stadiums, and dams to – more recently – the vast increase of young couples opening dozens of shops in towns where even few European shops operate. Subsequent research unearthed plenty of attention to China's expansion. The following is just a sample of recent reporting.

In 2006, China celebrated the 50th anniversary of relations with certain African countries. During this time, it has labored to edge out Taiwan, and has established relations with 47 nations on the continent. China has bragged about the African support it has received during 13 attempts by Taiwan to return to the United Nations.⁸

South Africa, for example, will be celebrating 10 years of diplomatic relations in January 2008. During talks earlier this year between Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Hu Jintao, the leaders discussed China's "engagement with Africa," peacekeeping on the continent, economic investments, cooperation on U. N. Security Council issues, nuclear issues in Iran and North Korea, and proposed reforms within the United Nations. According to South African sources, China's trade with African nations has tripled during the last five years. Beijing has placed 15,000 Chinese doctors in 35 African nations.⁹ China's \$55.5 billion trade figure with Africa in

⁸ Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "Premier Wen's Visit to Boost China-Africa Ties," 16 June 2006, <http://www.gov.cn>, (accessed on 4 September 2007).

⁹ South African Government's Official Website, "President Mbeke to host Chinese Counterpart President Hu Jintao," 4 February 2007, <http://www.dfa.gov> (accessed 4 September 2007).

2006 reflects a 40 percent increase.¹⁰ In Kenya, China has deals in oil exploration, pharmaceutical investments, rice-growing, and establishing health units to treat malaria.¹¹ Trade with Ethiopia includes pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and construction.¹²

This, however, is not our principal concern. Amnesty International recently reported that China had provided about \$85 million of arms, ammunition, aircraft parts, and other military equipment to Sudan. In addition, it claimed that China's Minister of Defense had told the Sudanese government that they were "willing to further develop military cooperation between our two countries in all areas." The report detailed deliveries of K-8 attack aircraft, which it feared had been used for bombing raids in Darfur "in violation of the U.N. arms embargo and international humanitarian law." The organization also alleged that Chinese arms were provided to Chad's United Front for Democratic Change, which was connected with the Darfur conflict. The report also identified several Chinese A-5 "Fantan" jet fighters in Darfur.¹³ Even *Al Jazeera* alluded to China's profiting from the conflict in Sudan and "ignoring human rights abuses to secure oil for its burgeoning economy."¹⁴ This is our greater concern.

China has denied these reports and claimed "its exports to Sudan were legal, limited and on a small scale."¹⁵ In China's own words, however: "China provides aid to 53 African nations without political conditions."¹⁶ The People's Daily Online spoke quite frankly about China's

¹⁰ Tansa Musa, "China's Hu Starts Africa Tour," *Reuters*, 31 January 2007, <http://news.uk.msn.com> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹¹ *BBC News*, "China's Hu Boosts Kenyan Business," January 2007 <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹² *Xinhua News Agency*, "20 Accords Signed in Sino-African Business Conference," 17 December 2003, <http://www.china.org.cn> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹³ Amnesty International, "Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur," <http://web.amnesty.org> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹⁴ *Al Jazeera*, "Hu's Africa Visit Fuels Controversy," 29 January 2007, <http://www.english.aljazeera.net> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹⁵ *BBC News*, "China, Russia Deny Weapons Breach," <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹⁶ Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, "Premier Wen's Visit to Boost China-Africa Ties," 16 June 2006, <http://www.gov.cn> (accessed 4 September 2007).

“carrying forward its traditional friendship with Africa, and ...developing a new type of strategic partnership with Africa under new circumstances...”¹⁷

There are additional concerns. Fishing remains a major concern in Africa, as it had been during the last century in Europe. Conservationists in South Africa have voiced concern over the demise of abalone, or “perlemoen” stocks, particularly during Chinese New Year.¹⁸ Clear across the continent, conservationists claimed 99 Chinese boats were fishing off the coast of Mauritania. “In 2005,” this source wrote, “China, which catches more fish than any other, gave Mauritania two fighter jets as partial compensation for fishing rights.”¹⁹ Mozambique and Madagascar have caught illegal Chinese fishing in their regions.²⁰ The Environmental Justice Foundation has spotted many China National Fisheries Corporation ships illegally fishing in Guinea.²¹ The Ethical Corporation estimates an annual loss to Sub-Saharan Africa of one billion British pounds to Chinese and other fishermen “that have licenses to fish in one zone but then exploit another.”²² In another area of environmental concern, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London claimed that “70% of China’s timber import from Sub-Saharan Africa is illegal.”²³ Similar reports describe illegal or inhumane business practices in Congolese and Zambian mines, at Namibian construction sites, and in Gabonese forests.

¹⁷ *Xinhua News Agency*, “Roundup: China-Africa Cooperation Fruitful Over Past 50 Years,” <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn> (accessed 4 September 2007).

¹⁸ Fishupdate.com, “Wildlife Organization Urges Chinese to Avoid Endangering Seafood,” 2 February 2007 (<http://www.illegal-fishing.info> (accessed 4 September 2007)).

¹⁹ *Wall Street Journal*, “Global fishing trade depletes African waters,” 23 July 2007, <http://www.illegal-fishing.info> (accessed 4 September 2007).

²⁰ *Sunday Vision* (Uganda), “China’s rise: Hope or doom for Africa?” 16 June 2007, <http://www.illegal-logging.info> (accessed 4 September 2007).

²¹ *Environmental Times*, “West Africa’s globally robbed fisheries include a UK link,” 1 August 2007, <http://www.environmenttimes.co.uk> (accessed 4 September 2007).

²² John Russell, ed., “Sustainability and the sea: Illegal fishing – Slipping through the governance net,” 7 June 2007, Ethical Corporation, <http://ethicalcorp.com> (accessed 4 September 2007).

²³ *Sunday Vision* (Uganda), “China’s rise: Hope or doom for Africa?” 16 June 2007, <http://www.illegal-logging.info> (accessed 4 September 2007).

ANALYSIS OF CONCERNS

- Department of State –

A colleague who has been working on the development of AFRICOM wrote me: “Be sure to include a section on how State hated this idea from the beginning and only reluctantly came on board. I don’t know why, but ... suspect it was ‘Damn, there goes the last part of the world DoD has NOT already usurped our role in.’ ”

Another Foreign Service Officer sent some concerns that African leaders had communicated (with protected sources) through U.S. diplomats. Africans wanted to know if *their* views would be heard over the perceived propensity of Americans to voice only *our* message. There is skepticism about how the U.S. military plans to operate in “ungoverned spaces,” a phrase that many Africans apparently do not appreciate.

Perhaps the most disturbing perception, or misperception, that a colleague shared with me was that “many Africans believe they have a fairly limited problem with radical Islam, but that an overt U.S. military mission on the continent may well provoke it.”²⁴

²⁴ E-mail enquiry of fellow Department of State Deputy Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers (names protected) with whom I had been trained during the DCM/PO Class of June 2004.

MEETING OBJECTIVES – WHAT WE ALREADY ARE DOING

Notwithstanding individual concerns, the leadership of the Department of State has made a commitment. Assistant Secretary Frazer has firmly endorsed the creation of the U.S. Africa Command. She has stated that AFRICOM's framework is "supportive of both U.S. foreign policy interests" and that State has "seen no need to alter the current authorities that govern State/Defense collaboration in the field or in Washington."²⁵ Concurrently, we have just sent a full-time Ambassador to Addis Ababa (operating separately from our bilateral Ambassador) to be "the first non-African envoy" accredited to the African Union (AU). "The United States recognizes the evolutionary change the continent is undergoing," proclaimed Ambassador Cindy Courville. She has a small staff that includes two military liaison officers from USEUCOM.²⁶

President Bush announced that AFRICOM would "strengthen our security cooperation with Africa," "enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa," and "promote our goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."²⁷ We are certainly marching in the right direction because State and USAID now share the same strategic goals framework and most of our goals are in alignment.²⁸ Also, as a member of most U.S. Embassy country teams around the world, U.S. Defense Attachés participate in and concur with the same process.

²⁵ Jendayi Frazer, "Testimony" Senate, *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa: Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007, <http://www.state.gov> (accessed 1 October 2007).

²⁶ Jim Fisher-Thompson, USINFO Staff Writer, "Africa's Strategic Importance to U.S. Is Growing, Envoy Says," 14 May 2007, <http://usinfo.state.gov> (accessed 22 May 2007).

²⁷ J. Peter Pham, "Getting AFRICOM Right," 15 February 2007, *World Defense Review*, (Address by President George Bush on 7 February 2007), <http://worlddefensereview.com> (accessed 10 September 2007).

²⁸ U.S. Department of State and USAID Strategic Goals: 1. Achieving Peace and Security; 2. Governing Justly and Democratically; 3. Investing in People; 4. Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity; 5. Providing Humanitarian Assistance; 6. Promoting International Understanding; 7. Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities.

On the issue of China, the Department of State's Strategic Plan of 2007-2012 specifically lists as a regional priority that "we will expand dialogue with China, encouraging it to act as a responsible stakeholder in the international system." This ties in with other regional priorities including to "help Africans reform and strengthen their democratic institutions," to "support initiatives, such as the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, that conserve forest and wildlife resources and improve livelihoods" and to "build technical capacity to improve natural resources management and increase agricultural productivity."²⁹ Again, Defense Attachés along with other agency representatives on U.S. Embassy country teams have been part of this dialogue and decision-making process.

On the China issue, U.S. interests indeed overlap China's in areas such as oil purchases, regional stability, and moral leadership. Today's China may have much to offer, but is lacking in a critical principle – freedom. "The brilliance of China's system," writes Trudy Kuehner, "is how it makes people complicit with the unfreedom."³⁰ Hence, we can and should continue to market the attainment of freedom as a priority as important as security. President Bush "has increasingly turned to China on problem after problem: from North Korea to Darfur to the repression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Myanmar." The same news article did intimate that a threat from Hollywood to boycott the Beijing 2008 Olympics most likely convinced China to play a more constructive role in Sudan.³¹ James Fallows gave an optimistic reading about the economic competition between China and the United States. This national correspondent from

²⁹ U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007), 44-45.

³⁰ Trudy Kuehner, "Living Without Freedom: A History Institute for Teachers," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 12, no. 14 (September 2007), [fpri@fpri.org](http://fpri.org) (accessed 19 September 2007).

³¹ Steven Lee Myers, "Look Who's Mr. Fixit for a Fraught Age," *New York Times*, 7 October 2007, "Week in Review" Section, 1.

The Atlantic wrote recently that “America’s economic relationship with China has been successful and beneficial – and beneficial for both sides.”³²

I talk often of my last posting – as Deputy Chief of Mission of U.S. Embassy Praia. Cape Verde continues to honor the memories of the Chinese and Cuban people who came to their aid during their fight for independence from the colonial and then-Fascist rule of Portugal. Nevertheless, Cape Verde remains one of most democratic nations on the continent. In June 2006, for example, Cape Verde hosted NATO’s first Sub-Saharan exercises during which over 7,000 troops from 26 nations descended upon this archipelago. All went well. On Distinguished Visitor (DV) day of “Steadfast Jaguar,” I positioned myself at the airport for the arrival of several visiting U.S. ambassadors and four-star generals to ensure that their staffs and air crews had places to sleep in this small capital with no large hotels. (NATO had made arrangements for the generals.) The point is that this tremendous event, which involved a year a planning with hundreds of Cape Verdean officials, was a great success.

The Chinese and the Europeans have had a tremendous head start! Chinese affairs with Africa date back to early Chinese dynasties, including the Han (206 BC – AD 220), Tang (AD 618 – 907), Song (960-1279), Yuan (1260 – 1368), and Ming (1368 – 1644). There were African slaves in China as far back as the 8th century.³³ The United States has been proactive in Africa at least since 1820, when Congress directed President Monroe to set up the Africa Squadron, which was aimed at interdicting the slave trade between 1820 and 1862.³⁴ We tried for years to break the French oil monopolies in places such as Congo-Brazzaville, and finally

³² James Fallows, “Why China’s Rise Is Good For Us,” *Atlantic*, July/August 2007, 52.

³³ Joseph E. Harris, *Africans and their History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 93-95.

³⁴ Calvin Lane, “The African Squadron: The U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1820-1862,” Mystic Seaport Museum, <http://amistad.mysticseaport.org> (accessed 5 February 2007).

landed oil field contracts in 1995 with the former French colony of Senegal.³⁵ Nevertheless, the first sitting U.S. president to lead an “extended diplomatic mission to Africa intent on improving U.S. – African ties and promoting U.S. trade and investment on the African continent” occurred only in 1998 when President Clinton made a 12-day journey that brought him to Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Therefore, this research has demonstrated that we need not be so overly concerned today about Chinese competition. Nevertheless, we do need to retain the lead on accountability and good governance. Reports from both the Department of Defense and the Department of State indicate that our joint venture is starting well. The next section addresses options for approaches.

RECOMMENDED APPROACHES

1. APPROACHES TO ALLIANCES:

Remain confident that the chief partners of AFRICOM commanders and their staffs shall be colleagues in the Department of State, USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other overseas U.S. Government agencies. There will be some cooperation with the Peace Corps, with the understanding that a legal distance separates their work from that of some aspects of our work, e.g. intelligence gathering. The same applies to many non-governmental organizations.

³⁵ Gordon's, *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 148.

The Department of State places a high premium on building strong bilateral relationships. Unlike the political environment in EUCOM, the U.S. Africa Command will not be able to count too heavily on regional structures. None can be compared with an organization like NATO. The Africa Union (AU) and regional groups are important organizations with which to cooperate but not as critical as our bilateral relationships. This principle applies especially to China, whose ambassadors meet regularly with U.S. ambassadors at our embassies in the capital cities of most, if not all, African states.

2. APPROACHES TO ORGANIZATION:

Since AFRICOM must be organized differently than other commands, give consideration to developing a new set of support branches or offices – either on the continent or in the Pentagon. Though not perfect, the Department of State’s organization might give some clues to an improved arrangement than J1, J2, J3, and so forth.³⁶ In addition to regional bureaus (e.g., the Bureau of African Affairs – AF), there are functional bureaus including: Consular Affairs (CA); Democracy, Human Rights & Labor (DRL); Economic & Business Affairs (EB); Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA); Intelligence & Research (INR); International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL); Oceans, International Environmental & Scientific Affairs (OES); Political-Military Affairs (PM); Population, Refugees & Migration (PRM); War Crimes Issues (S/WCI); and the like. Given that one AFRICOM deputy is a State Department Officer, this may facilitate such creative thinking in organizational planning.

³⁶ Part of this idea, to “get away from the Napoleonic structure,” comes from my advisor, Professor Thomas C. Hone, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. September 2007.

3. APPROACHES TO LOCATION:

Again, consulting with the Department of State (and particularly with its Office of Overseas Buildings Operations – OBO), consider requesting NSDD-38³⁷ authority to attach one or more AFRICOM officers to *many* missions, instead of planning for a larger presence in a *few* missions on the continent. Keep in mind that the normal size of a new agency at a small- or medium-sized U.S. Embassy is one or two American officers plus, perhaps, one locally-hired Foreign Service National (FSN) to do reporting, and one FSN clerk/driver. Nearly all administrative services (including housing) are available from State under a program called the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), of which DoD is a member.

Mobility is a key to this approach. During the worse periods of regional conflict along the West African coast – Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast – I used to joke, not so facetiously, that the United States should just use a ship to serve as a U.S. Embassy off shore, making daily port visits for administrative, consular, and political matters.

Be prepared to move in and out of nations as conflicts grow and die. The Department of State has a long list of partial and complete evacuations of U.S. Embassy personnel and other people from diplomatic posts in Africa. At some posts, we keep packed suitcases ready for quick, unexpected departures. The Department of Defense must plan to be as flexible. There are many arguments for and against either global representation (a U.S. Embassy in every capital city) or regional representation (regional support based in hubs such as Abidjan, Dakar, Nairobi, and Pretoria). There are risks either way. For example, my last visit to Embassy Nairobi was on

³⁷ NSDD-38 is the National Security Directive that requires all agencies to submit requests for new positions to overseas missions to the Department of State and the Ambassadors of the missions affected.

the Friday prior to Friday, 7 August 1998, during which a number of my colleagues were among more than 200 killed and 5,000 wounded by a truck bomb. A brand new state-of-the-art U.S. Embassy sits in Abidjan – another regional center – half vacant because of unanticipated sectarian violence that all but emptied the capital of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast).

Judging from personal experience, I might consider the following locations for small contingents, provided existing chanceries are enlarged or moved to larger spaces: Benin, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and São Tomé & Príncipe.³⁸ I believe it would be in our long-term interests to consider more challenging locations, such as the Central African Republic, but this would depend ultimately on the defined structure of AFRICOM’s organization.

4. APPROACHES TO MODERN AFRICAN LEADERSHIP:

This is the most delicate area of planning for the future. We don’t want to repeat our Cold War initiatives that left tyrants like Mobutu Sese Sekou in power for so long in Zaire. There will be times that regional security shall require us to support undesirable leaders. In a recent speech, Secretary of Defense Gates noted: “It is neither hypocrisy nor cynicism to believe fervently in freedom while adopting different approaches to advancing freedom at different times along the way – including temporarily making common cause with despots to defeat greater or more urgent threats to our freedom or interests.”³⁹ Moreover, we have admitted that the definition of democracy continues to evolve. Nevertheless, we must embark upon a journey

³⁸ We don’t have an Embassy in Sao Tome, but we have a successful VOA station and the U.S. Ambassador to Gabon is accredited to Sao Tome and Principe.

³⁹ Robert M. Gates, Speech to World Forum on the Future of Democracy, Williamsburg, VA, 17 September 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil> (accessed 9 October 2007) .

during which we fight *for* human rights as boldly as we fight *against* terrorism. China cannot yet compete with us in this particular arena.

In Admiral Fallon's 2005 testimony before Congress, he pledged that PACOM would have "an agile, flexible force, forward deployed, ready for immediate employment."⁴⁰ Will AFRICOM be willing and equipped for the same type of preparedness? In these remarks, the former Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command gave reports on our relations and projects with each nation in his Area of Operation. The AFRICOM Commander must be able to do the same. Speaking simply of "West Africa" or "the Great Lakes area" will not suffice. We must differentiate between independent nations. States such as Burundi, the Comoros Islands, and Togo each has an independent vote at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. A coup d'état or war in one of those places is not necessarily similar to a conflict elsewhere. In another example, there is little in common between the states of Equatorial Guinea (African-Spanish history), Guinea-Bissau (African-Portuguese history), and Guinea Conakry (African-French history). The DoD/State partnership (indeed the entire interagency fellowship) shall be invaluable to understanding these unique aspects about this continent.

The new American approach to developmental assistance is emerging under the leadership of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Very briefly, MCC money is granted to nations where corruption is low and democratic institutions are numerous. MCC Compact implementation in Africa has occurred only in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Madagascar. In addition, Compacts have been signed with Lesotho, Mali, Morocco, and

⁴⁰ William J. Fallon, "Testimony," Senate, *U.S. Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 8 March 2005, <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches>.

Mozambique; however, these agreements may be revoked – as has happened in The Gambia – if a nation tumbles below MCC thresholds.⁴¹

Sarah Sewall, writing recently in a magazine for foreign affairs professionals, advocated using principles in the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual to develop tools for a more robust national security strategy. Aiming to protect core human rights – at home and abroad – she pointed out in Section 3-24 that the Field Manual “honestly catalogs the costs and requirements of civilian protection and nation building in pursuit of stability.”⁴²

On both a continental and a country level, our new Ambassador to the African Union (AU) has given a hint to AFRICOM’s future engagement: “We have been on the cutting edge of the AU’s transformation and have had the most incredible access, and will continue to work with them in a ‘hands-on’ approach.”⁴³

5. APPROACHES TO TRAINING:

The Naval War College offers an excellent African Studies Elective to its students. Taking *Introduction to African Cultures and History*, or its equivalent, should be a prerequisite for personnel assigned to the U.S. Africa Command. The good news is that several of my colleagues, who have just completed that course with me, are headed this year to positions within the new AFRICOM offices.

⁴¹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, <http://www.mcc.gov> (accessed 4 September 2007).

⁴² Sarah Sewell, “Crafting a New Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Foreign Service Journal*, September 2007, 33.

⁴³ Jim Fisher-Thompson, USINFO Staff Writer, “Africa’s Strategic Importance to U.S. Is Growing, Envoy Says,” 14 May 2007, <http://usinfo.state.gov> (accessed 22 May 2007).

FIGURE 1:

Morocco first nation to recognize U.S. Independence in 1787

The following is the Treaty of Marrakesh

1787- In the name of God, the merciful. There exists strength and power only by God. From the Servant of God, Mohammed Ibn 'Abd Allah - may God help him - to the President of the United States of America. Salvation be upon him who follows the Righteous Path. We received your letter in which you propose a peace treaty. (We are informing you that) our intention is also to maintain peaceful relations with you. We have also contacted Tunis and Tripoli regarding what you solicited from Our Majesty and all your requests will materialize, God willing. Written on the 15th Dhu al-Qa'da 1202 (July 18, 1787)



The United States and Morocco share an uninterrupted period of friendship starting with Morocco being the first nation to recognize the independence of the United States and to have signed in 1787 a treaty of friendship and cooperation, the first of its kind concluded by the young republic. The American treaty of friendship with Morocco known as the "Treaty of Marrakesh", was signed in 1786, and had been drafted by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.

This was while Great Britain was turning its back on the young republic, ending its protection of all American trade ships sailing in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, Americans were suffering heavy losses from the vicious pirate attacks in the area. Great Britain had even encouraged acts of piracy of vessels flying the American flag. With no friends in the region and no navy to protect its ships, the United States was left defenseless and, according to Thomas Jefferson, incapable of exporting almost one third of its wheat and one fourth of other items produced by the seven states of the union. Attempts made by

the United States to solicit protection and support from France, however, failed since Britain had a stronger position than France in the area. Another attempt was made, and again failed, by turning to the Netherlands in 1782. On February 20, 1778, Sultan Sidi Muhammad bin Abdullah issued a declaration notifying all consuls and European merchants in Tangir, Sale, and Mogador that, "henceforth all vessels flying the American flag might freely enter the Moroccan ports and enjoy in them the same privileges and immunities with those of the other nations with whom the Morocco maintains peace." In response to the Moroccan Sultan's initiative, the United States Congress established a committee to write the draft of the agreement that took a few years to enact. When Benjamin Franklin left Paris in 1785, Thomas Jefferson became the U.S. minister to France. Thereafter, negotiations began between John Adams in London and Jefferson in Paris to form the final form of the "Treaty of Marrakesh" that ultimately was ratified on July 18, 1787. Later, in 1820, the sultan gave further evidence of his friendship with America by presenting the United States with a palace in Tangier. The building is still used by the American consul in that city, and America is the only country to ever receive such an honor from the government of Morocco. Source: The Arab-American Almanac, 5th edition

Arab-American Historian Newsletter

VOL.1 No.2 SPRING 2005

Published by

The Arab-American Historical Foundation

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