U.S. Navy Command and Control in the Aftermath of the Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982
Abstract
In analyzing the development of United States Naval Command and Control (C2) doctrine in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands Campaign, it is evident that the US Navy saw fit to incorporate at least four of the main lessons learned by the protagonists, namely the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander, the need for unity of comand/effort and the means to manage information. The analysis was broken down into two main areas: (1) the flawed British command and control with U.S. Navy lessons learned from Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 incorporated and (2) where the U.S. Navy is considering these lessons learned with command and control doctrine in the 21st Century. The analysis concludes the following: (1) the U.S. Navy took advantage of the British C2 lessons learned from the Falklands Campaign, (2) the U.S. Navy is moving in the right direction in the 21st Century with the writing of new C2 doctrine, focusing on the operational level of war and the creation of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), and (3) the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy is faced with the challenge of implementing the new doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA476618
Entities
People
- Stephen M. Neary
Organizations
- Naval War College