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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**TRAINING GROUND COMBAT FORCES FOR
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**

by

R. Jenks Reid

Colonel, USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

06 Nov 2007

Abstract

This paper explores how our military combat training centers are currently training Army ground forces for counterinsurgency. Although the training centers have done a good job transforming from the cold war to the war on terror, training objectives must be continually refined in order to train the force. Training objectives for commanders and their staffs at the tactical level are lacking and not fully developed and more importantly are not synchronized and nested with the joint task force commander's campaign plans, goals, and objectives in Iraq. This is an important topic because it suggests there is not a mechanism or system currently in place to ensure that we are fully training our tactical commanders and staffs in all aspects of the counterinsurgency and in line with the operational commander's vision for the end state. It suggests further that if we were to get the training right it could have far reaching impacts on our ability to better provide military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR).

INTRODUCTION

The United States Army combat training centers (CTCs) are currently training Army ground forces to fight against the insurgency in Iraq. Although the training centers have done a good job transforming from the cold war to the war on terror, much still needs to be done at the tactical level (battalion, brigade, and division) to better train the force to achieve operational objectives downrange. Training objectives for tactical commanders and their staffs at the combat training centers are lacking and not fully developed and more importantly are not synchronized and nested with the joint task force commander's campaign plans, goals, and objectives in Iraq.

Training objectives developed by tactical leaders at the battalion, brigade, and division level and employed at our training centers are not synchronized or nested with the operational war fighting commander's goals and objectives on the ground in Iraq today. In other words, a gap exists between what the JTF commander in Iraq is trying to accomplish in wartime versus what tactical leaders are attempting to accomplish during training at our combat training centers. If we could bridge this gap we could better focus pre-deployment training for our battalion, brigade, and division level commanders in the Army and United States Marine Corps at the combat training centers which would produce a more combat capable force for the operational commander. There are few mechanisms in place to ensure that our tactical ground force leaders, commanders, and staffs are being fully trained in all aspects of the counterinsurgency and in line with the operational commander's vision for end state downrange. This paper will attempt to answer several questions with respect to this topic. What are the theater-strategic and operational objectives in Iraq and how well nested are training objectives at our CTCs nested with them? What caused the gap between the

operational objectives of the JTF Commander in Iraq and the military training objectives of ground combat forces conducting pre-deployment training at the military combat training centers? What impact do doctrine, CTC history, and institutional training philosophy have on the relationship between operational campaign plans and goals training objectives at the CTCs? And finally, what should military leaders do now to bridge the gap?

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

One must understand the theater-strategic and operational goals in Iraq to better understand the disparity between training objectives at the CTCs and the objectives downrange. The current theater-strategic objectives are found in the National Security Council's "Victory in Iraq" dated November 2005. The strategy relies on a sustained effort by hundreds of thousands of Americans, military and civilian, in the security, political, economic, and diplomatic realms. Military planners have broken down the political, security, and economic strategy into eight pillars:¹

- Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency
- Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance
- Help Iraqis Form a National Compact for Democratic Government
- Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services
- Help Iraq Strengthen its Economy
- Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights
- Increase International Support for Iraq
- Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents²

An example of operational level campaign goals and objectives that supported the theater-strategic objectives can be seen in the campaign plan developed by Multinational Division-Baghdad planners in 2005. Major General Peter Chiarelli, the division commander, said, "my command adhered to an overall thematically based commander's intent and

¹ U.S. National Security Council, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, Washington, D.C., Nov 2005, 25.

² Ibid, 25-26.

maintained orientation on a well-founded operational campaign plan balanced across six integrated conceptual lines of operation (LOOs). The LOOs moved incrementally and cumulatively toward decisively accomplishing the ultimate goal of shifting Iraq away from instability towards a safe and secure environment.³ The six lines of operations are:

- Combat Operations
- Train and Employ Security Forces
- Essential Services
- Promote Governance
- Economic Pluralism
- Info Operations⁴

Combat missions in support of lines of operation such as these many times are characterized by non-kinetic operations where information exchange, civil-military operations, negotiations, and employment of governmental and nongovernmental agencies are the centerpiece. In order to prepare ground combat forces to wage war in this type of environment, similar lines of training should be employed at the combat training centers. Planners should focus training and develop scenarios at the CTCs that support this type of combat. Furthermore, division and brigade commanders, staffs, and other key leaders should use the JTF commander's LOOs as a guide when developing training objectives for home station and the combat training centers. Heavily armored formations conducting synchronized maneuver over large portions of the training area should give way to smaller, lighter forces that conduct combat patrols, establish check points, and engage the local population with themes and messages, information operations, negotiations, and civil military operations. Training should be tailored with emphasis on less kinetic missions and the "soft" skills required for success. Unfortunately, planning along these lines does not

³ MG Peter W. Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations", *Military Review* (July/August): 5, quoted in The United States Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Department*, NWC 6017.

⁴ Ibid, 7.

routinely and consistently happen and training objectives remain unlinked with much of the current action on the ground in Iraq. Training at the combat training centers continues to be characterized by violent and kinetic force-on-force actions, heavy mounted maneuver operations, and centralized FOB operations. This trend is exemplified by recent training at the National Training Center and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

In April 2007 a modular heavy brigade combat team (BCT) conducted a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) for Operation Iraqi Freedom at the National Training Center (NTC). The training goals and objectives of the brigade commander for the rotation were to conduct training focused on deployment and RSOI, BCT and subordinate mission essential tasks, command and control operations, ISR, FOB operations, and sustainment operations.⁵ The commander requested that his units were to be trained via situational training exercises, force on force scenarios, and live fire events. All but 6 of the 26 mission sets that the commander requested involved kinetic combat tasks such as cordon and search, sniper operations, vehicle checkpoints, and convoy security.⁶ Historically the NTC has emphasized live fire training for combat arms formations (armor, infantry, and artillery) and during this rotation all elements, including combat support and combat service support such as EOD, MP, PSYOP, civil affairs, COMCAM, engineers, and other combat multipliers conducted all phases of live fire.⁷ This illustrates that the training emphasis was weighted towards mastering security operations as opposed to improving the core competencies and unique skill sets of these forces. Less emphasis was placed on non-kinetic tasks such as SWEAT-MS assessments, negotiations, and information operations which are proving to be at the

⁵ COL Thomas S. James, Commander, 4th BCT, 3rd ID, Fort Stewart, GA, to Commander FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-TRC, Ft McPherson, GA, memorandum, 23 Oct 06, 2.

⁶ Ibid, 3.

⁷ Ibid, 4.

center of all combat operations downrange. Training plans like this at the NTC, although useful in preparation for many security operations in Iraq, are not structured to support the JTF commander's campaign goals and objectives of stability, reconstruction, and transition. An imbalance of kinetic training over non-kinetic training at the NTC does not prepare battalion and brigade leaders and staffs to confront complex problems inherent in lines of operations associated with promoting governance, ensuring economic pluralism, building infrastructure, and providing essential services.

Another example of the disparity between JTF campaign goals and training objectives at the CTCs can be seen in Army training conducted in Germany. In March 2007 a BCT conducted an Mission Rehearsal Exercise for Operation Iraqi Freedom at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). Division and brigade leaders requested scenarios that were designed to test their units on mostly lethal and kinetic combat skills such as attack, raid, cordon and search, and air assault.⁸ The division and brigade commander endorsed a training plan that resulted in limited training for tactical leaders and staffs in information operations, civil military operations, bi-lateral negotiations, and liaison with outside agencies.⁹ Instead, training consisted of small unit live fire exercises, air assault training to support urban raids and ambushes, and convoy live fire events. In all cases training plans like this are not nested and synchronized with the operational commander's goals and objectives in Iraq.

It is important for tactical training at the CTCs to be nested with operational campaign goals and objectives in order to achieve strategic success in Iraq. From these two examples and from similar training exercises that occur routinely across the Army combat

⁸ MG Frank G. Helmick, CG, USA, SETAF, Vicenza, Italy, to CG 7th USA Joint Multinational Training Center, APO AE 09114, memorandum, 6 Apr 06, Appendix B, 1.

⁹ Ibid, 3.

training centers and at home station, it is evident that a gap exists between operational campaign goals and objectives of the JTF Commander in Iraq and the military training objectives at the CTCs. To overcome the gap it is necessary to understand why it exists. The gap can be traced to three important and related elements - relevant training doctrine, history and parochialism of the CTCs, and the prevailing training philosophy of Army leaders.

Prior to the war on terrorism, the Army trained for war by employing a combined arms approach to operations from company through corps echelon. The 1982 and 1986 versions of Army Field Manual 100-5 described the Army's belief in "AirLand Battle", an orchestrated assault on a large, conventionally armed enemy using synchronized operations and an attack throughout its depths.¹⁰ Training was focused on heavily armored ground maneuver forces of tanks, armored infantry carriers, artillery, and attack helicopters and the infantry and armor divisions were envisioned as the core fighting force for ground combat. The 1976 doctrine set as its priority the defense of NATO Europe against a quantitatively superior Warsaw Pact and it accepted force ratios as a primary determinant of battle outcomes and argued the virtues of armored warfare and the combined arms team.¹¹ The Army combat training centers were developed in the early 1980's to support this training doctrine and for the past 25 years the CTCs have been the world's premier training centers for combined arms and maneuver warfare.

Since the end of the Cold War the nature of warfare changed which demanded a change in doctrine. Army views about warfare have shifted from major combat operations that airland battle once supported to smaller scale contingencies supported by emerging

¹⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Affairs*, review of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, reviewed by Elliott A. Cohen, July/August 1994, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940701fabook8740/u-s-department-of-the-army/u-s-army-field-manual-100-5-fighting-future-wars.html> (accessed 16 Oct 07).

¹¹ U.S. Army, *Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), v.

counterinsurgency doctrine. In this new era of warfare the Army's ability to rapidly project combat power, dominate the battle space, and quickly achieve operational success in the stability and support phase of a campaign is being tested. The counterinsurgency campaign is...a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of both familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. Leaders at all levels must adjust their approach constantly, ensuring that their elements are ready each day to be greeted with a handshake or a hand grenade, to be nation builders as well as warriors, to help re-establish institutions and local security forces, to assist in the rebuilding of infrastructure and basic services, and to facilitate the establishment of local governance and the rule of law.¹²

Unfortunately, tactical leaders have not fully embraced this doctrine and incorporated it into their training plans for Iraq and the CTCs have not transformed into training areas that fully implement the principles of counterinsurgency doctrine.

National level guidance is emerging that will further influence training doctrine. In November 2005 Department of Defense Policy Directive 3000.05 was signed which makes the military's support for stability operations a core military mission. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.¹³ SSTR activities occur after decisive operations end and phase IV operations commence. The goal

¹² U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 23-4, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 16 June 2006 (Final Draft), Foreword

¹³ Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, DC: DoD, 28 Nov 05), quoted in The U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Department*, NWC 3140, 2.

of SSTR is to secure essential services, allow the local population and government to function on its own, develop an economy that works, and reinstitute the rule of law and democracy.¹⁴ SSTR tasks include rebuilding the government and private sector and it employs military and civilian teams from within the United States government, foreign government, international organizations, and private contractors.¹⁵ The objective is to provide operational commanders with a military capability to support SSTR which spans six broad areas of post-conflict operations:

- Security
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Infrastructure Restoration and Essential Services
- Governance
- Social Reconciliation and Negotiations
- Economic Development¹⁶

Military support for SSTR and DOD Directive 3000.05 may be viewed by many as a revolution in military affairs and only through training will the military become adept at this new core competency. Combat training centers must develop scenarios that incorporate the complexities of SSTR in order to provide the best opportunity for training ground forces. This is true especially since tactical ground force commanders at the battalion, brigade, and division level are being called on more and more to execute post combat activities. Unfortunately combat training centers are not focused on SSTR and training remains lethal and kinetic and in many ways is a throw back to the cold war. Commanders in the field must develop and implement training strategies that support the operational commander's campaign goals and objectives in Iraq.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, DC: DoD, 28 Nov 05), quoted in The U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Department*, NWC 3140, 2.

¹⁵ Ibid, 2.

¹⁶ Professor George Oliver, "Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction" (lecture, The Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 20 Sep 2007).

Although some training scenarios at the CTCs have been adjusted to reflect realities of the counterinsurgency environment in Iraq, the institutions themselves must fundamentally change in order to support the operational commanders downrange. A review the history of the CTCs is useful to understand why changing these institutions is difficult.

For much of the Army's history, training was accomplished by individual units focused on those tasks that were essential to the completion of their wartime missions. Training was, and for the most part still is, accomplished at duty stations around the world. However, resource constraints at these installations limit our ability to conduct realistic, simulated combat training under stressful conditions. Until 1973, Army units followed the Army Training Program, which allotted time to specific subjects but did not dictate how well soldiers had to execute specific combat-related tasks. The first commander of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William F. DePuy, changed that concept.¹⁷

Gen DePuy realized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat and one of the three new training methods he implemented was the Combat Training Center Program. The Combat Training Center Program established specific places where units could go to perform force-on-force training in a field environment, under stressful and realistic simulated combat conditions, with established standards and evaluation procedures.¹⁸

For over 25 years the CTCs have offered a training opportunity that cannot be replicated at a unit's home station. The training is all encompassing, from preparing

¹⁷ Greg Reeson, Train as You Fight: The Development of the US Army's Combat Training Centers, How the CTCs Prepare Soldiers for War, 29 Jun 06, 1. http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/40866/train_as_you_fight_the_development.html?page1 (accessed 1 Oct 07).

¹⁸ Ibid, 2.

personnel and equipment for deployment to a theater of operations, to pre-combat actions at a forward staging base, to conducting tactical combat operations, to re-deploying from a combat theater. Unit commanders experience unique training with joint, coalition, and multinational partners and civilian role players, media on the battlefield, and fictional host-nation forces. Commanders receive unbiased feedback that offers a realistic evaluation of the unit's readiness for deployment and combat operations.¹⁹ The Army's Combat Training Centers provide the Army with one of the most important elements in training for possible future missions. The National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Joint Multinational Readiness Center have historically been custom tailored to a different theater of operation in which the Army may have to conduct missions. This approach has led to parochialism and deeply entrenched "personality traits" at each of the CTCs that must be overcome in order to better support the operational commander in Iraq.

The NTC, developed in the late 1970s, encompasses 640,000 acres of harsh desert environment and provides participating units with combat scenarios in a mid- to high-intensity environment applicable to Europe, Asia, or the Middle East.²⁰ Traditionally, armored and mechanized brigades and task forces supported by USAF close air support have trained at the NTC and over the years it has become known as the premier combat training center for mounted maneuver warfare.

Building on the success of the National Training Center, the Army developed a CTC in the early 1980s for its infantry, airborne, and special operations forces. The Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, provides realistic, simulated

¹⁹ Greg Reeson, Train as You Fight: The Development of the US Army's Combat Training Centers, How the CTCs Prepare Soldiers for War, 29 Jun 06, 8. http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/40866/train_as_you_fight_the_development.html?page8 (accessed 1 Oct 07).

²⁰ Ibid, 6.

combat training for light infantry brigade and battalion task forces. Each scenario is based on a U.S. task force deploying to a mythical island nation to assist in repelling a hostile invader, but it offers one unique tool to participating units: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). Fort Polk has a state-of-the-art MOUT facility that includes a mock city, an airfield facility, and a military compound that provides realistic training in third world urban warfare scenarios.²¹ Over the years JRTC has earned the unofficial nick name “light fighter training capital of the world.”

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) located at Hohenfels, Germany, is the European equivalent of a combined NTC and JRTC, with a recently added emphasis on multinational training. The JMRC provides combined arms training for U.S. heavy, light, and special operations units based in Europe and due to its central location now caters to numerous multinational and coalition forces supporting the global war on terror. Units training at JMRC prepare for deployment to the Middle East and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.²²

The CTCs have not fundamentally changed from the cold war training period. Furthermore, training goals and objectives at the CTCs are not synchronized and nested with the operational commander’s campaign goals and objectives in Iraq. The operational commander’s objective is to accomplish a variety of complex tasks across multiple lines of operation that rely heavily on tactical level leaders engaging the enemy with a variety of non-kinetic military operations. The operational commander is focused on military support to

²¹ Greg Reeson, Train as You Fight: The Development of the US Army’s Combat Training Centers, How the CTCs Prepare Soldiers for War, 29 Jun 06, 6. http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/40866/train_as_you_fight_the_development.html?page6 (accessed 1 Oct 07).

²² Ibid, 7.

SSTR. Unfortunately training at the CTCs continues to focus on lethal and kinetic security operations at the small unit level.

Lack of change at the CTC can be attributed to an enduring and deeply rooted training philosophy. There are a number of problems that persist today that leads to the lack of synchronization between training objectives of tactical commanders, training at the CTCs and operational objectives of the joint force commander in Iraq. The problems can be traced to five aspects of Army training philosophy that impact on the CTCs. The five problems are a lack of shared training vision, commander's prerogative, lack of oversight, time available for training, and outdated senior mentors.

The process for establishing the training objectives at the maneuver CTC should be a shared process between training unit commanders, training center leaders, and operational commanders. The most important input into the training plan is the operational commander who establishes the overall training objectives that are based on his goals and objectives in Iraq. Unfortunately, this collective meeting of the minds between these leaders does not occur. For this reason the training objectives at the CTCs are not nested and synchronized with the operational commander's objectives in Iraq.

The combat training center and all of its resources exist to support the training unit commander and it is the unit commander's prerogative to train as he sees fit as long as he is not violating guidance from higher authority. CTCs facilitate combat training for the commander like a retail business provides goods and services to a customer. Commanders develop training objectives based on unit METL and provide the objectives to the CTC where a planning staff develops a training scenario that supports the objectives of the "customer". The CTC facilitates the training process with men, equipment, and resources to

best support the training unit or. Unfortunately, and all too often, commanders train on the tasks that they believe are important, which is their prerogative, but which are not nested with the operational commander's campaign goals and objectives. Also, they tend to train in their comfort zone that is also their prerogative, and forgo the unwieldy military tasks that support SSTR. Instead they request CTC scenarios that support "old school" training where they revert to executing airland battle doctrine that dominated their careers for the past 20 to 25 years. There may be a need for high intensity combat training to fight future wars, but military support to stability and support operations is most important today and the training process demands some oversight if we are to get the training right.

Another element of training that compounds the problem is lack of central oversight. Although the CTCs develop training scenarios in conjunction with the tactical commanders, there is no central oversight in the Army or at the joint staff level to approve CTC scenarios and to ensure training supports the operational commander's campaign goals and objectives. There is also no central clearing house that develops standards and approves training scenarios.

The wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan have stretched the ability of the Army and Marines to properly prepare and train ground forces for combat. Commanders do not have time available for training like they had before. The standard training model for a unit training up for a CTC rotation used to be 6 months. Now it is expected and accepted that a tactical unit commander gets only two to four weeks of pre-deployment training at home station prior to an MRE.

One unique aspect of the Army CTC program is its senior observers who are retired senior general officers personally appointed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to oversee

training. Their role is to coach and mentor the rotational unit's senior leaders and staff while also providing feedback to the Army's senior leadership. Over the years the source pool of senior mentors has decreased and the ones that remain are outdated with respect to tactics, techniques, and procedures employed downrange which leads to their loss of relevancy when advising tactical commanders at the CTCs. Retirees like GENs Joulwan, Crouch, and Meigs provide interesting insights into the airland battle but their usefulness in coaching, teaching, and mentoring current military leaders in the counterinsurgency is questionable.

CONCLUSION

It is critically important for training goals and objectives at the US Army combat training centers to be nested and synchronized with operational goals and objectives in Iraq.

Unfortunately, not all training at the combat training centers is in line with operations in Iraq due to a number of reasons. The "gap" that is created causes friction between commanders, it leads to a waste of precious training time at home, and it produces a trained and ready ground combat force that is not fully prepared to operate in an environment that is largely characterized by military missions that require support to stability, security, reconstruction, and transition. We are fortunate that the gap has been identified and in some cases action is being taken to narrow the difference between training and execution. Operational commanders are in a position to solve the problem when they engage the training institution, disseminate training guidance, develop training standards, and accept only those ground combat forces that have been generated by ARFORGEN. This will ensure a trained and ready ground combat force led by tactical commanders and supported by staffs that are prepared to meet the challenges of combat in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Army leaders can significantly close gap that exists between training goals and objectives at the Army CTCs and the operational commander's campaign goals and objectives in Iraq. Five "imperatives" can be instituted that will fill the gap that currently exists and that will lead to proper nesting and synchronization of training objectives at the CTCs and the operational commander's goals and objectives in Iraq.

Firstly, and most importantly, the operational commander in Iraq must provide guidance and expectations for training at the CTCs. The operational commander's staff should develop a list of wartime mission essential tasks that support current lines of operation and send it to the CTCs every 90 days. There must be open and honest dialogue from downrange back to the combat training centers as witnessed during LTG Chiarelli's tenure as Commander, MNF-I. LTG Chiarelli held quarterly secure VTCs with senior trainers including the combat training centers to offer his insights, lessons learned, and commander's intent for training at the CTCs. In the end he tasked the CTCs to accomplish specific training that supported his efforts downrange. For example in late 2006 he insisted on creative training scenarios at the CTCs that would directly support his ability to help the Iraqi President create political solutions to make violence go away in Iraq. He stressed that the government of Iraq must take positive steps forward and he need tactical leaders that could assist in the process. LTG Chiarelli specifically tasked the CTCs to integrate more "friendlies" into training scenarios with emphasis on escalation of force and ROE training. He said that he also needed the CTCs to change all rotation culminating exercises to emphasize non-kinetic rather than kinetic operations. In his view troops were all too often arriving in theater fresh from the CTCs having just completed violent, aggressive, kinetic

combat training. He stressed the need for trained troops with less aggressive and violent attitudes that could more easily assimilate into the current operational environment of Iraq.²³ LTG Chiarelli's open dialogue and direct emphasis during this first VTC was followed by several others and marked a first for any operational commander in Iraq and should be a model for future operational commanders to follow.

Operational campaign plans must be developed with continuity of rotational forces in mind. One plan should be developed and passed from one operational commander to the next as opposed to successive commanders and staffs developing new plans every 12 to 18 months. A single, well developed operational plan supported by logical and well developed lines of operation that is disseminated throughout the Army would ensure quality training at the CTCs. It would foster a training environment where brigade and division commanders and training center leaders spent more time nesting their training goals and objectives with higher intent and less time training on cold war tactics, techniques, and procedures because of a lack of guidance from the boss.

Operational commanders must insist that the Army reinstitute and update lesson plans for all Leader Training Programs at the CTCs in order to develop battalion, brigade, and division staffs that are better equipped to operate in the current environment of Iraq. This is especially important when brigade and division level commanders are more and more the focal point for stability, security, reconstruction, and transition operations in Iraq. In many cases these commanders are being tasked to conduct missions that impact diplomatic, informational, and economic lines of operation that they and their staffs are not trained to handle. They would greatly benefit from training scenarios that emphasize information

²³ Notes, video teleconference between LTG Chiarelli and all Commanders of the Combat Training Centers, 11 Oct 06.

operations and civil military operations taught by experts from intergovernmental offices such as the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Justice.

Operational commanders must call on United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and specifically the Combat Training Center Directorate of Combined Arms Command, to take centralized control of the combat training center program and direct the CTCs to follow their specific operational guidance. This effort would standardize CTC training and eliminate disparity from one training center to the next.

Continuous, full-spectrum expeditionary operations are the new reality and implementation of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will provide commanders the necessary time to train before deploying. Until now commanders have rushed through critical training events and have barely reached acceptable levels of collective training prior to deploying. To meet this challenge the Army is developing a process of force generation to provide operational commanders and civil authorities with rapidly deployable, employable, and sustainable forces tailored to specific mission requirements. Army Force Generation leverages new unit designs and operational cycles to provide a sustained deployment posture of operationally ready units. The ARFORGEN process allows commanders to identify predictable deployment windows and manage readiness and training of forces accordingly.²⁴

SUMMARY

It is critical that operational commanders in Iraq exert influence over training at the Army CTCs in order to ensure proper nesting and synchronization of training objectives with operational goals and objectives. A gap exists between training objectives and operational objectives because of doctrine, combat training center parochialism, and current training

²⁴ U.S. Army Posture Statement, *Addendum E Army Force Generation Model – ARFORGEN*, http://www.army.mil/APS/06/maindocument/print/Text_addendum_E.html (accessed 22 Sep).

philosophy. Only when operational commanders get involved in the training process will training improve and the gap be narrowed. They must provide guidance to commanders and trainers based on the current environment in Iraq, develop campaign plans for continuity between force rotations, insist on revamped LTPs that teach leaders the principles of counterinsurgency and SSTR, demand TRADOC take centralized control of training at the CTCs to ensure standard programs of instruction, and accept only forces generated by ARFORGEN which will ensure units are best postured with respect to personnel, equipment, and training readiness.

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