Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)
Abstract
This monograph is one of a series produced as part of the RAND Corporation's research project for the U.S. Department of Defense on how to improve U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. It should be of interest to persons in the government who are concerned with COIN issues and to scholars working in this field. The project will culminate in a report that builds on these earlier should be noted that as of this publication date, it is still not clear how the political-security situation in Iraq will eventually turn out. In particular, the authors maintain considerable doubt as to whether Iraq can reconcile the divisions between the Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish elements of the population. Nevertheless, the reduced level of violence as of early 2008 was an encouraging development. That said, the authors view is that our examination of U.S. political and military challenges in Iraq from 2003 2006 has important implications for improving future counterinsurgency strategy and capabilities. Iraq presents an example of a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and persistent criminal opportunists some combination of forces likely to be replicated in insurgencies in other troubled states in the future. In that sense, this monograph highlights national capability gaps which persist despite the adoption and improved execution of counterinsurgency methods in Iraq.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA476633
Entities
People
- Bruce R. Pirnie
- Edward O'connell
Organizations
- RAND Corporation