

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 06 11 2007		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Chaplains and Joint Professional Military Education: Why Am I Here?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Brent William Scott Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The joint operations culture, birthed in the Petri dish of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, continues to develop with its own unique doctrine, dialect, and planning ritual. Analysis indicates that military chaplains assigned to this environment are unequipped to work within the joint culture as their expertise focuses primarily at the tactical level of war. This paper argues that chaplains working at the operational level require the same Joint Military Professional Education (JPME) as their line counterparts in order to learn the language and context exceptional to the joint environment. Then utilizing the fluency of that language, military chaplains, as essential staff officers are able to serve as trusted and capable advisors to the operation. Additionally, this analysis contends that the Joint Forces Chaplain (JFCH), equipped with JPME, works as a force multiplier and renders legitimacy in his role and relationship with the operational commander. Finally, the paper offers recommendations in preparing a "pool" of qualified chaplains from which selections to Unified and Subordinate Commands are made.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Military Chaplains, JPME					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 25	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

Military Chaplains and Joint Professional Military Education: Why Am I Here?

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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6 November 2007

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Abstract of

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Contents

Introduction	1
The Military Culture and Language	2
Joint Culture and Language	4
Chaplains in the Mix	7
The Equipping Mandate for the Joint Forces Chaplain	10
Where's the Rub?	14
Conclusion	17
APPENDIX A	19
APPENDIX B	20
Notes	21
Bibliography	24

Introduction

Bob Dylan was right. “Times ... they are a changin.”¹ Incremental, yet dramatic winds of change affect our global landscape in 2007, likewise transforming our nation’s vista. The American military, to keep in step, has altered how she views war and the way she plans and fights her wars. A half century ago, our strategy for defense fixated upon one enemy or variants of the same, preparing for the imminent possibility of another large and conventional conflict, to be fought in a time and place we could predict. Today, political and military leaders are required to scan the horizon in a different way. With one eye, they look at the likelihood of smaller, indiscriminate wars, limited contingencies, flash points of crisis, and activities requiring deterrence - where often there is no army or navy to combat. With the other, they maintain a fix on the dreaded possibility of another “big war” requiring a big force to employ conventional arms and methods of warfare.

Offering one response of many to this change in global mission and the wide range of military operations possible across the planet, the military has purposed to meld its service communities and their capabilities into a unique culture of operations. Joined in paradox by both its merged capabilities and the resolve to protect individual Service qualities, today our joint military force executes across a wide continuum of uncertainties, recognizing that not all needed competencies rest in one Service branch. This joint culture, as it seeks to build common ground, constructs its own way of communicating, planning, operating, and cooperating to achieve unity of effort in the field.

In recent years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed senior military chaplains into this fledgling joint environment and assigned them to serve Geographic, Functional, and Subordinate Joint Force Commanders who control forces from each of the

Services. Most of these men and women, unfamiliar with the joined military world, face the challenges of a mission mandate quite different from the norm. Therefore, the analysis of this project works to demonstrate that as this new culture demands the effective and qualified presence of a chaplain, military chaplains at the operational level require the same Joint Military Professional Education as their “line” counterparts in order to learn the language and context exceptional to the joint environment. Then utilizing the fluency of that language, these same chaplains are able to serve as trusted and capable advisors to the operation.

The Military Culture and Language

Culture is all about common ground. It makes necessary connections between people who share a way of life, a body of common understandings, and the values appreciated and taught from within. Culture speaks to the predictable and patterned ways that people behave and relate within their group, and provides a language crucial for those same individuals to convey the routine and ritual of the life they share.² In every group where there is common ground, predictable patterns and the arrangement of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are then expressed in a meaningful language of sounds and symbols understood by the group.

The military has its own culture and language to describe the common ground from which she operates. The men and women of the armed forces “share an identity fashioned by an always distinctive, frequently compelling, and occasionally peculiar military culture.”³ This culture, a microcosm of American life, embraces its own body of sacred traditions, writings, and rituals, that exist alongside sometimes “transgressive counterparts”; the caricatures and antics sometimes played out within its ranks.⁴ All are a parcel of the military way of life.

Additionally there are conscious and articulated values of the military community, normative statements that reflect the attitudes, hopes, and beliefs common to all. Partnered with the grammar describing the military's values, sounds and symbols tout what is fundamentally important to service men and women and render a vocabulary used to function daily. Arguably, the military culture and its unique language provide members an identity, offer a common way of coping with the challenges of life, and render a control mechanism that guides and shapes behavior.⁵

One must acknowledge that within the war fighting culture critical distinctions exist among the Service branches, and for good reason. Differences reflect particular traditions that enhance esprit de corps and provide capability specialization. Yet when the aim is interoperability, challenges are present too.

For example, at the center of the Army's culture is the connection it has with the populace, a Service birthed from among the people with a commitment to protect the people. In its mind, as the loyal steward of the nation's profession of arms, the Army speaks via the language of doctrine and national policy. In contrast, "doctrine" is a word largely missing from the Navy's vocabulary. The institution of the Navy emerges from a culture of tradition, resulting in a language derived from life at sea, a sufficient foundation in its mind to give clarity and direction for the future. Naval strategy and tactics develop at will, at sea, not from a desk in Washington. The Air Force, not bound to tradition or doctrine at all, operates void of an integrating vision. Freedom of flight is the passion of the Air Force, with its culture and language focused upon technologically advanced platforms and gadgetry.⁶ Finally, the Marine Corps, unlike any other Service embraces a "one of a kind" capability and passion. The Marine lexicon resonates with sounds and symbols rooted in a history

replete with an amphibious way of life and tales of great battles that connect the Corps to national pride.

Though some contend with his generalizations, long-time Pentagon reporter Arthur Hadley uses the officer ranks of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, as he further builds on the idea of the individual cultures within the broader culture.

Conflicting subcultures have long been a part of the military culture. Since Army officers work in a close-knit team of others in combat, the officers are more supportive of teamwork ... Naval officers have an independence of operation, a sense of isolation from other parts of the defense world ... and Air Force officers, removed from the effects of combat tend to embrace technical solutions to problems.⁷

All of these distinctions, though destined to create some measure of tension when brought together, serve to produce a Service synergy, a bolstered and viable culture when merged in the battle-space.

Joint Culture and Language

The joint operations culture, birthed in the Petri dish of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, continues to develop in spite of certain challenges. The strain of the individual Services to maintain their uniqueness alongside the challenge of reaching toward convergence has created a sort of “cultural schizophrenia.” One voice in this tension of two realities presses commanders to push particular war fighting functions into rigid stovepipes, all the while looking for the “specialist,” and insisting on the narrow view of the “right Service at the right time for the right job.”⁸ The other voice argues that because different force components can perform many of the same functions, the key to increasing combat effectiveness is to “combine forces in ways that would result in greater force output than could possibly be generated by a single service.”⁹ Yet, despite this tug-of-war between synergy and

specialization, *jointness* continues to mature and produce a viable culture that merges to produce a codified body of understanding, a useful and common language, and the planning “rituals” necessary for executing on the ground of joint operations.

The joint culture, like most communities, has become guardian to its own revered text, an essential body of understanding that offers guidance and a shared way of thinking for the operational environment. This guidance or *doctrine*, rich in concept and principal, communicates a standard in over seventy-three written “pubs” expressed in a fluid “dialogue that takes place between the past and the present for the benefit of future operations.”¹⁰ The purpose of doctrine tells how forces will fight together and uses a language that synchronizes mission and men through both art and science in order to execute across the range of operations. There are “pubs” guiding kinetic operations like Fire Support Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, Amphibious Operations JP 3-02, and Forcible Entry Ops JP 3-18, as well as those that support non-kinetic missions like Humanitarian Assistance JP 3-29, Health Support JP 4-02, and Peace Operations JP 3-07.3. Admittedly, most chaplains by virtue of their narrow training and experience are “deaf and dumb” to joint doctrine; an important admission as this study proceeds.

Furthermore, there is a distinct and common *dialect* in the joint culture that consists of a bewildering array of symbols and sounds. Though most chaplains are proficient in the daily dialect of their own Service, this language filled with a vocabulary particular to the operational or joint context, presents a challenge to the military chaplain’s effectiveness at the operational level of war. Ideas such as “synchronization,” “war gaming,” “operational design,” and “center of gravity” represent over 6400 terms and ideas that fill the lexicon of the joint world. Even more complex, these concepts are often tediously “acronized” as a sort

of fluent code designed to save time and space on paper. In some cases, joint dialogue is ridiculously laden with abbreviation. Such contrived language may sound something like this: “The JPG looked across the ROMO, and determined it was a NEO, with perhaps HA/DR and PEO, resulting in the JFCH assisting with the IO.”¹¹ Few chaplains have communicated with such grammar, a deficiency if their requirement is to interoperate with others immersed in the joint culture and language.

Interestingly, at the heart of this unique environment is a ritual in which the Services plan and orchestrate their operations together. This ritual or *planning process* performed by cells or planning teams work to make informed decisions and solve complex problems that affect operations at every level of war. Joint planning supports a continuum of missions from crises that demand a compressed timeline, to lengthy and deliberate operations. As the scope of this paper suggests, the chaplain who deliberately seeks to engage in this ritual has the potential of making an impact across this Range of Military Operations (ROMO), but will need more than the skills and experience developed at the tactical level to become a trusted and capable advisor to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Moreover, if the military chaplain serving at the operational level hopes to contribute and inject his expertise into the planning ritual, it is imperative that he gain a practical and capable understanding of this Service culture called “joint.”

The critical questions then arise: Where will a military chaplain learn of the language, the planning process, and the doctrinal framework so valuable to his work in the joint culture? Moreover, how will he make use of these cultural fundamentals to provide effective support to the Commander?

Chaplains in the Mix

As mandated by the First Amendment, and later codified for military personnel by the Department of Defense (DoD), U. S. military commanders are charged with the responsibility to ensure religious freedoms are met through qualified chaplains who provide for the “free exercise of religion and serve as an advisor to the commander.”¹² Remarkably, military chaplains regardless of their individual function or degree of responsibility have sought to meet this expectation solely at the tactical level of war. For the most part, even senior chaplains have limited their engagement to the care of personnel and the advisory role of commanders at the lowest levels, largely neglecting responsibilities unique to the operational level.¹³

Fundamentally, chaplains have a rich history that ties them to the tactical level.

Military historian Martin Blumenson agrees:

Most people who have served in the military are likely to remember a “padre” to whom the homesick, heartsick, lovelorn, and battle-worn turned for counsel. Indeed, the chaplain’s role has barely changed in centuries. In addition to officiating at religious services and facilitating religious practice, they foster good morale, offer counsel and guidance, and put themselves everywhere they deem their presence to be necessary.¹⁴

Chaplains have learned the necessity of building such critical bridges inside the culture they serve. They have discovered that there is nothing more disastrous, than to demand an audience, to challenge preferences, and speak into lives “without first earning the trust of the tribe.”¹⁵ Credible connections between a chaplain and his unit are key tactical requirements.

The advisory role outlined by the DoD underlines the same concern. Although the Commander bears the ultimate responsibility for the religious and moral life, as well as morale within the command, the chaplain at the tactical level works as advisor to the

commander in these matters, with the expectation that he will “display appropriate initiative to that end.”¹⁶ Military chaplains have historically responded to this commission in two ways: by serving as a “barometer” of the culture, helping to gauge and interpret the strength of unit morale and morals for the commander, and by creating or facilitating instructional programs that indirectly confront the spiritual fitness of the troops.¹⁷ No doubt, chaplains though effective caregivers and capable advisors have traditionally confined their role to the tactical level, tying their influence either directly or indirectly to personnel.

Notably, in 2004, a challenge to this limited level of influence came as the joint Services “raised the bar” of religious support at the operational level to address military chaplaincy as an essential component in the joint culture. In that expansion, official joint doctrine as outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*, gives military chaplains and religious ministry a significant place, priority, and purpose. This guidance profoundly directs chaplains and shapes religious ministry at the operational level of war to “transcend merely providing for the needs of U.S. personnel.”¹⁸

Religious Support in Joint Operations articulates this integral expansion in three key ways. First, the Services as directed are to assign a Joint Forces Chaplain (JFCH) to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Geographic and Functional Commands, to U.S Joint Forces Command, and to the Joint Task Forces. With these assignments, personal religious support is coordinated at the Unified Command level and provided by JFCHs throughout the theater. The nature of this support details “ecclesiastical, sacramental, or faith-based leadership” for military personnel and includes such tasks as providing religious care for enemy prisoners of war, detainees, coalition forces, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working out of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).¹⁹

Second, and perhaps most critical to the JFCH as he purposes to influence the joint culture, is the essential relationship between the chaplain and Joint Force Commander (JFC) unveiled at the operational level of war. JP 1-05 makes key connections between the JFC and his JFCH, and between the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and the JFCH. In a religiously diverse area of operation, doctrine aims the JFCHs to provide specialized guidance to the JFC concerning religious and cultural sensitivities, insight into national ideologies, and advice concerning moral or ethical constraints or restraints associated with certain policies, exercises, and operational plans. These connections as they relate to the planning process expose the unlimited potential for chaplains to provide religious support above the tactical level, where the language and processes of the joint environment are unique.²⁰

Third, as Joint Forces Chaplains detail to Commanders across the globe, the ROMO becomes a guide to mission possibilities for chaplains serving at the operational level. From the “right side” of the continuum where chaplains traditionally have cared for troops during war, to the “left side” where non-kinetic opportunities exist, military chaplains and their capabilities mesh with the Commander and his intent. “The JFCHs may assist the staff in developing an engagement strategy by providing advice within the scope of their expertise” as the U.S. military offers Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster Relief, or Host Nation (HN) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community building.²¹ Once again, the chaplain’s voice concerning the influence of religion or the effects of morals and morale upon such operations, require his understanding of the joint culture and a familiarity with the dialect and planning ritual that belongs to the operator.

The Equipping Mandate for the Joint Forces Chaplain

As previously noted, building bridges of credibility and identity are critical for any military chaplain working at the tactical level, but for the chaplain who desires to excel in the joint arena, a shift is required to move his identity from personnel alone, to the Joint Commander, his staff, and the processes that belong to them. For his experience, expertise, and capabilities to make sense and gain entrance “in culture,” the chaplain must gain exposure to the joint culture. The answer to this cultural competency for the JFCH lies in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

JPME in Phases I and II, introduces the military chaplain to the unique doctrine, dialect, and planning ritual of the joint environment in a curriculum that is meant to give the officer requisite tools to interoperate. Some of the tools in the box relate to the strategic view. Officers will wrestle with issues that surround national and regional security and how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and his Unified Commanders plan and execute within that environment. A deep draw upon military history in JPME will link every student of the past to the strategic problems of the present, with concerns aimed at the future. Chaplains get the “big picture” here.

Additionally, students explore the tools required for joint planning through a campaigning block. With case studies that make valid connections from the past to the present, students examine Operational Art alongside the processes and decision-making skills essential to a joint staff in planning operations across the ROMO, revealing an important feature for the chaplain. JPME, with this practical overlay of the ROMO, educates potential JFCHs to a “vision of possibilities” in military ministry that otherwise they would not grasp.

James Butler, a professor in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College, suggests that JPME seeks to provide a base of knowledge and tools from which to exercise useful skills of analysis.²² For the chaplain, this analysis employs a baseline of doctrine, dialect, and planning, all the while disclosing a vision required to interpret possibilities of influence and engagement.

Residential JPME programs unfold additional advantages including a practical “laboratory” where students actually experience interoperability in a seminar setting. Ideas, concepts, Service-core competencies, and differences converge as individuals from each of the Services, alongside foreign officers and civilians, develop mutual trust and understanding in an atmosphere of dialogue and instruction. Residential students also benefit from the occasional lecture given by renowned national political, military, and civilian leadership, adding to an officer’s expanded world-view and the understanding gained in the seminar.

Key to the point argued in this analysis; joint education helps raise a chaplain’s skill set beyond the tactical level using the concepts and processes rendered in the JPME curriculum. Phil Gwaltney, CENTCOM chaplain from 2003-06 underscores this value:

JPME forces a chaplain to think conceptually and abstractly. It equipped me with critical thinking skills and an understanding of strategies and systems and forces ...Most chaplains think and execute religious support from the tactical level ... JPME pushed my skills and intuitions upward, where there are organizational tensions ... where you learn the discipline of working ideas through the processes and requirements of the planners and operators.²³

Fundamentally, the benefits of JPME convey most convincingly in areas where religious support intersect with the JFC’s priorities. With the strange confluence of culture, politics, religion, and competing ideologies around the globe, every JFC must consider the moral force of religion a clear priority, a critical factor in the theater of operations. As Paul

Wrigley insists, “The operational commander, who is ignorant of or discounts the importance of religious belief, can incite his enemy, offend his allies, alienate his own forces, and arouse public opinion.”²⁴ Religion then, is a double-edged sword of benefit and tension, and how it cuts depends on who is wielding it.

Chaplains have an opportunity then, to support the commander’s priority as he helps broaden the focus in a region beyond “firepower and kill zones” to the more difficult and subtle problems posed by human behavior and regional history. In a global posture where the nuances of culture and religious concerns strangely and sometimes dangerously merge, it is imperative that the JFCH effectively works in conjunction with planning groups to unravel and reveal those critical religious distinctions. The language and processes learned in JPME give him voice to do just that. Such distinctions should include:

- The one between religion and religious terrorism, where violence and conspiracy meet for religious means, to religiously convert or cleanse a people and bring about revolutionary or reactionary change in a state or nation;²⁵
- Discernment of the “twin enemies” of fundamentalism and the extreme form of secular fundamentalism called nationalism, both born of passion and illogic;²⁶
- The one between the War on Terror and a war against Islam, condemnation of Islamic fundamentalism often extends to Islam itself;
- Religious differences from one geographic area to another, if possible, before the commencement of hostilities, anticipating the religious questions that will arise in time of war,²⁷ i.e. Tribal animism is the predominate religion in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for United States African Command (USAFRICOM). What does that mean for the U.S. military in planning non-kinetic operations?

Moreover, joint education prior to a joint assignment brokers the JFCH’s advisory capabilities early on, so that he raises these types of distinctions in a timely manner.

The notional Information Operations (IO) Cell diagram taken from JP 3-13 (Appendix A) rightfully suggests the chaplain’s place at the planning table. This planning

group idea serves as one possibility of many for the integration of the JFCH into the decision-making process. Whether he supports the planning of humanitarian assistance, a theater security co-operation mission, information operations, peace operations, host nation liaisons, or direct religious support to Joint Forces personnel during combat, he is more likely to be offered a seat if he earns credibility with the planners. Speaking the language in context assists him in doing so.

Norman Emory, an Information Operations officer during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, notes that a chaplain who knows the religious and historical structure of indigenous cultures *and* [emphasis added] knows the system can be a valuable multiplier in the total planning process. “Many IO missions begin before combat operations, and failure to understand the complexities of culture can negatively impact those operations. At that point, it is too late. Pre-emptive participation by the chaplain is invaluable.”²⁸

The chaplain’s value in these groups has the potential to work beyond investing religious information into the process, but also investing in the planners. At times, good ideas generated in the froth and fury of a hurried or excited planning group require a discerning, stable voice to consider the right idea instead of a good idea, especially when morals and ethics are involved. It may be that the presence of a chaplain in the planning cell will widen the perspective of the cell and present stronger Courses of Action (COAs) for consideration. One former COCOM chaplain admits that the value of a JFCH rests in his credibility, earned through long-term continuity and capability. “My chaplains went from being asked by planners, “What are you doing here?” to “Where were you today Padre?”²⁹

The JFC demands intelligent, thorough planning, but he also expects effective execution of the preferred COA or mission originating from his staff. Many of the missions

on the soft or non-kinetic side of the ROMO go beyond planning considerations and are suitable for direct JFCH involvement and leadership. “On the ground” leadership in a Humanitarian Assistance operation, port visit engagement or a security co-operation exchange with religious leaders in a safe or friendly country involve continuity of culture as he works alongside individuals from each of the Services. In order for a chaplain to offer himself as a key participant in these missions, and project his leadership in an effective way, he must communicate his competencies in the planning process, and with a grammar familiar to the joint culture.

JPME legitimizes the chaplain’s role as advisor and key participator in non-kinetic operations, and without such education, the chaplain reverts most naturally to the familiar, tactical realm, his “voice” then muted in the swirl of operational level demands. He needs to be inside the joint culture, demonstrating knowledge of the joint culture, in order to influence the culture with his religious expertise.

Where’s the Rub?

Unfortunately, there are some, perhaps many, like Lewis Sorley, who argue that chaplains and other military officers with highly specialized pursuits should not take seats in the JPME classroom because these individuals have responsibilities only “tangentially related to the curriculum.”³⁰ After all, the JPME resident programs, and non-resident programs for that matter, purpose to train joint operators or warfighters, and future commanders of joint forces. This seeming contradiction between JPME’s aim to train warfighters and a chaplain’s participation in joint education highlights a popular suspicion that a chaplain as a non-combatant is a waste of educational effort.

Furthermore, one might contend that chaplains as specialized assets, regardless of rank or Service, should not be “off line” for a year of education when total numbers from each of the Services are stretched and diluted by the current and enduring commitment to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A recent ABC news report cites “several hundred vacancies” in the military chaplaincy at a time when many chaplains have already served two or three tours on the battlefield.³¹ With no billets to waste, religious and spiritual leadership is most necessary alongside the troops serving “ready-up” on the flight line, upon the decks of a surface combatant in the North Arabian Sea, or some nasty place around the globe where boots are on the ground.

Though these contentions appear reasonable on the surface, one must remember that JP 1-05 delineates the role and position of the JFCH for a reason. Each of the Services have moved to assign chaplains to the CJCS, Geographical and Functional Commanders, Subordinate Commanders, and Joint Task Force Commands who are on the “tip of the operational spear.” With those “deals done,” the question begs the asking. If current policy directs chaplains to serve Commanders and their staffs, many of whom are in theater, do we want these chaplains engaged with legitimacy or do we want them working on the margins? Will a Unified Commander settle for a chaplain who is nothing more than a “house- pastor,” when his mission demands a staff member with viable capabilities in context? Assignment to such positions without education in the joint culture could be disastrous, with unprepared chaplains taking aim at their commander’s expectation, only to hit target accidentally.

Second, one must remember that chaplains have historically trained and worked alongside combatants, not apart from them. Anne Loveland writes of Army chaplains during Vietnam:

The “ministry of presence” they provided to soldiers in the combat zone constituted their most important contribution to morale. Accompanying men on combat missions, living in the dust and mud with them, eating the same rations, sharing the trauma and losses of battle – that kind of intimate association, apart from their performance of the usual priestly and pastoral duties – earned chaplains the gratitude of many.³²

Effective chaplains use their training and education to build bridges with the combatants they serve, and regardless of the Service and assignment, their status, as a non-combatant never relieves them from connecting at the edge of appropriate ministry. Certainly, there are limits and lines between the combatant and non-combatant that require respect and understanding. A former USCENTCOM chaplain offers one such look at how a chaplain discerns those lines effectively (Appendix B), without relinquishing his presence and part in the process.³³

Lastly, the chaplain who is JPME educated is not a detractor from support to personnel, but in fact a force multiplier. He is an indirect investor in military personnel because he trains and mentors chaplains to function well at the tactical level. General John Abizaid’s former COCOM chaplain insists that his support as a trainer of the Components and JTFs that involved oversight of 30 chaplains and augmentees from each of the Services between 2003-06, “multiplied religious support in the theater.” With a joint educated chaplain serving a COCOM, junior chaplains learned how to better serve their commanders, staffs, and troops in a variety of missions.³⁴ The current USEUCOM chaplain adds that personnel benefit from a synchronization of religious support throughout the theater, where leadership connected to the CCDRs vision works to achieve unity among NATO and service component chaplains involved in exercises, reconciliation efforts, humanitarian assistance, and other programs.³⁵ No doubt, in a day when global requirements stretch resources and assets, joint education multiplies the JFCH’s capabilities to affect the entire force structure.

Conclusion

In the 2005 Vision for Joint Officer Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined that the military services “must mentor all officers toward the Joint Officer Development objective ... the Services must develop a no-officer-left behind attitude.”³⁶ Admittedly, the Chaplain Corps from each of the Services have failed in this regard to connect joint doctrine with definitive, required educational milestones in such a way that prepares individuals for his vision. Only the U.S. Army has answered this directive in measure, by requiring all chaplains eligible for promotion to the grade of O5 to complete the Intermediate Leadership Education course before promotion, with joint education embedded in the core curriculum.³⁷

The process of selecting a JFCH appears a matter of convenience, an afterthought by assignment officers and the Chaplain Corps from each of the Services, with little vision to select and educate early. We need a plan that directs military chaplains toward jointness. One that selects and educates military chaplains to JPME and then details those chaplains toward the joint billets outlined in JP 1-05. First, every chaplain needs a “Zero Phase” level of joint education on the front end of his or her career.³⁸ The new consolidated chaplain schoolhouse, which will train chaplains from all three Service branches beginning in 2009, is the place to start. An introduction to JPME during the twelve week Officer Indoctrination should be required at the schoolhouse, followed by an on-line course of “basic joint education” during the first two years of a chaplain’s career. Second, all military chaplains should complete JPME I through distance, satellite, or resident programs, before their record is reviewed by the O5-selection board. This builds a pool of eligible Joint persons. Third, the matching of qualified JFCH with JF billets should be in the hands of the collective flag

officers of the Service branches who convene as the Armed Forces Chaplains Board. The Board, and not assignment officers, should select the CJCS and Unified Command Chaplains eighteen months in advance, and then direct these individuals to a resident JPME II program in route to their assignment. In light of the present practice, the Chaplain Corps of the Army, Navy, and Air Force require such a transformation to move us forward and from beyond the “we’re happy to stay behind” attitude.

Despite the difficulties and strains associated with the emerging joint culture, the doctrine, language, and process that belongs to the culture exposes the chaplain to a virtual toolbox of legitimacy, opening up possibilities for support to military personnel *and* to the missions formed in the joint arena. Without a doubt, JPME is the delivery mechanism for the chaplain who needs such tools in order to succeed. Chaplains working at the operational level will look to this education beyond the training, instincts, and experience requisite at the tactical level. Above all, where religious support intersects the priorities of a JFC, then chaplains educated in JPME and indoctrinated in the joint culture are not an option, but a requirement for the military’s brightest future.

APPENDIX A

Notional Information Operations Cell

(Figure IV-2 of JP 3-13, "Joint Information," 13 February 2006)




Figure IV-2. Notional Information Operations Cell


Note the Chaplain's presence in this notional view of potential roles and functions required in the planning process.

APPENDIX B

Religious Support to the Planning Staff

(Taken from USCENTCOM Religious Support Brief 2006)

Note: The dotted red line offers a guide for chaplains as they discern the appropriate and inappropriate areas of participation in the joint community.



NOTES

1. Bob Dylan, "The Times They Are A Changin'," (recording, *Bob Dylan's Greatest Hits*, Columbia Records, 1967).
2. Ina Corinne Brown, *Understanding Other Cultures* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1963), 3.
3. Carol Burke, *Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane, and the High-and-Tight: Gender, Folklore, and Changing Military Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 12.
4. Ibid, 12-18.
5. Debra L. Nelson and James Campbell Quick, *Organizational Behavior: Foundations, Realities, and Challenges* (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 1999), 539.
6. Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 17-32.
7. Arthur T. Hadley, *The Straw Giant* (New York: Random House, 1986), 67-71. Hadley's comparison did not include the Marine Corps in his discussion.
8. Major General John L. Barry and James Blaker, "After the Storm: The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001, 116-117, <http://webharvest.gov/> (accessed 25 September 2007).
9. Ibid, 116-117.
10. Richard Cobbold, "My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts," *RUSI Journal* 145, no. 2 (April 2000): 17.
11. The "first mention" acronyms were not spelled out in the text in order to demonstrate an interrupted reading of the sentence. Joint Planning Group (JPG), Range of Military Operations (ROMO), Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Disaster Relief (DR), Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO), Joint Forces Chaplain (JFCH), and Information Operations (IO).
12. U.S. Department of Defense, *Accommodation of Religious Practices with the Military*, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1300.17 (Washington, DC: DoD, 03 February 1988): <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 18 October 2007).
13. Bradford E. Ableson, "Time for a Conversion: Why Unified Commanders Are Not Well Served by Their Chaplains and What Needs to Change," (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2004), 1-6. Chaplain Ableson's research served to challenge the lack of doctrine and policy concerning Religious Support in joint operations. His work was the driving force behind the development of JP-1-05 in 2004.
14. Samantha Levine quotes historian Martin Blumenson, "A Calling of Duty: In Wartime, Military Chaplains Serve God and the Armed Forces," *U.S News and World Report* 131, no. 22 (26 November 2001): 48, <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 03 September 2007).
15. Brent W. Scott, "Essential Preaching: A Scribe Seeks Homiletic Treasures From Both the Old and New," (master's thesis, Duke University, 2002), 48.

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16. U.S. Department of Defense, *Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Services*, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1304.19 (Washington, DC: DoD, 06 November 2004): <http://www.dtic.mil/> (accessed 18 October 2007).
17. Anne C. Loveland, "From Morale Builders to Moral Advocates," In *Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Doris Bergen (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 233-245.
18. Ableson, "Time For a Conversion," 1.
19. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 09 June 2004), I-2
20. Ibid, II-2, II-3.
21. Ibid, II-3- II-6.
22. James Butler, "Learning Goals of Joint Military Operations," (lecture, Naval War College, Seminar 3, Newport, RI, 15 October, 2007).
23. Phil Gwaltney, telephone call with author, ref: Value of JPME and My Experience as CENTCOM chaplain, 02 October, 2007
24. Paul R. Wrigley, "The Impact of Religious Belief in the Theater of Operations," (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 1995), 1.
25. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, "What is Terrorism? Redefining a Phenomenon in Time of War," *Peace and Change* 30, no.2 (2005):241. Not all people readily recognize distinctions between those who are true examples of faith and those who "hijack the faith," as well as between mainstream and extremists on the fringe.
26. Ralph Peters, "Vanity and the Bonfires of the "isms,"" *Parameters*, Autumn 1993, 40-43. Peters details the two-front ideology-inspired war of nationalism and fundamentalism: Both are born of a sense of collective failure, always with a sense, real or perceived of historical grievance, preach a lost age only resurrected when a nation is purged of corrupting influences, dehumanize their opponents and view mercy toward them as irresponsible, and are dynamically violent with leadership coming to power on platforms of rebirth and revenge. He warns that both ideologies are aggravated by Euro-American dominance.
27. Ableson, "Time for a Conversion," 7-12. Chaplain Ableson, former USSTRATCOM chaplain, fleshes out baseline expectations for Unified Command Chaplains as they advise their commanders on religious issues.
28. Norman Emory, "Intelligence Support to Information Operations: Staff Chaplain," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 29, no. 3 (July-September 2003): 19-21, <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 03 September 2007).
29. Gwaltney, telephone call, 02 October 2007.
30. Lewis S. Sorley, "Competence as Ethical Imperative: Issues of Professionalism," in *Military Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays*, ed. James Brown and Michael J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1981), 50. Sorley contends that institutional practices of cronyism and self-interest drive selections to schools like the War College, a sign of eroding competence within the military institution.
31. Erin Hayes, "Military is Grappling With Shortage of Chaplains: Troops May Find God in a Foxhole, but It's Getting Harder to Find Chaplains in War," ABC News, October 16, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/> (accessed 18 October 2007).

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32. Loveland, "From Morale Builders to Moral Advocates," 236.
33. United States Central Command Chaplain, "Religious Support to the Planning Staffs at the Operational Level," Powerpoint, 2006.
34. Gwaltney, telephone call, 02 October 2007. Chaplain Gwaltney served General Abizaid from 2003-2006.
35. Mark Tidd, email response to the author's inquiry, ref: Value of JPME and My Experience as USEUCOM chaplain, 13 October 2007.
36. Peter Pace, "CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development," (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2005), 9.
37. Matthew Goff, (Training Director, U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains), telephone call with author, ref: JPME requirements for U.S. Army chaplains, 01 October, 2007.
38. David K. Richardson, "The Case For JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the United States navy From the Ground Up," (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2004), 6-9.

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