A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force Modernization
Abstract
Force modernization is more like a warfighting campaign than an industrial process. Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity inherent in all its key factors and enablers make modernization as much an operational art as a scientific method. Therefore, modernization, like warfare, would operate more effectively and responsively under an authoritative body of doctrine rather than under layers of detailed prescriptive and legally binding regulations. At the core of a body of doctrine is a foundational doctrine document setting forth broad guidance with fundamental principles to guide planning and execution. This study will consider the following principles as candidates for such a document: (1) Objective, (2) Stable Program Inputs, (3) Risk Management, (4) Simplicity of Command, (5) Economy of Effort, (6) Initiative, (7) Credibility, (8) Synergy, (9) Tempo, and (10) Synchronization. Together, these are the fundamental underlying doctrinal principles for an effective and efficient force modernization program. These principles can guide modernization process improvement efforts as well as modernization programs to shorten program timelines and still deliver a quality product. Force modernization includes the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), formerly the Requirements Generation System, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process. With respect to JCIDS, this paper is concerned only with material solutions feeding into the acquisition system. The analysis does not include doctrine, operations, training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solutions to documented needs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2006
- Accession Number
- ADA477016
Entities
People
- Benjamin A. Drew Jr.
Organizations
- Air War College