Theft and Diversion of Special Nuclear Materials and Military Nuclear Weapons
Abstract
Theft and diversion of nuclear materials suitable for construction of nuclear explosives or dispersal weapons has received considerable recent attention in the public domain. A design study was undertaken to improve the security systems for nuclear materials and weaponry. In addition to an analysis of the threat, calculations are presented to quantify the amount of material necessary to produce a significant nuclear yield, as well as models to deduce a probability of diversion and hazards associated with plutonium dispersion. These methods were closely patterned after a similar analysis contained in the recently released Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400). Several event trees were considered with different initiating events representing theft or diversion at different stages of nuclear materials processing or utilization. Unlike the Reactor Safety Report, fault trees were of limited use in assigning probabilities-- especially for the initiating event itself. Instead, probabilities were estimated based on models which were constructed from available data on similar terrorist activities such as airline hijackings, mass murders, and other equivalent antisocial acts. These techniques had only limited success and predicted only a gross upper bound for final probabilities. Relative risk levels are shown to be approximately an order of magnitude less than the risk posed by most common accidents.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 12, 1975
- Accession Number
- ADA477040
Entities
People
- Edward W. Merz
- Eugene W. Skluzacek
- Harold A. Careway
- Joel D. Johnson
- John T. Casady
- Kenneth A. Dreyer
- Michael L. Harkins
- Richard G. Bjurstrom
- Savery G. Stuckey
- William A. Danne
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology