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ARMY ECHELON REDESIGN—RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. AIR FORCE

By

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Introduction

“To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century, we articulate this vision: ‘Soldiers on point for the nation transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.’ With that overarching goal to frame us, the Army will undergo a major transformation...”

- General Erik K. Shinseki -

The concept of transformation is not new to the military or to organizations as a whole. As long as there have been organized entities with internal and external factors at play, organizations have had to undergo some semblance of transformation in order to remain viable. Organizational change is a fact of life. General Erik Shinseki, former Chief of Staff of the Army once stated: “If you don’t like change, you’ll like obsolescence even less.”

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently undertaking one of the most aggressive transformation efforts in history. Under the overarching umbrella and guidance of the Defense Department-wide transformation initiatives, each of the services are also pursuing individual transformation programs. This paper addresses one aspect of the United States Army’s transformation initiative commonly referred to as “echelon redesign.” Furthermore, the paper analyzes the potential impact of these organizational changes on the U.S. Air Force’s ability to support the Army both in peacetime and in the execution of future joint operations.

The first chapter of the paper addresses the macro concept of transformation. It provides definitions of terms and concepts used throughout the paper in order to ensure a common framework for understanding. Chapter One also outlines the scope and goals of both the Department of Defense’s and the U.S. Army’s respective transformation programs. Chapter

Two looks at specific aspects of the U.S. Army's and the U.S. Air Force's current organizational structures, their functional alignment, and habitual relationships in order to provide a baseline for comprehending proposed future changes. Specifically, how the Army's long standing corps and division structure dovetails with Air Force Air Support Operations Groups (ASOG), their associated Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOS), embedded Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC), and Weather Squadrons (WS). Chapter Three identifies the catalysts for the U.S. Army's echelon redesign efforts, maps out the proposed changes to the Army's organizational structure, as well as the roadmap for implementation. This chapter looks at the specific implications of the Army's echelon redesign program in the context of their proposed Unit of Employment Y (UEy) and Unit of Employment X (UEx) headquarters elements, and the primary warfighting echelon know as Units of Action (UA). Chapter Four uses the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct to identify the ramifications that echelon redesign will have on the U.S. Air Force's ability to integrate with, and provide support to, the Army in the conduct of future operations. Specifically, as the Army "grows" their number of brigade-sized Units of Action (a.k.a. Brigade Combat Teams [BCT]), what are the DOTMLPF implications for their habitually assigned Air Force ASOGs, ASOSs, and ASOCs? Finally, the conclusion addresses the way ahead, and provides recommendations on how the Army and Air Force can best partner together in the interest of optimizing future joint operations. Ideally, both services will be able to synchronize their respective transformation efforts to achieve synergistic results, and maximize their overall warfighting effectiveness in support of the Combatant Commander.

Chapter 1

Transformation

“We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight.”

- Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld -

Department of Defense Transformation

On October 29th, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld established a brand new entity within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) known as the Office of Force Transformation (OFT). OFT's charter is to act as the overall advocate for DOD-wide transformation efforts, and serve as the focal point and catalyst for monitoring, evaluating, and implementing DOD's transformation strategies.¹ Many people erroneously believe that the catalyst for DOD's transformation initiatives was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. While these events were no doubt instrumental in elevating the importance of transformation in the U.S. military, they were not the genesis of the program(s). In reality, transformation efforts of one kind or another have been consistently underway since the military's inception, but the magnitude of today's initiatives are actually an outgrowth of the impact of globalization on the international security environment, coupled with worldwide movement from the industrial age into the information age.²

Before pursuing the concept of transformation any further, it is important to define the term in order to ensure a common understanding within the context of this paper. In the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG), Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld identified transformation as: “A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”³ In congruence with the DOD definition, is the department’s overall goal for force transformation. That goal is to “ensure that the present military superiority of the United States is sustained in the future despite the attempts of potential adversaries to emulate our new approach to warfare or to develop asymmetrical strategies that target those areas where we may appear to be vulnerable.”⁴ In the course of accomplishing that goal, the U.S. military will emerge with a force that is more “expeditionary, agile, and lethal...capable of employing operational maneuver and precision effects capabilities to achieve victory.”⁵

Now with a common understanding of transformation at the DOD level, let’s explore down one layer and analyze the intricacies of the U.S. Army’s transformation program. Dramatic changes in the global security environment since the end of the Cold War have made it imperative that the Army undertake a major transformation initiative with a renewed sense of urgency.⁶

United States Army Transformation

The U.S. Army is currently undergoing a transformation effort of unprecedented magnitude. The forces driving this effort are very similar to those serving as the catalyst of DOD’s transformation. Changes in the global security environment to include the Global War

on Terrorism (GWOT), emergence of asymmetric and other adaptive threats, regional instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction/effects (WMD/E), homeland security requirements, among others dictate that the U.S. Army transform to cope with the evolving security challenges of the 21st century.⁷ Army transformation is anchored upon their core competencies which are: (1) train and equip soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commanders as part of the joint team.⁸ As they should be, the overarching goals of Army transformation are nested in their core competencies. These goals are to “provide relevant, ready forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for full-spectrum joint, interagency and multinational operations and to support future force development.”⁹ This will be an ongoing effort designed to make the Army more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.¹⁰ In order to achieve these aggressive goals, the Army has identified 16 focus areas designed to overhaul most aspects of their DOTMLPF construct.¹¹ Addressing all 16 focus areas is beyond the scope of this paper, so emphasis will be limited to the echelon redesign effort that falls under the “modularity” focus area. The echelon redesign facet of the modularity focus area deals primarily within the “O” or “organizational” realm of the DOTMLPF acronym. Modularity and the specific organizational impacts behind echelon redesign will be addressed at length in Chapter Three. For now, suffice it to say that the motivation behind echelon redesign is to develop modular, tailorable, capabilities-based force packages, the end result of which is a “relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a joint expeditionary mindset.”¹²

Chapter 2

Current Organizational Structure

“We are transforming to become strategically responsive and remain dominant across the entire spectrum of military operations.”

- General Erik K. Shinseki -

U.S. Army

Before delving into the specifics of the U.S. Army’s echelon redesign effort, it is important to have a solid understanding of how the Army is currently organized. Establishing some level of familiarity with the status quo provides an essential foundation for grasping exactly what echelon redesign is, how it will alter the Army’s organizational structure, the functions they perform, and the capabilities that they are designed to bring to the table. Figure 1 provides a general overview of the current echelons of U.S. Army forces.




Figure 1: U.S. Army Forces Overview

According to Field Manual (FM) 100-15, *Corps Operations*, the Army's current Corps and Division structure dates back to the French Revolution where Napoleon Bonaparte first obtained dramatic battlefield advantages over his adversaries by grouping combined arms divisions into massive formations known as corps.¹³ This organizational structure provided a way for Napoleon to coherently manage the enormous armies that arose out of his *levee en masse* ideology. *Levee en masse* was essentially the concept of universal military service across the entire eligible population. It was originated by Napoleon in France, the most populous European country in the late 1700s, and was enabled through his dictatorial methods. *Levee en masse* stimulated unprecedented nationalism amongst the French population, and resulted in the creation of the massive *Grand Armee*.¹⁴ It was under Napoleon's corps concept that his huge, overwhelming formations were first able to combine speed, versatility, and agility in order to achieve success through independent action and dispersed maneuver. Napoleon's organizational brilliance forever changed the face of land warfare, and even though there have been prolific technological advances since the late 18th century, corps and division structures have endured up to the present as the primary organizational units of most armies worldwide. The corps-based organization has been the linchpin of U.S. Army operations since the Civil War, and has functioned as the primary land maneuver force in virtually every major conflict since.¹⁵

Figure 2 depicts a typical Army organization starting with the Regional Combatant Commander. This particular example is from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM where the CFLCC was dual-hatted as the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), and shows a typical organizational structure down to the brigade level.




Figure 2: Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Organizational Structure

An ASCC is typically commanded by a three- or four-star general officer, and serves as the Army component for each of the regional combatant commanders. For example, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is the Army component to United States European Command (a regional combatant command). The ASCC is a tailorable support organization designed to organize, train, equip, maintain, and sustain forces. With the owning combatant commander's approval, an ASCC may be designated as a Numbered Army. A Numbered Army is operational in nature (as opposed to support), and is normally established when, due to the scope of the operation, the command and control requirements surpass those of a corps headquarters.¹⁶

There are four corps in the U.S. Army: I Corps, III Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Corps. Corps are the largest tactical units in the U.S. Army, and are the organization that higher levels of command use to conduct operations at the operational level of war. They contain organic combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements in order to be able to sustain operations across the spectrum of conflict for as long a duration as required. Today, corps are routinely involved in a force projection capacity as part of a larger joint or combined operation. Since corps can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the mission or the theater,

there is no one, standard organizational structure for a corps. Even though corps structures vary, there are some common characteristics that most corps organizations share. Corps can be assigned any complement of divisions depending on mission requirements. Each corps owns a Corps Support Command (COSCOM), and has maneuver/combat (infantry, armor, aviation, and air defense artillery), CS (military intelligence, chemical, engineer, military police, signal, psychological operations, and civil affairs), and CSS (POL, maintenance, personnel services, ordinance, transportation, medical, and finance) units assigned depending on mission requirements. According to FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, there are six critical roles of the corps¹⁷:

- Planning and conducting operations with other elements of the joint force to achieve campaign objectives.
- Integrate available Air Force, Navy, and Marine combat, CS, and CSS units, along with interagency support in land operations, including joint efforts in intelligence, target acquisition, target attack, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and CSS.
- Collecting intelligence, anticipating enemy activities and intentions, and planning future operations.
- Planning and conducting simultaneous operations in depth.
- Nominating targets for nuclear weapons employment in support of campaign objectives.
- Planning and conducting effective deception operations according to the higher echelon's deception plan.

Bottom line, the corps' main operational responsibility is to participate in the development of a supporting joint campaign plan. One important thing to note is that under the current structure,

a corps commander and his/her headquarters are capable of functioning as the Commander, Army Forces (COMARFOR); Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC); or, with augmentation, Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF).¹⁸ Again, since corps can be tailored to meet specific mission needs, they can vary dramatically in size. Taking a few examples, in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, XVIII Corps had only 12,000 troops, while conversely, during Operation DESERT STORM they had approximately 118,000. VII Corps amassed 142,000 troops comprised of four U.S. and one British division for Operation DESERT STORM. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, LTG Wallace's V Corps had over 130,000 troops participating. Figure 3 depicts a typical Army corps organizational structure.




Figure 3: Army Corps Organizational Structure

The next echelon in the Army's organizational structure is the division. Divisions normally operate as part of a corps, but are capable of conducting operations as part of a joint task force (JTF) or a multinational force. They are considered "the basic unit of maneuver at the tactical level," and are responsible for conducting major tactical operations on behalf of the corps. Like corps, divisions are largely self-sustaining combined arms entities that can be tailored and deployed to conduct any type of tactical operation to include offensive operations,

defensive operations, retrograde, as well as operations other than war. There are five types of divisions: light infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, airborne, and air assault. Each type possesses unique characteristics, capabilities, and limitations. Light infantry are highly deployable and mobile, and operate very effectively in restricted terrain. Their primary limitations include their reliance on the corps or other higher headquarters for support, and their need for prepared cover and concealment for survivability. Mechanized and armor divisions (commonly referred to as heavy divisions) share some of the same characteristics in that they possess substantial mobility, survivability, lethality, and psychological shock effect. Heavy divisions are most effective in open, unrestricted terrain where they can effectively employ their “fire on the move” direct-fire weapons. The primary limitations associated with heavy divisions are their massive consumption rates in terms of fuel and supplies, inability to operate effectively in restricted terrain, and their relatively slow deployment timeline coupled with their huge demand for strategic lift. Airborne divisions bring rapid deployment and forced entry capability to the Army’s combined arms team. They perform parachute assaults and large scale tactical raids in order to secure vital objective areas for follow-on operations. Airborne divisions rely on their strategic and operational mobility in order to use the element of surprise to their maximum advantage. All of their equipment is air transportable, most equipment is air droppable, and all personnel are parachute qualified. An airborne division’s primary limitation is survivability against enemy armored and mechanized forces due to their lack of armored protection. Finally, the air assault division combines rapid strategic deployability with tactical mobility by virtue of its significant organic rotary wing capability. This enables the air assault division to attack rapidly, deep into enemy territory with less impact from terrain and distance considerations. One of their primary limitations is their relative vulnerability to surface to air threats (missiles, anti-

aircraft artillery, and small arms fire). The capabilities of the Army's various divisions are complementary providing them a wide range of combined arms capability across the entire spectrum of conflict from major combat operations to stability and support operations.¹⁹ Normally, a corps will be comprised of somewhere between two and five divisions, depending on mission requirements. Figure 4 depicts a representative organizational chart for a heavy division.




Figure 4: Army Armored Division Organizational Structure

U.S. Air Force

The U.S. Air Force has been providing direct support to Army units in order to facilitate and synchronize the integration of air and space power into ground combat operations since World War I.²⁰ As with most organizations, the Air Force's Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) structure has evolved over the years from Tactical Air Control Wings (TAIRCW) in the Vietnam era, to Air Control Wings (ACW) and Air Support Groups (ASG) in the early 1990's, to what are now known today as ASOGs.²¹

In order to remain within the scope of this paper, the discussion on current Air Force organizational structure will be limited to those units that are habitually associated with, and provide direct support to, the U.S. Army in order to effectively integrate the application of air and space power into their ground scheme of maneuver. Specifically, the paper will address the following Air Force organizations: Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE), Air Support Operations Group (ASOG), Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS); Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), and Weather Squadrons (WS). The following definitions are provided:

- ACCE: The Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) representative to the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) responsible for representing the JFACC in either a supporting or supported role. The ACCE is normally relatively small, ad hoc organization that could be headed by anyone from a Colonel to a Major General (e.g. the Operation Iraqi Freedom ACCE was headed by an Air Force two-star general).
- ASOG: USAF organization designed to provide USAF unique administrative support to their subordinate ASOS and WS personnel assigned to Army installations. The ASOG Commander (Colonel) functions as the Corps Air Liaison Officer (ALO).
- ASOS: USAF organization that provides TACPs to the U.S. Army at the division, brigade, and battalion levels. The ASOS Commander (Lieutenant Colonel) functions as the Division ALO.
- ASOC: A separate and distinct ASOS that functions as the primary control agency of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) for the execution of air and space power in direct support of ground operations (e.g. execution of close air support [CAS]).

- TACP: The principle Air Force liaison element aligned with Army maneuver units from battalion through corps level.
- WS: Provides weather support at the corps level while in garrison and during deployments. The WS commander functions as the corps' Staff Weather Officer (SWO).²²

Habitual Relationships

For illustration purposes, this essay will use the organizational structures and relationships between the III Mobile Armored Corps and the 3rd ASOG, both collocated at Ft. Hood, Texas. (Note: for example, other habitual relationships include I Corps and 1st ASOG, Ft. Lewis, WA; XVIII Corps and 18 ASOG, Ft. Bragg, NC; etc...). Figure 5 shows the macro organization of III Corps' combat arms units, and Figure 6 shows the structure of the 3rd ASOG.




Figure 5: III Corps Combat Arms Organizational Structure



Figure 6: 3rd Air Support Operations Group Organizational Structure

The 3rd ASOG has over 450 members and is tasked to provide a variety of direct support to III Corps. The 3rd ASOG has four subordinate ASOSs (9th, 10th, 11th, and 13th), as well as the 712th ASOC, and the 3rd WS. The 3rd ASOG provides tactical air support to III Corps. The four ASOSs provide like support to each of the III Corps subordinate units including the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 4th Infantry Division (Mech). They also support geographically separated units to include 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Ft. Carson, CO); 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Ft. Carson, CO); 10th Special Forces Group (Ft. Carson, CO); 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Ft. Riley, KS); and the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division (Ft. Riley, KS). The 3rd WS provides weather support to III Corps in garrison and while deployed.²³ The “lash up” of the aforementioned Army and Air Force units is depicted in Figure 7.

USAF Unit 3rd ASOG	Army Unit III Corps	Collocated at
3 rd ASOG	III Corps	Ft. Hood, Texas
712 th ASOC	III Corps	Ft. Hood, Texas
9 th ASOS	1 st Cavalry Division	Ft. Hood, Texas
11 th ASOS	4 th Infantry Division	Ft. Hood, Texas
3 rd WS	III Corps	Ft. Hood, Texas
10 th ASOS	1 st Brigade, 1 st Infantry Division 3 rd Brigade, 1 st Armored Division	Ft. Riley, Kansas
13 th ASOS	3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 3 rd Brigade, 4 th ID 10 th Special Forces Group	Ft. Carson, Colorado

Figure 7: III Corps/3rd ASOG Organizational Alignment

Current Air Force Support to Army units is specified in an Army/Air Force Four-Star Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), signed 16 June 2003 which states that the Air Force agrees to provide “combat ready Air Support Operations Centers in direct support to Army corps, or the senior Army tactical command echelon in the absence of a corps.” It also states that the Air Force agrees to provide “Tactical Air Control Party support down to the battalion level.”²⁴ The Air Force currently (prior to Army echelon redesign) meets the requirements of the MOA by organizing, training, and equipping the following forces:

- Six ASOCs (four active duty and two Air National Guard) provide coverage to the four Army corps
- Five ASOGs that possess 24 ASOSs providing TACP coverage for all infantry and armor battalions, as well as cavalry squadrons.²⁵

As you can see, current force structure in the Air Force is sized to accommodate the standing number of Army corps, divisions, and maneuver brigades. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on the significant DOTMLPF ramifications that Army echelon redesign will have on the Air Force’s ability to support Army units.

Chapter 3

Army Echelon Redesign

“As long as the U.S. Army has existed, it has transformed and always will.”

- General Peter J. Schoomaker -

Why Echelon Redesign?

The ASCC, corps, division and below structure has served the U.S. Army very well for hundreds of years, so why undertake a major change now? As previously mentioned, the overall global security environment has undergone monumental changes. The effects of globalization, explosion of the information age, and major technological advances are creating a demand for ever increasing capabilities. In addition, there is an even greater emphasis on leveraging the synergy derived from well integrated joint, combined, and interagency operations. In short, the consensus is that the U.S. military is in the middle of a revolution in military affairs, coupled with revolutionary changes in the global security environment, requiring a fundamental look at all aspects of the DOTMLPF equation. As Jeffrey Cooper said in his article [Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs](#), “The potent increases in operational effectiveness from this RMA can only be obtained by adopting substantial changes in operational concepts and organizational structures that will allow coherence to be maintained across spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as among forces of different types...these changes suggest many of the restructuring activities that will be required if the U.S. military is to seize the opportunities presented by the

RMA. Therefore, the services must be prepared to go beyond the DESERT STORM model to investigate and to exercise new operational as well as organizational concepts”²⁶ The Army’s echelon redesign effort targets changes in their organizational structure that Cooper talks about.

In a briefing presented by Mr. Clint Ancker, Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, to Lt Gen Ronald E. Keys, Director of Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force in May 2004, Mr. Ancker laid out the following differences between the legacy force and the transformed force under echelon redesign. The basic premise behind the comparison was that “the nature of war remains implacable, but the ways and means have changed constantly.” Figure 8 captures the evolution of the warfighting environment, and the rationale for change between 1984 and 2004.

1984	2004
• High intensity war against conventional forces	• Full spectrum vs. conventional and asymmetric threats
• Joint warfare by domain (air, sea, land, special operations)	• Tactically integrated joint combat with constantly changing combinations
• Linear and sequential combat in depth	• Distributed and simultaneous combat across vast areas
• Combined arms focus	• Network enabled warfare; joint interdependent

Figure 8: Why Change?

Perhaps General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, put it in the simplest, most understandable terms during an interview with Tom Philpott, Contributing Editor for Military Officer Magazine. When asked “But of the Army’s performance, we continually hear, ‘they’re good, maybe the best ever.’ If so, why transform?” General Schoomaker responded by saying, “I’ll use my 100 dollar bill analogy: We’re organized into 100 dollar bills in our pockets, called divisions. If we buy groceries worth \$19.80 and pay with a 100 dollar bill, we get a lot of

change. At the next store we spend \$121.00. We don't have enough change to handle that so we break another hundred. Go through life this way, you end up breaking this huge organization, because it's organized improperly. We need to go to more self sustained, robust, agile, brigade-level organizations that can aggregate up when you need to spend only 60 or 70 dollars."

According to Schoomaker, it gives you smaller, more efficient units that are better suited to operating in the joint environment.²⁷ Figures 9 and 10 graphically depict the point that General Schoomaker is trying to make. In the modular configuration resulting from echelon redesign (Figure 10), forces modules will be aggregated based on specific joint force commander requirements. Instead of the Army throwing increments of 100 dollar bills at every situation, they'll be able to selectively aggregate five, ten, and twenty dollar packages to provide the joint force commander the exact capability, while maintaining the maximum number of force modules behind to meet future, unforeseen requirements.²⁸




Figure 9: Current Division Organization




Figure 10: Echelon Redesign Concept

Echelon Redesign Defined

What exactly is involved in echelon redesign? What does it mean to current Army units “where the rubber meets the road?” In this case, perhaps a picture is worth a thousand words. Figure 11 depicts rather concisely how the current ASCC/corps/division/brigade organization is transformed into the UEy, UEx design, flattening the organization from three echelons above brigade level down to two echelons.




Figure 11: The Big Picture

Unit of Employment Y (UEy)

When appropriate, the UEy will serve as the theater-level headquarters, and there will normally be a UEy associated with each regional combatant commander, both in peacetime and at war. The UEy will perform most of the functions currently handled by the ASCC to include: tailoring forces for the theater, providing administrative control (ADCON) functions, and providing Army Support to Other Services (common user logistics, mortuary affairs, ballistic missile defense, NBC defense, POW administration, etc.). The functions performed by the UEy lifts the bulk of the administrative and support burden off of the UEx, and allows them to concentrate on joint operational tasks as opposed to being bogged down with Army specific support tasks.²⁹ The UEy, depending on the theater situation, may be tailored to include supporting commands (e.g. intelligence, sustainment, network capability, civil affairs/civil military operations) as appropriate.³⁰ In addition, during major combat operations, the UEy is capable of serving as the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) in the situation where the Regional Combatant Commander is functioning as the Joint Force Commander.³¹

Unit of Employment X (UEx)

The UEx is modularly designed along functional lines. The plan is to transfer assets and capabilities from the existing corps structure down to the UEx, along with full joint connectivity, giving it a more robust organic capability than a current division possesses.³² Free from administrative and support responsibilities, the UEx is poised to serve as the primary warfighting headquarters, able to absorb the operational and tactical responsibilities currently associated collectively between corps and divisions. Of interest to the joint commander is that the UEx possesses a completely self sufficient headquarters capability that can be deployed alone, or as part of a larger force package. The Army no longer has to break a “100 dollar bill” in order to

provide the joint community with a responsive command and control capability.³³ A UEx headquarters is an extremely flexible entity capable of performing a broad range of roles. It is capable of functioning as:

- A stand alone Commander of Army Forces (COMARFOR) headquarters.
- A Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) headquarters with Marine and/or multi-national augmentation as appropriate.
- A Joint Task Force headquarters (for smaller scale contingencies) with augmentation from a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters, or augmentation from the other services via an approved Joint Manning Document (JMD).³⁴

One important thing to remember is that the UEx and UEy are actually complementary functional headquarters that possess unique design characteristics. In the execution of major combat operations, it is likely that there would be both UEy and UEx headquarters serving under a Joint Force Commander, albeit in distinctly different capacities.³⁵

Unit of Action (UA)

The ground maneuver combat striking power resides in brigade combat teams (BCT), currently referred to in the echelon redesign construct as Units of Action (UA). The UEx's modular design enables it to be tailored to possess any number and/or compliment of brigade-size UAs.³⁶ UAs are designed to be modular, "plug and play" elements organized along functional lines that include maneuver units (infantry, heavy, and Stryker), and support brigades (reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition; sustainment; aviation; maneuver enhancement (engineer); and fires).³⁷

As part of their overall, long-term transformation effort, the Army currently plans to increase its end strength by 30,000 soldiers, as well as realign portions of their current force

structure (field and air defense artillery forces transitioning to civil affairs, military police, engineers, etc.). The objective of these efforts is to eventually “grow” the Army from 33 active duty brigades up as many as 48 active brigades. This is one of the primary areas for concern for the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force currently has a finite amount of force structure (organized, trained, and equipped) in its habitually associated ASOGs, ASOSs, ASOCs, and WSs in order to provide air operations support to the current Army force (33 brigades). The Army’s growth to 48 brigades carries with it obvious implications for the Air Force. If the Army and the Air Force don’t approach their transformation efforts in a synchronized, coherent manner; there is great risk of serious degradation of Army/Air Force support relationships. The impact on the U.S. Air Force is addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Transformation as a whole, and specifically echelon redesign is not going to be an easy task for the Army, especially when you take into account that they have to accomplish this in “full stride,” simultaneously conducting high operations and personnel tempo activities in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea, the Sinai, and multiple other worldwide commitments. When asked, “What’s the challenge to organizing the Army this way?” General Schoomaker replied, “It’s huge, like taking your kid’s toy box and dumping it into the middle of the floor...we’re using the war and its focus to force function into form. As units come back, they’ll be reset for the 21st century.”³⁸

Chapter 4

Ramifications for the U.S. Air Force

Putting transformation on the back burner and focusing solely on the fight at hand is simply not an option. We are fighting a war unlike any we have fought before—it demands new ways of thinking about military force, new processes to improve strategic agility, and new technology to take the fight to the enemy.”

- General Richard Meyers -

General

At the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the timeline for U.S. Army echelon redesign implementation was accelerated from the original plan calling for units to begin transforming in 2012, up to essentially immediate (2004) implementation. The resetting of units is already underway, so “the train has left the station” in terms of units commencing the echelon redesign process. The Army now has a very aggressive schedule for transforming their units while in “full stride” with ongoing worldwide commitments. The current plan calls for units to “reset” during rotations back in garrison from deployments (e.g. OIF, OEF, etc.). Figure 12 depicts the timeline for unit-by-unit echelon redesign implementation.




Figure 12: Echelon Redesign Implementation Timeline

As previously mentioned, it is crucial for the Army and the Air Force to undertake these changes hand-in-hand in order to alleviate the chance of risking serious degradation of Army/Air Force support relationships. This chapter assesses the impact of Army echelon redesign on the U.S. Air Force using the DOTMLPF construct as a framework for analysis.

General

There is one overarching change, fundamental to the Army's transformation effort that needs to be kept in mind throughout the course of the following DOTMLPF discussion. As previously mentioned, the Army is planning on increasing their number of active duty BCTs from 33 up to as many as 48. They plan to accomplish this through a combination of efforts including temporarily increasing their end strength by 30,000 troops, and rebalancing their force

structure by shifting manpower slots from field artillery and air defense artillery over to specialties like civil affairs, military police, engineers, and the like. This shift away from organic artillery force structure, coupled with the cancellation of the Army's next generation Crusader artillery system, drastically reduces their organic fires capability. In the future, the Army will shift toward more interdependence and reliance on joint fires to support the ground scheme of maneuver. The Army plans to use airpower integration to replace the void in organic fires capability. This increased demand for air support brings with significant manpower and resource requirements. The impact of this shift to reliance on joint fires integration is addressed in greater detail in the following DOTMLPF analysis.

Doctrine

As echelon redesign is implemented, and affected Air Force units modify their alignment and support relationships, associated doctrinal changes will be inevitable. One of the most immediate and critical doctrinal disconnects is with regard to the alignment and functioning of the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). Joint Pub (JP) 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)* states that the ASOC will normally be collocated with the corps, or the Army's senior warfighting echelon in theater.³⁹ By definition, the ASOC is the "primary control agency component of the Theater Air Control System (TACS)...and...coordinates and directs air support for Army or joint force land component operations."⁴⁰ In short, the ASOC is the CAS execution agency in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.

The Air Force currently has only six ASOCs worldwide (four active duty and two Air National Guard) aligned to support five standing Army corps. In the event that the ASOC is aligned at the UEy level in peacetime, and/or the UEy is functioning as the senior warfighting

headquarters in an area of operations, there will be minimal impact on the current doctrinal relationship, nor on the level of demand for ASOC organizations. However, under the echelon redesign construct where UEx organizations are slated to replace the corps as the Army's primary warfighting echelon—this could have major implications on the requirement for organized, trained, and equipped ASOCs. The Army is currently planning to stand up 18 UEx organizations to supplant the five existing corps as the Army's primary warfighting headquarters. This could potentially triple the demand up to 18 ASOC-like elements, compared to the existing supply of six⁴¹. Obviously this would have major DOTMLPF implications across the board.

Worthy of note, but of lesser concern than the ASOC dilemma, is the treatment of the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). As mentioned, the ACCE (a small staff element headed by a Colonel through Major General depending on the size of the operation) is the JFACC liaison to the JFLCC, co-located at the JFLCC headquarters. For example, in OIF, the ACCE (Maj Gen Leaf) was co-located at the 3rd Army Headquarters as the JFACC's (Lt Gen Moseley's) direct liaison to the JFLCC (LTG Mckiernan). Under echelon redesign, if the ACCE maintains the relationship at the ASCC/Numbered Army level, there should be little or no impact. If however, the ACCE becomes aligned at the UEx level (which is entirely possible, as the UEx is capable of functioning as the JFLCC and/or JTF commander), this could potentially put a much larger demand on ACCE requirements. One critical variable would be the number of UEx entities functioning in a JFLCC/JTF headquarters capacity at any given time. One mitigating factor is that the ACCE is currently formed as an ad hoc entity, so to a point, the Air Force could theoretically support multiple warfighting headquarters without a major impact on service capabilities.

Another potential doctrinal implication deals with what the Army calls Army Support to Other Services or ASOS. These are essentially functions where the Army has been identified as the “lead agent” for providing specified services to all forces participating in an operation. Examples include: ballistic missile defense, NBC defense, common user logistics (fuel, water, etc.), mortuary affairs, POW administration, etc. These are functions normally accomplished at the ASCC and/or Corps level. UEy and UEx restructuring will inevitably impact how these products and services are doctrinally apportioned. One thing to note is that these types of services are likely to be theater dependent, so there may be no single solution across the board.

Organization

The potential organizational impacts of echelon redesign on the U.S. Air Force could be staggering. As previously mentioned, the current ASOG/ASOS force structure is sized to support the Army’s current corps and division forces, and their associated 33 maneuver brigades. The Army’s current plan is to expand and redistribute its force structure in order to build up to as many as 48 active duty brigades. If this is done without a commensurate growth in ASOG, ASOS, and ASOC force structure, a major disconnect will result, leaving the Army vastly under supported in the air operations support arena. The Air Force currently has 790 total (active and ARC) Joint Terminal Air Control (JTAC) personnel (excluding combat control teams that support USAF operations). Of that 790, 587 are currently combat mission ready. Additionally, equipment-wise, the Air Force possesses approximately 700 TACP equipment sets. Bottom line, the Army is requesting JTACs be deployed down to the company-level, an initial unvalidated requirement of some 1,300 JTACs—again, only 586 are currently trained. This represents a huge delta in Army requirements versus Air Force capabilities. With the current emphasis on

effects based operations (EBO), the Army may be better served in trying to articulate required effects as opposed establishing a JTAC target number.⁴²

In addition, the ASOC dilemma mentioned above could have a huge impact. If the Army and the Air Force collectively decide to align the ASOC at the UEx level, this would effectively triple (6 up to 18) the requirement for organized, trained, and equipped ASOC organizations.

Above and beyond the air operations support arena, echelon redesign could have far-reaching impacts across numerous Air Force functional areas to include: strategic mobility (inter- and intra-theater airlift), command and control, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, and so on. Unfortunately, these other functional areas are beyond the scope of this paper, and will need to be analyzed in separate forum.

Training

Training is another area that requires consideration in the course of assessing the overall ramifications of echelon redesign. Aligning the ASOC at the UEx level, coupled with “growing” 15 additional maneuver brigades, will result in several critical training issues that warrant analysis. If the Air Force ends up adding (or realigning) force structure to support the increased demand for ASOCs, and/or JTACs (a delta of 713 JTACs between the Army’s initial requirement and the currently trained force), that would bring with it an inherent training pipeline in order to initially qualify air controllers. An even larger obstacle is the challenge of continuation training required to keep them all qualified and proficient.⁴³ This is a potential “showstopper” because there are a finite number of fixed wing training sorties available for “live” CAS terminal control training and certification—this is already a limitation at current force structure levels. Increasing the requirement in order to adequately support the Army’s increased demand will only exacerbate the training dilemma. A parallel argument holds for

ASOC personnel. Tripling the demand for ASOCs brings with it a dramatic increase in training, exercise, and proficiency requirements.

Historically, ASOCs have “plugged in” almost exclusively at the corps level. Training, exercises, and actual execution has always been accomplished with corps staffs. Should the ASOC align at the UEx level, this would require significant joint training in order to develop a smooth working relationship between the new UEx staffs and the ASOCs—entities presently unaccustomed to working together. Due to the criticality of rapid, accurate, well coordinated, and adequately deconflicted execution of CAS sorties, extensive training will be required to ensure effective and efficient execution in the heat of battle.

Materiel

Increasing demand, increasing force structure, and increasing training requirements—all of this adds up to an increase in materiel requirements. Air support operations organizations will need robust acquisition programs in order to effectively comply with their growing training and operational requirements. Vehicles, communications gear, personal equipment, the list is endless. One of the primary equipment issues emerging from the UEx construct is that of operational reach. Given the advances in network centric warfare, ground forces are able to operate in significantly larger areas of operation (AO), and traverse much greater distances a lot faster than they have in the past. Case in point, Operation Iraqi Freedom: V Corps covered huge expanses of territory in a matter of days during their “thunder run” from the Kuwait border to Baghdad and beyond. ASOCs and TACPs currently operate using line of sight, very high frequency (VHF) radios, with extremely limited range—often further degraded by terrain considerations. Trying to affect control over greater distances, at faster speeds of advance will present connectivity challenges for Air Force units. To a degree, this problem has been

recognized, and there are enhancements in work for improved communications gear for TACPs. The Air Force needs to ensure that, given the impacts of echelon redesign, that ongoing acquisition efforts won't be obsolete before they are fielded.

Leadership and Education

Any time there are major elements of change in any organization, associated leadership challenges come with it. The impact of Army echelon redesign is no exception. Leadership demands transcend all levels of the chain of command (Major Command, Numbered Air Force, Group, Squadron, and below), and cross all boundaries across the entire DOTMLPF spectrum. Doctrinal impacts, organizational upheaval, increased training demands, equipment acquisition, a myriad of personnel related issues, not to mention long-term facility needs are but a small representation of some of the forthcoming leadership challenges. It will be critically important for Air Force leaders at all levels to be proactive in order to stay out in front of all these key issues. The Air Force leadership must effectively manage change in order to minimize the impact on their organizations, and avoid degradation of capability throughout the transition period.

Personnel

Several personnel related issues have already been addressed indirectly: the potential need for more TACPs (ALOs and JTACs), more ASOC qualified personnel to meet the Army's increasing demands, and the associated personnel training requirements. Where will the people come from? New accessions? Cross trained from another Air Force specialty? The Army providing people to be trained as Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC) and/or Forward Observers (FO)? These are questions that the Army and Air Force leadership will need to analyze and resolve.

A less obvious personnel issue that arises out of echelon redesign is that of populating the Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) and/or the Joint Manning Document (JMD). As mentioned in Chapter Three, one of the proposed functions for the UEx headquarters is to have the capability of serving as a Joint Task Force headquarters (for smaller scale contingencies) with augmentation from a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) headquarters, or from the other services via an approved Joint Manning Document (JMD). Both of these augmentation packages will bring with it a personnel bill for the Air Force and the other services as well. What specialties are required (e.g. command and control, ISR, airlift, fires, logistics, etc.)? What functions, tasks, and capabilities are they required to accomplish? How will they be organized? How are they going to be trained? Are they permanent joint billets, or are they formed as ad hoc organizations? This is an area that requires much greater attention by both services. The Army needs to specifically identify their requirements, and provide them to the Air Force to sort out the best way of fulfilling the requirements.

Facilities

There are numerous facility requirements that will be derived from these organizational changes, if they come to fruition. Given long lead times required to accomplish facility construction, renovation, or enhancements, these are requirements that need to be addressed as early as possible in the planning cycle. There are potentially many facility-type requirements that could arise, over and above merely ASOG, ASOS, and ASOC facilities to house the increased number of personnel assigned. Air Force units deploying with their Army counterparts from various force projection platforms may drive an increase in the need for roads, railways, airfields, ramp space, beddown locations, warehouse space, marshalling areas, and so on. Again,

all of these facility related needs are high dollar, long lead time requirements that require immediate attention.

Conclusion

“First and foremost, the President and the Secretary elevated transformation to the level of strategy, and that is probably the most important lens through which we should look at transformation.”

- Vice Admiral (Retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski -

As you can see, challenges abound for both services as they transform their capabilities in order to meet the challenges of an evolving global security environment. According to the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004*, “adaptive organizations must be more modular and support rapid reconfiguration of joint capabilities for specific missions.”⁴⁴ The U.S. Army is “moving out” in an attempt to become that modular organization that is capable of providing “relevant, ready forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for full-spectrum joint, interagency and multinational operations and to support future force development.”⁴⁵

Prior to getting into a detailed discussion regarding conclusions and recommendations, it is important to recognize at the outset that the Air Force is not undertaking this endeavor from a completely “cold start.” As alluded to in Chapter 3, the Air Force XO, other senior leaders from the XO staff, along with general officers from both Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command all received an echelon redesign briefing from the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas at the Pentagon in the Spring of 2004. A joint Army/Air Force Council of Colonels has been meeting periodically at Langley AFB with echelon redesign being one of their primary topics of discussion. The subject has also been broached during the

November 2004 Air Force Doctrine Summit, and Army/Air Force Warfighter talks. In addition, the Air Force recently stood up the Joint Air-Ground Operations (JAGO) office at Langley AFB. The JAGO charter is to “address immediate air-ground issues, integrate all command activities on the subject, and act as the service’s single point of contact for all operational issues in support of ground forces.” While the JAGO office plans to work closely with counterpart Army offices, one drawback is that there will be no soldiers directly assigned to the office at Langley.⁴⁶ So, there is some level of awareness of the potential impacts of echelon redesign at Air Force senior leadership levels. Having said that, the author contends that both services need to be more proactive and raise the level of coordination in order to ensure synchronized transformational efforts.

With that in mind, the following observations and recommendations are offered. First, a manpower assessment needs to be accomplished in order to determine the impact of the Army’s proposed increase in maneuver brigades, as well as the alignment of the ASOC. Worst case would be an increase of 15 maneuver brigades and the associated TACP demands, coupled with the alignment of the ASOC at the UEx headquarters level effectively tripling the demand for ASOC organizations. The Army has commenced their UEy/UEx conversions, and have approval to increase their end strength in order to start standing up additional brigades. The Air Force can’t afford to delay the required analysis and planning in order to meet these evolving requirements.

Second, all of the services need to re-look their “lead agent” roles and responsibilities—what the Army refers to as Army Support to Other Services (ASOS). Restructuring of ASOC, corps, and division assets and responsibilities could impact overall support to the joint (not to

mention multi-national and interagency) community in a deployed theater of operations. To complicate matters, these arrangements may well vary from theater to theater.

A third consideration is the equipping of TACPs and ASOCs. With technology enabling a UEx organization to undertake operations in much larger areas of operation, coupled with unprecedented speeds of advance—current command and control assets may be inadequate. The services need to ensure that their current modernization plans and doctrinal employment concepts will keep pace with the demands of the Army's improved speed and agility.

A fourth ramification deals specifically with the personnel requirements alluded to above in the ASOC/ALO/JTAC discussion. Where will the additional bodies come from: new accessions? Cross-trainees? Army personnel trained to fulfill some of the functions? Given the long-term exorbitant costs associated with manpower, should the worst case scenario play out, the services need be prepared to implement a carefully thought out plan.

Finally is the situation where a UEx unit is stood up as a JTF headquarters in support of a smaller scale contingency, and they require augmentation from a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) or via an approved Joint Manning Document (JMD). First of all, the Army needs to define their requirements in terms of tasks, functions, and desired capabilities. The Air Force then needs to help shape their involvement to ensure the proper mix of skill sets so that the JTF headquarters is postured for success right out of the chute. Failure to address these requirements will result in the generation of an ad hoc organization with a strong likelihood of delivering sub-optimal performance.

Keep in mind that each and every one of these ramifications brings with it impacts across all DOTMLPF areas. For example, aligning the ASOC at the UEx level and tripling the number of ASOC organizations would have doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, and facility implications. Once all of these DOTMLPF issues are resolved, the next step is to capture all of the nuances in Army, Air Force, and Joint doctrine.

Time is of the essence. It is imperative that the Air Force establish a multi-functional team to engage with the appropriate Task Force Modularity entities in order to start framing these issues so that Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) can be identified to begin systematically addressing all of these critical issues. Immediate action is necessary in order to ensure that both services accomplish their transformation goals in the true spirit of jointness. Anything less will result in a significant degradation in the warfighting capabilities that the services bring to the table on behalf of the combatant commanders.

“Our overall goal is to encourage a series of transformations that in combination can produce a revolutionary increase in our military capability and redefine how war is fought. The capabilities demonstrated in Afghanistan show how far we have come in the ten years since the Persian Gulf War. But they are just a glimpse of how far we can still go.”

- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz -

“We have the most technologically advanced Army in the world, resourced with outstanding equipment and enhanced with cutting edge technologies. But equipment, organizations and precision-guided munitions don’t fight and win wars: soldiers do.”

- Lieutenant General Richard A. Cody -

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