

CADRE/PC 2005-007

AIR FORCE FELLOWS (SDE)

AIR UNIVERSITY

REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

by

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A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2005
2004

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE MAY 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reforming the Interagency Process				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University,Air War College,325 Chennault Circle,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 122	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Preface

At the highest levels of government, translation of national security objectives into demonstrable action rests with the National Security Council (NSC) and its application of the Interagency Process (IAP). The NSC, via the IAP, is charged with integrating civil-military capabilities in policy formulation and implementation. However, observers and participants of the IAP innately understand the current process is flawed. Recent contingencies operations, from Somalia to Iraq illustrate numerous shortcomings such as stove piped execution, lack of unity of effort, poor ability to plan, and lack of a coherent implementation structures.

Against this backdrop, I focus on answering the following question—Is there a requirement to pass legislation akin to the National Security Act of 1947 in order to improve the IAPs application of four instruments of national power (diplomatic, military, information, economic) and if so, then what areas should the legislation address?

Several individuals have been instrumental during production of this paper and deserve special recognition. I would like thank Mr. Joshua Quincy for his help as my research assistant. Also special recognition goes to Mr. Lance Hampton and Mr. Thomas Haase who served as my primary editors. Additionally, special thanks go to Mrs. Kelly McDevitt for all her support as the assistant to the Director to the Ridgway Center. Finally, I would also like to thank Professors Donald Goldstein and William Keller for their guidance and to Dr. Dan Mortenson for his recommendations on my content.

Abstract

This paper proposes reforms that correct deficiencies in the Interagency Process (IAP) in order to improve its capability to apply the instruments of power to accomplish national security policy directives. Recommended changes involve modifying national security legislation and revising the organizational construct.

Analysis of the current IAP reveals several problems, such as unity of command, unity of effort, and cultural mismatch, that inhibit effective policy execution. It also reveals the current agency centered approach presents additional challenges to efficient execution. The result is a process that continues lacking the ability to clarify objectives, chains of command, and policy implementation plans. Insights from organizational behavior theory reveal that some of the IAPs sub-optimal performance and irrational behavior are rooted in bureaucratic bargaining and decisions.

Reforming the IAP requires legislation that provides a framework to guide the process's reform. Legislative changes, based on the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, provide overarching guidance that drive reform of the IAP. Reform also requires undertaking organizational changes that corrects structural problems and provides the framework within which the legislative guidelines can evolve and grow to meet future national security challenges. Revised organizational constructs also correct systemic structural deficiencies in the process.

Chapter 1

The Necessity to Transform the Interagency Process

The security challenges facing the nation today are increasingly complex, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. These include USG agencies, partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), regional and international organizations, and the agencies of the host country. Efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies.

Joint Publication 3-08
Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations

In an environment where the lines between diplomacy, information, economics, and military action blur, response to future national security challenges requires synergistic instead of piecemeal application of all instruments of national power. From its inception, the National Security Council (NSC) has been the epicenter of that response. Throughout its over 50 year history, the NSC has acted as the key broker forming and executing national security policy. At the highest levels of government, it has attempted to synergistically integrate civil-military capabilities to accomplish national security objectives.

The process the NSC uses to form and execute national security policy is known as the Interagency Process (IAP). The current IA Process generally involves participants

across the executive branch acting together to provide advice to the President of the United States (POTUS) regarding the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The IAP generally executes two tasks--policy development and policy execution. Policy development involves a series of committees across the national security community researching and recommending policy options for POTUS approval. Once approved, policy options are executed using an agency centered approach. The agency centered approach is one where various agencies or departments execute their portion of the policy.

With this construct in place, a question arises as to the effectiveness of the IAP in executing national security policy. In a post Cold War environment, a survey of several contingencies, from Panama in 1989 to Iraq in 2004, reveals an IA process with multiple shortfalls. Throughout the last 15 years, studies of various operations reveal inconsistent application of the instruments of power towards national security objectives. Additionally, organizational problems continue inhibiting effective policy execution. Finally, the agency centered approach lacks the capability to impose unity of command and unity of effort—both elements vital to synergistic application of the instruments of power. Many of these problems can be traced back to the absence of detailed planning processes and crippling cultural barriers between departments and agencies. As a result, problems continue to hinder achieving clear objectives, precise chains of command, and effective policy implementation plans. What it has also shown is the current IAP is inadequate to effectively confront complex challenges such as terrorism or mass humanitarian suffering.

Insights from organizational behavior theory reveal some reasons why the IA process has been less than capable of executing effective operations. The bureaucratic politics model reveals that the IA processes' sub-optimal performance and irrational behavior is the result of bureaucratic bargaining. The model also reveals that several factors, to include interests, perception, power and position, provide the seeds for conflict between organizations involved in the IA process. The result is choices based primarily on bargaining, power, influence, and continued agency survival--not based on how best to accomplish national security objectives. While the bureaucratic politics model provides insights into why the bureaucracy acts as it does, the National Security Agency Model helps us to understand that key decisions made at an agencies' inception and its evolutionary path are key factors that, once set in motion, are difficult to change. Additionally, the National Security Agency Model helps us understand that changing the structure of the IAP is tantamount to waging war against entrenched interests and requires the full weight and effort of the POTUS and buy-in by key interest groups in order to effect change.

Reforming the Interagency Process – Legislation and Structure

Correcting the problems and reforming the IA process involves implementing two initiatives. First, it requires legislation that outlines core principles necessary to correct current shortfalls. This legislation provides the strategic guidance to guide the processes' evolution. A useful starting point for drafting legislative reforms is the Department of Defense's (DOD) enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Goldwater-Nichols drove profound changes and corrected major deficiencies in DOD's joint warfighting processes. Applying Goldwater-Nichol's overarching

objectives to the IA process reveals that implementing several guidelines could easily correct various shortfalls pertaining to unity of effort, unity of command, organizational leadership, and cross cultural understanding.

While legislative guidelines provide overarching guidance, the second requirement to effect IA process reform is undertaking organizational reform. Organizational reform provides the framework within which the guidelines can evolve and grow to meet future national security challenges. The recommended organizational structure to reform the IAP involves forming a standing Interagency Headquarters (IAHQ) supported by regional and functional Interagency Task Forces (IATF). The IAHQ serves as the umbrella organization providing policy, guidance, and oversight over national security policy execution. The IATF's serve as the regional or functional experts that develop and execute plans for dealing various national security priorities using assigned capabilities from across the IA community.

Structure of this paper.

Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on outlining reforms to the IAP for the executive and legislative branches of government to enact. The goal of these reforms is to improve the IAP by enforcing the leadership and management discipline. The desired end state for these reforms is an IAP that accomplishes policy directives by coherently and synergistically applying all instruments of national power.

Structurally, this paper is divided into eight chapters. Chapter two begins the analysis by providing a brief overview of the IAP to include its origins, evolution and current operating process. Understanding the origins and evolution of the IAP help to understand why many of the problems in the current IAP exist. The overview is followed

by chapter three--case studies of IAP performance in various contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, Panama, and Iraq. Chapter four builds on the observations from various case studies to outline key areas to improve the IAP. Before delving into specific reforms, chapter five provides a brief review of organizational theory. Organizational theory helps to focus on the critical problems that commonly plague large bureaucracies. With areas of improvement established, the remaining chapters focus on proposing two reforms—overarching legislative guidance and organizational reforms. Chapter six proposes overarching guidelines for legislative enactment based on the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Chapter seven proposes organizational reforms using a multiple course of action approach. Three different organizational reform courses of action are proposed, analyzed, and compared in order to recommend the best restructuring model for the IAP.

Constructs and Constraints.

This paper uses several constructs to focus the discussion. First, the IAP, as mentioned previously, is broken into two sub-processes, policy formation and policy execution. The prime focus is on policy execution (See Figure 1 – Analytic Construct). Policy formation involves the process where national security policies are formulated and published. Policy execution relates to the “doing” function of government and involves various departments and agencies implementation of national security policies. This distinction helps to focus on the heart of the problem—the IAPs inability to effectively translate strategic policies into tactical action.¹ An example of this distinction between policy formation and execution was the decision to intervene in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The process to reach a decision to intervene

falls in the realm of policy formation. However, executing military and other governmental operations associated with the decision represents policy execution.

Second, the focus is limited to national security rather than domestic policy (See Figure 1 – Analytic Construct).² The distinction between domestic and national security policy centers on the various interest groups involved and the openness of the policy development process. In her book, “Flawed by Design”, Amy Zegart, states “Domestic policy agencies live in a world littered with scores of powerful, long-standing, and varied interest group.”³ Conversely, the national security interests groups are fewer and more tightly aggregated. Zegart goes on to say, “Whereas domestic policy is fairly out in the open, much of national security agency activity is conducted in secret.”⁴

Third, analysis is focused at the strategic and operational levels of national security. The strategic level of national security refers to national policy formation and involves the NSC and other executive branch departments or agencies. The operational level of national security, in general, pertains to the mechanisms used to translate strategic policy into demonstrable tactical action at the departmental level.




Figure 1 – Analytic Construct

A final constraint is the target audience. The target audience is national security professionals and other public servants, military and civilian, knowledgeable in IA processes. Where necessary, detailed discussion of the IA and NSC is included, however, the focus of this paper is not introductory level concepts.⁵

Definitions.

Before proceeding and to promote clarity, three key ingredients of the IAP are defined—the actors, their duties and responsibilities, and the tools at their disposal. Actors within the IAP include those statutorily defined in the National Security Act of 1947 along with other groups required to effectively implement policy.⁶ Statutory members of the NSC and IAP include the president, vice-president, secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.⁷ Some of the non-statutory groups involved in the IAP include “engaged US government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations.”⁸ The duties and responsibilities of the actors in the IAP, as outlined in National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), “Organization of the National Security Council System” are to “coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies”⁹ The tools at their disposal to accomplish policy directives are the four instruments of national power—Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME). The DIME provides the broad capabilities available to enact policy directives.¹⁰ The Joint Staff Officers guide states that “U.S. engagement abroad is carried out through the four elements of national power...Each of these elements, in and of itself, cannot be the sole

answer to U.S. engagement strategy abroad. Each element must be applied in concert with and in a manner complementary to each of the other three.”¹¹

Summary

In a recent article in the Financial Times, Anthony Cordesman stated that the 2003 Iraq war “showed that the U.S. did not have an interagency system that could enforce meaningful coordination between the Departments of Defense and State and other civil agencies, and developed an effective and coordinated civil and military approach to stability operations and nation building.”¹² Solving this problem requires executive and legislative branches of government to enact legislative and organizational changes. However, before proposing changes it is useful to understand the origins and evolution of the current IAP and its performance in recent contingencies. Within this context, focus now turns to outlining the origins and evolution of the current IAP.

Notes

¹ This paper relies heavily on a concept that the military terms Operational Art. Operational Art is the process of translating strategic intent into tactical action. As stated in the Joint Staff Officer Guide, “To succeed in creating an effective campaign plan, the operational commander must consider and apply a myriad of considerations in its development. The talent for taking national guidance and Service resources and creating a coherent joint plan that achieves the strategic aim is called operational art... Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating key activities at all levels of war.” “Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 2000.” National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, 3-2 and 3-3

² In most cases, executing domestic policy considerations typically rests within the capabilities of single departments or agencies. Additionally, those agencies are recognized as the lead for those policy decisions and executions. For example the majority of policy, guidance and oversight for the criminal justice systems clearly rests with the Department of Justice. Other examples of clear domestic policy areas include social security and nuclear energy regulation. One exception is that spans national

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security and domestic policy is homeland security. In this paper, homeland security is within the scope of discussions.

³ Zegart, A. B. (1999). Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

⁴ Ibid., 27

⁵ For more in-depth background information and discussion on the of the IA process see "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, 9 October 1996. Vol. Joint Pub 3-08 Vol I and "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, 9 October 1996. Vol. Joint Pub 3-08 Vol II.

⁶ There also exists a parallel Homeland security Council systems that mirrors the NSC process. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1 (HSPD-1) outlines this organization. See Lt. Col Birmingham, G., CDR Barndt, Luann, and MAJ Salo, Thomas (2003). Achieving Unity of Effort: A call for legislation to improve the interagency process and continue enhancing interservice interoperability, Joint Forces Staff College. 2-3

⁷ Membership of the National Security Council - The National Security Council is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of Central Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate. "History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997". Washington, D.C., 1999. Ed. U.S. Dept. of State Office of the Historian. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State 2004. <<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS3006>>

⁸ "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." Ed. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000. Vol. Joint Publication 1. 2-11. Joint Publications 3-08 and 3-33 provide an extensive list of possible groups involved in the IA process. The point of including non-statutory organizations in the definition is to show the requirement for coordination across many different organizations at many different levels. See Lt. Col Birmingham, G., CDR Barndt, Luann, and MAJ Salo, Thomas (2003). Achieving Unity of Effort: A call for legislation to improve the interagency process and continue enhancing interservice interoperability, Joint Forces Staff College. 2

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⁹ The White House. "Organization of the National Security Council System." Ed. National Security Council: National Security Presidential Directives. 1

¹⁰ For a brief discussion on instruments of power see "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." Ed. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000. Vol. Joint Publication 1.

¹¹ Joint Staff Officers Guide, 2-11

¹² Cordesman, A. (2005). A Lesson in Transforming Warfare. Financial Times., Feb 18, 2005, 13

Chapter 2

The Interagency Process—Yesterday and Today

In short, what began as a creature of Congress has evolved into a series of unique institutional creations reflecting each president's distinctive personality, demands, and leadership style. Or so goes the conventional wisdom.

Zegart

Before recommending reforms, it is useful to understand the origins, evolution, and current operational constructs of the IAP. Understanding the IAPs post World-War II origins, the birthmarks established at the time of its inception, and the subsequent evolution of the process provides keen insights into the IAP. Understanding the organization and functions of the IAP establishes a baseline from which reform recommendations emerge. Finally, understanding the current operating framework of the IAP provides context for follow-on case studies.

Overview of the Interagency Process

The IAP is the primary methodology the POTUS uses to form and execute policy using views of a broad and diverse group of national security professionals.¹ Its primary purpose, as stated in NSPD-1, remains “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.”² The

IAP is less a formal structure and more a community of departments and agencies that coordinate executive branch policy development and execution. It still largely reflects the desires of the POTUS and his exercise of executive privilege over national security issues.³ Working in an environment of formal and informal bureaucratic processes, pertinent issues drive both IAP activities and participation. The current process, while evolving on the margins from its original inception in 1947, remains fundamentally unchanged since 1963 from procedures established during the Kennedy Administration.⁴

Origins and Evolution

Created in the aftermath of World War II, the NSC and IAP came into existence with the passage of the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947.⁵ Concerns in both the executive and legislative branches of government over the military services stove piped conduct of World War II operations,⁶ perceptions of President Franklin Roosevelt's "freewheeling, ad hoc World War II leadership, and impending Cold War challenges"⁷ drove the 1947 Act's passage. Facing strategic challenges from the Soviet Union and a burgeoning nuclear threat, national leaders realized that national security interests required close cooperation among all branches of the executive, particularly diplomats, members of the military, and intelligence services.⁸ Responding to the emerging challenges posed by the confluence of dual threats of communism and proliferation of nuclear weapons, the doctrines of containment and deterrence provided impetus to unify the national security community in its policy formation and execution decisions.⁹

Thus, urged by President Truman, congress enacted the NSA. The Act attempted to impose a modicum of restraint and discipline on the national security policy formation

and execution process by mandating requirements to consult with congress and other bodies outside the executive branch.

During debate and eventual enactment of the 1947 Act, several interesting unintended consequences emerged that are birthmarks of the current IAP. The first was the creation of the NSC. Originally an offshoot of negotiations to gain Navy Department agreement, Congress envisioned the NSC as largely an “administrative” staff supporting decision maker’s deliberations over national security policy. However, the 1947 Act’s writers never codified this “administrative” intent. Congress’s silence provided the POTUS the opportunity to create his own personnel NSC staff, ample room for him to appoint its members, and ultimately to use the NSC as he wished. It was this lack of guidance in the 1947 Act and the evolution of the NSC and IAP that would later serve as one of the main problems.¹⁰

With little guidance as to its function, the NSC grew beyond its original intent to assume a large role in policy development and execution. This evolution largely reflected the actions of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. These three administrations fundamentally created a national security policy system with the White House versus the Department of State as its focal point. The NSC staff, with POTUS interests looming in the background, became the core for managing policy formation, analysis, and advice. The system evolved into a policy oriented National Security Advisor (NSA) and NSC staff with immense power.¹¹ While various Presidents from Lyndon B. Johnson to George W. Bush have tinkered on the margins, the NSC and IAP’s power and influence has ebbed and flowed but has never been divested.¹²

The NSC and IAP Today

Today, the NSC and IA are both a group and process designed to coordinate executive branch development and execution of the national security policies. It is a forum that provides voice to disparate groups of national security professionals.¹³ Additionally, it is a hierarchy and network of participants who voice opinions, offer recommendations, and provide feasible options to the POTUS. It is a system where decisions and guidance emerge from the “Oval office” and where executive branch departments take those outcomes for action. The internal structure, working groups, and issues are purely left up to executive branch discretion with only membership in the most senior group, the NSC, mandated by law.¹⁴

The participants of the NSC and IA are organized around four main groups—NSC, Principles Committee (PC), Deputies Committee (DC), and Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) (See Table 1 – Hierarchy of Participants in the NSC and IAP). Most senior of these groups is the NSC.¹⁵ The NSC comprises key senior advisors to the POTUS that provide advice with respect to integration of foreign and domestic dimensions of national security policies. It also serves as a venue to coordinate policy across departments and agencies.¹⁶ Supporting the NSC is the PC.¹⁷ The PC is led by the National Security Advisor and is the senior IA venue that considers national security policy recommendations to the NSC and meets at the discretion of the National Security Advisor.¹⁸ Subordinate to the PC is the DC.¹⁹ The DC, led by the Deputy National Security Advisor, is the senior sub-cabinet IA group that prescribes and reviews IA group actions, and analyzes and prepares issues for the PC. Finally, PCCs are the base level organizations of the IAP. PCCs serve as the daily forum for IA coordination on various

national security issues. They conduct policy analysis for other senior committees and include numerous representatives from various executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the DC. Broken down along regional and functional lines, PCCs are chaired by either Under or Assistant Secretaries of States. Chairs of various PCCs, with consent from the NSC Executive Secretary, can establish subordinate IA Working Groups (IWGs) to aid in policy development and execution.²⁰

Organization	Leader	Duties
National Security Council	POTUS	- Provide advice with respect to integration of foreign and domestic dimensions of national security policies - Venue to coordinate policy across departments
Principles Committee	National Security Advisor	- Considers national security policy recommendations to NSC
Deputies Committee	Deputy NSA	- Prescribes and reviews IA group actions, and analyzes and prepares issues for the Principles
Policy Coordination Committees	Under or Asst Secretaries of States	- Daily forum for IA coordination - Conduct policy analysis for other senior committees

Table 1 – Hierarchy of Participants in the NSC and IAP

Generally speaking, the IAP oversees policy formation while policy execution is largely the purview of designated lead agencies or departments. Policy issues generally flow up from PCCs through the PC and DC to NSC. Traditional functions of the IA process include coordination, integration, supervision, adjudication, formulation and advocacy of all aspects of policy administration and crisis management. It also attempts to ensure elements of national power are integrated synergistically toward accomplishing policy directives. Implied tasks within this process include identifying issues, formulating options, raising and adjudicating concerns at various levels commensurate

with action required, making decisions when and where appropriate, and overseeing implementation of policy decisions.²¹

The IAP has various strengths (See Table 2 – Strengths and Weaknesses of the NSC and IAP). One of the strengths is its consensus based approach. The process is geared toward achieving consensus, and involves extensive coordination meant to be thorough and inclusive.²² The process is well-suited for the policy formation requirements of deliberate and thoughtful consideration. Another strength is the IAPs simultaneous operations as both a network of individuals across various departments and a hierarchy of individuals working in the IAP.

However, given various strengths, there are also considerable weaknesses in the process. One weakness is that the consensus based approach can be cumbersome and slow, and not well suited for rapid high paced operations.²³ It is also prone to perpetuate bureaucratic politics and does little to mitigate actors actions based on survival. The process also lacks robust capability to ensure unity of effort during policy execution. Additionally, network and hierarchical dimensions of the IAP also contribute to weaknesses in achieving unity of effort and unity of command. Finally, with changes across various administrations, the process suffers from lack of continuity and established standard operating processes. Each transition of power brings with it changes in NSC membership, subordinate working groups, and policy formation methodologies. This lack of continuity is a direct byproduct of the original lack of guidance outlined in the 1947 Act and a traditional deferral by the legislative branch to the executive for control over national security policy.²⁴

Strengths	Weaknesses
• Consensus based approach • Well-suited for policy formation • Simultaneously operates as a network of individuals across various departments and a hierarchy of individuals	• Consensus based approach can be cumbersome, slow and not well suited for rapid high paced operations • Prone to perpetuate bureaucratic politics • Lack of capability to impose unity of effort and command • Process suffers from lack of continuity and established standard operating procedures • Causes actors to act based on survival versus synergy • Perpetuates cultural stereotype

Table 2 – Strengths and Weaknesses of the NSC and IAP

Notes

¹ “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations Handbook”, National Defense University, January 2003, 5

² The White House. "Organization of the National Security Council System." Ed. National Security Council: National Security Presidential Directives.

³ (1999). History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997. U. S. DoS. Office of the Historian. Washington, D.C., Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State. 2004., Lt Col Loxterkamp, E. W., Lt Col Welch, Michael F., and CDR Gomez, Richard M. (2003). The Interagency Process: The Need for New Legislation, Joint Forces Staff College: 31. 4

⁴ For an in-depth summary of the major changes occurring between from the Truman to Kennedy administrations see (1999). History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997. U. S. DoS Office of the Historian. Washington, D.C., Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept of State. 2004.

⁵ Zegart, A. B. (1999). Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. 54-57, 68

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⁶ One example of the inter-service conflicts during prosecution of World-War II include different strategies to prosecute the pacific campaign. These conflicts resulted in execution of two simultaneous campaigns led by the Army and Navy.

⁷ Zegart, 54

⁸ Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White, eds. "Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future." Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 265-266

⁹ Carter 265;

¹⁰ Zegart, 94

¹¹ Ibid., 6

¹² For example, there is the Johnson administration's use of Presidents Kennedy's policy making in ad hoc groups in lieu of NSC and continued reliance on a trusted inner circle at the expense of various departments and agencies. Under President Nixon, the NSC staff expanded and focused more power to NSA. Under President Carter, the NSA became the principle advisor on national security issues and the NSC staff continued in power. President Reagan favored his Chief of Staff over the NSA but the NSC staff maintained much of its earlier derived power. President George H. W. Bush furthered the NSC staff's dominance with formation of the today's structure of Principles Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordination Committees. Finally, President Clinton expanded the NSC to include the Department of the Treasury. Notably, President Clinton attempted to establish deliberate planning into the NSC and IA process with Presidential Decision Directive 56; Zegart, 57; Loxterkamp page 4,5; History of the National Security Council, 1-2.

¹³ Loxterkamp, 8

¹⁴ Zegart, 55

¹⁵ Members of the NSC include the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense. Advisors to the NSC include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence

¹⁶ "The Interagency Process in the Bush Administration, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1: Organization of the National Security Council System" a briefing from National Defense University, slide #2

¹⁷ Members of the PC are the National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advisor, and Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, White House Chief of Staff. The

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Director of Central Intelligence, Attorney General and Director of Office of Management and Budget attend as required.

¹⁸ “The Interagency Process in the Bush Administration”, slide #6.

¹⁹ Regular members of the DC include the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Treasury or Under Secretary Treasury for International Affairs, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President/Policy, Chief of Staff for the Vice President, National Security Advisor for the Vice President, Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. When international economic issues are discussed, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Deputy US Trade Representative, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture are also included.

²⁰ The Interagency Process In the Bush Administration, slide 13. Currently Regional PCCs include Europe/Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East & North Africa, and Africa. Functional PCCs include Democracy, Human Rights & International Operations, International Development & Humanitarian Assistance, Global Environment, International Finance, Transnational Economic Issues, Counter-Terrorism & National Preparedness, Defense Strategy, Force Structure & Planning, Arms Control, Proliferation, Counterproliferation & Homeland Defense, Intelligence & Counterintelligence, Records Access & Information Security, International Organized Crime, Contingency Planning, Space, and HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases. Currently there are 54 IWGs that remain in existence from the Clinton administration.

²¹ “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations Handbook,” 6

²² "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, 9 October 1996. Vol. Joint Pub 3-08 Vol I. "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." Ed. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000. Vol. Joint Publication 1. "Doctrine for Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, September 2001. Vol. Joint Pub 3-0. Loxterkamp 8,

²³ Mendel, William W. and Bradford, David G. "Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations." Ed. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University, 1995.

²⁴ Zegart, 55

Chapter 3

NSC and IA Process in Action--A Broken Process?

We...fought the war to remove Saddam from power without any meaningful plan for stability operations and nation building. We allowed political and economic chaos to take place as we advanced and in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's fall.

Anthony Cordesman

Generally speaking, the NSC and IAP oversee all aspects of national security policy formation and execution. Policy formation is largely the purview of the formal process and policy execution generally occurs through designated lead agencies or departments. With this construct in mind, a crucial question arises. How effective has this IAP been in executing contingency operations over the past two and a half decades? This chapter focuses on answering that question by examining IAP performance during contingency operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq. As this chapter will report, with notable consistency the IAP failed to synergistically apply instruments of power to meet national security objectives. Additionally, the process seems unable to achieve unity of command, unity of effort, and focus in its planning processes. Finally the process remains overly dominated by ad hoc organizational structures.¹ The first of these cases, Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, illustrates shortfalls in the IAP

capability to coordinate objectives and properly plan for post-conflict operations in Panama.²

Case 1 - Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY

After several incidents that raised the ire of the US, President George H. W. Bush directed actions to bring Panamanian President Manuel Noriega to justice.³ Following unsuccessful attempts to actively coerce⁴ Noriega and pressure him to change his policies, United States Southern Command conducted Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY—military operations to oust the Panamanian dictator and restore democracy.⁵ Strategically, operations focused on establishing a democratic government in Panama. At the operational level, the objectives were to protect Americans in the region, enforce Panama Canal Treaties, and remove Noriega from power.⁶

Militarily, Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrated the overwhelming capability of the US to conduct decisive combat operations. However, operational military success did not translate in to strategic success. The transition from Operation JUST CAUSE to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY demonstrated a myopic focus on operations to oust Noriega at the expense of detailed planning and consideration of post-conflict stabilization requirements.⁷ It also reflected serious shortcomings in the agency centered policy execution process inherent in the IAP. For example, vital players were frozen out of the process—a process where security considerations reigned supreme and prevented full coordination within the IA community. Additionally, the plan was incomplete. It relied on military officers to the exclusion of other IA experts and lacked clear missions and responsibilities. It also inadequately resourced peace enforcement, displaced personnel, enemy prisoners of war, and civil affairs missions. Of the numerous post-

conflict problems that occurred, most were directly attributable to the lack of discussions across the IA community. One report stated that “many agencies were excluded from DOD planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.”⁸ Finally, the commander of Southern Command stated, “It is a deficiency of a tightly held plan that it does not get discussed in the governmental apparatus. This is where the post-conflict problem for Panama originated.”⁹

Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY revealed several IAP shortfalls. First, it exposed planning shortfalls that failed to draft plans that included both conflict and post-conflict requirements or that clearly coordinated objectives across the IA. Second, it brought to light a lack of unity of effort across the IAP. However, Panamanian operations did not fully reveal the deadly consequences of uncoordinated action. It would take humanitarian intervention operations in Somalia to show the high cost in American blood, treasure, and lost prestige of poorly planned and executed operations.

Case 2 - Operations UNITAF and UNOSOM II

If Panamanian operations exposed several IAP deficiencies, humanitarian intervention in Somalia confirmed and expanded that list. In 1991, Somalia was a state on the verge of collapse. Civil war, famine, clan violence, and continued drought racked this strategically important country on the Horn of Africa. In the wake of a mounting humanitarian crisis, the UN executed United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)—an attempt to bring humanitarian aid to the Somali people, halt conflict, and reconstitute a viable state.¹⁰ However, without an established plan for security, UNOSOM I’s mission proved difficult to execute. Facing belligerent Somali’s and

growing security concerns, the UN transitioned to Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operations. UNITAF, led by the US military's Operation RESTORE HOPE, sought to create a secure environment UNOSOM I operations could not achieve. With the backing of 37,000 troops, the US led coalition restored order to roughly 40% of Somalia. The achievement of a modicum of security spurred the US and UN to transition to UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II continued security operations of UNITAF and implemented new efforts to rebuild Somali democracy. However, as with UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II also failed to prevent violent attacks against aid workers and UN forces. In an attempt to aid UNOSOM II operations, the US expanded its mission and attempted to provide security by executing unilateral operations to arrest General Mohammed Aidid, a key Somali clan leader and one of the major obstacles to peace.¹¹ On October 3, 1993, US Special Forces executed operations that captured 24 of Aidid's key advisers. However the price paid for this operation was 18 dead and 75 wounded US soldiers, two helicopters shot down, and one captured pilot. While the pilot was eventually released 11 days later, the images of US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu ultimately culminated in US withdrawal from Somalia.¹²

What is revealing about Somalia contingency operations is the lack of clear strategic objectives, lack of a plan to accomplish those objectives, shifting mandates, and the difficulty of operating in a combined IA and coalition environment. For example, forces assigned to the Aidid capture mission were never part of UNOSOM II and until the mission was failing, the UN had no awareness of its execution. Operations in Somalia also demonstrated the lethality of a lack of an integrated strategy to achieve national objectives. US operations did not clarify objectives and lacked cohesive unity of

command and unity of effort across the IA and international community. Lastly, it also demonstrated the direct cost of poor coordination—lost US prestige and needless sacrifice of blood and resources.

Case 3 - Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

If Panamanian and Somali operations identified major shortcomings in the IAP, 1994 operations in Haiti proved the IA community could take lessons learned and improve performance—albeit short lived. Following months of planning that began in 1993, the US military executed Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY—actions taken to restore President Jean-Bertrande Aristide to power after he was illegally ousted during a coup by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Facing increasing international pressure, the US aircraft carrier Eisenhower battle group off shore, and the 82nd Airborne Division en route, Cedras returned to negotiations that eventually led to his abdication of power.¹³

Haitian operations demonstrated a well coordinated plan that included capabilities from all elements of power and reliance on agencies with technical expertise to accomplish disparate missions. However, analysis of IA performance also demonstrates persistent cultural and doctrinal problems plaguing the IA community. For example, while United States Atlantic Command took the lead for military plans, DOD worked diligently with groups such as USAID and the Department of Justice to incorporate their capabilities. Nonetheless, even with improved performance and increased planning, “other governmental agencies were slow to arrive or build-up resources...Generally other departments had not done the detailed planning that DOD had, and often wanted more support than DOD had expected to provide.”¹⁴ Thus, lack of planning for realistic capability from the IA community and cultural barriers forced DOD to expand its focus.

Case 4 - Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

Perhaps the best, recent example of IAP shortcomings was planning and execution of post-conflict operations following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While the military swiftly and violently destroyed Saddam Hussein's regime, numerous missteps and lack of coordination that plagued previous operations continued in Iraq.

Post-Conflict Planning Requirements

Before covering various aspects of OIF post-conflict operations, it is instructive to understand the challenge of conducting post-conflict reconstruction. The role of occupying power presents immense challenges and unique requirements that require capabilities across government be fully coordinated, planned in detail, and led as a unitary force. In their monograph, entitled "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Force in a Post-Conflict Scenario", Crane and Terrill outline the complexity of conducting post-conflict operations. They specify 135 essential tasks categorized into 21 mission areas necessary to conduct post-conflict operations.¹⁵ Each task and mission is interrelated, occurs on interdependent timelines, and executes before, during, and after major combat operations. Some of these tasks become particularly critical during the transition between conflict and post-conflict operations. Finally, tasks and missions involve most departments and agencies within and outside of the US government, including international organizations.¹⁶ The vast array of mission areas required to reconstruct a state such as Iraq, necessitates clear objectives, detailed interagency planning, thorough coordination, and aggressive leadership in addressing areas such as public administration, civil information, public works, and education.¹⁷

Haphazard command relationships, disunity of effort, inter-organizational infighting, and uncoordinated plans will hamper any efforts to “win the peace.”

Ideology replaces planning

Many of the shortfalls common in other complex contingency operations discussed previously again emerged in OIF post-conflict operations. Coordination between various IA groups was loose and ad hoc. Moreover, operations lacked standard planning processes and unity of command. In an article entitled “How peace in Iraq became so elusive”, Slavin and Moniz revealed that Anthony Cordesman believed “a number of prewar decisions...create[ed] the current situation. Hasty planning, rosy assumptions about Iraqi attitudes and a failure to foresee and forestall the disastrous effects of looting and sabotage all contributed. We have to understand that it was the function of the NSC to insure that the interagency process worked...Failure must be placed at the level of the NSC and the president.”¹⁸ Cordesman, in his paper, “Iraq: Too Uncertain To Call”, went on to reveal that,

“US officials relied on ideology instead of planning...They failed to either make realistic assessments...or properly prepare for the fall of the regime...Parts of these failures were military...Part were not all failures the Administration and US military planners could avoid....The fact remains, however, that the US government failed to draft a serious or effective plan for...The period of conflict termination and the creation of an effective nation building office.”¹⁹

Too Many Actors

From the outset, any attempt to gain unity of effort proved difficult. This was due in large part to the number of different and diverse groups involved and the timing of their involvement.²⁰ Figure 2 provides a partial list of the groups directly or indirectly

involved. What is instructive is the breadth of agencies and diversity of expertise.²¹ To manage the entire post-conflict effort, DOD took the early lead with its formal designation as lead agency in October 2002—six months before commencement of combat operations.²² Under the unified command plan, the task to plan and execute conflict and post-conflict operations and lead the IA effort squarely fell on US Central Command (CENTCOM).²³ While CENTCOM and DOD formally led post-conflict planning, other agencies, such as NSC, DOS, USAID, and others also continued their efforts. Some efforts were coordinated, others were not.²⁴ Finally, increasing the difficulty in achieving unity of effort was establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in January 2003. While designation of ORHA, a subordinate planning effort within DOD, clearly designated it as the focal point for post-conflict operations, it also added further complexity. Just three months prior to the start of OIF, ORHA attempted to consolidate planning efforts and develop and execute a coherent post-conflict plan across the IA.

Group	Participating Agencies/Departments
IA Planning Groups	Pol-Mil, ESG, Humanitarian and Reconstruction, Energy, Coalition, Communications
Departments/Agencies	Defense, State, Justice, Energy, Commerce, USAID, CIA
DOD	Joint Staff, CENTCOM, Joint Task Force-4 ¹ , Directorate of Special Plans, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Civilian	Freedom of Iraq project by DoS, National Defense University, Army War College

Figure 2 – Groups Involved in OIF Post-Conflict Planning

Too Many Plans

As diverse as the groups involved, so to were their post-conflict plans—yet another dimension adding further complexity and difficulty in unifying post-conflict operations.

Professional military planners acknowledge achieving battlefield victory is but a means to achieve political ends. The true end state is achieved when military victory establishes the conditions for accomplishing the overall political goal and associated termination objectives.²⁵ Planning for post-conflict operations requires detailed overview and supporting plans to ensure tasks are properly identified, transition points anticipated, and command and control is well thought out. Without detailed planning post-conflict operations will result in confusion and paralysis. It can also lead to “winning the war and losing the peace.”

Analyzing Iraqi post-conflict plans reveals numerous documents ranging from exhaustive multi-volume studies to detailed military operations orders. Each document addressed a portion of the post-conflict problem and was based on different foci and assumptions. For example, examining two of the studies, the DOS “Freedom of Iraq Project” and the Army War College “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Force in a Post-Conflict Scenario” monograph reveals the diversity of materials.²⁶ The Freedom of Iraq Project, started in March 2002, was a 13 volume, 2,500 page report that included inputs from Iraq exile groups. It covered a broad spectrum of topics ranging from rebuilding infrastructure to spurring economic development.²⁷ The projects academic tone focused on areas for consideration and inclusion in any post-conflict operation. Conversely, the Army War College “Reconstructing Iraq” was a three section work, focused specifically on post-conflict Iraq as viewed through the lens of previous post-war occupations. It included a comprehensive list of mission areas and tasks. Its tone was specifically geared toward developing an action plan.²⁸

In addition to academic studies, there were formal plans and briefings produced by several groups including CENTCOM, NSC, USAID and ORHA that added further complexity. Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4), a subordinate command to CENTCOM produced a 300 page operations order detailing Phase IV—military jargon for post conflict operations phase of the campaign.²⁹ JTF-4 focused on seven lines of operations.³⁰ Concurrently, the NSC created an Executive Steering Group (ESG) for post-war operations. The ESG created, briefed, vetted, and approved detailed post-war plans for relief and reconstruction.³¹ In addition to JTF-4 and NSC, USAID conducted Iraq Working Groups that included non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in an effort to produce plans for relief efforts in post-war Iraq.³² Finally, ORHA, the organization officially tasked with post-conflict reconstruction, developed its own post-war reconstruction plan. While a daunting task, ORHA's main task was assimilating much of the work previously accomplished into a workable plan and disseminating it for action.

Thus what resulted was many documents but no overarching plan. These views were echoed by official US Army historian and Iraq conflict planner Major Isaiah Wilson III. "There was no Phase IV "plan" for occupying Iraq after the combat phase. While a variety of government offices had considered the possible situations that would follow a U.S. victory, no one produced an actual document laying out a strategy to consolidate the victory after major combat operations ended."³³

Conflicting Cultures

Thus far the OIF post-conflict operation's story involves "lots of participants" reading off of "lots of scripts." Not surprisingly many and varied policy viewpoints also complicated the effort. In large part these differences represented underlying differences

in cultures—another area working against efforts to achieve unified effort. Differences included disagreements between departments, between the military and civilians, and within organizations. While useful during policy discussions, these differences became paralyzing and led to uncoordinated implementation of policy.

Many of the differences occurred between the State and Defense Departments and were the result of differing priorities. For Defense, the priority was on winning the war. Within DOD, efforts conflicting with war planning took a back seat. This included post-war Iraqi reconstruction and occupation.³⁴ The focus on war planning did not reflect blatant disregard for post-conflict planning requirements but rather the necessity for military planners to focus on the inherent requirements of producing detailed plans that include specific tasks, priorities, and organizational arrangements necessary to conduct complex military operations. As such, many in DOD and CENTCOM primarily focused on war planning with post-war construction planning relegated to the “B” team.³⁵ In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Peter Pace confirmed this prioritization when he said, “we did not want to be planning for a postwar in Iraq before we were sure we were going to go to war.”³⁶

For State, the main concern lay with the war’s aftermath. The “Freedom of Iraq Project” served as the fulcrum for many of the main issues in a post-Hussein environment. Unlike DOD’s focus on actionable war plans, DOS’s “Freedom of Iraq Project” took a more holistic view and attempted to achieve consensus on a common vision for post-war Iraq.³⁷ Largely reflecting its consensus oriented approach, the “Freedom of Iraq Project” involved discussions with Iraqi exiles to determine their desires and impetus for change.³⁸ What emerged was an extensive document whose

utility was largely determined by the reader. To some, particularly in DOD, the project looked more like a book report. They viewed it as an academic work with limited use in developing detailed requirements necessary for post-war reconstruction operations. For others, it was a comprehensive work that outlined many details in reconstructing a society.

As different as the priorities were between State and Defense, so were planning assumptions and policy decisions. Throughout the process broad and substantive disagreements occurred over the rapidity with which Iraq could be turned into a working democracy and necessity for long term large troop concentrations in post-war Iraq. In one corner, the State Department, some in the US Army, and the CIA, viewed establishment of a democracy in Iraq as difficult and bleak. They also felt it would require a long term commitment and large numbers of troops to secure the peace. In the other corner, Defense Department officials believed Iraq could become a liberal electoral democracy in short order. They did not favor large troop levels and held a view that US forces would be seen as liberators. Furthermore, they assumed victory would allow for immediate reduction in troop levels during the post-war period.³⁹ Ultimately, the assumption over US force levels would impact the available forces to conduct required security operations in an unstable post-war Iraq. An additional planning difference centered on establishment of a shadow government prior to invasion and who was to lead that government. Defense Department planners favored establishing a shadow government led by Ahmad Chalabi, despite his checkered past, while State Department officials opposed any notion of a shadow government and favored Adnan Pachaci as their potential head of state.⁴⁰

Seeds of Confusion Germinate

If the potential seeds for chaotic OIF post-conflict operations were sown in the months prior to war, they germinated during the transition to post-conflict operations.

Transition operations between the end of sustained combat operations or Phase III to Phase IV post-conflict operations represent a critical period. Typically, planning major combat operations such as OIF generally fall into four phases—Phase I, preparation for combat, Phase II, initial combat operations, Phase III, sustained combat operations, and Phase IV, post-conflict operations. Phase I normally involves gathering intelligence and logistically preparing for conflict. Phase II takes actions to seize the initiative and prevent the enemy from attaining their objectives while Phase III expands operations throughout the battle space and sets the conditions for Phase IV, conflict termination and post-conflict operations.⁴¹ Between phases, transition points or seams occur as one phase ends and another begins. Transition points, or seams, involve a point of confluence where a variety of organizations and chains of command meet. They also represent tenuous periods when one phase's culmination represents the starting conditions for another. Seams become particularly complex when various phases of an operation occur simultaneously. Ignoring seams invites lost momentum and chaos. Anticipating seams, while not ensuring mission success, mitigates their impact.

Reality's intrusion brought to light the inadequate preparation for the transition from conflict and post-conflict operations. It was the combination of the number of groups, lack of an overarching well coordinated plan, and lack of a single actor to execute and manage the process that led to unsynchronized post-conflict operations. Two examples illustrate the lost momentum during the transition to post-conflict operations. First was the decision to transition from Phase III to IV. In his article for National Review entitled,

“What Went Wrong?,” former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) official Mike Rubin states, “We can do all the planning we like...but someone needs to make the call as to when Phase III ends.”⁴² The decision to transition between Phase III and IV hinged upon the establishment of security. Even with the fall of Baghdad, CENTCOM did not view Phase III as complete and Phase IV commencing. However, in the eyes of ORHA, security could not be established because Phase IV operations had not commenced. While a seemingly simple decision, differences in transition criteria illustrated a seam in command and control that should have been adjudicated during planning.

Second, unmitigated cultural differences emerged between post-war policy executors and troops on the ground. The CPA, with their emphasis on centralized bureaucratic processes, tended to directly conflict with soldiers in the field with a bent for action. Joshua Hammer in his article for the New Republic entitled, “Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military” intimates “The antipathy [between the CPA and military] in part reflects the cultural and institutional divide between soldiers and civilians. ‘The military is set up to communicate, organize well, and make trains run on time. Civilians are set up to think about things.’”⁴³ The problem emanated from bureaucratic turf battles and views by soldiers that CPA administrator’s decisions from safe confines of Baghdad palaces did not reflect the reality of the situation. It is also the result of differences in philosophy with military forces driven to find quick fixes to local problems while the CPA favored longer term broad approaches.⁴⁴ Finally, they also emanate from an over-centralized bureaucracy seemingly unresponsive to field concerns, particularly in regards to the contracting process.⁴⁵ Many of these problems started with poor planning and lingered throughout the post-conflict reconstruction period.⁴⁶

Observations Part I – Who’s in charge and why?

Several observations emerge from analyzing OIF post-conflict planning and execution. The uncoordinated involvement of a number of groups, the numerous plans developed, and the diverse cultures they represented ultimately resulted in problems with post-war Iraq occupation. It was the confluence of these factors that created confusion during critical transition points. It also raised the central issue—why didn’t the IAP assert control and drive the entire process?

It is unclear why DOD rather than an overarching IA group with cross-functional capability led such a large and complex task of rebuilding Iraq. With formal assignment as lead for post-conflict operations, DOD’s role expanded to an area traditionally beyond its expertise and in some cases directly conflicting with combat operations planning. Clearly, DOD possessed significant capability, but the fact remains that the magnitude of rebuilding a nation and the necessity to plan and execute combat operations stretched its capabilities. Similarly, CENTCOM had been working on plans to attack the Hussein regime and had, at various times, engaged the problem of post-conflict reconstruction. However, their focus had continually been on conflict operations and not on the broader question of post-conflict occupation. Even with the establishment of ORHA, whose focus was post-conflict operations, its chain of command still fell within DOD. Additionally, it was given less than four months to plan the post-conflict operations.⁴⁷

A second issue arises over holistic use of each instrument of power. The selection of DOD as lead for IA planning and execution raises questions with respect to the over emphasis on the military instrument. Clearly conflict planning and execution fell within the realm and expertise of the military and should have been the main effort during that portion of the campaign. However, it is unclear why DOD would lead the overall effort

when the military instrument of power was a facilitator of the main effort to reconstruct Iraq.

Observations Part II – Writing a Single “Script”

A second set of observations from OIF post-conflict planning involves the myriad of plans. It raises the fundamental question of who was in charge. Regarding the planning process, at various times DOD, the NSC, DOS, CENTCOM, or ORHA all had planning efforts on-going. However, it appears that many of these efforts, while not mutually exclusive, were not fully coordinated.⁴⁸

Second, it is unclear the extent to which subordinate level plan development translated strategic and operational policy into tactical action. An after-action review conducted by the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division reported that superior headquarters did not provide plans or guidance for Phase IV and little if any training occurred to ensure post-conflict operations were conducted seamlessly.⁴⁹ A battalion commander from the Division stated he went into combat without any guidance, direction, or detailed plans that he would have expected. Major Isaiah Wilson III summarized the problem when he stated,

“While there may have been 'plans' at the national level, and even within various agencies within the war zone, none of these 'plans' operationalized the problem beyond regime collapse" -- that is, laid out how U.S. forces would be moved and structured, Wilson writes in an essay that has been delivered at several academic conferences but not published. "There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations.”⁵⁰

It is also unclear why the process lacked a single focal point to combine planning efforts and build coherence from various plans and studies. Each planning effort provided a piece of the post-conflict puzzle. The Freedom of Iraq report provided views

of Iraqis.⁵¹ CENTCOM provided combat planning and expected conditions at the end of major combat operations.⁵² USAID contributed humanitarian relief dimensions to the operation. JTF-4 focused on post-conflict unity of effort, security, rule of law, civil administration, governance, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement issues.⁵³ Finally, ORHA focused on humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civil administration. Clearly each group had a piece of the answer but bringing coherence to the process also required a group with an overarching view of all plans.

In short, OIF post-war planning suffered from too many experts, too many efforts, lack of leadership, and not enough coordination.⁵⁴ While many efforts for post-war planning did occur, it appears these efforts were uncoordinated, not well transmitted to the tactical operators, based on faulty assumptions, and inadequately resourced.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the planning process did not build coherent supporting plans or allow training and rehearsals for difficult post-conflict tasks. With focus of military planners on Phase III,⁵⁶ Phase IV operations received less focus. It was a lack of detailed plans, inadequate rehearsals, and faulty assumptions that created situations where units engaged in combat were expected to immediately transition to security. This situation forced them to “make it up” as they went.⁵⁷

OIF Post-Conflict Post Script

In sum, the three key observations come to light from analyzing OIF post-conflict—who’s in charge (control), what’s the plan (consensus and unity of effort), and how does the plan get executed (coordination). Logically, there should have been a single person or group responsible for overseeing the entire post-conflict operation. However, this was not done. Along the way various groups with a variety of strengths, weaknesses, and

cultures planned and executed post-conflict operations. Furthermore, a plethora of problems ranging from a lack of standardized planning processes to cultural dysfunction accompanied the lack of unity of effort and created multiple seams. The result was a tenuous start to reconstruction operations that cost billions of dollars, lost credibility, and several military and civilian casualties. What was true of other operations during the previous 15 years, was true of OIF post-conflict operations. It was the failure of the IAP to coherently and synergistically direct the instruments of national power toward accomplishing the nation's objectives.

Summary

Contingency operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Iraqi reveal persistent shortfalls in the IAP. Operations in Panama reveal the IAP failed to produce a comprehensive plan for conflict and post-conflict operations, did not clearly coordinate objectives, and generally did not achieve unity of effort. Operations in Somalia reveal the IAP did not clarify objectives, lacked a comprehensive plan to achieve those objectives, and did not attain unity of command and unity of effort. Operations in Haiti reveal an IAP that learned lessons from past interventions but still was unable to effectively bridge various cultural barriers.

Finally, operations in Iraq reveal an IAP unable to bridge crippling cultural barriers, lacking of standardized planning processes, and again unable to achieve unity of effort or unity of command. In the case of Iraq, these problems, coupled with the speed with which enemy resistance collapsed, magnified imperfect planning and overly optimistic assumption about the post-conflict environment. In his work entitled "Toward an American Way of War," Antulio J. Echevarria II best sums up the problems of OIF post-

conflict operations as portrayed in a briefing on post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq by Conrad Crane.

Planning and coordination were still inadequate, however. In each case, shortages existed in combat support and combat service support units, and difficulties repeatedly occurred in turning over certain functions and responsibilities to civilian agencies. In Iraq, in particular, no vetting programs for “de-Baathification,” or for restructuring, re-equipping, or re-manning the Iraqi military had been worked out in advance. The role of the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Activities (ORHA) was unclear and, in any case, it appeared insufficiently resourced to accomplish its many Herculean tasks. While military planners within the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) had focused primarily on Phase III, Decisive Combat Operations, ORHA concentrated on Phase IV, Stability Operations. Unfortunately, little coordination had occurred between the two.⁵⁸

Distilling lessons drawn from each contingency reveal persistent organizational shortfalls, lack of unity of command, lack of unity of effort, lack of planning culture, lack of common terms and procedures, and impregnable cultural barriers between IAP organizations.

Notes

¹ The spectrum of conflict referred to in this analysis involves the scale and size of operations. On the lower end of the spectrum are humanitarian intervention and other military operations other than war where armed conflict is minimal. Mid-range operations on this spectrum refer to small scale contingency operations. The high end of the spectrum include major theater war.

² Gray, Anthony and Manwaring, Maxwell. Panama: Operation Just Cause: National Defense University 1

³ Some of these incidents included taking military members hostage, harassing Americans, and annulling the May 1989 elections.

⁴ Crane, Conrad C. and Terrill, W. Andrew. "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario." February 2003. 3-4. The U.S. military executed Operation NIMROD DANCER in 1989. The operation was executed by U.S. Southern Command and was a show of force that attempted to demonstrate American resolve to the Noriega government. For Operation

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NIMROD DANCER, see "Operation Nimrod Dancer" at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/nimrod_dancer.htm;

⁵ For more information on Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY see Joint Forces Quarterly article, "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti Cole, R. H. (1998-99). "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn/Winter: 66-75.

⁶ Gray, 1

⁷ Operation PROMOTE Liberty was post-conflict operations conducted following execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. For more information see Gray and Manwaring "Panama—Operation JUST CAUSE"; <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books-1998/PolicingtheNewWorldDisorder-May98/chapter2.html>

⁸ Crane and Terrill, 5

⁹ "Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities." Department of Defense, December 2004.

¹⁰ Department of Public Information. "Somalia - UNOSOM I". 1997. United Nations. January 28, 2005. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>>.

¹¹ Bowden, M. A Defining Battle. The Philadelphia Inquirer. Philadelphia.

¹² Department of Public Information. "Somalia - UNOSOM II". 1997. United Nations. January 28, 2005. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomii.htm>>.

¹³ Crane and Terrill, 5

¹⁴ Ibid., 7

¹⁵ Ibid, VI and 46

¹⁶ Ibid., 63-76

¹⁷ Ibid., 63-72

¹⁸ Slavin, Barbara and Moniz, Dave. "How Peace in Iraq Became So Elusive." USA Today Tuesday, July 22, 2003. Mr. Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies and has written numerous articles related to national security.

Notes

¹⁹ Cordesman, Anthony. "Iraq: Too Uncertain To Call." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November, 2003. 2

²⁰ Loxterkamp, 14

²¹ Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq, NESAs.

²² Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld's War, The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004, 46

²³ The [Unified Command Plan is the] document approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called the UCP. "DoD Dictionary." Department of Defense, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>

²⁴ For example, the DoS Freedom of Iraq Project was an independent effort by the State Department to gather a consensus of what post-war Iraq would look like.

²⁵ "Doctrine for Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, September 2001. Vol. Joint Pub 3-0. I-11

²⁶ One example was a joint work between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute for Public Policy. The work produced principles to guide post-war policy efforts. Fallows, James. "Blind into Baghdad." *The Atlantic Monthly* 293.1 (2004): 52-74. 68

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 57, Rieff, David. "Blueprint for a Mess." *New York Times Magazine* Nov. 2, 2003: 28-78. 31

²⁸ Fallows, 68, Crane and Terrill

²⁹ For additional information on Joint Task Force – 4 see Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq, NESAs.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2

³¹ Fallows, 4

³² *Ibid.*, 62-63

³³ Ricks, Thomas E. "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan." *Washington Post* December 25, 2004, Saturday ed.: A01.

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³⁴ It is fair to say that there was some post-war planning conducted by Defense officials, however it tends to be second priority to war planning. This is the case because planners tend to be more comfortable with tactics and operations, the sheer difficulty of planning post-war operations, and a lack of experience in “nation building” operations. Additionally, the direct cost in terms of potential casualties also causes war planners to place a high priority on detailed war plans.

³⁵ Fallows, 68

³⁶ General Peter Pace, VCJCS, testimony before a hearing of the HASC Subject: Sustaining Global Commitments, Implications for U.S. Forces” 5 November 2003 (WA Federal News Service, Inc, 2004) www.defnews.com

³⁷ Rieff, page 31

³⁸ Fallows, 56

³⁹ Rieff, 31-32, Scarborough, 46

⁴⁰ Ibid, 31

⁴¹ Joint Publication 3-0, xiii and xiv

⁴² Lowry, R. What went wrong? The miscalculations and missteps that led to the current situation in Iraq. National Review, 3 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, was the temporary governing body that replaced ORHA as the interim administrator in Iraq. Its administrator was Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. The CPA operated as the legal government of Iraq until the time the Iraqi people effectively formed and operated a stable government. The CPA ceased existence in June 2004 and was replaced by the U.S. Embassy in Iraq under the direction of Ambassador John Negroponte. For more information, see <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/>

⁴³ Hammer, Joshua. "Tikrit Dispatch: Uncivil Military." The New Republic March 1, 2004: 16. 1

⁴⁴ Ibid., 2

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4, Cordesman, 11

⁴⁶ Ibid, 2

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⁴⁷ Loxterkamp, 15

⁴⁸ Lowry, 5

⁴⁹ Reiff, 58

⁵⁰ Ricks, A01.

⁵¹ Lowry, 4

⁵² Ibid., 2-4

⁵³ Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq, NESA. 2

⁵⁴ Lowry, 5

⁵⁵ For example, planning efforts included NSC Executive Steering Group plans, JTF-4 300 page plan, Department of State Freedom of Iraq project

⁵⁶ James Fallows, in his Atlantic Monthly article entitled “Blind in Baghdad” states the “neither the Army nor the other services moved very far past Phase III thinking. ‘All the A-Team guys wanted to be in on Phase III, and the B-team guys were put on Phase IV,’ one man involved in Phase IV told me.” Additionally, Lowry writes that it appears the CENTCOM planners were not eager to undertake stability operations., Lowry

⁵⁷ Reiff, 58

⁵⁸ Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Toward an American Way of War." Ed. Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004. 26

Chapter 4

Summary of Problems with the Interagency Process

"All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them."

Galileo Galilei

After examining IAP performance in contingency operations during the past 15 years, focus turns to categorizing the shortfalls. Identifying shortfalls provides the departure point for proposing reform measures to solve IAP inadequacies—the subject of the remainder of this paper.

IAP performance in recent contingencies operations is best characterized as inconsistent and prone to policy setbacks as opposed to successes. William Mendel in his book “Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operation” summarized the problems. He intimated unity of command and unity of effort problems still afflict the IAP and there is a noticeable absence of a single focal point that enables coherent execution. Moreover, questions of “Who’s in charge” still torment IA efforts and the concept of lead agency still does not carry with it the full operational authority to organize and direct the instruments of national power toward achieving a common objective. Additionally, the IAP lacks sufficient planning discipline, training, and doctrine to effectively execute coherent operations.¹ Finally, cultural clashes born from entrenched bureaucratic interests still prevents implementing synergistic solutions.

Organizational Shortfalls.

The first shortfall involves IAP organization. Specifically, the current process lacks a standing policy execution organization and thus defaults to either ad hoc or agency lead constructs—both of which have proven inadequate. Furthermore, organizational mismatch also plagues the IAP when organizations are tasked with missions they lack the capability to perform.

Lack of Standard Policy Execution Organization

The IAP lacks a standing policy execution organization that works to synergistically apply instruments of national power. Apart from policy formation mechanisms, the IAP executes policy using either a lead agency or through ad hoc organizations.² Either approach is inadequate and results in an environment where working relationships built on trust never fully develop, familiarity is lacking, and unity of effort suffers. General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander supports this finding by stating “The only such [IA] cooperation is on an ad hoc person-to-person or group-to-group basis. So if you have a problem like putting Iraq back together after Saddam...there’s nowhere to start.”³ Additionally, General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, goes on to state that the IA process does “a pretty good job of defining problems...and solutions.”⁴ However, he also went on to say that “After the President makes a decision...Each department...takes its share of the mission and goes back into its ‘stovepipe’ to do the work.”⁵

Organizational Mismatch

Organizational mismatch is another area causing inefficiencies in the IAP. Organizational mismatch tasks an agency to execute policy when it does not possess the

capability to perform the mission. The best example of organizational mismatch is the improper tasking and over reliance on the military instrument of power. As each case study demonstrated, contingency operations require multi-agency cooperation to apply all instruments of national power. The military instrument alone is insufficient to accomplish such diverse mission areas as humanitarian assistance, nation building, and post-conflict reconstruction. However, it has become the instrument of choice. Part of the reason for this is the unique position and capabilities of the DOD's Regional Combatant Commands (RCC). By design, RCCs serve as the focal point for regional or functional issues. They also possess the capability to vertically and horizontally integrate actions across the IA and maintain a constant presence within their respective areas of responsibility. Finally, RCCs provide a unique capability to the POTUS. RCCs provide a streamlined organization with a succinct chain of command, highly trained forces, and established command relationships that the POTUS can use to execute a wide variety of policies.⁶ Additionally, they possess the expertise to translate strategic guidance into tactical action.

Outside RCCs, the remainder of the IA community lacks similar forward based operational level capability. Departments (e.g., State and CIA) tend to centralize operations and generally do not operate theater based regional commands. While departments do organize regionally and functionally, these organizations tend to operate from parent headquarters. Additionally, most of these organizations do not maintain large staffs with expeditionary capability and lack the training and resources to respond to global contingency operations.⁷ Finally, their focus is on the strategic and tactical extremes of national security policy at the expense of operational level planning.⁸ At the

strategic level, great effort is expended in policy formation. At the tactical level, small field operating agencies, such as embassies, serve as the focal point synchronizing elements of national power.⁹ What is lacking are regional organizations that possess the capabilities and processes to coordinate actions and translate strategic policy.¹⁰

Lack of Unity of Command - Authority to compel action.

A second shortcoming of the IAP is its ability to achieve unity of command. Unity of command is the authority to compel action and normally implies one responsible individual with the requisite authority to direct all involved parties toward achieving a common goal.¹¹ What clearly emerges from the various case studies is an IAP that has no recognized leadership below the POTUS ensuring unity of command.¹² The NSC, with its small staff, expert in a broad range of security issues, has neither the authority nor capacity to compel action.¹³ Furthermore, by design various committees and working groups seek consensus and being directive is an anathema to the culture.¹⁴

Further complicating unity of command is a weak chain of command and lack of recognized leadership. In a system prone toward department or agency execution, the IAP lacks formal operational level organizations tasked with executing policy. Some formal (e.g., JIATFs for counter-narcotics) and informal (e.g., JIACGs) operational level organizations do exist. However, they are a far cry from fully functioning organizations with the authority to integrate the instruments of power to meet regional or functional national security objectives.

Lacking unity of command, the IA process defaults to a lead agency approach. However, as demonstrated in the most recent example in Iraq, lead agency still suffers from ability to compel the bureaucracy to action¹⁵ and most often results in confusing

chains of command, needless duplication of effort, and a bias against unity of effort.¹⁶ The problem of unity of command is further exacerbated with the stress of crisis situations. Rather than immediately executing the best response, the first question answered is who's in charge.

Lack of Unity of Effort - Synchronization of Action.

Closely related to problems of unity of command is a lack of unity of effort. Unity of effort is defined as the synchronization of a wide array of governmental and non-governmental actions taking place within an IA context and under overall direction of a lead agent. Tenants of unity of effort include common understanding, coordinated policy, trust, and confidence. Achieving unity of effort is attained through close and continuous coordination and cooperation that overcomes confusion and organizational limitations.¹⁷

With a system biased toward agency centered action and with little incentive to work synergistically, unity of effort is often sacrificed until circumstances force coordination.¹⁸ Bureaucratic interests and organizational survival spur "turf" battles as "multiple missions of multiple departments or agencies" cross clearly defined organizational boundaries.¹⁹ For example, examining agencies possessing strategic communications capability reveals nine different US Government organizations and seven different non-government agencies possess some capability to provide strategic communications.²⁰ In the best case, begrudging cooperation occurs. In the worst case organizations react harshly when traditional roles and responsibilities are threatened. As Moore states in his work, "Today It's Gold, Not Purple," "In interagency operations, turf delineation becomes less certain and inefficiencies abound as bureaucracies under siege

depend upon standard operating procedures to the detriment of the larger effort. The problem is compounded when organizations attack problems from their respective cultures, civilian versus military.”²¹ Thus, with little motivation to subordinate interests until forced to do so, unity of effort becomes one of the first casualties.²²

Lack of Planning Process.

Within the IA process, there is also a stark absence of an integrated interagency planning process linking strategic objectives to tactical action.²³ This limits the IAPs ability to produce plans by those responsible for their execution. It also hinders the capability for plans to serve as a policy evaluation tool. Finally, it reduces the capability for plans to serve as the basis for resource allocation decisions. In any organization, irrespective of size, planning is necessary. President Eisenhower said in 1958, “No...task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to national security objectives.”²⁴

There are several reasons for this absence. First, the IAP tends to focus on the extremes of strategic policy determination or tactical action. This drives the process to overlook the vital component of operational planning that allows strategic policy to be coherently refined, translated, and coordinated into tactical action. Second, IAP time horizons tend toward annual as opposed to multi-year outlooks.²⁵ The result is short-term orientation for strategies requiring long-term commitment in order to demonstrate results. It also drives overemphasis on rapid military solutions when the situation requires long term diplomatic or economic responses. Third, the NSC staff, whose charge is integrating agency efforts and monitoring execution, has little capacity, authority, or expertise to accomplish operational level planning.²⁶ All three factors result in an IA

process that lacks capability to develop, review, and exercise plans that translate strategic policy, clarify roles and missions, and spells out chains of command.

Lack of Common Ground.

Another deficiency in the IAP is a lack of common ground with respect to established doctrine, standard execution procedures, common geographic divisions, and interoperable communications networks.

The current IAP lacks formal doctrine and standard execution procedures. In this case, doctrine and standard execution procedures are defined as the fundamental principles guiding the IAP. Doctrine and procedures represent a “best practice” that provides continuity, establishes a common frame of reference, and creates a common language. While authoritative, it requires judgment in application.²⁷ Detailed doctrine and procedures are underdeveloped, driving IAP organizations to operate using culturally distinct vocabularies—vocabularies that remain largely incongruent.²⁸ Additionally, the IAP

“lacks established procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans. Additionally, each new administration tends to reinvent this wheel, issuing new guidance on how strategy development and planning is to be done, often overlooking the best practices of and lessons learned by its predecessors. Some administrations have ignored the issue entirely until they confronted an actual crisis to which they had to respond. This ad hoc approach has thwarted institutional learning and often hindered performance.”²⁹

In addition to underdeveloped doctrine and procedures, varying geographic and functional divisions across departments also creates friction.³⁰ Variations in geographic and functional divisions create unnecessary complexity by increasing coordination requirements and necessitating development of a wide variety of networks to implement

actions. Non-standard functional divisions also increase IAP friction and make it difficult to identify individual focal points within and across departments. For example, comparing Kenya and Rwanda reveals various geographic divisions across DOS, DOD, CIA, and USAID.³¹ Within DOD, responsibility for Kenya and Rwanda falls within two different RCCs—CENTCOM and European Command. However, DOS classifies both Kenya and Rwanda under the Bureau of African Affairs.³² Another example is India and Pakistan. DOS, CIA, and USAID include both nations in similar regions. However, DOD assigns India to US Pacific Command and Pakistan to CENTCOM.³³ Finally, functionally, responding to a natural disaster in Mozambique might involve three USAID bureaus, three under-secretaries of State, four regional State bureaus, and DOD's EUCOM.³⁴

Further adding to problems with building common ground is the lack of secure interoperable communication architectures.³⁵ With one exception, no system exists where IAP participants can exchange sensitive information.³⁶ Additionally, there exists no intra-governmental open or closed computer system.³⁷ The shortfall in intra-governmental communications capability requires most interaction to be person-to-person—a slow and cumbersome process.³⁸ Until a “national security affairs network” is fielded, the IA process coordination will be difficult and slow and work against its integration.³⁹

Cultural Barriers Across Organizations.

The final shortfall that underpins most of the aforementioned problems, are cultural differences across the IAP that impede efficient and effective performance. Each organization, from Defense and State, to NSC, represents different organizational

cultures. Various cultural biases both positively and negatively impact the IA process in three distinct ways—they establish an organizations climate and decision making style, they determine the method by which they communicate, and they markedly influence innovative thinking.⁴⁰

One area highlighting the impact of cultural barriers is the desire for specificity within an organization and it's affect on reinforcing perceptions. This cultural difference is most pronounced between DOS and NSC and DOD. On one end of the spectrum, DOS and NSC implicitly tend to avoid specificity in an effort to keep every option “in play.”⁴¹ One the other end, DOD explicitly seeks clear and precise guidance before engaging in various operations. These differences cause Defense officials to view State and the NSC as desiring to commit the troops without clear objectives and in areas not in the national interest. Conversely, State and NSC view Defense using lack of clear objectives as an excuse not to commit its resources.⁴² Another cultural barrier involves consensus versus results orientations. On one end of the spectrum, State's desire to focus on process and gaining consensus is diametrically opposed to Defense's results orientation.

Another area of cultural friction also results from conflicting views over the IAP's network or hierarchy orientation. Officially, the IAP is a hierarchy of different groups (e.g., Principals and Deputies committees) designed to determine and implement policy. In this hierarchal view, information in the form of policy options flows up from various staff organizations and policies and guidance flow down for implementation.⁴³ Given a hierarchal view, the system is designed to work decisively and provide a framework to act with relative speed.⁴⁴ Realistically, with only the POTUS having the real authority to compel action, the process tends toward a network dominated orientation.⁴⁵ Absent

specific Presidential focus, the IA process participants spend time coordinating and consulting with various groups attempting to reconcile disparate views and achieve consensus.⁴⁶ From a network standpoint, the strength is its ability to adapt to various situations. However, conflict arises when different IA process participants fail to recognize the necessity for both dimensions to operate simultaneously. Those viewing the system as predominantly a hierarchy become frustrated when it fails to produce clear objectives and end states. Alternatively, those viewing the system as dominated by networks become frustrated when results trump achieving consensus.

Finally, several other cultural differences complicate IA operations. Cultural differences exist across various organizations pertaining to process versus results orientations. Additionally, organizations differ in their rejection or acceptance of new and innovative solutions. Traditional stereotypes of various organizations further perpetuate problems.⁴⁷ Many of the cultural barriers and stereotypes perpetuate themselves because of minimal opportunities for cross functional education, training, and engagement. Aside from ad hoc initiatives, IAPs participants are not afforded the necessary number of venues to develop better understanding of various organizations capabilities, limitations, and cultures.

Summary

The reason the IAP exists is the challenge that still remains—achieving unity of effort by combining disparate cultures, interests, and priorities in the application of all elements of national power against national security requirements. Lacking is the authority to compel action and basic understanding of principles such as unity of effort, unity of command, or deliberate planning. Trust, confidence, and cooperation remain an

elusive goal. Reforming the IAP requires establishing overarching guidelines designed to revamp the process and an organizational structure that allows those guidelines to flourish.

Notes

¹ Mendel, William W. and Bradford, David G. "Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations." Ed. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University, 1995. 8

² Policy formation mechanisms refers to the PC, DC, and NSC structure that provides policy alternatives for POTUS discussion and approval.

³ Clancy, Thomas. "Battle Ready." New York: Penguin Books, 2004

⁴ Garamone, Jim. "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says." American Forces Press Service September 17, 2004. 1

⁵ Ibid., 1

⁶ The vertical component of integration stems from clear command relationship from the POTUS through the SECDEF to the Regional Combatant Commander. The horizontal component of integration results from the RCCs standing component construct (Joint Force Land, Air, Maritime, and Special Operations Components)

⁷ Murdock, Clark A. et al. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004. 41

⁸ This issue will be addressed in detail during discussion pertaining to lack of common planning constructs

⁹ Mendel, 7

¹⁰ Century, The United States Commission on National Security/21st. "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change." The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001. 62

¹¹ "Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000." National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, 3-16.

¹² Garamone, 1

¹³ Mendel, 8

Notes

¹⁴ Ibid., 8

¹⁵ Murdock

¹⁶ Moore, S. W. (1998-99). "Today It's Gold, Not Purple." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn/Winter: 100-106., 101

¹⁷ Joint Staff Officers Guide 2000, 3-17 & 3-18

¹⁸ Moore, 101

¹⁹ "Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities." Department of Defense, December 2004.

²⁰ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, 9 October 1996. Vol. Joint Pub 3-08 Vol II. D-2 & D-3

²¹ Moore, 101

²² Lt. Col Birmingham, G., CDR Barndt, Luann, and MAJ Salo, Thomas (2003). Achieving Unity of Effort: A call for legislation to improve the interagency process and continue enhancing interservice interoperability, Joint Forces Staff College., 5-6

²³ Rast, Vicki J. Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia. Ed. Richard Bailey. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2004.

²⁴ President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Congress, 3 April 1958, cited in "Directions for Defense," Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 24 May 1995, p. 2-2.

²⁵ Mendel, 8. Defense Science Board

²⁶ Murdock,

²⁷ DoD Dictionary

²⁸ Rast, 179 and Moore, 101

²⁹ Murdock

³⁰ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001. 60

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³¹ “Appendix K, Areas of Responsibility of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies.” Institute for Defense Analyses. http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/425/Interagency_Boundaries.doc

³² If non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are included, the problem of common geographic divisions grows. For example, trying to coordinate operations in Kenya along may require as many as 55 different NGOs that routinely engage in operations in Kenya.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001. 53

³⁵ DoD Dictionary. “A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness.” <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01127.html>

³⁶ Rast, 178, The lone exception is Secure Video Teleconferencing System,.

³⁷ As an example, while DoD possess a myriad of open and closed networks (e.g., SIPRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS) DoS primary communication mechanism with embassies is through cold-war era “cables.”

³⁸ Rast, 178

³⁹ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001., 49

⁴⁰ Rast, 174

⁴¹ Ibid., 179

⁴² Ibid., 175

⁴³ Tucker, D. "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" Parameters Autumn, 2000. 4

⁴⁴ Ibid., 5

⁴⁵ Ibid., 4

⁴⁶ Ibid., 5

⁴⁷ Rast, 185

Chapter 5

Theoretical Foundations

“It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country and its future organization will be achieved. Political action is by far the more important.”

Marshall Joseph Simon Gallieni instructions
to the French forces occupying Madagascar

Before recommending specific reforms, focus shifts to briefly discussing organizational behavior theory. Examining theory is instructive in several ways. First, it provides insight into organizational dynamics and the nature of bureaucracies. Second, it assists in understanding how initial birthmarks imprinted on an organization impact its evolution. Third, understanding organizational theory helps focus on root problems versus symptoms.¹ The discussion of theory is divided in two parts beginning with an examination of Graham Allison and his arguments involving organizational behavior. Allison’s theories shed light on bureaucracies, their actors, and their interactions. Following Allison’s model, discussion turns to Amy Zegart’s organizational evolution theory. Zegart’s theory contributes to understanding the impact of decisions made at the time of an organization’s establishment.

Allison's Organizational Behavior Model

Harvard Professor Graham Allison's organizational behavior models explain forces at work in bureaucracies and sheds light on "why" the IAP is unable to coherently apply all the elements of national power. In his work, "Essence of Decision," Allison studied the events of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis to develop three different conceptual models—Rational Policy Model (Model I)², Organizational Process Model (Model II), and Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III).³ It is important to note that Allison's work is descriptive versus prescriptive. His models indicate why the bureaucracies, such as the IAP, operate as they do but do not provide a solution.⁴

Of the three models Allison outlines, the two most useful are the Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Models. The Organizational Process model indicates that organizations place high value on routine and procedure in order to mitigate paralysis and minimize uncertainty. This model views organizational output primarily based on adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) built from past experience. Additionally, the model considers longevity, positional power, and turf as key components for success in the organization. Given a familiar set of circumstances, the Organizational Process model indicates standard responses produce optimal results. However, when faced with unfamiliar situations, sub-optimal or irrational results occur as organizations attempt to apply inappropriate SOPs rather than considering better alternatives. The Organizational Process model explains the benefit and cost of SOPs. The benefit is that disciplined procedures produce known results. The cost is rejection of innovative solutions when trying to apply SOPs to inappropriate situations.

Unlike the Organizational Process Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model perceives sub-optimal and sometimes irrational performance differently. The model regards organizational output largely based on bureaucratic bargaining between actors with various interests, perceptions, levels of power, and position. The underlying assumption is “that many actors influence decisions through a dynamic bargaining process shaped by myriad factors.”⁵ In this environment access and trust serve as the base for power. Sub-optimal output occurs when the bureaucratic process, in this case the IAP, is skewed by actors with the most influence. These influential actors may or may not be the leader of the organization. Therefore, choices result from give and take at crucial decision points and not as the result of careful study or a senior leader’s preference.⁶

Zegart’s National Security Agency Model

A final theoretical model helps explain how a government organization origin and development impacts its effectiveness. In her book, “Flawed By Design,” Amy Zegart states “national security organizations are not rationally designed to serve the national interest.”⁷ She attributes sub-optimal performance to factors leading up to the initial design and evolution of the organization. During the initial design of key national security agencies (e.g., JCS, CIA, etc.), political conflict and compromise among key stakeholders dominate the process. Additionally, the force driving the new organization is not a pressing international concern or congressional mandate but rather a push from the executive branch. Congress does play a role, albeit secondary.⁸ Congressional oversight, in theory is strong, but in reality is sporadic and ineffective due in large part to lack of electoral incentive and an unwillingness to expend political capital. It also reflects an overarching view that national security is primarily a presidential domain.⁹

The end result is an agency that is formed from bureaucratic bargaining, that reflects the incentives, interests, and political compromise of those involved in the creation process, and that may not serve the national interest or its intended purpose.¹⁰

Once codified, agency evolution is driven by three factors. First, structural choices and compromises made at the time of the agencies inception determines its evolutionary path. Most often a reflection of the current political environment, structural choices codified in law imprint organizational “birthmarks.” The rigor of the codification process also provides an enduring quality to the initial birthmarks.¹¹ For example, with passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the impact of the decision to include the Joint Chiefs in the decision chain caused degradation in civilian control that lasted almost 40 years. The problem was not recognized and corrected until Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

While statutes codify major aspects of agencies, not everything can be predetermined.¹² Thus the second factor, bureaucratic interests, serves as an additional evolutionary pressure point. The ebb and flow of various interest groups and changes in their alignment over time causes agencies to evolve. Much of this evolutionary force is the prime domain of the executive branch.¹³

Finally, the impact of real world events provides a third factor impacting agency evolution. As Zegart states, “domestic and international political developments serves as external shocks that can entrench an agency in its current developmental path or...shift it to a new one.”¹⁴ For example, the attacks of September 11, 2001 served as a major impetus for both the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Director for National Intelligence.

Analysis of Zegart's model helps to understand several concepts. First, any decision to change the IAP will have a lasting impact that is not easily altered once set in motion.¹⁵ Second, prior to making any decisions about changing the IAP, it is instructive to look through organizational history and examine previous initiatives to correct shortcomings.¹⁶ Third, undertaking any change must not be halfhearted.¹⁷ Waging war against entrenched bureaucratic interests to reform the IAP, by default, is a battle with a low probability of success.

Summary

Analyzing problems with IAP through the lenses of Allison's and Zegart's models provides useful insights. It illustrates that the goal of developing an IAP that embodies the teamwork necessary to apply all elements of national power is difficult to achieve because of various factors designed to protect the status quo. IAP participants do not act as a unitary force with the singular goal of executing policy optimally. Rather, they operate in a process biased toward a tug-o-war between competing bureaucratic interests. While success requires participants to lay aside differences, this runs counter to an agency's survival interests. Working toward a common good disrupts standard operating procedures, requires surrendering turf, and adds uncertainty—all a high price to pay for a vague return. Additionally, in a process where job security is based on agency performance, little incentive exists to cooperate. Reforming the IAP requires considerable energy.¹⁸ Any hope of achieving substantive improvement in the IAP, other than “changes to name plates on doors,” requires the full weight of the POTUS, early buy-in from bureaucratic interest groups, and advocacy from key congressional leaders.¹⁹

Notes

¹ Before reviewing pertinent models, it is also useful to understand three environmental dimensions within which each theory operates. First, as previously outlined, the IA process is both a network and a hierarchy. Second, the IA process operates using different decision modes and speeds—crisis management and long-term planning. Each mode provides either action or consensus based decision making modes. Each mode also determines the dominance of either hierarchy or network structures. Third, the IA process is comprised of both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontal dimensions include discussions with the formal Washington based IA process or in the field. The vertical dimension is discussion and action between the Washington based IA process and those of the field.

² The first, the rational actor model, treated governmental action as the result of rational choice. Views organizations as rational entities; characterized by purposeful "acts" and "choices." Observers often just assume that this is how foreign policy is made. States behave as rational actors. Foreign policy is made through a rational decision making process. (Four steps: identify goals; identify all available alternatives; consider likely consequences of all alternatives; choose the alternative most likely to achieve goals at reasonable costs.) state is seen as a unitary actor, meaning it isn't divided internally and decisions are made in the overall national interest. Allison argued that Model I is incomplete. Often, foreign policy-making is nonrational. In this analysis, through examples from the various case studies, the rationale actor model is considered not pertinent. Conley, Kathleen M., "Campaigning for Change." *Airpower Journal* (Fall 1998): 54-70

³ Gibbings, T., Hurley, Donald, and Moore, Scott (1998). "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore." *Parameters*(Winter 1998): 99-112.

⁴ Conley

⁵ Rast, Vicki J. *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia*. Ed. 85-86

⁶ *Ibid.*, 85-86

⁷ Zegart, Amy B. *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 8

⁸ *Ibid.*, 39

⁹ *Ibid.*, 36

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 42

Notes

¹² Ibid., 43

¹³ Ibid., 39

¹⁴ Ibid., 43

¹⁵ Ibid., 234

¹⁶ Ibid., 235

¹⁷ Ibid., 234

¹⁸ Moore, S. W. (1998-99). "Today It's Gold, Not Purple." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn/Winter: 100-106. 102

¹⁹ Zegart, 235-236

Chapter 6

Solutions – Part 1, Overarching Guidance

The answer to your question is simple; it's the solution that's hard.

Anonymous

Thus far, the IAP can best be described as anything but effective in applying the elements of national power to accomplish national security objectives. Various contingencies illustrate a process lacking unity of effort and paralyzed by cultural mismatches. Different organizations involved in the IAP strive to maintain their status and power instead of working together to promote synergistic solutions. Given the inadequacy of the current process, reform is paramount. Proposing reforms involves enacting two fundamental changes. First is legislation providing overarching guidelines that dictate how the IAP should perform. Second is implementing overarching guidelines in an organizational structure that enables them to take root and evolve to meet current and future requirements. Put differently, a revised organizational structure for the IAP provides the soil within which the seeds of overarching guidelines can germinate and grow. This chapter focuses on framing overarching guidelines. The next chapter focuses on recommending a revised organizational structure.

Charting a New Course – Strategic Guidance

Charting a new course for the IA process, one where clarity, unity, and synergy reign supreme, begins by reviewing “lessons learned” from previous executive branch reorganizations. Lessons learned frame the debate and provide the necessary “tools” to enact reform legislation. There are three recent examples that provide a useful starting point for drafting overarching guidelines necessary to revamp the IAP—The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the 2003 creation of the Homeland Security Department, and the Intelligence Reform Legislation of 2004. Of the three, Goldwater-Nichols provides the best starting point.¹ Combining lessons learned from Goldwater-Nichols with the “best of breed” of the current IAP provides the fodder necessary to enact logical reform guidelines and avoids “reinventing the wheel.”²

The Goldwater-Nichols Act served as watershed legislation that fundamentally altered DOD by successfully integrating service capabilities into an effective joint warfighting force. Goldwater-Nichols sought to mitigate the “excessive power and influence of the four services” that prevented their successful integration.³ Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, unity of effort and command suffered as the services maintained considerable independence at the expense of the warfighting combatant commanders.⁴ Chains of command and authority were unclear and certain roles and responsibilities remained ambiguous because they were never clearly specified in the original National Security Act of 1947.⁵ Additionally, planning within DOD pre-Goldwater-Nichols was also ineffective. “Contingency plans had limited utility in crises, often because they were not based on valid political assumptions.”⁶ Finally, there was little incentive for officers to serve in joint assignments. When assigned to joint positions, they lacked adequate

education, experience, and skills to serve effectively and many times their service cultures drove their priorities.⁷ To solve these problems, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had seven specific purposes (see Figure 3 – Goldwater-Nichols Act Purposes).

1. To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority
2. To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense
3. To place clear responsibility commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned those commands
4. To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned those commands
5. To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
6. To provide for the more efficient use defense resources
7. To improve joint officer management policies
8. Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.

Figure 3 – Goldwater-Nichols Act Purposes⁸

Goldwater-Nichols objectives serve as a useful template to define legislative changes that correct current IAP problems. Problems that plagued the military, such as lack of unity of effort and ineffective planning, also plague the IAP. Additionally, the goals of both Goldwater-Nichols and IAP reform are similar—to define overarching guidelines that enable the IAP to execute policy using the full spectrum of national power, that clearly define chains of command, and that establish an environment where unity of effort and command flourish. Based on Goldwater-Nichols, overarching guidelines reforming the IAP are outlined in Figure 4.

Reorganize IA to improve the execution capability provided for the president.

Improving the IAP's ability to integrate political and military objectives and translate those objectives in to action requires redefining the IAPs organizational structure, establishing accountability, embedding flexibility, and clearly defining

1. Reorganize the IAP to improve the execution capability provided for the President
2. Chains of command - Place clear responsibility on an leader to direct action using all the capabilities from all elements of national power for the accomplishment of assigned missions
3. Clear Unity of Effort - Ensure the authority of leader is fully commensurate with responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned
4. Common procedures and language – Increase attention to strategy formulation, contingency planning, and doctrine development that includes application of all elements of national power and applies across the interagency community
5. Enhance the effectiveness of operations and improve leadership, management and administration

Figure 4 – Overarching Guidelines Reforming the IAP

hierarchies.⁹ The most critical of these initiatives is organizational reform. The central vision for organizational reform is increased unity of effort and unity of command. Organizational reform provides the capability to simultaneously develop and execute policy, the ability to distinguish between policy formation and its execution, and the capacity to better define mission areas and responsibilities.

Organizational reform decreases ambiguity by clearly articulating roles, missions, and responsibilities.¹⁰ Clearly articulating roles and missions requires delineating standardized geographic and functional organizations¹¹ that require significant expertise across the IA community.¹² It also minimizes duplication of effort and conflicting responsibilities. Standardized geographic groupings mitigate confusion and unnecessarily complex coordination requirements. Standardized functional

categorizations streamline processes by providing single focal points with functional expertise.

In addition to clarifying organizational lines, instilling accountability at the organizational level is also critical to improving the IAP. Organizational accountability implies willing acceptance of responsibility and accountability for actions. It also assures those tasked with specific missions and responsibilities “deliver.” Infusing accountability requires actors within the process possess appropriate resources to perform tasks and proper representation in the decision making process. Finally, imbedding accountability also entails providing participants with the ability to influence tasking provided that influence is not at the expense mission accomplishment or runs counter to mission leaders desires.¹³

Along with organizational change and increased accountability, improving IAP capability to execute policy also involves embedding flexibility. The IAP should possess the flexibility to simultaneously conduct daily, long range, and crisis operations across the spectrum of strategy, operations, and tactics. It should also allow the IAP to employ a variety of decision modes ranging from traditional coordination to real time command and control and also include the capacity to task organize IAP sub-elements. Finally, providing flexibility requires establishing defined command and control mechanisms and documented operating procedures that streamline routine actions and facilitate organizational trust and competence.

Finally, improving IAP execution capacity requires establishing an accepted hierarchy of command relationships among various IA process participants.¹⁴ Support relationships must be defined to ensure supported and supporting roles are understood.¹⁵

Relationships between leaders of various geographic or functional mission areas must also be established to clarify chains of command and support relationships where potential for functional or geographic responsibilities overlap exists.

Unity of Command.

A second principle critical to charting a new course for the IAP is establishing the principle of unity of command. Unity of command involves imparting authority in an individual to direct all elements of national power to achieve a common goal. Along with imparting authority and responsibility, unity of command also provides direct accountability in an individual to accomplish specified missions.¹⁶

A critical component in establishing unity of command is clearly defining the chain of command. The chain of command must be concise, avoiding confused and cumbersome decision layers. Where appropriate, the chain must include intermediate supervisory layers. However these layers should be limited. Unity of command should also clearly delineate those directly in the chain of command and those with advisory positions. Advisors should be eliminated from direct decision authority to avoid confusion, maximize objectivity, and ensure crisp, timely, and accurate advice.¹⁷ Carefully making this distinction frees advisors from parochial restrictions and increases the likelihood for unbiased alternative viewpoints. Finally, clearly defining advisory positions mitigates “lowest common denominator” decisions that dominate consensus based decision making and sustains distinct agency culture and inputs into the IAP.¹⁸

Along with a clear chain of command, individual accountability is a second critical hallmark of unity of command. Individual accountability involves the clear understanding that those tasked to lead will be applauded for mission success or blamed

for mission failure.¹⁹ It must be accompanied with the resources required to accomplish the mission, clarity in desired objectives, and freedom to organize and apply resources to objectives. Instilling accountability requires placing qualified leaders in their positions with the full backing, support, and trust of national leadership. It also requires a structure and culture where subordinate leaders and organizations recognize the appointed leader's authority and understand that the leader also holds them accountable for actions.²⁰

Unity of Effort.

Closely related to unity of command is unity of effort. Unity of effort forges critical links between each of the elements of national power and serves as the mechanism allowing IAP to focus on the task versus organizational interests. It also seals seams between elements of national power and provides transparent transition between them. Unity of effort is critical in an era of diverse challenges that require the capabilities of all branches of government to effectively execute policies underpinning US national security. As the Hart-Rudman commission stated unity of effort must operate...

“with one overriding purpose in mind: to permit the U.S. government to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era—not only the traditional agenda of defense, diplomacy, and intelligence, but also economics, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime, protecting the environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting human rights worldwide.”²¹

The desired end state of unity of effort is an IAP where efforts are integrated, coordinated, and synchronized across all elements of national power to accomplish required missions.

Inherently, unity of effort provides operational control over elements of national power. Operational control bolsters the capabilities of all participating agencies through

integrated action. Imparting operational control entails providing the capacity to direct all aspects of IA operations necessary to accomplish missions. Key elements of operational control include organizing and employing capabilities, developing objectives supporting mission accomplishment, and assigning tasks to subordinate organizations. Exercising operational control assures that all participating agencies act within their capability and focus of employing core competencies as a part of an integrated strategy.²² Operational control is limited, pertains only to tasks directly related to the mission, and does not include areas under the direct purview²³ of various agencies or departments.²⁴ However, any effort to restrict operational control should be limited and only for specific reasons.

Efforts to instill unity of effort must also consider mechanisms to include non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Increasingly, contingency operations involve areas where NGOs contribute major capabilities. Unity of effort should recognize NGOs as key participants and strive to enable interoperability between NGO and US Government operations. NGOs provide experience, permanence, and credibility in a variety of areas. Through non-governmental status, they maintain access and influence in areas traditionally difficult for the US to intervene. However, this same independence also means it is unlikely that NGOs will subordinate operational control to the US government. Therefore, where appropriate, their capability should be facilitated rather than duplicated.²⁵ Achieving unity of effort requires mitigating seams between NGOs and the US Government by incorporating them during planning and exercises and developing technical and procedural coordination and communication mechanisms.

Common procedures and language

Another area creating conflicts within the IAP arises from different culturally derived policies, procedures, and processes. In order to mitigate these cultural barriers requires developing a planning culture, defining a common set of terms, and standardizing procedures and processes related to policy execution.

The most critical aspect of alleviating cultural barriers is developing a planning culture. Developing a planning culture enables the IAP to anticipate national security challenges, articulate associated US objectives, develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, and delineate clear responsibilities for execution of the strategy. The benefit of developing a planning culture includes avoiding pitfalls of previous operations and contributes to establishing a shared vision.²⁶

An institutionalized planning culture provides a framework for actors across the IAP to share ideas, gain a mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations, and bridge cultural divides and stereotypes.²⁷ It serves as a critical element for exercising unity of command and unity of effort by recognizing a single leader tasked to accomplish specific missions.²⁸ It also provides a process to incorporate NGOs. Additionally, it serves as a mechanism within which imagination can be institutionalized and prevents policy-organization-resource mismatches.²⁹ Finally, it is the venue for drawing on the wealth of experiences from functional and regional experts.³⁰

A useful precedent for developing a standardized planning culture and process is “Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” PDD-56, signed by President Clinton in 1997, institutionalized lessons learned from IA operations undertaken in Somalia and Haiti. PDD-56 objectives included developing standing political military plans, conducting rehearsal and review of

those plans prior to execution, performing after-action reviews following operations, and administering training programs supporting the planning process.³¹

In addition to PDD-56's mandates, a standardized IA planning process should include steps to refine policy directives, develop and assess alternative courses of action, highlight policy-resource mismatches, identify potential obstacles.³² The planning process should also include a formal review and approval process. Additionally, the planning process should include capability and flexibility to operate in different modes and speeds ensuring responsiveness to time sensitive requirements and situations.³³ Finally it should strive to include input by all parties involved in plan execution.³⁴

As important as developing the planning process, so too is formulation and issuance of a portfolio of plans.³⁵ A portfolio of plans would anticipate requirements to defend Europe or Northeast Asia or that spell out an anticipated response to a humanitarian disaster in sub-Saharan Africa. A portfolio of plans reflects those areas that represent critical areas of national interest and provide the departure point necessary for subordinate level plan development.³⁶ Subordinate level plans provide the necessary detail required to fully translate strategic intent into tactical action. Plans also serve as a key accountability mechanism ensuring the IAP participants understand responsibilities required of their organizations.³⁷ Plans, and their ultimate approval, provide oversight capability for both the POTUS as well as interested members of the legislative branch.³⁸

Building common understanding across the IAP also requires developing standardized doctrine. Doctrine serves as common language that transcends departmental and agency perspectives and unifies action across the IA community.³⁹ The goal of developing doctrine is to overcome misunderstandings between agencies and departments

by establishing common terms and operating procedures. Doctrine outlines fundamental principles and serves as the authoritative guide. However, it is not dogmatic, does not replace leadership, and requires judgment in application.⁴⁰ Finally, doctrine promotes a common perspective and enables effective integration by gathering lessons learned and codifying best practices.

Improve leadership, management and administration.

The single pillar that facilitates each of the other objectives is building a cultural bias for IA solutions. To instill this cultural bias involves building mutual understanding and trust within IAP participants—a key determinant to increasing effectiveness. Breaking down cultural barriers and false perceptions facilitates real belief that integrated solutions provide the most effective method for dealing with national security challenges. At its core, building mutual trust begins with instilling a view that individuals from various agencies possess the competence to perform their tasks and desire to achieve IA solutions.⁴¹ Once individual competence is established, that same trust expands to include their parent agency or departments—a critical requirement necessary to mitigate organizational survival instincts. The main benefit of building a cultural bias for IA solutions is an environment that promotes confidence and interdependence and develops a shared appreciation for the requirements of IAP.⁴²

Achieving the goal of a cultural bias for IA solutions is not accomplished by fiat but through dedicated education and training courses, exercise programs, and incentives for IA service. Education and training builds a cadre of IAP professionals familiar with both their parent and other department capabilities. Exercise programs provide venues to

share experiences and break down cultural barriers. Finally, IA incentives provide a means for progression without threatening existing bureaucratic organizational survival.

Building a cultural bias for IA solutions relies heavily on education and training. Scott Moore states in his Joint Force Quarterly article, “Today It’s Gold, Not Purple,” “People achieve interagency unity. If people matter most, invest in them.”⁴³ Training and education are a critical and relatively easy requirement to implement.⁴⁴ It begins by supplementing “tactical” competence in core skills with a mindset that these skills operate best when integrated in IA solutions. Building this mindset involves education and training curricula that emphasize understanding of other departments and agencies capabilities, limitations, and methods of operation.

With “tactical” level expertise established, focus expands to “operational” level education and training. “Operational” level training and education is dual focused. First, it trains specific skills necessary to operate in the IAP. Specifically, operational level training concentrates on integrated planning processes outlined previously. Second, it teaches operational art—the art of translating national objectives into tactical action. Defined in Joint Publication 3.0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” operational art is “the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.”⁴⁵ Understanding how strategic objectives link to tactical action is a critical linchpin to successful IA operations.⁴⁶

Along with training and education, exercise programs are also a critical element in developing a bias toward IAP solutions. Exercises provide opportunities to train standard operating procedures, forge common bonds, simulate organizational pressures, and

provide experiences upon which IA process participants can build. They also provide a forum to forge mutual trust and confidence, and long lasting working relationships while helping instill practical realities that education and training do not provide. Again referring to Moore, “The more people work together, the more confidence they gain in each other, and the greater their efforts to maintain bonds and reputations. In turn, shared experiences build working relationships that underpin subsequent initiatives.”⁴⁷ Exercise programs require dedicated resources to build realistic multi-agency scenarios that encourage IA interaction.⁴⁸

Before leaving training, education, and exercises, it also important to note that programs designed to invest in IAP participants must also directly target their leaders. Policymakers, statesmen, and military commanders greatly impact the IAP as they lead their individual agencies, are involved in the policy development, and may eventually lead coordinated IAP efforts. Senior level IAP leaders are also more bureaucratically entrenched. Therefore, breaking down cultural barriers also requires targeted education, training, and exercise programs to enable an appreciation of various capabilities of participants, and allow them to work past personal biases. Training and exercises help senior leaders to understand the impact of their decisions and provide an arena to gain trust and confidence in other senior leaders.⁴⁹

The final area vital to changing the cultural bias toward IA solutions is personnel management. Similar to the DOD’s Joint Staff prior to implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, there is little incentive for IAP service. A 1985 senate report entitled “*Defense Organization: The Need for Change*”, stated that “military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty...are not prepared by either education or experience to perform

their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs.”⁵⁰ Like the current IAP, rewards, accolades and progression prior to Goldwater-Nichols were products of parent agencies or departments. In order for the IAP to develop a cultural bias toward integrated inter-departmental solutions requires a personnel system that provides promotions and assignments that reward IA participation. One attractive alternative advocated by the Commission for National Security/21st Century or Hart-Rudman Commission is the creation of IA professionals. Under this concept, IA professionals are provided opportunities to gain experience within various departments through a specialized assignment and promotion system. After firmly establishing “tactical” credentials, IA professionals are assigned key IA positions in various departments or agencies without penalty. Their promotions are controlled by a separate specialized IA group to ensure advancement on par with those staying within parent organizations. To provide incentive for IA professional service, key senior positions across the agencies and departments would require an assignment as an IA professional.⁵¹

Summary

The creation of an IAP that coherently fuses the elements of national power to accomplish national objectives requires imprinting key birthmarks. Birthmarks that reorganize the IAP to improve its capability to plan and execute integrated IA operations. Birthmarks that build trust among departments and agencies, move past turf battles, and establish accountability and reliability. Birthmarks that foster unity of command and unity of effort, establish common procedures and language, and provide critical education, training, and exercise opportunities. Finally, birthmarks that reward successful participation in the IA. But as important as laying the foundation for major IA

reform, so to is establishing the framework where they can be planted, grow, and mature—the topic of the next chapter.

Notes

¹ While the founding of the Homeland Security Department was a monumental change in the executive branch, its development is still ongoing and does not provide sufficient history or lessons learned as those from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Intelligence reform legislation largely resulted from finding of the 9/11 Commission Report. The most significant outcome of this legislation was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence. As with the creation of the Homeland Security Department, Intelligence Reform represents a major restructuring in the executive branch. However, as with the Homeland Security, there is insufficient history from this act to allow for useful lessons learned in the evolution of the organization.

² Establishing overarching guidelines to improve the IAP focuses on policy execution. While not perfect, the policy development process adequately fulfills requirements developing policy option for the POTUS.² Given that premise, (and one that requires closer examination),

³ Locher III, James R. "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn (1996): 34-40.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid., In this case, the original NSA 1947 did not clearly specified the relationship between the newly formed Secretary of Defense and the three service secretaries—Army, Navy, and Air Force.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Locher

⁹ "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, 9 October 1996. Vol. Joint Pub 3-08 Vol I. I-1

¹⁰ "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." Ed. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000. Vol. Joint Publication 1. VI-3

¹¹ Within the DoD this is commonly referred to Combatant command or unified command. For more information see the DoD Dictionary

¹² The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001 or

Notes

“The Hart Rudman Commission” referred to this as “fixing the map.”

¹³ Flournoy, Michele. "Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002. 3-4

¹⁴ Joint Publication 1

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Murdock, Clark A. et al. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004. 63-67

¹⁷ Locher, 12

¹⁸ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001.

¹⁹ Flournoy, 3

²⁰ Moore, S. W. (1998-99). "Today It's Gold, Not Purple." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn/Winter: 100-106. 103

²¹ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001. 47

²² Gibbings, T., Hurley, Donald, and Moore, Scott (1998). "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore." Parameters(Winter 1998): 99-112.

²³ Examples of areas not subsumed under operational control include administration, manning, training, and internal organization.

²⁴ DoD dictionary

²⁵ Gibbings, page 4

²⁶ Skeptics of the requirement to plan argue plans rarely execute as written. Others may be disinclined to “put down on paper” how the U.S. plans to accomplish its objectives fearing diplomatic ramifications should plans be leaked and desiring maximum flexibility to deal with national security situations. However, given the complexity of past operations, the alternative of continuing current ad hoc processes seem pointless as compared to developing a plan from which to IA process participants can deviate during execution and a process that helps to unify effort by providing standard procedures.

²⁷ Kelleher, P. N. (2002). "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military." Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn: 104-110. ,109-110

Notes

²⁸ Flournoy, 3

²⁹ In this case, institutionalized imagination can be accomplished by developing “Red Teams” within the formal planning process. The purpose of Red Teams, is to think, act, and operate as the adversary. In thinking as the adversary, they serve to probe standing institutions, find and exploit weaknesses, and help anticipate adversary courses of action.

³⁰ Kelleher, 109-110

³¹ Flournoy

³² Joint Publication 1, VI-5

³³ Flournoy, 4

³⁴ Joint Publication 1, VI-5

³⁵ “Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities.” Department of Defense, December 2004.

³⁶ The number of plans should be limited because of the time required to develop those plans.

³⁷ Flournoy, 3

³⁸ Ibid., 4

³⁹ DoD Dictionary.

⁴⁰ Joint Publication 1, I-8/9

⁴¹ Wilkerson, L. B. (1997). "What Exactly is Jointness?" Joint Forces Quarterly Summer: 66-68.

⁴² Joint Publication 1, VI-3

⁴³ Moore, 105

⁴⁴ Lt. Col Birmingham, G., CDR Barndt, Luann, and MAJ Salo, Thomas (2003). Achieving Unity of Effort: A call for legislation to improve the interagency process and continue enhancing interservice interoperability, Joint Forces Staff College., 10-16

Notes

⁴⁵ "Doctrine for Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, September 2001. Vol. Joint Pub 3-0. 14

⁴⁶ Joint Pub 3-08 Vol I, I-1

⁴⁷ Moore, 104

⁴⁸ Murdock, 63-67

⁴⁹ Moore, 105

⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, committee print, Senate report 99–86, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985,

⁵¹ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001.102-103

Chapter 7

Solutions – Part 2, Organizational Constructs

War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.

John Keegan
A History of Warfare

This chapter presents, analyzes, and recommends the three organizational reform Courses of Action (COA) that enable unity of command and unity of effort, bridge cultural divides, establish doctrine and procedures, and provide institutional incentives for IA service. It begins by providing an overview of each COA, and then assesses and compares each COA against predetermined criteria. The three organizational construct COAs are:

- COA 1 – NSC Focus. Implement National Security Council controlled regional and functional IA Task Forces (IATF)
- COA 2 – DOS IA Commands. State Department Focus. Maintain the current lead agency construct and task the State Department to assume primary role in IA by developing and staffing Regional IA Commands
- COA 3 – Standing IA HQ. Task the NSC to build a standing IA HQ with the responsibility to conduct full time planning and with the capability to stand-up ad hoc IATF as situations require.

Course of Action 1 – NSC Focus.

COA 1 involves developing an NSC based, regional combatant command “like” IATF, possessing command authority to plan and execute regional or functional operations.

IATF Organization.

There are two levels of organization involved in the IATF COA—external and internal. Externally, IATF’s organize along regional and functional lines. Regionally, IATFs are divided into geographic regions by reconciling current departmental geographic organizations.¹ Functionally, IATFs are divided along broad and continuing mission areas that transcend regional boundaries. For example, functional IATFs might be organized around counter-terrorism, humanitarian operations, and international organized crime while geographic organizations might mirror DODs Regional Combatant Commands. Where necessary, IATFs serve regional and functional roles. A current example of dual responsibilities is the DOD’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Functionally, SOCOM organizes, trains, and equips all special operation force capability. Geographically, SOCOM serves as the geographic focal point for DOD operations in combating global terror.

Internally, presidentially appointed leaders command IATFs. Supporting IATF leaders are a special staff and four components representing the diplomatic, military, informational, and economic instruments of power. Each component instrument of power is led by a representative of the agency with the predominance of capability and reports directly to the IATF leader. For example, the military domain would probably be led by the corresponding RCC. Supporting the IATF leader is a special staff resourced

from various agencies that provides operations, intelligence, logistics, and plans functions similar to those proposed by a 2004 Defense Science Board summer study (see Figure 5 – Defense Science Board Internal Structure for IATF).²




Figure 5 – Defense Science Board Internal Structure for IATF

IATF Leadership.

IATF leaders are presidential appointees with the required skills and experience necessary. The position does not require confirmation but does require annual reporting to appropriate congressional oversight bodies. Leaders report directly to the National Security Advisor and POTUS and rotate between various departments and agencies. The NSC, NSC staff, and other departments and agencies serve advisory roles in the chain of command.

Policy development.

Implementing this COA requires a POTUS driven, top-down policy development process. Overall responsibility for policy development rests with the National Security

Advisor and NSC staff.³ The National Security Advisor maintains the primary policy coordination role using the existing EXCOM, DC, PC, and NSC staff. In addition to policy development, the NSC staff is responsible for developing a National Security Planning Directive (NSPD).⁴ Combining a proposal of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study with the DOD's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the NSPD translates policy into a set of strategic goals and priorities.⁵ Additionally, the NSPD "assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies."⁶ Once completed, the NSPD serves as strategic guidance for IATFs. The NSPD tasks various IATFs with missions and requires development of plans to accomplish those missions.

Command relationships.

To ensure unity of command and effort, IATF leaders possess operational control over each component instrument of power and are responsible for combining those capabilities to accomplish national security objectives. To mitigate potential seams between geographic and functional IATFs, the NSPD establishes command relationships and planning requirements for the NSC, agencies, and IATFs. Additionally, it also outlines support relationships and liaison requirements across the IAP and IATFs.

Policy Execution.

With NSPD guidance and tasking complete, an organizational construct established, and command relationships specified, the IATF and its subordinate component instruments of power provide the mechanism for policy execution. IATFs direct actions in their regional or functional area. They are accountable to the National Security Advisor and POTUS for directing efforts across the IA community to develop, exercise, and execute plans and operations tasked by the NSPD.

NSC Impact.

Adopting the IATF COA requires the NSC organize around two branches—policy development and policy execution. The focus for the policy development branch is to coordinate policies through the current IAP and produce the NSPD. The Policy Execution Branch is a staff structure supporting and coordinating efforts across each of the IATFs. Ultimately policy execution authority would be divested away from the NSC staff and given to the IATFs.

Course of Action 2 – DOS IA Commands

This COA maintains a lead agency approach to IA operations. However, unlike current efforts, the DOS assumes the primary role for IA operations by developing regional IA command capability.

DOS IA Commands Organization.

Similar to the IATF COA, the DOS IA Command COA involves developing a regional command structure that possesses command authority for IA operations. Under this COA, DOS reconciles functional and regional delineations across the IA to create DOS IA Commands. The five current regional Under Secretaries provide the core structure. After establishing DOS IA Commands, departments and agencies provide capabilities to establish supporting component instruments of power similar to the previous IATF COA. With structure in place, the DOS IA Command assumes responsibility for combining capabilities across the IA in order to accomplish specific national objectives. The internal structure and special staff requirements of the DOS IA Command are left up to DOS discretion.

DOS IA Command Leadership.

Leadership for the regional and functional DOS IA Commands comes from the designated regional Under Secretary of State. As with the IATF COA, the position does not require congressional confirmation but would report annually to appropriate congressional oversight bodies. DOS IA Commands report directly to the Secretary of State and then POTUS. The NSC, NSC staff, and other departments and agencies serve advisory roles in the chain of command.

Policy development.

Policy development is similar to IATF COA with the DOS IA Command playing an active role in the process. However, unlike the IATF COA, once policy decisions are issued, responsibility for developing the NSPD is delegated to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State directs development of the NSPD and is responsible for outlining roles, missions, and command relationships. The Secretary of State also assigns specific responsibilities for planning and executing IA operations to the appropriate regional or functional DOS IA Command.

Command relationships.

Similar to the IATF COA, the DOS IA Command leaders have operational control over capabilities from each component instrument of power. Additionally, the NSPD serves as the primary document sealing seams and clarifying overlapping responsibilities, establishing support relationships, and explicitly outlining various roles of the NSC, departments, and agencies. The NSPD also tasks DOS IA Commands with specific planning requirements.

Policy Execution.

Under this COA, the DOS IA Command is the supported organization for IA operations with accountability to the Secretary of State and POTUS for leading efforts across the IA community. They maintain the requirement to develop, exercise, and execute plans as tasked by the NSPD. DOS IA Commands also retain responsibility for establishing entry and exit condition for DOD RCCs operations. During open hostilities, the DOD RCC would be the supported organization.

NSC Impact.

Adopting the DOS IA Command places the NSC in its traditional role of coordinating national security activities. The NSC maintains policy development, oversight, and advisory functions. However, it requires the NSC maintain a lower profile and serve its traditional role in national security advice to the POTUS. It also requires its staff to resist temptations to become policy makers and operational executors.

Course of Action 3 – Standing IAHQ.

This COA tasks the NSC to build a full time IA Headquarters (IAHQ) with the responsibility to conduct planning and capability to stand-up ad hoc Sub-IATFs. This COA builds on the work of a recent Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study entitled “Transition to and from hostilities.”

IAHQ Organization.

Within this COA, the NSC staffs and organizes a single, full time IAHQ, with representatives from each of the four elements of power—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational. As with the IATF COA, the structure of the IAHQ is similar to one

proposed by the 2004 Defense Science Board summer study (see Figure 5 – Defense Science Board Internal Structure for IATF).⁷ In addition to the staff functions, the IAHQ is also organized around geographic and functional sub-directorates. These sub-directorates represent areas where “U.S. interests are very important and the risk of U.S. intervention is high.”⁸ The number of sub-directorates is determined by potential areas of operations that meet predetermined thresholds for importance and potential requirement to intervene.⁹

Embodied within the IAHQ is the capability to deploy ad hoc Sub IA Task Forces (Sub-IATF).¹⁰ Sub-IATFs provide the capability to respond to emerging situations. They are task organized to accomplish missions in specific geographic areas or for specific functional contingencies and operate using the combined capabilities of the IA. Once established, they serve as the focal point for operations. They maintain operational control and command authority over forces and operations within their mission area. This operational control includes planning, exercise, and execution of operations.¹¹

IAHQ Leadership.

As with each of the other COAs, IAHQ leaders are selected by the POTUS, do not require congressional confirmation, and report annually to appropriate congressional oversight bodies.

Policy development.

Policy development is similar to other COAs with the process being POTUS driven. However, using an IAHQ construct, the IAHQ assumes responsibility for NSPD and supporting plan development. Additionally, the NSC and its staff maintain oversight of the plan approval process.

Command relationships.

IAHQ leaders report directly to the National Security Advisor and POTUS. They also have operational control over component instrument of power capabilities necessary to conduct planning and exercises. Where necessary, the IAHQ leader has the authority to delegate operational control to Sub-IATF leaders over component instrument of power capabilities. The NSC, NSC staff, and other departments and agencies serve advisory roles to the IAHQ and Sub-IATF. Other support relationships with departments and agencies are included in the NSPD.

Policy Execution.

Under this COA, IAHQs primary task is developing and exercising strategic plans. According to the DSB, “The task force would develop realistic objectives and strategic plans which would be exercised, tested, and red teamed; and which would be supported by more detailed ‘component’ plans, e.g., as prepared by the regional combatant commanders.”¹² The strategic plans serve as the starting point for departments and agencies to develop more detailed supporting diplomatic, information, military, and economic plans.

Plan execution rests with either a Sub-IATF, lead agency, or the IAHQ. The determination of executing authority depends upon the scope, scale, and duration of the operation. Operations involving a limited number of departments or agencies maintain the current lead agency execution construct. For larger operations involving a number of departments or agencies and having a potential for long term engagement, a Sub-IATFs would likely execute IA plans. For operations requiring a significant effort from a number of departments or agencies, the IAHQ assumes responsibility for executing

operations. In any of the aforementioned alternatives, operational control is delegated to the appropriate leader.

Course of Action Analysis.

With each COA in mind, focus turns to independently analyzing each COA against a potential scenario in order to determine strengths, weaknesses, and feasibility. The scenario chosen to analyze each COA is the OIF post-conflict case study. The OIF post-conflict case study represents a challenging environment that includes all aspect of national power. The Iraq case study helps to determine the feasibility of each COA in achieving an IAP with improved execution capability, unity of command, unity of efforts assigned, development of common procedures and language, and bridging cultural barriers.

COA 1 - IATF Advantages and Disadvantages.

Several potential advantages occur by employing an IATF construct in OIF post-conflict operations. The first advantage is increased simplicity and clarity. This advantage is achieved by placing one geographic IATF in charge with the span of control and authority to direct operations. This organization simplifies and clarifies chains of command, command relationships, and other organizational arrangements. Employing an IATF also consolidates various planning efforts. The IATF also increases unity of command by placing a single leader in a position with the authority, responsibility, and accountability to synergistically plan and execute post-conflict operations.

In addition to advantages related to post-conflict operations, the IATF generally improves IA operations in two ways. First, publishing an NSPD provides a “playbook”

that clarifies strategic guidance and establishes command relationships necessary to plan and execute IA operations. Secondly, the IATF provides continuity between administrations by establishing a standing execution structure for IA operations—one that only currently exists within the NSC

There are several disadvantages of the IATF COA. Most of these disadvantages do not directly relate to OIF post-conflict operations but are rather generally related to the COA. First, using an IATF may over-centralize power in the NSC. Under this COA, the NSC maintains primary control over all aspects of policy formation and execution. Control over policy formation is a result of the requirement for the NSC to write the NSPD. In this instance, the sheer fact that writing the NSPD requires clarification of issued policies puts the NSC in the position of controlling policy formation. Additionally, the NSC, through IATFs, also possesses immense control over policy execution by being provided the mandate and resources. This would come at the expense of various departments and agencies in the current IAP.

A second, disadvantage of this COA are requirements placed on the IATFs leaders. The IATF leader is responsible for understanding the capabilities of various departments, knowledge of planning processes, and requirements of their geographic or functional area. For example, if an IATF were in place for OIF post-conflict operations, the IATF leader would have to understand military operations, diplomatic agreements, cultural nuances, and inter-workings of the IA bureaucracy. Comparatively, while the Regional Combatant Commander requires working knowledge of each of the previously mentioned areas, his primary arena, military operations is his focus. Additionally, unlike IATF

leaders, the Regional Combatant Commander would likely have matured throughout his entire career focused on military operations.

Advantages	Disadvantages
• Increased simplicity/clarity through standardized geographic/functional organizations across the IA. • Increased unity of effort through assignment of key capabilities from departments/agencies to IATF • Increased unity of command. Tasks single leader with authority and responsibility to plan/execute operations spanning all IA capabilities. • Increased clarity of strategic guidance, IA command relationships with development of NSPD. • Reduced perturbations from changes in administrations,	• Over centralization of power within the NSC. NSC would control all aspects of policy including NSPD development. • Leadership requirements of IATF. The requirements for an IATF leader would be immense and would task his capability. The position would have required cross functional understanding of all four elements of national power.

Table 3 – IATF COA Advantages and Disadvantages

COA 2 – DOS IA Command Advantages and Disadvantages

In analyzing the State Department Focused COA against the Iraq scenario, several advantages emerge. It potentially places DOS in a position to fully utilize its organizational culture to drive post-conflict operations. The result is a comprehensive view of the entire conflict as opposed to separate conflict and post-conflict plans.

Aside from potential advantage gained for OIF post-conflict operations, an additional advantage of a DOS centered model is placing the department in charge that is best capable of viewing holistic solutions to national security challenges using the full portfolio of national power instruments. DOS possesses the cultural awareness, diplomatic understanding, and overall awareness of national security instruments

necessary to determine the best tool(s) to meet the requirements. A second advantage is balancing power within the executive branch. Executing a DOS IA Command COA strengthens DOS's role in policy execution, absolves the NSC from its policy coordination role, and positions it to serve in its administrative role as envisioned in the original National Security Act of 1947. A final advantage relates to executing a DOS IA Command COA is the minimal impact on the overall IA structure. The bulk of change occurs within the DOS. While manpower requirements increase from various agencies, these requirements could be resourced from various embassies.

There are also several disadvantages with this COA the first of which is a bureaucratic shift in power to the DOS. Implementing DOS IA Commands requires powerful departments and agencies to subordinate interests to DOS. For example, DOD regional combatant commands would support the corresponding DOS IA Command rather than reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, with DOS charged to draft the NSPD places it in a position to dictate tasks, command relationships, and support requirements.

A second disadvantage is the requirement for cultural and educational shift within DOS to implement the COA. Executing DOS IA Commands requires a cultural awareness and understanding of planning that is currently not present. It requires DOS to adopt disciplined planning processes in order to produce the NSPD and deliberate plans. Along with the requirement to adopt a planning culture, DOS IA Commands also impact the organizational culture by requiring a higher order of organizational discipline inherent in executing deliberate planning. Additionally, this COA leaves unmitigated cultural or organizational barriers present in the current IA process. Finally, DOD IA Commands

might directly conflict with embassies in various countries throughout the region and the powerful positions of the ambassadors.

<u>Advantages</u>	<u>Disadvantages</u>
• Harnessing DOS organizational culture to the benefit of the USG. In this case, DOS's more holistic approach to the Iraq conflict may have benefited in operational execution by including in-depth requirements for post-conflict operations. • Placing policy execution in the Department that is best capable of viewing solutions using all elements of national power. • Minimizing the impact on existing IA structure by implementing fewer changes. • Placing the NSC in more of its traditional role of policy coordination.	• Requiring a massive shift in power to the DOS. Implementing this COA would have required powerful departments, such as Defense, to subordinate their interests to State. • Requiring an immense cultural and education shift in DOS regarding planning. This COA would have required a high level of organizational discipline to implement the required planning culture requirements. • Unmitigated cultural or organizational barriers present in the current IA process. This COA would have done little to mitigate bureaucratic barriers between organizations that currently exist in the IA process.

Table 4 – DOS IA Command Advantages and Disadvantages

COA 3 – IAHQ Advantages and Disadvantages

Judging IAHQ COA performance in OIF Post-Conflict scenario, several advantages emerge. Chief among the advantages is increased unity of effort at the strategic level. The IAHQ aids unity of effort by centralizing all efforts in the IAP around one organization with the primary task of planning and executing OIF post-conflict operations. The IAHQ also provides the framework to integrate planning and execution. The employment of a standard planning process molds together various planning efforts to publish a single, actionable strategic plan. Through established

command relationships, the IAHQ also provides supporting departments and agencies with resources and clear objectives to execute operations.

A second advantage of the IAHQ COA is increased flexibility by forming Sub-IATFs. Sub-IATFs enable the IAHQ the flexibility to establish organizations based on operational missions requiring integration of various elements of national power. For example, building on Crane and Terrill's work, in the OIF Post-Conflict Iraq scenario Security, Stabilization, and Institution Building Sub-IATFs could be used to organize operational missions. Under this construct, "Sub-IATF Security" assumes responsibility for establishing security functions to include "separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure."¹³ While "Sub-IATF Security" accomplishes the security mission, "Sub-IATF Stabilization" continues infrastructure repair, strives to include civilian and NGO bodies, and facilitates full transition to Iraqi control. Along with security and stabilization, "Sub-IATF Infrastructure" focuses on long term nation state requirements to include economic investment, education, and electoral tasks.¹⁴

Several disadvantages emerge with the IAHQ COA. Most importantly, Sub-IATFs do little to build relationships or bridge operational or tactical level barriers. For example, if employed in the OIF Post-Conflict case, Sub-IATFs would not have provided the time for agencies to form working relationships and address required interoperability requirements. Even if Sub-IATFs were formed 6-12 months prior to execution, regional understanding and working relationships require years of focus. Finally, the training and exercise requirements required to build high functioning organizations are also lacking in a Sub-IATF construct. Finally, a series of Sub-IATFs increases coordination requirements and potentially complicates unity of command and unity of effort.

<u>Advantages</u>	<u>Disadvantages</u>
• Mitigated cultural barriers and departmental stovepipes at the strategic level by organizing the IA around and IAHQ and forcing departments and agencies to surrender capability to the IAHQ for their execution. • Centralized planning effort. • Increased flexibility to tailor Sub-IATF's based on requirements of the situation. In this case, the IAHQ could have established various Sub-IATF's to handle different aspects of the operation.	• Operational/tactical level cultural barriers remain unaddressed. While strategic level synchronization is achieved, operational/tactical level interoperability requirements still required • Would not have built established working relationships in the region. • Limited training and exercise opportunities • Increased complexity in coordination and not have required "shelf life" required to meet demands of long term engagement.

Table 5 – IAHQ Advantages and Disadvantages

Course of Action Comparison.

With COA analysis in mind, focus shifts to comparing each COA against a pre-established set of criteria. The criteria are:

1. Acceptability, Feasibility, and Adequacy – This criterion judges each COA against its manpower, materiel, and time requirements, whether the COA can be resourced to accomplish the mission, and whether the COA is sufficient to improve IA operations.
2. Facilitates unity of command
3. Facilitates unity of effort in synergistic application of instruments of national power
4. Overcomes organizational and cultural barriers and provides a shared frame of reference

Each COA is compared against the aforementioned criteria using a three level scale—strong, neutral, or weak. A rating of strong indicates that the COA meets a majority of the intent of the criteria. A rating of neutral indicates the COA meets some but not all of the criteria. A rating of weak indicates the COA does not meet a majority of the intent of

the criteria. With the criteria in mind, Table 6 – COA Comparison, provides results of the comparison.

	Courses of Action		
Criteria	IATF	DOS IA Command	IAHQ
Acceptability, Feasibility, and Adequacy	Neutral	Neutral	Strong
Facilitates unity of command	Strong	Weak	Neutral
Facilitates unity of effort	Strong	Neutral	Neutral
Overcomes organizational/cultural barriers	Strong	Weak	Strong

Table 6 – COA Comparison

Acceptability and Feasibility

Comparing COAs reveals that all three COAs are acceptable, feasible, and adequate. However, the IAHQ fares best in terms of acceptability and feasibility. The IAHQ COA only requires limited augmentation of manpower contained in the current NSC and IAP. Comparatively, the IATF and DOS IA Command potentially require significant additional manpower, material, and funding to form various regional and functional commands. Both the IATF and DOS IA Command COAs also require significant infrastructure and personnel investments to conduct operations. Finally, the DOS IA Command COA compares neutrally against acceptability and feasibility criteria because of the cultural requirements necessary for the DOS to implement a deliberate planning culture.

Unity of effort

When comparing each COA against the criteria for achieving unity of effort, again all three COAs improve the IAP. However, the IATF COA fares best. The IATF COA provides a focuses organization fully engaged in accomplishing missions assigned in their area of interest. The IATF COA also singularly focuses around IA operations. Conversely, the DOS IA Command COA is judged weakly against the criteria because its agency centered approach still suffers current bureaucratic problems. Finally, the IAHQ COA receives a neutral ranking. While it does bring together various elements of power under one organization, it relies on ad-hoc Sub-IATFs. The reliance on ad-hoc organizations may not allow organizations to continually work together and build relationships necessary to execute complex national security operations.

Unity of command

When comparing each COA against the criteria for achieving unity of command, the IATF COA fares better than either the IAHQ or DOS IA Command COAs. Again, the IATFs functionally or regionally based organizations provide a unique venue for all the elements of power to work together on a continual basis. While the DOS IA Commands provide similar opportunities, institutional resistance to placing departmental assets under the direct control of the DOS will likely preclude effective operations. Additionally, it may complicate unity of command for DODs regional combatant commands during the execution of major conflict operations. Finally, the IAHQ COA increases unity of command at the strategic level, however, operationally, unity of command is reduced by reliance on ad-hoc IATFs.

Organizational and Cultural Barriers

When comparing which COA overcomes organizational and cultural barriers, and provides a shared frame of reference, the IATF and IAHQ COAs best meet these criteria. Each COA orients the operating staff full time against a singular national security task. Comparatively, with its agency centered focus, the DOS IA Command model fares worst at breaking down cultural barriers unless steps are taken to force integration.

Recommendation

Based on the previous COA analysis and comparison, the recommended COA is a hybrid of various organizational reform courses of action presented previously. The recommended organizational structure involves forming a standing IAHQ of COA 3 supported by regional and functional IATFs of COA 1. Within this model, the IAHQ serves as the overall organization providing policy, guidance, and oversight for actions of regional and functional IATFs. The IAHQ also assumes primary responsibility for drafting the NSPD. In turn, IATFs serve as the regional or functional experts that use assigned capabilities from across the IA community to develop and execute plans for tasked by the NSPD.

Adopting a hybrid organization mitigates the disadvantages of employing ad-hoc Sub-IATFs. It also provides a standing capability necessary to establish regional partnerships and inter-departmental working relationships. Additionally, employing a standing IAHQ provides a full time organization focused entirely on executing and integrating IA operations across each of the various IATFs. Finally, employing IATFs in conjunction with IAHQ provides maximum flexibility to tailor responses to various regional or functional contingency requirements.

Notes

¹ Century, The United States Commission on National Security/21st. "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change." The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001

² "Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities." Department of Defense, December 2004.

³ Current NSC process refers to the NSC, PC, DC, and EXCOM configuration as supported by the NSC Staff.

⁴ Defense Science Board

⁵ The DoD Dictionary defines the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan as "The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and Secretary of Defense. Also called JSCP." "DoD Dictionary." Department of Defense, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddictionary/index.html>

⁶ Defense Science Board

⁷ Ibid. 27

⁸ Ibid., 27

⁹ Ibid, 30

¹⁰ Ibid., 32

¹¹ "Doctrine for Joint Operations." Ed. Department of Defense, September 2001. Vol. Joint Pub 3-0. II-14

¹² Defense Science Board, 28

¹³ Crane, Conrad C. and Terrill, W. Andrew. "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario." February 2003, 43

¹⁴ Ibid., 43-54

Chapter 8

Recommendations

“The result can be achieved more rapidly than most people think. It will advance not by columns, nor by mighty blows, but as a patch of oil spreads, through a step-by-step progression.”

Lyautey: Letter to Gallieni
14 November 1903

Sir Harold Nicholson, in his work entitled, “Diplomacy” wrote “Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassador and envoys.”¹ For most of later half of the 20th century, the overriding concern over a monolithic Soviet nuclear threat and dealing with that threat reinforced a Cold War paradigm that diplomacy reigned supreme as the prime tool of statecraft. While there was parallel application of other instruments of power, successfully achieving national interests did not solely rely on their synergistic application with diplomacy. Seemingly, the elements of national power could be applied in series with the military instrument seen as the tool of last resort and only committed decisively and with its full weight and effort. To do otherwise invited the potential for inadvertent nuclear war. However, piecemeal application of military force, as witnessed during the Vietnam War, proved a negative consequence of this approach.² Embodied in this Cold War paradigm was the idea of thresholds. Once a threshold was reached, one where diplomacy no longer proved a tenable alternative, focus shifted almost exclusively

to the military instrument of power. Prussian theorist Carl Von Clausewitz captured the essence of this transition point when he stated “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” and “War is a continuation of politics by other means.”³ This paradigm culminated with the Weinberger and Powell doctrines that specified that only after being given clear objectives, the military instrument of power was to be unencumbered by outside interference in its application of full spectrum of capabilities until such time it achieved those objectives. Once complete, the resulting situation was handed back to the diplomats.

While a useful pattern for dealing with Cold War challenges, interventions in the past quarter century illustrated disjointed application of the instruments of power as being ineffective in dealing with complex contingency operations. Furthermore, analysis of various operations revealed many executed with unclear end states, unclear chains of command, disunity of effort, and ineffective plans for dealing with conflict and its aftermath. Unless this approach is altered, piecemeal application of instruments of power against national security objectives will likely remain inadequate to deal with ambiguous and complex challenges such as global terrorism.

At the heart of the problem is the Interagency Process. From its humble beginnings as an administrative organization, the NSC and IAP have evolved into a major force brokering national security policy. By combining diverse groups across the national security community, the IAP drives most aspects of policy formation and implementation using the full spectrum of national power. However, while an effective venue to form policy, the IAPs ability to execute policy has fallen short.

Contingencies spanning the last 25 years reveal the US has paid a high price for the IAPs inability to consistently apply the instruments of power against various national security priorities. Panamanian Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY demonstrate an IAP unable to achieve unity of effort and incapable of clearly planning and executing conflict and post conflict operations. While the costs of these missteps in Panama were relatively small in terms of casualties and lost treasure, this was not the case in Somalia. The shortcomings of the IAP in executing the 1991 humanitarian intervention in Somalia included inadequate planning, shifting objectives, and unclear chains of command. The price of these missteps was 93 dead or wounded US soldiers and loss of tremendous prestige on the world stage. In Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the IAP learned from the hard lessons of Panama and Somalia to improve planning and integration across departments. However, solutions implemented for Haitian operations did little to mitigate persisting cultural and doctrinal issues across the IA community. Finally, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated how the IAP could contribute to engineering a major military victory and yet squander that success in post-conflict operations. During OIF post-conflict operations, planning was disjointed. Moreover, efforts across the IAP to plan and execute seamless transition to Phase IV lacked cohesiveness. Finally, stovepiping dominated the process that involved too many actors with too many agendas. Thus, what was true in contingencies over the past quarter century proved to still be the case in Iraq.

The current IAP lacks the ability to exercise unity of command and unity of effort. Cultural barriers prevent departments and agencies from working synergistically and a lack of common planning perspectives and doctrine further exacerbates the IAPs

dysfunctionality. Additionally, the process neither rewards service nor attempts to prepare and train participants to work in this environment. Organizational behavior theory reveals most of the IAP sub-optimal performance stems from bureaucratic bargaining and decisions made at the time of the IAPs inceptions. Additionally, power, position, influence, and survival instincts all drive the IAP toward inefficient and sometimes irrational behavior. Finally, decisions and negotiations made at the time the IAP was formed imposed birthmarks on the current system that persist today.

Reforming the process

The fundamental issue is how to reform the IAP? Reforming the IAP requires bold measures. First, reform begins by establishing clear guidelines and core operating principles to correct the shortfalls and provide the guidance for continued improvement. Using lessons learned from enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, five guidelines that improve IA process shortfalls include:

1. Reorganize the IA process to improve the execution capability provided for the president
2. Chains of command - Place clear responsibility on an leader to direct action using all the capabilities from all elements of national power for the accomplishment of assigned missions
3. Clear Unity of Effort - Ensure the authority of leader is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned
4. Common procedures and language – Increase attention to strategy formulation, contingency planning, and doctrine development that includes application of all elements of national power and applies across the interagency community
5. Enhance the effectiveness of operations and improve leadership, management and administration

These guidelines lay out the vision for how a reformed IAP should operate and provide the seeds of change. They also build upon lessons learned from a previous large

scale bureaucratic restructuring and seek to correct fundamental problems within the current process. Incorporation of these guidelines is no small task. It requires significant advocacy from champions in both the executive and legislative branches. Without such support, little if any reform is likely as the existing bureaucracy will war against the changes.

Accompanying bold legislative reforms, there must also be steps taken to fundamentally restructure national security organizations involved in the IAP. Steps must be taken to organizationally reform the IAP to provide the framework for the guidelines to evolve and grow. An effort must be made to adopt an organizational model that forms a standing IAHQ supported by regional and functional IATFs that plan, exercise, and execute national security policy directives. At the strategic level, the IAHQ serves as the umbrella organization that drives all aspects of IA operations. It serves as the focal point for developing operational guidance and defining command relationships. In turn, the IATFs are the operational and tactical executors. Their regional and functional focus combined with specific taskings, clear command relationships, and sufficient resources allow for coherent implementation of national policy.

Conclusion and Areas for Further Study

In and of themselves, these reforms require additional refinement and development. Various levels of analysis may reveal better ways to reform the IA process. However, at a minimum, they serve as the starting point from which experts can debate and implement reforms. Without these reforms to the IA process, there will likely be little improvement in the processes capability to synergistically apply the elements of national power in order to meet the requirements of our nation. Further study is also required to

address methods that overcome organizational resistance to change that will certainly arise if departmental “turf” is invaded. Also issues such as how to enforce accountability, tangible incentive systems for IA service, and preventing doctrine and procedures from limiting creativity are also areas that must be studied.

In drawing this analysis to a close, some may argue that the cost of implementing such drastic changes may far exceed the benefit. If the “operation kills the patient” then what’s the point? This is vital as an area for further study in any plan to transform the IAP. However, the fact remains that the current system already imposes significant tangible and intangible costs that dictate some amount of reform. Some of these costs come in the form of bad policy outcomes to include policy setbacks, diplomatic failures and military disasters that hurt American interests.⁴ Costs also incur when IA process tasks ill-suited agencies to produce positive results.⁵ The results are often achieved but exact an extremely high price. For example, a Defense Science Board study of the real investment of post conflict operations is some three to five times higher than conflict operations and that those large investments can be wasted if not properly planned and executed.⁶

The current IA process also imposes opportunity costs involving wasted time and interpersonal capital of the POTUS and other senior national security officials as they attempt to overcome its shortcomings.⁷ Opportunity costs manifest themselves as lost opportunities to capitalize on comparative advantages and inefficient use of resources when the IAP poorly synchronizes engagement initiatives and foreign assistance.⁸ Opportunity costs also occur when the focus within the IA process is on developing

relationships versus actions—an outcome in large measure resulting from an inability to maintain coherent organizations and ad hoc organizational relationships and procedures.⁹

Finally, continuing the status quo will perpetuate high costs and potential operational failings during critical time periods during transition between peace and conflict operations. It will also likely hinder most of the fruitful efforts to incorporate speed and agility witnessed in information based processes.¹⁰

Notes

¹ Nicholson, Sir Harold. *Diplomacy*, Oxford University Press, 1950. 15

² For a good overview of the problems with application of military power see McMaster, H.R. “Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.” Harper Collins, 1997.

³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) Book One Chapter One, 75

⁴ Zegart, Amy B. *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.229

⁵ *Ibid.*, 229

⁶ “Defense Science Board, Transition to and from Hostilities.” Department of Defense, December 2004.

⁷ Zegart, 229-231

⁸ Kelleher, P. N. (2002). "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military." *Joint Forces Quarterly* Autumn: 104-110., 108

⁹ *Ibid.*, 108

¹⁰ Tucker, D. "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters* Autumn, 2000., 2

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