U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Options
Abstract
Ample security at acceptable cost is the aim of U.S. strategic retaliatory forces, which are assigned primary responsibility for deterring atomic attacks against the United States. That aim stays constant, but essential force requirements do not. Nuclear systems needed in one context are surplus in others. Congress, in reviewing proposals, therefore needs some effective way to relate retaliatory force requirements with U.S. deterrent strategy before it can accurately assess the adequacy of present and projected postures. This brief, which provides no definitive "answers" and supports no special position, addresses three connected issues: How many U.S. weapon systems are compulsory? Which combination would be most suitable? What force level for each system would serve best? Assessments stress fundamental differences between functional classes. Bombers accomplish strategic nuclear missions in ways completely foreign to intercontinental ballistics missiles (ICBMs), which duplicate few strengths and weaknesses of submarine-launched counterparts (SLBMs), and so on. Improved products within each class perform missions better than predecessors, but in much the same way. Piston-powered aircraft and jets, for example, both fly from point A to point B. It is fruitless, therefore, to argue about relative merits of B-1 bombers and MX missiles before the need for any bomber or ICBM has been established. Particular makes and models are mentioned only for exemplary purposes.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 12, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADA477963
Entities
People
- Elizabeth A. Severns
- John M. Collins
Organizations
- Library of Congress